HLSS523Wk1

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1

OCTOBER 2020

C SIS B

R IEFS

By Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, Grace Hwang, & James Suber

INTRODUCTION There has been growing concern about the threat of domestic terrorism, with extremists motivated by political, racial, ethnic, economic, health, and other grievances. In October 2020, the FBI arrested Adam Fox, Barry Croft, and several other accomplices in a plot to kidnap and potentially execute Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. Members of this network, which had ties to militias in Michigan and other states, referred to Governor Whitmer as a “tyrant” and claimed that she had “uncontrolled power right now.”1 They also discussed kidnapping Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, in part because of his lockdown orders to slow the spread of Covid-19.2

Some U.S. government agencies have outlined the threat from domestic extremists, though most have not provided recent data about terrorist incidents. In its Homeland Threat Assessment released in October 2020, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security concluded that “racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists—specifically white supremacist extremists (WSEs)—will remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland.”3 The report

also assessed that anarchists and other individuals inspired by anti-government and anti-authority ideologies posed a threat. But it did not provide 2020 data. The Federal Bureau of Investigation similarly argued that the “top threat we face from domestic violent extremists” is from racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremists, including white supremacists.4 Nevertheless, FBI officials have not publicly released their data, making it difficult for U.S. civilians to judge the degree and type of threat.

To help fill this gap, this analysis provides new data on the domestic terrorist threat in the United States. It asks several questions. What are the main trends in domestic terrorism in 2020 in such areas as terrorist motivation, tactics, and targets? How did 2020 compare to previous years? To answer these questions, the authors constructed a data set of terrorist attacks and plots in the United States from January 1, 2020 to August 31, 2020, which updated a broader CSIS data set of terrorist incidents in the United States from 1994 to 2020.5

Based on the data, this analysis has several findings, which are discussed at greater length later in this assessment.

THE ISSUE White supremacists and other like-minded extremists conducted two-thirds of the terrorist plots and attacks in the United States in 2020, according to new CSIS data. Anarchists, anti-fascists, and other like-minded extremists orchestrated 20 percent of the plots and attacks, though the number of incidents grew from previous years as these extremists targeted law enforcement, military, and government facilities and personnel. Despite these findings, however, the number of fatalities from domestic terrorism is relatively low compared to previous years.

The War Comes Home The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the United States

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 2

First, white supremacists and other like-minded extremists conducted 67 percent of terrorist plots and attacks in the United States in 2020. They used vehicles, explosives, and firearms as their predominant weapons and targeted demonstrators and other individuals because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or political makeup—such as African Americans, immigrants, Muslims, and Jews. Second, there was a rise in the number of anarchist, anti-fascist, and other like-minded attacks and plots in 2020 compared to previous years, which comprised 20 percent of terrorist incidents (an increase from 8 percent in 2019). These types of extremists used explosives and incendiaries in the majority of attacks, followed by firearms. They also targeted police, military, and government personnel and facilities. Third, far-left and far-right violence was deeply intertwined—creating a classic “security dilemma.”6 Since it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, armed individuals from various sides reacted to each other during protests and riots, and each side’s efforts to protect itself and acquire weapons generally threatened others.

Despite these findings, this violence needs to be understood in historical context. The number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the U.S. homeland is still relatively small compared to some periods in U.S. history, making it important not to overstate the threat.7 Roughly half of the years since 1994 had a greater number of fatalities from terrorism than 2020—at least between January 1 and August 31, 2020. There were also no mass-casualty terrorist attacks, a stark contrast from such incidents as the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people; the September 2001 attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people; and the June 2016 Orlando attack, which killed 49 people. Still, violence levels in the United States could rise over the next year depending on political polarization, the persistence of the Covid-19 pandemic (and reactions to policy decisions to mitigate its spread), worsening economic conditions, growing concerns about immigration (whether real or perceived), racial injustice, or other factors. It is also possible that the organizational structure of extremism could evolve from today’s decentralized landscape to include more hierarchically structured groups.

The rest of this report is divided into three sections. The first defines terrorism and differentiates this report’s focus on terrorism from other phenomena, such as hate crimes and riots. The second section outlines and analyzes the 2020 terrorism data. The third explores future developments, including the potential for violence after the 2020 presidential election.

DEFINING TERRORISM This report focuses on terrorism—not other issues, such as hate crimes, protests, riots, or broader civil unrest. Terrorism is the deliberate use—or threat—of violence by non-state actors in order to achieve political goals and create a broad psychological impact.8 Violence and the threat of violence are important components of terrorism. This analysis divides terrorism into several categories: religious, ethnonationalist, violent far-right, violent far-left, and other (which includes terrorism that does not fit neatly into any of the other categories).9 Terms such as far-right and far-left terrorism do not correspond to mainstream political parties in the United States, such as the Republican and Democratic parties, which eschew terrorism. Nor do they correspond to the vast majority of political conservatives and liberals in the United States, who do not support terrorism. Instead, terrorism is orchestrated by a small set of violent extremists. As terrorism scholar Walter Laqueur argues, “terrorist movements are usually small; some very small indeed, and while historians and sociologists can sometimes account for mass movements, the movements of small particles in politics as in physics often defy any explanation.”10

