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The Senate and the fight against the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act/ Le Senat Canadien et le combat contre la Loi de l'immigration chinoise de 1885

Author: Christopher G. Anderson Date: Summer 2007 From: Canadian Parliamentary Review(Vol. 30, Issue 2) Publisher: Canadian Parliamentary Association Document Type: Article Length: 8,519 words

Full Text:

On June 22, 2006, the Prime Minister rose in the House of Commons to "offer a full apology to Chinese Canadians for the head tax and express our deepest sorrow for the subsequent exclusion of Chinese immigrants. " After recalling the fundamental role that Chinese Canadians had played in the nation-building construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), the Prime Minister observed how--once the line was completed--"Canada turned its back on these men" as it imposed a $50 Head Tax on Chinese migrants in 1885, increased this to $100 in 1900 and then to $500 in 1905, and finally expanded the scope of its exclusionary measures in 1923 to make it all but

impossible for Chinese immigrants to resettle legally in Canada through into the post-Second World War period. Although the various race-based measures instituted to exclude Chinese migrants were deemed to be legal at the time, they were, according to the Prime Minister, "inconsistent with the values that Canadians hold today." This article argues that at the time of the 1885 legislation, and for some time after, there were voices that spoke out against these discriminatory policies. Most specifically, this sentiment dominated debates on the question in the Canadian Senate between 1885 and 1887, and it did so to such an extent that government supporters had to resort to some clever procedural maneuvers to see the law passed and amended against the will of the majority of Senators. In an important sense, then, these restrictive measures are not only "inconsistent with the values that Canadians hold today," but also conflict with values held by Canadians in the late 19th century, values that can be traced to a set of liberal beliefs on the rights of non-citizens inherited from Britain. The debates that took place in the Senate are, therefore, both interesting and important because they provide greater depth to our understanding of the historical record of race relations in Canada. They also speak to the more general issue of the role of the Senate in Canadian politics.

Although Chinese migrants had lived in Canada since as early as 1858, it was not really until the 1880s that their numbers began to rise appreciably. Thus, while 4,383 were identified in the

1881 Canadian census, the population is then thought to have grown to around 10,550 by September 1884 as the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway picked up steam. More generally, some 16,000 to 17,000 Chinese migrants probably came to Canada during the early 1880s to work on the rail line. (1) For economic and geographic reasons, Chinese migrants generally arrived and lived in British Columbia, and it is from there that the most persistent and vocal cries were heard for greater control from the late nineteenth century onward.

At first, the reception of the Chinese was relatively cordial: "Colonial British Columbians were initially remarkably tolerant of the thousands of Chinese who came. British officials refused to countenance any discrimination, and whites, rather than pressing for hostile action, boasted of the British justice enjoyed by the Chinese." (2) Although there were certainly incidents of racism, including violence, against the Chinese, British liberalism formed the basis of the government's response to their presence in the colony. While Britain itself had had very limited experience with receiving Chinese migrants, the country's official position on the presence of non-citizens was primarily defined at this time by a recognition of the right of foreigners to enter and remain, which precluded any wholesale restriction? However, after British Columbia joined Confederation in 1871, local politicians (first at the provincial level and then at the federal level) began to pressure Ottawa to pass legislation to restrict the ability of the Chinese to immigrate to or--for those who had already arrived--find work in Canada. (4)

The first major effort in the House of Commons was undertaken by Arthur Bunster (Vancouver Island), who sought and failed to convince his fellow MPs in 1878 to make it illegal to hire people to work on the construction of the CPR if their hair was greater than 5.5 inches in length--an obvious attack on the Chinese, whose hair was generally worn in long queues. (5) In words that recalled those famously used by Lord Palmerston some 20 years earlier in the defence of the rights of foreigners in Britain, (6) Prime Minister Alexander Mackenzie stated that the motion "was one unprecedented in its character and altogether unprecedented in its spirit, and at variance with those tolerant laws which afforded employment and an asylum to all who came within our country, irrespective of colour, hair, or anything else." (7) Mackenzie did not "think it would become us, as a British community, to legislate against any class of people who might be imported into, or might emigrate to, this country." (8)

Although calls for "repressive measures" against the Chinese--including their forced removal from the country--were made time and again in Parliament through into the 1880s, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, while he personally opposed such immigration, appointed two separate commissions of inquiry to investigate the situation in 1879 and 1884. Once the CPR was completed, however, the government introduced changes in May 1885 to the proposed Electoral Franchise Act before Parliament to deny any person of Chinese origin the right to vote in federal elections.

John A. Macdonald justified this action on the grounds that the Chinese migrant "is a stranger, a sojourner in a strange land ... he has no common interest with us ... he has no British instincts or British feelings or aspirations, and therefore ought not to have a vote." (9) Moreover, if given the vote, he warned, the Chinese would likely elect a sufficient number of Chinese-origin MPs in British Columbia to force the rest of the country to adhere to their "eccentricities" and "immorality." (10) The Prime Minister's move received strong support from a number of MPs (especially those from British Columbia), but it also sparked some vocal opposition. For example, L.H. Davies (Queen's) argued that "If a Chinaman becomes a British subject it is not right that a brand should be placed on his forehead, so that other men may avoid him." (11) For his part, Arthur H. Gillmor (Charlotte), while he did "not think they are a desirable class of persons," argued all the same that "as British subjects, we ought to show them fair play." (12) Despite such protests, however, the motion was carried. For reasons that are not clear, such voices became mute when the House turned to consider the government's legislation to restrict Chinese immigration two months later.

It was left to Secretary of State Joseph A. Chapleau to explain Bill 125 (later renumbered Bill 156) "to restrict and regulate Chinese Immigration

into the Dominion of Canada" to the House, and he did so with such an expression of regret as to lead one MP to comment that "one would almost imagine [that he] were in opposition to the Bill rather than in favour of it." (13) Chapleau began by declaring that he had been surprised when:

a demand was made for legislation to provide that one of the first principles which have always guided the English people in the enactment of their laws and regulations for the maintenance of the peace and prosperity of the country, should be violated in excluding from the shores of this great country, which is a part of the British Empire, members of the human family. (14)

Although he agreed that it was a good thing to ensure the continuance of a "white" British Columbia, he took issue with the way in which the Chinese had been demonized. As co-chair of the 1884 commission, he had found little evidence to support the uniformly negative image put forward by those who wanted to prevent their arrival; moreover, he had concluded that such migration had had a generally positive impact on the regional economy. Chapleau had come to see, however, that when it came to the Chinese people Canadians were "naturally disposed, through inconscient prejudices, to turn into defects even their virtues." (15)

The law would not only impose a $50 "Head Tax" (or "Capitation Tax") on Chinese migrants before they could be landed, but would also put in place several other restrictions. For example, only one Chinese passenger was to be allowed per each 50 tons weight of the arriving vessel (s.5), and a system of certificates was to be put in place to control those who desired to leave and return without paying the Head Tax again (s.14). Those most in favour of restriction were not wholly satisfied by these proposals but saw in them "the thin end of the edge" in the creation of a more extensive system of control. (16) Indeed, amidst concerns over the administration of the legislation,

the only opposition came from those who wanted to make it more restrictive, although these critics supported Bill 156 all the same as it passed easily through the House.

