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SEEDS OF CHANGE: COMPARING STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA Author(s): Birol Baskan and Steven Wright Source: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 96-111 Published by: Pluto Journals Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858653 Accessed: 09-10-2019 09:24 UTC

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SEEDS OF CHANGE: COMPARING STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN

QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA

Birol Baskan and Steven Wright

Qatar presents an interesting case study on the nature of state-religion relations

as despite being of the same Wahhabi and Hanbali branch as neighboring Saudi

Arabia, there are stark differences in the role of religion at a political level within

the two countries. Indeed, this article argues that at a political level, Qatar has a

secular character more comparable to Turkey than Saudi Arabia. The main reason

for such differences will be shown through field research to be the lack of an

indigenous Ulama class within Qatar. The reasons for this are explained through not only a historical pedigree, which ties in with the role of Britain in the Gulf, but

also through a political economy perspective. Indeed, this research sheds new light

on the importance of a native Ulama class in explaining how and why religion is

promoted by the state and thus has implications for understanding contemporary

religiosity and pressures on governmental decision-making. Yet with evidence of

an emerging Ulama class within Qatar, the article suggests that there is reason to

believe that a more vocal, organized and influential section of society is in the

process of developing capacity to press for a greater role of religion at a political and societal level.

State and Religion in Qatar and Saudi Arabia

Qatar and Saudi Arabia present a fascinating insight into both how and why state-religion relations can differ so markedly within the Arabian Gulf. Whilst

both are Wahhabi states, which apply the Hanbali School, the impact this has

had on a political level, and society in general, demonstrates strikingly different

examples of application. This is in spite of them having a great deal in common on cultural, tribal and linguistic levels. Such commonalities are after all reinforced

through the intermarrying of branches of tribes located in both countries. Yet several

important differences exist: The Qatari State does not have a religious police force

Birol Baskan is Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Dr Steven Wright is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Qatar University.

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SEEDS OF CHANGE 97

that scrutinizes and enforces morality in public. In contrast, the Saudi Arabian

mutawwa ' in (religious police) are tasked with making sure that men and women

comply with Islamic dress code, behave morally in public, and close all businesses

during prayer times. These and other examples raise a number of important questions:

Why does such a broad range of differences exist? Why is Qatar apparently "more

liberal" than Saudi Arabia? Why is there then, a marked difference in state-religion

relations within these countries? Are determinants of change identifiable and what

are the implications for the future?

It is true that the manner in which the Saudi state came into being is an explanation

which scholarship on this issue would naturally gravitate to. Personal choices, peer

and/or family pressure, societal expectations and reputational concerns are also valid

factors. Despite the role of the Ulama within Saudi Arabia having been extensively

documented, no such research has been conducted on the situation in Qatar let

alone a comparative study. Therefore in explaining this analytical divide between

Qatar and Saudi Arabia this article focuses on the nature of Qatar's Ulama. The

importance of this group of people is that they should be seen as the force behind the

adoption of Islamic principles within public policy and by society in general. The

reality is that understanding their composition and role in public policy formation

actually gives us an insight into Qatari state-religion relations and consequently the manner in which Qatar is able to follow its own unique social, political and

economic developmental model.

Through conducting qualitative interviews with a range of Qatari based religious

scholars, it soon becomes clear that an Ulama class comprised of Qatari nationals

has historically not existed and only recently has a latent Qatari class of religious

scholars begun to emerge. Indeed, it is worth recognizing that unlike Saudi Arabia,

families known for producing religious scholars do not exist within Qatar. When

asked who have been the most influential religious scholars within Qatar, a mere

three names would uniformly be provided: firstly, Abd al Allah bin Zeyd bin

Mahmoud; secondly, Abd al Allah al Ansari, and finally Yusuf al Qaradawi. Of

these three, only Yusuf al Qaradawi is alive. It is striking however that none of these

influential Ulama are originally from Qatar. Both Bin Mahmoud and Al Ansari were

actually from Saudi Arabia whilst Al Qaradawi is from Egypt.1 It seems that the

children of these religious scholars did not necessarily follow in the paths of their

prominent fathers, which brings into question the development of a true religious class as exists in Saudi Arabia.

A second important aspect of Qatar's Ulama concerns the dominance of foreigners

in Qatar's religious education. This is interesting as it underscores a surprisingly

limited role for the Ulama. The Qatari school system departs markedly from the

model followed in Saudi Arabia as religious scholars have no input on textbooks, curriculum and administration. Unlike the situation in Saudi Arabia, the Qatari

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98 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

Ministry of Education has the exclusive authority over all state schools. The Ministry

also runs a Religious Institute that opened in 1 96 1 and was actually founded by Yusuf

al Qaradawi. The Religious Institute is different from other state schools only in

that it has four additional courses in religion added to the curriculum. The teachers

are directly employed by the Ministry; and the content of courses and textbooks are

all prepared and monitored by the Ministry. Therefore, this school has a character

comparable with the Imam Hatip Schools in Turkey, which are similarly run by the

Ministry of Education. Qatar's Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations has

no involvement in the preparation of the classes or recruitment of the personnel

teaching religious courses in both normal state schools and the Religious Institute.2

The Religious Institute is the sole example of its kind out of a total of 1 38 schools

within Qatar.3 During the 2008-09 academic year, the school had 257 students out

of just under 50,000 students within Qatar. However, it is interesting that only 24

of those 257 students are native Qataris; the others being international students.4

Given the absence of an established Qatari Ulama class, it is not surprising that

there is such a low enrollment rate by Qatari nationals at the Religious Institute.

