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au t h o r s Anthony Bell Kathryn McNabb Cochran Melissa Dalton Marc Frey

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Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

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Alice Hunt Friend Rebecca K. C. Hersman Sarah Minot

p r o j ec t d i r ec to r & e d i to r Rebecca K. C. Hersman

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World

M A Y 2 0 1 7

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M A Y 2 0 1 7

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World PROJ ECT DIRECTOR & EDITOR

Rebecca K. C. Hersman

AUTHORS

Anthony Bell Alice Hunt Friend Kathryn McNabb Cochran Rebecca K. C. Hersman Melissa Dalton Sarah Minot Marc Frey

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

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About CSIS

For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked

to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are

providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a

course toward a better world.

CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-

time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop

policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS

was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for

good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international

institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational

challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration.

Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015.

Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president

and chief executive officer since 2000.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should

be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

ISBN: 978-1-4422-8013-7 (pb); 978-1-4422-8014-4 (eBook)

Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield

1616 Rhode Island Ave nue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard

Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706

202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www . rowman . com

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http://www.csis.org

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iii

Contents

iv Acknowl edgments

v Executive Summary

PART 1. INTRODUCTION

2 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction

PART 2. CASE STUDIES

10 CHAPTER 2 | Addressing a Humanitarian Crisis in a Collapsed Region

Melissa Dalton

25 CHAPTER 3 | Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Anthony Bell and Alice Hunt Friend

42 CHAPTER 4 | Countering Regional Aggression

Kathryn McNabb Cochran

63 CHAPTER 5 | Responding to a Cross- Border Health Crisis

Sarah Minot

80 CHAPTER 6 | Countering Deepening Criminal Vio lence at the Subnational Level

Marc Frey

PART 3. CONCLUSION

96 CHAPTER 7 | Key Themes and Takeaways

111 CHAPTER 8 | Conclusion

112 About the Authors

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The authors would like to thank all the experts that participated in working group meetings and

provided feedback. In par tic u lar, the study team would like to thank Beth Cole, Max Kelly, and

Loren DeJonge Schulman for reviewing the report and providing valuable comments.

This report is made pos si ble by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship has contributed to

its publication.

Acknowl edgments

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Executive Summary

Today the world faces a volatile convergence of instability, state weakness, and conflict. These

conditions are complicating the ability of the United States to operate and pursue security objec-

tives in a number of critical regions. Crises and threats, propelled by advancements in communi-

cation and technology, increasingly disperse instability across state borders and engage regional

powers directly and indirectly. In some cases, nonstate or substate actors have emerged as in de-

pen dent sources of power and authority in both local and regional contexts. Porous borders, weak

national institutions, and power ful nonstate and trans- state actors challenge bilateral and multilat-

eral crisis responses.

While working to resolve the under lying causes of instability might be preferable, ongoing issues

may arise that are within the United States’ interest to address more immediately. The United States

needs to be able to work within the constraints of fragile environments, to implement approaches

that address pressing security threats and objectives and meet relatively urgent security or human-

itarian needs.

Recognizing that need, this study has three primary objectives:

1. Define and characterize a range of operating environments emanating from state fragility to

support planning, preparedness, and response to national security crises.

2. Identify key tools that allow the U.S. government to operate effectively in these environ-

ments when responding to national security crises or challenges.

3. Promote ways in which national security, humanitarian, and development efforts might better

align, in the near and long term, in highly fragile and unstable operating environments.

This report focuses on five functional security imperatives— humanitarian emergencies, terrorism

and violent extremism, great power aggression, health security crises, and international criminal

vio lence— and illustrates each imperative through regionally or subnationally defined operating

environments— namely, Syria- Iraq, Libya, Eastern Ukraine, West Africa, and Mexico, respectively.

Rather than using nations as the unit of analy sis, these case studies elucidate the structural and

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Executive Summaryvi

institutional challenges to crisis responses that principally exist at the substate, trans- state, and

regional levels. The territories chosen encompass fragile or unstable environments from near- total

collapse to subregional weakness in other wise relatively strong states.

CASE STUDiES

Each case study describes the operating environment according to three essential characteristics

adapted from fragility lit er a ture (authority, capacity, and security), lists key tasks to address the

security imperative, and describes the current state of play and U.S. and international efforts under

way. Importantly, the case studies then point to those actors, tools, and circumstances that may

offset or circumvent operational challenges and offer pathways for responding to the crises. The

authors also make policy recommendations for how the United States can better operate in these

specific environments and comparable future environments.

Addressing a Humanitarian Crisis in a Collapsed Region (Syria- Iraq)

Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, at least 470,000 people have died, and tens of millions

have suffered under siege, become internally displaced, or left the region as refugees traveling to

bordering countries and across the sea to Eu rope. The propensity of the Bashar al- Assad govern-

ment and the Islamic State to use aid as a coercive tool, the Islamic State (ISIS) and Jabhat Fateh

al- Sham’s refusal to abide by humanitarian requests or international rules, and complicated partner

dynamics have stymied U.S. attempts to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Syria- Iraq region.

This case highlights the challenges of operating in highly insecure environments, including regions

where national authority is absent, direct access is limited or non ex is tent, and more effective or

legitimate sources of authority are highly localized and often transcend national borders. The

United States may be able to take advantage of cease- fire- based win dows of opportunity of

decreased vio lence, accessibility through perimeter regions, and a robust civil society to deliver aid

to besieged populations in Syria and Iraq. Strong international outrage against the violation of

humanitarian laws and norms also forms a basis for changing the rules of engagement to make

such aid efforts pos si ble.

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Libya)

Over the last five years, Libya’s po liti cal instability and the outbreak of civil war provided conditions

for a number of international and domestic extremist groups to establish themselves and operate

with relative impunity. In late 2014, ISIS began to seize territory rapidly, amass resources, and unite

fighters from Libya’s fractured extremist landscape. This case exemplifies the prob lem of denying

extremist groups a secure base of operation and reducing their ability to or ga nize and conduct

terrorist attacks when the region’s fragmented power limits U.S. abilities to partner with a national

authority. Left with a fragile economic equilibrium utterly dependent on the central bank and only

semi- legitimate po liti cal leaders with almost no real capacity to impose their will or act as mean-

ingful conduits for outside assistance, the United States is being forced to create new ways to

operate to achieve its objectives in Libya. In doing so, the United States may draw on both interna-

tional and regional support for combating ISIS. Not only do Western powers and Libya’s neighbors

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Executive Summary vii

recognize the threat posed by ISIS’s growth, but local opposition in the area also runs strong,

giving disparate po liti cal and security ele ments a common enemy and an incentive to or ga nize.

The United States’ bases in Eu rope, its naval assets in the Mediterranean Sea, and Libya’s neighbors

provide the regional access from which the United States might lead such operations.

Countering Regional Aggression (Eastern Ukraine)

Rus sia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine has created a precarious

situation along the two states’ border carefully managed by Moscow, with separatists struggling to

establish the vestiges of a state, and the state struggling to provide ser vices and security to popu-

lations in and around the conflict zone. This case highlights how the United States can operate in

and empower its partners to function in environments where great powers exploit state weakness

for their own gains and violate sovereignty and the rule of law. Supporting Ukraine in its attempts

to counter Rus sia aggression is complicated by a number of under lying issues within Ukraine,

including over- bureaucratization, corruption, and inefficiencies in the military; weak control over

paramilitary groups; and Rus sia’s sophisticated misinformation campaign. Amid renewed hostilities,

the United States might leverage Ukraine’s robust civil society organ izations, strong relationship

with the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization (NATO), logistics infrastructure capable of supporting

rapid movement of military personnel and matériel in government- controlled areas, experienced

volunteer military forces/militias available to contribute to a counteroffensive, and a deeply frac-

tured authority structure in separatist controlled areas.

Responding to a Cross- Border Health Crisis (West Africa)

In weak and unstable nations, preventing and responding to disease threats is exceedingly prob-

lematic. Epidemics that originate in such regions can fuel the spread of preventable diseases

internationally and may leave already- weak states extremely vulnerable to new health threats. In

West Africa— where Ebola spread through Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia in 2014— inadequate

infrastructure, poor governance, and national governments frequently accused of corruption left

the region vulnerable to outbreak and continue to afford the conditions for a new crisis. This case

emphasizes the complexities and complications of emergency response in a regionalized crisis

that has disproportionate effect on weak, vulnerable, and fragile regions. West Africa has benefited

from strong habitual relationships with international partners, effective containment by neighbor-

ing countries, and the absence of an outbreak of vio lence. Critically, national governments and the

international community have learned from the mistakes from their initial responses to the Ebola

crisis. Should another health emergency surface, they would be better prepared to account for the

cultural specifics of the affected communities and include key local actors.

Countering Deepening Criminal Vio lence at the Subnational Level (Mexico)

Simmering challenges of criminal vio lence and corruption at the substate level can create weak-

ness and pockets of fragility in states that appear other wise stable at the national level. Endemic

corruption afflicting all levels of the Mexican government has undermined central authority and

the rule of law, allowed drug trafficking and associated violent crime to become entrenched in

many communities, and contributed to illicit human migration, while also thwarting government

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Executive Summaryviii

reforms and commercial investment. These prob lems flourish at the subnational level, exemplified

by Guerrero, where nonstate groups tacitly or overtly control much of the territory. This case highlights

the nuances of countering escalation of criminal activity in a sovereign partner state with limited

authority at substate levels. The United States has found it difficult to engage with Mexico’s opaque

municipal and state governments. Corruption at all levels has tainted perceptions of the Mexican

government and led to inefficiencies within the government as suspicion, poor communication,

and limited coordination have undermined potentially critical alliances between law enforcement

agencies and between local and federal officials. Given the depth of these relationships, and wells

of professional effectiveness and proficiency in certain parts of Mexican law enforcement and

governance, the United States may be able to effect credible and joint response in cooperation

with its Mexican partners.

KEY THEMES AND TAKEAWAYS

Taken together, these case studies emphasize that the United States has assets and opportunities

for building near- term strategies and meeting pressing operational needs, even in the most fragile

or difficult settings.

Even as no two crises are alike, there are nonetheless broader systemic challenges shaping and

characterizing the fragility landscape. These trends include the per sis tence of chronic, long- term

crises; the widespread weakening of national, state- based systems of government as the dominant

organ izing structure; the expansion of gray zone conflicts that feed tension short of war; a growing

complacency and disregard for international rules and norms; and the reemergence of great power

tensions. These trends are shaping the operating environment and straining traditional response

mechanisms as the United States seeks to engage its security interests in fragile or unstable areas.

Responding to crises and other security imperatives requires a more detailed characterization of

the operating environment according to critical gaps in capacity, authority, and security. As evident

from the case studies, most fragile or unstable environments reflect all three gaps to at least some

degree, and generally have one dominant gap to which the others are subordinate or from which

they derive. This assessment points toward some generalizable conclusions regarding best strate-

gic approaches in each of these areas of deficiency, both in terms of immediate crisis response

and longer- term crisis management and planning.

There are five primary crosscutting areas where the United States can focus to better operate in

unstable environments:

Enhancing Its Cross- Agency Operational Planning and Execution

While the United States cannot predict when and how national security crises will emerge, it can

do far more to map complex environments, pre- evaluate partners, and embrace diverse expertise.

It can start doing so through several steps:

• Build tailored playbooks, with pre- identified plug- and- play teams, that conduct preparatory

assessments of not only existing fragility gaps, but also areas of opportunity for quicker and

more effective crisis response.

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Executive Summary ix

• Incorporate unconventional expertise to enhance cultural, po liti cal, and resource situational

awareness and deep regional knowledge.

• Fuse operational and assistance efforts as close to the source as pos si ble, utilizing tools such

as cross- sector task forces, incentivized rotations, and enhanced analytics to facilitate U.S.

posture and presence in identified high- priority fragility zones.

Identifying and Utilizing Opportunities and Assets

During crisis, in even the most difficult or fragile environments, the United States will often find

areas of opportunity and leverage points it can rely on to offset or circumvent operational chal-

lenges. These opportunities can provide essential jumping- off points that provide access, relation-

ships, or resources that enable and support effective responses and are key to more effective and

less costly responses. These opportunities generally fall into six basic categories:

• Intermediary actors and access points, such as perimeter regions, that may facilitate rela-

tionships with key governments or organ izations or provide greater access to vulnerable

populations.

• Active civil society and localized credible authority structures that could serve as partners in

the field, whether in the delivery of aid or military force.

• Favorable public sentiments that may be leveraged to minimize knock-on effects.

• Positive bilateral relationships that can enable effective response in coordination with the

relevant national authority (or authorities).

• Credible/strong regional actors who provide critical waypoints, regional credibility, and

expertise in entering and managing crises in complex areas.

• Habitual partner relationships, where structures for collaboration and coordination already

exist and may be augmented or leveraged to support early efforts.

Improving Access

Some leverage points, such as the potential for partnership with local actors, will alleviate access

challenges that prevent the delivery of specific effects such as aid. Still, lack of infrastructure,

resources, and personnel— especially in environments where authority is fractured among national

and localized or subnational actors— pose significant hurdles for U.S. action and engagement. In

these highly insecure areas, gaining access will demand that the United States:

• Learn to operate at the seams, pre- establishing and utilizing interdisciplinary policy and

operational approaches, as well as interagency and international coordination mecha-

nisms for bringing holistic efforts as close to the source of crisis as pos si ble, preferably

through direct physical proximity or through better integration of on- the- ground

partners.

• Improve authorities and mechanisms for engaging at the subnational and transregional

levels, in preparation for the possibility that such fragile environments may impede the

emergence of long- term national entities with clear and respected national borders.

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Executive Summaryx

• Empower regional and perimeter actors who possess better access, resources, and relation-

ships and use hub- and- spoke approaches, in which highly localized implementation of on-

the- ground efforts are supported by regional enabling partners outside of national authorities.

• Pre- negotiate access agreements that include not only military- to- military partnerships, but

also status of forces agreements or other po liti cal or legal authorities that would enable the

United States to enter these complex environments more quickly and safely.

Managing Knock-on Effects and Unintended Consequences

Even where positive gains are made, the United States faces substantial risk— not only that the

effort will fail to deliver the desired result, but also that negative collateral outcomes may result. To

limit such knock-on effects, the United States will need to remain aware of several lessons:

• Don’t kill the opportunities, but think about how to preserve, reinforce, and expand them as

the United States pursues its interests, and remain conscious that employing these assets

will inherently alter them and may even put them at risk.

• Beware the pernicious partner and develop better tools for vetting— beyond “terrorist lists”—

that encompass the criteria, rationale, and flexibility for discerning the difference between a

difficult, challenging, and problematic partner and a totally unacceptable one.

Securing and Sustaining Gains

Delivering the necessary responses in the required locations with a minimum of negative knock-

on effects is a necessary but insufficient objective. The United States must undertake deliberate

efforts to secure and sustain the results of these efforts or simply risk a never- ending game of

“whack a mole” as the same response must be repeated over and over again with little lasting

impact. Ensuring that gains are longer- lasting and sustainable requires better action in the pres ent,

by which the United States works to:

• Get on the right side of history, treating humanitarian values and security imperatives as

complementary priorities, as well harnessing local opprobrium to terrorism, extremism, and

vio lence to foster enduring normative values.

• Build linkages across security imperatives, incentivizing collaboration and drawing direct

linkages between priorities in the interagency pro cess so that security and humanitarian

imperatives are treated as complementary or mutually reinforcing.

• Own the narrative, speaking effectively about U.S. intentions and actions rather than allow-

ing opposing ele ments to distort and mischaracterize the message.

• Better link and synergize crisis response with longer- term developmental assistance,

through longer- term focus, collaboration, and trust- building between and among interna-

tional organ izations and bureaucratic entities that often view their relationships as competi-

tive or adversarial.

• Create favorable incentive structures, preferably those that harness the po liti cal economy in

positive and sustainable ways and that support civil society, build essential human resource

capacities, and support linkages between economic and security imperatives.

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Executive Summary xi

• Track and assess effectiveness to target resources efficiently for sustainability, utilizing better

metrics to provide assessments, feedback, and course- corrections that serve as lessons

learned for future crises.

Time after time, the United States has been caught moving from crisis to crisis without sufficient

planning, tools, or resources to adapt to and operate in fragile environments. Today, the scale and

enormity of the crises faced internationally requires the United States to rethink how to operate

within a changed security landscape of geo graph i cally patchworked authority, functional states

with highly vulnerable institutions, or structurally failed states. Success will depend on the United

States’ ability to better assess and characterize these environments, improve coordination and

access, enhance planning, and diversify partners, while at the same time maintaining a longer-

horizon perspective.

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PART ONE

Introduction

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0 1

Introduction

Today the world faces a volatile convergence of instability, state weakness, and conflict. Lethal

wars rage in Syria, Iraq, Af ghan i stan, Yemen, Libya, and South Sudan, stoking regional rivalries,

offering a safe haven to violent extremist groups, and triggering im mense humanitarian crises. The

world is facing massive movements of forcibly displaced populations with over 65 million people

driven from their homes due to conflict, vio lence, and economic ruin. The rise of ISIS as a violent,

quasi- state- like, transnational entity is remaking the Middle East. Even in regions and states where

overt conflict is absent, such as West Africa or Central Amer i ca, institutional and economic weak-

ness creates unstable conditions that may enflame low- level shocks or simmering criminal activity.

These types of unstable environments serve as incubators for terrorism, illicit trafficking activities,

humanitarian crises, pandemics, economic instability, and regional destabilization. Such security

threats reflect the changing character of conflicts that threaten and complicate the ability of the

United States to operate and pursue security objectives in a number of critical regions.

At times resolution of these conditions may prove elusive and intervention fruitless. Addressing the

under lying causes of instability may be unfeasible in terms of resources, time, and access. Benefits

may accrue too slowly or simply be absent when security challenges emerge in these environ-

ments that require immediate and direct response. Even as long- term efforts are developed, the

United States must identify and implement tools to make its short- term security objectives more

achievable in the nearer term without exacerbating under lying stability.

In a crisis, the United States must live with conditions as they exist, yet still implement approaches

to address pressing security objectives or humanitarian needs. Many typical recommendations for

addressing fragile states are designed to develop effective early warning systems and to build

capacity and institutions so that shocks or crises can be addressed before they become cata-

strophic. Others call for the United States to develop frameworks and strategies to more compre-

hensively address fragility. These are valuable recommendations, but as the current environment

demonstrates, it is too late for early warning and prevention in many instances where the United

States faces security threats. The United States is frequently caught moving from one crisis to

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 3

another without time to sufficiently plan or adequate resources to adapt to and operate in these

complex environments.

Fragile environments greatly complicate crisis response and challenge typical approaches to

intervention. Advancements in communication and technology disperse challenges and threats

beyond state borders. In some cases, nonstate or substate actors have emerged as in de pen dent

sources of power and authority in both local and regional contexts. Porous borders, weak national

institutions, and increasingly power ful nonstate and trans- state actors challenge bilateral and

multilateral crisis responses. More countries face severe challenges in security, governance, and

stability stemming from the unpre ce dented scale of complex humanitarian crises and conflicts

spanning entire regions. Today, the scale and enormity of the crises faced internationally requires

the United States to rethink how to operate within an increasingly complex security landscape of

state fragility and instability. Lessons from prior cases can be generalized to create a generic toolkit

applicable to the security crises occurring in these unstable environments whether such condi-

tions exist in states with geo graph i cally patchworked authority, functional states with highly vul-

nerable institutions, or in structurally failed states.

STUDY OBJECTIVES

This study has three primary objectives:

1. Define and characterize a range of operating environments emanating from state fragility to

support planning, preparedness, and response to national security crises.

2. Identify key tools that allow the U.S. government to operate effectively in these environ-

ments when responding to national security crises or challenges.

3. Promote ways in which national security, humanitarian, and development efforts might

better align, in the near and long term, in highly fragile and unstable operating environ-

ments.

APPROACH

The United States must be prepared to operate in a range of complex environments to meet

security challenges and threats, such as humanitarian emergencies, terrorism and violent extrem-

ism, great power aggression, health security crises, and international criminal vio lence. This

analy sis focuses on these five functional security imperatives and illustrates each imperative

through regionally or subnationally defined operating environments. In each case, the selected

security imperative must be addressed in the near term to help meet other U.S. objectives. The

goal of the case studies is to characterize the operating environment, identify key tasks and

responsibilities to address the security imperative, and develop a set of tools and policy recom-

mendations for how the United States can better operate in the specific environment and

comparable future environments.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World4

The first case study focuses on addressing a severe humanitarian crisis in a collapsed region in the

midst of war. The humanitarian challenge in Syria- Iraq masks and feeds terrorist safe havens,

cascades state weakness into neighboring countries, and exports militancy transnationally. The

complex and violent operating environment makes it exceedingly difficult for the United States and

its partners to operate in localities, reach populations, and address the humanitarian challenge.

The second case study examines counterterrorism in a dysfunctional and nearly collapsed state.

The lack of nation- level authority with sufficient security capacity in Libya has opened safe havens

where transnational terrorist groups like ISIS can grow and plan attacks against Eu rope and the

United States. The case reviews tools and policies to deny extremist groups a secure base of

operation and to reduce their ability to or ga nize and conduct terrorist attacks from a region where

the fragmented nature of power limits U.S. abilities to partner with a national authority. In these

instances, traditional U.S. counterterrorism tools are less successful and ultimately unable to

reduce the terrorist threat.

The third case focuses on the need to prevent and counter great power intervention and

exploitation of state weakness. Increasingly, regional powers are intervening directly and indi-

rectly in local conflicts. This often leads to increasing levels of vio lence and directly threatens

U.S. interests. By examining the policy challenges of responding to Rus sia’s intervention in

Ukraine, this case study highlights the key limitations and tools for U.S. strategy in similar con-

flicts, where great powers exploit state weakness for their own gains and violate sovereignty and

the rule of law.

The fourth case study focuses on the challenges and security consequences of a cross- border

health crisis. The spread of disease is accelerated and dispersed in today’s urbanized, globalized,

and mobile world, and the international community witnessed the security threat posed by health

insecurity when Ebola spread through West Africa. Severe lack of capacity, weak institutions,

impoverishment, and limited resiliency throughout the region heighten vulnerability and enable

disease to spread with devastating consequence. This case explores challenges and tools for

responding to a significant health crisis in weak, fragile, and unstable regions.

The final case study examines countering escalation of criminal activity in a partner state with

limited authority at substate levels. This case was selected to reflect on U.S. approaches toward a

state that is unquestionably sovereign, in many ways stable and developing prosperously, but

hamstrung by a critical prob lem set of corruption, illicit trafficking, and violent crimes. By focusing

on the impact and consequences of criminal vio lence in Mexico, this case pres ents a chronic,

simmering prob lem predisposed to acute flare- ups generally entailing episodes of extreme vio-

lence that could directly impact the safety and security of U.S. citizens.

The case studies intentionally avoid using nations as the unit of analy sis, instead focusing on

complex border, subnational, or regional intersections. By avoiding a strictly state- based analy sis,

the case studies can better elucidate structural and institutional challenges to crisis responses that

principally exist at the substate, trans- state and regional levels. The cases also represent a spec-

trum of state weakness, instability, and vio lence. These territories encompass a spanning set of

fragile or unstable environments, from near- total collapse to subregional weakness in other wise

relatively strong states. For example, the case focusing on Mexico examines subnational- level

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 5

dynamics by specifically examining criminal vio lence in Guerrero, and the Iraq- Syria and West

Africa cases both focus on regional dynamics.

The study methodology was developed not to redefine fragility or provide new characteristics and

criteria for evaluating fragility, but instead builds on and incorporates the extensive lit er a ture and

analy sis on fragility to hone in on specific characteristics that define the environment and context

where the United States must operate. To facilitate comparative analy sis, the study team developed

a framework based on existing assessment tools and methodologies from fragility lit er a ture. The

study framework is derived from Charles Call’s three gaps— capacity, security, and legitimacy— that

generally characterize fragile or collapsed states.1 Weak and failing states are frequently defined

and evaluated based on three key ele ments or functions of the state: governance and po liti cal

institutions, capacity, and security.2 Legitimacy, accountability, and impartiality are key characteris-

tics for evaluating the level of functionality of governance and po liti cal institutions. Capacity refers

to the level at which the state provides basic ser vices to the population and whether the whole

population has access to those ser vices. Security functions focus on whether the state holds a

mono poly on the use of force, controls borders and territory, and possesses the ability to maintain

order and enforce laws. While these characteristics provided the framework for analyzing the

operating environment for each case, the study team developed specific characteristics for each

of the gaps to reflect substate and regional actors that provide functions beyond national- level

institutions.

CASE STUDY ELE MENTS

Introduction

In the opening section of the case studies, each author defines the case and elaborates on why

the specific security imperative and operating environment, or geographic region or subregion,

was selected. The author then describes the crisis that demands a U.S. response and why the

United States must take action.

Security Imperative

This section outlines the specific requirements needed to address the security crisis, including key

tasks, requirements, and essential steps.

Background and Context

The authors define the geographic and demographic par ameters of the case study, and pres ent

essential background and context of the location and the specific security imperative. Each case

utilizes existing indexes and rankings to pres ent a comparative baseline of the states of fragility and

weakness for each operating environment.

1. Charles Call, “Beyond the Failed State: Toward Conceptual Alternatives,” Eu ro pean Journal of International Relations

(2010), http:// journals . sagepub . com / doi / abs / 10 . 1177 / 1354066109353137 .

2. Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2011), 8–17.

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http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066109353137

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World6

Operating Environment

This section characterizes the operating environment according to authority, capacity, and secu-

rity. Taken together, these essential ele ments shape the conditions and limitations for any crisis

response. While Call’s gaps provided the foundational categories for analy sis, the study team

developed specific characteristics for each of the gaps to enhance comparative analy sis across the

cases (as reflected in Table 1.1).

State of Play

Each case provides a brief description of the current state of play and what efforts have been tried

or are currently under way to address the security imperative.

Challenges and Limitations

This section pres ents an analy sis of the biggest challenges and limitations that constrain the ability

of the United States to address the security imperative.

Table 1.1. Key Characteristics of the Operating Environment

Components of the Operating Environment Key Characteristics

Authority • Key stakeholders

• Ability to exercise control over populations

• Who has legitimacy?

• What are the gaps/voids in authority?

• Are there cross- border, transnational, subnational sources of authority?

Capacity • State of the economy

• Poverty rate

• Access and quality of education

• Access and quality of health ser vices

• Quality of infrastructure

• Access to basic ser vices

Security • Strength and effectiveness of law enforcement and military

• Level of vio lence

• State and intensity of conflict

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 7

Opportunities and Assets

The case studies emphasize not only the prob lems that negatively impact pursuit of the security

imperative, but also those features of the operating environment that serve to facilitate or enable

effective action. These positive attributes, referred to as opportunities and assets, are actors, tools,

or circumstances that provide potential ave nues for pro gress or offset other operational chal-

lenges. By providing opportunities to avoid, overcome, or circumvent obstacles in the operating

environment, assets offer pathways to respond to complex crises.

Recommendations

Each case study concludes with key recommendations for enhancing U.S. policy options for

managing and addressing the security imperative.

Crosscutting Analy sis and Recommendations

Following the case study overviews, the study team conducts a comparative analy sis and provides

recommendations for operating more effectively in these types of operating environments and

with these types of security imperatives. Even though each case is unique, there are overlapping

challenges and recommendations for operating that cut across cases and security imperatives.