Subsequently, amendments were introduced to the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act during the next two years. In 1886, the government sought to enforce compulsory registration of those already in Canada (with penalties for non-compliance), expand the scope of the law to cover trains as well as ships, and remove merchants from the list of those exempt from paying the Head Tax. Although the bill was passed in the Lower Chamber with little dissent, it was ultimately held up in the Senate by the opponents of restriction. In 1887, the government introduced new amendments that were notable for the absence of any further restrictions, save a change to allow the Chinese only three months leave from the country before having to repay the Head Tax. (17) Even these proposals, however, barely made it through the Upper Chamber, and that lone restrictive feature was ultimately removed.

There was an intimation of the level of support that the Chinese might receive in the Senate during its debate on the 1885 Electoral Franchise Act. "I cannot myself see the propriety," Alexander Vidal commented, "of excluding the Mongolians, who have shown themselves to be patient, industrious and law-abiding, from privileges which are given to every other member of the human family in this country." (18) For his part, Lawrence G. Power did not think "the Parliament of Canada should make any distinction of race at all; that the Chinese, Negroes, Indians and Whites should be on the same footing; that no exceptions should be made in favour of one or against another race." (19) Striking a position that would be repeated by a number of his colleagues when Bill 156 arrived not long thereafter, Richard W. Scott observed that having sought to open up China to the world, Canada should not "set up a Chinese wall on our side," for to do so would be "entirely contrary to the principles of the Empire."(20) Despite such objections, however, the franchise legislation was passed. The protests that were made over denying the Chinese the right to vote paled, however, in comparison to the outrage expressed by the many Senators who spoke against the restriction of Chinese migration.

The Senate in Defence of the Chinese (1885-87)

Early on in the debate, Alexander Vidal set the tone for the majority in the Senate when he declared: "I think it is entirely inconsistent with the very fundamental principle of the British constitution that legislation of this kind should find a place on the statute book." (21) To pursue such a course as that proposed in Bill 156, observed James Dever, would tarnish the reputation of the country:

We, who pride ourselves on the freedom of our institutions, and the abolition of slavery in the United States, and who fancy we are going over the world with our lamp in our hand shedding light and lustre wherever we go--that we should become slave-drivers, and prohibit strangers from coming to our hospitable shore because they are of a different colour and have a different language and habits from ourselves, in deference to the feelings of a few people from British Columbia, is a thing I cannot understand. (22)

To the extent to which the law would discriminate against a particular group, concluded William Almon, it remained "contrary to the genius of the nineteenth century." (23) Moreover, it was suggested that if the Chinese did not seem to adapt well to Canadian society, then this was in part the fault of Canadians themselves when they instituted such barriers as disenfranchisement and the prevention of family reunification. Indeed, it was observed that the Chinese became further

excluded from European Canadian society by the stereotypes that the latter employed.

Although the opponents of restriction were unable to prevent the passage of the bill, the way in which it was returned to the House is worth noting, for it was only on account of some fancy procedural footwork on the part of the government side that it happened with so little disturbance. William Almon had "given notice that [he] would oppose it at the third reading, and that [he] would move that it be read the third time three months hence"-thereby making it impossible for the legislation to pass that session. (24) The Senator, however, apparently committed a procedural error that allowed the legislation to emerge from the committee stage unscathed and pass through Third Reading without any discussion. Not only did Almon not give notice in writing, but he also wrongly assumed that debate could not pass through two stages on the same day. As a result, his efforts to scuttle the bill were sidestepped and it was returned to the House of Commons without a word altered, despite the considerable opposition to the very principles on which it was based that had been expressed. Almon's frustration comes through quite clearly, as does his firm conviction that it was a fundamentally illiberal piece of legislation: "I think such legislation is a disgrace to humanity. I think it is rolling back civilization from the end to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The early part of this century did away with the Slave trade, with the Test Act, and gave Catholic emancipation and abolished slavery in the West Indies. We now enact a law which is as vile as any of those to the repeal of which I have just alluded, and I think it will impress an indelible disgrace on this House and on the Dominion." (25)

The chances that Almon's effort might otherwise have succeeded would seem to be slim--after all, it was fairly rare for a government bill to be turned back in the Senate, especially when the same party controlled both chambers--but the fate of the government's attempt to amend the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act by passing Bill 106 the following year makes it difficult to claim that there were none. As noted above, the proposed amendments in 1886 were mostly restrictionist in nature, but rather than simply debate these measures, opponents attacked the law itself. While much of the criticism trod upon familiar ground (e.g., "It is so repugnant to all that is English, and honourable or right that one can hardly discuss it in a proper frame of mind"), (26) there were important developments as well.

For example, Alexander Vidal raised the question of Canadian sovereignty and the country's right to restrict entry at its borders, and he suggested that this should not be held to be absolute but rather ought to conform to the principles on which the land had come to be settled. He began by inquiring as to the foundations of Britain's occupation of North America:

By what royal right have we and our fathers crossed the ocean and taken possession of this western continent? What right had we to come here and dispossess the Indians, native proprietors of this country, and take possession of their lands? ... [Do we] not only consider that we have a better right to it than they have, but to consider it so exclusively our own as to shut out from sharing in the advantages of this country others of God's people who have as much right to it as we have? (27)

The land was taken not by right, he claimed, but "because we believed that where our civilization and enlightenment have been introduced we have carried with us the blessings of Christianity to the people amongst whom we have settled." (28) To restrict other people now from coming to live in the country on the basis of race, he concluded, was so "utterly inconsistent with our professions as Christians and with the vaunted freedom we profess to cherish as a British people" that it undermined the basis on which the land had been occupied--the superiority of "the Anglo-Saxon race." (29) Thus, while Senators often still viewed the issue from a race-based and even missionary

perspective, they also operated within a rights-based framework, with potentially quite important policy implications for Chinese Canadians.

Even George W. Allan, who introduced the amendments in the Senate for the government, said that he had "no special leaning towards this Chinese legislation." (30) Given the level of agreement against the proposals, it would be, Richard W. Scott averred, "a service to the empire if we allow this question to stand over another year." (31) By that time, he hoped, passions in British Columbia might have calmed somewhat and a more reasonable examination of the question might be assayed. Thus, the same Senate that had seemed to sanction the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act now let the debate on its amendment stand for six months, thereby signaling an unwillingness to allow the law to be changed in a more restrictive manner.

