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Current "Mass Line" Tactics in Communist China Author(s): H. Arthur Steiner Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1951), pp. 422-436 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951469 Accessed: 22-04-2018 21:34 UTC

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FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS

CURRENT "MASS LINE" TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA*

H. ARTHUR STEINER

University of California (Los Angeles)

I

The Problem. Chinese communist leaders generally attribute their conquest of power to the faithful pursuit of effective "mass line" tactics. They now regard a "correct" mass line as the essential prerequisite for the full consolida- tion of power, for the successful implementation of the ambitious and far- reaching policies to which they are committed, and for the ultimate transition

from the "people's democratic dictatorship" to the complete socialist order. Recognizing that large numbers of cadres adequately trained in mass line tactics are critically needed for these purposes, the Chinese Communist Party intensified its cadre training program in 1950-1951 to insure that all party

(and other public) workers would be carefully indoctrinated in basic Marxist- Leninist mass line theory and practice. Training in mass line tactics ranges in

scope from propaganda to public administration, but finds its principal focus in the delicate area of the Party's public relations with the great masses of

Chinese people who have yet to be sold on the communist program. The problem is so serious, and the need for a solution so urgent, that the party leadership has temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending

the completion of the current cadre training program. Essentially, the mass line is designed to effect that relationship between the

Party and the masses best calculated to enable the revolutionary leadership to capture mass support for its program. As explained by Liu Shao-ch'i in his famous report to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945, the mass line is "a method of leadership" by which the Party's leading cadres are intimately linked with the broad masses-a "two-way process between the Party and the masses" that combines "general appeals

with individual guidance." The mass line, he continued, "enables our Party to adopt a correct attitude and correct methods for leading the masses of the people. It is a line which aims at establishing a correct relationship between our Party's leading organs and individual leaders on the one hand and the masses of people they lead on the other."' In the language of the Party Con-

* The research on which this article is based was supported in part by grants from the United States Educational Foundation in China and from the Social Science Research Council. Quotations from Chinese communist documents and other materials are fre- quently employed in this article to explain the attitude of the high party leadership toward the problem under review, without intending to imply that they are historically exact or substantively valid.

1 Liu Shao-ch'i, Kuan-yii hsiu-kai tang-chang ti pao-kao [Report on the Amendment of Party Constitution] (reissued; Hongkong, 1948), Ch. 2, pt. 4.

422

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CURRENT "MASS LINE ) TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 423

stitution, as revised June 11, 1945, on the basis of Liu's report, the Party, as "the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class," must "always be alert to mobilize and organize the great masses" and "must endeavor to establish itself as the core of all revolutionary mass organizations." But without ab- dicating its responsibility for strong leadership, the Party must simultaneously

"guard constantly against the danger of becoming isolated from the masses and see to it that such incorrect tendencies as tailism, commandism, isola- tionism, bureaucratism and warlordism, that estrange the Party from the masses, are prevented and liquidated."2

The Mass Line and Cadre Practice. Mao Tse-tung rose to his present pre- eminence in the Party because he realistically understood what was required to effect the strongest possible organization of the Chinese masses in flexible and unstable political circumstances. Ever since the days of his early organiza- tional activity among the peasantry of Hunan Province, he has preached tirelessly the doctrine that the Party must rely on the masses for its strength, that it must serve the needs of the masses, draw its inspiration from them, and gear its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsive- ness.3 This approach was initially based on sound propaganda for party cadres: the Party could not recruit and discipline a core of essential cadres in a China where Marxist teachings were strange and unknown unless it could first fire its prospective workers with a sense of the mission of making life more tolerable

for China's multitudes. Thereafter, when such cadres had been recruited and had begun in the course of time to exercise de facto authority in border or

guerrilla base areas, Mao remained keenly alert to the danger that arrogant, inefficient, bureaucratic and otherwise inept conduct on the part of the cadres might incur the hostility of the masses and undermine the structure he had so carefully erected. The mass line policy of the Party, in its organizational work among the masses, acquired the additional character of a strong weapon of the party leadership to maintain the internal discipline of a professional elite dedicated to the principle of "democratic centralism."4 Mass line activity exemplifies the classic Marxist-Leninist precept on the "unification of theory

2 General Introduction to the Party Constitution. 3This theme is reflected in most of Mao's essays, books, reports, and public state-

ments, usually in protest against doctrinaire attitudes that fail to reconcile Marxist- Leninist theories with the practical experiences of the Chinese people. A clear theoretical explanation of the problem is found in his Kai-tsao wo-men ti hsieh-hsi [Reform Our

Learning] (May 19, 1941). A more specific condemnation of "subjective dogmatism" is developed in his "On Practice," an essay ascribed to July, 1937, but generally made known for the first time when "reissued" on December 29, 1950, in an authoritative text. See Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] (Peking), December 29, 1950.

