Discussion

International

"T "bis book purports to present a theory o

f international politics. T he test by

1 w hich such a theory m

ust be judged is not a priori and abstract but em pirical

and pragm atic. T

he theory, in other w ords, m

ust be judged not by som e precon-

ceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and m

eaning to a m ass o

f phenom ena that w

ithout it w ould rem

ain disconnected and unintelligible. It m

ust m eet a dual test, an em

pirical and a log- ical one: do the facts as they actually are lend them

selves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them

, and do the conclusions at w hich the theory arrives fol-

low w

ith logical necessity from its prem

ises? In short, is the theory consistent w ith

the facts and w ithin itself?

T he issue this theory raises concerns the nature o

f all politics. T he history o

f m

odem political thought is the story o

f a contest betw een tw

o schools that differ fundam

entally in their conceptions o f the nature o

f m an, society, and politics.

O ne believes that a rational and m

oral political order, derived from universally

valid abstract principles, can be -achieved here and now . It assum

es the essential goodness and infinite m

alleability o f hum

an nature, and blam es the failure of the

social order to m easure up to the rational standards on lack o

f know ledge and

understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or the depravity o f certain isolated

individuals or groups. It trusts in education, reform , and the sporadic use of force

to rem edy these defects.

T he other school believes that the w

orld, im perfect as it is from

the rational point o

f view , is the result o

f forces inherent in hum an nature. To im

prove the w

orld one m ust w

ork w ith those forces, not against them

. This being inherently a w

orld o f opposing interests and o

f conflict am ong them

, m oral principles can

never be fully realized but m ust at best be approxim

ated through the ever tem -

porary balancing o f interests and the ever precarious settlem

ent o f conflicts. This

school, then, sees in a system o

f checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historical precedent rather than to abstract princi- ples and aim

s at the realization o f the lesser evil rather than o

f the absolute good.

3

5 4

A R

ealist Theory of International P olitics

T his theoretical concern w

ith hum an nature as it actually is, and w

ith the historical processes as they actually take place, has earned for the theory presented here the nam

e o f realism

. W hat are the tenets o

f political realism ? N

o system atic

exposition o f the philosophy o

f political realism

can be attem pted here;

it w

ill suffice to single out six fundam ental principles, w

hich have frequently been m

isunderstood.

SIX PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REALISM

1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by

objective law s that have their roots in hum

an nature. In order to im prove society

it is first necessary to understand the law s by w

hich society lives. T he operation o

f these law

s being im pervious to our preferences, m

en w ill challenge them

only at the risk o

f failure. R

ealism , believing as it does in the objectivity o

f the law s o

f politics, m ust

also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, how ever

im perfectly and one-sidedly, these objective law

s. It believes also, then, in the pos- sibility o

f distinguishing in politics betw een truth and opinion-betw

een w hat is

true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illum inated by reason,

and w hat is only a subjective judgm

ent, divorced from the facts as they are and

inform ed by prejudice and w

ishful thinking. H

um an nature, in w

hich the law s o

f politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies o

f C hina, India, and G

reece endeavored to discover these law

s. H ence, novelty is not necessariiy a virtue in political

theory, nor is old age a defect. T he fact that a theory o

f politics, if there be such a theory, has never been heard o

f before tends to create a presum ption against,

rather than in favor of, its soundness. C onversely, the fact that a theory o

f poli- tics w

as developed hundreds or even thousands o fyears ago-as w

as the theory of the balance o

f pow er-does not create a presum

ption that it m ust be outm

oded and obsolete. A

theory o fpolitics m

ust be subjected to the dual test o freason and

experience. To dism iss such a theory because it had its flow

ering in centuries past is to present not a rational argum

ent but a m odernistic prejudice that takes for

granted the superiority o f the present over the past. To dispose o

f the revival o f

such a theory as a "fashion" or "fad" is tantam ount to assum

ing that in m atters

political w e can have opinions but no truths.

For realism , theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them

m eaning

through reason. It assum es that the character o

fa foreign policy can be ascertained only through the exam

ination o f the political acts perform

ed and o f the foresee-

able consequences o f these acts. T

hus w e can find out w

hat statesm en have actu-

ally done, and from the foreseeable consequences o

f their acts w e can surm

ise w

hat their objectives m ight have been.

Y et exam

ination o f the facts is not enough. To give m

eaning to the factual raw

m aterial o

fforeign policy, w e m

ust approach political reality w ith a kind o

fra- tional outline, a m

ap that suggests to us the possible m eanings o

f foreign policy.

S ix P

rinciples o f P

olitical R ealism

In other w ords, w

e put ourselves in the position o f a statesm

an w ho m

ust m eet a

certain problem o

f foreign policy under certain circum stances, and w

e ask our- selves w

hat the rational alternatives are from w

hich a statesm an m

ay choose w ho

m ust m

eet this problem under these circum

stances (presum ing alw

ays that he acts in a rational m

anner), and w hich o

f these rational alternatives this particular statesm

an, acting under these circum stances, is likely to choose. It is the testing o

f this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical m

eaning to the facts o f international politics.

2. T he m

ain signpost that helps political realism to find its w

ay through the landscape o

f international politics is the concept o f interest defined in term

s o f

pow er. T

his concept provides the link betw een reason trying to understand inter-

national politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonom ous

sphere o f action and understanding apart from

other spheres, such as econom ics

(understood in term s o

f interest defined as w ealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion.

W ithout such a concept a theory o

f politics, international or dom estic, w

ould be altogether im

possible, for w ithout it w

e could not distinguish betw een political

and nonpolitical facts, nor could w e bring at least a m

easure o f system

ic order to the political sphere.

W e assum

e that statesm en think and act in term

s ofinterest defined as pow er,

and the evidence o f history bears that assum

ption out. T hat assum

ption allow s us

to retrace and anticipate, as it w ere, the steps a statesm

an-past, present, or future- has taken or w

ill take on the political scene. W e look over his shoulder w

hen he w

rites his dispatches; w e listen in on his conversations w

ith other statesm en; w

e read and anticipate his very thoughts. T

hinking in term s o

f interest defined as pow

er, w e think as he does, and as disinterested observers w

e understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does him

self. T

he concept o f interest defined as pow

er im poses intellectual discipline

upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject m atter o

f politics, and thus m

akes the theoretical understanding o f politics possible. O

n the side o f the

actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding con- tinuity in foreign policy w

hich m akes A

m erican, B

ritish, or R ussian foreign policy

appear as in intelligible, rational continuum , by and large consistent w

ithin itself, regardless o

f the different m otives, preferences, and intellectual and m

oral quali- ties o

f successive statesm en. A

realist theory o f international politics, then, w

ill guard against tw

o popular fallacies: the concern w ith m

otives and the concern w

ith ideological preferences. To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the m

otives of states- m

en is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because m otives are the m

ost illusive o

f psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and em

otions o f actor and observer alike. D

o we really know w

hat our ow

n m otives are? A

nd w hat do w

e know o

f the m otives of others?

Y et even if w

e had access to the real m otives o

f statesm en, that know

ledge w

ould help us little in understanding foreign policies and m ight w

ell lead us astray. It is true that the know

ledge o f the statesm

an's m otives m

ay give us one

7 6

A R

ealist Theory of International P olitics

am ong m

any clues as to w hat the direction o

f his foreign policy m ight be. It can-

not give us, how ever, the one clue by w

hich to predict his foreign policies. H istory

show s no exact and necessary correlation betw

een the quality o f m

otives and the quality o

f foreign policy. T his is true in both m

oral and political term s.

W e cannot conclude from

the good intentions o f a statesm

an that his foreign policies w

ill be either m orally praisew

orthy or politically successful. Judging his m

otives, w e can say that he w

ill not intentionally pursue policies that are m orally

w rong, but w

e can say nothing about the probability o f their success. Ifw

e w ant to

know the m

oral and political qualities o f his actions, w

e m ust know

them , not his

m otives. H

ow often have statesm

en been m otivated by the desire to im

prove the w

orld and ended by m aking it w

orse? A nd how

often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving som

ething they neither expected nor desired? N

eville C ham

berlain's politics of appeasem ent w

ere, as far as w e can judge,

inspired by good m otives; he w

as probably less m otivated by considerations o

f personal pow

er than w ere m

any other B ritish prim

e m inisters, and he sought to

preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Y et his policies helped

to m ake the Second W

orld W ar inevitable and to bring untold m

iseries to m illions

of people. Sir W inston C

hurchill's m otives, on the other hand, w

ere m uch less

universal in scope and m uch m

ore narrow ly directed tow

ard personal and national pow

er, yet the foreign policies that sprang from these inferior m

otives w ere cer-

tainly superior in m oral and political quality to those pursued by his predecessor.

Judged by his m otives, R

obespierre w as one o

f the m ost virtuous m

en w ho ever

lived. Y et it w

as the utopian radicalism o

fthat very virtue that m ade him

kill those less virtuous than him

self, brought him to the scaffold, and destroyed the revolu-

tion o f w

hich he w as a leader.

G ood m

otives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee the m

oral goodness and political success o f the policies they inspire.

W hat is im

portant to !m ow

, if one w ants to understand foreign policy, is not pri-

m arily the m

otives o f a statesm

an but his intellectual ability to com prehend the

essentials o f foreign policy, as w

ell as his political ability to translate w hat he has

com prehended into successful political action. It follow

s that, w hile ethics in the

abstract judges the m oral qualities o

f m otives, political theory m

ust judge the political qualities of intellect, w

ill, and action. A

realist theory of international politics w ill also avoid the other popular fal-

lacy o f equating the foreign policies of a statesm

an w ith his philosophic or political

sym pathies, and o

f deducing the form er from

the latter. Statesm en, especially under

contem porary conditions, m

ay w ell m

ake a habit ofpresenting their foreign policies in term

s o f their philosophic and political sym

pathies in order to gain popular sup- port for them

. Y et they w

ill distinguish w ith L

incoln betw een their "official duty,"

w hich is to think and act in term

s o f the national interest, and their ''personal w

ish," w

hich is to see their ow n m

oral values and political principles realized throughout the w

orld. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to

political ideals and m oral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction

betw een the desirable and the possible-betw

een w hat is desirable everyw

here and at all tim

es and w hat is possible under the concrete circum

stances o f tim

e and place.

Six P rinciples o

f P olitical R

ealism

It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have alw ays follow

ed so rational, objective, and unem

otional a course. T he contingent elem

ents o fpersonality, prej-

udice, and subjective preference, and o fall the w

ealm esses o

fintellect and w ill that

flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course.

E specially w

here foreign policy is conducted under the conditions o f dem

ocratic control, the need to m

arshal popular em otions to the support of foreign policy

cannot fail to im pair the rationality o

f foreign policy itself. Y et a the.0ry o

f foreign policy that aim

s at rationality m ust for the tim

e being, as it w ere, abstract from

these irrational elem

ents and seek to paint a picture o fforeign policy that presents

the rational essence to be found in experience;w ithout the contingent deviations

from rationality that are also found in experience. D

eviations from rationality that are not the result of the personal w

him or the

personal psychopathology o f the policym

aker m ay appear contingent only from

the vantage point ofrationality but m

ay them selves be elem

ents in a coherent system of

irrationality. The possibility o f constructing, as it w

ere, a counter-theory of irrational politics is w

orth exploring. W

hen one reflects upon the developm ent of A

m erican thinking on foreign

policy, one is struck by the persistence o f m

istaken attitudes that have survived- under w

hatever guises-both intellectual argum ent and political experience. O

nce that w

onder, in true A ristotelian fashion, has been transform

ed into the quest for rational

understanding, the

quest yields a conclusion

both com forting and

disturbing: w e are here in the presence o

f intellectual defects shared by all o f us

in different w ays and degrees. T

ogether they provide the outline o f a kind o

f pathology o

f international politics. W hen the hum

an m ind approaches reality

w ith the purpose o

f taking action, o f w

hich the political encounter is one o f the

outstanding instances, it is often led astray by any of four com

m on m

ental phenom

ena: residues o f form

erly adequate m odes o

fthought and action now ren-

dered obsolete by a new social reality; dem

onological interpretations of reality that substitute a fictitious reality-peopled by evil persons rather than seem

ingly intractable issues-for the actual one; refusal to com

e to term s w

ith a threatening state o

f affairs by denying it through illusory verbalization; or reliance upon the infinite m

alleability o f a seem

ingly obstreperous reality. M

an responds to social situations w ith repetitive patterns. T

he sam e situa-

tion, recognized in its identity w ith previous situations, evokes the sam

e response. T

he m ind, as it w

ere, holds in readiness a num ber o

f patterns appropriate for dif- ferent situations; it then requires only the identification o

f a particular case to apply to it the preform

ed pattern appropriate to it. T hus the hum

an m ind follow

s the principle o

f econom y o

f effort, obviating an exam ination de novo of each in-

dividual situation and the pattern o f thought and action appropriate to it. Y

et w

hen m atters are subject to dynam

ic change, traditional patterns are no longer appropriate; they m

ust be replaced by new ones reflecting such change. O

therw ise

a gap w ill open betw

een traditional patterns and new realities, and thought and

action w ill be m

isguided. O

n the international plane it is no exaggeration to say that the very structure ofinternational relations-as reflected in political institutions, diplom

atic procedures,

9 8

A R

ealist Theory of International P olitics

and legal arrangem ents-has tended to becom

e at variance w ith, and in large m

easure irrelevant to, the reality o

f international politics. W hile the form

er assum es the

"sovereign equality" of all nations, the latter is dom inated by an extrem

e inequality o

fnations, tw o o

fw hich are called superpow

ers because they hold in their hands the unprecedented pow

er o f total destruction, and m

any o f w

hich are called "m in-

istates" because their pow er is m

inuscule even com pared w

ith that o f the traditional

nation-states. It is this contrast and incom patibility betw

een the reality o f interna-

tional politics and the concepts, institutions, and procedures designed to m ake

intelligible and control the form er that have caused, at least below

the great-pow er

level, the unm anageability o

f international relations, w hich borders on anarchy.

International terrorism and the different governm

ent reactions to it, the involve- m

ent o f foreign governm

ents in the Lebanese civil w ar, the m

ilitary oper~tions o f

the U nited States in Southeast A

sia, and the m ilitary intervention o

f the Soviet U

nion in E astern E

urope cannot be explained or justified by reference to traditional concepts, institutions, and procedures.

A ll these situations have one characteristic in com

m on. T

he m odem

fact o

f interdependence requires a political order that takes that fact into account, w

hile in reality the legal and institutional superstructure, harking back to the nineteenth century, assum

es the existence o f a m

ultiplicity o f self-sufficient,

im penetrable, sovereign nation-states. T

hese residues o f an obsolescent legal and

institutional order not only stand in the w ay o

f a rational transform ation o

f in- ternational relations in light o

f the inequality o f pow

er and the interdependence o

f interests, but they also render precarious, if not im possible, m

ore rational policies w

ithin the defective fram ew

ork o f such a system

. It is a characteristic o

f prim itive thinking to personalize social problem

s. T

hat tendency is particularly strong w hen the problem

appears not to be suscep- tible to rational understanding and successful m

anipulation. W hen a particular

person or group o f persons is identified w

ith the recalcitrant difficulty, that m ay

seem to render the problem

both intellectually accessible and susceptible to solu- tion. T

hus belief in Satan as the source o f evil m

akes us "understand" the nature o

f evil by focusing the search for its origin and control upon a particular person w

hose physical

existence w

e assum

e. T

he com

plexity o

f political conflict

precludes such sim ple solutions. N

atural catastrophes w ill not be prevented by

burning w itches; the threat o

f a pow erful G

erm any to establish hegem

ony over E

urope w ill not be averted by getting rid o

f a succession o f G

erm an leaders. B

ut by identifying the issue w

ith certain persons over w hom

w e have-or hope to

have-control w e reduce the problem

, both intellectually and pragm atically, to

m anageable proportions. O

nce w e have identified certain individuals and groups

ofindividuals as the source o f evil, w

e appear to have understood the causal nexus that leads from

the individuals to the social problem ; that apparent understand-

ing suggests the apparent solution: elim inate the individuals "responsible" for it,

and you have solved the problem .

Superstition still holds sw ay over our relations w

ithin society. T he dem

ono- logical pattern o

f thought and action has now been transferred to other fields o

f hum

an action closed to the kind o f rational enquiry and action that have driven

Six P rinciples o

f P olitical R

ealism

superstition from our relations w

ith nature. A s W

illiam G

raham Sum

ner p~t it, "T he

am ount o

f superstition is not m uch changed, but it now

attaches to poht1cs, not to religion."

1 T he num

erous failures o f the U

nited States to recognize and respond to the polycentric nature o

f C om

m unism

is a prim e exam

ple of this defect. T he corol-

lary o f this indiscrim

inate opposition to C om

m unism

is the indiscrim inate support

of governm ents

and m

ovem ents

that profess and

practice anti-C

om m

unism .