Religious terrorism includes violence in support of a faith- based belief system, such as Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or Hinduism. The primary threat from religious terrorists in the United States comes from Salafi-jihadists inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.11 Ethnonationalist terrorism refers to violence in support of ethnic or nationalist goals, which often include struggles of self-determination and separatism along ethnic or nationalist lines. Due to the relatively low levels of ethnonationalist terrorism in the United States—no such incidents occurred in 2020—this brief does not address ethnonationalist terrorism.12 Far- right terrorism refers to the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities whose goals may include racial or ethnic supremacy; opposition to government authority; anger at women, including from the involuntary celibate (or “incel”) movement; belief in certain conspiracy theories, such as QAnon; and outrage against certain policies, such as abortion.13 Some extremists on the violent far-right have supported “accelerationism,” which includes taking actions to promote social upheaval and incite a civil war.14 Far-left terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism; advocate black nationalism; pursue environmental or animal rights issues; espouse pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs; or support a decentralized social and political system such as

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 3

anarchism.15 Other involves the use or threat of violence by subnational or non-state entities that do not neatly fit into any of the above categories, such as the anti-government Boogaloo movement, whose adherents aim to start a civil war (or “boogaloo”) in the United States.16

In focusing on terrorism, this report does not cover the broader categories of hate speech or hate crimes. There is some overlap between terrorism and hate crimes, since some hate crimes include the use or threat of violence.17 But hate crimes can also include non-violent incidents, such as graffiti and verbal abuse. Hate crimes and hate speech are obviously concerning and a threat to society, but this analysis concentrates only on terrorism and the use—or threat—of violence to achieve political objectives. In addition, this analysis does not focus on protests, looting, and broader civil disturbances. While these incidents are important to analyze— particularly in light of the events in 2020 following the death of George Floyd—most are not terrorism. Some are not violent, while others lack a political motivation. For instance, some of the looting following the death of George Floyd was perpetrated by apolitical criminals.18 Nevertheless, coding incidents as terrorism is challenging in some cases, which is addressed in the methodology that accompanies this analysis.

Finally, while there is often a desire among government officials and academics to focus on terrorist groups and

organizations, the terrorism landscape in the United States remains highly decentralized. Many are inspired by the concept of “leaderless resistance,” which rejects a centralized, hierarchical organization in favor of decentralized networks or individual activity.19 As Kathleen Belew argues in her study of the white power movement in the United States, the aim of leaderless resistance is “to prevent the infiltration of groups, and the prosecution of organizations and individuals, by formally dissociating activists from each other and by eliminating official orders.”20 In addition to their decentralized structures, the violent far-right and far-left in the United States include a wide range of ideologies. The decentralized nature of terrorism is particularly noteworthy regarding the use of violence, which CSIS data suggests is often planned and orchestrated by a single individual or small network. Consequently, this analysis frequently refers to terrorist individuals and networks, rather than groups.

DATA ANALYSIS To evaluate the terrorism threat in the United States, CSIS compiled a data set of 61 incidents that occurred in the country between January 1 and August 31, 2020. (The link to the methodology can be found at the end of the brief.) These incidents included both attacks and plots. The authors coded the ideology of

transnational

threats project

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Number of Terrorist Attacks and Plots by Perpetrator Orientation, January to August 2020

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Other Salafi-jihadist Violent Far-le� Violent Far-right

N um

be r o

f A tt

ac ks

a nd

P lo

ts

Perpetrator Orientation

Figure 1: Number of Terrorist Attacks and Plots by Perpetrator Orientation, January–August 2020

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 4

the perpetrators into one of four categories: religious, violent far-right, violent far-left, and other (there were no ethnonationalist attacks or plots during this period). All religious attacks and plots in the CSIS data set were committed by terrorists motivated by a Salafi-jihadist ideology. Of the four attacks coded as “other,” all were committed by adherents of the Boogaloo movement. This section analyzes the data in three parts: number of attacks and plots, targets and tactics, and fatalities.

Attacks and Plots: Most domestic terrorist attacks and plots between January 1 and August 31, 2020 were committed by white supremacists, anti-government

extremists from the violent far-right, and involuntary celibates (incels). As shown in Figure 1, far-right terrorists committed 67 percent of attacks and plots, far-left terrorists committed 20 percent, and extremists with other motivations (such as supporters of the Boogaloo movement) and Salafi-jihadists each committed 7 percent.

In mid-January 2020, six members of The Base, a transnational white supremacist group, were arrested in Georgia and Maryland and charged with plotting terrorist attacks.21 On May 8, the FBI arrested anti-government extremist Christian Stanley Ferguson in Cleveland, Ohio, who was planning to ambush and execute federal law

enforcement officers and then start an uprising.22 Ferguson also posted violent messages on the digital distribution platform Discord. In one of three attacks in 2020 linked to the online “manosphere,” Armando Hernandez, Jr. was arrested in Glendale, Arizona, after a shooting spree targeting couples at the Westgate Entertainment District that injured three individuals.23

Targets and Tactics: The increase in protests and political rallies over the summer of 2020 resulted in notable changes in targets and weapons adopted by violent far-left and far- right extremists.

