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SOC 420 Lesson 2 SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1: Epistemology and the Sociology of Religion

Even if you are a minority of one, the truth is the truth.

—Mahatma Ghandi (as cited at brainyquote.com )

First Things First—Basic Concepts and Required Reading

Welcome to Lesson 2 of our Sociology of Religion course! Hopefully you’re getting all the time you need to fully process the concepts we’re reading about. In case you were curious: A “concept” is a topic, subject, complex idea, etc. We read about the concepts of sociology, religion, and Rational Choice theory in the previous unit, for instance. In this unit, we are reading about the concepts of social theories, methods, epistemology, and so forth. Please start by reading the assigned text chapters. There are other readings in the remainder of the lesson that are recommended, but also optional. As I’ve previously noted, I generally err on giving you access to more information than you’ll probably need, rather than not enough. In any case, there are some additional key concepts to cover in this lesson, so let’s jump into it.

The Wide Wonderful World of Epistemology

In the sociology of religion, especially as we consider the importance of studying religion scientifically (for Assignment 2 purposes), ( it’s useful to understand a little of the discourse of epistemology, or how we know something is true, valid, or correct. Remember, as in the last lesson, we in the sociology of religion aren’t trying to figure out the truth, validity, and/or correctness of particular claims of belief or doctrine. Rather, we are looking back at our own observations and asking ourselves if we got those right: Did we really observe what we thought we observed? Was that measurement valid and reliable? Are our conclusions valid and based on a correct interpretation of our data?

In the sociology of religion, our epistemological concern isn’t whether we know a given religious belief is or isn’t true, valid, and/or correct—it’s whether we can reasonably know that our data, interpretation of that data, and the conclusions that result from our analysis are true, valid, and correct. So, to pick a broad example of a given religious belief, we aren’t trying to establish whether God exists. That’s impossible for empirical science, as explained below. However, we are trying to establish whether we have correctly understood, interpreted, and explained what it means that a given religious group believes God exists. (If you follow that.) (

In brief, in the sociology of religion, we also often ask ourselves: Do we know we’ve correctly grasped the issue we’re researching? In other words, regarding the concept of epistemology, in the context of the social research methods we often use and their validity but this time using the “plain English” translation: ( Do we really know what we think we know? Do we “get it”? As we’ll see, part of the answer involves the method we use to ask the question.

Another caution as well: Just because we are setting aside the notion of the truth of a given religious claim does not mean that we are either affirming or denying it. We are NOT saying that any particular religious belief—or for that matter, religious belief as a whole—is true or false. We are simply affirming that the veracity (truth or falsehood) of any particular religious belief is beyond the power of scientific verifiability or explanation. Instead, we are considering what it means that the belief exists. Back to the example of the existence of God, science—especially social science—has no power to confirm or deny God’s existence. The same is true of any other idea, concept, or principle of religious belief.

To confirm that God exists from a purely scientific standpoint, and assuming a monotheistic perspective for the sake of argument (polytheism really, really adds new levels of complexity to this question), ( we social scientists would likely have to accomplish this: Search the universe, find and observe God directly, bring back evidence of God’s existence, explain to the satisfaction of our peers at minimum (though probably also to everyone else, too) ( why we normally can’t see God directly, and rule out any possibility that our observations can be attributed to any other cause.

Interestingly, empirically ruling out God’s existence is even more difficult, and much more so. To do that, we social scientists would have to search the entire known universe, fail to find God, show that our search was sufficiently thorough to account for any other possibility for our failure to find God—perhaps God was actually in one spot while we were searching another, or our tools or methods weren’t sophisticated enough to allow us to discover God, and so forth—and altogether rule out the existence of God by establishing alternative explanations for every single phenomena that have been historically attributed to God. This must also be done to our satisfaction, to that of most of our peers, and to the public. It is similarly difficult, if not impossible, to empirically verify any particular precept of religious belief or doctrine. Heck, modern scientific-minded adventurers have trouble enough trying to detect, much less confirm, the existence of Bigfoot on our own Earth, even using highly advanced technology and modern empirical methods, let alone many of the rest of us trying to search the entire universe for deity! (

So in short, this suspension isn’t a denial of religious belief, just as it isn’t an affirmation. It’s simply an honest and candid admission that either confirming or denying the epistemological truth of actual religious beliefs is well beyond the scope of empirical science. By setting aside or “bracketing” the truth of particular religious beliefs, in as unbiased fashion as possible, we merely acknowledge the limitations of the tools we have on hand. Logic and the scientific approach, whether inductive or deductively oriented, are highly useful in empirical science—but they can only take us so far. We must also use these tools correctly in the appropriate context, sadly unlike our unfortunate penguin friend shown above. (

In any case, that’s the approach we take. Still, we try to minimize as many of our own biases as we can. We remain human, so we cannot eliminate our biases altogether. We can’t magically transform ourselves into someone else—we have never been anyone else, and never will be. We cannot see beyond our own perspectives; we simply need to admit what our own biases have been and strive to minimize those so we can be as unbiased as possible as we investigate.

So this, combined with the information in the previous lesson about the sociology of religion, should let you know how you should approach your assignments. Conduct all your observations, including your Meet the Believers exercise (Shameless Plug Alert: Please don’t put that off—get started ASAP!), ( with a mind open to multiple possibilities. Then as you write, show what you have learned from our course readings, and compare and contrast concepts in an insightful and minimally biased way. In your MTB report, as with all other assignments, focus on what you’ve learned and your understanding of the concepts first and foremost. Share your experiences and observations as an observer trying to—as we discussed in the first lesson—reveal that which has been hidden.