Yet it is not only the enrollment statistics which are illuminating, as its teaching

faculty are generally not Qatari nationals. For example, the Director of the Religious

Institute, himself a graduate of the school in 1978, did not recall any Qataris among

the teachers or staff when he was a student. This role of foreign religious scholars

is pertinent as the same pattern can also be observed throughout Qatar's education

system under the Ministry of Education.

A similar picture can also be seen in higher education. There is only one national

university in Qatar in addition to several branches of some prominent American

universities, including Georgetown, Northwestern, Texas A&M, which are part of

the broader Education City under the Qatar Foundation. The national university,

Qatar University, has seven colleges and is the sole provider of higher religious education under the College of Sharia and Islamic Studies. This college enjoys no

special status or privilege over any other college, which underscores an important

difference with Saudi Arabia. Qatar's model for higher religious education is actually more similar to that being applied in Turkey or Tunisia during Habib

Bourguiba's rule as independent religious institutions were absorbed by a national

university and granted no special status. For example, under Ataturk, Turkey did not

just abolish the religious seminaries, which had historically provided the backbone

of its Ulama class, but rather converted them into a Faculty of Theology under Istanbul University. Similarly in Tunisia, members of the historic Al Zaitounia

Institute of Religious Higher Education became faculty members within the University of Tunis as a part of Bourguiba's broader educational reforms.5 Such

models limit institutional autonomy and influence from which an indigenous Ulama

class may develop.

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SEEDS OF CHANGE 99

In terms of the nationality of religious scholars within the College of Shariah

and Islamic Studies at Qatar University, a similar picture exists to that described

about the Religious Institute. The college was established in 1977, as one of the

four colleges of Qatar University by its first Dean, Yusuf al Qaradawi. A number

of male and female Qataris who graduated from the College of Shariah in the early

1980s have been interviewed and none of them recalled a single Qatari faculty

member; all faculty members were foreigners, mostly Egyptian. In fact, the first

Qatari funded by the state of Qatar to pursue higher religious education abroad

was Amina Muhammad al Jabor, who is now professor of jurisprudence in the

College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University. After graduating from

the College in 1979, she went to Egypt in 1981 and got her Master's in 1984 and

then doctorate in 1987, both from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt.

She then came back to Qatar and became the first Qatari professor in the College of

Shariah and Islamic Studies. Apparently her example set the stage for other Qataris

going abroad for higher religious education. In fact the state of Qatar rented a house

in Egypt to accommodate female students in Egypt.6 As of now, both religious

education institutions in Qatar have since then graduated many Qataris, who are

now employed in a range of government ministries; but few actually pursued higher

education with the aim of becoming a religious scholar.7 Presently, there is thus an

emergent class of religious scholars in Qatar; however, it will take time to develop

a distinct class identity and consciousness.

On a governmental level however, it is interesting that Qatari religious scholars

do not have an institutionalized role in the political decision-making process. There

is no religious office, like the office of Grand Mufti, within the Qatari state system.

The role of the Ulama within Qatar is relegated to one of personal contacts or informal influence.

By comparison, Saudi Arabia has a religious office to secure religious support

for its policies, which institutionalizes the active involvement of religious scholars

in political decision-making. Up until 1971, the office of Grand Mufti was the

institution via which the Saudi rulers had secured religious justification for their

rules. In 1971, the office of Grand Mufti was replaced by the Board of Senior

Religious Scholars, headed by the Grand Mufti. The Board has since then been

instrumental in securing religious support for governmental policies and has issued

fatwas (religious justification) for policies the Saudi state wanted to pursue. The

absence of a religious office, which formalizes the role of Islamic scholars in

decision-making, is particularly interesting in the case of Qatar as institutionalized

religious offices actually exist in countries generally perceived as "more secular"

than Qatar, such as: Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria.

In terms of the role of the leading religious scholars, an interesting comparative

analysis can be made through looking at: Abd al Aziz ibn Baaz (d. 1 999) and Yusuf

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100 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

al Qaradawi. Both scholars remain widely respected throughout the Gulf region. Abd al Aziz ibn Baaz was the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. His influence

came not only from his scholarly achievements, but also from the high positions he

held within the Saudi political system. He became the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia

in 1993, and hence the head of the Board of Senior Religious scholars. This was a

position he would serve in until his death in 1999. By comparison, Egyptian born

Yusuf al Qaradawi 's rise to prominence within Qatar was not through official state

backing.8 The highest public/official position he had held in Qatar was the Dean of

the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University, through which he

influenced many Qataris. He also hosts a popular show, Shariah and Life , on the

Al Jazeera television network. He remains widely acknowledged as the leading

religious scholar within Qatar. The career path of Qatar's leading religious scholar

is illuminating as it shows the very limited, if any, role the state has played in

supporting the Ulama and granting them a formal role in policy formation through

an institutional setting.