4 During the anti-Japanese war, at a time when the KMT-CCP United Front had in

fact been breached, the Party Politburo adopted two decisions reflecting this view: a de- cision of July 1, 1941, on "The Strengthening of the Party," and another of September 1, 1942, on "Party Leadership and Relations between Various Organizations in Anti-Japa-

nese Resistance Bases." For the texts of these decisions, which are basic in the organiza-

tion and practice of the Party, see Cheng-feng wen-hsien [Documents on the Party Renova- tion Movement] (Hongkong, 1949), pp. 125-128 and 129-137, respectively.

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424 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

and practice." For party cadres, faithful adherence to the current mass line

provides the best insurance against the purge.

After the sweeping victories of 1949-1950, the problem of maintaining the

mass line of the Party became acute. Membership in the Party had grown from

1,210,000 in April, 1945, to "more than 5,000,000" in mid-1950.6 The swollen ranks of the party cadres now included recent recruits of ambiguous origin and

questionable loyalty, and the older cadres had begun to manifest disquieting

tendencies of arrogance and complacency. Screening devices and cadre training procedures had failed to keep pace with the requirements of the new situation,

precisely at the time when the Party would be exposed to the most strenuous

tests. Liu Shao-ch'i listed the "correction of shortcomings and errors in the

training of cadres" among the principal "tasks" of the moment in his 1950

May Day address. After referring to the rapid growth in party membership

and to the absorption of "large numbers of old personnel to work in government

institutions," he declared: "We are required to undertake large-scale training

work immediately, and first of all the training of cadres. The main task will be

to review our work and correct authoritarian styles of work and, secondly, to

correct other mistakes and shortcomings."'

Patently, the situation invited a purge, and this Mao pronounced in his

topical report of June 6, 1950, to the Third Plenary Session of the (Seventh)

Central Committee.7 Henceforth, he declared, membership in the Party would

be expanded with greater care; the recruitment of new members in rural areas

would be discontinued or substantially curtailed; and measures would be taken both to expel present "opportunist elements" and to prevent new ones from

entering the Party. He also called for a "large-scale ideological remoulding movement," calculated (a) to raise the ideological and political level of the party rank and file and cadres alike, (b) to overcome the mistakes committed

in party work, (c) to "overcome feelings of arrogance and self-satisfaction in

those who think themselves heroes" and (d) to improve the relations between

the Party and the masses by overcoming "bureaucratism and commandism." Finally, as a more specific guide, he directed the "resolute observance" of a recent series of Central Committee organizational directives. Two of these

dealt directly with mass line problems: the resolution of March 25, 1950, on "Consolidating and Strengthening the Relationships between Communist Party Members and the Non-Party Masses,"8 and the one of April 19, 1950, on "Encouraging Criticism and Self-Criticism in Newspapers and Periodicals."'

I Jen-min jih-pao, July 1, 1950.

6 Address at the Cadre Meeting Celebrating the May 1 Labor Day in Peking, Hsin-hua yueh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 5-10 (May, 1950); English translation in People's China, Supplement to Vol. 1, no. 10, pp. 3-10 (May 16, 1950).

7 "Struggle for a Basic Improvement in the Financial and Economic Situation of the Country," Hsin-hua yiieh-pao, Vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 487-488 (July, 1950); English translation in People's China, Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 4-6 (July 1, 1950).

8 Text in Hsin-hua huo-yeh wen-hsuan [New China Leaflets], no. 58 (Shanghai, April, 1950).

9 Ibid., no. 66 (May, 1950).

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CURRENT MASS LINE" TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 425

In keeping with the same trend, the Central Committee subsequently promul- gated, on January 1, 1951, a "Decision on the Establishment, throughout the Party, of a Propaganda Network for the Masses.''l°

Strenythening the Links with the Masses. The Central Committee resolution of March 25, 1950, resorted to the standard device of "reissuing" two classic statements of mass line policy as refreshers for indoctrination purposes- one, a three paragraph excerpt from Stalin's address of February 19, 1933, to the First All-Soviet Collective Farms Representatives' Conference; the other, a paragraph extracted from Mao Tse-tung's address of November 21, 1941, to the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area Representatives' Conference. The resolution castigated party members guilty of arrogance in their relations with non-party masses, and especially those members who took undue pride in their status as "old-time revolutionaries" condemning the "isolationist" attitudes of both for failing to cooperate with non-party masses and other "democratic" elements. All members were exhorted to study the reissued texts in order "to control their behavior, to overcome defects in relationships between party members and non-party elements, and to strengthen [these relationships]." This particular resolution, in fact, was the signal for a special campaign by United Front workers to gain the confidence of the cooperating minor parties, a campaign that continued through the fall of 1950.