A m

erican policies in A sia and L

atin A m

erica have derived from this sim

plistic position. T

he V ietnam

W ar and our inability to com

e to term s w

ith m ain!and C

hina find here their rationale. So do the theo1y and practice o

f countennsurgency, including large-scale assassinations under the Phoenix program

in V ietnam

and the actual

or attem pted assassinations

of individual statesm en. Signs

of a sim ilar

approach have been evident m ore recently in C

entral A m

erica. T

he dem onological approach to foreign policy strengthens another patho-

logical tendency, w hich is the refusal to acknow

ledge and cope effectively w ith a

threatening reality. T he dem

onological approach has shifted our attention and concern tow

ard the adherents o f C

om m

unism -individuals at hom

e and abroad, political m

ovem ents, foreign governm

ents-and aw ay from

the real threat: the pow

er o f states, C

om m

unist or not. M cC

arthyism not only provided the m

ost pervasive A

m erican exam

ple o f the dem

onological approach but w as also one o

f the m

ost extrem e exam

ples o f this kind o

f m isjudgm

ent: it substituted the largely illusory threat o

f dom estic subversion for the real threat of R

ussian pow er.

Finally, it is part o f this approach to politics to believe that no problem

s- how

ever hopeless they m ay appear-are really insoluble, given w

ell-m eaning, w

ell- financed, and com

petent efforts. I have tried elsew here to lay bare the intellectual

and historical roots o f this belief;2 here I lim

it m yself to pointing out its persist-

ent strength despite m uch experience to the contrary, such as the V

ietnam W

ar and the general decline o

f A m

erican pow er. This preference for econom

ic solu- tions to political and m

ilitary problem s is pow

erfully reinforced by the interests o

f potential recipients o f econom

ic support, w ho prefer the obviously profitable

transfer o f econom

ic advantages to painful and risky diplom atic bargaining.

T he difference betw

een international politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from

it is like the difference betw een a photograph and a painted

portrait. T he photograph show

s everything that can be seen by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show

everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it show

s, or at least seeks to show , one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the

hum an essence o

f the person portrayed. Political realism

contains not only a theoretical but also a norm ative elem

ent. It know

s that political reality is replete w ith contingencies and system

ic irra- tionalities, and points to the typical influences they exert upon foreign policy. Y

et it shares w

ith all social theory the need, for the sake o f theoretical understanding,

to stress the rational elem ents o

f political reality; for it is these rational elem ents

'"M ores o

f the Present and Future," in l¼ r and O

ther Essays (N ew

H aven, C

T : Y

ale U niversity Press,

1911), p. 159. 2Scientific M

an ¼ rsus Power Politics (C

hicago: U niversity o

f C hicago Press, 1946).

1 0

A

R ealist Theory of International P

olitics

that m ake reality intelligible for theory. Political realism

presents the theoretical construct o

f a rational foreign

policy that experience

can never com

pletely achieve.

A t the sam

e tim e political realism

considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy m

inim izes risks and m

axi- m

izes benefits and, hence, com plies w

ith both the m oral precept o

fprudence and the political requirem

ent o f success. Political realism

w ants the photographic pic-

ture o f the political w

orld to resem ble as m

uch as possible its painted portrait. A

w are o

f the inevitable gap betw een good-that is, rational-foreign policy and for-

eign policy as it actually is, political realism m

aintains not only that theory m ust

focus upon the rational elem ents o

f political reality but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view

o f its ow

n m oral and practical purposes.

H ence, it is no argum

ent against the theory here presented that actual for- eign policy does not or cannot live up to it. T

hat argum ent m

isunderstands the intention o

f this book, w hich is to present not an indiscrim

inate description o f

political reality but a rational theory o f international politics. Far from

being in- validated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance o

f pow er policy w

ill scarcely be found in reality, it assum

es that reality, being deficient in this respect, m

ust be understood and evaluated as an approxim ation to an ideal system

o fbalance

o f pow

er. 3. R

ealism assum

es that its key concept o f interest defined as pow

er is an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow

that concept w ith

a m eaning that is fixed once and for all. T

he idea o finterest is indeed o

fthe essence o

f politics and is unaffected by the circum stances o

f tim e and place. T

hucydides' statem

ent, born o f the experiences o

f ancient G reece, that "identity o

f interests is the surest o

f bonds w hether betw

een states or individuals" w as taken up in the

nineteenth century by L ord Salisbury's rem

ark that "the only bond o f union that

endures" am ong nations is "the absence o

fall clashing interests." It w as erected into

a general principle o f governm

ent by G eorge W

ashington:

A sm

all lm ow

ledge of hum an nature w

ill convince us, that, w ith far the great-

est part o f m

ankind, interest is the governing principle; and that alm ost every

m an is m

ore or less, under its influence. M otives of public virtue m

ay for a tim

e, or in particular instances, actuate m en to the observance o

f a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of them

selves sufficient to produce pre- serving conform

ity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few

m en are capable of m

aking a continual sacrifice of all view s o

f private interest, or advantage, to the com

m on good. It is vain to exclaim

against the depravity o

f hum an nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience o

f every age and nation has proved it and w

e m ust in a great m

easure, change the constitu- tion o

f m an, before w

e can m ake it otherw

ise. N o institution, not built on the

presum ptive truth o

f these m axim

s can succeed. 3

3The W ritings o

fGeorge W ashington, edited by John C

. Fitzpatrick (\V ashington, D

C : U

nited States Printing O

ffice, 1931-44), V ol. X

, p. 363.

Six P rinciples o

f P olitical R

ealism

11

It w as echoed and enlarged upon in the tw

entieth century by M ax W

eber's observation:

Interests (m aterial and ideal), not ideas, dom

inate directly the actions of m en.

Y et the "im

ages of the w orld" created by these ideas have very often served as

sw itches determ

ining the tracks on w hich the dynam

ism o

f interests kept actions m

oving. 4

Y et the kind o

f interest determ ining political action in a particular period o

f history depends upon the political and cultural context w

ithin w hich foreign pol-

icy is form ulated. T

he goals that m ight be pursued by nations in their foreign

policy can run the w hole gam

ut o f objectives any nation has ever pursued or

m ight possibly pursue.

T he sam

e observations apply to the concept o f pow

er. Its content and the m

anner o f its use are determ

ined by the political and cultural environm ent. Pow

er m

ay com prise anything that establishes and m

aintains the control o fm

an over m an.

T hus pow

er covers all social relationships that serve that end, from physical vio-

lence to the m ost subtle psychological ties by w

hich one m ind controls another.

Pow er covers the dom

ination o fm

an by m an, both w

hen it is disciplined by m oral

ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in W estern dem

ocracies, and w

hen it is that untam ed and barbaric force that finds its law

s in nothing but its ow

n strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizem ent.

Political realism does not assum

e that the contem porary conditions under

w hich foreign policy operates, w

ith their extrem e instability and the ever-present

threat o f large-scale violence, cannot be changed. T

he balance o f pow

er, for in- stance, is indeed a perennial elem

ent o f all pluralistic societies, as the authors o

f The Federalist papers w

ell knew ; yet it is capable o

f operating, as it does in the U

nited States, under the conditions o f relative stability and peaceful conflict. If

the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the in- ternational scene, sim

ilar conditions o f stability and peace w

ill then prevail there, as they have over long stretches o

f history am ong certain nations.

W hat is true o

f the general character o f international relations is also true o

f the nation-state as the ultim

ate point o f reference o

f contem porary foreign policy.

W hile the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by w

hich po- litical action m

ust be judged and directed, the contem porary connection betw

een interest and the nation-state is a product o

f history and is therefore bound to dis- appear in the course o

f history. N othing in the realist position m

ilitates against the assum

ption that the present division o f the political w

orld into nation-states w ill be

replaced by larger units o f a quite different character, m

ore in keeping w ith the tech-

nical potentialities and the m oral requirem

ents o f the contem

porary w orld.

T he realist parts com

pany w ith other schools o

f thought before the

all- im

portant question o fhow

the contem porary w

orld is to be transform ed. T

he realist is persuaded that this transform

ation can be achieved only through the w orkm

anlike

4M arianne W

eber, M ax W

eber (T iibingen: J.C

.B . M

ohr, 1926), pp. 347-48. See also M ax W

eber, G

esam m

elte Aufsiitze zttr Religionssoziologie (T iibingen: J.C

.B . M

ohr, 1920), p. 252.

12 A

R ealist Theory of International P

olitics

m anipul_ation o

fthe perennial forces that have shaped the past as they w ill the future.

T he ~eahst cat:1:ot be p~rsuaded that w

e can bring about that transform ation by con-

frontm g a political reality that has its ow

n law s w

ith an abstract ideal that refuses to take those law

s into account. 4. Political realism

is aw are o

f the m oral significance o

f political action. It is also aw

are o f the ineluctable tension betw

een the m oral com

m and and the re-

qui:em ents o

f suc_cessful political action. A nd it is unw

illing to gloss over and obhtera~e ~

at tension and thus to obfuscate both the m oral and the political issues

by m aking 1t appear as though the stark facts o

f politics w ere m

orally m ore satis-

fying than they actually are, and the m oral law

less exacting that it actually is. R

ealism m

aintains that universal m oral principles cannot be applied to the

actions o f states in their abstract universal form

ulation but that they m ust be fil-

tered through the concrete circum stances o

f tim e and place. T

he individual m ay

say for him self, "Fiat justitia, pereat m

undus (Let justice be done, even if the w orld

perish)," but the state has no right to say so in the nam e o

f those w ho are in its

care. B oth individual and state m

ust judge political action by universal m oral prin-

ciples, such as that o f liberty. Y

et w hile the individual has a m

oral right to sacri- fice him

self in defense o f such a m

oral principle, the state has no right to let its m

oral disapprobation o f the infringem

ent o f liberty get in the w

ay o f successful

political action, itself inspired by the m oral principle o

f national survival. T here

can be no political m orality w

ithout prudence, that is, w ithout consideration o

f the political consequences o

f seem ingly m

oral action. R ealism

, then, considers prudence-the w

eighing o f the consequences o

f alternative political actions-to be the suprem

e virtue in politics. E thics in the abstract judges action by its con-

form ity w

ith the m oral law

; political ethics judges actton by its political conse- quences. C

lassical and m edieval philosophy knew

this, and so did L incoln w

hen he said:

I do the very best I know how

, the very best I can, and I m ean to keep doing

so until the end. Ifthe end brings m e out all right, w

hat is said against m e

w on't am

ount to anything. Ifthe end brings m e out w

rong, ten angels sw ear-

ing I w as right w

ould m ake no difference.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the m

oral aspirations o f a particular

nation w ith the m

oral law s that govern the universe. A

s it distinguishes betw een

truth and opinion, so it distinguishes betw een truth and idolatry. A

ll nations are tem

pted-and few have been able to resist the tem

ptation for long-to clothe their ow

n particular aspirations and actions in the m oral purposes o

f the universe. To know

that nations are subject to the m oral law

is one thing, w hile to pretend to

know w

ith certainty w hat is good and evil in the relations am

ong nations is quite another. T

here is a w orld o

f difference betw een the belief that all nations stand

under the judgm ent o

f G od, inscrutable to the hum

an m ind, and the blasphe-

m ous conviction that G

od is alw ays on one's side and that w

hat one w ills oneself

cannot fail to be w illed by G

od also. T

he lighthearted equation betw een a particular nationalism

and the coun- sels o

f Providence is m orally indefensible, for it is that very sin o

f pride against

Six P rinciples o

f P olitical R

ealism

1 3

w hich the G

reek tragedians and the biblical prophets have w arned rulers and

ruled. T hat equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the

distortion in judgm ent that, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations

and civilizations-in the nam e o

f m oral principle, ideal, or G

od him self

O n the other hand, it is exactly the concept o

f interest defined in term s o

f pow

er that saves us from both that m

oral excess and that political folly. For if w e

look at all nations, our ow n included, as political entities pursuing their respective

interests defined in term s o

f pow er, w

e are able to do justice to all o f them

. A nd

w e are able to do justice to all o

f them in a dual sense: w

e are able to judge other nations as w

e judge our ow n and, having judged them

in this fashion, w e are then

capable o f pursuing policies that respect the interests o

f other nations w hile pro-

tecting and prom oting those o

f our ow n. M

oderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the m

oderation o f m

oral judgm ent.

6. T he difference, then, betw

een political realism and other schools o

f thought is real, and it is profound. H

ow ever m

uch o f the theory o

f political real- ism

m ay have been m

isunderstood and m isinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its

distinctive intellectual and m oral attitude to m

atters political. Intellectually, the political realist m

aintains the autonom y o

f the political sphere, as the econom

ist, the law yer, the m

oralist m aintain theirs. H

e thinks in term s

o f interest defined as pow

er, as the econom ist thinks in term

s of interest defined as w

ealth; the law yer, of the conform

ity o f action w

ith legal rules; the m oralist, o

f the conform

ity of action w ith m

oral principles. T he econom

ist asks: "H ow

does this pol- icy affect the w

ealth ofsociety, or a segm ent ofit?" T

he law yer asks: "Is this policy in

accord w ith the rules oflaw

?" T he m

oralist asks: "Is this policy in accord w ith m

oral principles?" A

nd the political realist asks: "H ow

does this policy affect the pow er of

the nation?" (O r o

f the federal governm ent, of C

ongress, of the party, o fagriculture,

as the case m ay be.)

T he political realist is not unaw

are o fthe existence and the relevance ofstan-

dards o f thought other than political ones. A

s political realist he cannot but sub- ordinate these other standards to those o

f politics. A nd he parts com

pany w ith

other schools w hen they im

pose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political spheres. It is here that political realism

takes issue w ith the

"legalistic-m oralistic approach" to international politics. T

hat this issue is not, as has been contended, a m

ere figm ent o

f the im agination but goes to the very core

o f the controversy can be show

n from m

any historical exam ples. T

hree w ill suf-

fice to m ake the point. 5

In 1939 the Soviet U nion attacked Finland. T

his action confronted France and G

reat B ritain w

ith tw o issues, one legal, the other political. D

id that action vi- olate the C

ovenant o f the League o

f N ations, and, ifit did, w

hat counterm easures

5See the other exam ples discussed in H

ans J. M orgenthau, ''A

nother 'G reat D

ebate': T he N

ational Interest o

f the U nited States," The Am

erican Political Science Review , V

ol. X LV

I (D ecem

ber 1952), pp. 979 ff. See also H

ans J. M orgenthau, Politics in the 20th Century, V

oL 1, The D_edine ofpem ocratic

Politics (C hicago: U

niversity o f C

hicago Press, 1962), pp. 79 ff; and abndged ed1t1on (C hicago:

U niversity o

f C hicago Press, 1971), pp. 204 ff.

1 4

A

R ealist T

heory of International P olitics

should France and G reat B

ritain take? T he legal question could easily be answ

ered in the affirm

ative, for obviously the Soviet U nion had done w

hat w as prohibited

by the C ovenant. T

he answ er to the political question depends, first, upon the

m anner in w

hich the R ussian action affected the interests o

f France and G reat

B ritain; second, upon the existing distribution o

fpow er betw

een France and G reat

B ritain, on the one hand, and the Soviet U

nion and other potentially hostile na- tions, especially G

erm any, on the other; and, third, upon the influence that the

counterm easures w

ere likely to have upon the interests o fFrance and G

reat B ritain

and the future distribution o f pow

er. France and G reat B

ritain, as the leading m

em bers o

f the L eague o

f N ations, saw

to it that the Soviet U nion w

as expelled from

the L eague, and they w

ere prevented from joining Finland in the w

ar against the Soviet U

nion only by Sw eden's refusal to allow

their troops to pass through Sw

edish territory on their w ay to Finland. Ifthis refusal by Sw

eden had not saved them

, France and G reat B

ritain w ould shortly have found them

selves at w ar w

ith the Soviet U

nion and G erm

any at the sam e tim

e. T

he policy o f France and G

reat B ritain w

as a classic exam ple o

f legalism in

that they allow ed the answ

er to the legal question, legitim ate w

ithin its sphere, to determ

ine their political actions. Instead o fasking both questions, that oflaw

and that o

f pow er, they asked only the question o

f law ; and the answ

er they received could have no bearing on the issue that their very existence m

ight have depended upon. T

he second exam ple illustrates the "m

oralistic approach" to international politics. It concerns the international status o

f the C om

m unist governm

ent o f

C hina. T

he rise o f that governm

ent confronted the W estern w

orld w ith tw

o issues, one m

oral, the other political. W ere the nature and policies o

f that gov- ernm

ent in accord w ith the m

oral principles o f the W

estern w orld? S

hould the W

estern w orld deal w

ith such a governm ent? T

he answ er to the first question

could not fail to be in the negative. Y et it did not follow

w ith necessity that the

answ er to the second question should also be in the negative. T

he standard o f

thought applied to the first-the m oral-question w

as sim ply to test the nature

and the policies o f the C

om m

unist governm ent o

f C hina by the principles o

f W

estern m orality. O

n the other hand, the second-the political-question had to

be subjected to the com plicated test o

fthe interests involved and the pow er avail-

able on either side, and o f the bearing o

f one or the other course o f action upon

these interests and pow er. T

he application o f this test could w

ell have led to the conclusion that it w

ould be w iser not to deal w

ith the C om

m unist governm

ent o

f C hina. To

arrive at this conclusion by neglecting this test altogether and answ

ering the political question in term s o

f the m oral issue w

as indeed a classic exam

ple o f the "m

oralistic approach" to international politics. T

he third case illustrates strikingly the contrast betw een realism

and the legalistic-m

oralistic approach to foreign policy. G reat B

ritain, as one o f the guar-

antors o fthe neutrality o

fB elgium

, w ent to w

ar w ith G

erm any in A

ugust 1914 be- cause G

erm any had violated the neutrality o

fB elgium

. T he B

ritish action could be justified in either realistic or in legalistic-m

oralistic term s. T

hat is to say, one could argue realistically that for centuries it had been axiom

atic for B ritish foreign policy

Six P rinciples o

f P olitical R

ealism

15

to prevent the control o f the L

ow C

ountries by a hostile pow er. It w

as then not so m

uch the violation o fB

elgium 's neutrality per se as the hostile intentions o

fthe vi- olator that provided the rationale for B

ritish intervention. If the violator had been another nation but G

erm any, G

reat B ritain m

ight w ell have refrained from

inter- vening. T

his is the position taken by Sir E dw

ard G rey, B

ritish foreign secretary during that period. U

ndersecretary for Foreign A ffairs H

ardinge rem arked to him

in 1908: "IfFrance violated B

elgian neutrality in a w ar against G

erm any, it is doubt-

ful w hether E

ngland or R ussia w

ould m ove a finger to m

aintain B elgian neutrality,

w hile if the neutrality o

f B elgium

w as violated by G

erm any, it is probable that the

converse w ould be the case." W

hereupon Sir E dw

ard G rey replied: "T

his is to the point." Y

et one could also take the legalistic and m oralistic position that the viola-

tion o f B

elgium 's neutrality per se, because o

f its legal and m oral defects and

regardless o fthe interests at stake and o

fthe identity o fthe violator, justified B

ritish and, for that m

atter, A m

erican intervention. T his w

as the position that T heodore

R oosevelt took in his letter to Sir E

dw ard G

rey o fJanuary 22, 1915:

To m e the crux of the situation has been B

elgium . If E

ngland or France had acted tow

ard B elgium

as G erm

any has acted I should have opposed them , ex-

actly as I now oppose G

erm any. I have em

phatically approved your action as a m

odel for w hat should be done by those w

ho believe that treaties should be observed in good faith and that there is such a thing as international m

orality. I take this position as an A

m erican w

ho is no m ore an E

nglishm an than he is

a G erm

an, w ho endeavors loyally to serve the interests of his ow

n country, but w

ho also endeavors to do w hat he can for justice and decency as regards

m ankind at large, and w

ho therefore feels obliged to judge all other nations by their conduct on any given occasion.