At this stage, the conclusions that can be drawn from this are that state-religion

relations are fairly limited in scope within Qatar. Indeed, its education system closely

echoes the model followed in Turkey rather than neighboring Saudi Arabia. The

absence of a religious office akin to the Grand Mufti is also telling. Overall it is the

lack of a native Ulama class that has translated into the government being under little

if any organized pressure to give religious scholars a voice in public policymaking.

With the majority of religious scholars in Qatar being non-nationals and ultimately

under visa sponsorship, the state is able to effectively regulate them. A native Ulama

class, which has only just begun to emerge, would understandably have a different

dynamic, but it is worth highlighting that the trend since the late 1 970s has been for

women to constitute the majority Qatari nationals who become religious scholars.

The final analysis shows that in the case of Qatar, the role religion has within society

and government policy, can be largely explained though answering the question of what are the characteristics, origins and institutional role of religious scholars

within the society. The lessons Qatar teaches us is that the historical reliance on

non-nationals for religious guidance has allowed for a great deal more autonomy on

behalf of the government, and ruling tribe in particular, in regard to state-religion relations.

Given these observations, the pressing question is why do state-religion relations differ so markedly between Qatar and the Saudi state ? What is it that led

to the development of religious institutions within Qatar having such a different

character from those of its close neighbor? These questions not only have important

implications for society in general but also feed into questions on the wider debate on

political evolution within the Gulf. The difference can be explained by whether there

exists a historically entrenched class of religious scholars or not. Yet the question

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SEEDS OF CHANGE 101

this raised is why is there only now an emerging Ulama class within Qatar? Given

this, what follows in this article will aim to argue that two main reasons account

for the lack of such a class in Qatar. First, because of her geographically strategic

location, Qatar could not be incorporated into the Saudi- Wahhabi state. Second,

because of her weak economic background, Qatar could not support a class of religious scholars. In order to prove such arguments, this article will provide an

examination of the historical relationship between Qatar and the Saudi- Wahhabi

state. It will do this by initially outlining the historical context in the birth of the

Wahhabi state before moving on to a specific discussion of the emergence of Qatar.

The Emergence of the Saudi-Wahhabi State

Following the devastating Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, spiritual

Sufi Orders of various types began to command the loyalty of the Muslim masses,

increasingly taking control in regulating and guiding their religious lives. They

became the agent spreading the Islamic message especially in frontier regions, such

as Africa, Central Asia, India and later in the Balkans. Sufi Orders' flexibility to

incorporate religious rituals and beliefs from other religions greatly increased their

appeal to the people, their rituals often involving music and poetry.

There occurred reactions from theologians to the supposedly un-Islamic rituals

and beliefs, whether associated with the Sufis or not, as early as the fourteenth

century, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1 328) and his student, Ibn al Qayyim al Tawziyah (d. 1350),

possibly being the most notorious cases of reaction. However, these reactions did

not change the fortune of Sufi Orders in the Islamic world mostly because state

rulers continued to protect and support them. The earliest example of a state going

against Sufi Orders occurred in a rather unexpected place: Iran. Starting in the

sixteenth century, the Safavids, originally a Sufi Order, set out to destroy all Sufi

Orders from the Iranian landscape in alliance with Shi' a Ulama. In the seventeenth

century, the Kadizadeli movement tried to move the Ottoman state rulers against

the Sufi Orders, but failed in bringing any decisive change in the Ottoman state

policy, which had remained supportive and protective of Sufi Orders more or less until the end.9

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab personifies probably the most unrelenting theological reaction to the rituals and beliefs deemed as un-Islamic and religious

innovations, for which he was seen as a strict follower of Ibn Taymiyya.10 He was

born in 1702-03 in Al Uyaynah, a town in the province of Najd in the Arabian

Peninsula, into a family of religious scholars. His grandfather, his father and his

uncle served as religious judges in Najd. He began his religious studies under his

father, and then moved to Medina and Basra to pursue further religious education. It

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102 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

was probably in Medina where he developed most of his religious views, claiming to

restore "Islam to what it was in the time of the holy Prophet and the great caliphs."11

For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, practices such as visiting tombs and wish trees, venerating

saints and invoking them as intermediaries with God were clearly forbidden in

Islam, the essence of which was the unity of God. The title of his main work, Kitab

al-Tawhid (the book of unity), in fact summarizes his attitude toward these practices.