Criticism and Self-criticism in the Press. The Central Committee resolution of April 19, 1950, made mass line problems the theme of a renewed campaign of criticism and self-criticism on the part of all elements of the Chinese press. The directive struck at the "isolationist" policy of the party press that had discouraged the non-party masses from participating actively in the work of "criticizing" defects in party work and public administration generally, and proceeded to observe: "If the mistakes and defects in the work of our Party and the People's Government, and in economic institutions as well as all mass organizations, cannot be publicly and currently criticized and self-criticized both within the Party and by the general public, we will then be severely poisoned by 'bureaucratism' and will fail in our mission to construct a new China." The Central Committee therefore "definitely resolved that criticism and self-criticism of all mistakes and defects in administration will be encour- aged in all public meetings, among the masses of the people, and especially in the newspapers and periodicals." Moreover, "party members, especially the cadres, should be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the rela- tions between the Party and the popular masses . . . and that the popular masses will be awakened and encouraged if they can feel free to express their criticisms and proposals to the Party and the People's Government in the newspapers and periodicals." This clever directive thus sought to enlist the services of the general public as watchdogs of the party cadres in the interests of inner party discipline as well as for the curbing of "isolationism" and "bu-

'° New China News Agency, Peking release, January 1, 1951.

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426 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

reaucratism" in the conduct of party and public functionaries. In response,

throughout the summer and fall of 1950 the Chinese press opened its pages in a nationwide campaign of criticism and self-criticism, printing countless letters from the general public pointing to mistakes committed by erring party

cadres in their daily work, and devoting editorial space to the public reprimand

of individual party workers." Propaganda Organization and the Mass Line. Despite the notorious output

of propaganda in Communist China, the Central Committee decision of Janu- ary 1, 1951, condemned as a "principal weakness of the Party's propaganda work for the masses [the failure] to establish a regular system of propa- ganda ... and to subject this work to the systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations" ! The directive continued: "One of the inborn duties of a Communist lies in the incessant effort to carry out propa- ganda among the people so as to educate them, to wage relentless war against all reactionary and mistaken conceptions and principles, and to promote as well as raise the political consciousness of the masses. The lack of a regular and well-organized system of propaganda devoted to the people shall in- evitably . . . prevent the strengthening of the ties of relationship between the Party and the people, and obstruct the Party's attempt to surmount the

deviations of commandism and bureaucratism ... " Without in any way restricting the existing obligation of all party members to engage in general propaganda work, the directive provided for the establishment of networks

of "propaganda officers" -one in every party cell-and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Under stricter control, propaganda activity among the masses was to be conducted in accordance with approved "fixed activity programs."

Among their other duties, the propaganda officers are to maintain constant

public contact so that they can "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time." Propaganda officers' meetings are to "formulate a proper division of labor between the Party, the Youth League, the trade unions, the peasants' associations, the

cooperatives," and the other party-controlled mass organizations that have mushroomed in Communist China during the past two years. In the end, no mass element is to be left untouched in the new propaganda drive, because "In all propaganda movements of a mass nature, it behooves party organiza- tions -to cooperate with various democratic parties and groups and people's organizations, as well as to organize the working personnel of people's govern- ments, the People's Liberation Army, cultural circles, educational circles and art circles to take part in the work." Even the reporting officers are to undertake the public function of rendering "political reports to the mass meetings or

11 This campaign resembled familiar campaigns in the Soviet Union, and was in part inspired by the reissue of Soviet documents dealing with criticism and self-criticism. It was characterized by the most fulsome adoration and praise of Chairman Mao, the high party leaders, and the policies of the Central People's Government. "Criticism and self-criti- cism," of course, did not extend to a critical reexamination of current official policies and programs.

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CURRENT "MASS LINE I TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 427

representatives' meetings of urban or rural people, at least once every two

months"-thus providing a popular channel for applying the method of

criticism and self-criticism to the work of the-propaganda officers. In its leading editorial supporting the directive, the People's Daily reiterated

the main point and purpose: "We depend upon the building up of direct relationships between the leadership of the Party and the masses of the people.

It is imperative for the Communists to keep in incessant touch with the masses in order to gain invincible might."'2 Systematic propaganda, in this respect, is a two-way street, deriving impetus and effectiveness from the transmission

of mass enthusiasm to the responsible propaganda agencies of the Party. But by being blanketed into the party propaganda apparatus, the "various demo- cratic parties and groups" may find that any vestige of independent opinion which might have remained to them is likely to disappear.

II

The five principal sins against the Party's mass line are enumerated in the Party Constitution as "tailism," "commandism," "isolationism," "bureau-

cratism," and "warlordism."'3 Unless corrected and controlled, each of these is an offensive deviation from approved party conduct likely to "estrange" the Party from the masses. Much of the present cadre training program centers upon the analysis of these evils and their avoidance as practical phenomena in party work. They will be considered here as a basis for evaluating specific problems that arise in the course of maintaining a uniform mass line at dif- ferent levels of the party hierarchy; discussion of these will also reveal the irregularities in party discipline and administration that undermine the central authority and menace the security of the regime.

