There is one more requirement. Write 10 key point after references, and write some word reflection each point. Can be one sentence

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Home >Business & Finance homework help >Management homework help >There is one more requirement. Write 10 key point after references, and write some word reflection each point. Can be one sentence

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Families and Aging

LE ARNING OBJEC TIVE S After studying this chapter, you will be able to…

12-1 Describe how families are similar and different in the United States and worldwide.

12-2 Describe how and explain why U.S. families are changing.

12-3 Describe, illustrate, and explain why intimate partner violence, child maltreatment, and elder abuse occur.

12-4 Describe, illustrate, and explain how the U.S. older population is changing, and its impact on our society.

12-5 Compare and evaluate the theoretical explanations of families and aging.

After finishing this chapter go to

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W H A T D O YOU T H I N K ?

I would undergo medical treatments to live to age 120 or longer.

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strongly agree strongly disagree

12-1 WHAT IS A FAMILY? Ask five of your friends to define family. Their defini- tions will probably differ not only from each other’s but also from yours. For our purposes, a family is an intimate group consisting of two or more people who (1) have a committed relationship, (2) care for one an- other and any children, and (3) share activities and close emotional ties. This definition includes households (e.g., foster families, same-sex couples) whose members aren’t related by birth, marriage, or adoption.

Contemporary households are complex; family structures vary across cultures and have changed over time. In some societies, a family includes uncles, aunts, and other relatives. In others, only parents and their chil- dren are viewed as a family.

12-1a How Families Are Similar Worldwide

The family, a social institution, exists in some form in all societies. Worldwide, families are similar in fulfilling some functions that have persisted over time.

FAMILY FUNCTIONS Families vary considerably in the United States and globally but fulfill five important functions that ensure a society’s survival (Parsons and Bales, 1955):

▸▸ Sexual activity. Every society has norms regarding who may engage in sexual relations, with whom, and under what circumstances. U.S. laws ban sexual

American families vary greatly in structure, dynamics, and racial-ethnic diversity.

This chapter examines the ways that families and aging are changing, both in the

United States and globally. Before reading further, take the True or False quiz to see

how much you already know about these topics.

intercourse with someone younger than 18 (or 16 in some states), but several states allow 12- and 13-year- old girls and 14-year-old boys to marry with parental permission, and some countries permit marriage with girls as young as 8 (McClendon and Sandstrom, 2016; Sandstrom and Theodorou, 2016; see also Chapter 9). One of the oldest rules that regulate sexual behavior is the incest taboo, cultural norms and laws that forbid sexual intercourse between close blood relatives (e.g., brother and sister, father and daughter, uncle and niece).

family an intimate group consisting of two or more people who (1) have a committed relationship, (2) care for one another and any children, and (3) share activities and close emotional ties.

incest taboo cultural norms and laws that forbid sexual intercourse between close blood relatives.

HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW ABOUT

CONTEMPORARY U.S. FAMILIES

AND AGING?

1. Nonmarital teenage births have increased over the past 20 years.

2. College-educated women are less likely than those with a high school diploma to live with a man outside of marriage.

3. Divorce rates have increased since the 1990s.

4. The most common type of family is married couples with children.

5. Baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) are the fastest growing segment of the population.

6. Asian Americans are more likely than Latinos to live in a home with three or more generations.

True or False?

The answers to #2 and #6 are true; the others are false. You’ll see why as you read this chapter.

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▸▸ Procreation and socialization. Procreation is an essential family function because it replenishes a country’s population. Through socialization, children acquire language; absorb the accumulated knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and values of their culture; and learn the social and interpersonal skills they need to function effectively in society (see Chapters 3 and 4).

▸▸ Economic security. Families provide food, shelter, clothing, and other material resources for their members.

▸▸ Emotional support. Families supply the nurturance, love, and emotional sustenance that people need to be happy, healthy, and secure. Our friends may come and go, but our family is usually our emotional anchor.

▸▸ Social class placement. Social class affects all aspects of family life. Initially, our social position is based on our parents’ social class, but we can move up or down the social hierarchy in adulthood (see Chapter 8).

Some sociologists include recreation as a basic U.S. family function. This function isn’t critical for survival, but since the 1950s many parents have spent much more time with their children on leisure activities (e.g., visiting amusements parks, playing video games together) that strengthen interpersonal bonds.

MARRIAGE Marriage, a socially approved mating relationship that people expect to be stable and enduring, is also universal. Countries vary in their specific norms and laws dictat- ing who can marry whom and at what age, but marriage everywhere is an important rite of passage that marks adulthood and its related responsibilities, especially pro- viding for a family.

ENDOGAMY AND EXOGAMY All societies have formal or informal rules about the “right” marriage partner. Endogamy (often used inter-

changeably with homog- amy) is a cultural practice of marrying within one’s group. The partners are similar in religion (e.g., Catholics marrying Catho- lics), race or ethnicity (e.g., blacks marrying blacks), social class (e.g., college- educated marrying col- lege-educated), and/or age (e.g., young people marry- ing young people). Across

the Middle East and Africa, marrying a first or second cousin is not only common but desirable. In Egypt, for example, 40 percent of the population marry a family member. The benefits include knowing a lot about one’s relatives and ensuring that property stays in the family, but the practice increases the chance of genetic diseases (such as cystic fibrosis and thalassemia, a blood disorder) in their children (“Consanguineous Marriage,” 2016).

Exogamy (often used interchangeably with het- erogamy) is a cultural practice of marrying outside one’s group, such as not marrying one’s relatives. In the United States, 25 states prohibit marriage between first cousins, but violations are rarely prosecuted (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). Even when there are no formal laws, cultural norms and values (as well as social pressure) usually limit our marital partner choices.

12-1b How Families Differ Worldwide Families also differ around the world. Some variations affect the family’s structure, whereas others regulate where people reside and who has the most household power and authority.

NUCLEAR AND EXTENDED FAMILIES In Western societies, the typical family form is the nuclear family composed of married parents and their biologi- cal or adopted children. In much of the world, however,

marriage a socially approved mating relationship.

endogamy (often used interchangeably with homogamy) cultural practice of marrying within one’s group.

exogamy (often used interchangeably with heterogamy) cultural practice of marrying outside one’s group.

nuclear family a family form composed of married parents and their biological or adopted children.

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the most common family form is the extended family, composed of parents, children, and other kin (e.g., uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, cousins, grandparents).

As the number of single-parent families increases in industrialized countries, extended families are more common. By helping out with household tasks and child care, other adult members make it easier for a single par- ent to work outside the home.

Many Americans assume that the nuclear family is the most common arrangement, but such families have declined in number. In 2014, just 14 percent of children lived with a stay-at-home mother and a working father— down from 50 percent in 1960 (Livingston, 2015).

RESIDENCE PATTERNS In a patrilocal residence pattern, newly married couples live with the husband’s family. In a matrilocal residence pattern, they live with the wife’s family. In a neolocal residence pattern, the couple sets up their own residence.

Around the world, the most common residence pattern is patrilocal. In industrialized societies, married couples are typically neolocal. Since the early 1990s, how- ever, the tendency for young married adults to live with the parents of either the wife or the husband—or some- times with the grandparents of one of the partners—has increased. Such “doubled-up” U.S. households have al- ways existed, but escalated during the 2007–2009 reces- sion for economic reasons (Parker, 2012).

One result is a boomerang generation, young adults who move back into their parents’ home after liv- ing independently for a while or never leave home in the first place. Seven years after the 2007–2009 recession, for example, 33 percent of 18- to 34-year-olds lived with their parents. Of those, one in four didn’t work or go to school (Vespa, 2017).

You saw in Chapter 4 that many young adults don’t feel a need to set up their own homes because, among

other reasons, the stigma of living with parents has faded. Some observers predict that boomerangers will become more numerous. Many “helicopter-parented, trophy- saturated, and self-centered” millennials, who were raised by coddling baby boomers, are catering to their own chil- dren even more. They want to be their kids’ friends rather than authority figures. Instead of helicopter parenting, millennials are “drone parenting”—they still hover, but are now “following and responding to their kids rather than directing and scheduling them” (Steinmetz, 2015: 38, 41). Parents try to launch their children into the adult world, but like boomerangs, some keep coming back.

AUTHORITY AND POWER Residence patterns often reflect who has authority and power in the family. In a matriarchal family system, the oldest females (usually grandmothers and mothers) control cultural, political, and economic re- sources and, consequently, have power over males. Some American Indian tribes were matriarchal, and in some African coun- tries, the oldest women have considerable author- ity and influence. For the most part, however, matri- archal societies are rare.

Worldwide, a more typical pattern is a patri- archal family system, in which the oldest males

In China’s Himalayas, the Mosuo are a matriarchal society. A family consists of a woman, her children, and the daughters’ offspring. An adult man will join a lover for the night and then return to his mother’s or grandmother’s house in the morning. Children resulting from these unions belong to the female and take her surname, she and her relatives raise them, and daughters are preferred to sons. The Mosuo population is decreasing, however, as more young people marry outside the group or move to cities for work (Qin, 2015).