They constitute associating partners with God, or shirk in Islamic terminology, the

greatest sin one can commit in Islam: "they accord godlike status to created beings

and objects."12

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab went beyond simply criticizing some widespread practices

among the masses. He also attacked the class of religious scholars, the Ulama, on

many grounds. First and foremost, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab questioned the dependence

of ordinary Muslims on the Ulama in understanding the primary sources of Islam,

the Qur'an and the hadith. Every Muslim male and female should have read the

Qur'an and the hadith on his/her own. This call in fact questioned the whole reason behind the existence of the Ulama in Muslim societies. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab even

questioned the Ulama class's knowledge of the Qur'an and the hadith for they knew

only the previous legal texts and exegesis, not the Qur'an and the hadith. Ibn Abd

al-Wahhab also criticized the Ulama for their corruption and nepotism,13 which had

been complained about by some others in the Ottoman Empire well before Ibn Abd

al-Wahhab: "Virtually every memorialist in the turbulent seventeenth century...

decried the state of the ulama" in the Ottoman Empire.14

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab naturally made sworn enemies, especially among

the Ulama. His views often attracted reactions from the local religious scholars,

including his own uncle, who was reported to have said "He claims... to follow

the Holy Quran and al-Sunna [the example of the Prophet and his companions

accepted by Sunnis] and dares to deduce from their teachings, paying no heed to

any opposition. Anyone who opposes him he calls a heretic, although he possesses

none of the qualifications of the mujtahedeen [those who exercise independent reasoning]."15 He became an itinerant preacher, in fact being forced to be. For example, he could not stay in Basra because he was forced to leave the town. He could not even stay in Al Uyaynah, his hometown. He stopped preaching in Huraymila, where his father was a religious judge, and had remained silent until the

latter 's death. Once he started preaching in Huraymila, he escaped an assassination

attempt after which he left Huraymila too.

The turning point in the life of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab came in 1744, and this is

what made him different from Ibn Taymiyya. He found not only a protector, but

also a strong military ally in the personality of Muhammad ibn al-Saud, a local

ruler of Al Dir'iyah. This alliance was forged strong by an exchange of oath and a marriage between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's daughter and Ibn al-Saud's son, Abd

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SEEDS OF CHANGE 103

al- Aziz. In Al-Saud, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab found a sword to implement his views

and eradicate rituals and beliefs he deemed un-Islamic. He could preach and train

students according to his own understanding of Islam. In Abd al-Wahhab, Al-Saud

found a religious banner, a powerful one indeed calling for the re-proselytizing of the

whole Arabian Peninsula, under which hitherto fragmented Arab tribes could unite.

As noted, before finally settling down in Al Dir'iyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had

preached in different towns. Hence, his message was not unknown to the inhabitants

and probably he made some converts. These new converts came and joined him in

Al Dir'iyah, adding further manpower to Al-Saud's military strength. In the first

two years of this alliance, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sent out letters inviting local rulers

and religious scholars to accept his vision of Islam. Not all accepted. However,

those who accepted joined the tribal confederation taking shape under Muhammad ibn al-Saud.

Boosted by new recruits and driven by a religious zeal, Muhammad ibn al- Saud

embarked upon a series of military campaigns against other rulers. Al Uyaynah,

some 30 miles to the north-west of Al-Dir'iyah, became one of the first towns to

fall before Saudi- Wahhabi forces. The growing strength of Al-Saud also attracted

opposition: a coalition of tribes from the Hasa and the Nejd in the 1 750s and another

one from southwestern Arabia in 1765 attacked Al Dir'iyah with serious damages inflicted on the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance.

In 1765, Muhammad ibn al-Saud died to be succeeded by his son, Abd al- Aziz

al-Saud, who was also the son-in-law of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Military expansion

accelerated under his leadership, Riyadh falling in 1773. By 1790, the Saudi state consolidated its rule over central Arabia and turned its attention to the east, the oases

of Al Hasa and Qatif falling under Saudi-Wahhabi domination by 1 793 . Neither the

death of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1792 nor three punitive campaigns in the 1790s,

two by the ruler of the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula and another by the

Ottomans, failed to halt Saudi-Wahhabi expansion. The city of Karbala in Iraq

was sacked in 1802, holy shrines of the tomb of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet,

destroyed, thousands of its inhabitants killed. In revenge, a Shi'a killed Abd al- Aziz

in 1 803 in Al Dir'iyah. Saud ibn al-Saud continued his father's expansionist policy.

Mecca was occupied and looted in 1803, shrines and tombs destroyed, inhabitants

refusing to adhere to Wahhabism massacred. Madina fell into the hands of the

Wahhabis in 1804, even the tomb of the Prophet had faced the Wahhabi wrath.