Tailism. This offense against correct Leninist practice consists of erroneously identifying the mass line (of leadership) with the practice of following blindly the wishes or demands of the masses whenever they are made evident. Party workers must not seek to appease the masses or to win cheap popularity for themselves by yielding to the temptation of softening the substantive or tactical line of the high party command. According to the situation, tailism may be an error of right or left deviationists; but in either case, Mao has characterized the struggle against tailism as "a necessary condition for the successful solution of the tasks which face our Party and the Chinese people."'14

In Mao's judgment, Chen Tu-hsiu had been guilty of a rightist form of tailism reflecting "bourgeois reformism" when, in the critical days of 1927, he underestimated the capacity of the Chinese peasantry to respond to the

12 "An Important Link in Closely Uniting the Party with the Masses," Jen-min jih-pao, January 3, 1951.

13 General Introduction. Mao Tse-tung, in Part 5 of Lun lien-ho cheng-fu [Coalition Government] (April 24, 1945), listed four supplementary "sins": "dogmatism," "empiri- cism,"~ "sectarianism" (or "factionalism") and "arrogance."

14 Mao Tse-tung, "Tasks of the National Anti-Japanese Front in China," Address to a Cadre Conference in Shensi Province, May 3-7, 1937, as given in Communist International? Vol. 14, p. 828 (New York, Nov., 1937).

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428 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

organizational leadership of the Party and endorsed an "opportunistic" rap- prochement with the Kuomintang."5 Later, during the civil war period of 1946-1949, tailism was primarily the offense of left deviationists among party workers in rural areas when they acceded to the extreme demands of the peasantry for land redistribution-thus advancing the social revolution beyond the point then considered tactically feasible by the high party leadership. The issue was presented specifically in 1947-1948 in relation to the status of the "middle peasants" under the land reform program of October 10, 1947. Although the tactic of the Central Committee was to "win over" the middle peasantry by preserving the lands of even well-to-do middle peasants against the demands of the poor peasants for a share of their properties, working cadres were often found to follow the path of least resistance by acceding to the pressures brought by poor peasants. Mao Tse-tung publicly condemned this error as follows, in his April 1, 1948, review of the errors of a Land Committee Secretariat Conference: "Clear analysis is lacking in coping with the problem of the people's requests by generally adopting the slogan 'It shall be done in whatever way the people wish it to be done.' Concerning this latter problem and that of the relationships between the Party and the people, it should be understood that any suggestions of the people that are correct should be appreciated by the Party leading the people in accordance with existing con- ditions, while those which are incorrect should be rectified by educating the people. The Secretariat Conference has only stressed the point that the Party has put into effect the suggestions of the people and has overlooked the point that the Party must also educate and lead the people."' In a word, whether the people's demands are "correct" is to be determined by their conformity with high party policy; when the demands are "incorrect," party cadres are responsible for leading the masses to accept the party policy by education and explanation.

Similar leftist tailism is evident in other fields when party cadres incorrectly yield to the demands of industrial workers for equal wages, or precipitately turn over the management of industrial establishments to workers' committees. At a time when the peasants demanded the confiscation and redistribution of the capital equipment used by a landlord in operating a coal pit on his property, Jen Pi-shih once pointed out that to grant the demand would violate the basic policy toward small-scale industry outlined in Mao Tse-tung's speech of December 25, 1947 (and subsequently incorporated into the Common Program of 1949). Therefore party cadres must be alert to cope with peasant ignorance; they "must persuade the peasants to understand the advantages of having the coal pits in existence intact, and that if dispersed the coal pits will be ruined and they themselves will have no coal to burn. This would hinder the economic development of the liberated areas."'7

15 Idem.

16 Tsai Chin-Sui kan-pu hui-i shang-ti chiang-hua [Address to the Cadre Meeting of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Area] (Hongkong, 1948).

17 Jen Pi-shih, Address to the Northwest People's Liberation Army Front Committee, January 12, 1948; North Shensi Radio, April 13, 1948.

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CURRENT "MASS LINE I TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 429

Similarly, for political reasons the Party has found it necessary to condemn those cadres who, yielding to local pressures, engage in "indiscriminate beat- ings, indiscriminate arrests, indiscriminate killings and the use of torture"- particularly against landlord elements capable of being "won over." The peasants need to be made to realize that "unorganized and undisciplined" action can no longer be tolerated once the people's government has set up regular procedures for legally administering punishment to those whose conduct merits rough treatment.'8 Yet the working cadre must not err in the other direction: he must not confuse the regime's "policy of magnanimity" with a policy of "boundless magnanimity" if the effect would mitigate the punishment of irreconcilable reactionaries or counterrevolutionaries. "Education [alone] is not omnipotent" in the reform of "bad characters.'9

Commandism. Judging from the persistent and repetitive attack waged on "commandism" in 1950, this is the most common offense of the party bureau- crat. In its primary facet, "commandism"20 has been defined as "the practice of attempting to carry out party or governmental work merely by issuing orders or merely by making use of the administrative machinery without taking the trouble to mobilize, organize, educate, and convince the masses."'" In an important secondary facet, "merely enforcing orders" of the higher authorities in a perfunctory or unimaginative manner has been considered by Liu Shao-ch'i as "the most fatal among our mistakes."22 While acknowledging that cadres are called upon by higher authorities to discharge many varied tasks, Liu emphasized that they should nevertheless "take the trouble" to perform each of them in the light of the general policies of the state and Party. Too many cadres "adopt a crude manner of work, taking no heed of the actual situation [in their respective jurisdictions] and its possibilities, unwilling to consult the local people humbly but simply fulfilling the tasks. The result is that tasks have been fulfilled, but the people have suffered losses which were

18 A leading editorial in Chieh-fang jih-pao [Liberation Daily] (Shanghai), January 30' 1950, was devoted to this problem.