T his realist defense o

f the autonom y o

f the political sphere against its sub- version by other m

odes o fthought does not im

ply disregard for the existence and im

portance o f these other m

odes o f thought. It rather im

plies that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function. Political realism

is based upon a plu- ralistic conception o

f hum an nature. R

eal m an is a com

posite o f "econom

ic m

an," "political m an," "m

oral m an," "religious m

an," etc. A m

an w ho w

as noth- ing but "political m

an" w ould be a beast, for he w

ould be com pletely lacking in

m oral restraints. A

m an w

ho w as nothing but "m

oral m an" w

ould be a fool, for he w

ould be com pletely lacking in prudence. A

m an w

ho w as

nothing but "religious m

an" w ould be a saint, for he w

ould be com pletely lacking in w

orldly desires. Recognizing that these different facets o

f hum an nature exist, political real-

ism also recognizes that in order to understand one o

f them one has to deal w

ith it on its ow

n term s. T

hat is to say, if I w ant to understand "religious m

an," I m ust

for the tim e being abstract from

the other aspects o f hum

an nature and deal w ith

its religious aspect as if it w ere the only one. Furtherm

ore, I m ust apply to the reli-

gious sphere the standards o f thought appropriate to it, alw

ays rem aining aw

are o f

the existence o fother standards and their actual influence upon the religious qual-

ities o fm

an. W hat is true o

f this facet o fhum

an nature is true o f all the others. N

o

1 6 A

R ealist Theory of International P

olitics

m odern econom

ist, for instance, w ould conceive o

f his science and its relations to other sciences o

f m an in any other w

ay. It is exactly through such a process o f

em ancipation from

other standards o f thought, and the developm

ent o f one ap-

propriate to its subject m atter, that econom

ics has developed as an autonom ous

theory o f the .econom

ic activities of m an. To contribute to a sim

ilar developm ent

in the field o fpolitics is indeed the purpose o

f political realism .

It is in the nature o f things that a theory o

f politics that is based upon such principles w

ill not m eet w

ith unanim ous approval-nor does, for that m

atter, such a foreign policy. For theory and policy alike run counter to tw

o trends in our cul- ture that are not able to reconcile them

selves to the assum ptions and results o

f a rational, objective theory o

f politics. O ne o

f these trends disparages the role o f

pow er in society on grounds that stem

from the experience and philosophy of the

nineteenth century; w e shall address ourselves to this tendency later in greater

detail. 6 T he other trend, opposed to the realist theory and practice o

fpolitics, stem s

from the very relationship that exists, and m

ust exist, betw een the hum

an m ind

and the political sphere. For reasons that w e shall discuss later,7 the hum

an m ind

in its day-by-day operations cannot bear to look the truth of politics straight in the face. It m

ust disguise, distort, belittle, and em bellish the truth-the m

ore so, the m

ore the individual is actively involved in the processes o f politics, and particu-

larly in those o f international politics. For only by deceiving him

self about the nature o

f politics and the role he plays on the political scene is m an able to live

contentedly as a political anim al w

ith him self and his fellow

m en.

T hus it is inevitable that a theory that tries to understand international pol-

itics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view o

f its intrinsic nature, rather than as people w

ould like to see it, m ust overcom

e a psychological resistance that m ost

other branches o f learning need not face. A

book devoted to the theoretical understanding of international politics therefore requires a special explanation and justification.

6See pages 37 ff. 7See pages 101 ff.

UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

D ifferent Approaches

T his book has tw

o purposes. T he first is to detect and understand the forces th~t

determ ine political relations am

ong nations, and to_ com pr~hend th~ _w

ays m

w hich those forces act upon one another and upon m

ternat1onal political rela- tions and institutions. In m

ost other branches o f the social sciences, this purpose

w ould be taken for granted, because the natural aim

o f all scientific undertakin~s

is to discover the forces underlying social phenom ena and the m

ode of theu operation. In approaching the study o

f international politics, one cannot take this purpose for granted; it therefore requires special em

phasis. A s D

r. G rayson

K irk has put it:

U ntil recent tim

es the study of international relations in the U nited States

has been dom inated largely by persons w

ho have taken one of three approaches. First there have been the historians w

ho have considered interna- tional relations m

erely as recent history, in w hich the student is handicapped

by the absence of an adequate am ount of available data. A

second group, the international law

yers, have properly concerned them selves prim

arily w ith the

legal aspects of interstate relations, but they have seldom m

ade a serious effort to inquire into the fundam

ental reasons for the continuing incom plete-

ness and inadequacy of this legal nexus. Finally, there have been those w ho

have been less concerned w ith international relations as they are than w

ith the m

ore perfect system w

hich these idealists w ould like to build. O

nly recently-and belatedly-have students undertaken to exam

ine the fundam en-

tal and persistent forces of w orld politics, and the institutions w

hich em body

them , not w

ith a view to praise or to condem

n, but m erely in an effort to

provide a better understanding of these basic drives w hich determ

ine the

17

1 8

The S

cience of International P olitics

foreign policies o f states. T

hus the political scientist is m oving into the inter-

national field at last. 1

Professor C harles E. M

artin has taken up D r. K

irk's them e by pointing to

the problem w

hich faces the students and the teachers of international rela- tions :nore than any other, nam

ely, that dualism w

e have to face in m oving in

tw o different and opposite areas. I m

ean the area o f institutions o

f peace w

hich are rel~ted to the adjustm ent of disputes and the area o

f pow er politics

and w ar. Y

et, It m ust be so. There is no escape from

it. ... I think probably one of the greatest indictm

ents of our attitude in teaching in the last tw enty

years has been to w rite off glibly the institution of w

ar and to w rite off the

books the influence of pow er politics. I think political scientists m

ake a great 1:1istake (n ~oin~ so: W

e should be the very ones w ho are studying pow

er poli- tJCs and Its 1m

phcat1ons and the situations grow ing out of it, and w

e should be the ones w

ho study the institution of w ar. 2

. D

efined in s~ch term s, international politics as an academ

ic discipline is dis- tm

ct from recent history and current events, international law

, and political reform .

International politics em braces m

ore than recent history and current events. T

he ob~erver is sur~ounded by_ the contem porary scene w

ith its ever-shifting

em phasis and changm

g perspectives. H e cannot find solid ground on w

hich to stand, or objective standards o

f evaluation, w ithout getting dow

n to fundam entals

that are revealed only by the correlation o f recent events w

ith the m ore distant

past and the perennial qualities o f hum

an nature underlying both. International

politics cannot be

reduced to

legal rules

and institutions. !nternational politics operates w

ithin the fram ew

ork o f su~h rules and through the

m strum

entality o f such institutions. B

ut it is no m ore identical w

ith them than

A m

erican politics on the national level is identical w ith the A

m erican C

onstitution the federal law

s, and the agencies o f the federal governm

ent. '

C oncerning atte_m

pts to reform international politics before m

aking an effort to understand w

hat m ternational politics is about, w

e share W illiam

G raham

Sum

ner's view :

The w orst vice in political discussions is that dogm

atism w

hich takes its stand on great principles or assum

ptions, instead o fstanding on an exact exam

ina- tion o

f things as they are and hum an nature as it is.... A

n ideal is form ed of

som e higher or better state o

f things than now exists, and alm

ost unconsciously the ideal is assum

ed as already existing and m ade the basis of speculations

w hich have no root.... T

he w hole m

ethod o f abstract speculation on politi-

cal topics is vicious. It is popular because it is easy; it is easier to im agine a

new w

orld than to learn to know this one; it is easier to em

bark on specula- tions based on a few

broad assum ptions than it is to study the history of

1A m

ericanjoum al o

fInternational Law , V

ol. 39 (1945), pp. 369-70. 2Proceedings o

fthe Eighth Conference o fTeachers ofIntem

ational Law and Related Subjects (W

ashington, D C

: C

arnegie E ndow

m ent for International Peace, 1946), p. 66.

U nderstanding International P

olitics 19

states and institutions; it is easier to catch up a popular dogm a than it is to

analyze it to see w hether it is true or not. A

ll this leads to confusion, to the adm

ission of phrases and platitudes, to m uch disputing but little gain in the

prosperity of nations. 3

lim itations to U

nderstanding T

he m ost form

idable difficulty facing a theoretical inquiry into the nature and w

ays o f international politics is the am

biguity o f the m

aterial w ith w

hich the observer has to deal. T

he events he m ust try to understand are, on the one hand,

unique occurrences: they happened in this w ay only once and never before or

since. O n the other hand, they are sim

ilar, for they are m anifestations o

f social forces. Social forces are the product o

f hum an nature in action. T

herefore, under sim

ilar conditions, they w ill m

anifest them selves in a sim

ilar m anner. B

ut w here

is the line to be draw n betw

een the sim ilar and the unique?

T his am

biguity o f the events to be understood by a theory o

f international politics-it m

ay be pointed out in passing-is but a special instance o f a general

im pedim

ent to hum an understanding. "A

s no event and no shape," observes M

ontaigne, "is entirely like another, so also is there none entirely different from

another: an ingenious m ixture on the part o

fN ature. ffthere were no sim

ilarity in our faces, we could not distinguish m

anfrom beast; ifthere were no dissim

ilarity, we could not distinguish one m

anfrom another. A

ll things hold together by som e sim

ilarity; every exam

ple is halting, and the com parison that is derived from

experience is alw ays

defective and im perfect. A

nd yet one links up the com parisons at som

e corner. A

nd so do law s becom

e serviceable and adapt them selves to every one o

f our affairs by som

e w rested, forced, and biased interpretation."

4 It is against such "w

rested, forced, and biased interpretation" o f political events that a theory o

f international politics m

ust be continuously on guard. W

e learn w hat the principles o

f international politics are from com

parisons betw

een such events. A certain political situation evokes the form

ulation and execu- tion o

fa certain foreign policy. D ealing w

ith a different political situation, w e ask our-

selves: how does this situation differ from

the preceding one, and how is it sim

ilar? D

o the sim ilarities reaffirm

the policy developed previously? O r does the blending

o fsim

ilarities and differences allow the essence o

fthat policy to be retained w hile, in

som e aspects, it is to be m

odified? O r do the differences vitiate the analogy altogether

and m ake the previous policy inapplicable? If one w

ants to understand international politics, grasp the m

eaning o f contem

porary events, and foresee and influence the future, one m

ust be able to perform the dual intellectual task im

plicit in these ques- tions. O

ne m ust be able to distinguish betw

een the sim ilarities and differences in tw

o political situations. Furtherm

ore, one m ust be able to assess the im

port o f these

3"D em

ocracy and R esponsible G

overnm ent," The Challenge o

fFacts and O ther Essays (N

ew H

aven, C T

: Y

ale U niversity Press, 1914), pp. 245-46.

4The Essays o fM

ichel de M ontaigne, edited and translated by Jacob Z

eitlin (N ew

Y ork: A

lfred A. K nopf,

1936), V ol. III, p. 270; M

ontaigne's italics.

2 0

The S

cience of International P olitics

sim ilarities and differences for alternative foreign policies. Three series of events

taken at random , w

ill illustrate the problem and its difficulties.

' O

n Septem ber 17, 1796, G

eorge W ashington m

ade a speech in w hich he bade

farew ell t~ the nation, outlining the principles o

fA m

erican foreign policy in term s

o fabstent10n from

E uropean affairs. O

n D ecem

ber 2, 1823, President M onroe sent

a ~ess~ge ~o _C ongress in w

hich he form ulated the principles o

f A m

erican foreign policy m

sim ilar term

s. In 1917, the U nited States joined France and G

reat B ritain

against G erm

any, w hich threatened the independence o

fboth. In 1941, the U nited

~tates follow ed a sim

ilar course of action. O n M

arch 12, 1947, President T rum

an, :n a m

essage to C ongress, reform

ulated the principles o f A

m erican foreign policy

m term

s o f the w

orldw ide containm

ent o f C

om m

unism .

In 1512, H enry V

III o fE

ngland m ade an alliance w

ith the H apsbu;gs against

France. In 151:5,_ he m ade an alliance w

ith France against the H apsburgs. In 1522

and 1542, he Jm ned the H

apsburgs against France. In 1756, G reat B

ritain allied itself w

ith Prussia against the H apsburgs and France. In 1793, G

reat B ritain, Prussia,

and the H apsburgs w

ere allied against N apoleon. In 1914, G

reat B ritain joined w

ith France and R

ussia against A ustria and G

erm any, and in 1939 w

ith France and Poland against G

erm any.

N apoleon, W

ilhelm II, and H

itler tried to conquer the continent o f E

urope and failed.

A re there w

ithin each o f these three series o

f events sim ilarities that allow

us to form

ulate a principle o f foreign policy for each series? O

r is each event so dif- ferent from

the others in the series that each w ould require a different policy? T

he diffi~ulty in m

aking this decision is the m easure o

f the difficulty in m aking cor-

r~ct Jud_gm ~nts in (oreign policy, in charting the future. w

isely, and in doing the nght thm

g m the nght w

ay and at the right tim e.

Should the foreign policy in W ashington's Farew

ell A ddress be considered a

g~~eral principle_ o f ~

~ rican

foreign policy, or did it stem from

tem porary con-

d1t1o~s and w as its validity therefore lim

ited to them ? A

re the foreign policies o f

W ashington's and M

onroe's m essages com

patible w ith the T

rum an D

octrine? To state the problem

another w ay, is the T

rum an D

octrine a m ere m

odification o f a

gen~ral principle underlying W ashington's and M

onroe's conception o f foreign

affairs, or does the T rum

an D octrine constitute a radical departure from

the tradi- tions. ~

f A m

erican foreign p_olicy? Ifit does, is it justified in the light o f changed

cond1ti?ns? G ener_ally speaking, do the differences in the international position o

f the_l-!111ted States m

1796, 1823, 1917, 1941, and 1947 justify the different foreign policies form

ulated and executed w ith regard to these different political situations?

W hat are

the sim ilarities and differences in the situations w

ith w hich E

urope confronted the U

nited States in 1917, 1941, and 1947, and to w hat extent do they

require sim ilar or different foreign policies on the part o

f the U nited States?

W hat is the m

eaning of those shifts in B ritish foreign policy? H

ave they grow

n from the w

him ~nd perfidy of princes and statesm

en? O r are they inspired

by the accum ulated w

isdom o

f a people m indful o

f the perm anent forces, tran-

scending any particular alignm ent, that determ

ine their relations to the continent o

f E urope?