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extended family a family form composed of parents, children, and other kin.

patrilocal residence pattern newly married couples live with the husband’s family.

matrilocal residence pattern newly married couples live with the wife’s family.

neolocal residence pattern a newly married couple sets up its own residence.

boomerang generation young adults who move back into their parents’ home or never leave it in the first place.

matriarchal family system the oldest females control cultural, political, and economic resources and, consequently, have power over males.

patriarchal family system the oldest males control cultural, political, and economic resources and, consequently, have power over females.

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(grandfathers, fathers, and uncles) control cultural, political, and economic resources and, consequently, have power over females. In some patriarchal societies, women have few rights within or outside the family; they may not be permitted to work outside the home or at- tend college. In other patriarchal societies, women may have considerable decision-making power in the home but few legal or political rights, such as getting a divorce or running for political office (see Chapter 9).

In an egalitarian family system, both partners share power and authority fairly equally. Many Americans think they have egalitarian families, but our families tend to be patriarchal. For example, employed women shoul- der almost twice as much housework and child care as men, and are more likely than men to provide caregiving to aging family members (see Chapter 9).

COURTSHIP AND MATE SELECTION Sociologists often describe U.S. dating as a marriage market, a courtship process in which prospective spouses compare the assets and liabilities of eligible partners, and choose the best available mate. Marriage markets don’t sound very romantic, but open dating fulfills sev- eral important functions: recreation and companionship; a socially acceptable way of pursuing love; opportunities for sexual intimacy and experimentation; and finding a spouse (Benokraitis, 2015).

Many societies, in contrast, discourage open dating and have arranged marriages in which parents or rela- tives choose the children’s spouses. An arranged marriage is a family rather than an individual decision that increases solidarity between families and preserves endogamy. Chil- dren may have veto power, but they believe that if partners

are compatible, love will result. In some of India’s urban areas, arranged marriages also rely on non- traditional methods (e.g., online dating services) to find prospective spouses (Cullen and Masters, 2008; see also Chapter 9).

MONOGAMY AND POLYGAMY In monogamy, one per- son is married exclusively to another person. Where di- vorce and remarriage rates are high, as in the United States, people engage in

serial monogamy. That is, they marry several people but one at a time—they marry, divorce, remarry, divorce, and so on.

Polygamy, in which a man or woman has two or more spouses, is subdivided into polygyny—one man married to two or more women—and polyandry—one woman is married to two or more men. Nearly 1,000 cul- tures around the world allow some form of polygamy, either officially or unofficially (Epstein, 2008).

Although rare, there are pockets of polyandry in some remote and isolated parts of India, and among the Pimbwe in western Tanzania, Africa. Polyandry serves several functions: The family is more likely to survive in harsh environments if there’s more than one husband to provide food, and if one husband dies, the others care for the widow (Borgerhoff Mulder, 2009; Polgreen, 2010).

In contrast to polyandry, polygyny is common in many societies, especially in some regions of Africa, South America, and the Middle East. Men benefit from polygyny in several ways: They can have many legal sexual partners, more chances to have male heirs, more income if some of the wives are employed, and high so- cial status because they can support multiple wives and children (Al-Jassem, 2011; Nossiter, 2011).

Western and industrialized societies forbid polyg- amy, but there are pockets of isolated polygynous groups in the United States, Europe, and Canada. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) banned polygamy in 1890 and excommunicates members who follow such beliefs. Still, males of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), a polygynous sect that broke away off from the main- stream Mormon Church more than a century ago, head

India’s Ziona Chana has the world’s largest polygynous family—39 wives, 94 children, and 33 grandchildren (so far). They all live together in a 100-room mansion (Sykes, 2015).

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egalitarian family both partners share power and authority fairly equally.

marriage market prospective spouses compare the assets and liabilities of eligible partners and choose the best available mate.

arranged marriage parents or relatives choose the children’s spouses.

monogamy one person is married exclusively to another person.

serial monogamy individuals marry several people, but one at a time.

polygamy a man or woman has two or more spouses.

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an estimated 300,000 families in Texas, Arizona, Utah, and Canada. Wives who have escaped from these groups have reported forced marriage between men in their 60s and girls as young as 10 years old, sexual abuse, and in- cest (Janofsky, 2003).

12-2 HOW U.S. FAMILIES ARE CHANGING

American families have changed considerably since the 1950s. Some of the most important changes are related to marriage, divorce, cohabitation, nonmarital childbear- ing, and single-parent families.

12-2a Marriage and Divorce The United States has one of the highest marriage and di- vorce rates in the world. By age 65, 95 percent of Americans have been married at least once; over a lifetime, about half of first marriages end in divorce (Vespa et al., 2013). Despite the high divorce rate, most people aren’t disil- lusioned about marriage. Indeed, nearly 85 percent who divorce remarry, half of them within 4 years, and 8 percent have been married three times or more (Kreider and Ellis, 2011; Livingston, 2014).

TRENDS U.S. marriage and divorce rates rose steadily during the twentieth century, but have declined since 1990 (Figure 12.1). In 1960, only 9 percent of U.S. adults age 25 and older had never been married. By 2016, 52 percent had never been married—an historic high.

Marriage rates are expected to decrease further because the number of newlyweds has been falling since 2012 (Wang and Parker, 2014).

In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to le- galize same-sex marriage. In 2017, 10 percent of LGBT adults were married to a same-sex spouse, and 13 per- cent were married to an opposite-sex partner. About half of people who self-identify as LGBT are bisexual, helping to explain the high proportion who are married to opposite-sex partners. Men (11 percent) are more likely than women (9 percent) to be married to a same- sex partner. The marriage rates are highest among males age 50 and older, but 32 percent of this age group have never married, compared with 11 percent of their non- LGBT counterparts (Jones, 2017; see also Chapter 9). Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s legalization of same- sex marriage in 2015, LGBT marriages haven’t surged. Like heterosexuals, LGBTs may be postponing marriage or decide to not marry.

In 1970, California was the first state to pass a no- fault divorce law; neither partner needs to prove guilt or wrongdoing (e.g., adultery, desertion). Today, in all states, couples can simply give “irreconcilable differ- ences” or “incompatibility” as a valid reason for divorce. As these laws changed, marital dissolutions became quick and cheap, and divorce rates rose to historically high lev- els, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. Divorce rates are high, but lower today than they were between 1980 and 2009 (Figure 12.1). In 2017, 73 percent of Ameri- cans said that divorce was morally acceptable, compared with only 53 percent in 1954 (Dugan, 2017). Thus, and despite greater public acceptance, the divorce rate has fallen to its lowest point in decades.

WHY ARE MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES FALLING? There are several macro-level reasons for declining marriage and divorce rates. First, U.S. values have been changing. In 2010, 39 percent of Americans said that marriage is becoming obsolete, up from 28 percent in 1978 (Cohn et al., 2011; Fry, 2012). Just 45 percent of millennials say that marriage is an important step in becoming an adult, and only 44 percent of Americans believe that having chil- dren is a “very important” reason to marry. Only 31 percent think that premarital sex is immoral, open marriage markets provide many opportuni- ties for nonmarital sex, and nonmarital births are now socially acceptable (Cohn, 2013; Jones, 2017; Vespa, 2017). Thus, the traditional reasons for marriage have waned.

Figure 12.1 U.S. Marriage and Divorce Rates, 1870–2014

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Year

Marriage

Divorce

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Sources: Based on Plateris 1973, Table 1; and CDC/NCHS National Vital Statistics System, 2017.

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Second, the economy affects marriage and divorce rates. Economic depressions, recessions, and unem- ployment tend to delay marriage, especially for men. Because of the recent recession, 20 percent of 18- to 34-year-olds have postponed marriage. Moreover, when incomes plummet and people are insecure about their jobs, unhappy married couples tend to stay together: They can’t afford to divorce and risk the possibility of not being able to maintain separate households (Cohn, 2012; Martin et al., 2014).

Demographic variables also affect marriage and di- vorce rates. The median age at first marriage is 30 for men and almost 28 for women, compared with 23 for men and 21 for women in 1970 (“Marital Status,” 2017).

There are now almost as many single as married Americans (128 million and 129 million, respectively) and, for the first time, single women outnumber married women. Marriage has become an option, rather than a goal, primarily because women are free to pursue a higher education, to have a career, and to cohabit. Thus, many women have become choosier about whether and when to marry (Traister, 2016; “Unmarried and Single . . .,” 2017).

About 64 percent of Americans with college degrees are married, compared with 47 percent of those with a high school diploma or less, who are more likely to co- habit than marry. The education-marriage relationship holds even at higher levels. Among women in their early 40s, for example, 80 percent with a Ph.D. or professional degree are married, compared to 63 percent with a bach- elor’s degree. The highly educated tend to marry other highly educated people, and are almost twice as likely as people with less education to have marriages that last at least 20 years. In effect, then, there’s a growing “marriage gap” between the most and least educated (Wang, 2015; Reeves et al., 2016). Such data also challenge stereotypes of highly educated women as sad and lonely “old maids” who lavish attention on a brood of cats.

Americans with a bachelor’s or graduate degree also have lower divorce rates than those without col- lege degrees. By age 46, 30 percent of people with a college degree or higher are divorced compared with 59 percent with less than a high school diploma (Augh- inbaugh et al., 2013). College graduates have lower divorce rates not because they’re smarter but because going to college postpones marriage. As a result, better- educated couples are often more mature and capable of dealing with personal crises. They also have higher

incomes and health care benefits, both of which lessen marital stress over financial problems.