The government's second attempt to amend the law, Bill 54, responded to some of the criticisms that had been expressed in the Senate by removing the restrictive elements included in the previous bill. Moreover, the one aspect of the new bill that would have made it more difficult for Chinese migrants--the three-month return clause--was first extended to six months and then dropped altogether. Nonetheless, the legislation received extended criticism ("a diabolical Bill ... [that] has not a shadow of justice or right on its side"), (32) out of which emerged--amidst the old complaints--other lines of argumentation. For example, Almon asked: "How will it be now if we pass [this] Act to say that there is a dividing line between Canada and the United States? ... Can we any longer point with pride to our flag and say that under that emblem all men, be they Mongolian, Circassian or Caucasian, are equally free?" (33)

The Senator who sponsored the bill on the government's behalf, future Prime Minister John J.C. Abbott, agreed that the principle that lay behind the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act was offensive to the chamber, but he argued all the same that the amendments on the floor might help to temper the harshness of the law. If too many alterations to the proposed bill were presented to the House, he cautioned, then it would reject them, with the result that the modest positive alterations that could be made would not come into effect, leaving the Chinese worse off than they might otherwise have been. This line of reasoning found some sympathy but little support, as "the sentiment of the Senate seemed to be that the Act should be wiped off the Statute Book. (34) Indeed, Vidal introduced Bill P to do just that, and he had such backing that Abbott himself admitted that it would likely pass on a vote. The justification for repeal was succinctly expressed by Robert Haythorne, who declared that "it is a difficult thing to amend a Bill based upon a wrong principle, and the principle upon which [the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act is] based is a bad and cruel one." (35) Even if the House would not accept it, Vidal argued, passage of Bill P would "show that we have proper views of British freedom and the responsibilities that are attached to our professions as Christians." (36)

The government side, however, was once again able--through procedural means--to steer its legislation through the chamber. It argued successfully before the Speaker that since the law involved the collection of revenue--the Head Tax--the Senate could not seek to repeal it. The Speaker based his ruling on s.53 of the 1867 BNA Act ("Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue, or for imposing any Tax or Impost, shall originate in the House of Commons") and on the 47th Rule of the Senate according to Bourinot ("The Senate will not proceed upon a Bill appropriating public money that shall not within the knowledge of the Senate have been recom-. mended by the Queen's representative"). The question of the Senate's authority to amend money bills would long trouble Parliament and was eventually the subject of a Special Committee of the Senate in 1917. In response to this decision, Vidal argued: "I can easily understand that if we found the word 'Chinese' between cheese and cigars in the tariff bill that we could not touch it, but it is an extraordinary thing that we cannot amend a public Bill simply because there is a penalty attached

for which the Government derives a revenue." (37) Although the purpose behind the Head Tax was clearly one of policy (that is, to restrict the entry of Chinese migrants) rather than one of generating revenue, the Speaker supported the government's line of reasoning. Thus, not only was Vidal's initiative ruled out of order but any chance of pursuing meaningful change to the bill seemed to have been thwarted. With the wind so completely and effectively taken out of the opposition's sails, Third Reading was speedily accomplished. It would be some years before the Senate would again exhibit such a rights-based outlook on the issue of migration control, even as the government expanded the scope of its restrictions towards Chinese migration as well as all other non-white, non-Christian, and non-British groups.

After coming into effect in January 1886, the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act doubtless contributed to the low levels of Chinese migration to Canada that occurred during the remainder of the 1880s. It is difficult, however, to assess the effect of the new law as there was an anticipated reduction in arrivals due to the completion of the CPR, which led many to leave the country, either to return to China or to try their fortunes in the United States. How ever, throughout the 1890s the number of entries recorded each year grew, if somewhat erratically, sparking a new wave of restrictive measures towards Chinese migration that culminated in the extremely effective 1923 Chinese Immigration Act. Indeed, according to official tallies, only eight Chinese immigrants were landed in Canada between 1924-25 and 1938-39--less than one every two years.

Conclusions

This examination of the response in the Senate to the government's first attempts to control Chinese immigration between 1885 and 1887 is instructive in at least two major respects. First, it uncovers an important feature of the history of Canadian state relations with Chinese migrants that has too long been overlooked. While it is certainly true that the Chinese had few friends willing to support them in Canada, they could count a large number of Senators amongst them. Thus, Senator William J. Macdonald, himself a representative of British Columbia, took note of the role that many of his colleagues were playing:

I wish to express my satisfaction at the fact that a people who have been treated so rigorously and ungenerously, who are unrepresented, and who have been hunted to the death, should have found representatives to stand up on the floor of this House and speak on their behalf. (38)

Of course, rights-based British liberalism was not the sole motivation for opposition to the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act. Indeed, there were traces of distrust of organized labour, alongside a desire that business should have access to such--as one Senator would put it a few years later-- "good labour-saving machines." (39) Moreover, an opposition to discrimination did not necessitate admiration for the Chinese either as individuals or as a group (although it often was joined to such sentiments)Y It also was at times connected to an opinion that "whites" were superior to the Chinese, (41) and for some Senators accepting such migrants in Canada was an important means by which the Chinese might be converted to Christianity. (42) Nonetheless, there is a clearly expressed respect for the individual rights of the Chinese that comes through in these debates, one that found widespread support amongst the opponents of restriction. Their racism, in short, did not fully displace their belief in equality, and they were able to support, as a result, radically different policy options from those that were being pursued by the government, and that would ultimately be transformed into a source of national shame.

As well as recalling an important piece of Canadian history, one that has been completely ignored or overlooked in the literature, the relevance of these Senate debates today can also be seen in the

extent to which members of that institution sought to institute a policy position that is much more in keeping with what we understand to be modern values held by Canadians. This not only suggests that Canadians possess a much richer and more complex political history than is often recognized, but it also underlines the potential role for the Senate in broadening our political ideas and language, of providing the sort of sober second thought that was supposed to be one of its central functions in the Canadian political system.

Notes

(1.) Patricia E. Roy, A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese hnmigrants, 1858-1914 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989), x-xi.

(2.) Ibid., 4. See also W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia [Second Edition] (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 24-29.

(3.) See Colin Holmes, John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988).

(4.) See Bruce Ryder, "Racism and the Constitution: The Constitutional Fate of British Columbia Anti-Asian Immigration Legislation, 1884-1909," Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Volume 29, Number 3 (1991), 619-76.

(5.) Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 18, 1878, p. 1207. See also James Morton, In the Sea of Sterile Mountains: The Chinese in British Columbia (Vancouver: J.J. Douglas Ltd., 1973), 43-44.

(6.) "Any foreigner, whatever his nation, whatever his political creed, whatever his political offences against his own Government may, under this Bill, as he does today, find in these realms a safe and secure asylum so long as he obeys the law of the land." Quoted in T.W.E. Roche, The Key In The Lock: A History of Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day (London: John Murray, 1969), 58.

(7.) Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 18, 1878, p. 1209.

(8.) Ibid.

(9.) Ibid., May 4, 1885, p. 1582.

(10.) Ibid., p. 1588.