Actors of both orientations targeted demonstrators in a large percentage of their attacks.24 Demonstrators were the primary targets of far-right terrorists—in 50 percent of attacks and plots—including attacks from white supremacists and others who opposed the Black Lives Matter movement. For example, on May 30 Brandon McCormick threatened Black Lives Matter protesters in Salt Lake City, Utah, with a knife and a loaded compound bow while shouting racial slurs.25 As in previous years, violent far-right extremists frequently targeted government, military, and police targets (18 percent of incidents) and private individuals based on race, gender, and other factors (18 percent of incidents).

While the primary targets (58 percent) of anarchists and anti-fascists

Abortion Related

Demonstrators

Government, Military, and Police

Journalists and Media

Other

Private Individuals

Religious Institutions

Transportation and Infrastructure

transnational

threats project

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Targets of Violent Far-right Terrorist Attacks and Plots, January to August 2020

2%

50%

18%

3%

3%

18%

3% 3%

42%

58%

Demonstrators

Government, Military, and Police

transnational

threats project

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Targets of Violent Far-le Terrorist Attacks and Plots, January to August 2020

Figure 2: Targets of Violent Far-right Attacks and Plots, January–August 2020

Figure 3: Targets of Violent Far-left Attacks and Plots, January–August 2020

Note: Data on violent far-right targets exclude three plots for which specific targets were not publicly identified.

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 5

were police, government, and military personnel and institutions, 42 percent of their attacks and plots in 2020 also targeted demonstrators. These included crowds supporting the police and Donald Trump, as well as protesters against abortion. The rise in violent far-left and far-right attacks against demonstrators may have been caused by the emerging security dilemma in urban areas, where there was a combustible mix of large crowds, angry demonstrators, and weapons.

There was also an increase in vehicle attacks, most of which targeted demonstrators and most of which were committed by white supremacists or others who opposed the Black Lives Matter movement. On June 7, for instance,

Harry H. Rogers—a member of the Ku Klux Klan— intentionally drove his blue Chevrolet pick-up truck into a crowd of Black Lives Matter protesters, injuring one.26 Rogers was later convicted and sentenced to six years in prison. From January to August 2020, vehicles were used in 11 violent far-right attacks—27 percent of all far-right terrorist incidents—narrowly making them the weapons most frequently used in far-right attacks. This marked a significant increase from 2015 to 2019, during which a vehicle was used in only one violent far-right attack. Although vehicle attacks against demonstrators were most common among white supremacists, one such attack was committed by a violent far-left perpetrator as well. On July

25, Isaiah Ray Cordova drove his sports utility vehicle into a crowd in Eaton, Colorado, which had gathered for a Defend the Police rally.27

This spike in vehicle attacks may have been caused by the ease of using a vehicle to target large gatherings, such as protests. As a Department of Homeland Security assessment concluded, “Attacks of this nature require minimal capability, but can have a devastating impact in crowded places with low levels of visible security.”28 While a concerning development, these vehicle attacks were not as lethal as those in such cities as Nice, France in July 2016, which killed 86 people; Barcelona in August 2017, which killed 16 people; or New York City in October 2017, which killed 8 people.

Explosives, incendiaries, and firearms remained common in both violent far- right and violent far-left attacks and plots, despite the increase in vehicle attacks linked to rallies and protests. Firearms were used in nearly a quarter of violent far-right incidents and were used in 34 percent of violent far-left attacks and plots. On June 6, local police arrested Brandon Moore in Coos Bay, Oregon, after he threatened protesters with a handgun while saying, “White lives matter.”29 Meanwhile, explosives and incendiaries were used in half of far-left terrorist incidents—all of which

Explosives and Incendiaries

Firearms

Melee

Other

Vehicle

transnational

threats project

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Weapons in Violent Far-right Terrorist Attacks and Plots, January to August 2020

25%

24%

12%

12%

27%

50%

34%

8% 8%

Explosives and Incendiaries

Firearms

Melee

Vehicle

transnational

threats project

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Weapons in Violent Far-le Terrorist Attacks and Plots, January to August 2020

Figure 4: Weapons in Violent Far-right Attacks and Plots, January–August 2020

Figure 5: Weapons in Violent Far-left Attacks and Plots, January–August 2020

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 6

targeted government or police property or personnel—and in 25 percent of violent far-right attacks and plots. On May 28, far-left extremists in Minneapolis, Minnesota, conducted an arson attack against the Minneapolis Police Department’s Third Precinct, as the crowd shouted “Burn it down, burn it down.”30 The U.S. Department of Justice charged four men—Dylan Shakespeare Robinson, Davon De-Andre Turner, Bryce Michael Williams, and Branden Michael Wolfe—with conspiracy to commit arson and other crimes in the attack at the Third Precinct.31