OK, let’s keep going into the wide wonderful world of epistemology…

Some Absolutely Crucial ( Sociological and Epistemological Concepts

So far, so good. To continue, let’s define and briefly discuss a set of concepts that will become vital to our understanding of the sociology of religion. The first is religion itself , which involves not only belief and a worldview associated with that belief, but a system of practices and objectives that are associated with those beliefs. For a bit more background on that, two articles from The Hartford Seminary illuminate the issues of the difficulty of defining religion and the origin of "Religious Studies" .

In any case, belief is a key dimension of religion that needs a bit of elaboration. According to Merriam-Webster, belief is defined as :

1: a state or habit of mind in which trust or confidence is placed in some person or thing

2: something believed ; especially : a tenet or body of tenets held by a group

3: conviction of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon especially when based on examination of evidence

Religious belief encompasses all of these three senses of the word—trust and confidence, along with a particular worldview; a body of tenets, principles, or doctrines; and a conviction of the reality of those principles and/or a particular being. In the American context, a claim to religious belief is strong and continues to be so, even in the modern age, though religious practice seems to be a bit more problematic.

The second term is spirituality. Some believers see little difference between religion and spirituality, though many observers in our day and age actually see a fair amount of difference between the two. (For instance, this paper from the University of Miami offers an interesting comparison and contrast.) As currently defined, in any case, spirituality is thought of as a much broader endeavor than religion, and one that can possibly encompass it. Hence, religion is a part of spirituality in most theoretical frameworks. As for exactly what constitutes spirituality, it is often thought of as a quest—a holistic search for meaning and purpose above and beyond the material aspect of life, whether symbolic or metaphysical. This “quest” can take the sense of a search for self-authenticity, care for others, construction of meaning, an experiential encounter with the unexpected, or a desire for interconnectedness and wholeness. (See this discussion from a UCLA-hosted forum , for example.)

Third, let’s discuss religiosity. Briefly defined, this is the way people practice their religious beliefs, or religious behavior. Sometimes researchers vary this somewhat; for instance, researchers Nathaniel Lambert and David Dollahite use it this way in this study of religion and marital conflict : “For the purposes of this study, we define religiosity as a person’s spiritual beliefs, religious practices, and involvement with a faith community.” Religiosity can be understood as having private and public dimensions. Private religious behavior is what believers tend to do out of the public eye, such as prayer, reading sacred texts, fasting, and so forth; public religiosity is what is done in a group setting, such as church attendance, service to the community, preaching to others, and so forth.

A quick note about some other terminology that we occasionally run across in the study of religion. A theodicy is the defense of deity’s goodness or positive qualities in the face of challenges, as in the case of bad things happening to generally good people. Soteriology is the study of salvation, particularly in the Christian context, and the theological and logical principles associated with it. As in one of our Lesson 6 modules, metaphysical has to do with other-worldly matters in general, such as ghosts and spirits, angels, visions, and other phenomena that are either directly or indirectly associated with religion and belong to a purportedly unseen sphere of existence. Paranormal, however, is a larger label that doesn’t refer only to religious matters, but anything that lies beyond the scope and/or detection of modern science. The metaphysical can be considered part of the paranormal, in a way.

Also, to move on to even more profound matters, let’s address at length another common misperception in our modern world. We have discovered that many, many phenomena in life are dependent on our perception and/or social context, but many among us have erroneously concluded that this means everything is dependent on culture and/or personal perspective. As some seem to believe, our old ideas about Absolute and Unchanging Truth—so mid-20th century! If not 1700s!—have therefore been proven completely wrong, and Objective Truth no longer exists. Ummmm… just three words for you—OK, maybe four—No, no, and no. At various times in our philosophical discourse, we’ve been somewhat confused about the nature of Absolutes and Absolute Truth and what constituted It/Them, but please make no mistake at all: There are Absolutes. (Consider the converse statement, “There is no such thing as an Absolute,” and ponder the absurd self-contradiction. It’s absurd for a pretty darn good reason!) (

The fact is: Objective Truth in some form must necessarily exist. Without it, not only would all nature and our everyday experience be sheer chaos, but existence itself would be impossible. So again, please make no mistake whatsoever: There IS Objective Truth. We don’t have time or space to go over the entire logical argument right now, and it’s not our focus anyway, though DesCartes (“I think, therefore I am”) had this part of it mostly right (though he was mistaken in some other areas); Gandhi knew this as well, as in the words at the top of the lesson. There’s a fairly intense philosophical discussion on this point at this link from Notre Dame University , too.

But as a short “for instance,” let’s examine one subjective-relative thesis; George Berkeley’s argument that perception determines existence, so that objects that we don’t perceive don’t truly exist for us, will do nicely. This idea of existence depending on subjective perception is an interesting theoretical concept, and allows us to debate whether trees falling in forests without anyone nearby actually make sounds, among other fun and games. ( (Berkeley most definitely said No, BTW—not only for the sound, but for the tree! In his view and conceptualization, neither truly exists, since nobody knows about either of them!) Berkeley’s arguments came long ago—see this Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article for more about him—and his thinking influenced subsequent arguments over the centuries. So our modern day public philosophy is largely based on subjectivism and relative collectivism of this sort.