19 "Rectify Thoroughly the Deviation of Misinterpreting the 'Policy of Magnanim- ity,"' leading editorial of Jen-min jih-pao, December 28, 1950. This "rightist deviation" in dealing with counterrevolutionary elements was also condemned by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security of the Central People's Government, in his Report for 1950 (ibid., Jan. 1, 1951).

An astonishing attempt to link the "mass line" with the present blood-letting in Com- munist China was made in apparent earnestness by P'eng Ch'en, a party Politburo member and vice-chairman of the central government's Political and Legal Affairs Com- mittee, in an official report on the new "Regulations for the Punishment of Counter- revolutionaries, " adopted by the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951. P'eng insisted that "the mistaken practice of excessive magnanimity" in the punishment of counterrevolutionaries had "aroused the dissatisfaction of various classes of people," and that the new regulations had been drafted in direct compliance with popular demands that "enemies of the people" be more sternly punished! (New China News Agency, Peking release, Feb. 21, 1951).

20 Ming-ling chu-i, also variously translated as "authoritarianism," "orderism," and "dictatorialism."'

21 New China News Agency, note in People's China, Vol. 2, no. 1, p. 8 (July 1, 1950). 22 May Day Address, 1950, cited above, n. 6.

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430 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

entirely avoidable. Such simple enforcement of orders is quite serious in the work of levying public grain, collecting taxes, and selling Victory Bonds, and it has aroused the dissatisfaction of many persons. If this is not corrected, we shall be estranged from the masses."

Conceptually, commandism may be considered as an abrasive practice that

slows down the intricate machinery of "democratic centralism" and leads to the imperfect transmission and unfaithful reflection of the central purpose to the lower administrative levels. Typical results may be imagined from the nature of the problem. Local or intermediate administrative action may dis- credit the benevolent pretensions of the party high command in the eyes of the general public if those responsible for enforcing directives conduct them- selves as petty dictators. Or the failure of working cadres to adapt their interpretations and methods to the full spirit and intent of central directives may be conducive to a lack of uniform enforcement and may even, if not controlled, lead to specific local implementations that actually defeat the central purpose. Problems of this type have been seriously attacked by party leaders over a period of years. They influenced the Central Committee in its decision of July 1, 1941;23 and the "ideological remoulding" movement of 1950-1951 took the correction of such abuses as its principal theme. A directive of the East China Branch Bureau of the Central Committee of May 20, 1950, assailed the improper conduct of old and new party cadres, reciting evidence of egotism and complacency, of exploitation of the masses and corruption, and of action that "destroyed the prestige of, and confidence in, the Party."24 The campaign against commandism today has been enlarged to embrace nearly every form of party or public administrative action, and in certain areas has already led to a rigorous purge of undesirable party elements.

A leading editorial in the People's Daily tied the problem of commandism directly to the party mass line with the following remarks: "Our old cadres take pride in their achievements and slight the masses.... Among the new party members and cadres, many are still under the effects of the work attitude of the Kuomintang, and do not understand correctly the pursuit of the mass line, and adopt the evil attitude of commandism in dealing with the masses, leading to a mess being made in the implementation of many correct policies which care for the interests of the masses." Instead, then, of "issuing commands forcibly to the masses," or of adopting "simple and crude methods of forcing the masses to accept what they cannot accept," the lower cadres must humbly mobilize the masses and patiently explain to them why they should volun- tarily and cooperatively conform to the policies of Party and government.25

Cadres must attend properly "to the basic task of education and explanation of policies, so that on the basis of the awakening and spontaneous desire of the masses, they will be able at all times to respond to our call and contribute to the common completion of our pressing tasks."26 Naturally, "forcible

23 Cited above, n. 4. 24 Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 1, 1950. 25 "Resolutely Oppose 'Commandism,"' September 14, 1950. 26 Ibid.

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CURRENT "MASS LINE" TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 431

methods may, and should, be employed" against the "illegal activities of a minority who violate the interests of the majority"-i.e., against the reaction- ary or counterrevolutionary social elements -that refuse to conform to the people's democratic dictatorship.27 But it cannot be assumed that the broad masses would knowingly wish to resist; "the laws and orders of the People's Government represent and protect the interests of the absolute majority of people,"28 according to the basic assumption of the paternalistic dictatorship. Therefore, since all cadres must dedicate themselves to the enforcement of policies, the proper method is for them "to undertake the arduous task of educating the masses, winning over the masses by persuasion, and attending to their tasks by adhering to the mass line."