The Ottoman response to the Saudi-Wahhabi threat came in 1811, sending the

semi-autonomous ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, into Arabia in 1 8 1 1 . It took seven

years to eradicate this threat though. In 1818, the son of Muhammad Ali, Ibrahim

Pasha entered Al Dir'iyah, destroyed the city and its fortifications and massacred hundreds of Wahhabi Ulama. Thus came the end of the Saudi-Wahhabi state,16

"hoped never to rise again - the extraordinary sect of the Wahabees."17

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104 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

The hope turned out to be too optimistic. The Ottoman-Egyptian blow to the

Saudi-Wahhabi state was fatal indeed. But, the Saudi-Wahhabi project was not

completely over. There were tribes especially from Central Arabia still loyal to the

Saudi-Wahhabi cause, possibly longing for the good days they had enjoyed. In the

rest of the nineteenth century, these tribes supported the Saudi leadership to regain

what was lost. In fact, as early as 1824, Turki bin Abdullah al-Saud captured Riyadh

and made it the capital of the second Saudi-Wahhabi state, re-establishing the Saudi rule over the Central and Eastern Arabian Peninsula.

However, this time it did not go smoothly. First Muhammad Ali of Egypt and

then the Ottoman Empire re-asserted its rule over the Hejaz. In the Eastern Arabian

Peninsula, the British extended their sphere of influence without formally colonizing

the region. Later the Ottomans made incursions into the Eastern Arabian Peninsula

starting in the 1870s. Qatar, for example, accepted Ottoman sovereignty over the

peninsula in 1872. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire began to support the rival Rashidis to counterbalance the Saudis. The Rashidis eventually ousted the Saudis

even from Central Arabia, occupying Riyadh in 1891. Abd al-Rahman bin Faisal

al-Saud found refuge in Kuwait, moving his family with him.

In the autumn of 1901, his son, Abd al- Aziz al-Saud, gathered some forty to

sixty men and left Kuwait. After several raids on nomad camps and trade caravans,

he reached the gate of Riyadh, his father's capital, with now close to 400 men in

January of 1902. In a surprising night attack, he killed the Rashidi governor of the

city and re-established the Saudi state. Immediately after this attack, Abd al- Aziz

organized a series of campaigns on small towns surrounding Riyadh, making them

a part of his new state. In 1 906, he captured Qasim, after which the Ottoman Empire

recognized him as the ruler of Qasim and southern Najd. In 1913, he turned to the

east, and captured Hafuf, which was in the hands of the Ottomans. Abd al- Aziz now

became the Abd al-Aziz Pasha of Najd according to the imperial order. The First World War brought new opportunities for the Saudi state. Britain signed

a treaty, granting Abd al-Aziz 1 ,000 rifles, a sum of £20,000 and a monthly subsidy

of £5,000. In return, Abd al-Aziz promised not to enter into any agreement with any

foreign power and not to attack places under British protection, such as Bahrain,

Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman.

During the war, Abd al-Aziz obtained further military and financial support from

Britain to capture Hail, the seat of the Rashidis. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire

and the continuing support of Britain shifted the balance of power in favor of Abd al-Aziz. Hail fell into his hands in 1921. Abd al-Aziz then turned his attention to

the Hejaz, hosting two holy cities, Mecca and Madina. The region was in the hands

of the Hashemites, another British client. In 1922, a southern city of Hejaz, Abha,

was captured. In September 1924, Taif fell, followed by Mecca in December of that

year. The capture of Jeddah took another year, Madina surrendering beforehand.

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SEEDS OF CHANCE 105

Abd al- Aziz al-Saud declared himself King of Hejaz in December 1925. Britain

signed another treaty with Abd al- Aziz in 1927, the treaty of Jeddah. According

to this treaty, Britain recognized "the complete and absolute independence of the

dominions of his Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies,"

in return, Abd al- Aziz would keep "friendly and peaceful relations with the territories

of Kuwait and Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast."18 In

1932, Abd al- Aziz united his dominions and titled himself King of Saudi Arabia.

In Abd al-Aziz's belief, "all the battles he fought and the conquests he won in a

reign of fifty years were fought and won for God,"19 best reflecting this belief being

probably his flag: on a green background was written in Arabic "There is no God

but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah." No better phrase could possibly

summarize all Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab preached about. Immediately after

he captured Riyadh in 1902, Abd al- Aziz al- Saud married Tarfa, the daughter of

Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Latif al-Shaykh, an influential religious scholar, Abd al-Aziz's

personal instructor in religion, and more importantly, the descendant of Muhammad

ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This couple's son, Faysal ibn al-Saud, would become the third king of Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975. This was an act of great symbolic

value, reminding the one established by Muhammad ibn al-Saud and Muhammad

ibn Abd al-Wahhab through their siblings. Hence, the third Saudi state was no

different from the two predecessors in successfully mobilizing Wahhabism and the

Wahhabi Ulama under its banner, which deeply influenced the later course of the

history of Saudi Arabia. This partly explains Al-Saud's success against the Rashidis.

While the former could unite the tribes under a religious identity transcending

tribal affiliations, the latter remained a tribal enterprise, Al Shammar dominating

the others.20 Thus once again, the Saudi- Wahhabi movement put all local rulers on alert about their future.