U nderstanding International P

olitics 21

A re the disasters that follow

ed in the w ake o

f the three attem pts at conti-

nental conquest so m any accidents due to disparate causes? O

r does the sim ilarity

in results point to sim ilarities in the overall political situation, sim

ilarities that convey a lesson to be pondered by those w

ho m ight w

ant to try again? M ore par-

ticularly, w ere the policies the Soviet U

nion pursued in the afterm ath o

f the Second W

orld W ar sim

ilar to those o f N

apoleon, W ilhelm

II, and H itler? Ifthey

w ere, did they call for policies on the part of the U

nited States sim ilar to those

pursued in 1917 and 1941? Som

etim es, as in the case o

f the changes in B ritish foreign policy, the answ

er seem

s to be clear: that policy proceeded from w

isdom rather than from

w him

. M

ost o f the tim

e, how ever, and especially w

hen w e deal w

ith the present and the future, the answ

er is bound to be tentative and subject to qualifications. T he facts

from w

hich the answ er m

ust derive are essentially am biguous and subject to con-

tinuous change. To those m en w

ho w ould have it otherw

ise, history has taught nothing but false analogies. W

hen such m en have been responsible for the foreign

policies o f their countries, they have achieved only disaster. W

ilhelm II and H

itler learned nothing from

N apoleon's fate, for they thought it could teach them

noth- ing. T

hose w ho have erected W

ashington's advice into a dogm a to be follow

ed slavishly have erred no less than those w

ho w ould dism

iss it altogether. T

he M unich settlem

ent o f 1938 is another case in point. In retrospect, o

f course, w

e all know from

practical experience that it w as a failure, and from

that experience w

e have developed the theoretical categories that dem onstrate that it

w as bound to be a failure. B

ut I rem em

ber very w ell the consensus w

ith w hich the

M unich settlem

ent w as approved at the tim

e of its conclusion by theoreticians and practitioners o

fforeign policy and by the m an in the street as w

ell. T he M

unich settlem

ent w as then generally regarded as a great act ofstatesm

anship, a concession m

ade to a w ould-be conqueror for the sake ofpeace. E. H

. C arr so regarded it then,

and A J.P. T

aylor so regards it now . T

he flaw in that reasoning, w

hich few people

w ere-and perhaps could be-aw

are o fat the tim

e, w as again the neglect o

fthe con- tingencies inherent in political prediction. T

hat w hich reveals itself as a sim

ple truth in retrospect either w

as com pletely unknow

n in prospect or else could not be determ

ined by anything but an uncertain hunch. Take finally the contem

porary issue o f nuclear w

ar. From

tim e to tim

e A

m erican policym

akers speak openly about "prevailing" in a nuclear w ar. In this

they m irror com

m ents m

ade by R ussian m

ilitary leaders-although not by Soviet political leaders such as B

rezhnev, w ho m

ore than once w arned that a therm

onu- clear w

ar w ould be suicidal for both superpow

ers. Particularly in the 1980s, as C

old W ar tensions m

ounted again, voices in both countries echoed the belief that victory in a nuclear w

ar w as not unthinkable, provided augm

ented strategic forces w

ere form

ed through vastly increased defense expenditures. It is possible to develop a theory o

f nuclear w ar that assum

es nuclear w ar to be just another kind

o f violence, greater in m

agnitude but not different in kind from the types of vio-

lence w ith w

hich history has acquainted us. It follow s from

this assum ption that

nuclear w ar is going to be m

uch m ore terrible than conventional w

ar, but not nec- essarily intolerable, provided w

e take the m easures that w

ill enable at least som e

2 2

The S

cience of International P olitics

~ f us to survive it. In other w

ords, once one starts w ith this theoretical assum

p- tion o

f the nature and the consequences o f nuclear w

ar, one can logically arrive at the conclusion that the foreign policy o

f the U nited States does not need to lim

it itself to trying to avoid nuclear w

ar but that the U nited States m

ust also prepare to survive it. A

nd then it becom es perfectly legitim

ate to raise the question, pro- vided 100 m

illion A m

ericans w ere to be killed in a nuclear w

ar and nine-tenths o f

the econom ic capacity o

f the U nited States w

ere to be destroyed, o f how

w e

enable the surviving A m

ericans to rebuild the U nited States w

ith the rem aining

one-tenth o f econom

ic capacity. T

he contingent elem ent in this theory o

f nuclear w ar is its utter uncertainty,

and this uncertainty is typical o f all levels o

ftheoretical analysis and prediction in th~ field o

f politics, dom estic and international. E

ven if one w ere to accept all its

es'.1m ates o

f deaths and m aterial destruction and o

f the rate o f m

aterial recovery, this theory w

ould have to be uncertain about the hum an reactions to the kind o

f hum

an and m

aterial devastation

that nuclear w ar

is likely

to bring

about. O

bviously, if a highly com plex hum

an society could be visualized to operate like a prim

itive ant society, its recuperative ability could be taken for granted. If one- half o

f the ants o f one anthill have been destroyed together w

ith nine-tenths o f

the m aterial o

f the anthill, it is safe to conclude that the rem aining ants w

ill start all over again, building up the anthill and reproducing until the next catastrophe forces them

to start all over again. B

ut a hum an society does not have this type o

f m echanical recuperative

ability. Societies have a breaking point as do individuals, and there is a point beyond w

hich hum an endurance does not carry hum

an initiative in the face o f

such unprecedented m assive devastation. O

nce that point is reached, civilization itself w

ill collapse. T he exact location o

f that point in the scale o f hum

an reactions is beyond theoretical understanding. \V

hat w e are left w

ith are hunches that m ay

or m ay not be confirm

ed by experience. T

he first lesson the student o f international politics m

ust learn and never forget is that the com

plexities o f international affairs m

ake sim ple solutions and

trustw orthy prophecies im

possible. H ere the scholar and the charlatan part com

- pany. K

now ledge o

f the forces that determ ine politics am

ong nations, and o f the

w ays by w

hich their political relations unfold, reveals the am biguity o

f the facts o f

international politics. In every political situation contradictory tendencies are at play. O

ne o f these tendencies is m

ore likely to prevail under certain conditions. B

ut w hich tendency actually w

ill prevail is anybody's guess. T he best the scholar

can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies that, as potentialities, are inherent in a "certain" international situation. H

e can point out the different conditions that m

ake it m ore likely for one tendency to prevail than for another and, finally,

assess the probabilities for the different conditions and tendencies to prevail in actuality.

T hus w

orld affairs have surprises in store for w hoever tries to read the

future from his know

ledge o fthe past and from

the signs o f the present. In 1776,

W ashington declared that "the Fate o

f our C ountry depends in all hum

an prob- ability, on the E

xertion o f a Few

W eeks." Y<lt it w

as not until seven years later \

U nderstanding International P

olitics 23

that the W ar o

f Independence cam e to an end. In February 1792, B

ritish prim e

m inister Pitt justified the reduction o

f m ilitary expenditures (particularly a dras-

tic decrease in the personnel o f the B

ritish navy) and held out hope for m ore

reductions to com e by declaring: "U

nquestionably there never w as a tim

e in the history o

f this country w hen from

the situation o f E

urope w e m

ight m ore rea-

sonably expect fifteen years o f peace than at the present m

om ent." O

nly tw o

m onths later the continent o

f E urope w

as engulfed in w ar. Less than a year later

G reat B

ritain w as involved. T

hus w as initiated a period o

f alm ost continuous

w arfare that lasted nearly a quarter o

f a century. W hen L

ord G ranville becam

e B

ritish foreign secretary in 1870, he w as inform

ed by the perm anent undersec-

retary that "he had never, during his long experience, know n so great a lull in

foreign affairs, and that he w as not aw

are o f any im

portant question that he [L

ord G ranville] should have to deal w

ith." O n that sam

e day Prince L eopold

o f H

ohenzollern-Sigm aringen accepted the crow

n o f Spain, an event that three

w eeks later led to the outbreak o

f the Franco-Prussian W ar. Six w

eeks before the R

ussian R evolution o

f M arch 1917, L

enin told a group o f young socialists in

Z urich: "W

e old people w ill probably not live to see the decisive battles o

f the com

ing revolution." Less than a year later, the decisive battles o f the R

ussian R

evolution began under his leadership. W

hen the prophecies o fgreat statesm

en fare so ill, w hat can w

e expect from

the predictions o f lesser m

inds? In how m

any books w ritten on international

affairs before the First W orld W

ar, w hen com

m on opinion held great w

ars to be im

possible or at least o f short duration, w

as there even an inkling o f w

hat w as to

com e? W

as any book w ritten in the period betw

een the tw o w

orld w ars that could

have helped one anticipate w hat international politics w

ould be like in the ninth decade o

f the century? W ho could have guessed at the beginning ofW

orld W ar II

w hat the political w

orld w ould be like at its end? W

ho could have know n in 1945

w hat the w

orld w ould be like in 1955, or in 1960 w

hat it w ould be like in 1970 or

1980? W hat trust then shall w

e place in those w ho today w

ould tell us w hat

tom orrow

and the day after w ill bring or w

hat the year 2000 w ill be like?

5

In 1979

the intelligence com

m unity,

and m

ore particularly the

C entral

Intelligence A gency, w

ere criticized for their failure to w arn A

m erican policym

akers of the upheavals that culm

inated in the Shah oflran's ouster. President C arter him

- self took the unprecedented step ofpublicly reprim

anding the highest authorities in the intelligence field for their lack of foresight.

W hat accounts for this failure of foresight on the part o

f otherw ise intelligent

and responsible people? T he answ

er lies in the nature of the em pirical m

aterial w

ith w hich these individuals had to deal. T

he observer is confronted w ith a m

ul- titude o

f factors, the totality o f w

hich shape the future. In order to foresee the

5T he fallibility o

f prophecies in international affairs is strikingly dem onstrated by the fantastic errors

com m

itted by the experts w ho have tried to forecast the nature o

f the next w ar. T

he history o f these

forecasts, from M

achiavelli to G eneral J.F.C

. Fuller, is the story oflogical deductions, plausible in them

selves, that had no connection w ith the contingencies o

f the actual historical developm ent.

G eneral Fuller, for instance, foresaw

in 1923 that the decisive w eapon of the Second W

orld W ar

w ould be gas! See 77Je Reform

ation o fW

ar (N ew

Y ork. E. P. D

utton, 1923).

2 4

The S

cience of International P olitics

future, the observer w ould have to know

all these factors, their dynam ics, their

m utual actions and reactions, and so forth. W

hat he actually know s and can know

is but a sm

all fragm ent o

f the total. H e m

ust guess-and only the future w ill show

w

ho chose rightly am ong the m

any possible guesses. T

hus, w ith regard to Iran the intelligence com

m unity guessed w

rong. Instead o

f blam ing it indiscrim

inately, one ought to ask oneself tw o questions:

C ould one have pinpointed in tim

e the outbreak o f popular discontent? If the

answ er is in the affirm

ative, w hat could the U

nited States have done about it? T

he answ er to the second question is, at best: very little. T

his is probably w hy

the intelligence com m

unity paid less attention to Iran than it m ight have done

in the first place. It is sobering to note that the science o

f econom ics, presum

ed to be the m

ost precise o f the social sciences because its central concept, w

ealth, is quanti- tative by definition, is sim

ilarly incapable o f reliable prediction. An exam

ination o

f a large num ber o

f forecasts o f year-to-year changes in the A

m erican G

N P

for the years 1953-63 established an average error o

f about 40 percent. 6 In O ctober

1966 the Prudential Life Insurance C om

pany predicted that in 1967 consum er

expenditures w ould rise by 31 billion dollars and inventory investm

ents w ould

am ount to 7.5 billion dollars. In O

ctober 1967 it scaled its estim ate o

f consum er

expenditures dow n to 27 billion dollars, an error o

f alm ost 15 percent, assum

ing the correctness o

f the revised estim ate; it reduced its estim

ate o f inventory invest-

m ents to 7 billion dollars. T

he C ouncil o

f E conom

ic A dvisors overestim

ated the grow

th o f the G

N P

for the sam e year by about 12 percent.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE

T hese questions lead us to the secondary purpose o

f this book. N o study o

f poli- tics, and certainly no study o

f international politics in the final decades o f the

tw entieth century, can be disinterested in the sense that it is able to divorce know

l- edge from

action and to pursue know ledge for its ow

n sake. International politics is no longer, as it w

as for the U nited States during m

ost o f its history, a series o

f incidents, costly or rew

arding, but hardly calling into question the nation's ve1y existence and destiny. T

he existence and destiny o f the U

nited States w ere m

ore deeply affected by the dom

estic events o f the C

ivil W ar than by the international

policies leading up to, and evolving from , the M

exican W ar, the Spanish-A

m erican

W ar, and the R

oosevelt corollary to the M onroe D

octrine. 7

6V iktor Z

arnow itz, A

n Appraisal o fShort-Tenn Econom

ic Forecasts (N ew

Y ork: N

ational B ureau o

f E

conom ic R

esearch, 1967). 7T

his corollary is found in the m essage o

fT heodore R

oosevelt to C ongress on D

ecem ber 6, 1904. In

that m essage he proclaim

ed the right o f the U

nited States to intervene in the dom estic affairs o

f the L

atin A m

erican countries. For the text, see R uhl J. B

artlett, editor, The Record o fAm

erican D iplom

acy: D

ocum ents and Readings in the H

istory o fAm

erican Foreign Relations, 4 th ed. (N

ew Y

ork: A lfred A

. K

nopf, 1964), p. 539.

U nderstanding the P

roblem o

f International Peace 25

Tw o facts peculiar to our tim

e have com pletely reversed the relative im

por- tance o

f dom estic and international policies for the U

nited States. First o f all, the

U nited States is at the m

om ent o

f this w riting one of the tw

o m ost pow

erful nations on earth. Y

et, in com parison w

ith its actual and potential com petitors, it is

not so pow erful that it can afford to ignore the effect o

f its policies upon its posi- tion am

ong the nations. From the end o

f the C ivil W

ar to the beginning o f the

Second W orld W

ar, it m attered little w

hat policies the U nited States pursued w

ith regard to its L

atin A m

erican neighbors, C hina, or Spain. T

he self-sufficiency o f its

ow n strength, in conjunction w

ith the operation o fthe balance o

fpow er, m

ade the U

nited States im m

une to the boundless am bition born of success and the fear and

frustration that goes w ith failure. T

he U nited States could take success and failure

in stride w ithout being unduly tem

pted or afraid. N ow

it stands outside the enclo- sures o

f its continental citadel, taking on the w hole o

f the political w orld as friend

or foe. It has becom e dangerous and vulnerable, feared and afraid.

T he risk o

f being very pow erful, but not om

nipotent, is aggravated by the second fact: a threefold revolution in the political structure o

f the w orld. First,

the m ultiple-state system

o f the past, w

hose center w as in E

urope, has been replaced by a w

orldw ide, bipolar system

w hose centers lie

outside E urope.

Furtherm ore, the m

oral unity o f the political w

orld, w hich has distinguished

W estern civilization during m

ost o f its history, has been split into tw

o incom -

patible system s o

f thought and action, com peting everyw

here for the allegiance o

f m en. Finally, m

odern technology has m ade possible total w

ar resulting in universal destruction. T

he preponderance o f these three new

elem ents in con-

tem porary international 'politics has not only m

ade the preservation o f w

orld peace extrem

ely difficult but has also increased the risks inherent in w ar to the

point w here all-out nuclear w

ar becom es a self-defeating absurdity. Since in this

w orld situation the U

nited States holds a position o f predom

inant pow er, and

hence o f forem

ost responsibility, the understanding of the forces that m old

international politics and o f the factors that determ

ine its course has becom e for

the U nited States

m ore

than an interesting intellectual occupation. It has

becom e a vital necessity.

To reflect on international politics from the vantage point o

f the contem -

porary U nited States, then, is to reflect upon the vital problem

s that confront A

m erican foreign policy in our tim

e. W hile at all tim

es the prom otion o

f the national interests o

f the U nited States as a pow

er am ong pow

ers has been the m

ain concern o f A

m erican foreign policy, in an age that has seen tw

o w orld w

ars and has learned how

to w age total w

ar w ith nuclear w

eapons, the preservation of peace has becom

e the prim e concern o

f all nations. It is for this reason that this book is planned around the tw

o concepts o f

pow er and peace. T

hese tw o concepts are central to a discussion o

f w orld politics

in the final decades o f the tw

entieth century, w hen an unprecedented accum

ula- tion o

f destructive pow er gives to the problem

o f peace an urgency it has never

had before. In a w orld w

hose m oving force is the aspiration o

f sovereign nations for pow

er, peace can be m aintained only by tw

o devices. O ne is the self-regulatory

m echanism

o f the social forces, w

hich m anifests itself in the struggle for pow

er

2 6

The S

cience of International P olitics

on the international scene-that is, the balance o f pow

er. T he other consists o

f norm

ative lim itations upon that struggle, in the form

o f international law

, inter- national m

orality, and w orld public opinion. Since neither o

f these devices, as they operate today, is likely to keep the struggle for pow

er indefinitely w ithin

peaceful bounds, three further questions m ust be asked and answ

ered: W hat is the

value o f the m

ain current proposals for the m aintenance of international peace?

M ore particularly, w

hat is the value o f the proposal for transform

ing the interna- tional society o

f sovereign nations into a supranational organization, such as a w

orld state? A nd, finally, w

hat m ust a program

for action be like that is m indful

o f the lessons of the past and endeavors to adapt them

to the problem s of the

present?