There are also micro-level (individual) reasons for falling marriage and divorce rates. About 84 percent of unmarried Americans say that love is a “very impor- tant” reason to marry. As a result, a third are still wait- ing for their “ideal mate” or “one true love” (Wang and Parker, 2014).

The most common micro-level reasons for divorce include infidelity, communication and financial prob- lems, substance and spousal abuse, premarital doubts, continuous disagreements about how to raise and dis- cipline children, and expecting to change a partner af- ter marriage (see Benokraitis, 2015, for a discussion of these studies). Because many people are delaying mar- riage, they’re usually more mature in handling the chal- lenges of married life, which decreases the likelihood of divorce.

12-2b Cohabitation Cohabitation is an arrangement in which two unrelated and unmarried people live together and are in a sexual relationship (shacking up, in plain English). Because it’s based on emotional rather than legal ties, “cohabitation is a distinct family form, neither singlehood nor marriage” (Brown, 2005: 33).

TRENDS Married couples comprise 49 percent of all households, a sharp decline from 78 percent in 1950. The decline is due to falling marriage rates and rising cohabitation. The number of adults in heterosexual cohabiting relationships surged from 430,000 in 1960 to almost 18 million in 2016. This number climbs by another 860,000 if we include same-sex cohabiters. Despite the high numbers, only 7 to 9 percent of the population is cohabiting in any given year (“Characteristics of Same-Sex Households,” 2017; Stepler, 2017).

cohabitation two unrelated and unmarried people live together and are in a sexual relationship.

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About half of cohabiters are younger than 35. Since 2007, however, the number of cohabiters aged 50 and older has increased faster than other groups (Figure 12.2). Because of high divorce rates and a grow- ing share of people who have never been married in this age group, more people are available for cohabitation (Stepler, 2017).

By age 44, 65 percent of women—compared with 33 percent in 1987—have cohabited. Cohabitation is a common experience at all education levels, but the like- lihood of cohabiting decreases as women’s educational levels increase (e.g., 76 percent of women with less than high school vs. 58 percent of women with a bachelor’s or advanced degree). On average, college-educated women cohabit for the shortest period (17 months) and are more likely than those without college degrees to transition to marriage (Copen, 2013; Vanorman and Scommegna, 2016).

Black women are less likely to have ever cohabited (59 percent) than white women (67 percent) or Latinas (64 percent). Among all cohabiting adults, significantly more Asians (46 percent) live with a partner of a differ- ent race or ethnicity than Latinos (24 percent), blacks (20 percent), or whites (12 percent) (Vanorman and Scommegna, 2016; Livingston, 2017). The high rate of Asian interracial cohabitation, like intermarriage, may be due to this group’s small population size and short- age of available partners within their own group (see Chapter 10).

WHY HAS COHABITATION INCREASED? On a micro level, some people drift gradually into dating cohabitation, when a couple that spends a great deal of time together decides to move in together. Dating cohab- itation is essentially an alternative to singlehood because the decision may be based on a combination of reasons (e.g., convenience, finances, companionship, and sexual accessibility), but there’s no long-term commitment. In this type of cohabitation, and especially among young adults, there’s considerable serial cohabitation, living with different sexual partners over time. Even if there’s an unplanned pregnancy, the man, especially, may decide to move on to another cohabiting arrangement (Manning and Smock, 2005; Wartik, 2005).

For many people, premarital cohabitation is a step between dating and marriage. In premarital cohabita- tion, the couple lives together before getting married. They may or may not be engaged but plan to marry. Such “almost-married” cohabitation may be especially attractive to partners who wonder if they can deal successfully with problems that arise from differences in personalities, in- terests, finances, ethnicity, religion, or other issues.

On a macro level, and across all ethnic groups, 3 out of 4 people who cohabit say that they’re delaying mar- riage because “Everything’s there except money.” Many low-income women don’t want to marry because they believe that their live-in partners will be poor providers, unemployed, unfaithful, irresponsible fathers, or imma- ture even though “he’s the love of my life” (Xie et al., 2003; Lichter et al., 2006).

Those with high income and education levels have little to gain from cohabitation. Unlike people in lower socioeconomic groups, they’re more likely to have jobs, to afford their own housing, and, consequently, to have

Figure 12.2 Cohabitation, by Age Groups, 2007 and 2016

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+20% +75%

3.9 4.7

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Number of cohabiters in each age group, in millions

2007 2016 2007 2016

18–34 35–49 50+

Source: Stepler, 2017.

Do you think that women or men benefit more from cohabitation? Why?

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more options in living independently even though they’re involved romantically (Fry and Cohn, 2011; Sassler and Miller, 2011).

Does cohabitation lead to better marriages? Recent studies show that women who cohabit are no more likely to divorce than those who didn’t cohabit if there’s a com- mitment (definite plans to marry) and the cohabitation is short. However, marital success also depends on the cohabitors’ age, socioeconomic status, commitment, and attitudes toward marriage (Reinhold, 2010; Manning and Cohen, 2012). Cohabitation, like any other relation- ship, has benefits and costs (Table 12.1).

12-2c Nonmarital Childbearing More than 9 in 10 Americans aged 45 or older either have children (86 percent) or wish they had (7 percent). Such positive attitudes toward child- bearing are about the same as in 1990, but since then U.S. birth rates have dropped by 11 percent (Martin et al., 2013; Newport and Wilke, 2013).

A notable exception is nonmarital childbear- ing, which has increased significantly since 1970. Nearly half of American men ages 15 to 44 re- port that at least one of their children was born outside of marriage, and 31 percent say that all of their children were born outside of marriage (Livingston and Parker, 2011).

TRENDS In 1950, only 3 percent of all U.S. births were to unmarried women. In 2016, there were more

than 1.6 million, accounting for 40 percent of all births. Thus, 4 in 10 American babies are now born outside of marriage, a new record (Hamilton et al., 2017).

Births to unmarried women vary widely across racial-ethnic groups. White women have more nonmarital babies than do other groups. Proportionately, however, nonmarital birth rates are highest for black women and lowest for Asian American women (Figure 12.3).

As in marriage and cohabitation, nonmarital births vary by social class. Among college graduates, only 13 per- cent of recent births were outside of marriage compared with 57 percent for high school dropouts (Table 12.2A).

Table 12.1 Some Benefits and Costs of Cohabitation

Benefits Costs

●● Couples can pool their resources instead of paying for separate housing, utilities, and so on. They can also have the emotional security of an intimate relationship but maintain their independence by spending time with their friends and family members separately (McRae, 1999; Fry and Cohn, 2011).

●● U.S. laws don’t specify a cohabitant’s rights and responsibilities. For example, there’s no automatic inheritance if a partner dies without a will, and it’s more difficult to collect child support from a cohabiting partner than an ex-spouse (Silverman, 2003; Grall, 2013).

●● Couples who postpone marriage have a lower likelihood of divorce because being older is one of the best predictors of a stable marriage (Copen et al., 2012).

●● Compared with married couples, cohabitants have a poorer quality of relationship and lower levels of happiness and satisfaction (Sassler et al., 2012; Wiik et al., 2012).

●● Couples find out how much they really care about each other when they have to cope with unpleasant realities (e.g., a partner who doesn’t pay bills or rarely showers).

●● Cohabitation dilutes intergenerational ties. Compared with their married peers, the longer people live together, the less likely they are to give or receive help from their parents, and to be involved in extended family activities (Eggebeen, 2005).

●● Children in cohabiting households reap economic advantages by living with two adult earners instead of a single mother (Lundberg et al., 2016).

●● Because cohabiting parents are more than twice as likely as married parents to break up, children’s academic, emotional, behavioral, and financial problems often increase (Fomby and Estacion, 2011; Rackin and Gibson-Davis, 2012).

Figure 12.3 Births to Unmarried Mothers, by Race and Ethnicity, 2016

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Latinas

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Asian/Pacific Islander

70% 68%

53%

28%

12%

Source: Based on Hamilton et al., 2017, Table 3.

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The percentage of nonmarital births decreases as house- hold income increases (Table 12.2B). Consequently, the poorest and least-educated women are the most likely to have babies outside of marriage, decreasing the children’s chances of moving up the social class ladder (Sawhill and Venator, 2014).

Unmarried teenage births peaked in the early 1990s, have declined steadily since then, and are now at their lowest level since 1968. Teenagers account for 13 per- cent of all nonmarital births compared with 78 percent for women ages 20 to 34. Thus, the number of births to unmarried women ages 20 to 34 is six times greater than for teenagers. Still, 89 percent of teenage births are non- marital, compared with 52 percent for women in their 20s, and 22 percent for women in their 30s. Moreover, 20 percent of unmarried teenagers have a repeat birth: 86 percent have a second child, and 15 percent have 3 to 6 children (Gavin et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2017).