(11.) Ibid., p. 1583.

(12.) Ibid., p. 1585.

(13.) Ibid., Edgar C. Baker (Victoria), July 2, 1885, p. 3013.

(14.) Ibid., p. 3003.

(15.) Ibid., p. 3006.

(16.) Ibid., Noah Shakespeare (Victoria), July 2, 1885, p. 3011.

(17.) The new bill kept a provision to allow Chinese travelers in transit to pass through Canada without paying the Head Tax, while it added a clause to allow the Chinese wife of a white man to enter without paying the Head Tax, and another that would ensure that a portion of the Head Tax was sent to provincial coffers in Victoria.

(18.) Canada, Senate Debates, July 13, 1885, p. 1276.

(19.) Ibid., p. 1280.

(20.) Ibid.

(21.) Ibid., p. 1297.

(22.) Ibid., p. 1298.

(23.) Ibid., p. 1295.

(24.) Ibid., July 18, 1885, p. 1411.

(25.) Ibid.

(26.) Ibid., Richard W. Scott, January 30, 1886, p. 692.

(27.) Ibid., May 21, 1886, p. 687.

(28.) Ibid.

(29.) Ibid.

(30.) Ibid.

(31.) Ibid., May 26, 1886, p. 747.

(32.) Ibid., William J. Macdonald, June 10, 1887, pp. 311-12.

(33.) Ibid., p. 299.

(34.) Ibid., Richard W. Scott, June 13, 1887, p. 349.

(35.) Ibid., June 10, 1887, p. 313.

(36.) Ibid., p. 307.

(37.) Ibid., June 14, 1887, p. 396.

(38.) Ibid., June 10, 1887, p. 311.

(39.) Ibid., Henry A.N. Kaulbach, July 8, 1892, p. 497.

(40.) See W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia [Second Edition] (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), Chapter 1.

(41.) According to Vidal, for example, the "superior civilization" of the "Anglo-Saxon race" meant that whites should have no fear of being overpowered by the Chinese; see Canada, Senate, Debates, July 13, 1885, p. 1297.

(42.) See ibid., William Almon, p. 1296.

Christopher G. Anderson currently teaches at Wilfrid Laurier University. This paper is based on his Ph.D. thesis presented to the Department of Political Science at McGill University in 2006.

Le 22 juin 2006, le premier ministre du Canada s 'est leve a la Chambre des communes pour declarer : << Nous presentons des excuses completes aux Canadiennes et aux Canadiens d'origine chinoise pour la taxe d'entree, et nous sommes profondement desoles de l'exclusion des immigrants qui a suivi >>. Apres avoir rappele le role fondamental qu 'ont joue les Canadiens d'origine chinoise dans l'edification de la nation en participant a la construction du chemin de fer Canadien Pacifique, le premier ministre a fait remarquer a quel point--une fois la voie terminee--le Canada << a tourne le dos >> aux migrants chinois en leur imposant une taxe d'entree de 50 $ en 1885, haussee a 100 $ en 1900, puis a 500 $ en 1905, pour finalement elargir la portee de ses mesures d'exclusion en 1923, de sorte qu'il est devenu presque impossible pour eux de se retablir legalement au Canada jusqu 'apres la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Bien que jugees legales a l'epoque, les diverses mesures raciales visant a exclure les immigrants chinois etaient, selon le premier ministre, contraires << aux valeurs canadiennes d'aujourd'hui >>. Dans le present article, l'auteur soutient qu 'au moment de l'adoption de la loi de 1885, et pendant un certain temps par la suite, des voix se sont elevees contre ces politiques discriminatoires. Plus precisement, ce sentiment a domine les debats sur cette question au Senat canadien entre 1885 et 1887, a tel point que les partisans du gouvernement ont du recourir a certaines ruses procedurales pour reussir a faire adopter et modifier la loi contre la volonte de la majorite des senateurs. Il est donc vraiment important de souligner que non seulement les mesures restrictives prises a cette epoque etaient << contraires aux valeurs canadiennes d'aujourd'hui >>, mais qu 'elles heurtaient egalement les valeurs des Canadiens a latin du XIXe siecle, ces valeurs dont les origines remontent a un ensemble de convictions liberales sur les droits des non-citoyens que nous avons heritees de la Grande-Bretagne. Par consequent, les debats qui ont eu cours au Senat sont a la fois interessants et importants, car ils permettent de mieux comprendre l'historique des relations interraciales au Canada. De maniere plus generale, ils temoignent egalement du role joue par le Senat dans le systeme politique canadien.

Des migrants chinois etaient presents au Canada des D1858, mais ce n'est en fait qu'a partir des annees 1880 que leur nombre a commence a augmenter sensiblement. Ainsi, alors que le recensement canadien de 1881 denombrait 4 383 migrants chinois, on estime que ce nombre est passe a environ 10550 en septembre 1884, quand la construction du chemin de fer Canadien Pacifique s'est acceleree. De maniere plus generale, entre 16 000 et 17 000 migrants chinois sont probablement arrives au Canada au debut des annees 1880 pour venir travailler au chemin de fer (1). Pour des motifs economiques et geographiques, ils s'installaient generalement en Colombe- Britannique, et c'est donc de la que sont venues les protestations les plus vives et les plus tenaces pour qu'on exerce un meilleur controle sur l'immigration a la fin du XIXe siecle et par la suite.

Au debut, l'accueil des Chinois a ete relativement cordial : << La Colombie-Britannique coloniale etait, au depart, extremement tolerante a l'egard des milliers de Chinois qui etaient arrives. Les responsables britanniques refusaient de se preter a toute forme de discrimination et les blancs, plutot que de reclamer des mesures hostiles, s'enorgueillissaient du systeme de justice britannique qui profitait aux Chinois >> (2). Bien que ces derniers aient surement ete victimes d'incidents racistes, notamment de violence, c'est le liberalisme britannique qui a servi de fondement a la

reaction du gouvernement face a leur presence au sein de la colonie. La Grande-Bretagne ayant elle-meme tres peu d'experience dans l'accueil de migrants chinois, la position officielle du pays sur la presence de non-citoyens etait surtout determinee, a cette epoq .ue, par la reconnaissance du droit des etrangers d'entrer au pays et d'y demeurer, ce qui empechait toute restriction systematique (3). Toutefois, apres l'entree de la Colombie-Britannique dans la Confederation en 1871, les politiciens locaux (d'abord au provincial, puis au federal) ont commence a exercer des pressions sur Ottawa pour qu'il adopte une loi visant a restreindre la capacite des Chinois d'immigrer au Canada ou, pour ceux qui etaient deja arrives, d'y chercher un emploi (4).