W HAT IS POLITICAL PDW

ER? 1

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for pow er. W

hatever the ulti- m

ate aim

s o

f international politics,

pow er

is alw

ays the

im m

ediate aim

. Statesm

en and peoples m ay ultim

ately seek freedom , security, prosperity, or

pow er itself. T

hey m ay qefine their goals in term

s o f a religious, philosophic,

econom ic, or social ideal. T

hey m ay hope that this ideal w

ill m aterialize through

its ow n inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural devel-

opm ent o

f hum an affairs. T

hey m ay also try to further its realization through

nonpolitical m eans, such as technical cooperation w

ith other nations or inter- national organizations. B

ut w henever they strive to realize their goal by m

eans o

f international politics, they do so by striving for pow er. T

he C rusaders w

anted to free the holy places from

dom ination by the Infidels; W

oodrow W

ilson w anted to

m ake the w

orld safe for dem ocracy; the N

azis w anted to open E

astern E urope

to G erm

an colonization, to dom inate E

urope, and to conquer the w orld. Since

they all chose pow er to achieve these ends, they w

ere actors on the scene o f

international politics. 2 Tw

o conclusions follow from

this concept ofinternational politics. First, not every action that a nation perform

s w ith respect to another nation is of a political

1T he concept o

f political pow er poses one o

f the m ost difficult and controversial problem

s o f politi-

cal science. T he value o

f any concept used in political science is determ ined by its ability to explain

a m axim

um o

f the phenom ena that are conventionally considered to belong to a certain sphere of

political activity. T hus the coverage of a concept o

f political pow er, to be useful for the understand-

ing of international politics, m ust be broader than the coverage o

f one adopted to operate in the field of m

unicipal politics. T he political m

eans em ployed in the latter are m

uch m ore narrow

ly cir- cum

scribed than are those em ployed in international politics.

2For som e significant rem

arks on pow er in relation to international politics, see L

ionel R obbins, The

Econom ic Causes o

fW ar (L

ondon: Jonathan C ape, 1939), pp. 63 ff.

2 9

3 0

P

olitical P ow

er nature. M any such activities are norm

ally undertaken w ithout any consideration

o fpow

er, nor do they norm ally affect the pow

er o f the nation undertaking them

. M

any legal, econom ic, hum

anitarian, and cultural activities are o f this kind. T

hus a nation is not norm

ally engaged in international politics w hen it concludes an

extradition treaty w ith another nation, w

hen it exchanges goods and services w ith

other nations, w hen it cooperates w

ith other nations in providing relief from nat-

ural catastrophes, and w hen it prom

otes the distribution o f cultural achievem

ents throughout the w

orld. In other w ords, the involvem

ent o f a nation in interna-

tional politics is but one am ong m

any types o factivities in w

hich a nation can par- ticipate on the international scene.

Second, not all nations are at all tim es to the sam

e extent involved in inter- national politics. T

he degree o f their involvem

ent m ay run all the w

ay from the

m axi~u1:1 at pr~sent attained by the U

nited States and the Soviet U nion; through

the m m

1m um

m volvem

ent o f such countries as

Sw itzerland, L

uxem bourg, or

V enezuela; to the com

plete noninvolvem ent o

fL iechtenstein and M

onaco. Sim ilar

extrem es can be noticed in the history o

f particular countries. Spain in the six- teenth and seventeenth centuries w

as one o f the m

ain active participants in the struggle for pow

er on the international scene but plays today only a m arginal role

in it. T he sam

e is true o f such countries as A

ustria, Sw eden, and Sw

itzerland. O n

the other hand, nations such as the U nited States, the Soviet U

nion, and C hina are

today m uch m

ore deeply involved in international politics than they w ere fifty or

even tw enty years ago. In short, the relation o

fnations to international politics has a dynam

ic quality. It changes w ith the vicissitudes o

f pow er, w

hich m ay push a

nation into the forefront o f the pow

er struggle or m ay deprive a nation o

f the abil- ity to participate actively in it. It m

ay also change under the im pact o

f cultural transform

ations, w hich m

ay m ake a nation prefer other pursuits, for instance com

- m

erce, to those o fpow

er. T he tendency o

f countries to be involved to a greater or lesser extent in the struggle for pow

er prom pted A

rnold W olfers to observe that

they occupied positions at opposite extrem es o

f a spectrum extending from

w hat

he called the pole o f pow

er to the pole o f indifference.

Its N ature: Frmmr Distiru::th:m

s \X

lhen w e speak o

f pow er in the context o

f this book, w e have in m

ind not m an's

pow er over nature; or over an artistic m

edium , such as language, speech, sound,

or color; or over the m eans o

f production or consum ption; or over him

self in the sense o

f self-control. W hen w

e speak o f pow

er, w e m

ean m an's control over the

m inds and actions o

f other m en. B

y political pow er w

e refer to the m utual rela-

tions of control am ong the holders of public authority and betw

een the latter and the people at large.

Political pow er is a psychological relation betw

een those w ho exercise it and

those over w hom

it is exercised. It gives the form er control over certain actions of

the latter through the effect that the form er has on the latter's m

inds. T hat effect

derives from three sources: the expectation o

f benefits, the fear o f disadvantages,

and the respect or love for m en or institutions. It m

ay be exerted through orders,

W hat Is P

olitical P ow

er? 31

threats, the authority or charism a o

f a m an or o

f an office, or a com bination o

f any of these.

In view o

f this definition, four distinctions m ust be m

ade: betw een pow

er and influence, betw

een pow er and force, betw

een usable and unusable pow er, and

betw een legitim

ate anq illegitim ate pow

er. T

he secretary of state w ho advises the president o

f the U nited States on the

conduct o f A

m erican foreign policy has influence if the president follow

s his advice. B

ut he has no pow er over the president; for he has none of the m

eans at his disposal w

ith w hich to im

pose his w ill upon that o

f the president. H e can per-

suade but he cannot com pel. T

he president, on the other hand, has pow er over

the secretary of state; for he can im pose his w

ill upon the latter by virtue o f the

authority o f his office, the prom

ise o f benefits, and the threat o

f disadvantages. Political pow

er m ust be distinguished from

force in the sense of the act~al exercise o

f physical violence. T he threat o

fphysical violence in the form o

f pohc_e action, im

prisonm ent, capital punishm

ent, or w ar is an intrins~c e!em

ent o f ??h-

tics. W hen violence becom

es an actuality, it signifies the abdication o f political

pow er in favor of m

ilitary or pseudom ilitary P?"'.er. _In internat!onal politics in

particular, arm ed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the m

ost im portant 1:11-at_e-

rial factor m aking for the political pow

er o f a nation. If it becom

es an actuality _m w

ar, it signifies the substitution o f m

ilitary for political pow er. T

he actual exe_m se

of physical violence substitutes for the psychological relation betw een tw

o m m

ds, w

hich is o f the essence o

f political pow er, the physical relation betw

een tw o bod-

ies, one o f w

hich is strong enough to dom inate the other's m

ove1:1ents. It is for this reason that in the exercise o

f physical violence the psychological elem ent of

the political relationship is lost and that w e m

ust distinguish betw een m

ilitary and political pow

er. .

. .

T he availability o

fnuclear w eapons m

akes it necessary to distm gm

sh betw een

usable and unusable pow er. It is one of the paradoxes of the nuclear age that, in

contrast to the experience of all of prenuclear history, an increase in m ilitary

pow er is no longer necessarily conducive to an increase in politica! pow

er. T he

threat of all-out nuclear violence im plies the threat o

f total destruct10n. A s such,

it can still be a suitable instrum ent o

f foreign policy w hen addressed to a nation

that cannot reply in kind. T he nation arm

ed w ith nuclear w

eapons can assert pow

er over the other nation by saying: "E ither you do as I say, or I w

ill des:roy you." T

he situation is different if the nation so threatened can respond by saym g:

"Ifyou destroy m e w

ith nuclear w eapons, you w

ill be destroyed !n turn." H ere ~he

m utual threats cancel each other out. Since the nuclear destruction of one nation

w ould call forth the nuclear destruction o

f the other, both nations can afford to disregard the threat on the assum

ption that both w ill act rationally. .

. It is only on the assum

ption that the nations concerned m ight act m

a- tionally by destroying each other in an all-out nuclear w

ar that the threat of nuclear w

ar is credible and has indeed been used by the U nited States and the

Soviet U nion against each other, for instance by the Soviet U

nion during the Suez C

risis of 1956, by the U nited States during the B

erlin C risis o

f 1961, and by both during the A

rab-Israeli W ar o

f 1973. Y et w

hile here the threat o f force can be used

32 Political P

ow er as a rational instrum

ent o fforeign policy, the actual use o

f that force rem ains irra-

~ional; ~or the th:eatened force w ould be used not for the political purpose o

f m

fluencm ~ the :"ill o

f the other side but for the irrational purpose o f destroying

the other side w ith the attendant assurance o

f one's ow n destruction.

T hus the m

agnitude o f its destructiveness, as com

pared w ith the lim

ited character o

f the political purposes that are the proper object o fforeign policy, ren-

ders nuclear force unusable as an instrum ent o

f foreign policy. It can be rational under certain condi~ions to threaten the other side w

ith destruction through the use o

f nuclear force m order to change the other side's w

ill; it w ould be irrational

to actually destroy the other side, thereby inviting one's ow n destruction. In con-

~rast,_ c~nventional force is usable as an instrum ent o

fforeign policy; for by inflict- m

g lim ited dam

age w ith com

m ensurate risks to oneself, one can use it indeed as

a suitable instrum ent for changing the other side's w

ill. .

. Finally, legitim

_at~ po:ver-that is, pow er w

hose exercise is m orally or legally

Justified-m ust be distm

gm shed from

illegitim ate pow

er. Pow er exercised w

ith m

oral ~r legal authority m ust be distinguished from

naked pow er. T

he pow er o

f t~e police officer w

ho searches m e by virtue o

f a search w arrant is qualitatively

different from the pow

er o f a robber w

ho perform s the sam

e action by virtue o f

his holding a gun. T he distinction is not only philosophically valid but also rel-

evant for the conduct o f foreign policy. L

egitim ate pow

er, w hich can invoke a

m oral or legal justification for its exercise, is likely to be m

ore effective than equivalent illegitim

ate pow er, w

hich cannot be so justified. T hat is to say, legiti-

m ate_ po':~

r has a better chance to influence the w ill o

f its objects than equiva- lent illegitim

ate pow er. Pow

er exercised in self-defense or in the nam e o

f the U

nited N ations has a better chance to succeed than does equivalent pow

er exer- cised by an "aggressor" nation or in violation o

f international law . Political ide-

ologies, as w e shall see, serve the purpose o

f endow ing foreign policies w

ith the appearance o

f legitim acy.

W hile it is generally recognized that the interplay o

f the expectation o f

benefits, the fear o f disadvantages, and the respect or love for m

en or institu- tion~, in ever-changing com

binations, form s the basis o

f all dom estic politics,

the im portance o

f these factors for international politics is less obvious but no les~ real. T

here has been a tendency to reduce political pow er to the actual appli-

cat10n o f force, or at least to equate it w

ith successful threats o f force and w

ith persuasion, to the neglect o

f charism a. T

hat neglect, as w e shall see, 3 accounts

in good m easure for the neglect o

f prestige as an independent elem ent in inter-

national politics. Y et w

ithout taking into account the charism a o

f a m an, such

as N apoleon or H

itler, or o f an institution, such as

the governm ent or the

U nited States C

onstitution, evoking trust and love through w hich the w

ills o f

m en subm

it them selves to the w

ill o f such a m

an or institution, it is im possible

to understand certain phenom ena o

f international politics that have been par- ticularly prom

inent in m odern tim

es.

3See C hapter 6.

W hat Is P

olitical P ow

er? 33

T he im

portance that charism atic leadership and the response to it as l_ove

o f the subject for the leader has for international politics is clearly rev~aled 111 a

letter that John D urie, Scotch Presbyterian and w

orker fo_r ~rotestant u~ity, w rote

i ·n 1632 to the B ritish A

m bassador T

hom as R

oe, explam m

g the decl111e o f the

. pow

er o f G

ustavus A dolphus o

fSw eden, then fighting for the Protestant cause 111

G erm

any:

The increase of his authority is the ground of his abode; and love is the ground of his authority; it m

ust be through love; for it cannot be through pow

er; for his pow er is not in his ow

n subjects but in strangers'. not in ~is m

oney, but in theirs; not in their good w ill, but in m

ere necessity as thm gs

stand now betw

ixt him and them

; therefore if the necessity be not so urgent as it is; or if any other m

eans be show n by G

od (w ho is able to do as m

uch by another m

an as by him ) to avoid this necessity; the m

oney and the pow er

and the assistance w hich it yieldeth unto him

w ill fall from

him and so his

authority is lost, and his abode w ill be no longer: for the Love w

hich w as at

first is gone.... 4

T he president o

fthe U nited States exerts political pow

er over the executive branch o

f the governm ent so long as his orders are obeyed by the m

em bers o

f that branch. T

he leader o f the party has political pow

er so long as he is able to m old

the actions o fthe m

em bers of the party according to his w

ill. W e refer to the polit-

ical pow er o

f an industrialist, a labor leader, or a lobbyist in so far as his p~erer- ences influence the actiop.s o

f public officials. T he U

nited States exerts political pow

er over Puerto R ico so long as the law

s o f the U

nited States are observe~ by the citizens of that island. W

hen w e speak o

f the political pow er of the U

m ted

States in C entral A

m erica, w

e have in m ind the conform

ity of the actions o f

C entral A

m erican governm

ents w ith the w

ishes o f the governm

ent o f the U

nited States. 5 T

hus the statem ent that A

has or w ants political pow

er over B signifies

alw ays that A

is able, or w ants to be able, to control certain actions of B

through influencing B

's m ind.

. .. W

hatever the m aterial objectives o

f a foreign policy, such as the acqm sit1on

o f sources o

f raw m

aterials, the control of sea lanes, or territorial changes, they alw

ays entail control o f the actions o

f others through influence over their m inds.

T he R

hine frontier as a century-old objective o f French foreign policy points to

the political objective to destroy the desire of G erm

any to attack Fran~e ?Y m ak-

ing it physically difficult or im possible for G

erm any to do so. G

reat B ntam

ow ed

its predom inant position in w

orld politics throughout the nineteenth ce_nt~ry to the calculated policy o

f m aking it either too dangerous (because G

reat B ntam

w as

4G unnar W

estin, N egotiations A

bout Church U nity, 1628-1634 (U

psala: A lm

quist and W iksells, 1932),

p. 208. T he spelling has been m

odernized. .

. . .

. 'T

he exam ples in the text illustrate also the distm

ctton betw een pohtIC

al pow er ~s m

ere soC1al fact, _as in the case o

f the lobbyist, and political pow er m

the sense oflegit1m ate authonty, that 1s, the i:rrn-

dent o f the U

nited States. B oth the president o

f the U nited States and the lobbyist exercise poht1C

al pow

er, how ever different its source and nature m

ay be.

3 5

3 4

P

olitical P ow

er

too strong) or unnecessary (because it strength w as used w

ith m oderation) for

other nations to oppose it. T

he political objective o f m

ilitary preparations of any kind is to deter other nations from

using m ilitary force by m

aking it too risky for them to do so. T

he political aim

o f m

ilitary preparations is, in other w ords, to m

ake the actual appli- cation o

f m ilitary force unnecessary by inducing the prospective enem

y to desist from

the use of m ilitary force. T

he political objective o fw

ar itself is not per se the conquest of territory and the annihilation o

f enem y arm

ies but a change in the m

ind o f the enem

y that w ill m

ake him yield to the w

ill o f the victor.

T herefore, w

henever econom ic, financial, territorial, or m

ilitary policies are under discussion in international affairs, it is necessary to distinguish betw

een, say, econom

ic policies that are undertaken for their ow n sake and econom

ic policies that are the instrum

ents o f a political policy-a policy, that is, w

hose econom ic

purpose is but the m eans to the end o

f controlling the policies o f another nation.

T he export policy o

f Sw itzerland w

ith regard to the U nited States falls into the

first category. T he econom

ic policies o f the Soviet U

nion w ith regard to the

nations o fE

astern E urope fall into the latter category. So do m

any econom ic poli-

cies o f the U

nited States in L atin A

m erica, A

sia, and E urope. T

he distinction is o f

great practical im portance, and the failure to m

ake it has led to m uch confusion

in policy and public opinion. An econom

ic, financial, territorial, or m ilitary policy undertaken for its ow

n sake is subject to evaluation in its ow

n term s. Is it econom

ically or financially advantageous? W

hat effects has acquisition o f territory upon the population and

the econom y o

f the nation acquiring it? W hat are the consequences o

f a change in a m

ilitary policy for education, population, and the dom estic political system

? T

he decisions w ith respect to these policies are m

ade exclusively in term s o

f such intrinsic considerations.