So as we consider epistemology, please keep in mind that there’s a distinct relationship between Objective (Big-T) truth and subjective (little-t) truth. We know well about subjective little-t truth—of course, we know what we know, subject to our own perceptions, assumptions, and previous learning. Hey, we all call it like we see it and/or tell it like it is—or at least as we think it is ( —so let’s not explore subjectivity at great length. We already know what it’s all about—or at least we hope so. ( But Objective Big-T Truth is a different matter, and we’re frequently confused about what these Truths are, especially when we plunge into metaphysics and spirituality.

Here’s what Objectivity is all about: The Big-T Truths, as it were, are the Truths we know in an Ultimate Objective sense, which hold true no matter what: We exist. The sky is blue. Pure water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit at sea level. Sodium and chloride atoms react with each other to form table salt. Science helps us discover some of these Absolutes; other Objective Truths in the religious world we may consider self-evident, as (for instance) The Word of God.

However, please keep in mind a core irony of our religious existence: Many of our reasons for evaluating any given religious principle as Objective Truth are ironically subjective. We who are religious believers really do believe we know The Truth, at least on some level and to some extent—or we wouldn’t really believe it! Yet we all perceive the Objective from a subjective standpoint! In the words of Paul in the New Testament, we see “through a glass darkly.” We also often fail to recognize the extent to which our customs, traditions, and fallible perceptions color our individual understandings of what that Truth really is and what it entails. So in addition to our subjective perception of Truth, we also have other people explaining The Truth to us and interpreting it!

This is yet another reason we in the sociology of religion “bracket” the question of the Ultimate Truth of various religious claims. We can only go so far as the best evidence we have takes us, and there eventually comes a point in our journey of discovery where evidence—perceived and interpreted, as it is—is no longer feasible to help us know what is correct and valid. (Søren Kierkegaard’s proverbial “leap of faith” comes to mind, for instance.) Also, if you follow one of Peter Berger’s primary arguments in The Sacred Canopy, much of religion lies in the interaction of the Nomos (social order) and the individual, as truth and reality are socially and individually constructed as these two levels interact. So if our focus is on those dimensions, Objective Truth doesn’t really come into play to begin with!

In any case, these Objective Truths, as Absolutes, involve what we consider always and absolutely True, never changing, always dependable, always constant. Many metaphysical (other-worldly) teachings, for instance, are often considered Objective. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous lesson, many people who hold particularly strong religious convictions or come to experience particular events such as ghostly encounters or near-death-experiences thereafter consider those religious/metaphysical experiences as more Real than the events and circumstances of the everyday world. As in Lesson 1, Berger also explored this phenomenon in The Heretical Imperative, though we won’t recap this at length here. In short, instead of our ordinary view of the religious world being a fanciful illusion and our world being real, for them, their experience becomes real and the mundane world becomes the fanciful illusion.

For instance, the 2001 film The Other Side of Heaven is based on the real-life experiences of John Groberg, as recorded in a memoir written a couple of decades before that, The Eye of the Storm. As a Mormon missionary in Tonga in the mid-1950s, Groberg nearly starved to death after a hurricane devastated the island where he was living and relief efforts were delayed for several weeks. But he was saved when a local minister of another Christian denomination—in a wonderfully altruistic act of surpassing generosity—offered him the last of his own food shortly before dying of starvation himself. Groberg also wrote that in his state of advanced hunger, he’d had some metaphysical experiences in which he’d actually seen and visited a spiritual world beyond this one. That confirmed his faith, for him, and that world he’d said he’d visited thereafter became his Reality. Without giving specifics of the spiritual encounters, he observed in his memoir, repeated in the film: “There is a connection between heaven and earth. Finding that connection gives meaning to everything, including death. Missing it makes everything meaningless, including life.”

Subjectively perceived and understood Objective experiences such as Groberg reports are typical of many believers who report beyond-this-world encounters, from experiences recorded in texts considered sacred (the Bible, Baghavad Gita, the various writings of Buddha, and so forth) to Joan of Arc’s visions to the mystical writings of Zen Buddhism and many other metaphysical claims of believers. Verifiable or not—and virtually always not!—they often conclude that the world-beyond-this, at least as they experience it, is the actual though ironically little perceived Objective sphere of existence, while the world we know around us is the sphere of existence that is in Reality impermanent and fleeting. Of course, from a sociological standpoint, this “Reality” is still very much the subjective experience and property of the perceiver, and nearly impossible to verify empirically; hence the utility of phenomenology for many sociologists, as we shall see.

The Epistemology of Method and Theory

Remember, we as religious scholars seek to verify our findings with observable data using specific methods. When the data are not directly observable, as in stories of metaphysical encounters, the reports of the experiences become the data. These data are then analyzed for their social meaning. But much more often, other sociologists largely avoid this conundrum by emphasizing phenomena that are more easily observable to begin with. We are generally unable to observe someone’s near-death experience or ghostly encounter—the report of the experience is the closest thing to it—but we can certainly observe religious socialization in process. With carefully trained eyes, we can also see phenomena such as power dynamics, gender roles, ethnic differences, institutional behavior, and religious conflict at work.

The particular methods social scientists use help them answer important questions. So these methods are used to help reinforce the researchers’ social-scientific epistemological concerns. Epistemologically speaking, we are arguing that we know our results are accurate because we are basing our observations on data and adhering to established scientific methods. There are many different methods used in the sociology of religion today, though a handful are especially common. For instance, those of you who have carefully read the American Grace excerpt have noted that the study resulted from amassing data from a series of surveys. Questionnaires were sent to many respondents, who answered the questions in the form of numerical scales. With the responses converted to numbers on a progressive scale, the results can be statistically analyzed. (The same is also true of other quantitative (numerical-based) methods that convert responses to numbers. Internal statistical measures are also conducted to estimate many factors that interest social scientists. These include the probability of the reliability of measurement, also known as inter-respondent agreement. In other words, how often do the respondents agree on similar questions of interest to the researchers? Researchers also assess the correlation of particular measurements as well as the probability that the correlated relationships came about by chance. In terms of epistemology, these statistical measures form a logical basis for how we as researchers “know” that our measurements and the relationships we postulate are correct.