WHY HAS NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING INCREASED? On a micro (individual) level, many teens and young adults use contraception inconsistently or incorrectly be- cause they think they or their partners are sterile, they believe that not taking the pill a few times “doesn’t really

matter,” or the males don’t want to use condoms. Oth- ers think that unplanned pregnancies are predetermined or controlled by outside forces like God or fate (“It was meant to happen” or “It’s God’s plan”) (Frohwirth et al., 2013; Lindberg et al., 2016).

Unintended pregnancies have decreased by 18 per- cent since 2008. Nonetheless, 81 percent of pregnancies among never married non-cohabiters, 75 percent of teen pregnancies, and 56 percent of pregnancies among co- habiting women are unintended. Even if the pregnancies are unwanted, women may not get abortions because of personal or religious beliefs (Curtin et al., 2014; Finer and Zolna, 2016).

Demographic variables also affect nonmarital child- bearing. Social class is a key factor in nonmarital births (Table 12.2). Educated women are more likely than less- educated women to postpone parenthood until marriage, to be more aware of family planning, and to have more decision-making power in their relationships, such as in- sisting that men use condoms (Livingston and Cohn, 2013).

Among college-educated women, 41 percent of black women, compared with 22 percent of Latinas and only 9 percent of white women, choose single motherhood. Nonmarital childbearing is a “rational choice” for black women who don’t want to marry less educated black men or across racial lines, believe that they may never marry, or that marriage will come too late for them to bear chil- dren (Keels, 2014).

Macro-level variables increase nonmarital birth rates in several ways. Until the early 1970s, nonmarital births were rare and kept secret, young people were forced into “shotgun” marriages if the girl was pregnant, and young women—especially white women—were pressured to give their babies up for adoption. Now, almost 75 percent of Americans aged 15 to 44 believe that “it’s okay for an unmarried female to have and raise a child.” Because atti- tudes have changed, nonmarital childbearing has become normal. In contrast, only 2 percent of children in Japan and South Korea are born outside of marriage because unmarried mothers are stigmatized (Daugherty and Copen, 2016; “Marriage in Japan,” 2016; Chamie, 2017).

Table 12.2 Births to Unmarried Mothers, by Education and Household Income

A. Educational Attainment

Less than high school 57%

High school graduate 52%

Some college 40%

Bachelor’s degree 13%

Graduate or professional degree 7%

B. Annual Household Income

Under $10,000 77%

$10,000 to $24,999 62%

$25,000 to $49,999 45%

$50,000 to $99,999 30%

$100,000 to $199,999 20%

$200,000 and above 13%

Source: Based on U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 American Community Sur- vey 1-Year Estimates, Table S1301, and “Fertility of Women in the United States: 2016,” Current Population Survey, Table 7. Accessed July 10, 2017 (factfinder.census.gov and census.gov/hhes/fertility/data).

The number of births to unmarried women ages 20 to 34 is SIX times greater than for teenagers.

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Fewer teens, particularly in nonmetropolitan areas, are receiving formal sex education in school than they did a decade ago. Among all 15- to 17-year-olds, 58 percent didn’t get information about birth control and 88 percent weren’t taught about STDs and HIV/AIDS before they had sex for the first time (Lindberg et al., 2016).

Government policies also affect nonmarital birth rates. Publicly funded family planning services that offer counseling and contraceptives, particularly for teenagers and young adults, reduce unintended nonmarital preg- nancies and births. Many states, however, fund only sex- abstinence education, and can now deny federal money to organizations that include contraception services. In 2013, Texas closed nearly half of the state’s abortion clinics. Hav- ing to travel 200 or more miles for medical services re- duced abortion rates by 47 percent. Reducing access to family planning clinics and abortion services can increase nonmarital births, especially among teens (Cunningham et al., 2017; Superville, 2017; see also Chapter 9).

In what some researchers describe as a pattern of “negative assimilation,” 41 percent of second-generation Latinas and Asian mothers are unmarried, compared with 23 percent of recent immigrant women (“Second- Generation Americans,” 2013). Thus, many second- generation women are espousing U.S. values that births outside of marriage are acceptable.

12-2d Single-Parent Households Most children spend the majority of their childhood living with two parents, but single-parent families are increas- ingly common. Women head most one-parent families.

TRENDS In 2016, 69 percent of children under age 18 lived with married parents, down from 77 percent in 1980. The number of one-parent families, on the other hand, has nearly doubled—from 16 percent in 1975 to 31 percent in 2015. Compared with other families with children un- der 18, mother-only families

▸▸ make up nearly 25 percent of all families and 78 percent of one-parent families;

▸▸ comprise 54 percent of black, 29 percent of Latino, 19 percent of white, and 12 percent of Asian families;

▸▸ make up 28 percent of poor families; and

▸▸ are nearly twice as likely as father-only families to be living in poverty, even when the mother works full- time and year-round (Women’s Bureau, 2016).

Asian American children are the most likely to grow up in two-parent homes (Figure 12.4). Until 1980, mar- ried couple families were the norm in African American families. Since then, black children have been more likely than children in other racial-ethnic groups to grow up

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A recent study found that the reality TV show 16 and Pregnant reduced U.S. teen births by almost 6 percent in the 18 months following its release (Kearney and Levine, 2014). Should middle schools require adolescents to watch such programs?

Figure 12.4 Where U.S. Children Live, by Race and Ethnicity, 2016

39%

89%

25%

67%

52%

76%

16%

4% 4% 5% 4%

Both parents

Mother only

W hi

Bl ac

As ia

La tin

Father only

Neither parent

2% 2%

Note: “Both parents” includes married and cohabiting couples.

Source: Based on U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2016 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table C3, April 6, 2017. Accessed July 11, 2017 (census.gov).

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with only one parent, usually the mother. Among Latinos, 67 percent of children live in two-parent families, down from 78 percent in 1970 (Lugaila, 1998; Figure 12.4).

Nationally, of the 690,000 same-sex households, 18 percent are raising children under age 18. About 200,000 of these children have married or cohabiting same-sex parents; more than a million LGBT adults who aren’t in a couple are raising approximately 2 million children. Even though same-sex individuals and couples are less likely than different-sex couples to be raising children, they’re three times more likely to adopt or fos- ter a child (Gates, 2014, 2015). Thus, large numbers of lesbians and gay men—single, partnered, or married— are parents.

WHY HAVE FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS INCREASED? On a micro level, having sex at an early age, and not using contraception at all, incorrectly, or sporadically increases the likelihood of unintended or unwanted pregnancies and mother-only families, especially among teenagers. Among unmarried parents, 63 percent have multiple part- ners. In these relationships, most of the fathers invest little time and money in their children because the fathers are young, have low education levels, or are incarcerated. The fathers don’t live with their children, know little about them, and move from one sexual relationship to another (Scommegna, 2011; Dodson and Luttrell, 2011).

Mass media routinely feature the “single mother by choice” (SMC). Whether in movies, in newspapers, or on TV shows, SMCs are typically white, well-educated, and successful women in their 30s and 40s who decide to have and raise a baby without a partner. According to some sociologists, however, SMCs are “a relatively rare phenomenon,” more common in the media than in real- ity, because they make up less than 5 percent of women, most of whom are older and well-educated (Hayford and Guzzo, 2015; Braff, 2016).

Demographic variables, especially social class, also affect the rise of female-headed households. College- educated people, as you’ve seen, tend to postpone mar- riage, marry rather than cohabit, and delay parenthood— factors that decrease the likelihood of divorce, one-parent households, and, consequently, children’s experiencing poverty (Redd et al., 2011).

Not all female-headed households are poor, of course. Among mother-only families, 17 percent of the women have at least a college degree, and 38 percent own their own homes (Vespa et al., 2013). Instead of waiting for “Mr. Right,” some women with economic re- sources are deciding to raise children on their own.

In many African American and Latino families, adult males (e.g., sons, brothers, uncles, grandfathers) often provide emotional and financial support to female kin who head households (Sudarkasa, 2007). Many black families also welcome fictive kin, nonrelatives who they accept as part of the family. Fictive kin have strong bonds with biological family members and provide important services (e.g., caring for children when young mothers are employed or negligent) (Billingsley, 1992; Dilworth- Anderson et al., 1993). A variation of fictive kin involves single mothers—many of whom are white, unmarried, and college educated—who turn to one another for com- panionship and child care help (Bazelon, 2009).

At the macro level, values and views about single parenthood have shifted. The share of Americans who view the growing trend of single mothers as a “big prob- lem” decreased from 71 percent in 2007 to 64 percent in 2013 (Wang et al., 2013).

The economy also affects the number of female- headed households. As in the case of cohabitation and non- marital childbearing, low-income women often drift into parenthood with low-income or unemployed men. Men may embrace parenthood and resolve to be good fathers, but already weak bonds with the child’s mother can deterio- rate further. Seeking financial security and stability, women gain little or nothing by mar- rying the babies’ fathers or other low-income men (Edin and Nelson, 2013).

Is the absent black father a stereotype? A recent national study of white, black, and Latino men found that, among fathers who don’t live with their children, black fathers were the most likely to parent their children from birth to age 18. The parenting included, and on a daily basis, feeding, bathing, dressing, playing with and reading to children, taking them to and from activities, and helping them with or checking homework (Jones and Mosher, 2013).

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fictive kin nonrelatives who are accepted as part of a family.