The Emergence of the Qatari State: Autonomy and Security from the Wahhabi State

For Qatar, its geopolitical location has naturally been a key factor that has played

heavily in its efforts to emerge as a sovereign state. In terms of state-religion

relations, the difference between Saudi Arabia and Qatar can largely be explained

by the divergent means in which the two states emerged. Yet for Qatar, it is the

very quest for tribal sovereignty and autonomy away from the Saudi state that has

inhibited the emergence of an indigenous Ulama class. As discussed above, it is with

the emergence of the Saudi state that given its population, size and religious zeal,

it became the dominant player on the Arabian Peninsula and therefore has played

a key geopolitical role in the formation of the small sheikhdoms.

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106 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

For Qatar and the other smaller Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states,

Saudi Arabia has historically been an aspiring hegemonic power which brought

with it natural challenges and perceived threats. A notable example of this occurred

in 1851 as Emir Faisal bin Turki al-Saud saw the Qatari peninsula as being one

of his dominions. He desired to extend his influence over the Qatari peninsula by

using the pretext of enforcing the collection of the annual zakat (religious tax)

from the Al-Khalifa rulers of Bahrain as they were the controlling power over the

western Qatari peninsula at that time. Wahhabism was thus a means by which the

Al-Saud extended their influence over the other ruling tribes. In this regard, the

dilemma for the rulers of Qatar was that although Wahhabism served a domestic

purpose of shaping opinion and fostering legitimacy for the rulers, it also presented

a challenge in that if the Ulama were to have too much power or influence they

would conceivably align themselves with the Saudi state and thus pose a domestic

challenge. It was therefore a delicate challenge of finding the right balance to meet

social needs against political expediency.

Another area in which Qatar's security was challenged by Saudi Arabia was through competing claims of tribal sovereignty. The influence and loyalty a leader

commanded from key tribes, or indeed, branches from within tribes in border areas

in particular, defines tribal conceptions of territorial sovereignty, or dirahs. It has

served to shape historical influences on contemporary attitudes, relationships and

prejudices between neighboring states. The large Al-Murrah tribe is an interesting

example of this as their historic tribal territory was located partly within both countries near the border region.21 Different branches of the same tribe exist in each

country given its size and the large territory in which it had historically roamed.22

Abd al- Aziz al-Saud used this issue to justify his expansive claims of sovereignty

over Qatar at the time of the oil concession as he claimed tribal allegiances from

the AI- Murrah, even though separate and fairly distinct branches from the same

tribe exist in both Qatar and Saudi Arabia.23 This issue would later play a key role

in Qatar's future border disputes with Saudi Arabia. This serves to underline that

Saudi Arabia is a geopolitical force with which Qatar, along with the other rulers of

smaller GCC states have had to historically contend. This pedigree has relevance in

the contemporary era given the way in which a domineering neighbor may impede

the autonomy and independence of action of smaller states such as Qatar.

With the Al-Thani rising to prominence, they successfully led a rebellion in

1 867 comprising a coalition of tribes on the Qatari peninsula against the rule of the

Al-Khalifa, which by the 1860s had in fact become nominal.24 This rebellion25 was

unsuccessfully suppressed by the Al-Khalifa, yet the more important outcome was

that following this, the British in 1868 recognized the Al-Thani as the Sheikhs of

Qatar as part of a peace agreement. In the wake of this, Britain's relationship with

the Al-Thani was initially forged through Sheikh Mohammed bin al-Thani having

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SEEDS OF CHANCE 107

signed with Britain a maritime treaty on preventing piracy in 1868. The maritime

agreement in 1 868 was not a protectorate treaty, but was significant in that it signaled

Britain's formal recognition of Sheikh Mohammed al-Thani as the Sheikh of the

Qatari peninsula.26 By 1871, the Ottomans established a military presence on the

Qatari peninsula and Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed al-Thani crafted a relationship

with the Ottomans, in addition to the British, which effectively insulated the Qatari

peninsula from the geopolitical challenges from the Al-Khalifa and the Saudi state.

Ultimately this was formed within the context of the security threats posed by

Saudi Arabia, the Al-Khalifa and to a lesser extent the Al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi.

The Ottomans and the British thus offered the Al-Thani a means of externally

backed security and provision for a continuity of tribal rule. This followed the

historic tribal system of overlapping alliances and security guarantees so cultivating

relationships with other powers would have been an obvious way to safeguard tribal

autonomy over the Qatari peninsula away from the Al-Saud tribe. It was thus a

development that was critical to the rulers of Qatar as they had effectively crafted

defense arrangements against the looming hegemony of the Wahhabi-Saudi state.