Do the statistics generated in the methods of social science really guarantee that the researchers “know” that their results are true—or, as some argue, True? This is a very interesting question. Statistics do follow a general train of logic, so that the numerical results do have a particular meaning. The resulting methods are no doubt at all infinitely better than out-of-thin-air guesswork. Yet, as those with a sharp critical eye have no doubt already noticed, there is a process of interpretation that enters into statistical analysis. The numbers generated by quantitative methods definitely have meaning. But the researchers themselves infer that meaning—it is NOT simply a given result of the numbers. The numbers are real, but the researchers have interpreted the numbers. How do the researchers know their interpretation is correct? They have prior experience, they weigh their interpretation against comparable studies, and they read their results in light of what is already known on the subject. This results in a degree of knowledge and truth—though still, whether it is Absolute Knowledge and Truth are still debatable, even when statistics have been used.

Other researchers use more qualitative methods such as personal observation. There, a researcher goes out and personally observes a given situation or social context, makes careful notes at opportune times, and examines the data that results. A close cousin, historical analysis, takes a similar approach, though the direct observation is of other historical sources, not people in face-to-face social settings. Immersion in part of an experience can be a powerful way of gaining insight into that experience. Whether it’s anthropologists who live with tribes in undeveloped nations or investigative journalists who spend weeks and even months talking with sources, checking facts, and carefully researching information to give us an in-depth analysis of a particular news story, the power of personal observation has a long tradition in social research (and related fields). Historical analysis—often done in quiet library collections or archives—likewise has been with us for decades, if not in some form for centuries.

But here again, epistemological questions arise. No doubt observation and analysis alike yield a degree of expertise, but do we know for certain that a particular observer knows everything there is to know, even after ten, twenty, or even fifty years of observation or analytical comparison? Would factors such as the observer’s friends, interests, personality, biases, and other subjective matters influence the resulting observations and reports? Even more broadly, how much did the observer or analyst fail to observe? Would another observer come in and immediately replicate the original observer’s observations? How does the observer know that his or her observations are accurate, and do the observations establish truth—much less Truth? Here again, careful and well-conducted observation (as with analysis) has its utility. It is indeed much better than none at all. But there are epistemological limitations. Careful, in-depth observation is good, but it doesn’t necessarily settle all questions, and observers and analysts don’t know everything. We try to find truth by asking specific questions and using specific methods to answer them.

OK, that’s good for methods for a bit; we’ll revisit that topic in a few pages . What about social theories? Let’s take a brief look at five common theoretical approaches that are commonly used in the sociology of religion. There is also a really extensive section in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion about social theory; just search the resource in your ASU Library and add the search term “Theory: Classical, Modern, and Postmodern” for more. In any case, the first and probably most noteworthy theoretical perspective is functionalism. For more on the functional perspective, please click on this link from Grinnell College . Functionalism has to do with the study of—big surprise here—the social functions of religion. ( Typical aims and focuses of functional-religious studies include what religions do, how they work, what social needs those functions fill, and what the religions accomplish. This is a fairly common approach in the social-scientific study of religions, and as a matter of fact, it’s what we’ll be primarily focusing on in our course. But we will touch upon the others from time to time, as appropriate.

As we’ve read, many functional theorists tremendously emphasize the idea of rational choice. This is a sub-theory of functionalism. Yet, as addressed in our first assignment, is rational choice—a conscious analysis of the costs and benefits associated with our decisions, whether major or minor—the best explanation for religious affiliation and behavior? Do we change our religious beliefs, church membership, spiritual habits, and so forth for reasons purely related to our self-interest? Or are there other factors at work in our religious practices—and if so, which and why? Keep in mind that, according to how most sociologists consider Rational Choice Theory (RCT), believers are not merely assessing concrete costs and benefits (money, time, property, and so forth) of a particular religion. They are also considering abstract costs and benefits, such as their friendship circles and networks of support (whether losing the ones they have and/or the emotional/energy costs of developing new ones), lifestyle changes, overall level of comfort, the customs and traditions they have learned throughout life, and the ultimate benefit, Heaven-Nirvana-Enlightenment-Valhalla-Elysian Fields-Becoming One with the Universe-etc. So the believer weighs ALL those costs, concrete AND abstract, against the benefits, also concrete AND abstract, in making his or her decision about religion and spirituality.

I’m a bit conflicted about this. The more abstract conceptualization of RCT makes more sense to me, but I still suspect that the ultimate explanation is even more nuanced. RCT is certainly involved in religious behavior, but I see the process as more complicated than RCT alone suggests. For instance, what about religious conviction and experience? How do believers become convinced of the Ultimate Truth of a particular religious system? Then how do believers remain convinced of that truth? Third, as one past student insightfully pointed out, what happens in settings where religious freedom is restricted so that would-be seekers cannot actually seek? Does RCT only apply in settings of a free religious marketplace of ideas? And fourth, is it possible to even possess the capability to investigate every religion? Fifth… well, let’s stop there. ( But you get the idea… RCT is definitely involved as religious seekers make their conscious choices, and it makes sense from where I sit as an explanation of the rational component of religious conversion or switching. But in terms of overall religious behavior and RCT, there are more questions to be asked. And answered. (

For those interested in more exploration of RCT and religion, feel free to consult two excellent resources from The Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion and from Emory University .