Overall, the data suggest that domestic terrorism evolved based on the surge in public demonstrations that began in May. These trends were not a commentary on the protests themselves, but rather on the ability of extremists to adapt to opportunities and the proximity of armed individuals in cities with different political and ideological motivations. Data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) found that out of 10,600 demonstrations between May and August, nearly 95 percent were peaceful, while approximately 5 percent—fewer than 570—involved violence.”32

Fatalities: Despite the large number of terrorist incidents, there were only five fatalities caused by domestic terrorism in the first eight months of 2020. There were four times as many far-left terrorist incidents and the same number of far-right terrorist incidents in 2020 as in all of 2019. Yet only 5 of the 61 incidents (8 percent) recorded between January and August 2020 resulted in fatalities, excluding the perpetrator. Some of these incidents were plots foiled by the FBI or other law enforcement agencies, which suggested that law enforcement agencies were effective in preventing several major attacks. Still, the number of fatalities in 2020 was low compared to the past five years, in which total fatalities ranged from 22 to 66 fatalities. All five fatal attacks in 2020 were conducted with firearms.33

Of the five fatal attacks—each of which resulted in the death of one individual—one was committed by an Antifa activist, one by a far-right extremist, one by an anti-feminist, and two by an adherent of the Boogaloo movement.34 In the fatal far-left attack, Michael Reinoehl, an Antifa extremist, shot and killed Aaron “Jay” Danielson in Portland, Oregon, on August 29.35 On July 25, Daniel Perry shot and killed a protester in Austin, Texas.36 On July 19, anti-feminist Roy Den Hollander shot the family of U.S. District Judge Esther Salas, killing her son and wounding her husband.37 Finally, there were two fatal Boogaloo attacks in 2020. On May 29, Steven Carrillo shot and killed

Pat Underwood, a protective security officer, and wounded his partner in Oakland, California.38 Carrillo also killed a Santa Cruz County Sherriff ’s Deputy in Ben Lomond, California, with an assault rifle on June 6, 2020.39

The relatively low number of fatalities compared to the high number of terrorist incidents suggests that extremists in 2020 prioritized sending messages through intimidation and threats rather than killing. Given that a large portion of attacks were conducted with vehicles or firearms, there was a high potential for lethality—but an apparent lack of will.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS A growing number of U.S. federal and state threat assessments have concluded that domestic terrorism could persist in the United States for the foreseeable future, including in 2021 and beyond. For example, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness projected that “domestic extremists—primarily anarchist, anti-government, and racially motivated—will continue to manipulate national incidents” and remain a threat at least through 2021.40 Looking toward the future, there are several issues worth monitoring.

First, there are various scenarios for a continuation—and even a rise—of violence after the November 2020 elections, which could persist into 2021 and beyond. Rising political polarization, growing economic challenges, the persistence of Covid-19, and growing concerns about immigration could lead to a rise in domestic terrorism.

The actions of far-left and far-right extremists are likely to be interlinked as various sides respond to others during protests, riots, demonstrations, and online activity. There appears to be an assumption by some extremists that others are prepared to use force, which heightens the possibility of violence. All sides have access to firearms, incendiaries, crude explosives, and other weapons, and are willing to bring them to demonstrations. This situation is a classic security dilemma.41 Each side’s efforts to increase its own security and acquire weapons inadvertently threaten the other side. Since it may be difficult for individuals to distinguish between offensive and defensive arms, even efforts by one side to protect itself may motivate others to arm, creating a spiral of actions that leads to violence.42 As Figure 6 highlights, domestic terrorism incidents have not been isolated to specific geographic locations, suggesting that a rise in terrorism would likely be a national problem, not a regional one. The broad scope of domestic terrorism also makes it difficult to predict where future incidents will occur.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 7

In the event of a Democratic presidential victory, the threat could involve specific attacks by radicalized white supremacists, militias, and other related individuals. In these incidents, the primary weapons—particularly for fatal attacks—are likely to be firearms and explosives, as highlighted in the 2020 militia plots against the governors of Michigan and Virginia. Based on data from the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), the number of firearm background checks for gun purchases spiked to its highest level ever in 2020—which doubled over the past decade.43 The pervasiveness of guns—including automatic weapons—is particularly concerning in the United States’ ultra-polarized political climate. Based on our data, the targets are likely to be demonstrators, politicans, or individuals based on their race, ethnicity, or religion—such as African Americans, Latinos, Muslims, and Jews.

In the event of a Republican presidential victory, for example, the primary threat may come from large-scale demonstrations in cities, some of which become violent. Anarchists, anti-fascists, and other far-left extremists have

utilized digital platforms and other publications to argue that Donald Trump is a neo-fascist and that violence is legitimate.44 As the Antifa-aligned journal It’s Going Down argued, “Suddenly, anarchists and antifa, who have been demonized and sidelined by the wider Left have been hearing from liberals and Leftists, ‘you’ve been right all along.’”45 A Baltimore-based Antifa activist explained the use of violence as graduated and escalating: “You fight them with fists so you don’t have to fight them with knives. You fight them with knives so you don’t have to fight them with guns. You fight them with guns so you don’t have to fight them with tanks.”46 Anarchists, anti-fascists, and other far-left individuals and networks have increasingly used firearms—in addition to explosives and incendiary devices—in conducting attacks. In this scenario, the primary targets could be government, military, and police facilities and personnel.