W hen, how

ever, the objectives o f these policies serve to increase the pow

er of the nation pursuing them

w ith regard to other nations, these policies and their

objectives m ust be judged prim

arily from the point o

f view o

f their contribution to national pow

er. A n econom

ic policy that cannot be justified in purely eco- nom

ic term s m

ight nevertheless be undertaken in view o

f the political policy pur- sued. T

he insecure and unprofitable character o f a loan to a foreign nation m

ay be a valid argum

ent against it on purely financial grounds. B ut the argum

ent is irrelevant if the loan, how

ever unw ise it m

ay be from a banker's point o

f view ,

serves the political policies o f the nation. It m

ay o f course be that the econom

ic or financial losses involved in such policies w

ill w eaken the nation in its interna-

tional position to such an extent as to outw eigh the political advantages to be

expected. O n these grounds such policies m

ight be rejected. In such a case, w hat

decides the issue is not purely econom ic and financial considerations but a com

- parison o

f the political chances and risks involved-that is, the probable effect o f

these policies upon the pow er o

f the nation. W

hen the U nited States provides loans or assistance to countries such as

Poland that lie in the shadow o

f the R ed A

rm y, the purpose is not prim

arily eco- nom

ic or financial. It is rather to enable such countries to m ove tow

ard a degree

The D epreciation o

f P olitical P

ow er

. fl d

ow er o

f the Soviet U nion. If the repay-

of indepf~ndenct: ~ ::i~

:n u

:;:c i:: o

; financial institutions is p~stponed w ith

m ent o

oans 1

h' .

t £ r hum anitarian or charitable reasons

U l.S. goRva~~~:~~s ~

~ r:;a

~ tp~;i~~ ~oo ke:p open certain options foSr t~etgUovn~1ornn-

a one. ,

• 1

d dence on the

ov1e ·

m ent o

f Pola~d, options th~t pre;ent it; ~~::d ~~e;olitical objectives that in the Such actions m

the econom 1~ sp

}r; ~r nd as a sovereign state-how ever m

uch its long ru~

:~ ~

s~ :l~

t~ ~

:l ;:t~:~ 0 m

a; ;orce it to accept the position o f; s~tell~te

geog~ap h

S viet U nion at least in the short run. In a w

or , t e aim

w ithm

the sphere o ft . e

o 1· d Poland is to lim

it Soviet influence . and of A

m erican econom

ic po icy tow ar

h"l .

sing the leverage of the U nited

pow er in C

entral and E astern E

urope w

I e m crea

States in the area.

THE DEPRECIATION OF POLITICAL POW ER

. d.

. · h.

1 nt of international poli-

T he aspiration for pow

er bem g the

1st_1~gu:s m

g e em ~

olitics W

hile tic_s, as o~ all p

o li\t' intem

_ati~ni~ r:1 1:~:c~:c~f ;e;::;:a:~

~ :a~

rJfairs, i~ is fre- th1s fact is genera y recogm

ze f

h lars publicists

and even states- uently denied in the pronouncem

ents o sc o

, '

. h

W . stem

q

s· the end o

f the N apoleonic W

ars, ever larger gro~ps m t. e

le m

en. m

ce d d that the stru gle for pow

er on the m tem

at1ona scene w

orld have been persua e h.

. lg

.d nt that is bound to disappear once .

phenom enon a

1stonca acc1 e

. .

d 1s a tem

porary. .

. .' •

· e to it have been ehm m

ate .

the peculiar hB1sto~c co;~ :tlo~

tta~t t~:v:o~;:~i~~n for colonies w as at the root

T hus Jerem

y ent am

e_ ieve"

. loniesl" w

as his advice to the of all international. confl1c'.s.

Em anflc~pate ydour co

uld .of necessity disappear.6 t

d m tem

attonal con ict an w

ar w o

. h

govem m

en s, an h

C bden7 and Proudhons w

ere convm ced that t e

::~ ::~

~ ti:~

:e ~::j:r:u~~a/:he ;nl~g~~~~~~o~;;rt~~11 ;s~~:a~!e:r::~~~~::7e:~

neut harm ony am

ong nations an m

t fu

I t·

,, said C obden

"w e m

ay r .

lt ther

"A t som

e ture e ec 10n,

' nationa l po JtlC

S a oge

. .

r . ' r d to those w

ho offer to becom e

probably see the test 'no fore1g~ po 1~1cs,,/f p l~arx and his follow ers, capitalism

the representativ~s of fre~ co~s~~uen~1es. d o:r T

hey m aintain that international

1

~~ ~

::;~ :~

::h e ~

st:~ gl:~

or;o~ er on the international scene and

. C

l ·

(L don· R

obert H ew

ard, 1830). b

. 6Em

anapate Your onzis

on b .l.na dow

n the barriers that separate nations; those arners,

7"Free trade! W hat 1s 1t. W

hf, rea a

;,cl h tr cl

and jealousy w hich every now

and then behind w

hich nestle the feelings o f p

n e, rev_enge'. hable 'cl,, "Free trade is the international law

o f

. cl

cl cl I ae w hole countnes w

it oo ·

ch by

burst their boun s, an e llo

b

"one and the sam e cause." See Spee

es the A

lm ighty," and free trade anti p

ea~ :;i)~

~ ~

I ep. 79· Political W ritings (N

ew Y

ork: D . A

ppleton, Richard Cobden (L

ondon: M acfm

At w

l , t · H

enry A shw

orth, quoted in John M orley, Life o

f 12 1842

0 1867), V

ol. II, p. 110; letter o pn

, '

154 Richard Cobden (B

oston: _R oberts Bhrothlel_rs, 188})~:-peop. les w

ill thus be declared, their solidarity rec- 8"L

ress the tanffs and t e a Janee o

e l I

248 e_t uds suhpl;

l"ty ro~laim

ed." O euvres com

pletes (Paris, 1867), V o . ' p.

. ogm

ze t

e1r equa 1 P

· h L"b z·

195 9 r,.

cl' . A

C F B

ales A

Short H istory o

fEnglzs z era zsm

, p. .

'-<.Yote 1n

. . •

e ,

3 6

P

olitical P ow

er w ill bring about perm

~n~nt peace. D uring the nineteenth centm

y liberals every- w

here shared the conv1ct10n that pow er politics and w

ar w ere residues o

fan obso- lete system

o f governm

ent and that the victory o f dem

ocracy and constitutional ~overnm

ent over absolutism and autocracy w

ould assure the victory o f interna-

tional harm ony and perm

anent peace over pow er politics and w

ar. O f this liberal

school o f thought, W

oodrow W

ilson w as the m

ost eloquent and m ost influential

spokesm an.

In recent tim es the conviction that the struggle for pow

er can be elim inated

~r?m the international scene has been connected w

ith the great attem pts at organ-

1zm g the w

orld, such as the L eague o

f N ations and the U

nited N ations. T

hus C

ordell H ull, then U

.S. secretary o fstate, declared in 1943 on his return from

the M

oscow C

onference, w hich laid the groundw

ork for the U nited N

ations, that the new

international organization w ould m

ean the end o f pow

er politics and usher in a new

era o f international collaboration. 10 M

r. Philip N oel-B

aker, then B ritish

m inister o

fstate, declared in 1946 in the H ouse o

fC om

m ons that the B

ritish gov- ernm

ent w as "determ

ined to use the institutions o f the U

nited N ations to kill

pow er politics, in order that, by the m

ethods o fdem

ocracy, the w ill o

fthe people shall prevail."

11

W hile w

e shall have m ore to say later about these theories and the expecta-

12 tions d_eriv~d from

them ,

it is sufficient to state that the struggle for pow er is uni-

versal m tim

e and space and is an undeniable fact o f experience. It cannot be

denied t~~t throughout historical tim e, regardless o

fsocial, econom ic, and politi-

cal cond1tto-:1s, states have m et each other in contests for pow

er. E ven though

anthropologists have show n that certain prim

itive peoples seem to be free from

the desire for pow

er, nobody has yet show n how

their state o fm

ind and the con- ditions under w

hich they live can be re-created o n

a w orldw

ide scale so as to elim -

inate the struggle for pow er from

the international scene. 13 It w ould be useless and

even self-destructive to free one or the other o f the peoples o

f the earth from the

desire for pow er w

hile leaving it extant in others. If the desire for pow er cannot

be abolished everyw here in the w

orld, those w ho m

ight be cured w ould sim

ply fall victim

s to the pow er o

f others. T

he position taken here m ight be criticized on the ground that conclusions

draw n from

the past are unconvincing and that to draw such conclusions has

alw ays

been the m ain stock in trade o

f the enem ies o

f progress and reform .

T hough it is true that certain social arrangem

ents and institutions have alw ays

existed in the past, it does not necessarily follow that they m

ust alw ays exist in the

future. T he situation is, how

ever, different w hen w

e deal not w ith social arrange-

m ents and institutions created by m

an but w ith those elem

ental biopsychological drives by w

hich in tum society is created. T

he drives to live, to propagate, and

10N ew

iork Tim es, N

ovem ber 19, 1943, p. 1.

11H ouse o

fC om

m ons D

ebates (Fifth Series, 1946), V ol. 419, p. 1262.

12See Part E ight.

13 For an illum inating discussion o

f this problem , see M

alcolm Sharp, "A

ggression: A Study o

f V alues

and Law ," Ethics, V

ol. 57, N o. 4, Part II (July 1947).

The D epreciation o

f P olitical P

ow er

37

to dom inate are com

m on to all m

en. 14 T heir relative strength is dependent upon

· I conditions that m ay favor one drive and tend to repress another or that m

ay socia

. .

. d .

h'l h

w ithhold social approval from

certam m

am festat1ons o

f these nves w

1 e t ey

encourage others. T hus, to take exam

ples only from the sp?e:e o

f ~ow er, m

ost societies condem

n killing as a m eans o

f attaining pow er w

1thm sooety,_ but all

cieties encourage the killing o f enem

ies in that struggle for pow er that 1s ~ailed

~:ar. D ictators look askance at the aspirations for political i::ow

er am ong :~etr fel-

low citizens, but dem

ocracies consider active participation 1~ th~ com petition f~r

political pow er a civic duty. W

here a ~onopolis~ic orgam zat10~ o

f econ~1:11c activities exists, com

petition for econom ic pow

er 1s absent, and m _com

pet1t1ve econom

ic system s certain m

anifestations o f the strugg~e for _econom

ic pow ~r are

outlaw ed w

hile others are encouraged. O strogorsky, m

vokm g the authonty .~

f T

ocqueville, states that "the passions o f the A

m eric~n. people_ are_ not o

f a poht1- cal, but o

f a com m

ercial, nature. In that w orld aw

a1tm g cult1vat1on, the love o

f .

l h

h' "ls

pow er aim

s ess at m

en t an at t

m gs.

. . . .

. R

egardless o fparticular social cond1t10ns, the dec1S1ve ar~um

ent aga:nst ~he opinion that the struggle for pow

er on the internation~l scen_e_1s a m ere h1stoncal

accident m ust be derived from

the nature o f dom

estic politics. T he esse1:ce o

f international politics is identical w

ith its dom estic counterpart. B

oth d_om est1c and

international politics are a struggle for pow er, m

odified onlY_ by the_ d1ffer~nt con- ditions under w

hich this struggle takes place in the dom estic and m

the m terna-

tional spheres. T

he tendency to dom inate, in particular, is an elem

ent o f all hum

an asso- ciations, from

the fam ily, through fraternal and professional associations and

local political organizations, to the state. O n

the fam ily level, the typical con-

flict betw een the m

other-in-law and her child's spouse is in its essence a strug-

gle for pow er, the defense o

f an established pow er positi?n against ~he atte:npt

to establish a new one. A

s such it foreshadow s the conflict on the m

ternatlon- al scene betw

een the policies o f the status quo and the policies o

f im perialism

. Social clubs, fraternities, faculties, and business organizations are scenes o

f continuous struggles for pow

er betw een groups that either w

ant keep w

hat pow

er they already have or seek to attain great~r pow er. C

om pet1t1ve contests

betw een business enterprises, as w

ell as labor disputes betw een em

ployers and em

ployees, are frequently fought not only, and som etim

es not even prim arily,

for econom ic advantages but for control over each other and over others-that

is, for pow er. Finally, the w

hole politica~ life o f a na_tion, pa~ticularly o

f a dem -

ocratic nation from the local to the nat10nal level, 1s a contm

uous struggle for pow

er. In pe;iodic elections, in voting in legislative assem blies, in law

suits

I4Z oologists have tried to show

that the drive to dom inate is found even i1_1 _anim

als, s~ch as chickens and m

onkeys, w ho create social hierarchies on t~e basis o

f \~1ll and the ~b1hty to dom inate. See, e_.g.,

W arder A

llee, A nim

al Life and Social G rowth (B

altim ore: W

illiam s a1:d W

ilkens, 1932), and The Soaal Life efA

nim als (N

ew Y

ork: W . W

. N orton, 1938). C

f. also the theones of K onrad L

orenz and the controversies concerning them

. .

15JvI. O strogorsky, D

em ocra91 and the O

rganization o fPolitical Parties (N

ew Y

ork: M acm

illan, 1902), V

ol. II, p. 592.

3 8

P

olitical P ow

er before courts, in adm inistrative decisions and executive m

easures-in all these activities m

en try to m aintain or to establish their pow

er over other m en. T

he processes by w

hich legislative, judicial, executive, and adm inistrative decisions

are_ reached are subject to pressures and counterpressures by "pressure groups" trym

g to defend and expand their positions o f pow

er. A s one o

f the D ead Sea

Scrolls puts it:

W hat nation likes to be oppressed by a stronger pow

er? O r w

ho w ants his

property plundered unjustly? Yet, is there a single nation that has not oppressed its neighbour? O

r w here in the w

orld w ill you find a people that

has not plundered the property of another? \V here indeed?

. .

"O f the gods w

e know ," to quote T

hucydides, "and o f m

en w e believe, that

It 1s a necessary law o

f their nature that they rule w herever they can."16 O

r, as T

olstoy put it, "the very process o f dom

inating another's w ill w

as in itself a pleas- ure, a habit, and a necessity to D

6lokhov." 17 A

nd in the w ords o

fJohn o f Salisbury:

T hough it_is not given t? all m

en to seize princely or royal pow er, yet the

m an w

ho 1s w holly untam

ted by tyranny is rare or nonexistent. In com m

on speech the tyrant is one w

ho oppresses a w hole people by a rulership based

on force; and yet it is not over a people as a w hole that a m

an can play the tyrant, but he can do so if he w

ill even in the m eanest station. For if not over

the w hole body of the people, still each m

an w ill lord it as far as his pow

er extends. 18

In view o

f this ubiquity o f the struggle for pow

er in all social relations a_nd _on all level_s o

f social organization, is it surprising that international poli- tics 1s o

f necessity pow er politics? A

nd w ould it not be rather surprising if the

struggle for pow er w

ere but an accidental and ephem eral attribute o

f interna- tional politics w

hen it is a perm anent and necessary elem

ent o f all branches o

f dom

estic politics?

ROOTS OF TIU DEPRECIATIOPJ Of Pf!llUflCIU T

he depreciatio~ o f the r?le pow

er plays on the international scene grow s from

tw

o roots. O ne 1s the philosophy o

f international relations that dom inated the

better part o f the nineteenth century and still holds sw

ay over m uch o

four think- ing on international affairs. T

he other is the particular political and intellectual cir- cum

stances that have determ ined the relations o

f the U nited States o

fA m

erica to the rest o

f the w orld.

16T hucydides, B

ook V, § 105. 17L

eo T olstoy, W

ar and Peace, B ook E

ight, C hapter X

L 18 John o

f Salisbury, Policratictts, translated by John D ickinson (N

ew Y

ork: A lfred A

. K nopf, 1927),

V ol. V

II, p. 17.

Two R oots of the D

epreciation o f P

olitical P ow

er 39

N ineteenth=C

enturv Philosophy T

he nineteenth century w as led to its depreciation o

f pow er politics by its ~o~es-

tic experience. T he distinctive characteristic o

f this experience w as the dom

m at1on

o f the m

iddle classes by the aristocracy. B y identifying this dom

ination w ith polit-

ical dom ination o

f any kind, the political philosophy of the nineteenth century cam

e to identify the opposition to aristocratic politics w ith hostility to any kind

o f politics. A

fter the defeat of aristocratic governm ent, the n:1i?dle cl~s~~s d~vel-

oped a system o

f indirect dom ination. T

hey replaced the trad1t10nal d1v1s1?n m to

the governing and the governed classes, and the m ilitary m

ethod o fop~n v10lence

characteristic o f aristocratic rule, w

ith the invisible chains o f econom

IC depend-

ence. T his econom

ic system operated through a netw

ork o f seem

ingly equalitari- an legal rules that concealed the very existence o

fpow er relations. T

he nineteenth century w

as unable to see the political nature o f these legalized relations. T

hey seem

ed to be essentially different from w

hat had gone, so far, under the nam e o

f politics. T

herefore politics in its aristocratic-that is, open_ ~nd violent-:form w

as identified w

ith politics as such. T he struggle, then, for political pow

er-m dom

es- tic as w

ell as in international affairs-appeared to be only a historical accident, coincident w

ith autocratic governm ent and bound to disappear w

ith the disap- pearance o

f autocratic governm ent.