Le premier effort majeur a la Chambre des communes a ete realise par Arthur Bunster (Ile de Vancouver). En 1878, il a tente, sans succes, de convaincre les Communes de rendre illegale l'embauche, pour la construction du chemin de fer, de travailleurs dont la longueur des cheveux depassait 14 cm une attaque evidente contre les Chinois, qui portaient generalement les cheveux longs noues en tresse (5). En des mots qui rappelaient les celebres paroles de lord Palmerston, prononcees une vingtaine d'annees auparavant pour defendre les droits des etrangers en Grande- Bretagne (6), le premier ministre Alexander Mackenzie a declare la motion << de forme et de fond, [...] sans precedent et tout a fait contraire a l'esprit de tolerance de nos lois, qui assurent un asile et du travail a tous ceux qui viennent dans notre pays, de quelque origine qu'ils soient >> (7). Mackenzie ne << pense pas qu'il nous appartienne, comme sujets britanniques, de legiferer contre une classe de gens qui est venue ou qui pourrait venir chercher asile sur notre sol >> (8).

Meme si des appels a des << mesures repressives >> contre les Chinois--notamment leur renvoi force--ont ete lances a maintes reprises au Parlement jusque dans les annees 1880, le premier ministre John A. Macdonald, meme s'il etait personnellement oppose a cette immigration, a tout de meme nomme deux commissions d'enquete distinctes pour examiner la situation en 1879 et en 1884. Cependant, une fois le chemin de fer Canadien Pacifique termine en mai 1885, le gouvernement a presente au Parlement des modifications a ce qui allait devenir l'Acte du cens electoral afin de refuser aux personnes d'origine chinoise le droit de vote aux elections federales.

John A. Macdonald a justifie cette mesure au motif que l'immigrant chinois est un etranger, << c'est un voyageur sur une terre etrangere [...] Il n'a aucun interet commun avec nous [...] Il n'a ni instinct ni sentiment britannique, et il ne doit pas jouir du droit de suffrage >> (9). De plus, il avait prevenu que, si on leur accordait le droit de vote, les Chinois eliraient probablement un nombre suffisant de deputes d'origine chinoise en Colombie-Britannique pour obliger le reste du pays a souscrire a leurs << excentricites >> et a leur << immoralite >> (10). Le geste du premier ministre a obtenu un solide appui de nombreux deputes (en particulier ceux de la Colombie-Britannique), mais il a aussi declenche une vive opposition. Par exemple, L.H. Davies (Queen's) a ainsi soutenu ce qui suit : << Si un Chinois devient sujet anglais, il est injuste de lui mettre une marque au front pour que les autres hommes le reconnaissent et l'evitent >> (11). De son cote, meme s'il ne croyait pas << qu'ils forment une classe de personnes desirables >>, Arthur H. Gillmor (Charlotte) a tout de meme argue que << comme sujets anglais, dans des colonies anglaises, nous devrions leur donner franc jeu >> (12). Malgre ces protestations, la motion a quand meme ete adoptee. Pour des raisons obscures, ces voix se sont tues lorsque, deux mois plus tard, la Chambre a examine la mesure legislative visant a restreindre l'immigration chinoise.

C'est au secretaire d'Etat Joseph A. Chapleau qu'est revenue la tache d'expliquer a la Chambre le projet de loi 125 (renomme projet de loi 156) << restreignant et reglementant l'immigration chinoise dans le Dominion du Canada >>; il l'a fait avec un regret si sincere qu'un depute a meme declare : << on serait porte a croire [qu'il est] plutot a t'encontre qu'en faveur du bill >> (13). Chapleau a commence en declarant qu'il avait ete frappe d'un sentiment de surprise:

car c'etait demander de consacrer par un Acte de parlement la violation de l'un des principes qui ont toujours guide le peuple anglais dans la confection des lois et des reglements pour le maintien de la paix et la prosperite du pays, en fermant les ports et les rivages de cette vaste contree qui fait partie de l'empire britannique, a des membres de la famille humaine (14).

Meme s'il convenait que c'etait une bonne chose de maintenir une Colombie-Britannique << blanche >>, Chapleau contestait la maniere dont les Chinois avaient ete diabolises. En tant que copresident de la commission de 1884, il avait trouve peu de preuves pour soutenir l'image uniformement negative projetee par ceux qui voulaient empecher l'arrivee de ces migrants; de plus, il en etait venu a la conclusion que cette migration avait generalement eu des retombees positives sur l'economie regionale. Toutefois, Chapleau avait pris conscience que, vis-a-vis du peuple chinois, les Canadiens etaient << naturellement disposes, a cause de prejuges aveugles, a tourner en defauts meme leurs vertus >> (15).

En plus d'imposer une << taxe d'entree >> de 50 $ (ou << taxe de capitation >>) aux migrants chinois avant leur arrivee par bateau, la loi allait instaurer plusieurs autres restrictions. Par exemple, elle n'autorisait qu'un passager chinois par tranche de 50 tonnes de tonnage de bateau (art. 5), et un systeme de certificats devait etre mis en place pour controler ceux qui desiraient partir et revenir sans payer de nouveau la taxe d'entree (art. 14). Les gens les plus favorables aux restrictions n'etaient pas entierement satisfaits de ces propositions, mais y voyaient << un premier pas dans la bonne voie >> en vue de la creation d'un systeme de controle plus elabore (16). En effet, au milieu des preoccupations que suscitait l'application de la loi, la seule opposition provenait de ceux qui voulaient la rendre plus restrictive, meme si ces detracteurs ont quand meme appuye le projet de loi 156, puisque son adoption s'est faite sans peine a la Chambre.

L'Acte de l'immigration chinoise de 1885 allait subir des modifications au cours des deux annees suivantes. En 1886, le gouvernement a cherche a rendre obligatoire l'inscription des Chinois vivant deja au Canada (avec des peines en cas de refus), a elargir la portee de la loi pour inclure les trains et les navires, et a retirer les marchands de la liste des personnes exonerees de la taxe d'entree. Meme s'il a ete adopte a la chambre basse avec peu de dissidence, le projet de loi a fini par etre bloque au Senat par les opposants a ces restrictions. En 1887, le gouvernement a presente de nouvelles modifications qui avaient la particularite de ne contenir aucune restriction supplementaire, a l'exception d'un changement visant a permettre aux Chinois de s'absenter du pays durant trois mois seulement avant de devoir payer de nouveau la taxe d'entree (17). Toutefois, meme ces propositions ont a peine franchi l'etape de la chambre haute, et cette unique restriction a ete finalement supprimee.