These commonalities across operating environments and security imperatives can be utilized in

future crises to develop response tools and mechanisms that can then be tailored for the crisis

situation. The final chapter recommends, both generally and for each specific case, the tools,

techniques, and procedures for enhancing the U.S. response to security imperatives in complex

operating environments and identifies key takeaways on how the United States can better respond

and operate in the near term in complex and unstable environments.

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594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 8 5/20/17 1:03 PM

PART TWO

Case Studies

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INTRODUCTION

In large areas of the Middle East and Africa, expanding complex crises have resulted in im mense

human suffering, mass population displacement, and expanding conflict and instability. In these

areas, humanitarian assistance can take on urgency that compels the United States and the inter-

national community to intervene. Yet traditional modes of humanitarian assistance are deeply

challenged, given intentional targeting of civilians and health and humanitarian workers and lim-

ited access to vulnerable and besieged populations. The United States and the international com-

munity must develop new strategies and tools to deliver urgent humanitarian assistance in these

types of hostile environments.

Perhaps no modern conflict encapsulates the challenges to effective humanitarian response as

compellingly as that engulfing the Syria- Iraq region. The conflict is cross- border in nature, features

a multiplicity of internal and external actors, and has witnessed extraordinary vio lence surrounding

and inflicted on a highly vulnerable population. Since the Syrian civil war commenced in 2011, at

least 470,000 have died and tens of millions of people have suffered under siege, become inter-

nally displaced, or left the region, as refugees, traveling to bordering countries and across the sea

to Eu rope. Many areas in the Syria- Iraq region remain besieged and inaccessible to humanitarian

aid. This humanitarian crisis masks safe havens for terrorists, cascades into neighboring states, and

provides cover for exporting militancy.

This case highlights the challenges of operating in highly insecure environments, including regions

where national authority is absent, direct access is limited or non ex is tent, and more effective or

legitimate sources of authority are highly localized and often transcend national borders.

Addressing a Humanitarian Crisis in a Collapsed Region Melissa Dalton

0 2

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 11

SECURITY IMPERATIVE

The desperate conditions of vio lence and collapse in the Syria- Iraq border region both drive the

urgency and magnitude of the humanitarian crisis and define the conditions that make the execu-

tion of assistance so profoundly difficult. To meet the security imperative of providing urgent

humanitarian assistance in a collapsed region with ongoing conflict, the United States must ad-

dress several key requirements:

• Collaborate with multilateral organ izations to perform assessments of critical gaps and

needs, focusing on identifying key distribution points, dominant authority in those areas,

essential partners for delivery of ser vices, and the specific needs of the populations. This

assessment should account for synergies, risks, and limitations across these factors in order

to provide insight into pos si ble challenges and assets for aid implementation.

• Ensure appropriate resources and approval for critical aid.

• Negotiate access and safe passage arrangements to navigate through or around active

zones of conflict.

• Where pos si ble, partner with local providers to reach vulnerable populations where U.S.

direct access is limited. Local providers are frequently the only humanitarian personnel able

to access these populations without negotiated agreements for international delivery.

• Establish effective communications to provide information on aid distribution, cease- fire

and/or security requirements, and evolving conditions on the ground to local populations,

aid providers, and local authorities.

• Ensure effective coordination to deconflict across other U.S. government and international

activities in the region that may overlap.

• Reinforce support to periphery countries to alleviate burdens associated with mass refugee

inflows and ensure appropriate cross- border access.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Geography and Demography

The geographic focus for this case study is the Syria- Iraq region, including areas mostly east of the

Damascus- Latakia corridor, but also including besieged suburbs of Damascus and the Iraqi prov-

inces of al- Anbar and Ninewa. Humanitarian issues also pervade the perimeter region, including

the western and coastal regions of Syria and the broader Iraqi state, as well as neighboring coun-

tries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.

The Syria- Iraq region is largely an arid desert environment, bounded by the Tigris and Euphrates

rivers, mountains in the west and north, and an inland steppe area. The majority of the population

in the Syria- Iraq region are Sunni Arabs within tribal communities. A sizable minority of ethnic

Kurds inhabit the northern areas of this region, geo graph i cally including Hasaka, Ninawa, Dahok,

and Irbil, as well as the Kurdistan Regional Government. In the perimeter region, up to 75 percent

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World12

of Iraqis are Arabs who live predominantly in the west, central, and southern regions of the coun-

try. Kurds account for about 15 to 20 percent of the population and live in the autonomous north-

eastern region of Iraq. About 65 percent of Iraqi Muslims are Shi‘a, while approximately 35 percent

are Sunni. Fewer than 5 percent of Iraqis subscribe to Chris tian ity, and other minorities include

Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Persians, Bahais, and Mandeans. The remainder of

Syria is incredibly diverse with rural and urban, tribal, coast, interior, as well as ethno- sectarian

differences. Kurds comprise less than 10 percent of Syrians. In addition to the majority Sunni

Muslims, who comprise over 70 percent of the population, Syria contains several religious sectar-

ian minorities, including three smaller sects (Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis) and several Christian

denominations. The ruling Assad family are members of the minority Alawite sect (approximately

12 percent of the population).1

1. Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.

Response,” Congressional Research Ser vice, October 9, 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf.

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https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 13

History

Since March 2011, the Syrian civil war has driven more than 4.8 million Syrians into neighboring

countries as refugees, out of a total population of about 22 million. As of 2016, over 7.6 million

other Syrians are internally displaced. Twelve million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assis-

tance.2 At least 4.6 million live in besieged areas, deliberately cut off from humanitarian assistance,

mostly by the Assad government. In Iraq, at least 1.5 million Iraqis are internally displaced and at

least 500,000 refugees from Syria, Turkey, Iran, and other areas are in the country.

Historically, the central governments in Damascus and Baghdad have had less influence in the

Syria- Iraq region. Although mostly authoritarian, central government leaders have often found it

necessary to adopt policies that accommodated, to some degree, vari ous power centers within

the country’s diverse population and minimized the potential for communal identities to create

conflict. Yet, both central governments also have a history of violently suppressing re sis tance

movements. Assad’s father brutally cracked down on an armed uprising led by the Sunni Islamist

Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, killing tens of thousands of Sunni Muslims and others. The

Syrian regime also tolerated Sunni tribal networks in the early 2000s in eastern Syria that sup-

ported ISIS’s pre de ces sor, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Ethnic- sectarian cleavages and competition have

dominated Iraq’s post- Saddam governments and politics. These unresolved differences cascaded

following Iraq’s “de- Baathification” purge of Sunnis, culminating in mid-2012, and have since

returned Iraq to major instability, exacerbated by ethno- sectarian divisions, and fed the conditions

to allow the growth of AQI and then ISIS.3 Strug gles over power distribution will likely intensify

when the current conflict subsides, given the hardening of sectarian identities over the course of

the Syrian civil war and Iraq’s upheaval.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Instability in the region is directly connected to the contracting of state- based economies and

fragile governance in Syria and Iraq. The World Bank estimates that Syria’s GDP contracted an

average of 15.7 percent per year over the 2011–2014 period and was projected to contract by

another 12 percent in 2015.4 Declining oil prices and severe drought contributed to these sharp

decreases, worsened by significant inflation, trade disruption, and deterioration of public finances.

In light of these economic prob lems, as well as Syria’s continuing civil war, Iraq’s instability, and

ISIS’s advances, in 2015 the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index ranked Syria as a high alert

2. Ibid., 3.

3. Despite some improvements to governance following Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki’s departure, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs,

particularly in this case study’s focus region, resent the Shiite- dominated central government under Prime Minister

Hadir al- Abadi, which facilitated the rise of the Islamic State and the capture of nearly one- third of Iraqi territory in

2014. Sunnis remain divided between those who accept the Islamic State’s rule and those who want to help the

government defeat it. Baghdad’s reliance on Shi‘a militias to fight alongside Iraqi security forces fuels distrust in the

Sunni community. Tensions between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad persist, undermining

central government authority, although they share the common enemy of the Islamic State.

4. World Bank, “Syria Overview,” October 1, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview.

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http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World14

country, becoming one of the top ten most fragile countries for the first time in the history of the

index.5 Iraq ranked number 11 in the 2015 Fragile States Index, among the most worsened coun-

tries from 2014–2015.6

Authority

The Syrian government largely controls major cities in the west, including Damascus, Homs,

Aleppo, and Latakia; the Iraqi government largely has authority in Iraq’s center and south;7 ISIS is

dominant in Syria’s east and Iraq’s west; a marbled blend of groups contest and possess territo-

rial control in northern Syria; and relatively more defined lines of control among the Syrian

regime, U.S.- backed rebels, and extremist groups exist in Syria’s south. Much authority, both

state and nonstate, in this region is geopo liti cally and ethnically fractured as well as highly

coercive, dependent on fear, intimidation, and manipulation of a terrified and terrorized popula-

tion. This coercive dynamic occurs between the Syrian government and much of the Sunni

population. The Assad government has also deliberately withheld food, medical supplies, and

baby formula deliveries to besieged areas, such as Daraya, as part of a deliberate strategy to

weaken the opposition strongholds. Minorities in Syria, including Alawites and Christians, cling to

the regime because they fear reprisals from the Sunnis if the government falters. Iraqi and Syrian

Sunnis value leadership and authority of their tribal and local leaders. Iraqi Sunni unity among

the tribes was pivotal to the 2008 Anbar Awakening that coalesced to fight an earlier manifesta-

tion of ISIS.

ISIS exerts tight control over the population in areas where it is the dominant authority. Some

disaffected Sunnis support groups gravitate toward ISIS and al Qaeda because they believe they

are the most effective way to counter Assad or because they dismiss the Iraqi central govern-

ment as illegitimate. Still other Sunnis in the region support ISIS because it protects them from

violent Shi‘a militias. ISIS is a least- bad option. ISIS’s millenarian vision of establishing a Sunni

caliphate gives it a coercive authority, employing religious narrative and vio lence to lure recruits

from outside Syria and Iraq and to threaten and suppress the population in its territory. ISIS lacks

international legitimacy for a host of reasons, but germane to the case of humanitarian objec-

tives, ISIS does not acknowledge or abide by humanitarian laws, which fundamentally alters

normal response mechanisms for international humanitarian providers. Despite some prior

cooperation, it has broken access agreements with aid workers repeatedly and has targeted

them for kidnapping.

In the perimeter region, Iraqi national authority and control, supported by the United States and

Iran, is strongest in central provinces and in the south, although it is increasingly contested by

popu lar Shi‘a discontent. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) retains control of territory and

authority over Kurds in the autonomous northern region of Iraq. The Iraqi government has cred-

ibility with the international community, though many regional Sunni Arab leaders still remain

5. J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index 2015 (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2015), http://library.fundforpeace

.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf.

6. Ibid.

7. However, the Iraqi government’s authority is increasingly contested by Shi‘a populist sentiments that suspect the

government of corruption.

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http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 15

suspicious of a strategic alignment of the Shi‘a- led government with Iran. The Syrian government

lacks international and regional credibility with Arab countries for its brutality against its own

people.

Fragmented state control and authority in Syria and Iraq undermines the ability of both countries

and their neighbors to stem the waves of cross- border and transnational prob lems pouring out of

the conflict area. The millions of refugees, thousands of foreign fighters and weapons, and spill-

over of vio lence in the broader region and across the Mediterranean have overwhelmed border

authorities and controls, prompting a range of responses from Middle Eastern and Eu ro pean

countries struggling to absorb the humanitarian tidal wave.

Capacity

Traditionally the Syria and Iraq region enjoyed reasonably well developed capacities to meet the

basic needs of citizens, but these have declined precipitously since the war began in 2011. Enroll-

ment at Syrian government- sponsored schools has dropped due to the civil war. As of 2016, as

many as half of Syria’s children are not in school.8 Health care capacity across Syria has suffered

considerably. Forty percent of ambulances have been destroyed, 57 percent of hospitals have

been “severely damaged,” and 37 percent of hospitals remain out of ser vice.9 Syria is also experi-

encing a severe doctor shortage: 80,000 have emigrated and at least 600 have been executed or

tortured to death.10 Child vaccination rates have dropped from 90 percent to 50 percent since

2011.11 Cholera is on the rise as people are forced to drink untreated water. These statistics are

even worse in areas outside of Syrian government control.

With its ambitions of solidifying a caliphate- based state, ISIS places priority on the provision of

public goods and ser vices. At the height of its territorial control in 2015, it allowed local bureau-

crats to keep their jobs and devotes resources for new roads, small business programs, wheat

mills, oil and gas, factories, fuel subsidies, food provision, and improved electrical provision.12 It

effectively mobilized a police force (“Assas” or “Night Watchmen”) to monitor individuals in public

places to “protect” consumers and enforce morality standards— including appropriate dress and

8. Hanna Kozolwska, “Half of Syria’s Children Are Not in School, Creating Dire Consequences for the Future,”

Quartz, March 30, 2015, http://qz.com/372659/half-of-syrias-children-are-not-in-school-creating-dire-conse

quences-for-the-future/.

9. Sima L. Sharara and Souha S. Kanj, “War and Infectious Diseases: Challenges of the Syrian Civil War,” PLOS Patho-

gens 10, no. 11 (November 2014): E1004438, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4231133/.

10. Tom Templeton, “Four Years On: Syria’s Shameful Health Care Quagmire,” Thomson Reuters, March 16, 2015,

http://news.trust.org/item/20150316122104-dnso9.

11. Ibid.

12. Yochi Dreazen, “From Electricity to Sewage, U.S. Intelligence Says the Islamic State Is Fast Learning How to Run a

Country,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/19/from-electricity-to-sewage-u-s-intelli

gence-says-the-islamic-state-is-fast-learning-how-to-run-a-country/?page=full; Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic

State (Doha: Brookings Doha Center, November 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12

/en_web_lister.pdf; Maggie Fick, “Special Report: Islamic State Uses Grain to Tighten Grip in Iraq,” Reuters, http://www

.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-mideast-crisis-wheat-special-report-idUSKCN0HP12J20141001.

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http://qz.com/372659/half-of-syrias-children-are-not-in-school-creating-dire-consequences-for-the-future/

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4231133/

http://news.trust.org/item/20150316122104-dnso9

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/19/from-electricity-to-sewage-u-s-intelligence-says-the-islamic-state-is-fast-learning-how-to-run-a-country/?page=full

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/en_web_lister.pdf

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-mideast-crisis-wheat-special-report-idUSKCN0HP12J20141001

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World16

praying— keeping price controls on food and medical supplies low.13 Although a severe shortage in

health care persists throughout Syria, ISIS gave grants to medical personnel to purchase medicine

for communicable diseases and has actively recruited and paid foreign doctors to come to Syria to

increase the quality of ser vice. It controlled at least one free hospital in Mosul, Iraq.14 In terms of

infrastructure, ISIS provides bus ser vices between controlled territories, repairs electricity and

roads, and employed a postal ser vice. It ran schools for boys and for girls, provides water to vil-

lages, subsidized bread prices, managed sewage, and levied fishing regulations. It also capped rent

in Mosul to encourage recruits to settle there.15 On the other hand, antigovernment groups in Syria

such as al Qaeda and rebel groups supported by the United States have not been effective in

providing goods or ser vices.16 International attempts to buttress aid to opposition groups often fail

because of the regime’s intentional targeting of schools, hospitals, and other public ser vices that it

deems complicit with antigovernment forces.17

In the perimeter region, the Syrian government places a strong emphasis on delivering goods and

ser vices in areas it controls, but only to those that it perceives as loyal to the government. It delib-

erately withholds assistance from some areas. It views providing state ser vices as critical to its

legitimacy and uses the provision of goods and ser vices to delegitimize, starve out, and punish the

opposition. These ser vices include providing bread, subsidized fuel, health care, and education,

although subsidies for bread and fuel have recently been cut due to economic constraints.18

Iraqi state capacity is relatively better than in Syria but is still under strain. As of 2016, in the educa-

tion sector, 2 million children were out of school and 1.2 million were at risk of losing school

access. Often, Iraqi students had to rotate in two to three shifts per day.19 In the health care sector,

3 million Iraqis lacked access to basic health care, and a cholera outbreak in Najaf, Diwaniya, and

West Baghdad was highly concerning.20 Corruption undermines Iraqi government reforms and

upgrades to its infrastructure. In par tic u lar, electricity is intermittent and bureaucracies inhibit

13. Kheder Khaddour, “Shielded by the State: Assad’s Mono poly over Syria’s Public Institutions,” Car ne gie

Endowment for International Peace, August 17, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61027;

Kheder Khaddour, “The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian State,” Car ne gie Middle East Center, July 8, 2015,

http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/07/08/assad-regime-s-hold-on-syrian-state/id3k.

14. Dreazen, “From Electricity to Sewage”; Lister, Profiling the Islamic State.

15. Lister, Profiling the Islamic State.

16. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Constructing a New Syria: Dealing with the Real Outcome of the ISIS War,” Center for

Strategic and International Studies, September 4, 2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/constructing-new-syria-dealing

-real-outcome-isis-war.

17. Khaddour, “The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian State.”

18. Ibid.

19. UNICEF, “Vio lence Denies Millions of Children across Iraq Access to Education,” news release, October 30, 2015,

http://www.unicef.org/media/media_85997.html; UN News Centre, “Millions of Children Deprived of Education in

War- Torn Iraq, Says UNICEF,” October 30, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52424#.VjusuberSEY.

20. UN Radio, “Three Million in Iraq without Access to Health Care Ser vices,” August 4, 2015, http://www.unmulti

media.org/radio/english/2015/08/three-million-in-iraq-without-access-to-health-care-services/#.Vj0aN7erSEY; World

Health Organ ization (WHO), “Ministry of Health, WHO and Partners Step Up Response to Cholera Outbreak in Iraq,”

news release, September 20, 2015, http://www.emro.who.int/irq/iraq-news/response-to-cholera-outbreak-stepped

-up.html.

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http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61027

http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/07/08/assad-regime-s-hold-on-syrian-state/id3k

https://www.csis.org/analysis/constructing-new-syria-dealing-real-outcome-isis-war

http://www.unicef.org/media/media_85997.html

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52424#.VjusuberSEY

http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2015/08/three-million-in-iraq-without-access-to-health-care-services/#.Vj0aN7erSEY

http://www.emro.who.int/irq/iraq-news/response-to-cholera-outbreak-stepped-up.html

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 17

development or improvement of the grid.21 Moreover, the Iraqi government’s attempts to combat

ISIS have sapped government focus and funding from a range of domestic capacity issues, breed-

ing resentment among the population.22 Security capacity is crippled by Iraq’s difficulty in paying

its police, leading to disaffection and attrition. In Ramadi, the local government did not pay the

police in the months preceding the Islamic State’s invasion.23 In addition corruption is pervasive.

Iraqi prime minister Haider al- Abadi has estimated 50,000 salaries were being paid to soldiers who

did not exist.24 In contrast, the relative stability of the Iraqi Kurdistan region has enabled it to

achieve a higher level of development than other regions of Iraq, fueled until recently by oil rev-

enues, exports, and agricultural production. It has the lowest poverty rates in the country.

Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey are increasingly under strain to provide ser vices and are becoming

less willing to provide employment opportunities to Syrian refugees. Both Lebanon and Jordan

have a long history of absorbing refugees, particularly the Palestinians, often with adverse security

and economic effects. In Lebanon, public institutions provide basic needs but are severely

stressed. Jordanian border authorities at times have blocked some refugees from entering the

kingdom and forcibly deported others due to security concerns and the strains the refugee popu-

lation has placed on the country’s northern provinces. In Jordan, Syrian refugees have used

vouchers provided by the World Food Programme to purchase goods; they have also leveraged

informal networks to obtain food and supplies.25 Rents have nearly tripled in border towns such as

Mafraq and Ramtha, making housing unaffordable for many Jordanians. Turkey faces per sis tent

challenges in creating policies that can si mul ta neously provide a humanitarian access for refugees

and delivery of assistance while clamping down on foreign fighter flows and smuggling, as many

foreign fighter pipelines and logistical support to extremist groups connect through Turkey.26

Failing international support, these countries’ capacities to respond to and withstand the humani-

tarian crisis will be severely tested. Lack of capacity and security conditions in the perimeter coun-

tries have compelled refugees to flow into Eu rope.

Security

Armed groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, contest state control of the mono poly on the use of

force in the Syria- Iraq region. Moreover, government and nongovernment entities use vio lence as

a tool of repression and intimidation. Assad conducts air and artillery strikes and launches barrel

21. Ghaith Abdul- Ahad, “ ‘More Dangerous than Isis’: Power Cuts Leave Iraqis Boiling with Rage,” Guardian, October 5,

2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/05/iraq-power-cuts-isis-corruption-electricity.

22. Vivian Salama, “Thousands of Iraqis Protest against Government Corruption,” Associated Press, August 7, 2015,

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6fc618054f6443648d57f4c822c77c40/thousands-iraqis-protest-against-government

-corruption.

23. Hugh Naylor, “Fall of Ramadi Reflects Failure of Iraq’s Strategy against ISIS, Analysts Say,” Washington Post, May 19,

2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fall-of-ramadi-reflects-failure-of-iraqs-strategy-against

-islamic-state-analysts-say/2015/05/19/1dc45a5a-fda3-11e4-8c77-bf274685e1df_print.html.

24. Ibid.

25. Katy Montoya, “Syrian Refugees Collectivizing in Jordan Becomes a Security Issue,” Jadaliyya, February 20, 2015,

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20911/syrian-refugees-collectivizing-in-jordan-becomes-a.

26. Jim Zanotti, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Ser vice, October 5, 2015, https://

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf.

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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/05/iraq-power-cuts-isis-corruption-electricity

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6fc618054f6443648d57f4c822c77c40/thousands-iraqis-protest-against-government-corruption

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fall-of-ramadi-reflects-failure-of-iraqs-strategy-against-islamic-state-analysts-say/2015/05/19/1dc45a5a-fda3-11e4-8c77-bf274685e1df_print.html

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20911/syrian-refugees-collectivizing-in-jordan-becomes-a

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World18

bombs on civilian targets, including health care facilities and markets, to punish and intimidate the

population. This serves as a main driver of the humanitarian crisis, causing civilians to flee their

homes, return, and flee again in between bombing runs. ISIS conducts daily, public exhibitions of

vio lence and punishment against those who deviate from its strict norms as a deterrent to others

and to proj ect power. The level of vio lence in Syria and Iraq makes it exceedingly difficult for

humanitarian aid providers to deliver assistance to affected populations.

In this region, over 7.6 million people are internally displaced— often multiple times. Over 4.1 mil-

lion refugees have left Syria for neighboring countries.27 In Iraq, as of 2016 about 3.6 million

people are internally displaced and over 350,000 refugees have fled the vio lence there.28 It is

telling that the Uppsala Conflict Data Program has ceased attempting to code total deaths occur-

ring in Syria since 2015 due to underreporting, widespread and massive vio lence, and prob lems

distinguishing between state and nonstate- based vio lence.29 Likewise, in 2014, the United Nations

deci ded to stop logging deaths in Syria given difficulties in verifying them—at that time, 250,000

had perished.30 The Syrian Center for Policy Research estimates that 470,000 Syrians have died as

a result of the war, and Syrian life expectancy has dropped from age 70 to 56.31

Widespread vio lence rages with vari ous actors having diff er ent motives and targets, involving at

least 15 states and hundreds of nonstate actors. In the conflict between Assad and antigovernment

groups, Assad calculates that Arab rebels backed by U.S. and co ali tion partners pose a greater

threat than ISIS, so the regime is intentionally targeting those former groups. It is also killing and

imprisoning civilians perceived to be harboring rebels, for the purposes of intimidation. The Syrian

regime believes that if it eliminates these rebels, it will force U.S. and co ali tion partners to accept a

continuation of Assad’s rule in order to combat ISIS. Antigovernment forces in Syria also fight each

other to contest and control territory, resources, and influence over the population. ISIS uses

excessive vio lence to enforce security in its territory but also to fight against government and

nongovernment forces. Assad controls his military, but with substantial support from Rus sia, Iran,

as well as Lebanese Hez bollah. Rus sia and Iran have a say in Assad’s strategic calculations in the

use of force. ISIS leadership controls its local forces but is inspiring regional and global affiliates

who operate in de pen dently, some with logistical support from ISIS, particularly in Libya, Egypt’s

Sinai, and Af ghan i stan.

Meanwhile, Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces are actively working to improve

security. Kurdish forces in par tic u lar have proved to be able partners for the United States in com-

bating ISIS. However, low readiness and poor training hamper central government forces. They

27. Blanchard, Humud, Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response.”

28. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “2015 Country Profile, Iraq,” http:// reporting . unhcr . org / node

/ 2547# _ ga=1 . 171787177 . 848925459 . 1492627573 .

29. Uppsala Conflict Database Program, “Complexities of Coding Syria,” http:// ucdp . uu . se / #country / 652.

30. Laura Stampler, “UN to Stop Updating Syria Death Toll,” Time, January 7, 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/07

/un-to-stop-updating-syria-death-toll/.

31. Anne Bernard, “Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000, Group Finds,” New York Times, February 11, 2016,

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds

.html?ref=world&_r=3&referer.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 18 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2547#_ga=1.171787177.848925459.1492627573

http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/652

http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/un-to-stop-updating-syria-death-toll/

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?ref=world&_r=3&referer

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 19

have come to rely on Shi‘a militias in partnered operations, while also receiving U.S. support.

Partnership with the Shi‘a militias breeds resentment among Sunni populations and serves as a

recruiting tool for ISIS. The Iraqi government controls its military but is reinforced by Iranian-

backed Shi‘a militias. Iraqi military members primarily have allegiance to local leaders at the tribal

and provincial level and disaffection rises with rampant corruption in the ranks or with central

government efforts to reduce corruption that results in a loss of pay. Years of poor training and

corruption in the ranks resulted in the Iraqi security forces disintegrating in the face of an advanc-

ing ISIS in the summer of 2014. Diffuse control over the use of force in the region complicates

humanitarian aid providers’ efforts to negotiate and secure safe passage for the delivery of

assistance.

The region is flush with weapons. ISIS gained an arsenal of U.S. weapons and equipment when it

overtook Mosul in 2014. Munitions are harder to come by. ISIS set up an elaborate system to

resupply munitions based on local networks.32 The international community– led effort to trans-

port declared chemical weapons out of Syria in 2014 resulted in the removal of significant quanti-

ties of Assad’s chemical stockpile; however, since then, both the Syrian government and ISIS have

reportedly conducted chemical attacks on civilians.33

STATE OF PLAY

The grinding Syrian civil war has grown increasingly intense and sectarian. It pits Syrian govern-

ment forces and their foreign allies, including Rus sia and Iran, against a range of antigovernment

insurgents, including ISIS and al Qaeda, as well as a constellation of Kurdish and Arab rebels sup-

ported by the United States, other Arab countries, and Turkey. Rus sia’s intervention enabled the

Syrian government to reinforce and retake some territory. Turkey’s intervention in 2016 presented

entangling effects for U.S. and partnered security efforts. Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga,

and Shi‘a militias, backed by co ali tion advisers and air strikes, have retaken parts of al- Anbar prov-

ince, but substantial governance challenges remain in the recovered areas, such as Ramadi and

Mosul.

Syrian nongovernmental organ izations (NGOs) and other frontline humanitarian actors such as the

Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continue to shoulder the lion’s share of relief efforts. Close to 30

international NGOs are mobilized to respond to the humanitarian crisis.34 The United States re-

mains the world’s largest bilateral donor of humanitarian aid, contributing almost $6 billion since

32. Erika Soloman and Ahmed Mhidi, “ISIS: The Munitions Trail,” Financial Times, November 30, 2015, http://www

.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/baad34e4-973c-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc.html#axzz3tJydEhak.