To correct commandism, cadre training must include renewed instruction of older cadres in "thought and action," indoctrination in class analysis and organizational methods for newer cadres, and, for all cadres, a rigorous study of central laws and directives and an intensified exposure to the method of criticism and self-criticism. Effective education of the cadres "should also result in more effective discipline."29 This approach is extremely significant as a matter of administrative technique, showing unusual sensitiveness to the dilemma of the working cadre and his tendency to find the easy way of dodging the burden of work imposed by the unending stream of directives. And as a matter of policy, the campaign against commandism has international reper- cussions, since it is basically designed to insure the continued hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party and a mass line which, if successful, greatly inhibits the possibilities for counterrevolutionary or other hostile undercover action.

Practicality is the keynote. Instead of sitting in his office and issuing direc- tives and mandates to the masses, the lower cadre must go out to the masses in the towns and villages. He must initiate and conduct an incessant round of public meetings, demonstrations, and open forums, invite the masses to ask questions which he is prepared to answer, determine the degree of mass eager- ness for the action prescribed, and in the process discover and isolate the ele- ments harboring rebellious ideas. Yet despite the emphasis on drawing the masses along, the mass line remains a tactic for leaders, not followers: "Opposi- tion to, and the overcoming of, commandism must not be accompanied by the sponsoring of tailism, which permits the masses to follow their. own course of action without proper leadership. We must assuredly proceed to undertake correctly the leadership of the masses."30

27 See H. A. Steiner, "People's Democratic Dictatorship in China," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 3, esp. pp. 38-40 (Mar., 1950).

28 "Resolutely Oppose 'Commandism."' 29 East China Directive, May 20, 1950, cited above, n. 24. The directive continues with

a highly detailed statement of the curricular organization and content of the retraining movement. According to later official claims, over 350,000 cadres were exposed to general ideological retraining in the East China area between August and November, 1950, in addition to 176,000 cadres given ideological training in connection with preparations for agrarian reform (New China News Agency, Shanghai release, Mar. 10, 1951).

30 Ibid.

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432 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Isolationism. Isolationism, or a "closed-door policy," consists in conducting party affairs in a vacuum that neglects the tactical value of enlisting general public participation in the formation and execution of party policy. This tendency is especially difficult to control in a party whose members must satisfy special admission requirements and observe tight discipline, and who are taught that they form the militant and organized "vanguard of the prole- tariat." Yet in a "coalition" type of political relationship, in a pre-socialist stage of "people's democracy," uncontrolled isolationism would estrange the Party from the masses in general and also alienate the leaders of friendly, cooperative non-communist parties. Therefore, Mao Tse-tung has admonished Party members "to learn to love the people, to listen to them carefully, to mix with instead of overriding them, to develop and raise the consciousness of the masses with due consideration to their intelligence, and to help them if they are willing to organize themselves gradually for the necessary struggles.")3'

From the early days of the anti-Japanese war and the United Front, Mao has persistently worked to associate non-party elements with the work of the Party, aspiring both to supplement the party cadres in guerrilla base areas and to prevent abuse of special privileges by party cadres. In 1938, for example, he directed the Party to employ non-party cadres in situations where they were willing to undertake projects in common and where the Party should exploit the "genius, ability and aggressiveness" of useful talent.32 The brilliant results of this policy encouraged Mao to bring non-communist "third" parties and independents into the organization of the Central People's Government in 1949-1950.

In 1948, however, the problem was posed in a different light. Mao was then intent on a purge of party cadres working on the critical policy of land reform. A significant Central Committee directive of February 22, 1948, stipulated that the "soundest method" of achieving that aim was to invite the "masses outside the Party to participate in party meetings to examine party members and cadres in common."33 This attitude was designed to focus the dissatis- faction of the peasantry "on party members and cadres who use their poli- tical positions to commit evil acts and usurp the fruits of agrarian reform." The directive specified that in all but the very recently "liberated" areas, "all party cells should be made public. All meetings of all party cells to discuss problems concerning the interests of the masses, including party meetings for criticism and review, should be open to the non-party masses. Secret meet- ings are prohibited so that feelings of mystery of- the masses toward the party organization can be removed, and so that all party phenomena, good or bad, can be displayed to the masses for their information and criticism or sup- port." Mao Tse-tung strongly endorsed this policy in his address of April 1,

31 Coalition Government, Pt. 5. 32 Lun hsin chieh-tuan [On the New Stage] (Report to the Sixth Enlarged Plenary

Session of the [Sixth] Central Committee, Oct. 12, 1938), Ch. 7. 33 Text in I-chiu-ssu-ch'i nien i-lai Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang chung-yao wen-hsien chi

[Important Documents of the Chinese Communist Party since 1947] (Hongkong, 1949), p. 62.