Le debat sur l'Acte du cens electoral de 1885 avait laisse entrevoir le degre de soutien que les Chinois pourraient obtenir du Senat. Alexander Vidal avait ainsi declare : << Moi-meme, je ne vois pas le bien-fonde de retirer aux Mongols, qui se sont montres patients, travaillants et respectueux des lois, des privileges qu'on a accordes a tous les autres membres de la famille humaine dans ce pays >> (18). Quant a Lawrence G. Power, il ne croyait pas que << le Parlement du Canada devrait etablir une distinction entre les races; les Chinois, les negres, les Indiens et les blancs devraient etre traites sur un pied d'egalite; il ne devrait y avoir aucune exception, que ce soit en faveur ou au detriment d'une race >> (19). Emettant une opinion qui allait etre reprise par bon nombre de ses collegues peu apres a la suite du depot du projet de loi 156, Richard W. Scott a signale qu'apres avoir cherche a ouvrir la Chine au monde, le Canada ne devait pas << dresser une muraille de Chine de notre cote >>, car cela irait << totalement a l'encontre des principes de l'Empire >> (20). Malgre ces objections, la loi sur le cens a tout de meme ete adoptee. Les protestations soulevees par le refus d'accorder aux Chinois le droit de vote se sont toutefois revelees bien anodines par

rapport a l'indignation intense exprimee par les nombreux senateurs a propos de la restriction de l'immigration chinoise.

Le Senat a la defense des Chinois (1885-1887)

Des le debut du debat, Alexander Vidal a donne le ton pour la majorite au Senat en declarant : << Je crois qu'il va a l'encontre meme du principe le plus fondamental de la Constitution britannique qu'une loi de ce genre puisse trouver une place dans le recueil des lois >> (21). Comme l'a fait remarquer James Dever, poursuivre dans la direction proposee par le projet de loi 156 ternirait la reputation du pays :

Nous, qui sommes fiers de la liberte que nous procurent nos institutions et de l'abolition de l'esclavage aux Etats-Unis et qui revons de faire le tour du monde, lanterne a la main, pour repandre la lumiere partout ou nous allons--que nous devions devenir des exploiteurs d'esclaves et empecher les etrangers de gagner nos rivages hospitaliers parce que leur langue, leurs habits et la couleur de leur peau different des notres, afin de menager les sensibilites de quelques habitants de la Colombie-Britannique, c'est une chose que je ne comprends pas (22).

Dans la mesure ou la loi serait discriminatoire envers un groupe precis, a conclu William Almon, elle demeurerait << contraire au genie du XIXe siecle >> (23). De plus, on laissait entendre que, si les Chinois ne semblaient pas bien s'adapter a la societe canadienne, c'etait donc en partie la faute des Canadiens eux-memes, qui avaient dresse des obstacles comme la privation du droit de vote et l'interdiction de reunir les familles. En effet, on a constate que les Chinois ont ete exclus davantage de la societe canado-europeenne a cause des stereotypes qu'elle vehiculait.

Les opposants a la restriction ont ete incapables de bloquer l'adoption du projet de loi, mais la facon dont ce dernier a ete renvoye a la Chambre merite d'etre signalee, etant donne que cela ne s'est produit sans trop de bruit que grace au joli tour de force procedural du gouvernement. William Almon avait << donne avis qu'il s'y opposerait a la troisieme lecture, et qu'il proposerait qu'elle ait lieu dans trois mois >>--rendant de ce fait impossible l'adoption du projet de loi durant la session en cours24. Cependant, le senateur avait apparemment commis une erreur de procedure qui a permis au projet loi de sortir indemne de l'etape de l'examen en comite et d'etre adopte en troisieme lecture sans autre discussion. Non seulement Almon n'avait pas donne avis par ecrit, mais il avait egalement suppose a tort que le debat ne pouvait franchir deux etapes le meme jour. Resultat : ses efforts pour faire echouer le projet de loi ont ete esquives et ce dernier a ete renvoye a la Chambre des communes sans qu'une virgule ne soit changee, malgre l'opposition considerable qui s'etait exprimee contre les principes memes sur lesquels se fondait le projet de loi. La frustration d'Almon ressort tres clairement, tout comme sa ferme conviction qu'il s'agissait d'une mesure legislative fondamentalement antiliberale : << Je crois qu'une telle loi est une honte pour l'humanite. On fait reculer la civilisation jusqu'au debut du XIXe siecle. Au debut de ce siecle, on a mis fin a la traite des esclaves et au serment du test, accorde l'emancipation aux catholiques et aboli l'esclavage dans les Antilles. Nous adoptons aujourd'hui une loi qui est aussi infame que toutes celles auxquelles je viens de faire allusion, et je pense qu'elle infligera une honte indelebile a cette Chambre et au le Dominion (25). >>

Les chances de voir les efforts d'Almon porter ses fruits semblaient minces--apres tout, il etait assez rare qu'un projet de loi emanant du gouvernement soit renvoye au Senat, surtout quand un parti controlait les deux chambres --,mais, comme en temoigne l'issue de la tentative du gouvernement de modifier l'Acte de l immigration chinoise de 1885 en adoptant le projet de loi 106

l'annee suivante, il est difficile de pretendre qu'elles etaient nulles. Comme on l'a deja mentionne, les modifications proposees en 1886 etaient surtout restrictives, mais, plutot que de debattre simplement de ces mesures, les opposants se sont attaques a la loi meme. Si la plupart des critiques reprenaient des themes connus (p. ex. << cela est tellement repugnant pour tout ce qui est anglais et honorable ou bon, qu'on peut difficilement en discuter dans un bon etat d'esprit >> (26), il y eut aussi d'importants faits nouveaux.

Par exemple, Alexander Vidal a souleve la question de la souverainete du Canada et de son droit de restreindre l'entree a ses frontieres; il a indique qu'il ne devait pas etre considere comme absolu, mais qu'il devait plutot respecter les principes qui avaient preside a la colonisation du pays. Il a commence par s" interroger sur les fondements de l'occupation britannique en Amerique du Nord :

Par quel droit royal avons-nous, nous et nos peres, traverse l'ocean et pris possession de ce continent occidental? Quel droit avions-nous de venir ici et de deposseder les Indiens, les premiers occupants de ce pays, et de prendre possession de leurs terres? [...] Considerons-nous seulement que nous y avons davantage droit qu'eux, mais encore que ce droit nous revienne si exclusivement que nous en venions a empecher les autres creatures de Dieu, qui y ont droit autant que nous, de jouir des avantages de ce pays (27)?

Le pays n'a pas ete conquis de droit, a-t-il declare, mais << parce que nous croyons que la ou notre civilisation et notre enseignement ont ete introduits, nous avons transmis les bienfaits du christianisme aux personnes parmi lesquelles nous nous sommes etablis >> (28). Empecher quiconque aujourd'hui de venir vivre ici en raison de la race, a-t-il conclu, etait tellement << contraire a nos professions chretiennes et a la liberte tant vantee que nous pretendons cherir en tant que peuple britannique >> que cela bafouait le fondement sur lequel reposait l'occupation de la terre--la superiorite de la << race anglo-saxonne >> (29). Ainsi, alors que les senateurs auraient pu etudier la question sous l'angle de la race et meme de la mission, ils l'envisageaient egalement dans un cadre fonde sur les droits, avec des consequences sur les politiques pouvant se reveler assez importantes pour les Canadiens d'origine chinoise.