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12-3 FAMILY CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE Conflict is a normal part of family life, but violence is not normal. Over a lifetime, we’re much more likely to be assaulted or killed by a family member or current/ former spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend than by a stranger (Truman and Langton, 2014).

12-3a Intimate Partner Violence Intimate partner violence (IPV) is abuse that oc- curs between people in a close relationship. The term intimate partner refers to current and former spouses, couples who live together, and current and former boy- friends or girlfriends. IPV, which ranges from a single episode to ongoing abuse, includes three prevalent types of behavior:

▸▸ Physical abuse is threatening, trying to hurt, or hurting someone using physical force (e.g., throwing objects, pushing, grabbing, slapping, biting, choking, beating).

▸▸ Sexual abuse is threatening or forcing a partner to take part in a sex act without her or his consent (e.g., unwanted anal, oral, or vaginal sex).

▸▸ Psychological abuse (also called emotional abuse) is aggressive behavior that threatens, humiliates, ma- nipulates, or controls another person (e.g., criticism, rejection, isolation, name-calling, bullying, stalking).

IPV, which is pervasive in U.S. society (Figure 12.5), begins early in life. Among 12- to 18-year-olds in a recent or current dating relationship, 69 percent have been victims of IPV and 63 percent have perpetrated abuse. Among adults, 36 percent of females and 29 percent of males have been IPV victims at some time in their lives, and nearly half have experienced psychological abuse (Black et al., 2011; Copen et al., 2013; Taylor and Mumford, 2016).

Of the nearly 13,500 homicides in 2015, 30 percent involved IPV; 80 percent of the victims were females. When victims survive assaults, 40 percent of females compared with 5 percent of males suffer a serious physi- cal injury (e.g., gunshot or knife wounds, internal inju- ries, broken bones) (Catalano, 2013; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Women are also much more likely than men to experience IPV over a lifetime regardless of age, race or ethnicity, or social class (Black et al., 2011; Truman and Morgan, 2014).

There are nearly 1.3 mil- lion intimate partner vic- timizations every year, but this number is conservative.

Figure 12.5 Intimate Partner Violence, Sexual Violence, and Stalking in Lifetime

<$25,000

$75,000 +2.8%

9.7%

5.9%

Women with a household income less than $50,000 have a signif icantly higher prevalence of IPV.

have been raped in their lifetime.

1 in 2 bisexual women

lesbian women

1 in 8

2 in 5 gay men

have experienced sexual violence other than rape in their lifetime.

1 in 2 bisexual

men

1 in 6 heterosexual

women

1 in 5 heterosexual

men

By Sexual Orientation

4 in 10

3.5 in 10

4 in 10

3.5 in 10

2.5 in 10

3 in 10

5 in 10

2 in 10

Women Men

American Indian or Alaska Native

Non- Hispanic Black

Multiracial

White Non-Hispanic

Hispanic

Asian or Pacific Islander

4 in 10

By Income

By Race/Ethnicity

$50,000

000

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$55555555555555550000000000000000000,,,0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000$25,000–

$ 0

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$22222222222222555555555555555555,,,,,,00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000–––

Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infographic, 2014. Accessed October 8, 2015 (cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs /infographic.html).

intimate partner violence (IPV) abuse that occurs between people in a close relationship.

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An estimated 44 percent of victims don’t report IPV to the police because they’re ashamed, believe that no one can help, or fear reprisal (Reaves, 2017).

WHY DOES INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE OCCUR? The reasons for IPV are due to interrelated individual, demographic, and societal factors. On a micro level, violence escalates if one or both partners use alcohol or other drugs, if they have more children than they can afford (which intensifies financial problems), or if either partner has been raised in a violent household, has low self-esteem, and a controlling personality. The most common disagreements that can escalate into abuse and violence have four sources: gender role ex- pectations (who does what housework); money (saving and spending); children (especially discipline); and in- fidelity, both personally and online (Spivak et al., 2014; Benokraitis, 2015).

Regarding demographic variables, IPV often be- gins at a young age: 22 percent of females and 15 per- cent of males are between 11 and 17 years old, and 47 percent of females and 39 percent of males are be- tween 18 and 24 years old (Black et al., 2011). IPV cuts across all social classes, but women living in households with an annual income of less than $7,500 are nearly four times more likely to be abused than those living in households with an annual income of $75,000 or more (Figure 12.5).

Macro-level variables, particularly unemployment and poverty, increase the likelihood of financial stress and violence. The absence of legal or social sanctions against IPV and a scarcity of shelters discourage victims from trying to escape abuse (Matjasko et al., 2013). A study of girls aged 11 to 16 who had experienced sex- ual assault concluded that girls (and later women) often didn’t report the incidents because such violence had been “normalized in their communities.” The girls were ashamed and feared retribution, but also believed that men “can’t help it,” perceived everyday harassment and abuse as “normal male behavior,” and assumed that male authority figures (e.g., police officers, judges) would ac- cuse the girls of overreacting (Hlavka, 2014).

12-3b Child Maltreatment Child maltreatment (also called child abuse) includes a broad range of behaviors that can result in serious harm, including physical and sexual abuse, neglect, and emotional mistreatment. The victims often experience several types of maltreatment.

TRENDS U.S. child maltreatment rates fluctuate, but have de- creased since 2011. In 2015, nearly 684,000 children (9.2 per 1,000 children) experienced child maltreatment, and 1,670 died of abuse and neglect (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2017). Because only a frac- tion of the cases are reported, however, federal agencies assume that millions of children experience abuse and neglect every day.

Neglect is the most common type of abuse (Figure 12.6). The most vulnerable children, those younger than 3 years old, account for 28 percent of all child victims; another 19 percent are ages 3 to 5. Victimiza- tion rates per 1,000 children vary by race and ethnicity: 15 for African Americans, 14 for American Indian/Alaska Natives, 10 for multiracial, 9 for Pacific Islanders, 8 (each) for whites and Latinos, and under 2 for Asians (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2017).

Almost 81 percent of the perpetrators are one or both parents; in 37 percent of the cases, the abusers are mothers alone. An additional 7 percent of assailants are relatives, and 4 percent are the parents’ intimate part- ners, usually boyfriends (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013).

WHY DOES CHILD MALTREATMENT OCCUR? On a micro level, child mistreatment is most com- mon in households where there is parental substance abuse or mental illness,

Figure 12.6 Types of Child Maltreatment, 2015

Neglect 74%

Physical Abuse 12%

Sexual Abuse 8%

Other 3%

Emotional/ Psychological

Abuse 3%

Note: “Neglect” includes medical neglect (almost 2 percent of these cases). “Other” includes categories that some states report, such as a parent’s drug/alcohol abuse.

Source: Based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2017, Table 3-11.

child maltreatment (also called child abuse) a broad range of behaviors that can result in serious emotional or physical harm.

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adult or sibling violence, and one or more children have emotional, developmental, or physical disabilities (Finkelhor et al., 2011). Demographic variables that increase the likelihood of child abuse include living with a young parent, living in one-parent or stepparent households—particularly those with low socioeconomic status—and experiencing parental conflict before, dur- ing, and after a hostile divorce (Truman and Smith, 2012; White and Lauritsen, 2012). On a macro level, economic hardship, unemployment, and poverty in- crease the likelihood of stress that leads to child abuse, including infant deaths due to severe head traumas (Eckenrode et al., 2014).

Almost 26 percent of all children live in homes where parents or other adults are violent (Hamby et al., 2011). Whether children are targets of abuse or see it, violent childhood experiences are associated with lifelong devel- opmental problems, including depression, delinquency, suicide, alcoholism, low academic achievement, unem- ployment, and medical problems in adulthood (Hibbard et al., 2012; Sacks et al., 2014).

12-3c Elder Abuse and Neglect Elder abuse (also called elder mistreatment) is any knowing, intentional, or negligent act by a caregiver or other person that causes harm to people age 65 or older. This term includes physical, psychological, and sexual abuse; neglect; isolation from family and friends; depri- vation of basic necessities such as food and heat; not pro- viding needed medications; and financial exploitation.

TRENDS A national study of people ages 60 and older found that almost 12 percent had experienced at least one of

the following types of mistreatment: emotional (4.6 per- cent), physical (1.6 percent), sexual (0.6 percent), financial (5.2 percent), and neglect (6 percent) (Acierno et al., 2010). The actual rates are probably much higher be- cause only an estimated 20 percent of all elder abuse and neglect is reported (Administration on Aging, 2013).

Who are the victims? About 83 percent are white; the average age is 76; 76 percent are women; 84 percent live in their own homes; 86 percent have a chronic dis- ease or other health condition; 57 percent are married or cohabiting; 53 percent haven’t graduated from high school; 50 percent suffer from dementia, Alzheimer’s, or other mental illness; 46 percent feel socially isolated; and the average combined household income is less than $35,000 a year (Acierno et al., 2010; Jackson and Hafe- meister, 2011). These data suggest that the most likely victims of elder abuse are those who are the most vulner- able physically, mentally, socially, and financially.