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CURRENT "MASS LINE ' TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 433

1948, to the Shansi-Suiyuan cadres: "You have further enabled the non-party masses to participate in party cell meetings and to develop criticism and self- criticism. The symptoms of impure qualities or actions in party organizations

should be speedily rectified in order to maintain a close relationship between the Party and the people."34

In this particular respect, the 1948 line appears to have ended with the com- pletion of the purge. But in 1950, and for substantially the same reasons, the opening of party meetings to non-party elements again became fashionable. The Central Committee directive of April 21, 1950,35 specified that "criticism and self-criticism" should be practiced widely in public meetings at all levels. The retraining directives thereafter adopted by the Central Committee's re- gional branch bureaus36 specified that selected lower-level cadres should be as- sembled at special training schools. Upon completion of the course, they were instructed to return to their original posts and then convene party cell meetings "to which the non-party masses should be invited."37 As part of the "criticism and self-criticism" in these meetings, the "proposals and criticisms emanating from representatives of the masses should be welcomed; their correct proposals and criticisms should be accepted and appreciated. Where incorrect proposals and criticisms are off ered . . . errors should be explained in a spirit of good will. In particular, appropriate consolation and apology should be extended to those who have been beaten, imprisoned, or reprimanded by mistake. This will im- prove the relations between the cadres and the non-party masses." It would also expand the "ideological remoulding movement" to include all elements in the population.

In consequence, party meetings appear to have been opened to the public more extensively than in the "purification" movement of 1948.38 The substan- tive results are difficult to appraise in concrete terms. Yet this technique had spectacular effects in stimulating popular response to government policies di- rected against American "imperialist aggression" in Korea. The four-point pro- gram of "Resist America, Aid Korea, Defend Our Homes, Protect Our Country" was maintained with multi-party support during 1950-1951. The campaign to recruit "volunteers" for Korean service, intensified when United Nations forces moved north of the 38th Parallel in October, 1950, was waged by party organs with the constant participation of non-party elements, and the principal prop-

Cited above, n. 16. 3 Cited above, n. 8.

36 Directives of the East China, South-Central, Northwest, Southwest, Northeast and North China branch bureaus of the Central Committee are summarized in Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1950.

37 East China Branch Bureau Directive of May 20, 1950, cited above, n. 24. 38 Typical reports of non-party participation in party meetings emanated from

Shanghai (Shanghai Radio, May 16, 1950), North Anhwei (Shanghai Radio, July 17, 1950), and Chungking (Chungking Radio, July 22, 1950). Supplemental directives governing the procedure of opening party meetings to non-party elements were also issued by local party organs, as was illustrated by the June 20, 1950, directive of the Secretary of the Chungking Party Committee (Chungking Radio, July 18, 1950).

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434 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

aganda instrument of the anti-American campaign was the joint declaration of

all "democratic" parties issued on November 4, 1950. In addition, the break- down of isolationism within the Party has had the all-important political effect of obliterating differences between "party" and "government" activity in Red China and, by depriving independent party groups of any reason for their fur- ther existence, of thus preparing for the transition to the socialist society.

Bureaucratism. Commandism in 1950-1951 was considered a phenomenon af-

fecting chiefly the lower level party bureaucrats who proved inept in their direct public relations. "Bureaucratism" is a phenomenon common to "paper- pushers" at all levels. Liu Shao-ch'i described it as the tendency of working cadres to lack "a sense of responsibility to the people and the Party," direct- ing his attack to office-loafers who failed to conduct investigations into serious

administrative problems and cadres who "became corrupt and degenerate and lorded it over the people" or who conducted their work in a perfunctory spirit.39 The current intensive anti-bureaucratism campaign is being waged concur-

rently with the related campaign against commandism: special training meth- ods have been prescribed and erring bureaucrats have been either held up to public scorn in the party press or removed from office.40 Publicity has been given to such improper examples of bureaucratic conduct as arose during the

campaign to collect signatures for the Stockholm "peace petition"-cases in which signatures were taken from babes-in-arms and over-aggressive bureau- crats exacted signatures from peasants under the threat of refusing them a share of the land during land reform, as well as the special case of the cadre who was chastised for inventing his own imaginative slogan: "Only through the use of atomic weapons can peace be achieved !"'4 Eventually, as was inevitable, those bureaucrats who had been assigned responsibilities for conducting the "ideo- logical remoulding" movement themselves came under fire for bureaucratic tendencies shown in that work!42

Warlordism. The offense of "warlordism" consists in failure to appreciate the proper importance and responsibility of People's Liberation Army leaders for maintaining close links with the masses. This type of conduct appears less

serious at present than the aberrations previously mentioned. Nevertheless, on December 22, 1950, the State Administration Council of the Central People's Government and the Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Mili- tary Council issued a joint directive reminding troops that the army was "an important guarantee for the democratic dictatorship" and that "they should

not only set examples in observing the law but also in carrying out policies.... They should also recognize that the People's Liberation Army must at all times be closely united with the broad masses and protect their interests....