Another frequent approach is conflict theory. This sometimes takes the more specific form of Marxism, though this is less common in religion and more prevalent in, say, literary studies. You can find more information on conflict theory at this link from the University of Hawaii . Scholars interested in race, gender, inequality, power differentials, hegemony, and class analysis in religion frequently incorporate this perspective. There are numerous instances of conflict theory in modern sociology of religion, but for only one example, Susan Rose studied the role of women in a charismatic Christian community in the mid-‘80s. She concluded that the women she observed willingly relinquished some of their power and status in order to support their husbands, who they felt had been given “divine callings.” However, as an intriguing byproduct, as the women redefined their gender role, the male role was also redefined in turn. See the abstract of this study here or look it up in Sociology of Religion (1987) vol. 48 no. 3, pp. 245-258.

Another common approach is often called “symbolic interaction” but sometimes goes by a variety of other names in contemporary academic research, such as ritual or symbolic analysis. See this reading from Oregon State for more information on this theoretical approach. Studies vary widely; ritual and frame analyses, for instance, are often conducted using SI theoretical approaches, as well as research into the meaning and social significance of particular objects—for instance, icons or religious music—or practices such as kneeling for prayer. Religious philosopher Mircea Eliade has written a great deal about myth and ritual, which is also well-suited to a symbolic-interaction social-theory framework. But as another more current instance, a recent study (found at Critical Sociology, January 2010, vol. 36 no. 1, pp. 109-129) by Michelle Byng analyzed modern symbolic representations of Islam in modern news media, focusing especially on the practice of the hijab or veil for women in America, England, and France, as well as how the news media of these nations covered the practice.

We also want to explore, as previously mentioned, the approach of phenomenology. As in the context of The Heretical Imperative, this is something of a subjective exploration of ideas, perspectives, and experiences, as with metaphysical or “other-worldly” encounters. Sometimes this also extends to paranormal experiences—that is, experiences with the unknown in general in terms of what’s beyond current scientific understanding, under which category many include metaphysics. But since religion and metaphysics tend to be closely linked, this area often becomes the focus in sociology of religion. See this link from Penn State for more information. Phenomenology—the study of phenomena—considers individual other-worldly ideas, perspectives, and events as very real to the individual and/or group, but admits they may be difficult for others to apprehend. Phenomenologists in the sociology of religion often study accounts of various phenomena—near-death experiences, ghostly encounters, spiritual “witnesses” or “promptings,” déjà vu, feelings of “being called” or of encountering divinity, religious conversions, dreams and visions, and so forth—and analyze believers’ accounts of those experiences for their individual and social meaning. Please note, however, that phenomenologists in general are not necessarily trying to actually undergo metaphysical experience—we’re not talking about “ghost hunters,” mediums, séance participants, etc. Instead, these scholars assume that the reported idea/perspective/experience has real meaning to the individual who experienced it, consider the after-the-fact report of that phenomenon as evidence, and then assess the individual and social meaning of the phenomenon.

To fully understand phenomenology, it may help to turn to none other than Harry Potter. As at least a few of you doubtless remember (so no spoiler alert), ( late in Deathly Hallows, Harry has a vision-like experience of meeting and speaking with his deceased former Hogwarts headmaster, Albus Dumbledore. At the conversation’s end, Harry asks his mentor if the vision has been real or if it has been all happening in his head. Dumbledore’s reply perfectly illustrates a core assumption of phenomenology: “Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean it is not real?” (JK Rowling, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, 2007, pp. 722-23.)

So there it is: In phenomenology, the fact that the experience is happening “inside your head” (as it were) makes it real and meaningful to you! Likewise, experiences that are “inside the heads” of others are real to them, and are therefore worth exploring for their meaning. Consequently, phenomenology is frequently the framework of choice for analyzing the meaning of metaphysical encounters from a sociological standpoint. Perhaps the best-known phenomenological treatment in the sociology of religion is Martin Buber’s I-Thou discussion of a believer’s relationship to God; for an interesting perspective, see this entry from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Finally, another insightful theoretical approach to religious issues is social construction (of reality), largely as developed by our good friend Peter Berger as well as Thomas Luckmann in the mid-‘60s. For more information about social construction of reality (SCR, also called “constructionism”), see this basic link from Oregon State or this explanation of social interaction from the University of Minnesota . (CTRL-F it for “social construction” for the by-name discussion, but also note that SCR actually helps shape other concepts discussed, such as socialization, dramaturgy, and social roles, and yes, there’s some symbolic interaction overlap as well.) ( Berger, for his part, analyzes religion as a socially constructed entity—that is, it’s built by people using social constructs or ideas. It has not only Objective (absolutely real and unchanging) and subjective (as experienced by the individual) dimensions, but a range of phenomena between is socially constructed—or as later theorists have called it, intersubjective. We’ve “socially constructed” these little-t truths between ourselves—or, essentially, in other words we have as a society agreed that they are true. For instance: Stoplights are red. It’s rude to eat in front of others without offering them food. It’s flat-out weird to wear tuxedos or evening gowns to college classes. Football players are cheered for acts of violence during games for which they’d be arrested if the acts were done at home or on the street.