Digital platforms will likely continue to be a major battlefield. Far-left extremists will likely continue to use social media platforms—such as Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter—to release propaganda and instigate violence against political

Figure 6: Location of Domestic Terrorist Attacks and Plots, January–August 2020

Seattle

Portland

Salt Lake City

Las Vegas

Phoenix

Austin

Tampa

Richmond Kansas City

Bloomington

Madison

Minneapolis

Fort Mill

Boston

New York

Dallas

Corpus Christi

Albuquerque

Denver Grand Island

Cleveland

Newark

Los Angeles

Oakland

OtherSalafi-jihadist

Violent Far-le�Violent Far-right

Note: This map includes 61 events from January 1 to August 31, 2020. No events occurred in Alaska, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico during this period. Events that occurred near one another are buffered to avoid overlapping points.

Source: Data compiled by CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 8

opponents, law enforcement, military, and the government.47 Many adopted slogans, such as ACAB (“all cops are bastards”), that were used in memes as part of their propaganda campaigns. Far-right extremists will likely use a multitude of mainstream platforms (such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Telegram, and Reddit), lesser-known platforms (such as Gab, Discord, Minds, and Bitchute), forums (such as Stormfront and IronForge), and other online communities to instigate violence against African Americans, Jews, immigrants, and others.48 Extremists from all sides will likely utilize digital platforms to fundraise, communicate, issue propaganda, conduct doxing campaigns (releasing an individual’s personally identifiable information), intimidate targets, and coordinate activity.

Second, the domestic landscape could shift from a decentralized milieu of extremists to more organized and hierarchically structured groups. As one study concluded, Louis Beam’s concept of “leaderless resistance” has been “a near total failure as a method of fomenting widespread armed resistance against the U.S. government.”49 Most effective militant organizations have established centralized organizational structures to enable their leaders to control how violence is orchestrated and how finances are secured and managed.50

In the United States, there are a handful of groups—such as The Base, the Atomwaffen Division (including rebranded versions such as the National Socialist Order), and the Feuerkrieg Division—with some leadership structure and command-and-control arrangements. There are also loose extremist movements that have a limited structure— especially in local areas or online—but lack a clear hierarchy and ideology. Examples include the Three Percenters, Oath Keepers, Boogaloos, QAnon, and some local networks of anarchists, anti-fascists, and militias. There have been some indications of greater organization, including the establishment of online hubs, such as MyMilitia, that provide a venue for individuals to find existing militias in the United States—or even to start their own.51

A shift toward more hierarchical groups could have at least two implications. It could increase the competence and professionalism of these organizations in numerous areas, such as planning attacks, recruiting, training, improving operational security, and fundraising. In the 1960s and 1970s, extremists in the United States established more centralized groups—such as the Order, Mau Mau, and White Knights—to improve their effectiveness.52 But research on terrorist and other militant groups indicates

that centralized groups are more vulnerable to penetration by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.53

Fortunately, there is some good news. The number of fatalities from domestic terrorism today is relatively low, and the possibility of a civil war—which some experts have worried about and some extremists have predicted—is negligible.54 The United States has endured more violent periods in the past. Examples include a surge in white supremacist terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s (such as the Ku Klux Klan), black nationalist violence in the 1960s (such as the Black Liberation Army), revolutionary leftist violence in the 1960s and 1970s (such as the Weather Underground), and Puerto Rican nationalist violence in the late-1960s and 1970s (such as the Armed Forces of National Liberation, or FALN).55 In addition, the United States faced serious threats from Salafi-jihadists after September 11, 2001—such as Najibullah Zazi, Faisal Shahzad, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Nidal Hasan, Omar Mateen, and Mohammed Alshamrani— who perpetrated or plotted mass-casualty attacks.

But the United States weathered these periods thanks to the resilience of Americans and the effectiveness of U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and other national security agencies. During his second inaugural address, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln said it best in encouraging Americans to come together during divisive times:

With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish, a just and lasting peace, among ourselves and with all nations.56

President Lincoln’s words are just as relevant today.

Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Catrina Doxsee is a program manager and research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS. Nicholas Harrington is a program manager and research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS. Grace Hwang is a research assistant with the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. James Suber is a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 9

CSIS BRIEFS are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Cover Photo: Logan Cyrus/AFP/Getty Images

The authors give special thanks to Brian Michael Jenkins, Colin Clarke, Jacob Ware, and Alex Friedland for their review of the document—including the data set—and their helpful critiques. Also, thanks to David Brannan and Paul Smith for their comments.

For an overview of the methodology used in compiling the data set, please see “Methodology.”

This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 10

ENDNOTES

1. United States of America v. Adam Fox, Barry Croft, Ty Garbin, Kaleb Franks, Daniel Harris, and Brandon Caserta, Criminal Complaint, Case 1:20-mj- 00416-SJB, October 6, 2020.