The Am erican EHperjence

This identification o f pow

er politics w ith aristocratic governm

ent found support in the A

m erican experience. It can be traced to three elem

ents in that experience: the uniqueness o

f the A m

erican experim ent, the actual isolation of the A

m erican

continent from centers of the w

orld conflict during the nineteenth century, and the hum

anitarian pacifism and anti-im

perialism o

f A m

erican political ideology. T

hat the severance o f constitutional ties w

ith the B ritish C

row n w

as m eant

to signify the initiation o f an A

m erican foreign policy distinct from

w hat w

ent under the nam

e o f foreign policy in E

urope is clearly stated in W ashington's

Farew ell A

ddress: "E urope has a set o

f prim ary interests, w

hich to us have none, or a very rem

ote relation. H ence she m

ust be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes o

f w hich are essentially foreign to our concerns. H

ence, therefore, it m

ust be unw ise in us to im

plicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicis- situdes o

f her politics, or the ordinary com binations and collisions o

f her friend- ships or enm

ities." In 1796, E uropean politics and pow

er politics w ere identical;

there w as no other pow

er politics but the one engaged in by the princes o fE

urope. "T

he toils o f E

uropean am bition, rivalship, interest, hum

or or caprice" w ere the

only m anifestations o

f the international struggle for pow er before the ~yes o

f A

m erica. T

he retreat from

E uropean politics, as proclaim

ed by W ashm

gton, could, therefore, be taken to m

ean retreat from pow

er politics as such. Y

et A m

erican aloofness from the E

uropean tradition of pow er politics w

as m

ore than a political program . C

ertain sporadic exceptions notw ithstanding, it

w as an established political fact until the end o

f the nineteenth century. T his

4 0

P

olitical P ow

er fact w as a result o

f deliberate choice a

11 .

. geography. Popular w

riters m ight

'. shw

e ~s o

f the ob1ect1v: conditions o f

position the hand o f G

od h. sheehm

dt e uniiqueness o f A

m enca's geographic

. , w

ic a

una terably p ·b d

h A

m encan expansion as w

ell ·

l .

B

rescn e t e course o

f as iso at10n

ut m ore

'bl b

W ashington on, have been careful to e

~ ha .

resp~ns1 _e o servers, from

conditions and a foreign pol1·c

h . p

. size tdhe _con1unct10n o f geographic

. y

C oosm

g Its en s Ill th r h

f usm

g geographic conditions to attain those d

W .

h. e ig

t o geography,

detac~ed and distant situation" and asked· '~ ~

- f. as

m gton referred to "our

peculiar a situation?" W h

h. .

· Y

orego the advantages o f so

· en t is penod o

f A m

erican f. ·

1· d

close, John B right w

rote to A lfi

d L

"O

ore1gn po icy rew

to a .

re ove:

n your co f

t h

grow m

g m illions m

ay henceforth know nothin

f n m en

w e m

ay of'.e your

and you are

anxious to abstain fro

. . g o

:,var. N one can assail you;

nations."19 m

m

m glm

g W ith

the quarrels

o f other

From the shores o

f the N

th A m

·

. W

orld w atched

the st or

I encan c?ntm

ent, the citizens o f the N

ew

range spectac e o

f the m

t ·

l unfolding on the distant shores o

f E uro

A fi .

ernat10~a s~ruggle

for pow er

part o f the nineteenth century th . f.

_pe, /1ca, and A

sia. Sm ee for the better

o f spectators, w

hat w as actuallye~

~ eo~

:::to/cy ena?led t~em _ to retain the role

appeared to A m

ericans as a er

?. a passm g h1stoncal constellation

ordained. A t w

orst they w opuldm

anet~t cond1t10n, self-chosen as w ell as naturally

con m ue to w

atch th f

• . ~layed by others. At best the tim

e w as close at hand " /

g a~

~

pow er poht1es

hshed everyw here, the final curtain w

ould fall and :hen, w it

fem ocracy es_t~b-

w ould no longer be played.

e gam e

O

pow er politics

To aid in the achievem

ent f

h. l

A m

erica's m ission. T

hrou hout o

t_ is' go~ w

as conce!ved

to be part o

f

~~:~:da(:~::i~~s::~ ~

::!::to o

~ h

;::t:i:i:it~::;z1 :t:rt::i:~

~ :;;:s~

e~ ft~

~ :

cal philosophy o fJohn C

C

ffess1v~, ~bstenti~m st form

ulation, as in the politi- tic liberty. T

hus w e m

ay ."d a oun, 1t is conce1_ved as the prom

otion o f dom

es- .

o m ore to extend liberty b

I .

contm ent and the w

orld generally, than w ould b

d y

o u

r exam p e ?ver_th1s

W hen the U

nited States 1·n th

I f

h e _one by a thousand v1etones."

, e w

a,e o t e Spam

sh-A

· w

, desert

this anti-im

perialist and d

. .d

l m

encan w ar, seem

ed to .

em ocrat1c

1 ea W

ill' G

h

s restated Its

essence· "Expans1·on

d .

. 1· '

1am

ra am

um

ner ·

an 1m

pena ism

are a d

I h

dem ocracy ... expansion and 1·

. 1· .

gran ons aug

t on .

. m

pena ism are at w

ar w ith th

b d' ·

pnnc1ples, and interests o f the A

m erican people "20 C

. e

~st tra 1t101:1s, o

f E uropean pow

er politics w ith the ideals o

f th.e A m

o1;1panng dt. _e tendencies

~~ot~1~;:v!~h ~ ::~

e h

:::~ ~

t~ ;t~~ats!~t~~::~: iit~

:~ ~

~ i~

~ ~

~ ?it1:~

::;~ :;

irrevocably com m

itted A m

erica to the h

pam s

- m

encan W ar

in revolution and w ar.

sam e course t at w

as engulfing E urope

19Q uoted in M

erle C urti Peace and \¼

r· Th A

•

S C

om pany, 1936), p. 122:

· e

m encan

truggle 1636-1936 (N ew

Y ork: W

W N

orton, 20<'The C

onquest o f the U

nited States b S ain,, E

..

Y ale U

niversity Press, 1940), V ol. II, p. i9S: '

ssays ofW zlbam

G raham

Sum ner (N

ew H

aven, C T

:

The S cience o

f P eace: C

ontem porary U

topianism

41

T hus the general conception the nineteenth century had form

ed o f the

nature of foreign affairs com bined w

ith specific elem ents in the A

m erican experi-

ence to create the belief that involvem ent in pow

er politics is not inevitable but only a historical accident, and that nations have a choice betw

een pow er politics

and other kinds o f foreign policy not tainted by the desire for pow

er.

THE SCIENCE OF PEACE: CONTEM PORARY UTOPIANISM

A

w ord should be said about a school o

f thought-still influential in political and intellectual circles today-that proffers a "scientific" alternative to the "perennial w

isdom " o

f a rationalist approach to international politics. This school o f thought

w e m

ay call "scientific utopianism " for lack of a better term

; like the sources o f

self-deception as to the persistence o f political pow

er discussed above, the scien- tific interpretation has strong roots in nineteenth-century experience, both in E

urope and in A m

erica. In this case, how ever, neither the relations o

f class dom -

ination nor geographical accident gave rise to utopian hopes for a "science o f

peace." Instead, the fantastic progress o f the natural sciences led various thinkers

to assum e that the sam

e kinds o f m

ethods, applied to individual and collective hum

an behavior, could yield progress tow ard w

hat H erbert M

arcuse and others have called "the pacification o

f hum an existence."

T he m

odern science o f peace starts from

the assum ption that the w

orld is thoroughly accessible to science and reason and that it contains in itself all the ele- m

ents necessary for the harm onious cooperation o

f all m ankind. It is for science

to detect those elem ents, variously defined as harm

ony of interests, law s o

f eco- nom

ics, free trade, and m odern com

m unications; it is for law

to apply them w

here they do not prevail spontaneously; and it is for negotiation and com

prom ise to

discover them under the surface o

f apparent conflict. For such rationalism

it is the atavism o

f pow er politics that conceals and dis-

torts the harm ony of interests that is the true nature of international relations.

A dam

Sm ith, a founding father of classical liberalism

, as w ell as of classical econom

- ics, discovered such a fundam

ental harm ony of interests lying beneath the surface

m anifestations o

f self-regarding, com petitive econom

ic behavior. Selfish pursuits led to greater w

ealth for all through the w orkings of an "invisible hand." G

overned by an inner logic, the free m

arket operates to dispose all for the best. N ineteenth-

century liberalism had no use for even such residual traces of the m

iraculous in its search for a m

eans to establish harm onious relations am

ong states. O nly strictly

rational principles w ould do; all international conflicts w

ere considered capable of satisfact01y solutions, either through com

prom ise or arbitration. Since all m

en partake o

f reason, they m ust sooner or later m

eet on that com m

on ground, dis- covering that their conflicts are apparent rather than real and can all be solved by a rational form

ula acceptable to all. W ere all nations at all tim

es fully aw are of their

real interests, they w ould realize that apparently opposing interests are actually

identical, that w hat is good for one country is of necessity good for all other coun-

tries, and that conflict is m erely the product of ignorance and error.

4 2

Political P

ow er

C onflicts am

ong nations are due, then, to m aladjustm

ents arising from

!ack o f understandi~g and to the influence o

f political passions. E xcept for

1gnora_nce and em _ot10n, reason w

ould solve international conflicts as easily and as

rationally as 1t

has solved

so m

any problem s in

the natural

sciences. P

roudhon w as am

ong the first to glorify the blessings o f science in the inter-

national field:

7:ruth is everyw here identical w

ith itself: science represents the unity o f m

an- kind. If therefore science, instead o

f religion or authority, is taken in each country as social norm

, the sovereign arbiter of interests, w ith the governm

ent am

~unti~g to nothing, all the law s of the universe w

ill be in harm ony.

N ationality or fatherland w

ill no longer exist in the political m eaning o

f the term

;_ there w ill only be birthplaces. M

an, o f w

hatever race or colour he m ay

be, "'.ill actually be a native o f the U

niverse; the right o f citizenship he w

ill acqurre everyw

here. In the sam e w

ay in w hich in a certain district of the

national territory the m unicipality represents the nation and exercises its

authority, each nation of the globe w ill represent hum

anity and in its natural boundaries act for it. H

arm ony w

ill reign am ong the nations, w

ithout diplo- m

acy nor council; nothing shall from now

on disturb it.21

"T he duty o

fthe pacifist," according to C .E

.M . Joad, "is above all things to be rea-

sonable. H e should, that is to say, rely on the use o

fhis ow n reason in m

aking his appeal and he should assum

e that other m en m

ay be brought to use theirs.... T

ruth, in fact, w ill w

in out, ifpeople are only given a sufficient chance to find it."22 It w

as w ith the sam

e confidence in the pow er o

freason that C larence Streit assert-

ed in 1941 that "the really big m

en in the U nited States Senate and B

ritish Parliam

ent w ill cham

pion the U nion [o

f the tw o countries] once they understand

it."23 '

_Pol~tical hist~ry, then, becom es a succession o

fscientific problem s capable

?f sc1e_nt1fic solut1~

n-but m ost unreasonably handled by an

ignorant and 1m

pass1?ned hu_m arnty. ~ven for so realistic an observer as H

om er L

ea, the prob- lem

o f m

ternat10nal affa1rs resolved itself into a problem o

f know ledge; if the

"~alour o f ignorance" is replaced by the know

ledge o f the pertinent facts, m

an w

ill be able to act successfully o n

the international scene. 'T he tim

e can and w ill

com e;'' w

rote the fam ous pacifist B

ertha von Suttner, "w hen the science o

f poli~ics w

ill ha~e-replaced present-day statecraft, w hen only those w

iH have leg-

1Slat1ve and political P ?w

er ... w ho sincerely seek only the truth and through

the truth stnve to attam only the good-the universal good com

prehending all civilized nations."

21 "Idee generale de la revolution au dix-neuviem e siecle," O

euvres com pletes, IX

(1868), p. 300; see also Proudhon, La G

uerre et la paix (Paris: E. D entu, 1861).

22<'Pacifism : Its Personal and Social Im

plications," in G . P. G

ooch, In Pursuit o fPeace (L

ondon: M

ethuen, 1933), pp. 61, 63. 23 U

nion N ow

w ith Britain (N

ew Y

ork: H arper and B

rothers, 1941), p. 197.

The S cience of P

eace: C ontem

porary U topianism

43

T he tim

e S uttner spoke o

f has already arrived as far as the m ere posses-

sion o f know

ledge is concerned, according to R obert S. L

ynd. "T he diagnosis,"

he w rote,

is already fairly com plete, thanks to a long list o

f com petent studies of

nationalism , im

perialism , international finance and trade, and other factors

w ithin our culture that encourage w

ar. T he problem

of w ar, m

ore than m ost

others, has engaged the attention o f scientists from

several disciplines, and the dissection has proceeded to the point w

here fairly unequivocal know l-

edge exists. T he causes of w

ar are know n and accepted by a w

ide group o f

thoughtful students. B ut the statem

ent of w hat is to be done languishes

because social science shrinks from resolving the austere findings of scholarly

m onographs into a bold program

m e for action .... In the case o

f an issue like this, w

here the problem does not arise from

lack of know ledge, w

hat social science appears to need is the w

ill to m ass its findings so that the truth

they hold w ill not continue to trickle aw

ay as disparate bits of s~holarsh_ip. W

e know enough about w

ar and its causes to present these findm gs, pom

t their m

eanings, and propose action in a w ay that w

ill hold this dam aging

evidence steadily and authoritatively before the eyes of the hum blest

citizen. 24

It w as for this A

ge o f R

eason to replace the old m ethods o

f pow er politics,

secret diplom acy, and w

ar by a new , scientific approach. T

erritorial claim s, sover-

eignty over national m inqrities, the distribution o

f raw m

aterials, the struggle for m

arkets, disarm am

ent, the relation betw een the "haves" and the "have-nots,"

peaceful change, and the peaceful organization_ o f the w

orld in gen~ral-these are not "political" problem

s, to be solved tem poranl? and al_ways prec~nousl~ accord-

ing to the distribution o f pow

er am ong quarrelm

g nat10ns and its possible bal- ance. T

hey are "technical" problem s for w

hich reason w ill find the one correct

solution in each case. T

hus the nineteenth century developed a "science o f peace" as a separate

branch o f scientific know

ledge. Scores o f books w

ere published bearing this title. O

ne even received first prize in a scholarly com petition. 25 T

he concept o~ a "~at- ural frontier" -w

hich had had a strategical and political, but not a sc1ent1fic, connotation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-w

as construed by the French revolutionaries and N

apoleon in the sense o f a geographically "correct"

frontier. In the seventies and eighties o f the nineteenth century, public opinion

in G reat B

ritain discussed seriously the problem o

f the "scientific frontier," that is

a frontier that corresponds to reason and that, consequently, m akes all other

fr~ntiers in this geographical region scientifically incorrect. In his speech at M

ansion H ouse on N

ovem ber 9, 1878, D

israeli justified the Second A fghan W

ar by saying that the frontier oflndia w

as "a haphazard and not a scientific one."

24K now

ledge.for W hat? (Princeton: Princeton U

niversity Press, 1939), p. 241. 25L

ouis B ara, La Science de la paix (1872).

44 Political P

ow er

. T

he search for such a "scientific" frontier started in the second half o f the

eighteenth century w hen, on the occasion o

f partitions and annexations o f terri-

tory, the relative value o f the pieces o

f territory to be distributed w as determ

ined on the basis ?f certain "o~jective" standards, such .is fertility, num

ber and quali- ty o

fpopul~t10n, and the l:ke. Follow ing this trend the C

ongress o fV

ienna, upon the suggestion o

f M etterm

ch, appointed a special statistical com m

ission· it w as

charged w ith evaluati~g the territories under discussion by the "objectiv;" stan-

dard o f num

ber, _quality, and type o fpopulations. 26 T

he delim itation o

f territory thus beca~e a land o

f m athem

atical exercise. T he idea o

f the "good frontier," develo~e? m

t~e l~st de~ad~s o f the nineteenth century in G

erm any w

ith regard to R

ussia s terntonal aspirat10ns, had a som ew

hat sim ilar connotation. T

he idea ?f t~e "scientific _tariff" attem

pted to introduce science into foreign trade, build- m

g m part upon ideas put forth in the early nineteenth century by Friedrich List.

~he theory an~ pra~tice o f international plebiscites are also typical m

anifesta- tions o

f the rat10nahst approach to international problem s· here the w

ill o f the

m ajority i~ the scientific _te~t according to w

hich sovereign; over territory is to be determ

m ed. In the thirties, M

ajor L efebure advanced his theories on "scien-

tific di~ar~am ent._" "G

eopolitics" endeavoured to put foreign policy as a w hole

on a sc1ent1fic basis. It w

as onl_r a~ter the Firs~ :<7orld W ar that this tendency to reduce political

proble1:ns to. ~c1ent1fic propos1t10ns w on general acceptance. "R

eason is at last becom

m g an m

depende~t ~gency," w rote L

ord A llen ofH

artw ood, "influencing

the conduct o f m

en. T his 1s due to the com

ing o f science.... Feeling him

self now

to be _t~e m aster o

f nature, his m ind is beginning to w

ork rationally instead o

f supers_t1t10usly. W

he~ form

ing an opinion he observes

the phenom ena

aro~nd him and draw

s his ~onclusions. From that m

om ent m

ind begins to be an m

dependent agency o f m

fluence. It can now therefore be considered as a

p_ol_i'.ical_ force, w ~ereas that has never previously been possible in the history o

f C1V

1hzat10n. D

urm g the last thirty years this has

begun to influence public opinion."