Also, in social construction, cultural context matters, and very much so. Our “worldview” forms a great deal of our intersubjective basis for building these social constructions. Belching is often seen as rude in North American contexts, but in several traditional Pacific Islander cultures (and some other contexts elsewhere), belching is actually how a guest compliments a host on a fine meal. As previously mentioned, Berger’s The Sacred Canopy explores religion as a product of an interaction between individuals and society, referred to as the Nomos. As social orders are constructed and maintained, individuals interact with the social order as part of constructing themselves. So religion acquires an individual and social aspect, and is constructed and maintained on both of those levels or contexts.

As a result, many intersubjective beliefs and social practices inform the world of religion, and the social constructionist explores these constructs. For instance, Michael Szonyi explores secularization in the Chinese religious world , where some forms of popular religion have survived despite an unfriendly official secular climate. He interestingly concludes that secularization—one of Berger’s key social constructs in the sociology-of-religion field—is valuable in explaining what has happened in China from both a historical and ideological perspective. I also acknowledge but shall not explore ethnomethodology , which exists today more or less as a historical exercise in exploring social norms via their deliberate disruption rather than a viable independent theoretical framework.

Beyond Objective vs. Subjective

Social construction, highly epistemological in orientation, also brings out another important fact. Not all “little-t” truths can necessarily be considered either Objective or subjective. Other truths we encounter in our day-to-day lives carry a little “t” and may be deeply valued, if not held as if sacred, by some while questioned (and even hotly debated) ( by others: It's rude to belch. George Washington is a national hero. Al Gore was right about global warming. SUVs are safer than small cars. We need to retain the Affordable Care Act. Illegal immigrants are draining our local and national economy. We should have elected Hillary Clinton as President. We need to own guns to defend ourselves. All of this includes statements we often hear and what people (at least some people, anyway, depending on what political angle we’re considering) seem to take for granted as true. Politically, of course, there are disagreements—even within all those statements. That’s partly the point, actually. (

So when we dig deeper, we find there are exceptions and/or levels of complexity associated with these “truths.” We also find it’s tremendously difficult to figure out what really is true and what isn’t in terms of socially constructed knowledge. In our world of social-media urban legends, where it’s constantly rumored, say, that we must re-post such-and-such legalese on Facebook to preserve our rights as users, we want to be able to verify this. Some of us (me, too!) ( are in the habit of turning to www.snopes.com to check the facts whenever those alarm bells in our heads go off. But not even snopes.com claims infallibility! There’s a section of the site, in fact, containing several fake “urban legends” and a warning about what they call “False Authority Syndrome” to illustrate the importance of always checking facts for ourselves! Hence, we can’t—and shouldn’t!—always rely on outside sources to tell us what the truth is. Not even Snopes, or at least not all the time.

We can also be tricked by verisimilitude, or the fact that a particular entity appears in multiple respects to be authoritative. One of the best examples of this is a prank site that warns about the many unrecognized dangers of “dihydrogen monoxide” —i.e., H2O!— ( in our modern world. Funny as the site is, particularly if you enjoy a wry poke at the often stuffy language and obscure structure of academic research, ( phishing scams and other media-related fraud are frequently effective precisely because they look or seem like they could be true. Hence the crucial importance of critical thinking!

As we nonetheless continue to search for what’s true—or at least what’s authoritative, credible, AND accurate!—we may also find that many of the “truths” we like to think we know for certain may be dependent on a particular psychological, political, or cultural context. We also see there are even levels—particularly in political terms—on which the “truths” we discussed above may be considered false! Some families have belching contests just for fun. George Washington owned slaves, along with having other human foibles and imperfections. Even some climate change experts dispute the accuracy of An Inconvenient Truth. The “safety” of SUVs is chiefly attributed to their bulk and prevalence; if most cars were the size and weight of Smart Cars and there were no SUVs, the Toyota Yaris would be safer by comparison to all the rest. There’s still substantial debate, and firmly divided opinions, over Obamacare and illegal immigration—not to mention whether Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump should have been elected to the presidency! And whatever else we do or don’t believe about what rights the Second Amendment gives us, don’t we certainly need to try our best somehow to keep guns away from criminals and those with violent tendencies among the mentally ill?

The previously mentioned “truths” seem true in people’s minds, and at least some people believe them to be true, but are they really always true? And if they’re true, what in the heck are we all arguing about? ( Here again, there are many “facts” out there that we see as “true” only because we (or at least some of us) believe they’re true—or even more to the point in social-construction terms, we see them as true because many of us have agreed that they’re true. (And for those of you keeping score out there on the social-theory-perspective contest, this is pretty much the essence of social construction. Yes, it’s true—Peter Berger, along with Thomas Luckmann, have definitely affected my life. And now yours.) ( And even more importantly, underscoring the point about social construction, many of us have lately agreed on different truths. Ask a Donald Trump supporter near you all about that. ( Hence not only frequent shifts in what is and isn’t considered appropriate or polite, but the vehement debates about the truth of our nation’s history and the character of its leaders, health-care reform, illegal immigration, and gun control. We are frequently fighting each other over social constructions!

One other point is important—that of cultural context. Revisiting our belching example, remember that it is actually considered complimentary, and even the polite thing to do, in some cultures such as that of some Pacific Islanders, at least in terms of historical tradition. As we pointed out above, some families may also belch behind closed doors just for the fun of it. But also consider that this social construct, like all others, is established by social agreement. Now as most of you know, this same social agreement does NOT necessarily extend to your family’s Thanksgiving table. So please do NOT belch after your meal and then tell your family that Dr. Weight in your ASU Sociology of Religion class taught you it was a way to say Thanks. Live in the culture you’re in, my friends. ( You disrupt social norms very much at your own risk, and I did tell you not to, so sorry to tell all y’all—you’re all out on your own on that one! ( Common courtesy and “manners” require more or less that you act according to the set of social constructs of the social group and culture in which you’re living at the moment.