2. Kayla Ruble and Devlin Barrett, “FBI: Whitmer Plotters Also Discussed Kidnapping Virginia Governor Ralph Northam,” Washington Post, October 12, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/ralph- northam-gretchen-witmer-kidnapping-plot/2020/10/13/26b4e31a-0d5f- 11eb-b1e8-16b59b92b36d_story.html.

3. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, October 2020), 18, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_ homeland-threat-assessment.pdf. Emphasis added.

4. Christopher Wray, “Worldwide Threats to the Homeland,” Statement before the House Homeland Security Committee, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2020, (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 24, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/worldwide- threats-to-the-homeland-091720.

5. On previous data see Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, “The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States,” CSIS, CSIS Briefs, June 17, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-terror- ism-problem-united-states.

6. The security dilemma literature is large. Some of the basic works include John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157–80, doi:10.2307/2009187; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167–214, doi:10.2307/2009958; Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 50–90, doi:10.2307/2539079; Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 171–201, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054031.

7. For historical data see, for example, Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003).

8. On definitions of terrorism, see, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1–41, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB386.html; and Global Terrorism Database, Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, October 2019), https://www.start.umd.edu/ gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf.

9. See, for example, the definitions in National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Ideological Motivations of Terrorism in the United States, 1970-2016 (College Park, MD: START, Novem- ber 2017), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IdeologicalMotivation- sOfTerrorismInUS_Nov2017.pdf.

10. Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977), 80.

11. Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington, “The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States.”

12. Ibid.

13. Far-right terrorists are often described as believing that social and ra- cial inequality is inevitable, desirable, and natural. They also possess views that include anti-egalitarianism, nativism, and authoritarianism. See Jacob Aasland Ravndal et al., RTV Trend Report 2019: Right Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990-2018 (Oslo, Norway: Center for Research on Extremism, 2019), 3, https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/on- line-resources/rtv-dataset/trend-report-2019.pdf. Also see Jacob Aasland Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo, “Investigating Terrorism from the Extreme Right: A Review of Past and Present Research,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no.

6 (December 2018): 5–22, https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/ content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-6/ a1-ravndal-and-bjorgo.pdf; Ehud Sprinzak, “Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Split Delegitimization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 1 (1995): 17–43, doi:10.1080/09546559508427284; and Cas Mudde, “Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86),” European Journal of Political Research 27, no. 2 (1995): 203–224, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00636.x.

14. On proponents of accelerationism see, for example, James Mason, Siege, book manuscript, 1992. On the threat from accelerationism see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, and Colin P. Clarke, “The Growing Threat Posed by Accelerationist Groups Worldwide,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 20, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/arti- cle/2020/04/the-growing-threat-posed-by-accelerationism-and-accelera- tionist-groups-worldwide/.

15. Much of the literature on terrorism has classified Black nationalist groups as far-left. Many adherents of Black nationalism have opposed colonialism and imperialism, supported Marxist-Leninist views, advocat- ed anarchism, and cooperated with other far-left individuals and groups. See, for example, William Rosenau, “‘Our Backs Are Against the Wall’: The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 2 (2013): 176–192, doi:10.1080/105761 0X.2013.747074; Dana M. Williams, “Black Panther Radical Factionaliza- tion and the Development of Black Anarchism,” Journal of Black Studies 46, no. 7 (2015): 678–703, doi:10.1177/0021934715593053; Steven Windisch, Gina Scott Ligon, and Pete Simi, “Organizational [Dis]trust: Comparing Dis- engagement Among Former Left-Wing and Right-Wing Violent Extremists,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 42, no. 6 (2019): 559–580, doi:10.1080/105 7610X.2017.1404000.

16. On the ideology of the Boogaloo movement see, for example, “Affidavit in Support of an Application for a Criminal Complaint,” U.S. Department of Justice, September 4, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/ file/1313661/download.

17. On similarities and differences between terrorism and hate crimes, see Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses (The Hague: International Cen- tre for Counter-Terrorism, September 2019), https://icct.nl/publication/ extreme-right-violence-and-terrorism-concepts-patterns-and-responses/; Daniel Koehler, Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Ter- rorism, February 2019), 9, https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf; James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Kathleen Deloughery, Ryan King, and Victor Asal, “Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The Rela- tionship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime,” Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (October 2012): 663–688, doi:10.1177/0011128712452956; Randy Blazak, “Isn’t Every Crime a Hate Crime? The Case for Hate Crime Laws,” Sociology Compass 5, no. 4 (April 2011): 244–255, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/260416492_Isn't_Every_Crime_a_Hate_Crime_The_Case_for_ Hate_Crime_Laws; and Donald P. Green, Laurence H. McFalls, and Jennifer K. Smith, “Hate Crime: An Emergent Research Agenda,” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (August 2001): 479–504, doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.479.