33. Anthony Deutsch, “Assad Linked to Syrian Chemical Attacks for First Time,” Reuters, January 13, 2017, http://www

.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-chemical-weapons-idUSKBN14X1XY.

34. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Crisis in Syria,” March 24, 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/crisis

/syria; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “2015 Strategic Response Plan: Syrian Arab

Republic,” December 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2015_SRP_Syria

_EN_AdvanceCopy_171214.pdf.

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http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/baad34e4-973c-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc.html#axzz3tJydEhak

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-chemical-weapons-idUSKBN14X1XY

https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2015_SRP_Syria_EN_AdvanceCopy_171214.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World20

the start of the crisis, as of January 2017.35 It deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team

(DART) to Iraq in 2014 to manage and coordinate the flow of aid; given that the United States lacks

a national government partner in Syria, it is not pos si ble to insert a DART on the Syrian side of the

border. It also deployed a Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) in Jordan and a Syria Transi-

tion Response Team (START) in Gaziantep, Turkey. International donors for the humanitarian

response in Syria and bordering countries include the Eu ro pean Union, the United Arab Emirates,

Saudi Arabia, the Ira nian Red Crescent Society.36

Despite the international attention on the crisis, much more needs to be done. The UN estimated

$3.4 billion was needed to address its humanitarian objectives in 2017.37 In addition, despite inter-

national donors’ good intentions to target assistance to areas in need, funds have occasionally

ended up in the wrong hands. A succession of international attempts to stop hostilities has been

exploited by Assad, backed by Rus sia and Iran, in order to reinforce the regime’s positions, and

enabled Assad to retake Syria’s second- largest city, Aleppo, in 2016. Assad also has sought to

forcibly displace population areas, moving communities to other parts of the country, in order to

consolidate and solidify territorial control and delink populations and opposition groups. ISIS and

al Qaeda have not been party to these cease- fire agreements and have continued attacks.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

An array of limitations hinders the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Syria- Iraq region.

Below are listed some of the most impor tant factors.

Weaponization of Assistance

The Assad government and ISIS use aid as a coercive tool, where ser vices are accessible in

government- and ISIS-controlled areas but only to submissive populations. Additionally, aid

providers are under tremendous pressure to politicize assistance in Syria and Iraq. Controlling

aid is a tool in the war effort, making it increasingly difficult to provide assistance to civilians

objectively and without the appearance of favoritism. Fi nally, there is considerable tension

between urgent humanitarian requirements and the need for a negotiated settlement to the

overall conflict. As long as humanitarian assistance remains heavi ly dependent on cooperation

from the Assad regime, it may be used as a tool to negotiate outcomes more or less favorable to

the warring parties.

35. Carla Humud, Christopher Blanchard, and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Re-

sponse,” Congressional Research Ser vice, January 6, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf.

36. Patryk Pawlak, “Iran in Syria: Deal- Maker or Deal- Breaker,” Eu ro pean Parliamentary Research Ser vice, Janu-

ary 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/573920/EPRS_ATA(2016)573920_EN.pdf.

37. UNHCR, “United Nations Partners Strengthen Commitment to Syrians and Neighbors Affected by Syria Crisis,”

news release, January 24, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2017/1/588722a84/united-nations-partners

-strengthen-commitment-syrians-neighbours-affected.html.

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https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/573920/EPRS_ATA(2016)573920_EN.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2017/1/588722a84/united-nations-partners-strengthen-commitment-syrians-neighbours-affected.html

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 21

Health- Sector Vio lence

Extremely high levels of vio lence and routine Syrian- Russian bombing of civilian targets, including

hospitals, create an incredibly impermissive environment, although the previous cessation of

hostilities agreements have created temporary respite. Humanitarian needs are often greatest

where national government authority is weakest in the Syria- Iraq region. High levels of vio lence

often render besieged areas inaccessible, and humanitarian providers can only make brief visits,

often at night. Under these conditions, it is difficult to provide medical assistance in such short

win dows. Because of the complexity and dangers of operating in Syria and Iraq, aid providers are

unable to conduct sustained humanitarian operations that are needed to alleviate mass suffering. If

local providers, who are often the most effective delivery mechanism for reaching threatened or

besieged populations, are perceived as serving as proxies for larger stakeholders in the conflict,

they and the populations they serve risk further intentional targeting.

Spoiler Effects

Spoiler effects also undermine humanitarian aid deliveries. ISIS and al Qaeda do not abide by

humanitarian requests or international rules and will act as spoilers to all humanitarian options.

Both groups have reneged on agreements with aid workers, reportedly have taxed aid deliveries

and looted them to redistribute them, and when they do permit deliveries, seek to claim credit to

bolster their legitimacy. U.S. terrorism legislation constrains the ability of aid providers to deliver

assistance in areas where ISIS and other terrorist groups operate. These groups do not have the

best interests of local civilians driving their agenda and cannot be relied on even in urgent human-

itarian circumstances.

Complex Partner Dynamics

U.S. dynamics with partners complicate matters. Increasing reliance on the Kurds, even for hu-

manitarian purposes, has prompted a backlash from Turkey, which already perceives Western

cooperation with Kurdish militias as reinforcing Kurdish claims for in de pen dence. The United

States and its regional partners have differing goals and objectives, resulting in an uneven distribu-

tion of both humanitarian and security assistance to actors in the Syria- Iraq region and tensions

between the United States and its partners. For example, Turkey resists the United States’ reliance

on Kurdish groups in Syria because of those groups’ close linkages to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK) and Turkey’s fear of Kurdish territorial ambitions.

Legal Constraints

U.S. and international laws and sanctions prohibit U.S. assistance to designated terrorist entities,

sharply restricting U.S. humanitarian assistance to populations in ISIS- and al Qaeda– controlled

areas.

Lack of Effective Coordination

Difficulties in coordinating and deconflicting security and humanitarian assistance at the local level

undermine U.S. and international efforts. Operators and implementers often encounter prob lems

ensuring that they are collectively empowering groups and actors that can work together and not

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World22

at cross- purposes, avoiding duplication, and addressing gaps in security and humanitarian assis-

tance coverage.

Deconfliction of Humanitarian and Counterterrorism Operations

Humanitarian assistance often competes with other counterterrorism priorities in the same re-

gions. U.S.- led co ali tion air strikes and ground advisers and trainers in the area seek to minimize

civilian deaths and also increase the intensity of vio lence in the region and further hinder humani-

tarian aid. Conversely, attempts to prioritize humanitarian aid deliveries may alleviate civilian suffer-

ing in the short term, while empowering local agents linked to U.S. adversaries. Imposing limits on

military activities may constrain U.S. and co ali tion counterterrorism options vis- à- vis ISIS and al

Qaeda and create space for those groups to regain territory.

Weighing Risks of Military Options

Many humanitarian proposals, most notably the establishment of a humanitarian safe zone, have

significant downsides. Aid providers could deliver assistance from the Turkish or Jordanian borders

into the safe zone and incur fewer risks to their own safety. However, enforcement of the safe

zone would require constant monitoring and armed protection by air and on the ground. Even if

the Syrian government agreed to not bomb the area, it would still be vulnerable to attacks by ISIS

and al Qaeda. Moreover, the Syrian regime would likely suspect the United States and its Gulf

partners of providing military assistance to rebels in the safe area— and the United States and its

partners would be tempted to do so. This would likely provoke Syrian government monitoring and

pos si ble encroachment or even attacks against rebel suspects in the area, thereby compromising

the relative safety of the area for civilians.

Spillover Effects

Increasing aid and refugee support to perimeter regions may prompt greater inflows of refugees

from Syria and Iraq, further stretch neighbors’ economies, and potentially mask increased militant

and arms proliferation into the broader region. In addition, the neighboring countries would likely

fear the long- term implications of Syrian refugees receiving more assistance inside their borders as

leading to international ac cep tance of the refugees never returning home—as was experienced

with the Palestinians.

OPPORTUNITIES AND ASSETS

Despite significant challenges, the United States can build out humanitarian efforts, and accom-

plish its objectives, by identifying key access points, changing the rules of engagement, and

strengthening coordination mechanisms.

Accessible Perimeter Areas

Accessible Kurdish areas in Syria and Iraq can serve as a foothold for delivering aid to besieged

populations, although tensions with Turkey and Arab- Kurdish dynamics should be carefully

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 23

navigated. The perimeter region, where national government authority tends to be stronger, can

serve as entry points for reaching less accessible areas. Access from bordering countries (i.e.,

Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey) also remains critical, although challenged by those countries’ ca-

pacity and security constraints and, in the case of Turkey, conflicting objectives beyond the hu-

manitarian dimension.

Cease- Fire- Based Win dows of Opportunity

Cease- fire conditions, even if temporary, create opportunities for the infusion of assistance if

resources and partners are readily available.

Strong International Opprobrium

International outrage toward the targeting of and vio lence against humanitarian and health facili-

ties and personnel may provide leverage over actors to negotiate and adapt new rules of engage-

ment that re spect humanitarian laws and norms and facilitate emergency assistance, even if only

on a limited basis.

Robust Civil Society and Local Health Providers

Despite extensive displacement, the Syria- Iraq border region retains significant populations of

well- educated and skilled professional classes committed to supporting their communities

through health care, local governance, and other civil society activities. Also, Syrian and Iraqi civil

society actors in border areas with Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan provide critical aid to civilian

populations (e.g., Syrian doctors from Aleppo basing their operations out of Gaziantep and provid-

ing ser vices into the Aleppo region), although at high risk.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Re- baseline assistance

Reassess requirements for humanitarian assistance. The rapidly changing nature of the

conflict requires the United States to constantly assess the conditions on the ground. Such

assessments will provide an in- depth account of the needs of besieged and threatened

communities, the locations of vulnerable populations, authority dynamics, and the agencies

that can assist with delivery of humanitarian aid.

Reevaluate capacities of local security forces and aid providers. A baseline understanding of

the gaps and needs among local Syrian security forces and aid providers will facilitate their

interactions with and aid delivery to local communities, and build community resilience

beyond immediate humanitarian assistance.

2. Reinforce norms

Reform the rules of engagement for warring parties and refrain from bombing civilian

targets, particularly hospitals and clinics, to further improve humanitarian conditions. The

United States would have to create leverage through negotiations and economic coercion

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World24

with Assad, Rus sia, and Iran to convince the parties to adopt new rules of engagement.

Allowing norms and rules of modern warfare to backslide in this current conflict opens the

door for further atrocities against vulnerable populations in future conflicts. Enforcing

these rules will require international pressure with real and transparent consequences for

transgressions.

Press to sustain cessation of hostilities while enforcing limits on the use of force in areas

that can be targeted by air strikes, such as hospitals and other clear, civilian targets, and

work with Rus sia to pressure Assad to abide by them. Rus sia, Iran, and Assad have every

incentive to continue to bomb civilian targets with impunity without significant international

pressure to prevent them from doing so. Local aid providers may risk their lives to deliver

assistance in pres ent conditions; ceasing strikes will improve the ability of local aid providers

to access civilians under siege.

3. Enhance and localize U.S. coordination efforts

Deploy a DART- like synchronization team to fuse security, governance, and humanitarian

efforts across the Syria- Iraq region, not only individual countries, to better coordinate

actions and resource flow. The Iraq- based DART, Turkey- based START, and Jordan- based

SSAP initiatives are addressing diff er ent aspects of the prob lem set through diff er ent lenses

and do coordinate regularly, but a holistic approach is needed to better synchronize overt

and covert interagency activities to achieve maximum effect. Such teams are usually collo-

cated with embassies; a trans- border challenge such as in the Syria- Iraq region requires a

coordinating body on the ground that can cross seams, examine the prob lem set holisti-

cally, and have the authority to coordinate and deconflict trans- border and local assistance

efforts.

4. Engage subnational authorities

Explore enhanced authority mechanisms to partner with nonstate actors and engage at the

substate level. Given the lack of a national partner in Syria and the dynamics of the humani-

tarian challenges in the broader region, solutions to the prob lem may be mobilized at a

multinational and national level by the United States and international allies but will be best

implemented at the subnational level. The United States has incomplete authority mecha-

nisms to deal directly with subnational entities to deliver assistance; it should examine

possibilities for creating new authorities and/or adapting current ones to operate more

effectively in complex environments with dominant subnational dynamics.

Enhance and amplify U.S. and international support to local NGOs and improve local deliv-

ery mechanisms including funding, administrative ser vices, communications, and equip-

ment. The United States and its partners should encourage greater inclusivity of a broader

group of local councils and private actors in this pro cess, and disperse smaller amounts of

funding to a larger number of councils and actors to amplify humanitarian effects while

building resilience.

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INTRODUCTION

Unstable and fragile regions or territories serve as safe havens for violent extremism and compli-

cate effective counterterrorism efforts. While traditional policy tools for countering terrorism and

extremism revolve around partnering with governments and state security forces, U.S. policy

options are more limited in weak and unstable states where governments lack legitimacy and

security actors do not have formal ties to the state. Moreover, many con temporary operating

environments pres ent a proliferation of overlapping extremist groups and local opportunists, only

some of which pose direct threats to U.S. and allied security interests. Policymakers must distin-

guish among and between terrorist groups and radicalized communities, assessing which of them

pose direct threats to U.S. interests and international peace and security, and prioritize resources

accordingly. The lack of nation- level authority with sufficient security capacity has opened safe

havens where transnational terrorist groups like ISIS can grow and plan attacks against Eu rope and

the United States.

Over the last six years, Libya’s po liti cal instability and the outbreak of civil war provided conditions

for a number of international and domestic extremist groups to operate with relative impunity

while attempting to radicalize locals and grow deeper roots in Libyan society. In late 2014, how-

ever, ISIS began to seize territory rapidly, amass resources, and unite fighters from Libya’s fractured

extremist landscape. The group’s growing strength prompted the United States to expand its

counter- ISIS campaign to Libya in August 2016, using air strikes to support local Libyan forces

fighting the group (with the goal of defeating ISIS in Libya), denying the group the ability to hold

territory and secure a regional base of operations, and degrading its ability to plan and conduct

terrorist attacks abroad.

Meanwhile, the consequences of the conflict deprive Libyans and outsiders of many of the po liti-

cal, legal, and institutional tools necessary to counter terrorism effectively. Libya’s national institu-

tions have been hollowed out by years of competition between multiple governments vying for

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Anthony Bell and Alice Hunt Friend

0 3

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World26

power, leaving only minimally legitimate po liti cal leaders with almost no real capacity to impose

their will or act as meaningful conduits for outside assistance. The lack of entry points for outside

assistance has been most obvious in the security sector, where a patchwork of armed groups with

shifting loyalties operate autonomously from governing bodies and therefore outside recognized

legal par ameters. Meanwhile, attempts at national- level capacity building rely on Libya maintaining

an extremely fragile economic equilibrium: government at all levels and the economy rely on

funds controlled and distributed by the central bank, which in turn depends wholly on the oil

sector for its liquidity.

This case highlights tools and policies to deny extremist groups a secure base of operation and to

reduce their ability to or ga nize and conduct terrorist attacks from a region where the fragmented

nature of power limits U.S. abilities to partner with a national authority.

SECURITY IMPERATIVE

The expansion of ISIS into Libya extends the group’s global reach; provides another venue for

recruitment, training, and operational experience; and increases the terrorist threat to the United

States and its partners and allies in Eu rope and North Africa. Denying terrorist groups safe havens

and secure bases of operations inhibits their ability to consolidate power and complicates their

ability to plan and conduct large- scale complex attacks. It also reduces their ideological appeal.

There are immediate requirements for dislodging terrorist groups:

• Establish the intelligence collection infrastructure, analytic capabilities, decision pro cesses,

and rapid response forces to detect and immediately disrupt potential terrorist plots that are

emanating from terrorist- controlled territory and from smaller terrorist nodes that operate

with relative impunity in ungoverned spaces.

• Retask, as appropriate, existing intelligence community resources toward an emerging

threat. Craft necessary agreements with allies and partners for information sharing and

fusion cells on specific threats and groups.

• Enable state and local actors to conduct military and law enforcement operations against

terrorist strongholds with direct and indirect support. This entails assessments of potential

partners, particularly nonstate actors, and their po liti cal motivations, allegiances, and capa-

bilities.

• Place pressure and impose costs on terrorist nodes and support networks to reduce their

access to financial, human (fighters), and military resources.

• Identify potential on- the- ground partners.

• Support and develop a long- term national government that possesses the legitimacy, au-

thority, and capability to exert control over territory.

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 27

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Geography and Demography

Although many of the challenges of Islamist extremism affect broad areas of Libya, the geographic

focus for this case study are the areas contested or occupied by ISIS, which largely have been

located along the Libyan coastline. Libya’s border areas with Tunisia and Egypt and its sparsely

populated interior are impor tant in connecting the country to other regional terrorist groups, but

areas where ISIS has controlled territory and populations provide the group with resources and

some po liti cal power, and thus command policy focus. These areas are characterized by urban

environments where the group has been able to either take advantage of security vacuums, sup-

plant rival extremist groups, or build loose alliances with local actors. After being pushed out of its

former stronghold of Sirte in central Libya, ISIS retains some fighters and support networks in rural

central and southern regions. ISIS is believed to have a presence in the east around Benghazi and

Derna, and some networks across the western coastal cities including Sabratha, Tripoli, Misrata,

and Zliten.

History

The security imperative the United States faces today in Libya is rooted in the po liti cal and violent

competitions over power since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, which have fostered the conditions

for extremism to thrive. The rebels who overthrew the Qaddafi regime in 2011 were a disjointed

collection of opposition groups and militias, rather than a coherent organ ization with unified

po liti cal leadership and military forces. This deep fragmentation was due in part to the lack of

or ga nized internal opposition groups before the rebellion, the rapid and widespread mobilization

of militias once the war started, and the multiple competing channels of external support to the

rebels.1 Moreover, the rebels did not require significant cooperation to topple Qaddafi, as victory

was won largely on the back of NATO and Arab air power.

After Qaddafi’s fall, Libya’s divided po liti cal forces formed a weak transitional government that

lurched from crisis to crisis. The absence of follow-up support from outside powers, including the

United States, left Libya without sufficient capacity to mediate new rivalries or build new institu-

tions. Fueled by mistrust, a crippling po liti cal deadlock set in. As Fred Wehrey noted, Libya suffered

from “a balance of weakness amongst its po liti cal factions and armed groups: no single entity can

compel others to act purely through coercion, but every entity is strong enough to veto the

others.”2 Efforts to rebuild the country or forge a permanent national government floundered.

Rather than demobilizing, the disparate armed groups dominated the security sector, frequently

clashing with one another and extorting favorable policies and resources from the hapless national

authorities. The remnants of the Libyan military and police forces strug gled to rebuild due to the

1. Qatar has backed Islamist militias, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have backed more nationalist- leaning

militias including General Khalifa Haftar, with many ties dating back to the initial rebellion. See Giorgio Cafiero and

Daniel Wagner, “How the Gulf Arab Rivalry Tore Libya Apart,” National Interest, December 11, 2015.

2. Fredric Wehrey, “Beyond Benghazi: Libya’s Security Crisis and How the U.S. Can Help” (Testimony before the House

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, May 1, 2014), 5, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/20140501-Fred

-Wehrey-Libya-testimony-full-PDF.pdf.

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http://carnegieendowment.org/files/20140501-Fred-Wehrey-Libya-testimony-full-PDF.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World28

po liti cal gridlock in Tripoli, the competition for authority and resources with the revolutionary

militias, and the widespread mistrust of their ties to the Qaddafi regime.3

Domestic and regional extremist groups settled into the disorder and thrived. A patchwork of

Islamist militant organ izations gained favor in parts of the country. The slow boil of extremism

fi nally spilled over for the United States in September 2012, when militias with ties to terrorist

organ izations attacked two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, killing the U.S. ambassador to Libya, Christo-

pher Stevens, and three other Americans.4

With the security situation rapidly deteriorating and the country’s politics deadlocked, former

Qaddafi- era army officer General Khalifa Haftar rallied the demoralized security forces and tribal

3. Ibid.

4. Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger, “Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi,

Libya, September 11–12, 2012” (report to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 113th Cong.,

November 21, 2014), http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/benghazi%20report

.pdf.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 28 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/benghazi%20report.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 29

militias in eastern Libya around him under the “Libyan National Army” and launched an unsanc-

tioned military campaign against Islamist groups in Benghazi. Libya’s rival factions agreed to hold

elections in June 2014 for a new provisional national government in the hopes of breaking the

stalemate— but the election resulted in a lopsided victory for the nationalist and eastern factions.

The defeated Islamists and their allies disputed the outcome, and open civil war quickly erupted.

The factions divided into two governments: the House of Representatives (HoR), a co ali tion of a

number of nationalist and eastern groups that subsequently aligned with Haftar and based itself

out of the eastern cities of Tobruk and Bayda; and the General National Congress (GNC), an align-

ment of numerous Islamist militias, groups, and western cities that headquartered itself in Tripoli.

The United States and Eu ro pe ans pursued a policy of impartiality in the civil war and sought a

negotiated settlement premised on reuniting the factions under a new government where they

would share power.

Negotiations brokered by the United Nations and backed by the United States and Eu ro pean

powers resulted in the formation of a third body in December 2015: the Government of National

Accord (GNA), led by a Presidency Council under Fayez al- Sarraj, a moderate figure from western

Libya. Although the GNA was conceived as a kind of synthesis of, and replacement for, the HoR

and the GNC, in practice it has merely become a third actor in the civil war. As of this writing, the

United States and UN continue to back the juridical legitimacy of the GNA, even as the United

Nations ponders supporting changes to the GNA’s structure.5

Amid this disorder, ISIS first emerged in Libya in October 2014 after an Islamist militia in the eastern

city of Derna pledged allegiance to the group. According to media reports, ISIS’s growth in Libya

was further spurred by se nior commanders dispatched from Iraq and Syria to build and or ga nize

the group’s presence.6 In November 2014, ISIS formally announced its expansion into Libya. ISIS

attracted large clusters of defectors and splinter factions from extremist groups immersed in the

civil war in eastern Libya. Over the next year, ISIS managed to gain direct control over a swath of

coastal territory in central Libya around Sirte and established smaller networks across the country.

Despite several years of conflict, Libya has avoided a total economic collapse, which has limited

some of the pos si ble secondary effects of the conflict, such as large numbers of Libyan refugees

(most of the refugees and mi grants reaching Eu rope from Libya are from other states), internally

displaced persons, and shortages of food and medicine. This is in large part due to the nation’s

oil- driven economy, which provides it a large cushion of cash reserves, and the neutrality of Libya’s

central bank, which has been able to maintain the generous stream of state salaries, subsidies, and

imports. Libya is rapidly approaching an economic reckoning, however, as its cash reserves are

5. Jamie Prentis, “Libyan Army and Police Must Be Empowered, Kobler Tells UN Security Council,” Libya Herald,

February 8, 2017, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/08/no-alternative-to-empower-libyan-army-and-police-kobler

-tells-un-security-council/.

6. The presence of non- Libyan Islamic State leaders was highlighted in November 2015 when a U.S. air strike in Derna

killed Abu Nabil al- Anbari, an Iraqi national and Islamic State leader formerly affiliated with al Qaeda in Iraq. “Libya IS

Head ‘Killed in US Air Strike,’ ” BBC News, November 14, 2015. See also Frederic Wehrey and Ala’ Alrababa’h, “Rising

Out of Chaos: The Islamic State in Libya,” Car ne gie Middle East Center, March 5, 2015, http://carnegie-mec.org

/ diwan/59268.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 29 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/08/no-alternative-to-empower-libyan-army-and-police-kobler-tells-un-security-council/

http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59268

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World30

dwindling and domestic groups fight over oil- producing areas.7 At the same time, the receipts

from low oil prices are insufficient to plug the massive bud get deficit the country is currently

running, which the World Bank estimated in 2015 as 75 percent of GDP.8

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Libya’s po liti cal chaos and economic fragility have propelled the country into the ranks of the

world’s weak and failing states. Libya ranked 25th in 2015 in the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States

Index, up from 41st in 2014, notably ranked above some of its poorer neighbors, including Niger

and Chad.9 Freedom House gave Libya its second- worst ratings category for po liti cal rights and

civil liberties in 2016, noting the continuing po liti cal turmoil.10 Any efforts to combat terrorist

groups will have to enable operations in this unstable context.

Extremist groups— most importantly ISIS— only operate in large numbers in a handful of areas

including Sirte, Derna, and Benghazi. ISIS appears to have considerable reach with small cells

across the country that they use to perpetrate vio lence against rival groups with startling regularity

in the form of car bombs, suicide bombers, assassinations, and other attacks.

Authority

Libya’s security environment is characterized by highly fragmented territorial control among the

militias, extremist groups, and competing national and subnational governments. Governance in

Libya is almost entirely local, as Libya’s national governing entities possess dubious authority,

minimal capacity to govern, and little to no ability to provide security across the territory. In large

part, this is due to the inability of any one government to establish national legitimacy. Instead, the

country possesses a po liti cal system divided into the House of Representatives, the General Na-

tional Congress, and the Government of National Accord.

The House of Representatives (HoR) is Libya’s nationalist- aligned government based in the eastern

cities of Tobruk and Bayda. The HoR draws support from much of northeastern Libya and in the

northwest city of Zintan. The HoR aligned itself with the military forces of General Haftar, who has

cobbled together a military co ali tion in the east around Benghazi composed of the remnants of

Qaddafi’s security forces and a host of militias and tribal auxiliaries. For nearly three years, Haftar’s

forces have largely been bottled up in Benghazi and eastern Libya fighting ISIS and Ansar al- Sharia.

In September 2016, Haftar’s forces broke out and launched an offensive that seized much of

Libya’s oil infrastructure along its central coastline from rival militias aligned with the GNA. The

HoR only has a toehold in Tripolitania, located just southwest of Tripoli around Zintan. Under the

7. Ayman al- Warfalli, “Eastern Libyan Commander’s Forces Seize Key Oil Ports,” Reuters, September 11, 2016, http://

www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN11H094.

8. World Bank, “Libya: Overview,” accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview.

9. J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index 2015 (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2015), http://fsi.fundforpeace.org

/rankings-2015.

10. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2016), https://freedomhouse.org

/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 30 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN11H094

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview

http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015

https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 31

UN- backed transition plan, the HoR’s parliament was slated to become the legislature of the GNA.