But also consider this: Human mutual respect, tolerance, and understanding all require that we take a look at those social constructs, understand them at face value, and learn to see that we might accept the “truth” the other person accepts if we were in their proverbial shoes. Otherwise known as the “walk a mile in another person’s shoes” viewpoint, it’s the way we live in civilized society, or at least it certainly should be. We try to understand where each other are coming from, including the perspectives and social constructs on which we tend to act.

So back to those vehement political debates, understand that ardent Second Amendment defenders have a set of assumptions and social constructs about guns and responsible gun ownership. Those concerned about violence committed by people with guns also have their own set of assumptions and social constructs from which they approach the issue. So a wide variety of opinions results. I was born into a family of hunters, though I personally don’t go hunting for anything but good books. ( However, several of my cousins live for deer and elk hunting season, ( and I more or less see the point. They’re good and decent people and only use their guns for occasional hunting trips. Nobody else sees or handles those weapons without their say-so, believe me, and they carefully teach their children to be responsible with guns. If anybody has the right to bear arms, they and other responsible gun owners certainly do. Yet if I were, say, Gabby Giffords and had gone through all that she had, thanks to only one mentally ill man who had gained access to a gun, I’d probably advocate gun control, too! Ideally, the two sides would work out a compromise—including a new set of assumptions and social constructs—in an attempt to resolve the problem. That is usually how public discourse and new social construction works. However, the two sides seem rather far apart on this, since both camps have not only engaged in their own dialogues of social construction but have gradually defined each other as enemies.

All that aside, however, here’s the key point I want to make in terms of epistemology—you should consider the “either/or” relationship of the Objective and subjective a false dichotomy. In other words, all knowledge is NOT either Objective or subjective! In our Western mode of thinking, we often tend to view the relationship between Objective and subjective as an either/or sort of relationship—in this way of thinking, either our truths (and Truths) ( are Objective OR they’re subjective. Correct? No, sorry. Let’s dig deeper than that. In thinking in this “either/or” way, which we often tend to do in Western culture, we’re limiting ourselves—because the REAL relationship is “either/AND.” Put simply, as illustrated in the box on the next page, there’s a whole range of intervening experience between Objective Truth and subjective truth—the intersubjective . Those are the social constructions we’ve just spend several paragraphs addressing—and that range of intervening experience, by the way, is precisely what makes this comparison a false dichotomy! That spectrum-like relationship of Objective, intersubjective, and subjective is illustrated in the box below.

Hence, as we see in the box, in addition to Objective Truth—what is always True, Absolute, and Verifiable—there are a vast range of intersubjective truths as well. These are true according to our social agreement, though they’re impermanent or subject to change, and sometimes verifiable (and of course sometimes not.) ( Notably, the intersubjective truths are sometimes confused for subjective, but those darn intersubjective truths really cause trouble when some of us decide that they’re really Objective—and then hold it against other people when they don’t agree! We’ll be discussing religious conflict in Lesson 3, so feel free to hold onto that thought all you wish. (

Then at the other end, we have our subjective truths, which are usually highly dependent on our own perceptions. So we perceive our little-t truths, whether subjective or intersubjective, as true, and they’re frequently subject to change and not often verifiable. We discover these intersubjective (i.e., socially constructed) and subjective (personally perceived and interpreted) truths through our own learning and a process of building social consensus on culture, behavior, norms, values, and so on. That social consensus has a particular scope and context that gives our “little-t” truths MUCH more proverbial staying power than the trite “that’s just the way I see it” stance. Of course, no degree of social consensus will produce Objective and Ultimate Truth. What’s Absolutely Real is Real, whether or not any individual or group agrees, understands, or even knows about it. But in brief, religion can be understood as our intersubjective (or group) and subjective (or individual) attempts to grasp the Objective.

Wrapping It Up

Clear as mud yet? ( OK, let’s bring it home, as it were. In our readings for today, we’ve read a great deal about sociology and about religion. But our greatest challenges as sociologists of religion are frequently epistemological: How do we know what we know? The Objective-intersubjective-subjective spectrum of experience helps us classify what belongs where as we consider our data for analysis. We know that groups of religious believers consider their beliefs to be Objectively True. Though we cannot possibly verify that, say, a given group of Buddhists have in fact attained Nirvana, we can say that it is Objectively True that Buddhists in general believe in Nirvana and that they strive for this state of enlightenment. Thus, the belief itself is the verifiable social data, and we can study the social meaning of that belief as a social construction. However, significantly, we are then studying that belief on an intersubjective level—or even subjective, if we choose to interview particular individuals about their beliefs about Nirvana.

As previously mentioned, in terms of the discussion beginning on page 7 , specific analytical methods and relying on data help us resolve our epistemological concerns. Keep in mind: The Objective-intersubjective-subjective epistemological continuum has its strong points as a quality topic for a philosophical debate, faculty forum, conference presentation, journal article, and so forth. But the specific methods of trying to assess how we know what we know are what we actually focus on as we do our research. That’s how we integrate theoretical perspectives and methodological techniques to help us answer the questions we find out there in the social world. See the illustrative research studies cited throughout the discussion of the theories for more information on that. Those of you with the Christiano text will get even more information on the strong points and drawbacks of many of the specific methods used as we study religion from a social-scientific perspective—what we can be assured that we know and what we don’t. I won’t repeat that entire discussion here.

