Philosophy ethic
zachzhang
19.FearandTremblingProblemaII.pptxFear and Trembling
Problema ii
Today’s Agenda
I. Review and Finish Problema I
II. Do Absolute Duties Exist?
III. Is One Ever Justified in Acting on Absolute Duties?
*Note, references to page numbers are from a different translation from yours.
I. Problema I
Faith
Kierkegaardian faith is affective (a “passion”) and secular (about this world).
It occurs through “two movements.” What are they?
1. Infinite resignation, renouncing something as impossible in this life.
2. Passionately affirming, absurdly, the possibility of what has been renounced.
Faith involves affirming a paradox of will. What is a paradox of will?
An action that is impossible because it involves mutually inconsistent movements or beliefs.
“For God all things are possible.”
Is there a higher purpose served by Abraham’s action?
Option 1: No, Abraham’s action is moral, considered more carefully from the ethical perspective.
If O1 is true Abraham is just the tragic hero.
If O2 is false O2 or O3 must be true.
Option 2: No, Abraham’s action is the result of hedonic temptation (lower purpose).
If O2 is true Abraham sins; he acts as the aesthetic individual.
If O2 is false O3 is true.
Option 3: Yes, Abraham suspends the ethical for a higher, absolute/religious duty.
The Tragic hero argument (Against Option 1)
Why isn’t Abraham a tragic hero?
Because he does not sacrifice a particular ethical duty for a universal ethical duty. (No “greater good” is served by his sacrifice.)
Agamemnon: Duty to country higher than duty as parent.
Jephthah: Duty to honor promise to God higher than duty as parent.
Brutus: Duty of office higher than duty as parent.
The tragic hero’s act is consistent with the ethical, just at a higher “gradation” (level).
Abraham is not the aesthetic individual (Against Option 2)
What is the argument?
1. Abraham is tempted.
2. Abraham’s temptation is not hedonic.
3. Abraham is tempted by the ethical.
So, Abraham is not acting as the aesthetic individual.
1. Temptation is the awareness that one is transgressing her ethical duties—that she is making an exception of herself.
2. Typically, “temptation” occurs because we act selfishly for pleasure, i.e., as the aesthetic individual.
3. He loves Isaac and feels morally compelled to protect him.
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II. Do Absolute Duties Exist?
Divine Command Theory and duty
Why is there controversy over the existence of absolute duties?
The “ethical” is synonymous with Divine Command Theory (DCT).
“The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine” (68).
According to DCT, God establishes, by divine fiat, what is morally right and wrong.
E.g., the Ten Commandments
One’s “duties” are God’s commands.
“Duty is simply the expression for God’s will.”
Is there an absolute duty to god?
Problem: According to DCT, one’s “duties” are just God’s commands. So doesn’t that mean absolute duties are indistinguishable from ethical duties?
So, do absolute duties exist?
Yes, two arguments:
1. The Conceptual Argument
2. The Scriptural Argument
The Conceptual argument
Ethical duties honor God indirectly.
By treating you morally, I benefit you and my benefitting you pleases God.
E.g., charitable giving.
Accordingly,
(i) ethical duties are an expression of our “love for humanity,”
(ii) they can be satisfied without ever entering a relationship with God.
“The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God, but in the duty itself I do not enter into relation to God. For example, it is a duty to love one’s neighbor. It is a duty by its being traced back to God, but in the duty I enter into relation not to God but to the neighbor I love” (68).
The Conceptual argument
Absolute duties honor God directly.
They are intended to please God.
E.g., tests of devotion.
Accordingly, they
(i) are an expression of “love for God,”
(ii) may conflict with our ethical duties,
(ii) assume one is in a relationship with God.
The Scriptural Argument
We know from Problema I that absolute duties and ethical duties come into conflict in the Akedah (Abraham’s trial).
But is there a scriptural basis for absolute duties in the Bible (apart from the Akedah)?
Enter Luke 14:26:
“If anyone comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.”