27

. T

hus _began w ~at can properly be called the age o

f the scientific approach to m

ternatlonal affam , and the end is not yet in sight. Preceded by the H

ague C

onferences and hundreds o f sm

aller peace congresses, governm ents them

- selves em

barked on a program o

f feverish activity unprecedented in recorded ~istory, w

ith the purpose o f solving all international problem

s through scien- t~fic ~

ethods. T he go':ernm

en~s,_ th~ L eague o

f N ations, and private groups

vied ':"1th one another m orgam

zm g m

ternational conferences, in encouraging teachm

g and research, and in publishing hundreds o f volum

es to cure the ills o

f hum anity in a scientific w

ay. W e have recently w

itnessed w idespread efforts

to find a scientific solution for the problem s o

f the postw ar w

orld. T hese are

26 For details see C harles D

upuis, Le Principe d'equilibre et le Concert Europeen (Paris: Perrin et C ie, 1909),

pp. 38 ff, 60 ff. 27 "Pacifism

: Its M eaning and Its T

ask," in Pursuit o fPeace, pp. 22, 23.

The S cience o

f P eace: C

ontem porary U

topianism

4 5

the latest, but probably not the last, m anifestation o

f this m odern intellectual

trend. 28 .

O ur arre is forever searching for the philosophers' stone, the m

agic form ula,

w hich, m

echanically applied, w ill produce the desired r~sult and t~us substitute

for the uncertainties and risks o f political action the certitude ?f r~tlonal c~cula-

tion. H ow

ever, w hat the seekers after the m

agic fo~m ula v.:ant _is sim

~le, rational, m

echanical; w hat they have to deal w

ith is com plicated, m

ational, m calculable.

A s a consequence they are com

pelled, in order to present at leas~ ~he sem blance

of scientific solutions, to sim plify the reality o

f international politics and to rely upon w

hat one m ight call the "m

ethod o f the single cause."

. T

he abolition o f w

ar is obviously the fundam ental problem

confrontm g

international thought. To solve the problem one m

ust clearly first deter1:1ine ~ts cause or causes. W

hat m akes a solution appear so difficult for the nonrat10nahst

m ind is the variety o

f causes involved-causes that have their roots in the in_ner- m

ost recesses of the hum an heart. W

ere it possible to reduce all those m ultiple,

com plex factors to a single cause-one capable of rational form

ulation-the solu- tion o

f the problem o

f w ar w

ould no longer seem im

possible. Thi~ is w hat liberal

foreign policy has been trying to do since its very inception; and sm ~e the heyda?'

of the League o f N

ations m ost people w

ould take it for lack o f creative thought 1f

a statesm an or a political thinker did not have a "constructive" plan as a rem

edy for the "single cause."

. .

A re not the rem

nants o f feudalism

the great single cause m aking for w

ar m

this w orld? Let us do aw

ay w ith aristocratic governm

ent everyw here, the classical

liberals w ould say, and w

e w ill have peace. In practical politics this general propo-

sition w as frequently narrow

ed dow n to m

ore special rem edies inten~ed to ?1eet

particular situations. T hus, as w

e have seen, B entham

and the B entham

1tes pom _ted

to the struggle for colonies as the m ain cause for w

ar; they advocated abstention from

colonial policy as a rem edy for w

ar. For others tariffs w ere the source o

f all evils in the international sphere; to them

free trade w as the source of all good.

O thers w

ould abolish secret treaties and secret diplom acy in general and, through

popular control o f international policies, secure peace. Is not m

_od_ern w ar an out-

grow th o

f im perialism

, w hich, in turn, is a result o

f the contrad1ct1ons of m onop-

oly capitalism ? H

ence, let us do aw ay w

ith capitalism , the M

arxists w ould say, and

w e w

ill no longer have w ar: socialism

is peace.

28C f. C

harles A . B

eard, A Foreign Poliry far Am

erica (N ew

Y ork: A

lfred A. K nopf, 1940), pp. 98:-99:

"In line w ith the new

interests, the study o f international law

and diplom acy w

as encouraged m

institutions oflearning. O ld-fashioned courses o

n diplom

acy-cold, scholarly rerform ances-w

ere supplem

ented by courses o n

international relations, i': w hich em

i:hasis w as laid 01; w

orld pe~ce and the m

eans o f prom

oting it. B ooks, pam

phlets, and articles on pacification w ere w

naen, published, and w

idely circulated, often w ith the aid o

f subventions from peace funds. International peace con-

ferences w ere organized and provided opportunities for travel and exte~ded discourses._ S

eldom had

college presidents, professors, clergym en, and leaders am

ong w om

en_ enJoyed such p_nvileges and received such m

arked consideration at the hands o f the general public. It looked as if a new

era o f

usefulness and distinction had been opened for them in the field o

f great affairs, and they m ade the

m ost o

f its opportunities."

4 6

Political P

ow er

. T

~e sam e one-track _m

ode o f thought is found also in dom

estic politics. A ll

social evils stem from

our ignorance o fthe law

s o feconom

ics; the "single tax" takes accoun~ ~

f those law s and w

ill solve all social problem s. O

ur econom ic system

is out o

f JO m

t because the governm ent spends m

ore than it collects; balance the budget and our econom

ic problem s w

ill be solved. B ad linguistic habits are at the

root o f our _social evils; w

ith the acquisition o f good linguistic habits our social

problem s w

ill be solved. E m

erson, in "N ew

E ngland R

eform ers," thus described

this kind o f thinking:

O ne apostle thought all m

en should go to farm ing; and another, that no m

an should buy or sell; that the use of m

oney w as the cardinal evil; another, that

the m ischief w

as in our diet, that w e eat and drink dam

nation. These m ade

unleavened bread, and w ere foes to the death to ferm

entation.... O thers

attacked the system of agriculture; the use of anim

al m anures in farm

ing; and the tyranny of m

an over brute nature; these abuses polluted his food .... Even the insect w

orld w as to be defended-that had been too long neglected

and a society for the protection of ground w orm

s, slugs, and m osquitoes w

as to be incorporated w

ithout delay. W ith these appeared the adepts of hom

eop- athy; of hydropathy, of m

esm erism

, ofphrenology, and their w onderful theo-

ries of the C hristian m

iracles! O thers assailed particular vocations, as that of

the law yer, that of the m

erchant, of the m anufacturer, of the clergym

an, of the scholar. O

thers attadced the institution of m arriage as the fountain of social

evils. O thers devoted them

selves to the w orrying of churches and m

eetings for public w

orship; and the fertile form s of antinom

ianism am

ong the elder puri- tans, seem

ed to have their m atch in the plenty o

f thi: new harvest of reform

.29

In the dom estic field, how

ever, the "m ethod o

f the single cause" has been o

f rather lim ited theoretical and practical im

portance; for here, except in periods o

f collective insanity, im m

ediate personal experience reveals the absurdity o f the

approach; and the pressure o f the affected interests prevents the quack from

being m

istaken for the savior. T

he utopian internationalist, on the other hand, has no direct contact w ith

the international scene. H is thought, ifit is sufficiently general, can roam

over the globe w

ithout ever risking collision w ith the stark facts o

fpolitics. H e w

ho w ould

proclaim the Four Freedom

s for the U nited States itself w

ould soon learn from

personal experience the enorm ity o

f the social and political problem s entailed by

any attem pt at realizing those great principles. B

y contrast, proclam ation o

f the Four Freedom

s "everyw here in the w

orld" is sufficiently general to avoid contact w

ith historical realities and political facts. T

he reform er w

ithout responsibility finds in the arm ory o

fm odern interna-

tional thought w hat he is looking for. T

hat one panacea is frequently inconsistent w

ith an?ther need not t~ouble him . For since the "single cause" is an arbitrary

abstract1011 from a m

ultitude o f actual causes, one abstraction, and hence one

29 R alph W

aldo E m

erson, Ess,rys: Second Series (B oston: H

oughton M ifflin, 1899), pp. 204-5.

The S cience o

f P eace: C

ontem porary U

topianism

4 7

"single cause," is as good as the next one. Since, ~rtherm ore, _the hunt for the

"single cause" derives from a vague desire to contribute so~ethm

g t? the bett~r- ent o

f hum an affairs rather than from

a fixed resolve to m tervene m

a defim te

;olitical situation in a definite w ay, virtually any general explanation of th_e ills o

f the w

orld and any general plan to rem edy them

w ill satisfy the psychic need

involved. H

ence, the great hunting ground for the "single cause_" and _the "scientific form

ula" to rem edy it has been the international scene, w

hile their great season w

as the tw o decades betw

een the w orld w

ars. 30 International society is not organ- ized· thus "international organization"-in its abstract rationality a kind o

f legal cou~terpart to the utopian system

s o f eighteenth-

and nin_eteenth:century philos- ophy-becam

e the scientific form ula that, since the leadm

g pacifist and N obel

Prize w inner A. H

. Fried propounded it at the beginning of the century, has been the credo o

f a w hole school o

f thought. O thers w

ould look to m aterial rem

edies. A

re not w ars being fought w

ith arm s? L

et us prohibit or at least reduce arm am

en_ts, and w

ar w ill no longer be possible or at least w

ill be less likely. O thers, agam

, w

ould com bine different rem

edies, defending the com bination-"on scientific

grounds" -as the only appropriate one. T hus the French R

adic~l-Socialist Party advocated "security, arbitration, disarm

am ent" as logical successive steps for the

establishm ent o

f perm anent peace; w

hereas the French Socialists reversed the sequence and sw

ore to the exclusive scientific v~lue of. the form ula "sec~rity

through arbitration and disarm am

ent." French foreign policy has been especially productive in abstract schem

es that, like the "plan B riand," the "plan Laval," ~he

"plan T ardieux," the "plan H

erriot," or the "plan Paul-B oncour," pretended to_ give

in one legal form ula a scientific solution to the problem

s of E uropean secunty.

In other quarters, especially since the crisis o f 1929, the "single cause" o

f international unrest has been found in the econom

ic field. R estrictions on inter-

national trade, the lack o f raw

m aterials, and insufficient international purchasing

pow er drive nations to w

ar, so the argum ent ran. T

hen let us find a scien:ific for- m

ula for reciprocal trade agreem ents, for the redistribution of raw

m atenal~, and

for the floating o f international loans-and there w

ill be peace. Faced by the im pe-

rialistic aspirations of the thirties, it w as reasoned that w

henever nations cannot change the status quo peacefully they w

ill try to change it by w ar; thus peaceful

change, scientifically defined, w ould m

ake w ar unnecessary. Since bankers' fears

for their investm ents w

ere responsible for our involvem ent in the First W

orld W ar,

let us outlaw loans to belligerents: w

e shall thus escape participation in the next one. M

ore recently, it has been "discovered" that national sovereignty is respon- sible for w

ar; it follow s that the pooling o

f national sovereignties in a w orld fed-

eration or at least in a federation o f the dem

ocracies is a scientific solution to the problem

o f w

ar and peace. T hus our era is alw

ays in search of :he scientific form

ula, but an obstinate reality again and again m akes the solut1011 of today

the fallacy o f tom

orrow .

30See K enneth W

. T hom

pson, Ethics, Functionalism and Power in International Politics: 17Je Crisis in

Values (B aton R

ouge: L ouisiana State U

niversity Press, 1979), pp. 35-45.

Political P ow

er 4

8

T he "scientific" era o

f international relations resulted in the substitution o f

supposedly scientific standards for genuine political evaluations; in som e cases

this w ent so far as to im

pede, if not entirely destroy, the ability to m ake any intel-

ligent political decisions at all. Pow er, how

ever lim ited and qualified, is the value

that international politics recognizes as suprem e. T

he test to w hich international

political decisions m ust be subject refers, therefore, to the m

easure in w hich those

decisions affect the distribution o fpow

er. T he question that R

ichelieu, H am

ilton (no less than Jefferson, for that m

atter), or D israeli w

ould ask before they acted on the international scene w

as: does this decision increase or decrease the pow er o

f this and other nations? T

he question o f the international "scientist" is different.

Since for him the history o

f international affairs am ounts to a succession o

f sci- entific problem

s, correctly or incorrectly handled by inform ed or m

isinform ed

officials, the suprem e value is not pow

er but truth. T he quest for and the defense

o f pow

er then becom e aberrations from

the scientific attitude, w hich looks for

causes and rem edies. If w

e do not like the w ay things are, let us look for the cause

and change things by changing the cause. T here is essentially nothing to fight for;

there is alw ays som

ething to analyze, to understand, and to reform .

H ow

w as it possible for the m

odern m ind to m

ake the belief in the all- em

bracing pow ers o

f science the controllingforce o f its foreign policy? H

ere again, the answ

er is to be found in the general prem ises o

frationalistic philosophy, seem -

ingly verified in its universal assum ptions by dom

estic experience. T he victory o

f liberalism

in the dom estic field led to a peculiar narrow

ing of the political, and a corresponding w

idening o f the nonpolitical, sphere; and thus the latter w

as open to detached rational exam

ination. O bjectives that form

erly had been seen as the prize in the struggle for political pow

er w ere now

approached in a dispassionate, m

atter-of.fact w ay and m

astered in accordance w ith the specific techniques o

feco- nom

ics, adm inistration, or law

. First the natural sciences and religion had freed them

selves from political dom

ination and had established their autonom y. T

hen liberalism

, by conquering the state, freed an ever-increasing dom ain from

direct political dom

ination; finally, liberalism seem

ed to expel even politics from the

realm o

f the state and to m ake statecraft itself a science. C

om m

erce and industry w

ere the first to w in their autonom

y under reason. T hat w

hich for the physiocrats w

as still a political program , unsuccessfully suggested to the political pow

ers o fthe

day, w as for A

dam Sm

ith already a system o

f scientific truths verified by experi- ence, the practical im

plications o fw

hich no reasonable m an could escape. Political

tribunals w ere replaced by independent courts com

posed o fjudges trained to ren-

der justice according to the principles o f legal science. A

ntiquated and arbitrary election system

s favoring certain political groups m ade w

ay for scientific devices that w

ould secure full and equal representation for all citizens. T he civil service

system put the selection o

f governm ent personnel on an objective, nonpolitical

basis. T oday legislative reform

s are increasingly prepared by com m

ittees o f experts

w ho seem

to be influenced largely by scientific instead o f political considerations.

T axation, adm

inistration, and insurance becom e "scientific" in approach; and,

finally, there is no field o f governm

ental activity that w ould not be regarded as a

proper area for the application of"political science."

The S cience o

f P eace: C

ontem porary U

topianism

4 9

T he use o

f the scientific m ethod in politics, to w

hich the m odern m

ind w as

led by its perception of the liberal experience, w as and is a political fallacy in

dom estic affairs. T

here, how ever, the refined m

echanism o

f political pressure and self.interest serves as an autom

atic check on doctrinaire excess. In the international field such a m

echanism , acting directly upon the individual, does not exist. It is

here, therefore, that the belief in the lim itless pow

er o f the scientific form

ula has becom

e particularly prolific-and particularly ineffective. For it is here that the panaceas engendered by this belief have no connection w

hatsoever w ith the forces

that determ ine the actual course o

f events. E vents w

ill, therefore, either follow

their course as though all those proposals by international com m

issions o fexperts

and other rationalist-utopian devices had never been invented. O r those devices

w ill be applied in an exceptional instance and w

ill then produce effects unfore- seen by their prom

oters and frequently disastrous to them -such as the sanctions

against Italy during the Italo-E thiopian W

ar. Y et, as a suprem

e irony, this school of thought attem

pts to m onopolize for itself the virtue o

f being "practical"; it treats w

ith disdain the rare attem pts to base international action on a genuine

understanding o f the forces determ

ining political reality rather than on the ideal postulates o

f abstract reason. 31

31A s far back as 1877, Jam

es L orim

er could w rite in "Le Problem

e final du droit international," Revue du droit international et de legislation com

par/:e, IX {1877), p. 184: "Strangely enough, how

ever, these speculations of E

nglish utilitarianism , taken as a w

hole, are o f all the dissertations on the sub-

ject I know the least useful from

the practical point o f view

." C f. also B

eard, A Foreig,z Policy in

Am erica, p. 129: "N

early every evil that w as inconceivable in internationalist ideology in 1919 cam

e to pass w

ithin the span o f tw

enty years. It w ould seem

then that this schem e of thought had been

based upon som e m

isconceptions respecting the nature and propensities of m en and nations or, if

this explanation is invalid, that internationalists had not adopted the correct 'approach' to the goal they had set before them

selves. T heir im

age o f the w

orld had not corresponded w ith sufficient

exactness to its realities or their m ethods had been deficient in points o

f technique. T hey could,

and som e o

f them did, ascribe their defeats to the m

adness o f m

en and nations, but this w as a con-

fession that their form er prem

ises and actions had been founded upon errors o f calculation. In any

event the verdict w as the sam

e, unless all the blam e w

as to be laid on A m

ericans as the w orld's

greatest scapegoats."