It is worth recognizing here that Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed al-Thani pioneered this strategy in the Gulf of playing international powers off against each

other as a means of maximizing security and avoiding dependence on the Saudi

state. Indeed, this approach was later notably copied by Sheikh Mubarak bin Sabah

al-Sabah of Kuwait (known as Sheikh Mubarak the Great). Indeed, the trend of

Qatar, pragmatically using a foreign power as a guarantor of its security, is a strategy,

which continues in the contemporary era with the logic of allowing a military

presence of the United States. However, in the context of the First World War, which saw the Ottomans withdraw

from the Peninsula, Britain was to sign a treaty of protection in 1 9 1 6. An opportunity

therefore presented itself whereby Qatari and British interests coalesced: Britain's

desire for a greater controlling influence within the Gulf was compatible with the

Qatari objective of achieving security. After the Ottomans departed, a closer security

relationship with Britain thus made strategic sense for the Al-Thani. This ultimately

led to the signing of a special "protectorate" treaty with Britain and Sheikh Abdullah

bin Jassim al-Thani in 19 16.27 The significance being that the provisions of the treaty

afforded Qatar, and the other sheikhdoms that signed similar treaties, the security

they badly needed to survive as fledgling states, against the geopolitical weight of

Saudi Arabia in particular. In other words, the treaty with Britain in 1 9 1 6 to become

a protected state, gave Qatar a formal external security arrangement, which allowed

for a degree of regime security and autonomy on its domestic affairs through leaving

its foreign relations and security to the British. This relationship was long lasting

and continued until the protectorate relationship ended with the withdrawal of the

British from the region in 1971.

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108 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

Even though the protectorate relationship placed Qatar within a pax-Britannica

security umbrella, the perception of threat from Saudi Arabia was significant enough

to prompt repeated requests from the Qatari ruler, Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim

al-Thani, for a greater guarantee of protection from Saudi Arabia. As discussed in the

previous section, the potential threat was acknowledged by Britain and a provision

for Qatari sovereignty and security was included in the Anglo-Saudi agreement of

1 927 (the Treaty of Jeddah). It called for peaceful relations to be maintained between

the Saudi state and Qatar, in addition to the other Gulf sheikhdoms. Nevertheless,

despite the treaties of 1916 and 1927, Qatar faced an ongoing battle for a greater

degree of autonomy from these geopolitical pressures, which placed limitations on

its freedopi of action. Saudi Arabia's reaction to Qatar's oil concession in 1935 is

a telling example: King Abd al- Aziz al-Saud informed the ruler of Qatar that those

living on the Qatari peninsula were his subjects and part of his dirah (territory to

which tribal rights of control are claimed), and he only chose not to enforce this

because of his desire to remain friendly with the British.28

It was with Britain's announcement in January 1968 that it would be ending its

protection of the Gulf region by the end of 1971, that the security umbrella the

emirate enjoyed had come to an abrupt end. Qatar entered into negotiations with

Bahrain and the Trucial States for the formation of a union, but this ultimately was

unsuccessful. While Britain still had strategic and other commercial interests in

Qatar, the type of arrangement, which afforded Qatar autonomy and security from

an external power, was clearly missing. Qatar's relations with the United States

at this time were still in their infancy and Washington did not even establish an

embassy within Qatar until 1973. The historical emergence of the Qatari state thus

underlines the desire for autonomy and security away from the geopolitical stretch

of Saudi Arabia. As Wahhabism was an integral aspect of the Saudi state, it was

therefore, by extension, a potential political curb on the relative autonomy enjoyed

by the rulers of Qatar.

Given this history, it is understandable that the Qatari state did not use religion

in a politically legitimizing way in which the Al-Saud did. The actual state-building

project of the Al-Thani and their desire to maintain relative autonomy in their domestic affairs, dictated limiting the development of an indigenous Ulama class

through reliance on controlled non-native Ulama.

The Seeds of Change: The Emerging Native Qatari Ulama Class

As discussed earlier, the lack of a native Ulama class within Qatar has been decisive

in shaping the contemporary state-religion relations context, which has resulted in

Qatar having a character closer to Turkey than to the Saudi state. Indeed, it was on

account of the government's desire to have domestic autonomy and security that

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SEEDS OF CHANGE 109

would have lessened any desire to allocate funding towards the development of

Qatar's own capacity for higher learning in religious affairs or indeed actually giving

religious scholars a say within an institutional framework. Indeed, the Ministry for

Islamic Affairs and Endowments was only established in Qatar in 1993, some 22

years after full independence was achieved following the British withdrawal in 1971. This fact underlines the lack of involvement the Ulama were to have in the

Qatari government. As the Ulama in Qatar have historically been non-nationals, they

would have lacked the capacity to press the ruling elite to give them an institutional

role within government.

Given the tribal nature of Qatari society, our research has shown that fund

allocation and fundraising may have been intra-tribal, given the absence of an

intermediary religious institution to coordinate state-level fundraising and, therefore,

would not have had a widespread impact on society's religious development. Indeed,

it is precisely because of the lack of a Ministry, which may co-ordinate religious

endowments, and their allocation, which inhibited the actual growth of a native Ulama class.

The political economy of Qatar therefore allows us to explain a great deal in its

state-religion relations. It laid the foundations for a latent class of Qatari Ulama

to emerge from the late 1980s, who would have had the capacity to press for an

institutional role in religious affairs: this was thus the forebearer in the establishment

of a Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments in 1993. Although the Ministry

currently plays no role in educational curriculum design, it is important as it

provides an institutional voice within the government to press for an expansion of

religiously observant practices within society and therefore serves to encourage the

development of a native Ulama class.