The HoR parliament, however, has refused to endorse the GNA Presidency Council and thus its

executive branch has refused to cede power.11

The General National Congress (GNC), sometimes referred to as the National Salvation Govern-

ment, is the rump Islamist- aligned government headquartered in Tripoli. It once controlled large

portions of northwestern Libya and was supported by a loose co ali tion of Islamist factions, hard-

line revolutionaries, and western tribes and city- states.12 The GNC’s Islamist factions, well rooted

in Tripoli, are closely associated with the Justice and Construction Party, the Libyan branch of the

Muslim Brotherhood, and al- Watan, which is partly composed of veterans from the Libyan Islamic

Fighting Group (LIFG), a defunct anti- Qaddafi terrorist group once aligned with al Qaeda.13 The

constellation of forces supporting the GNC fractured upon the formation of the GNA, with some

factions, such as the Misratans, choosing to back the new unity government and others, such as

the Islamist militias in Tripoli, opting to stick with the GNC. In October 2016, militias loyal to the

GNC attempted to stage a coup in Tripoli against the nascent GNA leadership, leading to intense

fighting.14

The Government of National Accord (GNA) is the UN- brokered transitional unity government

established by an accord between multiple factions of the HoR and GNC in December 2015. Fayez

al- Sarraj is the head of the GNA’s Presidency Council, the executive body of the unity government,

which is also composed of figures from across Libya’s po liti cal spectrum. Recognized by the

United States and international community as the legitimate government of Libya, the GNA nomi-

nally took control of the central government from the GNC in Tripoli, in March 2016, but the extent

of its power is extremely circumscribed.15 The GNA had hoped to incorporate the HoR as its

legislative body and members of the GNC into a national advisory council and set the stage for the

creation of a constitutional system and new national elections. After its formation, the GNA man-

aged to gain support from some of the militias and powerbrokers that had backed the HoR and

the GNC, and these militias successfully pushed ISIS out of Sirte, but the GNA has failed to con-

solidate these groups into a single force or po liti cal movement. Overall, Libya’s warring factions

have repeatedly failed to abide by the agreement that led to the creation of the GNA. Rather than

unifying Libya’s two governments, however, the GNA has created yet a third entity vying for

authority.

11. “Libya’s UN- backed Government Gets ‘No Confidence’ Vote,” Al Jazeera, August 23, 2016, http://www.aljazeera

.com/news/2016/08/libya-backed-government-confidence-vote-160822150247789.html.

12. Andrew Engels, Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, Options, Research Note 24 (Washington, DC:

Washington Institute for Near- East Policy, 2014), 2.

13. Several former LIFG leaders such as Abdul Hakim Belhadj were detained by U.S. and co ali tion forces in Af ghan i stan

and Pakistan in 2001–2002 and served time in U.S. custody in Guantánamo Bay before being handed over to Qaddafi’s

regime. “Profile: Libyan Rebel Commander Abdel Hakim Belhadj,” BBC News, July 4, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news

/world-africa-14786753.

14. Moutaz Ali, “Anarchy as Tripoli Militias Fight after the Rixos Coup,” Libya Herald, October 16, 2016, https://www

.libyaherald.com/2016/10/16/__trashed/.

15. “Libyan Unity Government Extends Control over Tripoli Ministries,” Reuters, April 25, 2016.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 31 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/libya-backed-government-confidence-vote-160822150247789.html

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14786753

https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/10/16/_trashed/

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World32

While Libya is without comprehensive national governance, local governance is largely responsible

for making the day- to- day life of most Libyans pos si ble. The country’s 82 districts are each gov-

erned by a municipal council.16 The local representatives of the municipalities, most of whom are

elected, possess a high degree of authority in their communities and are considered by many to

be the most legitimate po liti cal bodies in the country. The connection between local and national

interests is less clear. It is oftentimes difficult to discern the precise interests an armed group or

po liti cal actor represents, particularly those actors attempting to build support bases at the na-

tional level. Even in cases of city- states and tribal militias, it is unclear if these forces are acting on

behalf of community interests or simply the parochial interests of their leaders. The challenge for

the United States is to be ready to work with what ever entities exercise legitimate authority in areas

held and contested by ISIS, without undermining the internationally recognized GNA.

ISIS’s own grip on authority seems more tied to coercion than genuine local support. In Sirte, for

example, ISIS’s initial ability to take control was due to a total security vacuum in the area, left after

the Misratan militias that had occupied the town since the fall of Qaddafi withdrew their forces to

fight elsewhere. ISIS’s presence comprised a mixture of Libyan defectors from Islamist groups and

foreign fighters, but likely few locals with direct ties to the area. Over time, ISIS tried with mixed

success to build relationships with the local Qadadfa and Firjan tribes, but its brutal actions and

hardline ideology appear to have largely alienated locals. During ISIS’s occupation of Sirte, there

were numerous instances of armed clashes between local tribesmen and ISIS.17

Capacity

Although authority is extremely decentralized in Libya, governing and ser vice provision capacity

are centrally rooted in revenues from the sale of oil and natu ral gas via the National Oil Com pany

(NOC). As part of an agreement between the NOC and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), these

revenues are deposited with the CBL and payments continue to all Libyan state employees, includ-

ing soldiers and militias on all sides, while po liti cal leaders are prevented from accessing funds.18

To this day, the CBL continues to dispense government salaries and fund and subsidize imports of

food, fuel, medicine, and basic consumer goods. The resiliency of the system has staved off a

humanitarian disaster in Libya, and municipal councils and citizens have been able to continue

daily life despite a near- total collapse of the national government.

Yet despite its benefits, the fiscal system has merely been able to keep Libya afloat and is highly

fragile to shocks in the price and supply of oil. Local leaders are entirely dependent on the volatile

funding provided by the central government. The municipal councils have little to no ability to

generate in de pen dent revenue and little discretion in how resources are spent. What stability they

have eked out is highly sensitive to crises— one power plant failure can undermine confidence in

16. Mahmoud Bader, “Is Local Government in Libya the Solution?,” Atlantic Council, April 2, 2014, http://www.atlantic

council.org/blogs/menasource/is-local-government-in-libya-the-solution.

17. Jared Malsin, “ISIS Re- Establish Their Hold on Qaddafi’s Home Town after Crushing a Rebellion,” Time, April 19,

2015, http://time.com/4003049/isis-sirte-rebellion/.

18. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine

/2015/02/23/unravelling.

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http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-local-government-in-libya-the-solution

http://time.com/4003049/isis-sirte-rebellion/

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/23/unravelling

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 33

municipal control over day- to- day life. Thus, what capacity exists is both vital to Libyans’ daily

existence and highly vulnerable to shocks.

Capacity shortages are not limited to civilians alone. Armed groups in Libya, including forces

affiliated with the GNA, almost certainly face shortages of manpower.19 Helpfully, and despite a

marketplace of groups representing every po liti cal stripe and the wide availability of weapons,

Libyans are not taking up arms in large numbers. Most Libyans are exhausted after years of insecu-

rity and po liti cal instability. Most impor tant, however, the continued payment of state salaries by

the Central Bank means Libyans are not being driven to fight in order to provide for themselves or

their families. This means that most militias are focused on local security or ideological goals and

have not amassed enough personnel to exercise a mono poly on vio lence across a region, let

alone the entire country. Only co ali tions of militias are able to expand beyond municipalities, and

the prospects for a genuinely national mono poly of security by any centralized organ ization—

official or other wise— are dim.

The long- term durability of the GNA and its successor governments’ resiliency and capability to

tackle extremist groups and restore security will depend in large part on how it can control and

leverage the country’s energy resources. Libya’s energy potential is staggering. The country pos-

sesses massive reserves of oil and natu ral gas of extremely high quality that can be produced at

minimal cost and easily delivered to Eu ro pean markets. It is, however, one of the least diversified

economies in the world.20 In 2010, the last full year of the Qaddafi regime, hydrocarbon revenues

accounted for over 72 percent of GDP, 95 percent of export earnings, and 90 percent of the

government’s bud get.21 Moreover, the full extent of Libya’s reliance on energy exports is obscured

because hydrocarbon revenues are recycled through the economy by means of generous state

subsidies, loans, and investments and bloated public sector payrolls that underwrite most of the

country’s other significant economic activities.

Security

Existing economic and po liti cal incentives have meant that security has been the most difficult

public good to consolidate under a single, or even just a few, authority structures. As the previous

discussion of militia manpower implies, Libyan security is, in some ways, a manifestation of the

country’s larger strug gles with governing authority and capacity. Militias have aligned under spe-

cific individuals and group identities, in support of hyper- local agendas and po liti cal positions.

Accustomed to this alignment, and lacking incentives to structure themselves other wise, groups

19. Numerous incidents of manpower and recruitment shortages have been reported. See Moutaz Ali, “Bukhamada

Calls for Reinforcements, Wages War against Ansar Al- Sharia,” Libya Herald, July 23, 2014, https://www.libyaherald

.com/2014/07/23/bukhamada-calls-for-reinforcements-wages-war-against-ansar-al-sharia/; Bertrand De La Grange,

“Misrata: The City Battling for Libya,” El Pais, January 26, 2015, http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/01/20/inenglish

/1421760231_731156.html; Carlotta Gall, “Weary of Chaos, Factions in Libya Consider Peace,” New York Times,

January 12, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/world/middleeast/weary-of-chaos-factions-in-libya-tentatively

-shift-toward-peace.html.

20. Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: From Colony to Revolution (Oxford: Oneworld, 2012), 130.

21. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Libya: Country Analy sis Brief (Washington, DC: EIA, 2015), 1–2, https://

www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=LBY.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 33 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://www.libyaherald.com/2014/07/23/bukhamada-calls-for-reinforcements-wages-war-against-ansar-al-sharia/

http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/01/20/inenglish/1421760231_731156.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/world/middleeast/weary-of-chaos-factions-in-libya-tentatively-shift-toward-peace.html

https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=LBY

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World34

act autonomously and with impunity. This has meant the municipal councils, the only consistently

legitimated form of governance in the country, have no direct control over the security of the

areas they administer. The disconnect between security and po liti cal structures has allowed fight-

ing to continue, without limitations from community interests, and makes reconciliation at the

national level increasingly disassociated from the real ity of domestic control. The idea of an inte-

grated military structure, subordinate to a national civilian authority and monopolizing legitimate

vio lence, is impracticable without somehow connecting the majority of Libya’s violent actors to

national po liti cal agendas.

In the near and medium term, successfully filling the security vacuum left by ISIS will largely de-

pend on the po liti cal will and limited military capabilities of local forces, which could prolong

counterterrorism efforts. For example, in order to assem ble the forces needed to retake Sirte,

Misratan militias withdrew forces occupying other towns in southern Libya, which is where many

analysts now believe ISIS fighters may attempt to regroup.22 Over the long term, the United States

and Eu ro pean states have indicated they may attempt to train national security forces for the GNA.

Yet it is unclear if—or when— another multinational train- and- equip effort is the right solution. A

major challenge will be who international actors should train and why. U.S. commanders have said

it is oftentimes unclear which armed groups are fighting on behalf of the GNA and which are

opposed to it.23 The Misratan militias that spearheaded the offensive against ISIS in Sirte appeared

to be acting in accordance with the GNA’s desires due to a shared interest in combating the terror-

ist group, but they were not under the GNA’s command and control. The Misratans largely self-

financed the fight, with local businessmen paying salaries for fighters and arms dealers channeling

supplies to the front lines.24 While these forces, the GNA, and the United States may have a shared

interest in battling ISIS today, it is unclear but seemingly unlikely this cooperation can be extended

to other areas.

STATE OF PLAY

The expansion of the ISIS into Libya has posed a conundrum for the United States, which had

pledged to degrade and defeat the group in Iraq and Syria but had little appetite to further expand

the U.S. military campaign or wade into the Libyan civil war. Moreover, U.S. officials were hesitant

to take either direct or indirect action against the group in Libya for fear of undermining the unity

government. Trying to avoid taking sides in the civil war and coax the Libyans into fighting ISIS,

Washington pledged it would only extend counterterrorism assistance to a unity government. The

series of ISIS terrorist attacks against Eu rope and the United States in late 2015 and early 2016

added impetus for action. While none of these attacks were linked to the group’s presence in

22. “Misratans Pull In Reinforcements from the South,” Libya Herald, July 25, 2016, https://www.libyaherald

.com/2016/07/25/misratans-pull-in-reinforcements-from-the-south/.

23. Carla Babb, “Friend for Foe? Doubts Plague U.S. Military in Libya Training,” VOA News, May 18, 2016, http://www

.voanews.com/a/us-military-prepared-to-support-train-and-equip-mission-in-libya/3335188.html.

24. Sudarsan Raghavan, “A Libyan Arms Dealer Chased by Gaddafi’s Legacy,” Washington Post, September 15, 2016,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/chased-by-a-dictators-legacy-an-arms-dealer-navigates-libyas

-chaos/2016/09/14/9fbbcb0a-63d8-11e6-b4d8-33e931b5a26d_story.html.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 34 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/07/25/misratans-pull-in-reinforcements-from-the-south/

http://www.voanews.com/a/us-military-prepared-to-support-train-and-equip-mission-in-libya/3335188.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/chased-by-a-dictators-legacy-an-arms-dealer-navigates-libyas-chaos/2016/09/14/9fbbcb0a-63d8-11e6-b4d8-33e931b5a26d_story.html

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 35

Libya, U.S. and Eu ro pean intelligence officials saw the group’s slowly expanding territory around

Sirte and its intent to use Libya as a staging ground for future attacks as a serious threat.25

As negotiations for the unity government progressed in late 2015, the United States took limited

direct action against ISIS leadership and began to build relationships with Libyan forces. In Novem-

ber 2015, the United States conducted its first direct military operation against ISIS in Libya, killing

the leader of the group in an air strike in the eastern town of Derna.26 By late 2015, small teams of

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) were reported to be establishing a presence in eastern and

western Libya to liaise with local militias and assess their capabilities to combat ISIS.27 In Decem-

ber 2015, negotiations in Skhirat to end the civil war appeared to achieve a breakthrough with

many of the warring factions signing an agreement to establish the GNA. Optimism from Western

governments that the unity government would be able to rally the country against ISIS quickly

faded. The Skhirat Agreement had been rushed and lacked the substantive po liti cal and security

arrangements needed to institute a lasting cease- fire and underpin the structure of the new unity

government. Many of the most power ful factions behind the HoR and GNC withheld their sup-

port, hobbling the GNA from the start.28

Throughout early 2016, a meager group of GNA leaders nominally took charge in Tripoli and

began establishing a bare- bones central government. Meanwhile, U.S. military officials, including

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, discussed the potential deployment

of U.S. SOF advisers on the ground to support Libyan forces against ISIS.29 As U.S. military activity

picked up, there were also strong indications that British, French, and Italian SOF were on the

ground building relationships with diff er ent Libyan groups, including those aligned with the GNA

and others that were not, including the forces of General Haftar.30

25. David D. Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubard, and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS’ Grip on Libyan City Gives It a Fallback Option,” New York

Times, November 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/middleeast/isis-grip-on-libyan-city-gives-it-a

-fallback-option.html.

26. “U.S. Air Strike ‘Targeted Se nior ISIL Leader’ in Libya,” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com

/news/2015/11/air-strike-targeted-senior-isil-leader-libya-151115044738165.html.

27. Missy Ryan, “U.S. Establishes Libyan Outposts with Eye Toward Offensive against Islamic State,” Washington Post,

May 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-establishes-libyan-outposts-with-eye

-toward-offensive-against-islamic-state/2016/05/12/11195d32-183c-11e6-9e16-2e5a123aac62_story.html; “Libya

Militia Chases Away U.S. Troops,” BBC News, December 18, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35131367.

28. Alice Hunt Friend and Anthony Bell, “In Libya, No Unity without Security,” War on the Rocks, February 10, 2016,

http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/in-libya-no-unity-without-security/.

29. Dan Lamothe, “Agreement That Could Lead to U.S. Troops in Libya Could Be Reached ‘Any Day,’ ” Washington Post,

May 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/05/19/top-general-agreement-to-send

-u-s-troops-to-libya-could-be-reached-any-day/. In February 2016, U.S. warplanes conducted air strikes against an ISIS

training camp west of Tripoli that killed over 40 fighters. “U.S. Airstrike in Libya Targets ISIL Training Camp, Se nior

Facilitator,” DoD News, February 19, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/658544/us-airstrike-in

-libya-targets-isil-training-camp-senior-facilitator.

30. “British Special Forces ‘Blew up Isis Suicide Truck in Libya,’ ” Guardian, May 25, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com

/world/2016/may/26/british-special-forces-blew-up-isis-suicide-truck-in-libya; “French Special Forces Waging ‘Secret War’

in Libya: Report,” Reuters, February 25, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-france-idUSKCN0VX1C3;

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 35 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/middleeast/isis-grip-on-libyan-city-gives-it-a-fallback-option.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/air-strike-targeted-senior-isil-leader-libya-151115044738165.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-establishes-libyan-outposts-with-eye-toward-offensive-against-islamic-state/2016/05/12/11195d32-183c-11e6-9e16-2e5a123aac62_story.html

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35131367

http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/in-libya-no-unity-without-security/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/05/19/top-general-agreement-to-send-u-s-troops-to-libya-could-be-reached-any-day/

http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/658544/us-airstrike-in-libya-targets-isil-training-camp-senior-facilitator

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/british-special-forces-blew-up-isis-suicide-truck-in-libya

http://www.reuters.com/article

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World36

In May 2016, Misratan militias acting on behalf of the GNA and enabled by U.S. and Eu ro pean SOF

initiated a large- scale ground offensive against ISIS aimed at retaking Sirte. After initially making

rapid pro gress and encircling Sirte, by July the Misratans had become bogged down in bloody

street- to- street combat against hundreds of ISIS fighters barricaded in the city. Aiming to break the

deadlock and support the nascent GNA, on August 1, the United States began conducting tactical

air strikes against ISIS positions in Sirte under Operation Odyssey Lightning. In contrast with earlier

U.S. counterterrorism operations in Libya that were limited to targeted killings of ISIS leaders, the

U.S. air strikes around Sirte were more open- ended and aimed at tactical targets to enable Mis-

ratan forces to advance deeper into the city. U.S. officials predicted the air strikes would continue

apace for several weeks, but weeks stretched into months.31 U.S. military operations were carried

out by fixed- wing aircraft and he li cop ters operating from naval vessels in the Mediterranean and

enabled by U.S. SOF operating behind the front lines with the Misratans, in addition to intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft flying from U.S. bases in Eu rope and Africa.32

The U.S. air campaign against ISIS in Sirte continued until the end of December 2016 when Mis-

ratan forces fi nally recaptured the last parts of the city. The United States conducted 492 air strikes

against ISIS in Sirte between August and December 2016. Given that the estimated number of ISIS

fighters in the city during the summer was at most a few thousand, this indicates that the partner

forces on the ground had become risk- adverse and highly dependent on sustained U.S. airpower

to notch even minor tactical gains. Many of the U.S. target sets released by AFRICOM indicate that

air strikes were hitting individual fighting positons— a high expenditure of resources per sortie that

is potentially unsustainable as a model of future counterterrorism operations.33 The Battle of Sirte,

however, did not portend the end of ISIS in Libya. In late January 2017, the United States con-

ducted a massive air strike on an ISIS camp in the desert about 30 miles outside of Sirte using two

B-2 stealth bombers and armed drones that dropped 108 precision- guided munitions and killed

about 80 ISIS fighters.34

While the U.S. and Libyan forces have notched successes against ISIS on the battlefield, defeating

the group’s networks elsewhere in the country and establishing the conditions to prevent it and

Tom Kington, “Italy Reportedly Sends Special Forces to Libya,” Defense News, August 11, 2016, http://www.defensenews

.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2016/08/11/libya-italy-special-forces-isis/88567660/.

31. Andrew Tilghman, “Air Campaign in Libya Enters Second Day, Will Last Weeks, Official Says,” Military Times, Au-

gust 2, 2016, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/08/02/air-campaign-libya-enters-second-day-last

-weeks/87958608/.

32. David Cenciotti, “U.S. Marine Corps He li cop ters aboard Amphibious Assault Ship and USAF Drones Lead New

Round of U.S. Air Strikes on ISIS in Libya,” Aviationist, August 1, 2016, https://theaviationist.com/2016/08/01/u-s-ma

rine-corps-amphibious-assault-ship-and-usaf-drones-lead-new-round-of-u-s-air-strikes-on-isis-in-libya/.

33. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), “AFRICOM Concludes Operation Odyssey Lightning,” news release, Decem-

ber 20, 2016, http://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/28564/africom-concludes-operation-odyssey

-lightning.

34. Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Bombs ISIS Camps in Libya,” New York Times, January 19, 2017, https://

www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/united-states-bombs-isis-camps-in-libya.html; Tom Demerly, “All We Know

about U.S. B-2 Bombers 30- Hour Round Trip Mission to Pound Daesh in Libya,” Aviationist, January 20, 2017, https://

theaviationist.com/2017/01/20/all-we-know-about-the-u-s-b-2-bombers-30-hour-round-trip-mission-to-pound

-daesh-in-libya/.

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http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2016/08/11/libya-italy-special-forces-isis/88567660/

http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/08/02/air-campaign-libya-enters-second-day-last-weeks/87958608/

https://theaviationist.com/2016/08/01/u-s-marine-corps-amphibious-assault-ship-and-usaf-drones-lead-new-round-of-u-s-air-strikes-on-isis-in-libya/

http://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/28564/africom-concludes-operation-odyssey-lightning

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/united-states-bombs-isis-camps-in-libya.html

https://theaviationist.com/2017/01/20/all-we-know-about-the-u-s-b-2-bombers-30-hour-round-trip-mission-to-pound-daesh-in-libya/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 37

other terrorist groups from using Libya as a safe haven will be a long- term challenge. The civil war

continues to divide the country and the under lying po liti cal and economic prob lems continue to

grow worse. In mid- September 2016, General Haftar— whose forces fighting ISIS have reportedly

received advice and support from U.S. and French SOF— launched an offensive against the GNA

and seized Libya’s most impor tant oil- exporting areas.35 Although Haftar’s aggression was con-

demned by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and others, his actions underscored

the tangled web of alliances that Washington and Eu ro pean allies must contend with as they try to

suppress and defeat the threat from ISIS.36

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

There are multiple factors that will constrain U.S. counterterrorism efforts to combat ISIS and other

terrorist groups in Libya. Some are rooted in a fundamental mismatch between the legal authori-

ties available to U.S. personnel, while others are endemic to Libya itself. In general, the United

States will have to take care not to further destabilize the country while pursuing its counterterror-

ism objectives.

Affecting the Balance of Power in the Civil War or Unintentionally Empowering Adversaries

Although the United States has sought to remain neutral in the multisided conflict and supported

international diplomatic efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, it has proved difficult if not

impossible for the United States to entirely separate its counterterrorism and diplomatic efforts.

U.S. counterterrorism activities that degrade some organ izations confer benefits on others, while

selecting certain counterterrorism partners over others provides some actors military assistance

and po liti cal legitimacy. There is a high risk that U.S. counterterrorism support to Libyan factions

will be perceived as Washington choosing a side in the civil war. Moreover, direct military actions

can rapidly shift the delicate balance of power inside the country.

Supporting Military Autonomy vs. Partnering with the GNA

The GNA’s lack of reliable security forces will inhibit the ability of the United States to channel

support and limit the helpfulness of the government as a partner. Although there are some areas in

which U.S. forces and Libyan militias can collaborate against ISIS, it will be challenging from both a

legal and policy perspective for the Departments of State and Defense to provide meaningful

military matériel assistance, training, and intelligence to nonstate actors. While the GNA has gained

the support of many armed formations— notably the Misratans— these are informal ties, and hap-

hazard attempts to legitimize militias could backfire.

35. “Khalifa Haftar Forces Seize Oil Port Brega in Libya,” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com

/news/2016/09/khalifa-haftar-forces-seizes-oil-port-brega-libya-160914061306594.html.

36. “Joint Statement on Libya by the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the

United States,” U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, September 12, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs

/ps/2016/09/261779.htm.

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http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/khalifa-haftar-forces-seizes-oil-port-brega-libya-160914061306594.html

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261779.htm

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World38

Meanwhile, Libyan factions across the board are very sensitive to the negative po liti cal optics of

being openly supported by foreign militaries and will likely reject overt forms of assistance that

may be construed by po liti cal rivals as undermining Libya’s sovereignty.

Force Protection and Operational Security

Force protection and operational security concerns will significantly constrain the ability of U.S.

personnel to engage and operate with Libyan forces. These challenges were highlighted in De-

cember 2015, when a U.S. SOF team landed at an airstrip in Western Libya to liaise with a local

militia but was met by an entirely diff er ent militia and ordered to leave. The team’s operational

security was then compromised after militiamen posted photo graphs of the U.S. personnel on

social media.37 Such experiences limit the ability of Western troops on the ground to build strong

relationships, maintain per sis tent presence, and gather intelligence. Given the security conditions,

U.S. and Western embassies were largely evacuated in mid-2014 and have yet to reopen in the

country. Underscoring the continued dangers of operating in Libya, in early January 2017, Italy

reopened its embassy in Tripoli, which was shortly thereafter targeted by a car bomb.38 The lack of

a permanent presence on the ground for diplomats and military officials to coordinate with Libyan

counter parts will remain a long- term obstacle.

The limitations placed on U.S. forces and the manner in which Libyan forces combat ISIS is

certain to pres ent policy, legal, and po liti cal challenges for the United States. The U.S. combat

role in Libya is likely to be limited to air strikes against high- value ISIS targets and to a small SOF-

led, advise- and- assist effort. Moreover, Libyan forces have demonstrated little to no ability to

conduct a swift and decisive military operation that could quickly retake territory from ISIS. Libyan

militiamen are not well trained or disciplined, nor have they demonstrated a concern for the laws

of war.

Competing Outside Interests

Libya is increasingly a cauldron of competition among outside powers whose national interests are

in tension and oftentimes pursued at cross- purposes. While the United States has prioritized

counterterrorism in Libya, Eu ro pean states tend to view mi grant flows as a higher priority, and

vari ous Arab states view the civil war through the lens of a regional competition with their rivals.

Meanwhile, Rus sia has recently sought to assert itself in Libya by fostering ties with certain power-

brokers. The Kremlin has come to view Libya’s chaos as a potential opportunity to exert its new-

found influence as part of its wider standoff with the West.39

37. Chris Stephen, “Secret U.S. Mission in Libya Revealed after Air Force Posted Pictures,” Guardian, December 17, 2015,

http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/17/secret-us-mission-in-libya-revealed-after-air-force-posted-

pictures?CMP=share_btn_tw.

38. Associated Press, “Italy Says Its Embassy Staff Is Safe after Libya Bombing,” Fox News World, January 21, 2017,

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/21/italy-says-its-embassy-staff-is-safe-after-libya-bombing.html.

39. Barbara Bibbo, “What Is Rus sia’s Endgame in Libya?,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com

/indepth/features/2017/01/russia-endgame-libya-170116061913370.html.

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http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/17/secret-us-mission-in-libya-revealed-after-air-force-posted-pictures?CMP=share_btn_tw

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/21/italy-says-its-embassy-staff-is-safe-after-libya-bombing.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/russia-endgame-libya-170116061913370.html

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 39

OPPORTUNITIES AND ASSETS

The United States has several assets and opportunities that can be used to accomplish U.S. counter-

terrorism objectives in Libya.

International and Regional Support for Combating ISIS

Strong international and regional support to combat ISIS in Libya provides a force multiplying

potential. Eu ro pean powers, including the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, and Libya’s neighbors

Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, all recognize the threat posed by ISIS’s growth and are willing to invest

resources and to cooperate on common counterterrorism objectives in Libya and the region at

large. This support will also allow the United States to work with other outside powers to leverage

mechanisms such as the UN Sanctions Committee, which gives the United States and others the

ability to influence the legal transfer of arms into the country.

Local Opposition to Extremism

Local opposition to extremism runs strong. Although the main parties do not consider ISIS central

to the po liti cal strug gle over the future Libyan government, the vast majority of Libyan factions

despise the Islamic State and other extremist groups. This provides a point of leverage across

Libya’s fractured po liti cal landscape, as it gives disparate po liti cal and security ele ments a common

enemy and therefore an incentive to or ga nize collectively. The United States should also work with

other countries and international institutions to ensure the continued po liti cal neutrality of the CBL

and to enforce centralized control over Libya’s oil exports.