However, just to recap some of the high points: Personal observation, when properly done, can be a powerful way of knowing. However, we may still never know all the answers, since one person—or even a team of four or five highly qualified observers—can only perceive so much. We can also depend on numerical data, though statistical analyses rely heavily on probabilities and the researchers’ ability to interpret the numbers. Historical analyses help us spot consistent trends and patterns, though the researchers’ understanding of history can certainly be called into question. Surveys, usually based on sound statistical data, can be another powerful way of knowing, too, though self-reported data are also far from foolproof. Other methods—content analysis, textual analysis, experiments, and a number of others—have their upsides as well as drawbacks. Epistemologically, sound as the data and/or our reasoning might be, there comes a level on which we just cannot tell if our conclusions are Absolutely True—there’s always a reason they might not be.

So while the methods we use to determine knowledge are much better than simply guessing or taking the proverbial shot in the dark, they are still influenced by subjective and intersubjective considerations. We as social researchers are trying to approach Objective Truth, but what we most generally derive is intersubjective—and socially constructed!—in nature. We know what we know, but it’s frequently intersubjective knowledge. Determining Objective Truth takes a great deal more time and effort. We can get there over years and years of work and study, if not decades or centuries. In any case, defining Objective Truth is NOT going to come overnight.

So, as we strive to “reveal what’s hidden,” as in Bourdieu’s statement in Lesson 1, we are likewise striving to pin down what’s as Objective as possible, though we most often find intersubjective truth. No, we can’t concretely verify Objective fact without a LOT of work, particularly what’s beyond the scope of social science—but we can try to find the equivalents of the boiling point of water and/or the “brick wall” we discussed earlier, in terms of the questions we ask in the sociology of religion. We can try to find valid and reliable explanations of the phenomena we observe, such as Kelley’s explanation for more conservative church growth and in American Grace’s analysis of the contemporary American religious world. We can represent the group we’re analyzing fairly and accurately, so that our explanations make sense even to those inside the group we’re discussing. This is a genuine challenge in Mormon scholarship, let me tell you, ( though the historical division between LDS-friendly and LDS-critical scholarly sources is far from unique to Mormon culture. How Islam is represented in the West, for instance, faces a similar problem and on a bigger scale. Most obviously, the historical misrepresentation of Jews and the catastrophic consequences are paradoxically well-documented, yet still alive in some quarters of, ahem, society. We have not yet discussed Max Weber's core concept of verstehen , but feel free to read up on that at the link given, if you wish—the top few paragraphs should give you the general idea, along with a more in-depth discussion below. See also this grad-school equivalent comparison of Weber’s thought with other philosophers , if you’re interested.

As we make sure that we understand and incorporate the essential differences between Objective, intersubjective, and subjective, we are more aware not only of what knowledge belongs where, but of how we know that knowledge. We rely on data in social science, and we need to go where the data indicate. In this way, we are able to more closely approach truth, if not Truth, and we will know it, even if we are minorities of one. Thanks, everyone, and I look forward to reading what you come up with on Assignment 2! As well as your Meet the Believers exercise in a few weeks!

Logic is useful, especially when correctly applied, ( in the discourse of epistemology. Illustration from � HYPERLINK "http://researchmeth.wikispaces.com/Ontology+and+Epistemology" �researchmeth.wikispaces.com�

Yet, useful and crucial as it is to understand subjective perception and cultural interpretation, neither contradict the existence of the Objective. The fact is this: The Berkeleyan thesis is easily refuted by actual experience. Imagine you’re running somewhere in the dark, where you can’t see what’s in front of you. Unfortunately, this includes a brick wall that runs across your path. That solid and extremely hard wall directly ahead of you is still very much there, whether or not you perceive it or know about it or choose to believe in it yourself. It even exists regardless of whether you or your culture of origin builds, values or even believes in brick walls. ( In any case, the wall isn’t going anywhere, regardless of your perceptions or beliefs about it, with a sad but predictable result if you don’t slow down or change your own direction to avoid it. True, tolerance and human understanding do require substantial allowances for individual and cultural perception. But our individual and cultural perception neither cause nor determine the Ultimate Realities we find in the world around us, Seen or Unseen. In any case, Absolute Truth is the Truth, even if (as Gandhi said) only one person correctly knows and perceives what that Truth is.

Photo from fanpixfamousfix.com. Anne Hathaway and Christopher Gorham (left), who played Jean and John Groberg in The Other Side of Heaven, pose with their real-life counterparts during a break from shooting the film in 2000.

Key Difference in Terms

Metaphysical = Other-worldly (spirits, angels, God, Heaven, etc.)

Paranormal = Beyond current scope of scientific understanding (UFOs, Bigfoot, telekinesis, ESP, much of metaphysical phenomena, etc.).

Dumbledore speaking to Harry in his vision, according to the 2011 Warner Brothers film. Image from harrypotter.wikia.com.

Image from feelgraphix.com. This is one of the world’s most dangerous substances, according to � HYPERLINK "http://www.dhmo.org" �www.dhmo.org�. (

OBJECTIVE

Always True Per Se

Absolute

Verifiable

INTERSUBJECTIVE

True by social agreement

Impermanent

Sometimes verifiable

SUBJECTIVE

You see it as true

Changes often

Not often verifiable

Objective, Intersubjective, and Subjective