39 Op. cit. above, n. 1.

40 Throughout August-September, 1950, the columns of Jen-min jih-pao (Peking) and Chieh-fang jih-pao (Shanghai) were intermittently filled with reports on this campaign.

41 Chungking Radio, July 25, 1950.

42 Shanghai Radio, September 11, 1950, reported several such irregularities among party bureaucrats in Shanghai and Hangchow.

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CURRENT {'MASS LINE" TACTICS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 435

Arrogance, smug self-satisfaction and the love of peaceful life with no will to fight should all be done away with. All acts against the interests of the people and in violation of mass discipline must be seriously scrutinized and rectified."43 This would serve to illustrate that no sector of party or other public activity, civil or military, can escape the controlling force of the mass line of the Chinese Communist Party.

III

Mass line tactics are not unique to the Communist Party in China, but con- form to the general line of all Marxist-Leninist parties.44 The mass line tactics of the Communist Party in China, however, are specially flavored by politi- cal and security considerations inherent in the currently fluid Chinese situation. While mass line tactics are specifically calculated to close the political gaps on the home front, their ramifications extend to the whole realm of public policy- including propaganda, internal party affairs, domestic administrative prac- tices, relations with "third" parties, and foreign policy.

In my judgment, American press coverage and editorial treatment of recent events in China reflect an unfortunate tendency to interpret strong action as evidence of weakness. Actually, mass executions of "reactionaries" and of- ficial condemnations of irregularities in communist party practice stem from the same political source: the calculated determination of the regime to pro- tect itself against controllable phenomena likely to undermine its power- whether these be counterrevolutionary activities of enemies of the regime or the blundering or inept actions of its own administrators. This, it may be argued with some cogency, is evidence of strength and power, rather than of weakness and uncertainty.

This judgment on present facts is, of course, not a prediction that the re- gime will actually succeed in its ultimate objective of capturing the allegiance of the Chinese masses. Obviously, the party high command is not infallible, and mass line tactics are no absolute guarantee against erroneous judgments. It seems clear, for example, that the Korean military adventure was partly de- signed to consolidate mass loyalties in support of a regime that undertook to "defend China" against "imperialist aggression." The prestige of the regime might well be shaken if future events demonstrate that the adventuresome policy miscalculated the capacity and determination of the United Nations. Even then, however, the final question of whether this would destroy the re- gime, would turn largely on the adaptability of flexible mass line tactics in the new situation.

Certainly the Chinese Politburo, in pursuing mass line tactics, gives evidence that it understands the actual and potential sources of danger to its program and authority. In such matters as agrarian reform policy, it has shown itself

43 New China News Agency, Peking release, December 23, 1950. 44 See, for example, Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (1924) and his report on the inter-

national situation (1927), as quoted in E. Burns, Handbook of Marxism (London, 1935), p. 909.

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436 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

fully capable of subordinating doctrinaire social considerations to political neces- sities judged to be more urgent. It has a masterful comprehension of the power of organization to capture a mass following-if not to elicit an affirmative mass enthusiasm-and to deny counterrevolutionary elements a capacity for sus- tained effort. It understands that "democratic centralism" cannot operate suc- cessfully unless solutions are found for a host of practical administrative prob- lems. It can blend "rewards and punishments," persuasion and force, into patterns of mass line action that are extremely flexible and delicately respon- sive to direction. To say that these tactics may enable the regime to consolidate its position is not, of course, to say that the substantive policies of the regime are ethically valid or entirely consistent with the best interests of the Chinese people. But such considerations as these are not nearly so relevant in a total- itarian environment as they might be in democratic societies; and they do not justify the hopeful sentiment that the regime will collapse merely from an ac- cumulation of careless miscalculations of the temper of the Chinese people. Mass line tactics are rooted in the assumption that organization is stronger than ideas.

A further caveat to the Western liberal may also be in order. The mass line of "loving the people, serving them, and learning from them" may, because it fails to describe an objective fact, be too casually dismissed as a line of prop- agandist sophistry. Certainly the mass line does have a high propaganda con- tent, but the Marxist-Leninist can no more separate action from propaganda than action from theory. Precisely because mass line tactics dovetail so neatly into the basic patterns of Marxist-Leninist ideology, they afford a most sig- nificant insight into the working of the communist mind. When mass line tac- tics are examined from the liberal democratic point of view, they have many apparent inconsistencies; but these disappear when examined from the inter- nal point of view of Marxist-Leninist dogmas and assumptions. While Marxist- Leninist mass line tactics palpably violate the tenets of a liberal democracy, they still supply the essential key for understanding how it is that Communist parties burgeon and swell in influence among the peoples of Asia, whose knowl- edge of democracy is so slight that they are unable to perceive the differences between democracy and mass line totalitarianism. In this sense, a Marxist- Leninist mass line whose political potentialities are ignored constitutes one of the greatest challenges to the democratic way of life.

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