Regional Access

The United States enjoys excellent access to Libya from its bases in Eu rope, naval assets in the

Mediterranean Sea, and Libya’s neighbors. This access not only allows the United States to take

direct action against ISIS when necessary, but can further enable additional military and po liti cal

objectives, such as leveraging U.S. and allied ISR assets to increase intelligence collection on

terrorist groups in Libya, better enabling the presence of U.S. SOF, and providing safe areas for

international personnel to train Libyan forces.40

40. There are still some hindrances for U.S. military access. To date, U.S. air strikes against the Islamic State in Libya

have largely been conducted from U.S. air bases in the United Kingdom rather than U.S. bases in Italy. The Italian

government only allows U.S. drones flying from bases on its soil to be used in a force protection role for U.S. Special

Operations Forces on the ground in Libya. Adam Entous and Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Wants Drones in North Africa to

Combat Islamic State in Libya,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-wants-drones-in-

north-africa-to-combat-islamic-state-in-libya-1436742554; Liam Moloney, “Italy Won’t Join U.S. Libya Offensive

Action,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/italy-wont-join-u-s-libya-offensive

-action-1456233482.

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http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-wants-drones-in-north-africa-to-combat-islamic-state-in-libya-1436742554

http://www.wsj.com/articles/italy-wont-join-u-s-libya-offensive-action-1456233482

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World40

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States will have to orient its counterterrorism policy toward actions that avoid under-

mining the po liti cal and security legitimacy of the nascent central authorities. This will be a key

factor at each decision point, whether it be which group to partner with, how to design training, or

whether to conduct a unilateral strike. Policymakers should work to understand how U.S. counter-

terrorism efforts affect the wider balance of power in each environment.

1. Keep efforts modest

Resist mission creep. Counterterrorism efforts against ISIS should focus only on the group

and its main areas of operations inside Libya rather than trying to fix all of the under lying

causes of the conflict at once. This will require cooperation with the GNA and select anti-

ISIS militias. It does not necessarily require rebuilding the Libyan national security apparatus

from the ground up. Instead, the United States should focus on modest goals and think

through the likely effects of its policies on the po liti cal conditions in the country. There will

be times when an opportunity in the counterterrorism realm may lead to costs in the na-

tional po liti cal realm, and policymakers must be prepared to decide explic itly which goals

to enable by their near- term actions, with a clear understanding of potential risks and

trade- offs.

2. Know and grow your allies

Scrutinize potential partners, especially nonstate militias, for problematic rec ords, ties, and

aspirations to better understand partner risks. Being anti- ISIS should only be the minimum

criteria. Partners must not be irreconcilable to the peace pro cess and should be open to

eventually supporting efforts to consolidate a central government. Ideally, U.S. support

could help build trust between diff er ent groups and offer points of leverage for supporting

the peace pro cess. Their joint operational experience could provide the groundwork the

national government could leverage into a national military. Thus, the United States could

help set the conditions for the eventual creation of national security forces without taking

on the responsibility of building one directly from scratch.

Nevertheless, all efforts to build security capacity among the vari ous armed groups in Libya

should be crafted with an eye toward the wider po liti cal ramifications of such assistance. On

its face, counter- ISIS efforts should provide niche military capabilities and avoid playing a

central role in Libyan politics. The major Libyan factions view one another as their primary

threats and largely consider ISIS a residual security prob lem rather than a fundamental

po liti cal challenge. Yet outside efforts to train and equip any armed groups in Libya would

enable some militias at the (real or perceived) expense of others. Thus, U.S. and Western

military support aimed against ISIS could unravel the fragile confidence- building pro cess of

establishing the GNA and exacerbate the po liti cal disorder either directly or indirectly to

ISIS’s advantage.41

41. Frederic Wehrey, “The Path Forward in Libya” (Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 3,

2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/03/03/path-forward-in-libya/iwvv.

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http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/03/03/path-forward-in-libya/iwvv

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 41

3. Focus on training

U.S. training assistance should revolve around professionalization, improving basic operator

capabilities and ensuring interoperability for counterterrorism operations with U.S. and other

Western forces, rather than technology transfers. The durability of Libyan security forces’

allegiance to central authority is tenuous at best. The emphasis should be less on raw

financial and material resources and more on plans, capabilities, and deft po liti cal engage-

ment and consistency, requiring a high degree of communication and collaboration be-

tween international military and diplomatic personnel.

Training efforts should focus on the most capable forces affiliated with the government or,

at the very least, not in opposition to it. Wherever pos si ble, the United States should let the

Libyans self- equip and avoid the inclination to directly train and equip entire units from

scratch or directly arm Libyans with U.S. equipment to improve their combat effectiveness.

U.S. training efforts must adapt to the weapons and equipment that Libyan partners already

have at their disposal, which is what they are most familiar with. Direct equipping, if neces-

sary, should focus on items that are easily used, maintained, and/or recapitalized by the

Libyan government or that make selected Libyan counterterrorism units tactically interoper-

able with U.S. forces (e.g., night vision and communications gear).

Training programs should help forge operational alliances between militia groups to achieve

counterterrorism objectives and lay the foundation for longer- term cooperation between

such forces. If paired with carefully developed power- sharing plans for security ministries,

such efforts can increase the country’s counterterrorism capabilities while improving the

prospects for long- term security institutionalization.

4. Limit unilateral action

Direct U.S. military action should be accompanied by, or in coordination with, GNA- allied

forces and actions wherever pos si ble. Unilateral action, such as air strikes, gives the impres-

sion that Libya has no sovereignty and the government has no control over outside actors,

undermining its claim to authority and the right to monopolize security. When unaccompa-

nied action is necessary, every effort should be made to secure the approval of the recog-

nized government and local authorities.

5. Be prepared to pivot

Policy tools must be flexible in order to respond to changes swiftly. Libya’s fragile economic

stability could collapse at any moment, the civil war could coalesce around fewer actors,

and vio lence could increase. At the same time, ISIS’s hold on power and populations in

Libya is tenuous and may collapse. The United States should be ready to shift its investment

portfolio among local actors as po liti cal and security conditions warrant. It must also be

ready to shift from offensive operations and training to mea sures that can prevent ISIS from

regaining its lost ground.

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INTRODUCTION

Weak and unstable territories can create targets of opportunity for intervention or manipulation by

regional or global powers seeking to expand power or influence. This often leads to increasing

levels of vio lence and directly threatens U.S. security interests. These crises challenge the United

States to counter or discourage regional adventurism while avoiding the escalation of a great

power conflict.

Rus sia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine brought this imperative back

to the forefront of the security agenda, underscoring the threat that Rus sia poses to its neighbors,

Eu rope, and the larger international order. Although the front lines have stabilized in the Donbas,

the situation in eastern Ukraine remains precarious. Many compare it to the frozen conflicts care-

fully managed by Moscow— such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria— with separatists

struggling to establish the vestiges of a state, and the state struggling to provide ser vices and

security to populations in and around the conflict zone.1 However, the potential for escalation

remains acute.

This case highlights the need to prevent and counter great power intervention and exploitation of

state weakness. By deepening the understanding of how to respond to separatist crises manufac-

tured and stoked by Rus sia in Eastern Eu ro pean and Eurasian states with limited capacity and weak

or fragmented authority structures, this case elucidates how the United States can operate in and

empower its allies to function in environments where great powers exploit state weakness for their

own gains and violate the traditional norms of sovereignty.

1. Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker, “Putin’s Frozen Conflicts,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2015, http://foreign

policy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/.

Countering Regional Aggression Kathryn McNabb Cochran

0 4

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http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 43

SECURITY IMPERATIVE

In the face of renewed separatist fighting, the primary security imperative will be to assist Ukraine

quickly, without drawing the United States into a broader confrontation with Rus sia, by bolstering

the fighting abilities of the Ukrainian military so that Ukraine can defend key cities and logistical

facilities and even retake lost territory. Because one of the U.S. goals is avoiding direct military

engagement, the United States will need to indirectly support Ukraine while forcefully pressuring

Rus sia to de- escalate the fighting. Addressing urgent needs in a renewed crisis will require tempo-

rarily setting aside the larger question of whether the United States should allow the conflict in the

Donbas to enter the ranks of frozen conflicts that simmer on in defi nitely. In responding to a re-

newed separatist offensive, the essential tasks are:

• Identify critical gaps in border security, military requirements, as well as humanitarian assis-

tance for affected populations.

• Secure necessary authority and resources for nonlethal military and humanitarian assis-

tance.

• Provide military advisers, nonlethal military aid, and intelligence sharing to address critical

gaps.

• Facilitate and create conditions for the sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance to

civilian populations affected by the fighting.

• Support civil society efforts to empower legitimate sources of authority and information

within the local populations.

• Ramp up pressure, both bilateral and multilateral, on Rus sia to reestablish cease- fires and

de- escalate the conflict.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Geography and Demography

This case focuses on eastern Ukraine, including the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk,

Kharkiv, and Zaprazitria. Donetsk and Luhansk have experienced the most disruption. The areas

outside the immediate conflict zone, including Dniprotrev, Kharkiv, and Zaprazitria, also face

significant challenges as the influx of internally displaced people (IDPs) strains their already limited

resources.

Eastern Ukraine lies in the Great Eu ro pean Plain. Fertile plains, plateaus, and rolling hills characterize

most of the landmass. The Dnieper River serves as the western boundary of the region in Dniprot-

rev, while the Donets River flows through Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. The area is rich in

minerals, including coal and iron ore. Prior to the war, it was the most densely populated region of

Ukraine, outside of Kyiv, accounting for roughly one- third of Ukraine’s total population. It is highly

urbanized and industrialized. The largest cities are Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk. With more

than a million residents each, these cities form an industrial triangle at the heart of eastern Ukraine.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World44

The po liti cal, ethnic, and linguistic divisions between east and west have been a defining charac-

teristic of Ukraine since it gained in de pen dence in 1991. Eastern Ukraine has a very high percent-

age of ethnic Rus sians; most citizens in its eastern oblasts speak Rus sian rather than Ukrainian and

tend to support a pro- Russian foreign policy posture.2 These long- standing divisions created

vulnerabilities that separatist forces, with Rus sian backing, were able to exploit in the weeks and

months following the Maidan protests and President Viktor Yanukovych’s fall from power in

February 2014.

History

Instability in eastern Ukraine is connected to the fragility and limitations of Ukraine as a whole. The

resources that national and local governments can devote to managing the crisis and adequately

caring for the displaced are severely limited due to Ukraine’s macroeconomic prob lems, which

2. Rebecca Kaplan, “A Look at Ukraine’s Internal Divisions,” CBS News, March 5, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com

/news/a-look-at-ukraines-internal-divisions/.

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http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-look-at-ukraines-internal-divisions/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 45

include high inflation, mounting debt, currency devaluation, consistent negative growth, energy

de pen dency, and corruption that siphons funds from needed development proj ects.3 Inefficien-

cies and corruption of the highly centralized bureaucratic structure limit the effectiveness of local

government institutions and reinforce beliefs that Kyiv purposefully neglects the needs and inter-

ests of Russian- speaking Ukraine. Fi nally, recruitment, training, and command- and- control issues

within Ukraine’s armed forces limit its ability to counter Russian- backed separatist advances in the

east.

In February 2015, Ukraine, Rus sia, France, and Germany signed the Minsk II agreement, which

called for an immediate ceasefire and established a detailed roadmap for resolving the conflict.4

Since then, there have been near- continuous violations of varying intensity on both sides of the

line of contact. In addition, other terms of the agreement have yet to be implemented, and the risk

of a renewed separatist offensive remains very real.5 Should such an offensive occur, with or

without the direct involvement of Rus sian troops, the United States will be supporting a partner

with moderate capacity and operating in an environment characterized by weak governance

structures, a vulnerable ser vice sector, and heightened security risks.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

These issues and the ongoing insecurity plaguing eastern Ukraine prompted the Fund for Peace to

dramatically downgrade its assessment of Ukraine’s stability in 2015. It saw a nine- point increase in

its Fragile States Index score in one year, the fifth- largest change recorded in the history of the

index. It scored worst in state legitimacy and external intervention, but also had significant issues

with group grievances, human rights, fractionalized elites, and security.6 Freedom House regis-

tered significant movements toward democracy and a strengthening of civil society after the

Maidan protests, but warned that government institutions remain highly fragile as Ukraine works to

contain corruption and liberalize the media.7 The World Bank’s assessment of Ukraine prior to the

conflict emphasized Ukraine’s economic vulnerability, weak health care system, strained transpor-

tation network, and underfunded ser vices section.8

3. World Bank, “Ukraine: Reforms Helped to Stabilize Economy, but Continued and Faster Reforms Are Key,” news

release, October 5, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/05/ukraine-macroeconomic

-update-october-2015.

4. “Minsk Agreement on Ukraine Crisis: Text in Full,” February 12, 2015, http:// www . telegraph . co . uk / news / worldnews

/ europe / ukraine / 11408266 / Minsk - agreement - on - Ukraine - crisis - text - in - full . html .

5. Steven Pifer, “Minsk II at Two Years,” Brookings, February 15, 2017, https:// www . brookings . edu / blog / order - from

- chaos / 2017 / 02 / 15 / minsk - ii - at - two - years / .

6. Fund for Peace, “Ukraine in 2015,” http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/2015-ukraine.

7. Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2015: Ukraine,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/ukraine.

8. World Bank, “Ukraine: Overview,” February 6, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 45 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/05/ukraine-macroeconomic-update-october-2015

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk-agreement-on-Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/02/15/minsk-ii-at-two-years/

http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/2015-ukraine

https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/ukraine

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World46

Authority

Authority structures are weak throughout the region, though they vary across government- and

separatist- controlled areas. Despite widespread corruption, the central government in Kyiv remains

the primary and the accepted authority in Ukraine with the exception of the Donbas. The Donetsk

People’s Republic (DPR) has managed to establish the vestiges of the state, but its authority is

precarious and dependent on Rus sian support. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) has not

managed to consolidate power, and authority is fractured among regional and local warlords who

control the resources and policies in their territories. This fragmentation prompted Moscow to take

more direct control over the management of both governments and to begin underwriting the

provision of basic ser vices.

Authority in Government- Controlled Areas

In government- controlled areas, the government remains the central authority figure despite high

levels of mistrust among the population after years of corruption and perceived discrimination.

Frustration with corruption in former president Victor Yanukovych’s government was one of the

driving factors of the Maidan protest movement, and the post- Maidan government took steps to

begin curbing corruption shortly after taking office. Despite new laws and the establishment of an

anticorruption bureau, corruption remains a serious problem that limits the ability of Kyiv to gov-

ern.9 Ukraine’s oligarchs continue to directly influence policy, billions of dollars are lost each year

to corruption in the government’s procurement process, courts are politicized, and even low- level

bureaucrats and tax collectors use the state apparatus for personal gain.10 A number of opposition

activists appointed to anticorruption positions have resigned due to frustration at the lack of

change in Ukraine. Despite these prob lems, Kyiv retains sufficient authority to implement policies

in response to separatist offensives without fear of serious compliance issues by subnational

entities.

Frustration with this corruption in Donetsk, Luhansk, Dniprotrev, Kharkiv, and Zaprazitria is com-

pounded by a widespread perception that the central government purposefully underfunds the

eastern provinces. This is partially a function of the high degree of centralization in Ukraine’s

bureaucratic structure, which discourages cooperation at the regional or local level. According to

the World Bank, “this disconnect exacerbated existing social differences and precipitated a misper-

ception shared in all parts of Ukraine— that other parts of the country were better funded and that

their needs were better addressed.”11

9. Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Co ali tion Faces No- Confidence Vote as Scandals Mount,” Financial Times, December 8,

2015, https://www.ft.com/content/d854f724-9dc8-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861#axzz3tpUtfydu.

10. Oleksii Khmara, “Anti- Corruption Reform in Ukraine: Going around in Circles,” Transparency International, Novem-

ber 16, 2015, http://blog.transparency.org/2015/11/16/anti-corruption-reform-in-ukraine-going-round-in-circles/.

11. World Bank, Ukraine Recovery and Peace Building Assessment: Analy sis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern

Ukraine, Vol. I: Synthesis Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated

/en/879011468188335375/pdf/96487-REPLACEMENT-FILE-WP-v1-Box391453B-PUBLIC-RPA-A4-Vol1-Eng-Web.pdf.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 46 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://www.ft.com/content/d854f724-9dc8-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861#axzz3tpUtfydu

http://blog.transparency.org/2015/11/16/anti-corruption-reform-in-ukraine-going-round-in-circles/

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/879011468188335375/pdf/96487-REPLACEMENT-FILE-WP-v1-Box391453B-PUBLIC-RPA-A4-Vol1-Eng-Web.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 47

Authority in Separatist- Controlled Areas

The state has essentially collapsed in the areas under separatist control, with Rus sia stepping in to

manage both the People’s Republic of Donetsk, which had succeeded in taking over some gov-

ernment functions, and the Luhansk People’s Republic, which had been much less successful in

consolidating control. In both the LPR and the DPR, military control defines the authority struc-

tures, but Rus sia serves as the ultimate arbitrator. Alexander Zakharchenko, the leader of the DPR,

has managed to somewhat consolidate power and take on the responsibilities of the state.12 The

inability of the LPR leader Igor Plotnitsky to similarly consolidate military power has undermined

his authority. A series of fiefdoms emerged, with authority flowing to the military commander of

the battalion that controls each area.13 The LPR’s primary leverage over these groups is their ability

to distribute military resources and other aid coming from Rus sia. Manipulation of this aid for

po liti cal aims has led to resentment and discontent among these leaders, sharpening the divide

between them and officials in Luhansk. There has been infighting between LPR authorities and the

Cossack groups, including assassinations and direct conflict.

The ultimate authority in both the LPR and DPR lies in Moscow. Rus sia has implemented a kurator

system where Rus sian citizens hold official government positions and employ advisers to ensure

local officials comply with Moscow’s directives.14 Rus sia settles internal disputes between separat-

ists and exercises ultimate control over major military and po liti cal decisions.15 This system creates

a vertical hierarchy in which local leaders have strong ties to Moscow but very little contact with

each other. The result is that Moscow’s priorities are well implemented with very little insubordina-

tion, but areas outside of Moscow’s purview suffer from severe coordination prob lems and infight-

ing, resulting in corruption, criminality, and inefficiencies.

None of these actors enjoy widespread legitimacy. In April 2014, only 25 percent of those polled in

Donetsk and 30 percent in Luhansk supported breaking away from Ukraine, though the vast

majority supported decentralization. More than 83 percent of the population in Donetsk and

58 percent of the population of Luhansk disapproved of the takeover of administrative buildings by

rebel forces.16 Many are still loyal to the Ukrainian state and those that are not have differing views

12. Tomasz Piechal, “The War Republics in the Donbas One Year after the Outbreak of the Conflict,” OSW Commen-

tary, June 17, 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-17/war-republics-donbas-one

-year-after-outbreak-conflict.

13. Associated Press, “Ukraine Rebels: A Disunited Front Run by Ruthless War Lords,” Japan Times, November 12, 2014,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/12/world/politics-diplomacy-world/ukraine-rebels-a-disunited-front-run

-by-ruthless-warlords/#.WJmw7GX0itl.

14. International Crisis Group, “Rus sia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine,” February 5, 2016, https://www.crisis

group.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/russia-and-separatists-eastern-ukraine; Gabriela Baczynska

and Aleksandar Vasovic, “Pushing Locals Aside, Rus sians Take Top Rebel Posts in East Ukraine,” Reuters, July 27, 2014,

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-rebels-insight-idUSKBN0FW07020140727#xTHz5iFl19FHCo6S.97.

15. Stepan Kravchenko and Ilya Arkhipov, “Putin Tightens Reins on Ukraine Rebels, Putting Conflict on Ice,” Bloomberg,

September 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-18/putin-tightens-reins-on-ukraine-rebels

-putting-conflict-on-ice.

16. Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), “The Views and Opinions of South- Eastern Regions Residents of

Ukraine,” April 2014, http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=news&id=258.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 47 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-17/war-republics-donbas-one-year-after-outbreak-conflict

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/12/world/politics-diplomacy-world/ukraine-rebels-a-disunited-front-run-by-ruthless-warlords/#.WJmw7GX0itl

https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/russia-and-separatists-eastern-ukraine

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-rebels-insight-idUSKBN0FW07020140727#xTHz5iFl19FHCo6S.97

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-18/putin-tightens-reins-on-ukraine-rebels-putting-conflict-on-ice

http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=news&id=258

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World48

about the region’s future, ranging from a desire for Rus sian annexation, to the establishment of a

Cossack nation, to the creation of the confederated state of Novorussiya. Despite this, there have

been no major protests against the LPR or DPR authorities and the administrative staff of many

local government institutions have remained in their billets. In addition, there is considerable risk

that the longer citizens live under separatist control, the more likely it is that broad ac cep tance of

the LPR and DPR governance structures will grow.17 This is especially true if Kyiv is viewed as being

unable or unwilling to defend and provide for those citizens or if those citizens accept Moscow’s

narrative that Kyiv- controlled Ukraine has been captured by a far- right agenda that threatens their

well- being.

Authority, the Media, and the Battle for Legitimacy

The battle for legitimacy in eastern Ukraine, on both sides of the line of control, is deeply shaped

by the fragmented and politicized nature of the media, with both sides using information and

misinformation strategically to undermine their opponents.18 The nation’s oligarchs own and

influence many outlets and the government operates national and regional tele vi sion networks.

Distrust of the media is rampant. The World Bank estimates that only 3.3 percent of Ukrainians

“fully trust the media.”19 Rus sia’s $1.4 billion propaganda machine controls a number of radio and

tele vi sion stations that broadcast to eastern Ukraine, and they use these outlets to foster distrust of

what they characterize as a fascist regime.20 Pro- Russian outlets are banned in most of Ukraine,

and pro- Kyiv outlets have been banned in separatist areas as both parties to the conflict try to

control the information space. Intimidation and violence against journalists is also common.21

Attempts by nongovernmental organizations and local media to counter Russian propaganda have

made some headway, but lack of coordination “largely produce[s] a cacophony with little

impact.”22 The government of Ukraine and its partners should continue to invest in developing

and coordinating an information campaign that combats Rus sia’s narrative in government-

controlled areas and capitalizes on the legitimacy issues in the DPR and LPR to undermine their

authority even further.

Capacity

Vio lence, economic challenges, and corruption are the primary obstacles to the delivery of public

goods in both government- and separatist- controlled areas, but these limitations are much more

17. International Crisis Group, “Rus sia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine.”

18. Fund for Peace, “Ukraine in 2015”; “Ukraine’s Media War: Battle of the Meme’s,” Economist, March 12, 2015, http://

www.economist.com/news/europe/21646280-russia-has-shown-its-mastery-propaganda-war-ukraine-struggling

-catch-up-battle-web.

19. World Bank, Ukraine Recovery and Peace Building Assessment.

20. Benjamin Ziff, “Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Eu rope Subcommittee,” November 3,

2015, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/110315_Ziff_Testimony.pdf.

21. Organ ization for Security and Cooperation in Eu rope (OSCE), “Freedom of Media Issues during the Ukraine Crisis”

(statements from 2013 to 2015 made by the representative on freedom in the media), http://www.osce.org

/fom/116021.

22. Roman Shutov, “Rus sian Propaganda in Ukraine: Fighting Phantoms,” Atlantic Council, February 3, 2016, http://

www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-propaganda-in-ukraine-fighting-phantoms.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 48 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21646280-russia-has-shown-its-mastery-propaganda-war-ukraine-struggling-catch-up-battle-web

http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/110315_Ziff_Testimony.pdf

http://www.osce.org/fom/116021

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-propaganda-in-ukraine-fighting-phantoms

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 49

acute in the DPR and LPR. In government- controlled areas the population enjoys a relatively high

baseline level of ser vices, but the strain of hosting more than a million IDPs has limited the effec-

tiveness of those ser vices to an extent. The DPR provides baseline levels of ser vices, but the sys-

tem is incredibly vulnerable to outside shocks and entirely dependent on Russian aid.23 Basic

ser vices are most limited in the LPR.

Capacity in Government- Controlled Areas

While the provision of public goods and ser vices continues at a moderate level in most sectors of

eastern Ukraine, its ability to absorb additional shocks is severely limited. Almost all programs are

underfunded and operating above capacity. The size and inefficiency of the bureaucracy, and its

centralization, hamper the ability of the state to respond in a timely manner to new challenges.

Although the state has been able to rely on civic groups and international organizations to fill gaps

during the crisis, those groups have been taxed after almost two years of conflict.24 Many suffer

from inadequate funding, a lack of coordination with other entities providing similar ser vices, and

only limited access to the decisionmaking pro cess of local and regional authorities. This is espe-

cially true of the informal organ izations that have not registered with the government. There are

also some indications that these organ izations are experiencing fatigue in managing humanitarian

needs, especially among IDPs. Resuming the war or the onset of another external crisis, such as a

polio epidemic or national disaster, would easily overwhelm the capacity of both government and

civic actors in eastern Ukraine.25

Basic infrastructure, including roads, sewers, the water supply, and electrical grid, is adequate,

though the Organ ization for Security and Cooperation in Eu rope (OSCE) reports periodic disrup-

tion of ser vices due to vio lence along the cease- fire line and some delay in repairing damaged

infrastructure.26 Despite these delays, core infrastructure including the roads and railways are well

developed and adequately maintained. This transportation network gives the government flexibility

to quickly respond to new separatist offensives. In addition, it should enable quick dissemination of

humanitarian aid and the movement of people out of the conflict zone.

Education continues to be provided for both local citizens and IDPs, with the exception of pre-

school and kindergarten programs that are largely at capacity and unable to welcome many

displaced children. The health care system and social systems are underfunded and badly strained.

The tenuous financial situation of the federal government severely limits the flow of cash from

Kyiv. An exodus of qualified staff from areas along the cease- fire line has made it difficult for the

government to provide ser vices. This prob lem is especially acute in the health care industry, as the

shortfall in staffing has coincided with a huge increase in demand for ser vices. An inefficient

23. International Crisis Group, “Rus sia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine.”

24. OSCE, Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine (Vienna: OSCE, February 2015), http://www.osce.org/ukraine

-smm/141046?download=true.

25. David Stern, “Ukraine Health Officials Fear Big Polio Outbreak,” BBC, September 22, 2015, http://www.bbc.com

/news/world-europe-34289480.

26. OSCE, “Daily and Spot Reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine,” statements from April 14, 2014 to

April 18, 2017, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 49 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/141046?download=true

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34289480

http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World50

bureaucratic pro cess further impedes delivery of goods. As discussed previously, every thing is

highly centralized and decisions typically require approval from national authorities.

Despite this, the local population continues to have access to ser vices even though some of these

ser vices are degraded. The internally displaced are particularly vulnerable and face the most

challenges in having their basic needs meet, especially nonregistered IDPs, the el derly, and the

disabled.27 Male IDPs are often discriminated against because the host communities assume they

have fought for the separatists. The Roma population, including the internally displaced, also faces

discrimination and open denial of access.28

Capacity in Separatist- Controlled Areas

The capacity of the governing institutions in separatist areas is much less developed than in

government- controlled areas. The DPR and LPR have begun to develop administrative capabilities

and many local administrative offices have continued to function under the new governments.