According to K, this passage must be read literally. As such, it demands absolute devotion, seemingly at the expense of our ethical duties.
Thoughts?
III. Is one ever justified in acting on absolute duties?
Some features of justification
The first thing to note about justification is that it is normative.
Specifically, it is prescriptive. Justifications tell us what we “ought” to believe.
It does so by providing reasons (considerations that count in favor of X).
By asking for or providing justification, we are essentially providing reasons as support for some claim, belief, or action.
Many philosophers also stress that justification is universal.
“In similar circumstances, you ought to act as I did.”
E.g., if you have a headache, you should take medicine.
Ethical justification
Justification in ethics/morality is no different.
In ethics we typically demand justification from others, or provide justification to others on our behalf, when we are confronted with the need to explain why our behavior is, was, or would be reasonable in some circumstance(s).
Proactively to recommend some action.
Should I Ф [e.g., tell the truth?] Yes. Why? Reason = justification.
Retroactively to deflect blame.
My Ф-ing wasn’t wrong [e.g., lying]. Why? Reason = justification.
Some features of Ethical justification
As such, ethical justification is interpersonal in nature.
It is a form of communication that aims to convince others (perhaps also God or one’s conscience) that what we did, will do, or would do is justified.
As such, moral reasons must be:
(i) Articulable (capable of being expressed and shared publicly).
(ii) Comprehensible (capable of being understood).
(iii) Impartial (should appeal to reasons anyone can appreciate).
Justification: The tragic hero and Abraham
The tragic hero satisfies the demands of ethical justification.
The tragic hero sacrifices a particular duty for a universal duty.
They can articulate their reasons (i), those reasons make sense (ii), and we can all appreciate the force of those reasons (regardless of whether we agree) (iii).
Abraham, by contrast, cannot satisfy the demands of ethical justification. Why? What are some challenges preventing Abraham from justifying himself? Discuss.
In short, he “cannot speak.”
Reasons Abraham “cannot speak”
1. Faith cannot be mediated.
Denies (i).
2. Faith cannot be made comprehensible to others.
Denies (ii) and (iii).
These are reasons to think that acting on an absolute duty cannot be justified.
faith cannot be mediated
“Faith itself cannot be mediated into the universal, for thereby it is cancelled” (71).
Mediation requires that one disengage from “being in the moment,” which is a defining characteristic of passionate commitment.
E.g., playing guitar, being on a “hot streak,” casting a fly rod.
If Abraham were to “mediate” God’s demand, if he were to disengage and reflect on what he is doing, he would retreat to the ethical (because it is aligned with reason).
The reasonable thing for him to do would be to conclude that he had gone insane. That it was not God speaking to him.
“Why sacrifice him then?” (70)
faith cannot be made comprehensible to others
Abraham “cannot make himself understandable to anyone … Partnership in these areas is utterly unthinkable” (71).
“[H]is life is like a book under divine confiscation and never becomes public property” (77).
The reasons to Ф would be private—between the individual and God alone. Even if they could be generated, they would only make sense to him and to God.
Even if Abraham could explain himself, no one would find his explanation plausible.
No one would take it to be prescriptive.
If I were in his shoes, I would conclude I had gone insane. If I heard a voice in the night telling me to sacrifice one of my children, I would conclude “that ain’t God.”
So why would I buy his story?
Illustrating the point further
Imagine that my wife has a dream in which God tells her we must kill our son because he will become the next Hitler.
My first thought would be: “what a strange dream!” I wouldn’t take it seriously.
Let’s imagine it keeps recurring.
My second thought would be: “you’ve gone crazy!” You need to get some help.
Let’s say she gets help, it keeps occurring, and she becomes convinced that the demand is real.
We must keep in mind that I have complete trust in my wife, I am devoted to her, she has always been concerned first and foremost with the welfare of our children, etc. That she is clearly struggling with the demand (in “fear and trembling”) as it were.