Meme George W. Allan, qui a presente les modifications au Senat au nom du gouvernement, a dit n'avoir << aucune preference particuliere en ce qui concerne cette loi sur les Chinois >>30. Vu le degre d'opposition manifeste contre les propositions, nous rendrions << service a l'Empire si nous permettions que cette question demeure en suspens une autre annee >> (31), de declarer Richard W. Scott. D'ici la, il esperait que les passions se seraient quelque peu apaisees en Colombie- Britannique et qu'on pourrait tenter d'etudier la question de maniere plus posee. Ainsi, le meme Senat qui semblait avoir sanctionne l'Acte de l'immigration chinoise de 1885 suspendait donc maintenant le debat sur ses modifications durant six mois, marquant de ce fait une reticence a permettre de changer la loi de maniere a la rendre plus restrictive.

La deuxieme tentative du gouvernement de modifier la loi, le projet de loi 54, repondait a certaines critiques qui avaient ete formulees au Senat en supprimant les elements restrictifs inclus dans le projet de loi precedent. En outre, le seul aspect du nouveau projet de loi qui aurait rendu la tache plus difficile aux migrants chinois, soit la disposition relative au retour dans un delai de trois mois, a d'abord ete modifie afin de porter cette periode a six mois, pour etre ensuite completement abandonne. Neanmoins, la mesure legislative a essuye de severes critiques (<< un projet de loi diabolique [...] sur lequel ne plane meme pas l'ombre de la justice ou du droit >> (32) qui ont fait naitre--au milieu des vieilles doleances--de nouveaux arguments. Par exemple, Almon demanda : << Comment cela se passera-t-il maintenant si nous adoptons [cette] loi pour dire qu'il y a une ligne

de demarcation entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis? [...] Pouvons-nous encore brandir avec fierte notre drapeau et dire que, sous cet embleme, tous les hommes, qu'ils soient mongols, karbades ou caucasiens, sont tout aussi libres les uns que les autres (33)? >>

Le senateur qui avait parraine le projet de loi au nom du gouvernement, le futur premier ministre John J.C. Abbott, reconnaissait que le principe sur lequel etait fondee l'Acte de l 'immigration chinoise de 1885 choquait la Chambre, mais il pretendait, tout de meme, que les modifications a l'etude pouvaient contribuer a attenuer la severite de la loi. Par contre, il a averti que, si le projet de loi propose a la Chambre faisait l'objet de trop d'amendements, ils seraient rejetes; par consequent, les amendements positifs et raisonnables qu'on aurait pu apporter ne seraient pas adoptes, ce qui rendrait la situation des Chinois bien pire qu'elle aurait pu l'etre autrement. Ce raisonnement a ete accueilli avec sympathie, mais a recu peu d'appuis, puisque << le Senat avait le sentiment que la loi devait etre effacee du recueil de lois >> (34). En effet, Vidal a presente le projet de loi P a cette seule fin, et il avait tellement d'appui qu'Abbott lui-meme a admis qu'il serait probablement adopte. Robert Haythorne a explique de facon succincte pourquoi il fallait abroger la loi : << Il est difficile d'amender un projet de loi fonde sur un principe errone, et le principe sur lequel repose [l'Acte de l 'immigration chinoise de 1885] en est un mauvais et cruel (35). >> D'apres Vidal, meme sans l'assentiment de la Chambre, l'adoption du projet de loi P aurait << montre que nous comprenons bien la liberte britannique et les responsabilites qui sont liees a nos professions de foi chretiennes >> (36).

Toutefois, le gouvernement est parvenu encore une fois--grace a la procedure--a faire adopter le projet de loi, en soutenant avec succes devant le president que, puisque la loi concernait la perception de recettes--la taxe d'entree--le Senat ne pouvait pas tenter de l'abroger. Le president a fonde sa decision sur l'article 53 de l'Acte de l'Amerique du Nord britannique de 1867 (<< Tout bill ayant pour but l'appropriation d'une portion quelconque du revenu public, ou la creation de taxes ou d'impots, devra originer dans la Chambre des Communes >>) et sur l'article 47 du Reglement du Senat, conformement au Bourinot (<< Le Senat ne doit pas proceder a l'etude d'un projet de loi comportant l'affectation de fonds publics, sauf si, a la connaissance du Senat, le representant de la Reine a recommande cette affectation. >>). La question du pouvoir du Senat d'amender les projets de loi de finances a longtemps trouble le Parlement et a d'ailleurs ete confiee a un comite special du Senat en 1917. En reponse a cette decision, Vidal a declare : << Je peux facilement comprendre qu'on ne puisse rien modifier si le mot "Chinois" se trouve entre "cheddar" et "cigares" dans un projet de loi sur les droits de douane, mais il est tres inhabituel qu'on ne puisse pas amender un bill public simplement parce qu'il prevoit une peine qui permettra au gouvernement d'encaisser des recettes (37). >> Meme si l'objectif de la taxe d'entree etait, de toute evidence, lie a la politique de l'Etat (c'est-a-dire restreindre l'entree des migrants chinois) plutot que d'ordre financier, le president a approuve le raisonnement du gouvernement. Ainsi, non seulement l'initiative de Vidal a ete jugee irrecevable, mais toute chance d'apporter des modifications significatives au projet de loi semblait ecartee. Avec une opposition completement a bout de souffle, la troisieme lecture s'est faite rapidement. Il faudra attendre quelques annees avant que le Senat invoque de nouveau des arguments lies aux droits sur la question du controle de la migration, meme si le gouvernement a elargi l'application de ses restrictions visant la migration chinoise a tous les groupes autres que ceux de race blanche, de religion chretienne et d'origine britannique.

Apres son entree en vigueur en janvier 1886, l'Acte de l 'immigration chinoise de 1885 a certainement contribue aux faibles taux de migration chinoise au Canada durant le reste des annees 1880. Il est toutefois difficile d'evaluer l'impact de la nouvelle loi en raison d'une baisse prevue des arrivees due a l'achevement du chemin de fer du Canadien Pacifique, qui a pousse de nombreux Chinois a quitter le pays pour retourner en Chine ou pour tenter leur chance aux Etats-

Unis. Cependant, tout au long des annees 1890, le nombre d'entrees enregistrees annuellement a augmente, quoique de facon irreguliere, provoquant ainsi une nouvelle vague de mesures restrictives contre la migration chinoise qui ont abouti a l'adoption d'une loi extremement efficace, la Loi de l "immigration chinoise de 1923. En effet, selon les chiffres officiels, seulement huit immigrants chinois sont debarques au Canada entre 1924-1925 et 1938-1939, soit moins d'une personne aux deux ans.