Concluding Observations

The indications on the nature of state-religion relations within Qatar show that

there is a stark difference to the situation within Saudi Arabia, which, in part, is

attributed to the historical manner in which the two states developed. However, the

single most determining factor in the Saudi case was the presence and capacity of

an indigenous religious class. In the Qatari case, the lack of an indigenous religious

class has allowed the country to develop a secular institutional character and a

secular education system similar to that of Turkey. This is not to say that Qatari

society is in any way secular as there is a clear level of religious observance, which is

culturally embedded. However, in several respects, the Qatari state shows a character

much more comparable to the situation in Turkey than the one in the Saudi state.

In the case of Qatar, it is the political economic situation coupled with the desire

by the ruling elite to limit the voice the non-native Ulama had within governmental

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110 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

decision-making that can largely explain the slow development of an indigenous

Ulama class. The role of the non-native Ulama was thus largely given autonomy in

the social sphere, but this was not extended to a voice in political decision-making.

As has been outlined, this was in part a result of the geopolitics and fear the elite had

of the non-native Ulama's relationship with leading scholars based in Saudi Arabia

who were understandably tied in with the Al-Saud. There was not the political will

to give power away given the context of Qatar's relationship with Saudi Arabia. It

was, however, only with the emerging growth in native Ulama which came about

as a result of the enhanced economic context following the dramatic rise in oil

prices in the early 1970s that surplus wealth contributed to the development of a

latent class, which had a capacity to call for change given that they were nationals.

The prospects for the future are thus clear: the trend of Qatar producing its own

Ulama is likely to continue. Within the context of rapid economic development

since 2000, which has also brought with it a sharp increase in population size, it

is likely that religiosity will be increasingly looked to as a means of preserving

indigenous culture. The role of indigenous Ulama is therefore likely to figure more

prominently in the future as a result, especially if a parliament is actually created.

As with the experience in Kuwait and Bahrain, it is when native Ulama are able

to have a political voice that a politicized religiosity is imposed on society. With

this, the secular character of the political structures of the state are thus likely to

become more challenged in the future by a growing class of indigenous Ulama who

have a greater political capacity as a result of political reforms and the pressures

of social change. While it is still only a latent class, the conditions are apt for its

continual development, and therefore it is an area that holds potential for future

qualitative research.

Notes

1 . See http://www.qaradawi.net, accessed on December 5, 2008.

2. Personal interview with the Director of the Religious Institute, Doha, November 20, 2008.

3. Annual Statistics Report 2006/2007 , Minister of Education, Qatar, p. 398. 4. Ibid., p. 65.

5. M. Boulby, "The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence," Third World Quarterly 10:2 (1988), 590-614.

6. One of those students accommodated by the state of Qatar was Haya Thamer Al Muftah, who is now professor of theology. Personal interview with Professor Al Muftah, November 10, 2008.

7. We could not find the exact number of Qataris. But it ranges from 10 to 15, dominantly females. This female dominance is also of interest.

8. See also the discussion in M. Q. Zaman, "Epilogue: Competing Conceptions of Religious Education,"

in R. W. Hefner and M. Q. Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam : The Culture and Politics of Modern Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 242-268.

9. See M. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca, 1988).

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SEEDS OF CHANGE 111

10. This is in fact a view shared by many. See, for example, H. Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002). For an opposing view, see N. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

11. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, a Wahhabi apologist, cited in C. Allen, God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006).

12. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 63. 13. Ibid., 30-31. 14. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety , 30.

1 5. Cited in Allen, God's Terrorists , 5 1 .

16. This discussion depends on M. AI Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and W. H. Bowen, The History of Saudi Arabia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), for this short historical account.

17. As such concludes Lieutenant Burden his report, cited in Allen, God's Terrorists , 68. 18. AI Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State , 48. 19. D. Howart, A Desert King: Ibn Saud and His Arabia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 55. 20. AI Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State , 37. 21. For an in-depth study of the Al-Murrah, see: D. P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah

Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1975). 22. Ibid.

23. Abdul-Aziz bin Saud to Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani, August 6, 1935, letter, No. 99/1/30. 24. For discussion on the nominal rule of the Al-Khalifa over the Qatari peninsula during the 1860s,

prior to the formal recognition of Mohammed al-Thani as the Sheikh of Qatar in 1868, see: W. G. Palgrave, Narrative of a Year 's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862-63) (London: Adamant Media Corporation, 2002), 379-395.

25. For discussion on the 1867 rebellion of eastern Qatar, see: J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman and Central Arabia (Gerrards Cross: Archive Editions, 1986), 1530-1531.

26. Agreement of the Chief of EI-Kutr (Guttar) engaging not to commit any Breach of the Maritime Peace of 1868, in C. U. Aitchison, Treaties and Engagements Relating to Arabia and the Persian Gulf(Gs rrards Cross: Archive Editions, 1987), 233-241.

27. The Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 was signed on November 3, 1916, but was not ratified by the British until March 23, 1918.

28. Abdul-Aziz bin Saud to Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani, August 6, 1935, letter, No. 99/1/30.

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