One of the most pressing challenges is the flight of human capital from the region.29 In the first

year of the conflict, an estimated 1.5 million fled separatist areas, close to one- third of the prewar

population. With the young, the educated, and the affluent leaving first, separatist areas were left

with the old, the poor, and the most vulnerable. The offices serving these populations suffer from

a lack of funding and staff shortages, as many staff were part of the exodus. Despite this, public

ser vice jobs are some of the only employment opportunities available outside of military ser vice,

and most municipal ser vices have continued their operations. In addition, there are indications that

Russia has begun to take a more direct role in funding social benefits, local salaries, and pen-

sions.30 Depending on the level of support offered by Moscow, this could greatly increase capac-

ity of the DPR and LPR to meet the basic needs of its population.

There is high unemployment, and the financial sector faces severe liquidity prob lems and insuffi-

cient collateral. The land and real estate markets have collapsed. The banking crisis is particularly

acute in the LPR, with citizens claiming they have to travel to Rus sia or government- controlled

areas to deposit or withdraw funds. Such travel is difficult because of severe restrictions on move-

ment into government- controlled territories. Law enforcement is not well equipped to deal with

human rights violations or increasing criminal activities, so that role has largely flowed to the

militias governing individual territories, especially in the LPR. Hospitals lack access to medicine,

and patients lack access to money to pay for medicine and ser vices. There is an acute shortage of

qualified staff, and prob lems with the supply of water and electricity also jeopardize care.31 In the

27. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine,”

December 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/ukraine-humanitarian

-needs-overview-hno-2015.

28. OSCE, Situation Assessment Report on Roma in Ukraine and the Impact of the Current Crisis (Warsaw: OSCE,

August 2014), http://www.osce.org/odihr/124494?download=true.

29. Andrew E. Kramer, “Nowhere to Run in Eastern Ukraine,” New York Times, November 13, 2014, https://www

.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/world/europe/nowhere-to-run-in-eastern-ukraine-.html?_r=2.

30. International Crisis Group, “Rus sia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine.”

31. OSCE, Access to Water in Conflict- Affected Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (Vienna: OSCE, Septem-

ber 2015), http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/183151?download=true.

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https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-overview-hno-2015

http://www.osce.org/odihr/124494?download=true

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/world/europe/nowhere-to-run-in-eastern-ukraine-.html?_r=2

http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/183151?download=true

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 51

LPR especially, access to food markets is limited due to a degradation of the transportation system

and continuing vio lence. There are reports of denial of ser vices to Ukraine speakers, Romani, and

the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Pensioners and those receiving

disability benefits are also in an extremely vulnerable position due to Kyiv’s decision to cut off

social payments to separatist areas.

Infrastructure has been badly damaged by the fighting, and OSCE reports suggest that delays

repairing road, water, and electrical networks are common.32 The DPR and LPR’s inability to

quickly remedy prob lems with critical infrastructure is an impor tant vulnerability that should be

exploited if hostilities resume. Targeting the road network could be a valuable way of limiting the

separatists’ abilities to move forces during military operations.

Security

Consistent low- level cease-fire violations and criminal activity undermine the security of the

population.33 Despite the requirements of Minsk II, heavy weapons have not been withdrawn from

the line of contact, making rapid escalation of the conflict a significant risk. Armed forces on both

sides continue to use artillery, mortars, tanks, armored vehicles, and firearms. Mines and unex-

ploded ordinance pose a threat to people residing in the conflict zone.34 While no major regional

offensives have been undertaken, there have been episodes of fighting around Mariinka, Starohna-

tivka, Novolaspa, Avidiivka, Yasinovata, and Horlivka.35

Between April 2014 and November 2016, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine

recorded 32,453 conflict- related casualties in Ukraine.36 In the four months between August and

November 2016, the UN recorded 32 civilian deaths and 132 injuries, which was a decrease com-

pared to the previous reporting period. Killings, abduction, torture, sexual vio lence, forced labor,

and extortion by separatist groups are common. There are also reports of arbitrary detention and

torture in government- controlled areas by security ser vices and paramilitary organ izations affili-

ated with the government of Ukraine. The vio lence has forced many people to leave their homes,

resulting in an exodus of refugees to Rus sia and an influx of IDPs from the conflict zone to more

stable areas of Ukraine.

In May 2016, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Global Focus website estimated

that there were approximately 1.8 million displaced people in Ukraine, most of them residing in

Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. While the vio lence is widespread and specific groups do not appear

32. OSCE, “Daily and Spot Reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.”

33. Ibid.

34. OSCE, “Cleaning Up Unexploded Ordinance in Eastern Ukraine,” July 31, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine

/175491.

35. Paul Quinn- Judge, “Ukraine’s Meat Grinder Back in Business,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2016, http://foreignpolicy

.com/2016/04/12/ukraines-meat-grinder-is-back-in-business/.

36. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Report on the Human Rights Situation in

Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November,” December 8, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UA

Report16th_EN.pdf.

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http://www.osce.org/ukraine/175491

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/ukraines-meat-grinder-is-back-in-business/

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport16th_EN.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World52

to be systematically targeted, the Tartar population, the Roma, and individuals suspected of coop-

erating with the opposing side are at a heightened risk.

Ukraine’s Military, the Paramilitary, and NATO

On the government side, the primary actor in the security sphere is the Ukrainian military and

Ukraine’s security forces. Prior to the onset of the crisis, these forces were not well postured to

counter a Russian threat, but their effectiveness against separatist groups during the so- named

anti- terrorist operation testifies to their ability to fight less- experienced adversaries.37 The Ukrai-

nian military lacked training and had little experience coordinating operations across multiple

units. Furthermore, the corruption that undermined the effectiveness of civilian institutions was

also rampant in defense. The transition toward professionalization was never completed, and more

than 60 percent of military personnel are conscripts.38 The military has been underfunded, and

the logistics and acquisition pro cess is antiquated and inefficient, diminishing the potential effects

of military aid.39 However, the conflict in the Donbas has forced Ukraine’s military to transform

and it is evolving into a more effective fighting force.40 Training by NATO, the United States, and

partner countries plus two years of combat experience have served as catalysts, but more needs

to be done, especially in logistics, medical capabilities, intelligence, and command and control.

The in effec tive ness of the Ukrainian military in the early days of the conflict led to the formation of

volunteer militias.41 Although these paramilitary groups officially fall under the control of Ukraine’s

armed forces or security ser vices, they are often funded by the nation’s oligarchs and coordination

between them and the official armed forces has been weak. The AZOV battalion, which is affiliated

with the national guard, proved especially effective but has also been criticized for its far- right

nationalist tendencies and neo- Nazi agenda.42 A number of these volunteer battalions have

blocked humanitarian convoys destined for separatist areas.43 While volunteer forces have played

a central role in fighting the separatists, their allegiance and po liti cal agenda are not always aligned

with Kyiv’s preferences. Reforms passed since 2014 moved to incorporate many of these organ-

izations into the official military and security forces, but they still retain much autonomy and there

are significant risks of politicization, criminalization, and fragmentation.

37. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Rus sia and Ukraine: Not the Military Balance You Think,” War on the Rocks, November 10,

2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/russia-and-ukraine-not-the-military-balance-you-think/.

38. Charles Recknagel, “Explainer: How Do Rus sia’s and Ukraine’s Armies Compare?,” Radio Free Eu rope/Radio Liberty,

March 6, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-armies-compare/25287910.html.

39. Jen Judson, “What the Ukrainian Military Really Needs,” Politico, August 27, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article

/ukraine-military-really-needs-defense/.

40. Ian J. Brzezinski, “Ukrainian Reforms Two Years after the Maidan Revolution and the Rus sian Invasion” (Testimony

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 15, 2015), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media

/doc/031516_Brzezinski_Testimony.pdf.

41. Oleg Shynkarenko, “Volunteers Bolster Ukraine’s Fighting Force,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, June 26,

2014, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/volunteers-bolster-ukraines-fighting-force.

42. Alec Luhn, “Preparing for War with Ukraine’s Fascist Defenders of Freedom,” Foreign Policy, August 30, 2014, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/30/preparing-for-war-with-ukraines-fascist-defenders-of-freedom/.

43. Amnesty International, “Eastern Ukraine; Humanitarian Disaster Looms as Food Aid Blocked,” December 24, 2014,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/eastern-ukraine-humanitarian-disaster-looms-food-aid-blocked/.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 52 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/russia-and-ukraine-not-the-military-balance-you-think/

http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-armies-compare/25287910.html

http://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-military-really-needs-defense/

http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031516_Brzezinski_Testimony.pdf

https://iwpr.net/global-voices/volunteers-bolster-ukraines-fighting-force

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/30/preparing-for-war-with-ukraines-fascist-defenders-of-freedom/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/eastern-ukraine-humanitarian-disaster-looms-food-aid-blocked/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 53

The Ukrainian military has an existing relationship with NATO, which can provide a framework for

cooperation.44 While Ukraine is not a NATO member, and NATO neither will nor should intervene

directly in fighting, expertise resident within NATO and allied governments regarding civil emer-

gency planning, defense planning and reform, disaster preparedness, cyber defense, critical infra-

structure, and civilian protection provides useful points of intersection where NATO members can

provide Ukraine with advice, training, and resources to deal with both the humanitarian and mili-

tary challenges of an ensuing crisis.

Ukraine and U.S. Eu ro pean Command (USEUCOM) established a Joint Commission in Octo-

ber 2014 to deepen their relationship.45 This commission provides both a vehicle for the provision

of military security assistance as well as a systematic framework for cooperation on military reform

modernization and training. Ukraine participates in vari ous military exercises with the United States

to enhance interoperability and readiness, including Rapid Trident, See Breeze, and Immediate

Response. The United States provides direct training to the Ukraine military through the Joint

Multinational Training Group, and in 2016 it gave $335 million in security assistance.46

Armed Groups in Separatist- Controlled Areas

There are a number of armed groups operating in separatist- controlled areas of eastern Ukraine.

The Donbas People’s Militia is the umbrella organ ization for most of the Ukrainian groups in the

DPR, including the Vostok Battalion, the Rus sian Orthodox Army, the Army of the Southeast, the

Oplot Battalion, the Zaraya Battalion, and the Kalmias Battalion. Although President Zarachenko

has been more successful in centralizing power than his counter parts in the LPR, there have been

indications of infighting between rebel groups and an inability to adequately control subordinate

military leaders.47

The situation in the LPR is more fractured.48 Diff er ent groups have assumed territorial control of

vari ous parts of the province— often using their military power to dictate policy in those areas as

well. They rarely work together and often clash with each other and the authorities in Luhansk.

The LPR’s military control only extends to the outskirts of Luhansk city. The most power ful groups

are associated with the Cossacks, who are closely tied to the Rus sian state.49 While there are

44. North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization (NATO), “Relations with Ukraine,” November 22, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps

/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.

45. U.S. Eu ro pean Command (USEUCOM), “Readout of Ukraine- US Joint Commission,” October 21, 2014, http://www

.eucom.mil/media-library/article/28857/readout-of-ukraine-us-joint-commission.

46. U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, “Fact Sheet: U.S. and NATO Efforts in Support of NATO

Partners, including Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova,” July 10, 2016, https://nato.usmission.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-nato

-efforts-support-nato-partners/.

47. Paul Quinn- Judge, “Disorder Spreads among Russian- Backed Ukrainian Rebels,” International Crisis Group, July 16,

2015, http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2015/07/16/disorder-spreads-among-russian-backed-ukrainian

-rebels/.

48. Vladimir Socor, “Armed Formations in the Secessionist ‘Luhansk Republic,’ ” International Center for Defense and

Security, January 10, 2015, https://www.icds.ee/blog/article/armed-formations-in-the-secessionist-luhansk-republic/.

49. Simon Shuster, “Meet the Cossack ‘Wolves’ Doing Rus sia’s Dirty Work in Ukraine,” Time, May 12, 2014, http://time

.com/95898/wolves-hundred-ukraine-russia-cossack/.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 53 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm

http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/28857/readout-of-ukraine-us-joint-commission

https://nato.usmission.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-nato-efforts-support-nato-partners/

http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2015/07/16/disorder-spreads-among-russian-backed-ukranian-rebels/

https://www.icds.ee/blog/article/armed-formations-in-the-secessionist-luhansk-republic/

http://time.com/95898/wolves-hundred-ukraine-russia-cossack/

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World54

divisions within the vari ous Cossack forces, most groups show disdain for Kyiv and the LPR,

though they have been willing to cooperate with the LPR to fight government forces. Importantly,

many do not consider Minsk II legitimate. They also have divergent po liti cal goals, as many of the

Cossack groups wish to establish a Cossack state, separate from either of the self- declared

people’s republics. In fall 2015, infighting between Cossack warlords and LPR forces intensified.50

Rus sia’s Military Involvement

Rus sia has provided indirect support to separatist rebels since the beginning of the conflict, but in

August 2014 it drastically escalated the conflict by sending tanks, artillery, personnel carriers,

surface- to- air missiles, and thousands of Rus sian troops without insignia to the border.51 Less

than two months later after agreeing to a ceasefire as part of the Minsk I in September 2014, Rus sia

again sent its military forces across the border.52 In both cases, support from Rus sia’s military

forces enabled the separatists to reverse government gains and capture valuable territory. It was

not until Minsk II was signed in February 2014 that Rus sia began withdrawing its forces from

Ukraine. Some Rus sian units remain in Ukraine and others are stationed just across the border.

During the major offensives of 2014, Rus sia took the lead role in coordinating military operations,

and it recently took steps to bring separatist groups into a more formal military system with Rus-

sian officers acting as commanders.53 At the strategic level, Moscow’s pressure has been critical in

forcing the separatists to abide (or not) by the terms of the ceasefire. Russian military units and

volunteers continue to operate in Ukraine, separatist militias are entirely dependent on Rus sian

military aid to remain operational, and Cossack groups affiliated with Rus sia are among the most

power ful of eastern Ukraine’s warlords.54 In addition, Russian military units stationed along the

border can deploy rapidly and have taken an active part in local fighting at least two times since

Minsk II.55 The continuation of both the LPR and DPR are predicated on continued Rus sian

support.

50. Andrew E. Kramer, “Cossacks Face Grim Reprisals from One- Time Allies in Eastern Ukraine,” New York Times,

August 4, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/europe/cossacks-face-reprisals-as-rebel-groups-clash

-in-eastern-ukraine.html.

51. Marek Menkiszak, Rafał Sadowski, and Piotr Żochowski, “The Rus sian Military Intervention in Eastern Ukraine,”

Center for Eastern Studies, September 3, 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-03/russian

-military-intervention-eastern-ukraine.

52. “Ukraine and Pro- Russian Rebels Sign Ceasefire,” BBC, September 5, 2014, http:// www . bbc . com / news / world - europe

- 29082574 .

53. International Crisis Group, “Rus sia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine,” February 5, 2016, https:// www . crisisgroup

. org / europe - central - asia / eastern - europe / ukraine / russia - and - separatists - eastern - ukraine .

54. John E. Herbst, “The Double Challenge to Ukraine: Kremlin Aggression and Reform,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Eu rope and Regional Security Cooperation, March 15, 2016,

http:// www . foreign . senate . gov / imo / media / doc / 031516 _ Herbst _ Testimony . pdf; Sabrina Tavernise, “Whisked Away for

Tea with a Rebel in Ukraine,” New York Times, July 15, 2014, https:// www . nytimes . com / 2014 / 07 / 16 / world / europe

/ whisked - away - for - tea - with - a - rebel - in - ukraine . html .

55. International Crisis Group, “Rus sia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine,” February 5, 2016, https:// www

. crisisgroup . org / europe - central - asia / eastern - europe / ukraine / russia - and - separatists - eastern - ukraine .

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 54 5/20/17 1:03 PM

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/europe/cossacks-face-reprisals-as-rebel-groups-clash-in-eastern-ukraine.html

https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-03/russian-military-intervention-eastern-ukraine

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29082574

https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/russia-and-separatists-eastern-ukraine

http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031516_Herbst_Testimony.pdf

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/europe/whisked-away-for-tea-with-a-rebel-in-ukraine.html

https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/russia-and-separatists-eastern-ukraine

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 55

STATE OF PLAY

The beginning of 2017 saw an increase in vio lence along the cease- fire line. There have been

significant military operations in Adviddvka, Yasinovata, and Horlivka.56 There are also indications

that heavy artillery and tanks, weapons both sides removed from the conflict zone as part of Minsk

II, have been reintroduced into the cease- fire zone.57 At the same time, high- level talks between

Rus sia, Ukraine, France, and Germany have failed to produce agreement on implementation of the

remaining Minsk II requirements. Elections have yet to be held in separatist- controlled areas, with

Ukraine blaming the separatists for poor security and lack of access and Rus sia blaming Kyiv for

not moving forward with legislation on decentralization.58 Ukraine has been struggling with an

internal po liti cal crisis, which culminated in Vladimir Groysman replacing Arseniy Yatsenyuk as

prime minister.59 That crisis delayed disbursement of much- needed aid from the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) as implementation of impor tant anticorruption mea sures stalled. However,

Kyiv has achieved a number of policy successes that will have direct bearing on the capacity of

Ukraine to deal with a renewed crisis in the Donbas, including stabilization of Ukraine’s

currency (the hryvnia), the establishment of an anticorruption bureau, the initiation of civil ser vice

reform, and the devolution of authority to local and regional governments for ser vice and policing

functions.60

In addition to sanctioning Rus sia for its involvement in Ukraine, the United States and its Eu ro pean

partners have taken steps to enhance Ukraine’s capacity to counter renewed separatist offensives

by addressing many of the under lying weaknesses discussed.61 The United States and a handful of

its NATO allies provide training programs for Ukraine’s military personnel and border guards.62

They have also provided nonlethal military assistance to the government of Ukraine, including

HMMWVs (“Humvees”), armored cars, radars, communications equipment, ordnance disposal

robots, food, and medical supplies. The United States has also provided financial assistance to

56. OSCE, “Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine,” February 1, 2017, http://www.osce.org

/ukraine-smm/296961/.

57. Christopher Miller, “Our Tanks Are Ready: Ukraine Braces for Escalation in Eastern War,” Radio Free Eu rope/Radio

Liberty, February 3, 2017, http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-avdiyivka-fighting-escalation/28276963.html.

58. Daniel Schearf, “Ukraine Talks Seek Pro gress, but Donbas Elections Remain a Hurdle,” Voice of Amer i ca, May 17,

2016, http://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-talks-seeks-progress-but-donbas-elections-remain-a-hurdle/3334350

.html.

59. Andrew Roth, “Ukraine’s Parliament Elects Government amid Po liti cal Crisis,” Washington Post, April 14, 2016,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraines-parliament-elects-new-government-amid-political-crisis/2016/04/14

/ffdd2919-0312-4ced-89d8-402317002762_story.html.

60. Victoria Nuland, “Ukrainian Reforms Two Years after the Maidan Protests and the Rus sian Invasion” (Testimony

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 15, 2016), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media

/doc/031516_Nuland_Testimony.pdf.

61. U.S. Department of State, “Ukraine and Rus sia Sanctions,” Executive Order 13660, signed March 6, 2014, https://

www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.

62. Vincent Morelli, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Ser vice, January 3, 2017, https://

fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf; NATO, “NATO’s Support to Ukraine,” Fact Sheet, July 2016, http://www.nato.int

/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-eng.pdf.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 55 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/296961/

http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-avdiyivka-fighting-escalation/28276963.html

http://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-talks-seeks-progress-but-donbas-elections-remain-a-hurdle/3334350.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraines-parliament-elects-new-government-amid-political-crisis/2016/04/14/ffdd2919-0312-4ced-89d8-402317002762_story.html

http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031516_Nuland_Testimony.pdf

https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-eng.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World56

support civil society, anticorruption mea sures, and UNHCR’s humanitarian work with IDPs. NATO

also established six trust funds, which facilitates allied contributions to Ukraine’s efforts in the areas

of logistics and standardization; command, control, communications, and computers (C4); cyber

defense, and military career management; medical rehabilitation; and counter- improvised explo-

sive devices (C- IED) and explosive ordnance disposal.63

Significant resources have also been dedicated to countering Rus sia’s disinformation campaign in

eastern Ukraine. In April 2014, President Barack Obama signed S. 2183, the United States Interna-

tional Programming to Ukraine and Neighboring Regions Act, which required Radio Free Eu rope,

Radio Liberty, and Voice of America to increase broadcasting into eastern Ukraine64 and the

Department of State established a rapid response system so that U.S. embassies could quickly

supply content- and fact- based narratives to local communities in the event of a crisis.65 The EU

has set up a division within the European External Action Service to provide Russian- language

broadcasting programs and real- time fact checking of local and Rus sian sources.66 NATO has

launched a Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence to provide a larger framework for

countering Rus sia propaganda, including programs to train local journalists in best practices.67

Ukraine has also taken a number of steps to limit Russia’s ability to influence the information

space.68 They have banned Rus sian broadcasting channels and films in Ukraine, adopted a law

requiring media companies to publicly disclose who owns them, and launched a patriotic informa-

tion campaign to provide an alternative to Rus sia’s narrative. Fi nally, there has been considerable

coordination at the intergovernmental level with the launch of “Friends of Ukraine,” a member

network of more than 20 governments and multilateral organ izations that share information so

that they can respond to Rus sia’s disinformation campaigns in real time through multiple voices.69

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

Overall, much of eastern Ukraine’s fragility has been induced by Rus sia’s policies in the Donbas,

though some challenges stem from structural prob lems in Ukraine’s economy and po liti cal sys-

tem. In the event of a renewed separatist offensive, the United States and its partners would be

wise to develop operational plans that address three key challenges: Rus sia’s involvement in the

63. “NATO’s Support to Ukraine: Fact Sheet,” North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, July 2016, http:// www . nato . int / nato

_ static _ fl2014 / assets / pdf / pdf _ 2016 _ 07 / 20160627 _ 1607 - factsheet - nato - ukraine - support - eng . pdf .

64. “The United States International Programming to Ukraine and Neighboring Regions Act,” https:// www . congress

. gov / bill / 113th - congress / senate - bill / 2183 .

65. Ziff, “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.”

66. “EU Launches Operation to Counter Rus sian Propaganda,” EURACTIV . com, March 20, 2015, http://www.euractiv

.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-launches-operation-to-counter-russian-propaganda/.

67. NATO Strategic Communications Centre, “About Us,” accessed September 2016, http://www.stratcomcoe.org

/about-us.

68. Shutov, “Rus sian Propaganda in Ukraine: Fighting Phantoms.”

69. EuroMaidan, “Friends of Ukraine Network,” accessed March 2016, http://euromaidanpress.com/friends-of-ukraine

-network/.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 56 5/20/17 1:03 PM

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-eng.pdf

https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2183

http://EURACTIV.com

http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-launches-operation-to-counter-russian-propaganda/

http://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us

http://euromaidanpress.com/friends-of-ukraine-network/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 57

crisis, Ukraine’s highly centralized and bureaucratized pro cess, and the corruption and inefficien-

cies of Ukraine’s military.

Rus sian Disinformation Campaign

Rus sia’s disinformation campaign distorted the public’s perception of Ukraine’s government,

playing on historical grievances and under lying distrust of Ukrainian officials to discredit the state,

its institutions, and its international and nongovernmental partners. Increased Rus sian influence in

local media complicates other actors’ abilities to advance an alternative narrative.

Rus sian Support to Separatists

Rus sia’s direct involvement in the fighting prevented the Ukrainian government’s “antiterrorist

operation” from defeating the separatists in the summer of 2014, and Rus sian financial support is a

prerequisite for the continued functioning of both the DPR and the LPR. Rus sia’s engagement

heightens the security imperative for the United States, because how effectively the United States

and its partners respond to Moscow’s aggression— conventional or other wise— has implications for

the security of other Eastern Eu ro pean states, including NATO allies in the Baltic States. Rus sian

intervention exacerbates the under lying sources of instability, while making direct U.S. involvement

incredibly risky.

It also makes it more difficult to achieve the core U.S. objective of avoiding escalation with Rus sia.

The Obama administration’s response focused on economic sanctions, isolating Rus sia diplomati-

cally, and reinforcing Eu rope’s defense posture. It limited direct assistance to Ukraine to humani-

tarian and non- lethal aid because the United States feared that providing weapons could prompt

an escalatory response from Moscow. However, expanding this aid to defensive military systems,

such as antitank missiles and recoilless rifles, could play an impor tant role in enabling Ukraine to

defend itself against a new incursion.

Over- Bureaucratization and Centralization

Another key challenge is the difficulty of providing assistance rapidly in a highly bureaucratized and

centralized system. Because all decisions must be approved by Kyiv, local organ izations cannot

respond quickly to emerging challenges or rapidly changing threats. In addition, aid that is pro-

vided to the central government often does not reach local ser vice providers quickly enough,

limiting the impact of that aid in crisis situations. Centralization has also hampered lateral commu-

nication between local, regional, and civic organ izations. This leads to duplication of ser vices and

also leaves most of these organ izations with informational gaps that prevent the efficient use of

their limited resources.

Corruption in Ukraine’s Military and Paramilitary

Corruption and inefficiencies in Ukraine’s military undermine the logistics and acquisition pro cess,

making it difficult to move men and matériel quickly. This also limits the effectiveness of military

aid in the short term. Volunteer battalions that could serve as effective partners in a military con-

flict are only loosely integrated into Ukraine’s military, complicating command and control.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World58

Furthermore, the far- right leanings of some groups feed into Rus sian discourse about the threat

the Ukrainian government poses to minority groups in the east.

OPPORTUNITIES AND ASSETS

Despite these challenges, should a new crisis erupt, eastern Ukraine has a number of characteris-

tics that should be leveraged, including a robust civil society, a unitary decisionmaking pro cess,

and an enemy with a fractured authority structure.

Robust Civil Society

Ukraine’s strong civil society can be leveraged now and if the conflict escalates.70 These organ-

izations enjoy widespread trust and have flexibility to respond rapidly to new challenges. For the

most part, they do not suffer from the corruption that plagues government offices and serve as

credible purveyors of assistance to the population.

Unitary Decisionmaking and Shared Objectives

Ukraine has strong authority structures in government- controlled areas, which ensure one deci-

sionmaking unit. The United States knows who its national government partner is and does not

have to worry about balancing the competing priorities of multiple partners or identifying who can

set and implement decisions. While the centralized structure of Ukraine’s government leads to

inefficiencies and delays, compliance is not an issue, and the risk of local spoilers purposefully

undermining government policies is low in government- controlled areas. Excepting a few para-

military groups, the United States and Ukraine do not have to worry about monitoring or securing

compliance from federal, regional, or local entities.

In addition, national and local entities share the broader goal of preserving the territorial integrity

of Ukraine, defending against separatist attacks, and meeting the needs of the civilian population

affected by the fighting. These shared objectives mean that decentralizing the decisionmaking

pro cess in the name of efficiency is workable. Policies adopted during a crisis that empower civil

society organ izations (CSOs), facilitate information sharing across local and regional offices, and

provide direct aid to local entities have few short- term risks because these entities share Kyiv’s

goals. In addition, the temporal trade- off between empowering local entities and building long-

term capacity is much less acute than in other cases, especially in the realm of ser vice provision.

Fragmented Control in Separatist Areas

Separatist- controlled areas are characterized by a fractured authority structure that can be ex-

ploited. As discussed previously, infighting between vari ous armed factions in both the DPR and

LPR is common, and many of these groups do not share a common vision of the future. Identify-

ing ideological schisms and conflict points between diff er ent groups and mapping those against

functional and territorial divisions of labor should enable Kyiv and its partners to target areas where

infighting has weakened military capacity. The LPR’s relative weakness suggests that its fiefdoms

70. OSCE, Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine.

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 59

would be particularly vulnerable to concerted counterattacks. Also, coordination prob lems have

made it difficult for separatist authorities to quickly repair damage to infrastructure. Targeting the

road network could be a valuable way of limiting the separatists’ abilities to move forces during

military operations.