My second thought would remain: “you’ve gone crazy!”
Illustrating the point further
Let’s say that I start having the dream. I am now (somehow) convinced that we need to murder our son.
Would you believe us?
No! You’d think of us like those insane sociopaths who end up on crime tv dramas.
“Tonight, hear the grisly tale about Amanda and Avery, the demented parents who tried to drown their child.”
A further problem…
It is not a test of love or devotion. It is still within the ethical.
The reason to murder our son is that is for the “greater good.”
And so, if it were true (a judgment that it seems is impossible to arrive at), it would still be justifiable according to the ethical.
We would still just be tragic heroes.
We must modify the example and go through it again.
My wife demands that I kill our son as test of my devotion to her.
Now you should really be appalled. How sick is that?!?
A related consideration
Ok, but it seems important that it is God making this demand and not another person. Does that help?
Is the murder of your child something that a just and loving God would demand?
Is this consistent with God’s “goodness?”
Euthyphro is relevant here. How?
(1) Is X pious because God loves it?
Or
(2) Does God love X because it is pious?
The Euthyphro Challenge
(1) If sacrifice is pious because God loves it sacrifice is demanded simply because it pleases God.
(2) If God loves sacrifice because it is pious the goodness of sacrifice is determined by some other reason(s), and God, recognizing those, deems it good.
Which version does Abraham’s trial suggest is true and why?
Option (1). The sacrifice is proposed as an act of devotion, simply because it would be pleasing to God. It serves no obvious other purpose.
Does the mere fact that God demands something make it justified? Even if what God demands involves murder?
A common reply
God’s nature is such that He is inherently Good (the just itself, the source of morality and goodness), and so his reasons could not be arbitrary or bad.
But this is not a good reply to the Euthyphro Challenge, why?
It begs the question. To thwart the worry that God’s demand might be arbitrary, we cannot just stipulate that it would be impossible for God to make arbitrary demands.
The point of the Euthyphro is to place the goodness of such demands into question…To place God under the same standards of reasonableness we’d apply to anyone else.
But isn’t that impious?
Yes (recall why Socrates was put to death). Who are we to hold God accountable?
After all, God is God and we are merely human...
But if God is God and we are merely human, shouldn’t we hold God to a higher standard?
Why should we rescind the demand for justification as it pertains to God when we would not rescind it toward other humans?
Because God is omnipotent? No! Power does not automatically confer respect or obedience.
Because God is our Creator? No! Simply being a parent does not grant absolute obedience.
Something else?—What?
Considerations to think Abraham might be justified
1. Abraham doesn’t want to kill Isaac.
2. Privacy doesn’t disqualify one from being justified.
3. Abraham might be justified solely in virtue of his relationship with God.
4. Ethical reasons may not always be overriding.
Abraham doesn’t want to kill Isaac
It’s obvious but must be said: Abraham doesn’t want to kill Isaac, whom he loves. God demands that he do it.
He raises the knife in “fear and trembling.”
What should we infer from this?
He wouldn’t kill him unless he believed it was absolutely necessary.
He is convinced that it is God speaking to him.
But we still have the familiar epistemic concerns about insanity, the devil, etc.
Abraham’s culpability
How does Abraham’s reluctance affect his culpability?
Does it absolve him of responsibility/blame?
Perhaps by shifting responsibility to God?
Does it lessen his responsibility/blame?
See previous.
No effect?
Some things to consider:
Abraham is still acting voluntarily (of his own volition/free will).
But he no doubt experiences enormous pressure to do as God demands.
Privacy doesn’t disqualify one from being justified
Here is an example:
You alone witness a murder. Folks in town are convinced it is George, who is pure scum, a suspected murderer (he has thus far evaded conviction), and all agree that everyone would be better off with George dead or in jail.
You agree, but you know it wasn’t George.
You decide to reveal the truth. What do you think happens?
Now everyone resents you. No one believes you. They now think you’re in cahoots with George; you’re an accomplice.