18. Wray, “Worldwide Threats to the Homeland.”

19. See, for example, Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” The Seditionist 12 (February 1992): 5.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 11

20. Kathleen Belew, Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 4-5.

21. “Three Alleged Members of the Violent Extremist Group ‘The Base’ Facing Federal Firearms and Alien-Related Charges,” U.S. Department of Justice, press release, January 16, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/ pr/three-alleged-members-violent-extremist-group-base-facing-feder- al-firearms-and-alien; “Three Men Charged with Murder Conspiracy, Anti-Government Activity,” Floyd County Police Department, January 17, 2020, https://floydcountypolicedept.wordpress.com/2020/01/17/ three-men-charged-with-murder-conspiracy-anti-government-activity/.

22. “Cleveland Man Indicted for Attempted Plot to Kidnap Law Enforce- ment,” U.S. Department of Justice, press release, May 21, 2020, https:// www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/pr/cleveland-man-indicted-attempt- ed-plot-kidnap-law-enforcement.

23. BrieAnna J. Frank, Maria Polletta, Joshua Bowling, and Alana Minkler, “Officials: Suspect Sought ‘Respect,’ Targeted Couples in Westgate Shoot- ing,” Arizona Republic, May 21, 2020, https://www.azcentral.com/story/ news/local/glendale-breaking/2020/05/21/police-identify-armando-her- nandez-jr-westgate-shooting-suspect/5235635002/; and Joshua Bowling and Perry Vandell, “Westgate shooting: Who is Armando Hernandez Jr.?,” Arizona Republic, May 23, 2020, https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/ local/glendale/2020/05/23/westgate-shooting-who-armando-hernan- dez-jr/5237382002/.

24. To compare targets with previous periods see Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, “The Tactics and Targets of Domestic Terrorists,” CSIS, CSIS Briefs, July 30, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ tactics-and-targets-domestic-terrorists.

25. “Man Accused of Pointing Weapon at Protesters to Stand Tri- al,” AP, July 15, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/3de21dccec- 90c8cccc7c7e64873d4e2e; and Nate Carlisle, “Man Who Drew Bow and Ar- row on Salt Lake City Protesters is in Jail, Charged with Three Felonies,” Salt Lake City Tribune, June 5, 2020, https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/06/04/ man-who-drew-bow-arrow/.

26. Shannon Taylor, “Henrico community members: Please see my complete statement below regarding an arrest last night by Henrico Police after a man drove a truck into protestors,” Facebook, June 8, 2020, https://www.facebook. com/ShannonTaylorVA/photos/a.1351162298359756/1733983986744250; Shannon Taylor, “Henrico community: Please see my complete statement below,” Facebook, June 25, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/ShannonTaylor- VA/photos/a.1351162298359756/1750676268408355; and Allyson Waller, “Virginia Man Who Drove Into Protesters Gets 6 Years in Prison,” New York Times, August 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/us/kkk-har- ry-rogers-guilty.html.

27. Trevor Reid, “Court Date Set for Man Accused of Driving into Eaton Police Rally,” Greeley Tribune, August 6, 2020, https://www.greeleytribune. com/2020/08/06/court-date-set-for-man-accused-of-driving-into-eaton- police-rally/.

28. “Vehicle Ramming: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, undated, https://www.cisa. gov/sites/default/files/publications/Vehicle%20Ramming%20-%20Securi- ty%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF.

29. Coos Bay Police Department, Press Release, Facebook, June 6, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/CoosBayPolice/posts/press-releaseon- saturday-june-6-2020-at-about-140-pm-coos-bay-police-received- ca/3432264840146430/.

30. Nick Woltman, “Minneapolis Police Precinct Abandoned, Torched; On Twitter, Trump Threatens ‘Thugs’,” Pioneer Press, May 28, 2020, https:// www.twincities.com/2020/05/28/minneapolis-police-abandon-third-pre- cinct-hq-as-george-floyd-protesters-pull-down-fences/.

31. “Four Indicted in Minneapolis Police Third Precinct Arson,” U.S. De- partment of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, August 25, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/four-indicted-minneapo- lis-police-third-precinct-arson.

32. Roudabeh Kishi and Sam Jones, “Demonstrations and Political Vi- olence in America: New Data for Summer 2020,” Armed Conflict Loca- tion & Event Data Project (ACLED), September 2020, https://acleddata. com/2020/09/03/demonstrations-political-violence-in-america-new-da- ta-for-summer-2020/.

33. Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington, “The Tactics and Targets of Domestic Terrorists.”

34. We did not code the Kyle Rittenhouse incident as a terrorist attack. We assessed that he lacked a clear political motive for the killings in Kenosha, Wisconsin. As with all of the incidents in our database, we had a group of outside reviewers examine the data and codings.

35. Neil MacFarquhar, Mike Baker, and Adam Goldman, “In His Last Hours, Portland Murder Suspect Said He Feared Arrest,” New York Times, September 4, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/04/us/port- land-shooting-michael-reinoehl.html; and Destiny Johnson and Cassi- dy Quinn, “Unsealed Documents Shed Light on Moments Before Fatal Downtown Portland Shooting,” KGW8, September 4, 2020, https://www. kgw.com/article/news/local/multnomah-county-district-attorney-pro- vides-new-information-in-homicide-case/283-629b983a-620a-469e-bc03- 4b365a99a547.