Conclusion

Cette etude de la reaction du Senat aux premieres tentatives du gouvernement de controler l'immigration chinoise entre 1885 et 1887 s'avere riche en enseignements sur au moins deux grands points. Tout d'abord, elle revele un pan important de l'histoire des relations entre les migrants chinois et l'Etat canadien qui a ete trop longtemps passe sous silence. Malgre leur manque d'appuis manifeste ici au pays, les Chinois pouvaient neanmoins compter sur un grand nombre de senateurs. Ainsi, le senateur William J. Macdonald, lui-meme representant de la Colombie-Britannique, a souligne le role qu'ont joue un grand nombre de ses collegues :

Je tiens a exprimer ma satisfaction du fait qu'un peuple qui a ete traite avec tant de durete et si peu de generosite, qui n'est pas represente et qui a ete chasse a mort, ait pu trouver des representants prets a se tenir debout dans cette chambre et a parler en son nom (38).

Bien entendu, le liberalisme britannique fonde sur les droits ne constituait pas l'unique motivation des opposants a l'Acte de l 'immigration chinoise de 1885. En effet, il y avait une pointe de mefiance de la part des syndicats, en meme temps qu'un desir de voir le monde des affaires acceder a cette << bonne main-d'oeuvre economique >> (39), comme allait le souligner un senateur quelques annees plus tard. De plus, il n'etait pas necessaire d'admirer les Chinois en tant qu'individus ou groupe pour s'opposer a la discrimination (meme si cette opposition etait souvent motivee par de tels sentiments) (40). Cette opposition etait aussi, a certains moments, liee a l'opinion que les << blancs >> etaient superieurs aux Chinois (41), et pour certains senateurs, le fait d'accueillir ces migrants au Canada constituait un excellent moyen de les convertir au christianisme (42). Neanmoins, il ressort de ces debats un respect evident des droits individuels des Chinois, un respect qui a trouve un appui generalise parmi les opposants a la restriction. Leur racisme, en somme, n'a pas completement supplante teur foi en l'egalite, et ils ont ete capables de soutenir, par consequent, des politiques radicalement differentes de celles adoptees par le gouvernement, et qui allaient finir par se transformer en une source de honte nationale.

En plus de rappeler un episode important de l'histoire canadienne, un episode completement meconnu ou neglige dans la litterature, ces debats du Senat peuvent aussi se reveler pertinents aujourd'hui parce qu'ils montrent que les membres de cette institution ont, a l'epoque, defendu une position qui correspond beaucoup plus a ce que nous considerons comme les valeurs contemporaines des Canadiens. Cet episode non seulement laisse entendre que les Canadiens possedent une histoire politique plus riche et complexe qu'on le reconnait souvent, mais il souligne egalement le role que le Senat peut jouer dans l'elargissement de nos idees et de notre langage politiques, soit celui d'une chambre de mure reflexion, comme cela devait d'ailleurs etre l'une de ses fonctions centrales dans le regime politique canadien.

Notes

(1.) Patricia E. Roy, A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1989, p. x-xi.

(2.) Ibid., p. 4. Voir aussi W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia, 2e ed., Montreal et Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, p. 24-29.

(3.) Voir Colin Holmes, John Bull's lsland: Immigration and British Society. 1871-1971, Londres, Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988.

(4.) Voir Bruce Ryder, << Racism and the Constitution: The Constitutional Fate of British Columbia Anti-Asian Immigration Legislation, 1884-1909 >>, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 29, no 3 (1991), p. 619-76.

(5.) Canada, Chambre des communes, Debats, le 18 mars 1878, p. 1207. Voir egalement James Morton, In the Sea of Sterile Mountains: The Chinese in British Columbia, Vancouver, J.J. Douglas Ltd., 1973, p. 43-44.

(6.) << Tout etranger, peu importe son origine, peu importe son allegeance politique, peu importe les infractions commises contre son propre gouvernement, peut dans ces domaines trouver, en vertu du present projet de loi, comme il le fait aujourd'hui, un havre de securite tant qu'il obeit a la loi du pays >>. Cite dans T.W.E. Roche, The Key In The Lock: A History of Immigration Control in England.from 1066 to the Present Day, Londres, John Murray, 1969, p. 58.

(7.) Canada, Chambre des communes, Debats, le 18 mars 1878, p. 1224.

(8.) Ibid.

(9.) Ibid., le 4 mai 1885, p. 1649.

(10.) Ibid., p. 1655.

(11.) Ibid.. p. 1650.

(12.) Ibid., p. 1652.

(13.) Ibid., Edgar C. Baker (Victoria), le 2 juillet 1885, p. 3108.

(14.) Ibid., p. 3098.

(15.) Ibid., p. 3102.

(16.) Ibid., Noah Shakespeare (Victoria), le 2 juillet 1885, p. 3107.

(17.) Le nouveau projet de loi a conserve une disposition qui permettait aux voyageurs chinois en transit de passer par le Canada sans payer la taxe d'entree, tout en ajoutant une disposition permettant a la conjointe chinoise d'un blanc d'entrer sans payer la taxe d'entree, et une autre qui prevoyait qu'une partie de la taxe d'entree soit envoyee dans les coffres de la province a Victoria.

(18). Canada, Debats du Senat. le 13 juillet 1885, p. 1276.

(19.) Ibid., p. 1280.

(20.) Ibid..

(21.) Ibid., p. 1297.

(22.) Ibid., p. 1298.

(23.) Ibid., p. 1295.

(24.) Canada, Debats du Senat, le 18 juillet 1885, p. 1411.

(25.) Ibid., p. 1411.

(26.) Ibid., Richard W. Scott, le 30 janvier 1886, p. 692.

(27.) Ibid., le 21 mai 1886, p. 687.

(28.) Ibid.

(29.) Ibid.

(30.) Ibid.

(31.) Ibid., le 26 mai 1886, p. 747.

(32.) William J. Macdonald, Canada, Debats du Senat, le 10 juin 1887, p. 311-12.

(33.) Ibid., p. 299.

(34.) Ibid., Richard W. Scott, le 13 juin 1887, p. 349.

(35.) Ibid., le 10 juin 1887, p. 313.

(36.) Ibid., p. 307.

(37.) Ibid., le 14 juin 1887, p. 396.

(38.) Ibid., le 10 juin 1887, p. 311.

(39.) Ibid., Henry A.N. Kaulbach, le 18 juillet 1892, p. 497.

(40.) Voir W. Peter Ward, op. cit., chapitre 1.

(41.) Selon Vidal, par exemple, le << caractere superieur >> de la << race anglo-saxonne >> signifiait que les blancs ne devaient pas craindre d'etre domines par les Chinois; voir Canada, Debats du Senat, le 13 juillet 1885, p. 1297.

(42.) Voir ibid., William Almon, p. 1296.

Christopher G. Anderson enseigne a l 'Universite Wilfrid Laurier. Le present article repose sur la these de doctorat qu'il a presentee en 2006 au Departement de sciences politiques de l 'Universite McGill.

Anderson, Christopher G.

Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2007 Canadian Parliamentary Association Source Citation

Gale Document Number: GALE|A165936016