But you know none of that is true. You’re justified, but your justification is private.
Abraham might also be justified in a similar way.
Abraham might be justified in virtue of his relationship
Imagine someone you trust completely.
Perhaps your parent(s), your sibling(s), or your best friend.
God is like this for Abraham. He does not show up one day “out of the blue.” Abraham and God were intimates. They had known each other for decades.
“Why, then, does Abraham do it? For God’s sake and—the two are wholly identical—for his own sake. He does it for God’s sake because God demands this proof of his faith; he does it for his own sake so that he can provide it” (59-60).
Abraham is “god’s confidant, the Lord’s friend, if I may speak humanly, [he says] ‘You’ to God in heaven, whereas even the tragic hero addresses him only in the third person” (77).
Isn’t this level of trust and devotion admirable? Isn’t it a “marvel” (46)? Is it any surprise that others—who do not share this relationship—do not understand it?
But isn’t this level of devotion also horrific?
Abraham doesn’t know that everything will work out as he holds the knife over Isaac.
“If the one who is to act wants to judge himself by the result, he will never begin. Although the result may give joy to the entire world, it cannot help the hero, for he would not know the result until the whole thing was over, and he would not become a hero by that but by making a beginning” (63).
“Although Abraham arouses my admiration, he also appalls me” (60)
“One approaches him with a horror religosus … [W]hat if he made a mistake?” (61)
Ethical reasons may not always be overriding
Consider Nietzsche: Morality is a tool used by the weak/mediocre to reign in the impulses of the strong/great.
Even if you agree, are you willing to follow Nietzsche in thinking this is bad?
Consider Bernard Williams’ (1976) treatment of Paul Gaugin.
Gaugin abandons is wife and children in Paris to pursue a life of painting in Tahiti. Arguably, he becomes great at it (at the very least he becomes popular/known/historically significant).
Does Gaugin’s achievement justify his immoral behavior?
According to Williams it apparently does, though our assessment of his action is due to moral luck (i.e., he cannot take complete credit for the outcome).
For existentialists this is also a live possibility. They care most about authenticity, and surely Gaugin was acting authentically.
A Related point
Must justification conform to the standards of the ethical?
Must the reasons we appeal to be (i) articulable, (ii) comprehensible, and (iii) impartial?
We need to be careful to not to beg the question.
We ought to leave open the possibility that Abraham might be justified “privately,” even if he cannot defend himself “publicly,” according to ethical standards of justification.
If we don’t leave open this possibility, we merely assume that justification must conform to the ethical, but that is something Kierkegaard is trying to get us to question….
The dilemma of justification
Abraham “places himself in an absolute relation to the absolute. Is he justified? Again, his justification is the paradoxical, for if he is, then he is justified not by virtue of being something universal but by virtue of being the single individual” (62).
Ethical justification requires that one’s reasons be articulable, comprehensible, and impartial, i.e., Abraham must justify himself from the ethical perspective.
But he cannot produce justifications of this kind, so he is disqualified from the ethical perspective. “[T]here he is and remains a murderer” (74).
And yet Abraham “gained everything and kept Isaac” (22). He was the “greatest of all” (16). So might he have been justified in another way? Say, simply in virtue of the nature of his commitment? Or the value of faith?
Consider, e.g., our commitment to the value of something like freedom or autonomy.
Was he justified?
Abraham “places himself in an absolute relation to the absolute. Is he justified? Again, his justification is the paradoxical, for if he is, then he is justified not by virtue of being something universal but by virtue of being the single individual” (62).
So, was he justified? As a way of starting you might consider:
Which features of Abraham’s trial stick out the most to you? Which are most plausible or implausible, troubling or admirable?
Which features of justification resonate with you? Do you think justification must conform to ethical standards?
Reflect on these questions and spend the next ~5-10 minutes recording your thoughts. Then discuss with others around you in small groups.
Your answer to this question will serve as a rough draft of your thesis statement.
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