Rus sian Influence

Moscow’s relationship with the separatist governments, while challenging, provides a number of

pivot points that could be assets. First, Rus sia can and does exercise control over separatist armed

groups, making it pos si ble to negotiate with Moscow, rather than trying to negotiate with a series

of armed groups with differing goals, each of which has limited ability to enforce compliance writ

large. The structure of the kurator system enhances these points of leverage. The most obvious is

the lack of horizontal communication structures between the vari ous armed groups. Each of the

armed groups has strong ties to Moscow and its local kurators but weak or dysfunctional ties with

other armed groups. This hierarchy is likely to hamper the agility of separatist forces to respond to

emerging opportunities or threats on the battlefield and may create opportunities for direct en-

gagement with Rus sia. Additionally, resentment of Rus sia’s manipulation of aid for po liti cal ends

creates opportunities for the U.S. media strategy to highlight specific grievances and focus public

attention on the divergent objectives of Moscow and the vari ous armed groups.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Working closely with Ukraine’s civil society organ izations, the United States can limit the humani-

tarian and social consequences of a renewed offensive, freeing up Ukraine to focus on defending

its sovereignty. Rus sia’s involvement makes direct intervention unpalatable, but the United States

can still affect the outcome of the conflict by imposing diplomatic and economic costs on Rus sia

and its proxies, and by providing aid to Ukraine. Consequently, the United States’ immediate opera-

tional response to a renewed offensive should focus on the rapid provision of military assistance

and advisers to the region; the establishment of information- sharing channels so that threat

intelligence can be quickly collected, analyzed, and distributed to Ukraine’s military, government,

and media; and the management of humanitarian consequences of the offensive. The United

States has a lot of flexibility to reinforce Ukraine’s military indirectly through assistance programs

for logistics, command and control, and other support functions.

To most effectively carry out these tasks in Ukraine, the United States and its allies should focus on

three things: utilizing local partnerships, leveraging existing networks, and exploiting under lying

weaknesses in separatist controlled areas.

1. Utilize local actors

Funnel aid to the local organ izations that are providing ser vices to the civilian population to

increase the speed with which military and humanitarian assistance reaches target popula-

tions. When pos si ble, in crisis situations the United States should focus on providing aid

directly to local ser vice providers in order to circumvent the federal government’s inefficient

(and corrupt) bureaucratic pro cess. This should be undertaken with Kyiv’s permission, and

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World60

when pos si ble, via international organ izations working within Ukraine that already have

established relationships with local entities. Although this may undermine the long- term

goal of building Kyiv’s capacity to govern more effectively, enabling local organ izations to

respond to the immediate needs of civilians affected by a renewed offensive must be priori-

tized during times of crisis. This will increase the speed with which aid reaches targeted

populations and decrease the probability that aid will get misused or misappropriated by

corrupt individuals. The United States should strengthen and expand the mechanisms that

make it easier for the U.S. government to partner directly with local and regional govern-

mental actors and CSOs.

Empower local governing bodies to interact more with each other so that they are less

dependent on Kyiv. The United States should continue investing in programs that facilitate

cooperation and coordination between CSOs, local authorities, and provincial authorities

in peacetime so that those relationship and communication channels can be utilized

during a crisis, thereby enabling more rapid responses. These programs should emphasize

creating linkages between civil society and local government officials so that the legiti-

macy and experience of the CSOs can contribute to the future capacity of local authori-

ties.

One way of doing this would be to help Ukraine establish a crisis information hub to

facilitate real- time information sharing between local actors engaged in military opera-

tions and the humanitarian response. This hub could serve as a local focal point for infor-

mation exchange among journalists, civil society organ izations, and local government

organ izations responsible for addressing the humanitarian and military crisis. This will

enable local information to be shared broadly and quickly, while minimizing the duplica-

tion of ser vices so that resources can be quickly diverted to areas that are underfunded or

understaffed. Ukraine’s intelligence analysts should also utilize this center so that the

military can benefit from local information collected by other entities. There are several

humanitarian coordination centers run by the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that could

serve as the primary hub during times of crisis. To enable quick mobilization, the center to

be repurposed should be identified beforehand and a plan for quickly reor ga niz ing opera-

tions to respond to a crisis and bring in additional stakeholders, including the military,

should be developed. In other crises, where those coordination centers do not already

exist, the ability to rapidly build such an organ ization from scratch could be a power ful

tool. Having periodic exercises in which identified centers practice quickly repurposing

their efforts to information management during war time would help prepare them for

future crises.

2. Leverage existing intergovernmental networks

Strengthen linkages between humanitarian response networks and local CSOs. The United

States should utilize the existing relationship that USAID and the National Endowment for

Democracy (NED) have with local civil society to identify useful partners and to serve as a

mechanism for building the capacity of governance CSOs to provide ser vices in a conflict

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 61

environment.71 For example, connecting the work of the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster

Assistance (OFDA) to the work that it is doing through its Democracy, Human Rights, and

Governance division would enable the expertise of OFDA and its local partners to be trans-

ferred to the CSOs that do not normally focus on ser vice provision, but who— during the

crisis— put other operations on hold to focus on the humanitarian crisis. These organ izations

can be power ful partners in responding to the crisis, but they are also the ones that need

the most support because their institutional knowledge is not focused on ser vice delivery. If

these institutional linkages were accompanied with flexible spending mandates that enabled

transition assistance and governance funds to be diverted to ser vice provision during crises,

CSOs working with those divisions would have more resources to respond to the basic

needs of the population, and the United States would have a larger number of partners to

work with. The close partnership between the Office of Transition Initiative (OTI) and OFDA,

both focused on ser vice provision, is an impor tant step in this direction. The United States

needs to continue to strengthen these programs and to provide additional mechanisms for

connecting them so that CSOs have flexibility to adapt their mandates and their spending

during crises. It would also be useful to facilitate coordination between CSOs and local

government officials and to encourage informal civil society organ izations to register so

they can benefit from aid and coordination activities.

Work with NATO and Eu ro pean partners to establish a dedicated emergency response trust

fund that Ukraine can draw from in emergencies so that resources can be quickly deployed

to meet short- term needs in crisis. This would help ensure that military assistance is not

impeded by the bureaucratic or po liti cal pro cess. The trust fund should be set up so that

Ukraine can access funds without prior approval when certain conditions are met (e.g.,

large- scale separatist offensives, or the movement of Rus sian conventional units across the

border). Such a mechanism would serve a dual purpose. It would enable military assistance

to be deployed rapidly in a crisis, while also creating an automated trip wire whereby Rus sia

will know that aid will flow automatically if they take certain actions. This would make it

more difficult for Rus sia to take advantage of the NATO deliberation pro cess to create fait

accomplis on the ground before aid can reach Ukraine’s military forces. As discussed above,

NATO currently has six trust funds that focus on varying ele ments of reform. While the

emergency trust fund is being established, NATO should consider creating legal mecha-

nisms that enable Ukraine to draw from these existing sources when the above conditions

are met. There are long- term costs of doing so, as this would necessarily divert funds from

vari ous reform efforts, but in crisis situations, addressing short- term needs should be para-

mount. While trust fund members may resist giving Ukraine flexibility to spend money on

nonallocated expenses, circumscribing the conditions under which diversion could be used,

limiting the length of time in which diversion could occur, and building in repayment obliga-

tions could allay some of those concerns. In the long term, the establishment of a dedicated

71. National Endowment for Democracy (NED), “Ukraine 2015,” http://www.ned.org/region/central-and-eastern-

europe/ukraine-2015/; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Democracy, Human Rights, and Gover-

nance,” accessed September 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/ukraine/democracy-human-rights-and-governance.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 61 5/20/17 1:04 PM

http://www.ned.org/region/central-and-eastern-europe/ukraine-2015/

https://www.usaid.gov/ukraine/democracy-human-rights-and-governance

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World62

emergency trust fund would be preferable to the use of the existing trust fund for crisis

management.

3. Exploit weaknesses in separatist areas

Provide intelligence assets and analy sis that enable the Ukraine military to target key vulner-

abilities in separatist areas. Capacity and coordination prob lems with infrastructure repair in

both the LPR and DPR make this a key vulnerability, and U.S. Imagery Intelligence capabili-

ties could be leveraged to enable Ukraine to target key nodes that would limit the separat-

ists’ ability to move forces during military operations. Other assets could be leveraged to

help Ukraine target geo graph i cal areas where competing LPR authority structures overlap to

take advantage of infighting between the groups.

Craft a public information strategy that highlights the divergent aims of diff er ent armed

groups, exploits separatist frustration with Moscow’s unwillingness to bring them into the

core decisionmaking pro cess, and emphasizes pressures on Moscow to abandon the sepa-

ratists’ compromise with Ukraine.

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0 5

Responding to a Cross- Border Health Crisis Sarah Minot

INTRODUCTION

In today’s urbanized, globalized, and mobile world, emerging disease threats pres ent unpre ce-

dented challenges to global health security. The routine movement of peoples, whether by choice

or forced displacement from conflict and crisis, creates an interdependent and insecure interna-

tional health system. Disease threats are unpredictable and can rapidly spread across borders,

straining international health systems even in relatively stable and secure nations. In weak and

unstable nations, however, preventing and responding to disease threats is exceedingly problem-

atic. Epidemics originating in unstable regions with weak systems and poor capacity can fuel the

spread of preventable diseases internationally. Unaddressed, such threats can in turn further

destabilize already- vulnerable states and contribute to the internationalization of a health security

crisis.

Severe lack of capacity, weak institutions, and impoverishment throughout West Africa heighten

vulnerability to disease outbreaks. Following the Ebola crisis, the region has progressed in some

facets but remains susceptible in others. Although the Ebola crisis has abated in part due to the

massive influx of international assistance, it is not over, and a crisis could easily recur. The United

States must learn how to better operate and respond to health crises in unstable and weak

environments.

The ramifications and aftermath of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa provide the basis for examin-

ing international response and recovery to a health crisis of international significance in weak,

vulnerable, and fragile regions. The epidemic’s spread across three adjacent states of Liberia, Sierra

Leone, and Guinea emphasizes the complexities of emergency response in a crisis that extends

beyond the borders of a single nation.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World64

SECURITY IMPERATIVE

West Africa remains at risk of resurgent epidemic conditions if not properly monitored and man-

aged. The regionalized nature of a crisis significantly complicates international efforts given the

need to coordinate across multiple national entities and diff er ent government structures. In the

face of another multistate health security crisis, the United States must take a number of essential

steps to respond and prevent further escalation of the crisis by containing, limiting, and ultimately

stopping the spread of the disease. The immediate requirements:

• Conduct a comprehensive health assessment to determine the extent and scale of the

outbreak, identify its origin and pathways, and evaluate the capabilities and capacities in

those locations for managing a health emergency.

• Engage quickly with national governments of affected nations and World Health Organ-

ization (WHO) authorities to determine the scope of the outbreak and issue a timely declara-

tion of a public health emergency of international concern, if appropriate.

• Assess operational shortfalls in terms of institutional capacities, infrastructure, and security.

• Identify key actors and potential partners at the regional, national, and local levels, and

determine the extent to which the United States already has programming or relationships in

the country or region.

• Develop multifaceted systems of communication with organ izations and governments that

are already working on the crisis, the affected communities and region, and with prac ti tion-

ers on the ground.

• Secure appropriate funding and authorities to ensure sufficient resources for personnel and

medical supplies and facilities. In the current environment, health crises require emergency

funding from Congress.

• Get the right experts on the ground and get the right medical supplies and facilities in place

and accessible to vulnerable populations. Training and appropriate supplies for specific

diseases are vital.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Geography and Demography

This case focuses on three states in Western Africa: Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. Ebola spread

beyond the countries of focus to Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Spain, the United States, the United King-

dom, and Italy, but for the purposes of this analy sis, the scope is confined to the intersection

where the crisis is most severe and where the national and international capacities are completely

overwhelmed. Although fear engulfed the world, the rest of the countries affected by Ebola were

able to contain the spread without requiring broader international intervention.

All three countries are ethnically diverse with a range of religious traditions. Sierra Leone has two

main ethnic groups, the Temne and Mende, with several smaller groups including the Limba, Kono,

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 64 5/20/17 1:04 PM

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 65

Kriole, Mandingo, and Loko. Another significant group in the country are refugees from Liberia

who came to Sierra Leone to flee the Liberian civil war. Sierra Leone’s main religions are Islam and

indigenous beliefs, with a minority Christian population. Liberia has a wide range of ethnic groups

including the Kpelle, Bassa, Grebo, Gio, Mano, Kru, Lorma, Kissi, Gola, and other. There is no

dominant ethnic group or widespread competition between two dominant groups in Liberia. The

country is predominantly Christian with minority Muslim and traditional populations. Guinea has

several dominant ethnic groups that have traditionally competed for authority, the Malinke and

Fulani. Other groups include the Soussou, Guerze, Kissi, and Toma. Guinea’s predominant religion

is Islam, with a smaller Christian minority. Some of the ethnic groups intersect across borders and

the populations are mobile across national borders.

History

Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia are exceptionally poor countries, each with inadequate infra-

structure, poor governance, and national governments frequently accused of corruption.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World66

Historically each country strug gled with recovery from civil wars and po liti cal instability, and

although each country faced distinctive conflicts, the instability spilled over and dramatically

affected the region. Civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone devastated the two countries throughout

the 1990s, resulting in half a million deaths among less than 10 million people in the two coun-

tries.1 Guinea has not experienced an outright civil war, but spillover from conflicts in the region,

combined with weak institutions, po liti cal instability, and an impoverished population has created

the conditions of a weak and fragile state with flare- ups of limited vio lence and demonstrations

during elections.2

The Ebola Crisis

The first case of Ebola in West Africa is traced to a rural village in Guinea close to the border with

Sierra Leone and Liberia in December 2013. The Ministry of Health raised the initial alert of an

unidentified disease on March 14, 2014, but Guinea lacked laboratory capacity to sufficiently test

samples. The outbreak went undetected for months as samples were sent abroad for examination.

The World Health Organ ization officially declared the outbreak on March 23, 2014, but the extent

and severity was severely underestimated.3 By that time the virus had spread to Liberia, there

were over 112 confirmed cases in Guinea alone.4 Ebola was confirmed in Sierra Leone on May 25

and in Nigeria on July 25. Sierra Leone declared a state of emergency in late July. Guinea and

Liberia followed suit in August. For several months Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Fron-

tières (MSF) repeatedly raised the alarm and called for additional support to stem the outbreak that

rapidly spread across the region, but the international effort to address the outbreak lagged. In

addition to the limited international response, the weak health systems throughout the region

steadily deteriorated as the crisis continued, which contributed to the rapid spread of the disease.

The majority of those infected had limited access to health centers due to severe shortages in

personnel and facilities. There was a severe limitation in supplies, including ambulances, gloves,

beds, and health workers, throughout most of the outbreak, and logistical failures caused delays in

supplying health centers particularly in more remote areas.

By late summer 2014, Ebola was spreading unabatedly across the region. On June 23, MSF warned

that the outbreak was out of control and overwhelming the regional capacities, but WHO did not

declare a public health emergency of international concern until August.5 Movement restrictions,

inaccessible roads, weak infrastructure, and limited communication hampered distribution of

assistance and access across the region. This includes significant delays in transporting patients to

1. Barbara McPake et al., “Ebola in the Context of Conflict- Affected States and Health Systems: Case Studies of North-

ern Uganda and Sierra Leone,” Conflict and Health 9, no. 23 (August 2015), https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral

.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-015-0052-7.

2. International Crisis Group, The Politics behind the Ebola Crisis (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015), https://

d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/232-the-politics-behind-the-ebola-crisis.pdf.

3. Marc DuBois and Caitlin Wake, with Scarlett Sturridge and Christina Bennett, The Ebola Response in West Africa:

Exposing the Politics and Culture of International Aid (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2015), https://www.odi.org

/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9903.pdf.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

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https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-015-0052-7

https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/232-the-politics-behind-the-ebola-crisis.pdf

https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9903.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 67

treatment centers and getting samples to labs for testing, and slowed communication across the

region, limiting distribution of public information about the disease.6 By early September there

was still no coordinated international response. International attention increased only when Amer-

ican health workers in the region contracted the disease and were transferred to the United States

for treatment.

On September 16, 2014, President Barack Obama deployed 2,800 military personnel to West

Africa for Operation United Assistance to build treatment centers and assist in training medical

providers. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Centers for Disease

Control (CDC) played lead roles in coordinating the U.S. intervention during the crisis— providing

funds for treatment beds, protective gear, and other supplies along with teams of experts to assist

with disease management and control.7 USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team

(DART) to coordinate the U.S. government response to the outbreak.

The United Nations mandated the first- ever emergency health mission in September 2014, the UN

Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), to fill gaps in the international response to the

crisis. The mission’s key objective was to scale up response on the ground and to unify nationally

led response efforts.8 Creation of UNMEER helped spur the international community into action

and contributed to a strong international response following the initial delay. Ghana served as the

logistical and training center for the UNMEER team.

International aid arrived in the affected region on a larger scale by October 2014, but by this time

there were approximately 9,000 reported Ebola cases.9 The international response continued to

ramp up, and the predicted worst- case scenario did not occur. Ultimately, more than 62 countries

participated in the international response, with some deploying military units. The United States

deployed troops to Liberia to assist with command and control and with logistics. The United

Kingdom deployed troops to Sierra Leone. France assumed a larger role in Guinea during the

response through nonmilitary medical assistance and training. The U.S. military operation provided

large- scale logistical support for construction and management of Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs)

and contributed to improving coordination, logistics, and the supply and training of health work-

ers. The deployment of U.S. troops to Liberia was vital in providing logistical support and also in

breaking the panic and fear in the country, even though the crisis had abated somewhat by the

time U.S. military- constructed facilities became operational. New cases in Liberia peaked in Sep-

tember 2014, but continued to rise in Sierra Leone and Guinea until late November and Decem-

ber.10 By mid-2015 all three countries were pushing to get to and remain at zero cases. WHO

6. World Health Organ ization (WHO), “ Factors That Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus and Impeded

Rapid Containment,” January 2015, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/en/.

7. Tiaji Salaam- Blyther, “U.S. and International Health Responses to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,” Congressional

Research Ser vice, October 29, 2014, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43697.pdf.

8. Global Ebola Response, “UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER),” accessed October 17, 2016,

http://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer.

9. Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres, “An Unpre ce dented Year: MSF’s Response to the Largest- Ever

Ebola Outbreak,” March 2015, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/unprecedented-year-msfs-response

-largest-ever-ebola-outbreak.

10. DuBois, Wake, Sturridge, and Bennett, The Ebola Response in West Africa.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 67 5/20/17 1:04 PM

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/en/

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43697.pdf

http://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer

http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/unprecedented-year-msfs-response-largest-ever-ebola-outbreak

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World68

announced on March 29, 2016 that the Ebola epidemic in West Africa was no longer an interna-

tional health emergency.11

Despite maintaining strong central authorities, there was some public mistrust of the central

governments particularly during the early months of the outbreak. Tension between the authority

of religious practices and government restrictions were particularly evident in funeral and burial

practices. According to Guinea’s Ministry of Health, 60 percent of cases in the country can be

linked to traditional funeral and burial practices, and the WHO estimates that 80 percent of cases

were linked to these practices in Sierra Leone.12 At the height of the outbreak, high fatality rates

created the perception that hospitals were places of death and reinforced the lack of compliance

with advice to seek early medical care.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Before West Africa was devastated by a health crisis, Sierra Leone and Liberia were showcased by

the Fragile States Index as notable success stories for post- conflict recovery.13 In 2013, Sierra

Leone and Liberia were ranked second and sixth among the top 10 countries with the highest GDP

growth.14 But the region was struck by the unexpected health crisis that halted pro gress and

exemplifies challenges of resiliency in fragile regions. The repercussions of Ebola in the region

remain evident— Sierra Leone and Liberia are ranked in the alert category of the Fragile States

Index and Guinea is under the high alert category. The outbreak reversed pro gress, accentuates

gaps in post- conflict recovery efforts, and leaves the region vulnerable to future outbreaks and

other shocks.

Authority

Many of the challenges and issues highlighted through the Ebola crisis reveal chronic dysfunction

in the delivery of assistance where governance is weak. All national governments and leaders

remain in power and maintain authority, but tensions persist as the countries transition to recovery

and face po liti cal elections. One of the major gaps in authority that fueled the Ebola crisis is lack of

trust in national institutions— a prob lem that lingers in all three countries today. National capacities

to respond to crises are not resilient and likely would be overwhelmed in future crises scenarios.

11. Pam Belluck, “Emergency over Ebola Has Ended, W.H.O. Says,” New York Times, March 29, 2016, http://www

.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/health/emergency-over-ebola-has-ended-who-says.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2

FEbola.

12. WHO, “ Factors That Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus.”

13. J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index 2016 (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, June 2016), http://library.fundfor

peace.org/fsi16-report.

14. Amadou Sy and Amy Copley, “Understanding the Economic Effects of the 2014 Ebola Outbreak,” Brookings

Institution, October 1, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/01/understanding-the -economic

-effects-of-the-2014-ebola-outbreak-in-west-africa/.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/health/emergency-over-ebola-has-ended-who-says.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FEbola

http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi16-report

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/01/understanding-the-economic-effects-of-the-2014-ebola-outbreak-in-west-africa/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 69

Trust in National Governance

Lack of trust in the national governments remains a challenge in the recovery stages of the crisis,

and each country has either experienced a transition in government or is holding elections in the

coming months. Trust in central government remains low due to limited implementation of com-

mitments and perceptions that certain subgroups benefit more from national programs and

resources. In Liberia and Guinea, critics accuse the governments of excluding certain populations

from development programs and public services—in Liberia, slum communities in southwest

Monrovia,15 and in Guinea opposition party supporters.16 Perceptions of discrimination and

marginalization along ethnic and religious lines remain a serious prob lem. According to the most

recent Afrobarometer survey, 70 percent of Sierra Leoneans believe government corruption has

increased in the last year.17 Seventy percent of citizens disapprove of the per for mance of their

members of Parliament and local government and only half of the population approves of the

president’s per for mance. Over 80 percent of the population believes that po liti cal party leaders are

more interested in their own ambitions rather than the interests of the people.

National Elections and Transitions

Concerns over election transitions and resilience of the national government remain. Alpha

Condé, the first president in Guinea to come to power through a demo cratic election in 2010, was

reelected in October 2015 following the height of the Ebola crisis and continues to move the

country in a transition from authoritarianism to demo cratic rule.18 Ethnic tensions were pres ent in

the months leading up to the election between Rally for the Guinea People (RPG), which is Con-

dé’s party, and Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG) supporters, the main opposi-

tion party. President Condé is from the Malinke ethnic group and he is accused of sidelining

opponents and other ethnic groups while favoring supporters. Po liti cal parties are typically formed

along ethnic lines throughout the country. Opposition groups alleged fraud and vote rigging and

lodged formal complaints with the constitutional court, but the final vote was ultimately con-

firmed.19 In recent months, President Condé and the leader of UFDG, Cellou Dalein Diallo, met on

demands to or ga nize local elections that have been delayed. Local elections that were scheduled

15. Maureen Quinn, ed., Governance and Health in Post- Conflict Countries: The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia and Sierra

Leone (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1606

_Governance-and-Health.pdf.

16. Erin McCandless and Nicolas Bouchet, eds., Tackling and Preventing Ebola While Building Peace and Societal

Resilience (The Hague: Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2015), http://www.cspps .org

/documents/130616042/130793247/CSPPS+Ebola+Report.pdf/33092e41-bd4a-4ccf-8ddf-4464e5c6ce37.

17. Lena Thompson, “In Sierra Leone, Perceived Corruption Rises, Public Trust and Leaders’ Job Approval Drop,”

Afrobarometer, June 29, 2016, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_dispatchno103

_corruption-trust-performance.pdf.

18. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2015: Guinea,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country- chapters/guinea.

19. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016: Guinea,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016

/guinea.

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https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1606_Governance-and-Health.pdf

http://www.cspps.org/documents/130616042/130793247/CSPPS+Ebola+Report.pdf/33092e41-bd4a-4ccf-8ddf-4464e5c6ce37

http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_dispatchno103_corruption-trust-performance.pdf

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/guinea

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/guinea

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World70

for February 2017 were delayed due to disagreements between the government and opposition

regarding the electoral pro cess.20

Liberia is a presidential republic and President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has been in office since Janu-

ary 2006. Liberia is preparing to hold presidential elections in October 2017. President Sirleaf has

served two terms and is not eligible to run for an additional term. The 2017 national elections are a

critical transition for Liberia’s recovery from civil war and the Ebola crisis and will be the first post-

war transition from one elected president to another through a demo cratic pro cess.21

Decentralization

Sierra Leone and Liberia strug gle with decentralization of authorities and delegating ser vice provi-

sion to local authorities. Both countries have formal government plans to shift functions and

resources for health care to the local level and to strengthen local government structures, but this

pro cess is hampered by lack of technical and institutional capacities, corruption, and patronage.22

The Liberian government has committed to establishing ser vice centers in all 15 counties by the

end of January 2018. Four county ser vice centers are functional and providing a range of legal and

public ser vices.23 Ebola disrupted the decentralization pro cess and both countries are slow in

implementing the strategies.

Sierra Leone’s government developed a national strategy for Ebola recovery that relies on the New

Deal for Engagement with Fragile States as an implementation guide. This demonstrates the

importance Sierra Leone is placing on a holistic approach to recovery with an emphasis on coun-

try owner ship, strengthening institutions, capacity building, and effective use of resources.24 The

government recognizes that public trust has eroded in public institutions as a result of the Ebola

crisis and rural communities in par tic u lar did not have as much support from the national govern-

ment. Additionally, the government continues to take owner ship for the shortfalls in governance

that contributed to the rapid spread of the disease. This recognition is a vital first step in building

resilient institutions for the future, but major shortcomings in implementation, as occurred in past

efforts to resource and build public institutions to meet the needs of the whole population, are

likely to resurface.

20. International Crisis Group, “Crisis Watch— February 2017, Guinea,” https:// www . crisisgroup . org / crisiswatch

/ database ? location%5B%5D=23&date _ range=last _ 3 _ months&from _ month=01&from _ year=2017&to _ month=01&to _ year=2017

21. The Car ter Center, “The Car ter Center International Election Observation in Liberia Pre- Election Statement,”

July 2016, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/liberia-pre

-election-statement-071816.pdf.

22. Quinn, Governance and Health in Post- Conflict Countries.

23. UN Security Council Resolution 2308, September 14, 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf

/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2308.pdf.

24. Government of Sierra Leone, National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone: 2015–2017 (Freetown: Govern-

ment of Sierra Leone, 2015), https://ebolaresponse.un.org/sites/default/files/sierra_leone_recovery_strategy_en.pdf.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 70 5/20/17 1:04 PM

https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=23&date_range=last_3_months&from_month=01&from_year=2017&to_month=01&to_year=2017

https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/liberia-pre-election-statement-071816.pdf

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2308.pdf

https://ebolaresponse.un.org/sites/default/files/sierra_leone_recovery_strategy_en.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 71

International Authority

International NGOs and government agencies are active in the affected countries, assisting with all

aspects of response to flare- ups, food security challenges, and non- Ebola- related health ser vices.