Who are the perpetrators? Most are adult children, spouses or cohabiting partners, or other family members. Less than a third are acquaintances, neighbors, or nonfa- mily service providers. The average age of the abuser is 45; 77 percent are white; 61 percent are males; 82 per- cent have a high school diploma or less; 50 percent abuse alcohol and/or other drugs; 46 percent have a criminal record; 42 percent are financially dependent on the el- der; 37 percent live with the older person; 29 percent are chronically unemployed; and 25 percent have mental health problems (Jackson and Hafemeister, 2011).

WHY DO ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT OCCUR? On a micro level, abuse of alcohol and other drugs is more than twice as likely among family caregivers who abuse elders as among those who don’t. Both victims and offenders often report a childhood history of witnessing or experiencing family violence, poor family relationships in the past and currently, and communication problems. In addition, older people with cognitive impairment— due to dementia (deteriorated mental condition) after a stroke, or the onset of Alzheimer’s disease—are abused at higher rates than those without such disabilities (Heisler, 2012; National Center on Elder Abuse, 2012).

The movie Precious (2009) received many awards, but some critics contended that the film stereotyped black female teenagers—especially those in low-income households—as obese, illiterate, and living with abusive mothers (Amusa, 2010). If you’ve seen the movie, do you agree with such criticism or not? Why?

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elder abuse (sometimes called elder mistreatment) any knowing, intentional, or negligent act by a caregiver or other person that causes harm to people age 65 or older.

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On a macro level, a shared residence is a major risk factor for elder mistreatment because the caregiver(s) may depend on the older person for housing, whereas the elder is dependent on the caregiver(s) for physical help. These situations compound the likelihood of everyday tensions and conflict. Financial stress may also increase the risk of abuse. Unlike low-income families, those in the middle class aren’t eligible for admission to public facilities, yet few can pay for the in-home nursing care, high-quality nursing homes, and other services that upper-class families can af- ford (Acierno et al., 2010; Jackson and Hafemeister, 2011).

12-4 OUR AGING SOCIETY One of our friends, 55, was shocked and insulted when he ordered a meal at a fast-food restaurant, and the young worker called out “one senior meal!” The Balti- more Sun (2012) recently reported on the death of an “elderly” man in a house fire. He was 62.

12-4a When Is “Old”? What images come to mind when you hear the word old? In a recent national survey, people in their 40s said that a person is old at age 63, those in their 70s said age 75, and a 90-year-old woman said that a woman isn’t old “until she hits 95” (AARP Magazine, 2014: 40). So, how old is “old”?

It depends on whom you ask because “old” is a social construction. In some African nations, where people rarely live past 50 because of diseases and civil wars, 40 is old. In industrialized societies, where the average person lives to age 78, 40 is considered young. Still, regardless of how we feel physically, society usually defines old in chronological age. In the United States, for instance, people are deemed old at age 65, 66, or 67 because they can retire and become eligible for Medi- care and Social Security benefits.

Many older Americans are vigorous and productive, but others experience physical and mental limitations as they age. There are significant differences between the young-old (65–74 years old), the old-old (75–84 years old), and the oldest-old (85 years and older) in health, liv- ing independently, and working. Generally, for example, a 75-year-old is much less likely than an 85-year-old to need caretaking.

12-4b Life Expectancy Life expectancy is the average expected number of years of life remaining at a given age. American children born in 2010 have a life expectancy of almost 79 years (compared with 71 in 1970 and 47 in 1900). Despite our

nation’s enormous wealth, the United States ranks just 42nd globally in life expectancy (Schwartz, 2017).

Life expectancy varies by sex, social class, and race- ethnicity. Historically, currently, and across all racial- ethnic groups, women live longer than men, and Asians have the longest lifespans (Figure 12.7).

The higher rates of cigarette smoking, heavy drink- ing, gun use, employment in hazardous occupations, and risk-taking in recreation and driving are responsible for many males’ shorter lifespans. The life expectancy gen- der gap has narrowed since the 1990s, however, because there’s been an increase in women’s smoking, use of al- cohol and other drugs, obesity (which increases the risk of hypertension and heart disease), and stresses due to multiple roles (e.g., juggling employment while caring for children and older family members) (“Catching Up,” 2013; see also Chapter 14).

Generally, higher socioeconomic levels increase life expectancy. People with a college degree and higher are more likely than less educated adults to be employed, to be financially secure, and to have employment-related health insurance. They’re also more likely to exercise, not smoke, drink alcohol in moderation, and maintain a healthy body weight.

Asian Americans die from the same diseases as other groups, but do so later in life. They’re the

Between the ages of 65 and 91, avid mountaineer Hulda Crooks scaled Mount Whitney (the highest mountain in the continental United States) 23 times. She died at the age of 101 in 1997.

life expectancy the average expected number of years of life remaining at a given age.

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highest-income and best-educated minority in the United States (see Chapter 10). About 97 percent live in or near a major city with access to high-quality health care and have strong family support networks during illness. They’re also more likely than other racial-ethnic groups to cook health- ful traditional meals, smoke less, and maintain a healthy body weight (Acciai et al., 2015). There are no definitive reasons for Asians’ longevity, but these factors prolong life.

12-4c How Our Graying Nation Is Changing

The 65 and older population is booming, and becoming more ethnically and racially diverse. For example,

▸▸ 49 million Americans (15 percent of the total population) are 65 or older, a dramatic increase from just 4 percent in 1900, and will comprise 21 percent of U.S. residents by 2030.

▸▸ One of the fastest- growing groups is the oldest-old, whose numbers increased from 100,000 in 1900 to 6.3 million in 2015. By 2030, this group will comprise almost 3 percent of the population.

▸▸ By 2030, 28 percent of the 65-and-older population will be minority, up from 20 percent in 2010; 23 per- cent of the 85-and-older population will be minority, up from 15 percent in 2010 (Colby and Ortman, 2015; “The Nation’s Older Population...,” 2017; “Older Americans Month...,” 2017).

Our aging population has four important (and inter- related) implications. First, as you’ll see shortly, health care and caregiving needs, services, and costs will surge. Sec- ond, the number of older Americans is increasing, whereas the proportion of young people is falling (Figure 12.8). As a result, many adult children—even in their 60s—will be caring for aging parents, grandparents, and other older relatives for more years than in the past.

Third, disability rates among older Americans have increased, particularly among baby boomers (people born between 1946 and 1964) and those 10 years younger than baby boomers. The higher disability rates are due to better medical diagnoses, but baby boomers are more likely than the previous generation to be obese and to have diabetes and high blood pressure (Scommegna, 2013). Thus, the boomer generation might be sicker and for more years than their predecessors who had lower life expectancies.

Fourth, as the number of older people increases, so does the old-age dependency ratio (also called the el- derly support ratio)—the number of working age (18 to 64) adults for every person aged 65 and older. The ratio is an approximation because some people work into their late 60s and 70s, but it’s a useful measure of the burden of workers who support the older population. The old- age dependency ratio has dropped from 14 workers per

Figure 12.7 U.S. Life Expectancy at Birth, by Sex and Race-Ethnicity, 2015

71.8

76.3

79.3

84.1

20 40 60 80 1000

78.1

81.2

83.8

88.9

Male

Female

Black White Latino Asian

Source: Based on National Center for Health Statistics, 2017, Figure 6; USA Life Expectancy, 2016.

Figure 12.8 The Young and the Old in the United States, 1900–2030

1900 1980 Year

Age

Pe rc

en t

2030

21 21

Under 18 65+

Sources: Based on U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging et al., 1991: 9, and Colby and Ortman, 2015, Figure 4.

baby boomers people born between 1946 and 1964.

old-age dependency ratio (also called the elderly support ratio) the number of working age (18 to 64) adults for every person aged 65 and older.

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older person in 1900. By 2020, only three working adults will be supporting each older person, and the ratio could drop to two by 2060 (Ortman et al., 2014; Mather et al., 2015). Thus, many people will have to pay much higher federal and state taxes to support our ever-growing older population.

12-4d Some Current Aging Issues The sandwich generation is composed of midlife people who care for aging parents, are raising a child under age 18, or supporting an adult child. About 71 percent who do so are ages 40 to 59 (Parker and Patten, 2013). In an aging society, the sandwich generation and older people experience many changes, including the rise of multi- generational households, work and retirement options, right-to-die issues, and competition for scarce resources.

MULTIGENERATIONAL HOUSEHOLDS The share of the U.S. population living in multigenera- tional households rose from 12 to 16 percent between 1980 and 2010. Asians (28 percent) are more likely to live in multigenerational households than blacks (26 per- cent), Latinos (25 percent), and whites (14 percent).

Why are several generations living under one roof? Graying boomers may move in with their adult children and grandchildren to avoid poverty. More grandparents are raising children because drug-addicted parents ne- glect them, abandon them, or die from an overdose. Adult children may move back home with their par- ents (often with children and girlfriends/boyfriends in tow) because of unemployment, low wages, or divorce. Extended family living provides intergenerational sup- port, including child care for employed parents. Cul- tural values, particularly among recent immigrants, reflect long-standing practices of caring for aging par- ents and grandparents in one’s own home (Ellis, 2013; Fry and Passel, 2014; Wiltz, 2016).

The effects of multigenerational households are mixed. Grandparents who live with their adult children and grandchildren may provide crucial economic and child care support. On the other hand, if the multigen- erational household is struggling financially, if the grand- parents are also raising their own children, and if there’s mother–grandmother conflict, grandparents experience emotional problems, including unhappiness, stress, worry, and anger (Deaton and Stone, 2013).