36. Daniel Perry’s Twitter posts from the account @knivesfromtrigu, which we examined, included such comments as, “Now is the time to take up arms and protect yourselves against violence” (May 31, 2020), “. . . you shoot center of mass. 1 it is a bigger target. 2 it still drops them. 3 even if you shoot them in the leg there is a major artery that will cause the person to bleed out in just a few minutes” (June 3, 2020), and “Send them to Texas we will show them why we say don’t mess with Texas” (June 19, 2020).

37. Eric Levenson, Paul P. Murphy, and Katelyn Polantz, “Suspect in Fatal Shooting at Home of Judge Esther Salas Described Himself as an ‘Anti-Fem- inist’ Lawyer, Once Argued a Case Before the Judge,” CNN, July 21, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/20/us/suspect-shooting-at-judge-salas- home/index.html.

38. “Two Defendants Charged with Murder and Aiding and Abetting in Slaying of Federal Protective Service Officer at Oakland Courthouse Build- ing,” U.S. Department of Justice, press release, June 16, 2020, https://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/two-defendants-charged-murder-and-aiding-and-abet- ting-slaying-federal-protective-service; Richard Winton, Maura Dolan, and Anita Chabria, “Far-Right ‘Boogaloo Boys’ Linked to Killing of California Law Officers and Other Violence,” Los Angeles Times, June 17, 2020, https:// www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-17/far-right-boogaloo-boys- linked-to-killing-of-california-lawmen-other-violence.

39. United States of America v. Steven Carrillo, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, May 29, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1285706/ download.

40. New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, Supplemen- tal Threat Assessment 2020-2021: The Convergence of COVID-19, Nationwide Civil Unrest, and the Upcoming Presidential Election (Trenton, NJ: State of New Jersey, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Prepared- ness, September 2020), 5, https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analy- sis/2020-2021-supplemental-threat-assessment.

41. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”; and Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”; Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited.”

42. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Ethnic

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 12

Conflict and International Security, Michael E. Brown, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): 103–124; and James D. Fearon, “Ratio- nalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379–414, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903.

43. On the data, see “NICS Firearm Background Checks: Month/Year,” National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), https://www. fbi.gov/file-repository/nics_firearm_checks_-_month_year.pdf/view.

44. See, for example, Joel Finkelstein et al., Network-Enabled Anarchy: How Militant Anarcho-Socialist Networks Use Social Media to Instigate Widespread Violence Against Political Opponents and Law Enforcement (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Miller Center for Community Protection and Resil- ience, September 2020), https://ncri.io/reports/network-enabled-anarchy/.

45. “What Anarchists Have Been Saying for Years, and What Liberals Need to Start Hearing,” It’s Going Down, December 8, 2016.

46. Mark Bray, Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, August 2017), 169.

47. See, for example, Finkelstein, Network-Enabled Anarchy; Michael Jensen et al., The Use of Social Media by United States Extremists (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror- ism, 2018), https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/use-social-media-unit- ed-states-extremists; and Craig Timberg and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “Violent Memes and Messages Surging on Far-Left Social Media, A New Report Finds,” Washington Post, September 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost. com/technology/2020/09/14/violent-antipolice-memes-surge/.

48. See, for example, Mauela Caiani and Linda Parenti, “The Dark Side of the Web: Italian Right-Wing Extremist Groups and the In- ternet,” South European Society & Politics 14, no. 3 (2009): 273–294, doi:10.1080/13608740903342491; Manuela Caiani and Linda Parenti, European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet (New York: Routledge, 2016); Caterina Froio, “Race, Religion, or Culture? Framing Is- lam between Racism and Neo-Racism in the Online Network of the French Far Right,” Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 696–709, doi:10.1017/ S1537592718001573; Caterina Froio and Bharat Ganesh, “The Transna- tionalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter,” European Societies 21, no. 4 (2019): 513–539, doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295; and Valentine Crosset, Samuel Tanner, and Aurélie Campana, “Researching Far Right Groups on Twitter: Methodological Challenges 2.0,” New Media & Society 2, no. 14 (2019): 939–961, doi:10.1177/1461444818817306.

49. Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Orga- nizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 5.

50. See, for example, Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 127-159; Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma.

51. See, for example, Tess Owen, “Meet MyMilitia, Where Right-Wing Extremists Find Friendship and Fantasize About Violence,” Vice News, October 15, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3gmmk/meet-mymi- litia-where-right-wing-extremists-find-friendship-and-fantasize-about- violence.

52. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 53–68.

53. See, for example, Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Under- standing the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 13–34; Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma; and Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 83–113.

54. On the prospect of a civil war see, for example, Brian Michael Jen- kins, Domestic Terrorism and the U.S. Elections (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, October 7, 2020), https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/10/domestic-terror- ism-and-the-us-elections.html.

55. See, for example, Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 12–22.

56. Ronald C. White Jr., Lincoln’s Greatest Speech: The Second Inaugural Address (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 19.