WORK AND RETIREMENT Many older Americans are postponing retirement. In 2017, almost 19 percent of people aged 65 and older were working—up from 14 percent in 2000 (Kromer and

Howard, 2013; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). The la- bor force participation rates have increased for both men and women, even for people aged 70 or over (Figure 12.9).

Most work out of necessity. A consequence of longer life expectancy is that people need to finance more years of retirement, but are they doing so? Almost a third of employed adults with $10,000 or more in investments give financial assistance to an adult child, a parent, or both (Saad, 2017). The contributions increase family sta- bility and strengthen family ties, but also deplete retire- ment savings.

Since the early 1990s, many large companies (es- pecially in the steel, airline, and auto industries) have greatly reduced or eliminated employee pension plans, but only about half of private sector workers partici- pate in a 401(k) or similar retirement savings program. Among those with savings, the median account value is just $148,00 for households aged 65 and older. In 2015, the average Social Security payment for people aged 65 and older was only $1,342 a month, but 60 percent rely on Social Security for half or more of their family income (“Who Pays the Bill?” 2013; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2016; Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics, 2016).

Social class is a key factor in living well after retire- ment. People in higher social classes have more savings, pensions, and property (including homes with paid-off mortgages); higher Social Security income because they had higher lifetime earnings; and 401(k)s that have in- creased in value over the years. Because of such assets, 64 percent of nonretirees with annual household in- comes of $75,000 or more expect to live comfortably in retirement, compared with only 32 percent with annual incomes below $30,000 (Norman, 2016).

Figure 12.9 The U.S. Labor Force Is Growing Older

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For older women, particularly, working is often a necessity rather than a choice. Did you notice, in Figure 12.8, that larger numbers of women in their 60s and 70s are in the labor force? You’ll see shortly that di- vorce rates after age 50 have been increasing. Divorced women, especially if they don’t get the house or a favor- able legal settlement, may have to enter (or re-enter) the labor force because they have few economic resources. In other cases, women in their 60s and 70s are staying in the workforce longer because, compared with prior gen- erations, they have more education, work experience, and access to better jobs (Goldin and Katz, 2016).

THE RIGHT TO DIE Living longer and with more years of chronic diseases and disabilities raises questions about later-life choices. Both historically and currently, one of the most contro- versial issues involves end-of-life decisions. Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, which took effect in 1997, au- thorized lethal prescriptions when two doctors agreed that a patient would die within six months and freely chose physician-assisted suicide (also called physician- aid-in-dying). Modeling Oregon’s law, six states and the District of Columbia have passed similar legislation.

In a recent Gallup poll, 73 percent of Americans said that doctors should be allowed to “end the patient’s life by some painless means” (Wood and McCarthy, 2017).

Advocates argue that terminally ill people who face a long and painful death and huge medical costs should have the legal right to die with dignity on their own terms instead of lingering in a nursing home, hospital, or hospice. Op- ponents maintain that actively ending a life, regardless of a person’s frailty or suffering, is a moral violation, and that patients might be pushed to die early for the caregiver’s convenience (Eckholm, 2014).

COMPETITION FOR SCARCE RESOURCES When Congress passed the Social Security Act in 1935, life expectancy was about 62 years compared with almost 79 today. In the future, the growing older population will put a significant strain on the nation’s health care services and retirement income programs.

The older population is about half as large as the 18 and younger population. Nonetheless, the federal gov- ernment spends nearly $6 on older people for every $1 it spends on children (Hahn et al., 2014). The older people get, the higher the medical costs. For example,

▸▸ Among Medicare recipients, the average annual health care costs are almost $17,000 for someone aged 65 to 74, compared with almost $26,000 for people aged 85 and over (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics, 2016).

▸▸ A study of 1.8 million Medicare recipients who died in 2008 found that nearly 20 percent had surgery in the last month of life, and nearly 10 percent had surgery in the last week of life. Among those undergoing end-of-life surgery, almost 60 percent were 80 and older (Kwok et al., 2011).

▸▸ About 60 percent of prostate cancer is diagnosed in men aged 65 or older. It costs $93,000 per patient to treat advanced prostate cancer; the treatment pro- longs life by an average of four months (Beil, 2012).

Many older people maintain that they deserve all the medical benefits they can get because they paid taxes over many years. In fact, an average two-earner couple that re- tired in 2015 will draw about $212,000 more from Medicare and Social Security than they paid in taxes to support these programs (Steuerle and Quakenbush, 2013).

Younger generations can’t count on federally fi- nanced health care and retirement benefits in the future. Medicare funds are supposed to last until 2026, and So- cial Security through 2033 (The Board of Trustees . . . , 2013), but there are no guarantees. As baby boomers age, the costs of these programs will mushroom. Because boomers have higher educational levels than previous generations, they’re likely to demand more and more ex- pensive health care services (see Chapter 14).

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Medical care for patients age 65 and older in the last year of life accounts for about 25 percent of annual Medicare costs (Cubanski et al., 2016). Is this a good investment of our resources?

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Despite rising health care costs, 20 percent of Ameri- cans want to live to age 100—about 21 years longer than the current average U.S. life expectancy. Moreover, 38 per- cent support medical treatments that would allow them to live to at least age 120 (Lipka and Stencel, 2013; Lugo et al., 2013). Who’ll pay for such radical life extensions?

12-5 SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF FAMILY AND AGING

The four sociological perspectives are useful in under- standing families and aging. Table 12.3 summarizes the key points of these theories.

12-5a Functionalism We began this chapter by looking at the vital functions that families perform—such as procreation and economic security—that promote societal stability and individual well-being. Functionalists recognize that families differ in structure (e.g., nuclear vs. extended), but believe that their similar functions ensure a society’s continuity.

STABILITY AND ACTIVITY For functionalists, marriage, followed by procreation, is critical in fostering social order and cohesion. Parent- hood is a crucial social role. One of its tasks, socialization, is essential to maintaining any culture. Problems arise, for instance, when parents can’t or don’t provide their children with the necessary financial and emotional sup- port or when they divorce.

Kinship ties involve responsibilities, but they also help keep families together, especially in time of trouble.

Extended family members offer financial assistance, emotional support, and help to care for young children and aging adults. Nearly 1.5 million employed grandpar- ents are responsible for most of the basic care of grand- children who live with them (“National Grandparents Day…,” 2017).

Retirement benefits society because it provides younger people jobs. Even in retirement, however, activity theory proposes that many older people re- main engaged in numerous roles and activities, includ- ing work. Moreover, those who are active adjust better to aging and are more satisfied with their lives (see Atchley and arusch, 2004, for a summary of some of this research).

CRITICAL EVALUATION Functionalism has several weaknesses. First, it’s ques- tionable whether some family functions are as universal or necessary as functionalists claim. Procreation often oc- curs outside of marriage and divorce rates have tripled among people aged 65 and older since 1990. Also, the government has assumed some of the family’s functions, including caring for some children (as in foster homes) and the aged (through Medicare, for example) (Lund- berg and Pollak, 2007; Stepler, 2017).

Second, is activity theory as representative of older people as some functionalists claim? People may continue to work even in their 80s, but usually not by choice. They can’t afford to retire, even though they’re in poor health and unhappy in their low- income jobs. As health dete- riorates, many older people become less active and more isolated (Lee, 2009).

Table 12.3 Sociological Perspectives on Families and Aging

Theoretical Perspective

Level of Analysis Key Points

Functionalist Macro Families are important in maintaining societal stability and meeting family members’ needs. Older people who are active and engaged are more satisfied with life.

Conflict Macro Families promote social inequality because of social class differences. Many corporations view older workers as disposable.

Feminist Macro and micro

Families both mirror and perpetuate patriarchy and gender inequality.

Women have an unequal burden in caring for children as well as older family members and relatives.

Symbolic Interactionist

Micro Families construct their everyday lives through interaction and subjective interpretations of family roles.

Many older family members adapt to aging and often maintain previous activities.

activity theory proposes that many older people remain engaged in numerous roles and activities, including work.

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Third, 10 percent of the huge wave of baby boomers say that they’ll never retire, primarily because they’ve saved very little and carry too much debt (Harter and Agrawal, 2014). This means that there isn’t always an orderly progression to retirement and opening up job slots to the younger generation.

12-5b Conflict Theory Conflict theorists agree that families serve important functions, but point out that some groups benefit more than others. Families are sources of social inequality that mirror the larger society, and the inequities persist from birth to old age (Cruikshank, 2009).

INEQUALITY, SOCIAL CLASS, AND POWER For conflict theorists, families in high-income brackets have the greatest share of capital, including wealth that they can pass down to the next generation. An inheri- tance reduces the likelihood that all families can com- pete for resources such as education, decent housing, and health care (see Chapter 8).

Economic inequality affects all aspects of fam- ily life. Child abuse and neglect are highest in U.S. counties with the greatest gaps between rich and poor. Moreover, the more distance between these social classes, the less likely that the poor will receive needed services and support that reduce child maltreatment rates (Eckenrode et al., 2014).

Unequal access to resources continues into old age. Most employers insist that they value older workers’ loy- alty, work ethic, reliability, and experience, but many are less likely to hire or retain older people because they’re usually more expensive than younger workers. Because many large companies have cut their pension plans, nu- merous older workers must work long after they expected to retire (Kromer and Howard, 2013; Winerip, 2013).

CRITICAL EVALUATION Conflict theory is limited for several reasons. First, con- flict theorists tend to overlook the fact that many families, especially those in the middle and upper classes, fund public assistance programs such as Medicaid (a social health care program for low-income individuals and fami- lies). They also pay billions each year to cover the costs of unintended pregnancies and the resulting infant care expenses for poor women (Sonfield and Kost, 2013).

Second, conflict theory links family inequality to capitalism and social class, but there’s also considerable family inequality in countries that aren’t capitalist (see Chapters 8 and 11). Thus, social class affects but doesn’t determine whether a child will succeed economically.

Third, many older people don’t have to struggle for resources. As you saw earlier, the U.S. government’s spending on children has declined but increased for people age 65 and older. Older people, regardless of so- cial class, have generous health care coverage through Medicare or Medicaid. They vote in large numbers, have influential lobbyists in Congress, and flood lawmakers with hundreds of thousands of letters and email mes- sages when there’s a threat of cutting Medicare or Social Security payments (Johnson, 2011; see also Chapter 11).

12-5c Feminist Theories Feminist scholars agree with conflict theorists that there’s considerable inequality between low-income and wealthy families in accessing necessary resources. How- ever, feminist theorists emphasize the inequality of gen- der roles in families, especially in patriarchal societies (including the United States).

GENDER ROLES AND PATRIARCHY For feminist scholars, families both mirror and perpetuate patriarchy and gender inequality. In most countries, males pass laws about property and inheritance rights, marriage and divorce, and many other regulations that give men au- thority over women. The United States is similar to many other nations in men (particularly lawmakers and Catholic Church officials) controlling women’s decisions about re- production and access to abortion that, in turn, increases unwanted pregnancies and nonmarital birth rates.

Male aggression against women and children is common in patriarchal societies where men hold most of the power, status, and privilege. Females, on the other

The average 65-year-old can now expect to live for another 20 years, half of them free of disability. For functionalists, older adults are happiest when they stay active and maintain social relationships.

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hand, are marginalized and socialized to accept male domination. In many cases, legal, political, and religious institutions don’t take violence against women and chil- dren seriously (Lindsey, 2005). Recently, for instance, a judge in Florida “sentenced” a man charged with domes- tic battery to take his wife, the victim, to Red Lobster for dinner and then bowling (McEwan, 2012). Thus, some judges still view domestic violence charges as frivolous.

Out of 190 nations, the United States, Papua New Guinea, and Swaziland are the only countries that have no national paid parental leave policy. As a result, caregivers, who are predominantly women, must often leave their jobs or work only part-time to care for children and aging parents. Working part-time or stepping out of the work- force reduces women’s earnings, career advancement, retirement income, and their families’ living standards. Among those who take time off from work following the birth or adoption of a child, women are nearly twice as likely as men (25 percent and 13 percent, respectively) to say that doing so had a negative impact on their job or career (Fry, 2017; Horowitz, 2017; Rossin-Slater, 2017).

CRITICAL EVALUATION Feminist explanations of families and aging have several lim- itations. First, according to critics, feminist scholars over- state women’s domination by men. For example, a record 40 percent of all households with children under the age of 18 include mothers who are either the sole or primary source of family income, up from just 11 percent in 1960 (Wang et al., 2013).

A second criticism is that feminist theories tend to gloss over data which show that intimate partner vio- lence is often mutual. Several dozen studies have found that women initiate from 30 to 73 percent of violent in- cidents (Straus, 2011, 2014). You’ll recall that mothers

mistreat their children, and almost 40 percent of the perpetrators of elder abuse are women (Jackson and Hafe- meister, 2011).

Third, the poorest older adults are minority women, but social class and marital status are important factors. Older married women and those in higher socioeco- nomic levels are less likely to experience poverty in later life than women who are single (never married, divorced, or widowed) and from lower socioeconomic levels (Hokayem and Heggeness, 2014; Hunter, 2014). Thus, social class may be more significant than patriarchy in shaping women’s later life outcomes.

12-5d Symbolic Interaction For symbolic interactionists, people create subjective meanings of what a family is and does. Thus, people learn, through interaction with others, how to act as a parent, a grandparent, a teenager, a stepchild, and so on throughout the life course.

LEARNING FAMILY AND AGING ROLES Throughout the socialization process, family members establish trust and develop emotional bonds. Between 90 and 97 percent of Americans believe that it’s impor- tant for both mothers and fathers to provide discipline and emotional support, and to teach values (“The New American Father,” 2013).

Interactionists often use exchange theory to explain mate selection and family roles. The fundamental prem- ise of exchange theory is that people seek through their social interactions to maximize their rewards and mini- mize their costs. In mate selection, people trade their re- sources (e.g., wealth, good looks, youth, and/or status) for more, better, or differ- ent assets. People may stay in unhappy marriages and

In most Latino communities, the quinceañera (pronounced “keen- say-ah-NYAIR-ah”) is an important coming-of-age ritual that celebrates a girl’s entrance into adulthood on her fifteenth birthday. It’s an elaborate and dignified religious and social event that reinforces strong ties with family, relatives, and friends.

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exchange theory people seek through their social interactions to maximize their rewards and minimize their costs.

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other intimate relationships because the rewards seem equal to the costs. Many women tolerate abuse because they fear loneliness or losing the economic benefits that a man provides (Khaw and Hardesty, 2009; see also Table 12.1 on the benefits and costs of cohabitation).

A well-known psychologist who interviewed more than 200 couples over a 20-year period found that the difference between lasting marriages and those that split up was a “magic ratio” of 5 to 1. That is, if partners have five positive interactions for every negative one, the mar- riage is likely to be stable over time (Gottman, 1994). Thus, we can improve our family relationships by learn- ing to interact in positive ways.

Stereotypes about older people are deeply rooted in U.S. society. About 84 percent of Americans age 60 and older encounter ageism, discrimination against older people, including insulting jokes, disrespect, and patron- izing behavior (Roscigno, 2010).

Our language is full of ageist words and phrases that ste- reotype and disparage older people (e.g., biddy, old bat, old fart, old fogey, geezer, over the hill, doddering). Because it’s legal to ask about age (but not sex or race), age discrimina- tion is a major barrier in getting a job. If employers assume that older workers are less productive, “technophobic,” or inflexible, older applicants—even those applying for low- skilled jobs—are half as likely as people aged 29 to 31 to get a callback. Ageism, especially in hiring practices, helps explain why people try to look younger. In 2016, for ex-

ample, people aged 40 to 54 had the most plastic surgery (American Society of Plas- tic Surgeons, 2017; EEOC, 2017; Newmark et al., 2017; Rosenblatt, 2017).

Continuity theory posits that older adults usu- ally maintain the same activities, behaviors, social roles, personalities, and past relationships. The theory also proposes that older people adapt to changes by substituting satisfying new roles for those they’ve lost (Atchley and Barusch, 2004). For example, a retired music teacher can join a local chorus or orchestra. Thus, developing new roles may lessen some of the emotional distress due to ageism.

CRITICAL EVALUATION A common criticism is that symbolic interaction, a micro- level perspective, doesn’t address macro-level constraints. For example, U.S. nonmarital teen births have fallen pri- marily because of structural factors (e.g., greater access to family planning services, expanded educational opportu- nities for disadvantaged young women) rather than teen attitudes about childbearing (Kearney and Levine, 2014).

Second, exchange theory is limited because people don’t always calculate the potential costs and rewards of every decision. In the case of women who care for older family members, genuine love, concern, and a sense of obligation override cost-benefit decisions, even when the person receiving care is abusive (Jackson and Hafemeister, 2013).

Third, continuity theory doesn’t distinguish normal aging from disease and disability. Older people who ex- perience chronic illness may be too sick to continue their activities and relationships. Continuity theory also over- looks structural obstacles that discourage older people from pursuing current or new roles. Poverty, for exam- ple, can affect physical and mental health which, in turn, weakens social networks and limits housing, medical, and recreational options.

ageism discrimination against older people.

continuity theory older adults can substitute satisfying new roles for those they’ve lost.

STUDY TOOLS 12 READY TO STUDY? IN THE BOOK, YOU CAN:

▸□ Check your understanding of what you’ve read with the Test Your Learning Questions provided on the Chapter Review Card at the back of the book.

▸□ Tear out the Chapter Review Card for a handy summary of the chapter and key terms.

ONLINE AT CENGAGEBRAIN.COM WITHIN MINDTAP YOU CAN: ▸□ Explore: Develop your sociological imagination by

considering the experiences of others. Make critical

decisions and evaluate the data that shape this social experience.

▸□ Analyze: Critically examine your basic assumptions and compare your views on social phenomena to those of your classmates and other MindTap users. Assess your ability to draw connections between social data and theoretical concepts.

▸□ Create: Produce a video demonstrating connections between your own life and larger sociological concepts.

▸□ Collaborate: Join your classmates to create a capstone project.

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