Recovery in each country is reliant on international aid and assistance. The World Health Organ-

ization is the central international organ ization charged with leading and coordinating international

responses to crises, but in many aspects throughout and after the crisis, the organ ization has failed

to effectively coordinate across the region on many aspects of the challenge set and did not

provide effective international support to address the crisis in a timely and efficient manner.

Capacity

The economic conditions that enabled the crisis to reach devastating proportions largely remain

and have only deepened. The crisis and massive recovery effort rob the region of pro gress in

post- conflict recovery and create conditions of weaker capacity and limited resources, and expose

the weakness of the affected nations’ health sectors. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have high

rates of poverty and rank close to the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index.

According to the last available rankings in 2015, Sierra Leone ranks 181, Liberia ranks 177 and

Guinea ranks 182 out of 188 countries.25 The share of people living on less than $1.25 a day

exceeds 40 percent in Guinea, 57 percent in Sierra Leone, and 84 percent in Liberia.26

Basic Ser vices

The Ebola crisis only exacerbated low school attendance and access to basic resources. Only

58 percent of children attend primary school in Guinea, 34 percent in Liberia, and 34 percent in

Sierra Leone.27 Food insecurity is a significant concern. Surveys indicate that approximately two-

thirds of house holds continue to be food insecure.28 Infrastructure and limited communication

continue to hamper access across the region and limit distribution of health and basic ser vices.

In effec tive and inadequate infrastructure remains a huge obstacle and delays transportation of

patients to treatment centers, delays getting samples to labs, and harms coordination and com-

munication across the region.

Health Ser vices

Even after an influx of support for health ser vices as a result of the crisis, health facilities and

ser vices remain inequitably distributed throughout the region. For example, 30 to 40 percent of

25. UN Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development (New York:

UNDP, 2015), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf.

26. UNDP, Assessing the Socio- economic Impacts of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone: The

Road to Recovery (New York: UNDP, December 2014), http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports

/EVD%20Synthesis%20Report%2023Dec2014.pdf.

27. UNDP, Recovering from the Ebola Crisis (New York: UNDP, 2015), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home

/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/recovering-from-the-ebola-crisis—full-report.html.

28. World Bank, “The Socio- economic Impacts of Ebola in Sierra Leone,” June 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en

/topic/poverty/publication/socio-economic-impacts-ebola-sierra-leone.

594-69657_ch01_3P.indd 71 5/20/17 1:04 PM

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf

http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/EVD%20Synthesis%20Report%2023Dec2014.pdf

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/recovering-from-the-ebola-crisis—full-report.html

http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/publication/socio-economic-impacts-ebola-sierra-leone

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World72

Liberians lack access to health care today, the same as before the crisis.29 The majority of health

facilities in all three countries are concentrated in urban areas, leaving large rural populations with

extremely limited access. In Guinea, the capital Conakry, which is home to 15 percent of the

population, has 72 percent of health workers. By contrast Guinée Forestière, which is rural and

hardest hit by the Ebola epidemic, accounts for 22 percent of the population but only 9 percent of

the health workers.30 More than 500 health workers were killed by Ebola in the three affected

countries, which has further limited the supply of health personnel.31

Use of health ser vices is significantly reduced and basic health care has suffered as a result of the

specific focus on Ebola. Immediately after the outbreak, fear prevented many from visiting health

facilities to receive treatment. Additionally, resources and personnel were focused on Ebola. In

Liberia, the epidemic contributed to a 61 percent decline in outpatient visits.32 Immunization rates

in Sierra Leone have fallen by 21 percent. Due to reduced access to health ser vices, an estimated

10,600 lives were lost to HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria in the three countries.33

Representatives from all three countries continue to express concern about long- term capacity

and health needs. Liberia’s Ministry of Health estimates that the cost of rebuilding a resilient health

system that is capable of addressing future epidemics and health threats will cost $489 million

through 2017, with an additional $1.21 billion through 2022.34

International Aid and Capacity Development

Training for health workers in triage and in rapid recognition of the early symptoms of Ebola has

expanded.35 Donors have pledged over $6 billion for Ebola recovery in the three countries. Sig-

nificant changes and updates to the health system will take time due to gaps in resourcing long-

term development aid. Despite flare- ups throughout the region, only one Ebola treatment center

remains operational.36 The influx of international aid did improve lab capacity throughout the

region, and training for health workers in triage and in rapid recognition of the early symptoms of

Ebola has expanded.37

The United States and international community are assisting in rebuilding health ser vices and

structures of the region. In addition to supporting restoration of basic health ser vices, USAID

29. Lois Parshley, “ After Ebola,” Atlantic, July/August 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07

/after-ebola/485609/.

30. UNDP, Assessing the Socio- economic Impacts of Ebola Virus Disease.

31. Tiaji Salaam- Blyther, Susan B. Epstein, and Bolko J. Skorupski, “Status of the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa:

Overview and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Ser vice, May 25, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs

/row /R44507.pdf.

32. Ibid.

33. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “Cost of the Ebola Epidemic,” August 8, 2016, http://www.cdc

.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/cost-of-ebola.html.

34. Salaam- Blyther, Epstein, and Skorupski, “Status of the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa.”

35. Parshley, “ After Ebola.”

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

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http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/after-ebola/485609/

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44507.pdf

http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/cost-of-ebola.html

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 73

provides support for infection prevention and control training and has provided training for over

2,800 health care workers in Guinea alone.38 However, due to a decline in cases and other health

priorities, the United States has reduced funding for recovery activities. Efforts continue to support

contact tracing during flare- ups in Liberia and Guinea, but long- term plans and recovery efforts

are unclear. Despite pro gress and assistance from the influx of international aid, delivery of assis-

tance for recovery and building resiliency for the health systems remains uncertain.

Economic Outlook

In the aftermath of the outbreak, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea are estimated to lose at least

$1.6 billion.39 The disease resulted in lower investment and a substantial loss in private- sector

growth and declining agricultural production, but the main economic sectors including agricul-

ture, mining, and tourism are slowly bouncing back from dramatic setbacks. The economy in

Sierra Leone is estimated to have contracted by more than 21 percent in 2015, and around 7,500

jobs were lost in the country throughout the crisis due to closure of two mines.40 Sierra Leone has

also experienced a simultaneous shock with a sharp decline in iron ore prices, the country’s

number- one commodity.41 Employment levels have rebounded to pre- Ebola levels, but surveys

indicate that employees are working fewer hours and earning lower wages. All three countries are

beginning to bounce back, and the International Monetary Fund estimates a 3.7 percent growth in

GDP in Guinea, 2.5 percent in Liberia, and 4.3 percent in Sierra Leone for 2016.42 Despite initial

pro gress in reestablishing economic activity, it is likely that all countries will rely on international

assistance and aid for the foreseeable future.

Security

During the epidemic, there were concerns over stability and fear that the outbreak would lead to a

breakdown of order and result in a recurrence of vio lence, after over a de cade of peace following

the civil war. Despite limited instances of vio lence, the security sector across the region continues

to provide valuable support in the maintenance of stability and contributes to recovery from the

Ebola crisis. In each country, the military remains one of the strongest institutions and each gov-

ernment will continue to rely on its military in future crises. With the strong security sectors,

concerns regarding the over- militarization of crisis response remain.

Despite national government confidence in the security sectors, citizens throughout the region

distrust military and law enforcement capabilities. Vio lence is limited but tensions remain. In Sierra

Leone over 50 percent of citizens believe the police are corrupt.43 Liberia is experiencing a major

transition in security responsibility. In June 2016, the Government of Liberia reassumed full

38. Salaam- Blyther, Epstein, and Skorupski, “Status of the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa.”

39. International Crisis Group, The Politics behind the Ebola Crisis.

40. Salaam- Blyther, Epstein, and Skorupski, “Status of the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa.”

41. Government of Sierra Leone, National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone.

42. USAID Office of Inspector General, Quarterly Pro gress Report on U.S. Government International Ebola Response

and Preparedness Activities: Fiscal Year 2016, Third Quarter (Washington, DC: USAID, 2016), https://oig.usaid.gov/sites

/default/files/other-reports/oig_ebola_quaterly_06302016.pdf.

43. Thompson, “In Sierra Leone, Perceived Corruption Rises, Public Trust and Leaders’ Job Approval Drop.”

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https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/other-reports/oig_ebola_quaterly_06302016.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World74

security responsibilities after 13 years when the UN Mission in Liberia led efforts. The United

Nations reduced troop presence and now serves a supporting role. Anxiety and uncertainty

throughout Liberia concerning this security transition are growing, particularly with the upcoming

elections in 2017. Citizens throughout the country are anxious about the ability of the Liberian

security forces to maintain stability during transition.44

The October 2015 presidential election posed a major challenge to Guinea’s security forces, and

limited vio lence and protests have occurred in the lead-up to elections. Po liti cally charged ethnic

tensions are still evident in the country. A co ali tion of opposition parties publicly protested against

President Condé in August 2016. Guinea is categorized as a deeply divided society with a high risk

for ethnically induced vio lence and conflict, but the country has largely remained stable and

continues to avoid large- scale vio lence. Reports of human rights violations by security forces have

significantly declined, but security forces are still accused of excessive use of force and unprofes-

sional conduct in response to protests and criminal incidents.45

STATE OF PLAY

Since the beginning of the outbreak there have been at least 28,616 confirmed, probable, and

suspected cases reported in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and 11,310 deaths.46 Flare- ups of

Ebola occur periodically even after West Africa was declared Ebola free in January 2016. Vigilance

is fading, and sustaining be hav ior changes into the future remains a concern. Reports indicate that

health workers were not wearing protective gear or following protocols.47 Experts warn that Ebola

could resurface at any time and linger in the eyes, ner vous systems, and bodily fluids of survivors.

International attention has turned away from the region as other crises demand humanitarian

action and attention, such as the Zika virus and conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. This is

evident in the reallocation of some of the emergency funds from the United States designated for

Ebola. In December 2015, the United States committed $5.4 billion in emergency funding to Ebola,

and $1 billion was committed specifically to building basic infrastructure and capacities in Sierra

Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and 14 other vulnerable states. The United States has obligated $3.1 billion

and $1.77 billion has been dispersed.48 As a result of the Zika health response, $589 million of the

unused funding appropriated for the Ebola response and recovery has been reprogrammed to

44. UN Security Council, “Thirty- Second Pro gress Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Mission in

Liberia,” August 12, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/706.

45. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2015: Guinea.”

46. WHO, “Situation Report: Ebola Virus Disease,” June 10, 2016, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/208883/1

/ebolasitrep_10Jun2016_eng.pdf?ua=1.

47. Kieran Guilbert, “West Africa Vulnerable to New Major Ebola Outbreak as Vigilance Fades,” Reuters, March 21, 2016,

http://news.trust.org/item/20160321185452-3xj2g/?source=spotlight.

48. USAID Office of Inspector General, Quarterly Pro gress Report on U.S. Government International Ebola Response

and Preparedness Activities.

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http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/706

http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/208883/1/ebolasitrep_10Jun2016_eng.pdf?ua=1

http://news.trust.org/item/20160321185452-3xj2g/?source=spotlight

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 75

address Zika.49 The United States remains the largest international financial contributor to the

Ebola response and recovery effort.50 International assistance is bolstering health systems and

response mechanisms throughout the region, but economic and social recovery remains slow and

vulnerable. International and domestic fatigue with emerging disease threats may dampen support

for sustained funding.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

Timely International Response

Responding in a quick and efficient manner to a transnational health epidemic is particularly

challenging in regions with weak local and national health systems and limited capacity. Early

warning mechanisms, medical supplies, and health personnel are often weak and in limited supply

in the poorest states, making local response options inadequate for addressing rapid disease

spread. International interventions and assistance are vital to stem outbreaks. However, the Ebola

crisis illuminates the many mistakes that the international community can make when responding

to a health threat. The initial response was inadequate and the epidemic reached severe propor-

tions before large- scale assistance was deployed, despite warnings that the crisis was out of

control. The World Health Organ ization is criticized for its lack of initiative during the early phase

of the outbreak. Warnings from NGOs on the ground were largely ignored in the initial stage, and

the WHO failed to rally international support and cooperation to handle the outbreak before it

reached the scale of a threat to international security. Rapid response models developed by the

international community were not followed and many international organ izations did not do their

job. It is difficult to attract international attention with slow- onset crises, but enacting procedures

in a timely fashion is vital for addressing health crises before they spread.

Limited Disease Knowledge and Expertise

Health crises often occur with little warning, and many times no one is prepared for a major

outbreak of rare diseases. The Ebola crisis was unpre ce dented as no other Ebola outbreak had

ever occurred in an urban setting. Many providers in the region had no experience with the disease

and those that did only had experience with Ebola in remote, rural villages. Major health crises are

likely to catch the international community flat- footed.

Fusing and Synchronizing Responses across Borders

Responses to outbreaks are frequently not holistic throughout affected regions and instead focus

on country by country, bilateral relationships, with limited regional planning across borders. Mobile

populations along national borders complicate response, and there are often no structures in

49. Nellie Bristol and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Future of the Global Health Agenda,” in Global Development

Monitor: A Changing World, ed. Conor Savoy (Washington, DC: CSIS, May 2016), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com

/s3fs-public/publication/160510_Savoy_GlobalDevelMonitor_Web.pdf.

50. USAID Office of Inspector General, Quarterly Pro gress Report on U.S. Government International Ebola Response

and Preparedness Activities.

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https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160510_Savoy_GlobalDevelMonitor_Web.pdf

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World76

place to coordinate between the affected communities, international NGOs on the ground, and

national governments. In the beginning of the Ebola outbreak, there was no clear international or

regional authority coordinating the response. The initial response from local agencies, govern-

ments, and NGOs was ad hoc, with intermittent communication across entities. Getting, sharing,

and managing information is a significant challenge, particularly among rural communities. Weak

surveillance and communication mechanisms make it difficult to mea sure the actual scope of the

prob lem. Lack of coordination and communication create redundancy across diff er ent organ-

izations and response efforts.

Recruiting and Getting the Right People on the Ground

Due to the threat of contamination for health providers, there are significant challenges with

recruiting and deploying staff. Throughout the Ebola crisis, there were substantial difficulties with

recruitment, ensuring medical clearance and deployment, establishing in- country health care, and

securing medical evacuations. Time- consuming pro cesses within the U.S. government and NGOs

delay departure of trained health professionals to affected regions. Additionally, limitations and

restrictions on deployed personnel can hinder response time and efficiency. Delays in permissions

and access can significantly impede deployment of medical professionals, health providers, and in

some instances the military to reach affected regions and populations.

Mistrust of National Institutions

Legacies of vio lence, corruption, and patronage structures based on regional and ethnic affiliations

can significantly erode trust in national authorities during times of crisis. The Ebola crisis illumi-

nates the challenges faced by national governments that maintain strong central authority but are

not trusted by portions of their populations. Centralized responses that do not fully engage local

authorities can intentionally or unintentionally exclude some communities and create mispercep-

tions about diseases. In some instances, populations might not believe the warnings of the na-

tional government or even international institutions.

OPPORTUNITIES AND ASSETS

Despite the inadequate response and weak capacity of the region, there were some assets and

bright spots in the response to the crisis.

Strong Habitual Relationships with International Partners

International engagement and involvement in regions prior to outbreaks significantly assist in

health crisis response. Before the outbreak, the international community was already heavi ly

invested in Liberia and Sierra Leone with post- conflict recovery and reconstruction assistance. As a

result, the region had strong habitual relationships with international partners that strengthened

the response when the assistance did arrive. The United States’ historical ties to Liberia, the United

Kingdom’s ties with Sierra Leone, and France’s relationship with Guinea proved vital, and these

extra- regional partners continue to help lead the region’s recovery. Strong relationships prior to a

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 77

crisis create more efficient mechanisms for partnering and each country that is responding can

assist and take the lead in the specific area where it has the best relationships.

Regional Leadership

Strong, stable regional actors are also valuable when responding to a disease outbreak. In the case

of Ebola, the outbreak was effectively contained beyond Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone—

including in Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. Even before the first Ebola patients appeared in any of

these countries, the governments had already established emergency plans and put resources in

place that enabled them to respond rapidly and effectively. These countries caught the outbreak

early and quickly isolated patients. Nigeria in par tic u lar had a history of responding to health

emergencies and adapted the country’s polio eradication efforts to the Ebola response. Strong

regional response and action has major benefits and helps prevent further spread of crises.

Region Relatively Conflict- Free

Responding to a health crisis in a conflict- free region is a significant asset and provides access that

might be absent when responding to a humanitarian health crisis in a conflict zone. Despite con-

cerns that the Ebola outbreak and response would result in vio lence, no major outbreaks of con-

flict occurred and each country continues to maintain public order. In some instances, the

response appeared securitized, but overall the security sectors in the countries and coming from

the international community provided valuable contributions in logistics and maintaining the safety

of the population without resorting to vio lence.

Adaptive International Health Community

The Ebola case illuminates the importance of adaptation and evolution in the midst of crisis. The

response, both nationally and internationally, was initially slow and centralized, but once the

international community recognized the gravity of the outbreak, the crisis prompted a huge multi-

lateral response that closely engaged local communities. Responders adapted messages and

deployed communication to reach across affected communities, accommodating local context

and practices to encourage be hav ior change. The evolved international response along with

community engagement helped prevent the outbreak from reaching the catastrophic worst- case

scenario. The Ebola response reveals the importance of learning and adapting in the middle of a

crisis to incorporate key lessons from initial responses.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prepare the groundwork for rapid intervention

Pre- identify deployable medical, technical, cultural, and regional expertise. Enhance ave-

nues to get the right experts and teams on the ground as quickly as pos si ble. In health

emergencies, time is key and ensuring specific experts can get to locations quickly and pass

disease information to local health facilities is vital. Local health care providers might not

know the specifics of addressing diseases that are relatively uncommon in their regions.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World78

Additionally, NGOs pres ent in communities prior to crises are often working on programs

beyond health and frequently their staff is not deeply knowledgeable about diseases and

transmission. Beyond health experts, knowledge of local communities, populations, tradi-

tions, and practices is a necessary component for fighting spread of crises. Anthropologists

and other regional experts can help health workers enhance response practices and com-

munication with the populations.

Pre- establish necessary permissions and access arrangements. Permissions must be in

place to ensure experts on specific diseases can quickly travel to the region to help assess

and train local staff on procedures and transmission. Experts from the U.S. government

must be invited by the country to assist, but this pro cess can slow down response in some

instances due to pos si ble delays getting authorization from both the host government and

the U.S. interagency system.

2. Expand reach- back capabilities

Use technology to engage experts other wise not available on the ground. Experts can use

advancements in technology to communicate treatment procedures to health providers on

the ground who may have limited knowledge of rare diseases. Virtual medicine approaches

can help spread valuable information on treatment procedures and specifics on disease in a

faster manner and to a wider population. Disease experts can share knowledge with a wider

audience and reach into rural populations.

3. Engage and communicate at the local level

Tailor messages for local populations. Mistrust and miscommunication hampered the Ebola

response. Clear, concise information in local languages that takes local customs into ac-

count must be circulated as quickly as pos si ble during a crisis. Multiple layers and types of

communication should be utilized to reach diverse populations with varying levels of edu-

cation. Communication must resonate with at- risk populations, so cultural advisers and

anthropologists should be brought in to help develop messaging for specific regions.

Coordinate with and communicate through local authorities. Community leaders can help

explain the causes of the health crisis and key treatment methods. During a time of crisis,

when it is difficult to build trust with local populations, these community leaders, health

providers, and responders can greatly enable communication and treatment.

4. Enhance international cooperation and cross- border communication

Establish formal mechanisms for coordination across national governments. The World

Health Organ ization is the international body responsible for coordinating international

response to crises, but the organ ization operated in effec tively in response to the Ebola

crisis. WHO reform will take time, and coordination of health crises must move forward in

the meantime. During the Ebola response, NGOs on the ground often informally coordi-

nated, but in a cross- border health crisis, formal mechanisms are needed. National govern-

ments should begin meeting immediately when they recognize the incident and inclusively

invite the support of NGOs active in the region, correspond with local governments and

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 79

local leaders of affected communities, and start the pro cess of pulling in regional institu-

tions to assist with cross- border communication.

Look to regional institutions and mechanisms for driving collaboration. Regional institutions

can play an impor tant coordinating role between national governments and international

organ izations in the immediate response, before international attention hits the region.

Strong regional states can also play a role. Rapid response mechanisms might lie in neigh-

boring countries, and these regional governments should step up in the immediate re-

sponse. International institutions or the United States are not always the best leaders for

immediate response. Utilizing strong regional powers with experience in rapid response can

help build regional capacity to address the crisis and support the region.

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INTRODUCTION

Simmering challenges of criminal vio lence and corruption at the substate level can create weak-

ness and pockets of fragility in states that appear other wise stable at the national level. These

localized challenges may flare up and spill over into the broader region, potentially threatening the

security of citizens from neighboring countries.

In Mexico, the central government has limited authority and control over the substate locale.

Endemic corruption afflicting all levels of the Mexican government has undermined government

authority and the rule of law, allowed drug trafficking and associated violent crime to become

entrenched in many communities, and contributed to illicit human migration, while also thwarting

government reforms and commercial investment. These prob lems flourish at the subnational level

within approximately half of Mexico’s 31 administrative states— exemplified by Guerrero— and

thousands of its municipalities, where nonstate groups tacitly or overtly control much of the

territory. Despite the inability of local, state, or federal law enforcement to stem rising crime levels

in Guerrero, its coastal resort Acapulco remains the third most visited destination in Mexico, and

U.S. travel to Mexico overall rose annually from 2009 to 2016. While transnational criminal organ-

izations (TCOs) have not targeted foreign or U.S. persons explic itly to date, their kidnapping activi-

ties have expanded significantly in recent years, including into areas proximate to tourist and

business destinations, and now target more opportunistically anyone that appears suitably affluent

or vulnerable. The daily kidnappings in Mexico, one every six hours according to the National

Citizens Observatory, attest to the ease with which these crimes are carried out. The unsolved

2014 kidnap and murder of 43 students from Iguala, Guerrero, highlights the near impunity with

which even large- scale crimes occur.1

1. Kirk Semple, “Missing Mexican Students Suffered a Night of ‘Terror,’ Investigators Say,” New York Times, April 24,

2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/world/americas/missing-mexican-students-suffered-a-night-of-terror

-investigators-say.html.

Countering Deepening Criminal Vio lence at the Subnational Level Marc Frey

0 6

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https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/world/americas/missing-mexican-students-suffered-a-night-of-terror-investigators-say.html

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 81

This corruption- fueled weakness at the subnational level undermines Mexico’s overall stability,

with consequences for its neighbors. Beyond the smuggling of drugs and other goods, potential

victimization of U.S. citizens in Mexico, spillover vio lence, and spikes in illicit migration pose signifi-

cant threats to the United States. This case highlights the difficulties of countering escalation of

criminal activity in a sovereign partner state with limited authority at substate levels. It demon-

strates the complexities of responding to episodes of extreme vio lence in Mexico that could

directly impact the safety and security of U.S. citizens.

SECURITY IMPERATIVE

The United States must respond to simmering crises of criminal vio lence and corruption that

directly threaten the safety of U.S. citizens in other countries. Within Mexico, the acceleration of

criminal activity and the rapid escalation of vio lence in states such as Guerrero have limited federal

control or authority in those areas.

These conditions heighten the risk that the United States will more frequently find itself addressing

situations of direct threat against its citizens in Mexico. The United States may need to mobilize to

assist U.S. citizens under duress and to prevent cascade effects that could result in spillover vio-

lence into U.S. territory. In addition, the U.S. response needs to avoid damaging relations with an

impor tant sovereign neighbor and prevent the diversion of these prob lems to existing stable areas.

In the event of such a crisis, the United States would need to take a number of critical steps:

• Improve its information- gathering pro cesses in order to be well positioned to prevent or

respond to potential situations of citizen endangerment.

• Ensure the United States has in place proper resources and procedures to encourage and

facilitate the safe departure of U.S. citizens from the region, if and as necessary.

• Train and position permanent and standby response capabilities needed to rescue or secure

release of kidnapped or trapped U.S. citizens. Taking into consideration that the Mexican

federal government is highly sensitive to issues of sovereignty, evaluate joint, embedded,

and unilateral insertion models.

• Develop stronger working relations with subnational- level partners in Mexico, including state

and local law enforcement, but also including civil society networks and the private sector.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Geography and Demography

This case focuses on Mexico’s administrative state of Guerrero. Guerrero’s mountainous terrain

and limited transportation infrastructure benefit the region’s drug trade and manufacturing by

limiting alternative economic opportunities for rural farmers, being well suited to marijuana and

poppy production, and constraining and raising the cost of government counternarcotics efforts.

Guerrero’s rural population is thus highly vulnerable, both physically and eco nom ically, to the

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World82

dictates of the TCOs. However, Guerrero’s urban residents, constituting just over half of the state’s

3.5 million population, also have been increasingly impacted by TCO activity. The most substantial

kidnapping operations occur in the state’s largest cities and Acapulco, with 25 percent of Guer-

rero’s population, and Chilpancingo, with the state’s highest per capita income, now ranked

among Mexico’s top five violent metropolises. Overall, Guerrero’s poverty rate is nearly three times

the Mexican average,2 and the average annual income is just over $5,000 compared to a national

median of nearly $8,000.3

2. Rodrigo Aguilera, “One the Margins: Why Mexico’s Southern States Have Fallen Behind,” Huffington Post, August 10,

2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rodrigo-aguilera/on-the-margins-why-mexico_b_7967874.html.

3. Explorando Mexico, “Economia de Guerrero” [Economy of Guerrero], accessed September 19, 2016 http://www

.explorandomexico.com/state/11/Guerrero/economy/.

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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rodrigo-aguilera/on-the-margins-why-mexico_b_7967874.html

http://www.explorandomexico.com/state/11/Guerrero/economy/

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 83

History

Mexico ranks among the more developed countries by a number of indicators, although there

remain significant economic and geographic gaps in access to quality goods and ser vices. Cur-

rently, the more fragile Mexican states are located in the country’s north and west, as drug-

trafficking routes migrated from the Gulf to the Atlantic and toward western inland ave nues.

Guerrero, on the western coast, pres ents a hotbed of instability, consistently ranking as one of the

country’s most impoverished states and beset by mountainous terrain and poor transport infra-

structure outside of the two major tourist ports, Acapulco and Ixtapa, that make ser vice provision

difficult and expensive. Economic opportunities are likewise limited, and for roughly half the

population who live outside the few urban centers, in de pen dent agriculture and seasonal migra-

tory work are the only income options. In addition, any tangible gains made on social, po liti cal,

and economic fronts are continually vulnerable to erosion from the state’s two crosscutting and

entwined challenges: corruption and drug trafficking.

The geography and economic conditions in Guerrero favor the TCOs. However, the strong and

improving per for mance of Mexican states’ positive peace indicators suggests that Guerrero’s civil,

commercial, and po liti cal assets, if marshaled properly, can deploy or develop the necessary

attitudes, institutions, and structures to combat crime and recover from vio lence. The rapid and

dramatic backlash of Chilpancingo’s business elites against the Los Rojos TCO’s surge in extortion

and kidnapping in 2013, and the reasonably successful state and federal response generated in late

2013 through 2014, demonstrates this positive potential. Overall, however, Mexico continues to

demonstrate an inability to transform the gains from short- term military and law enforcement

“surge” deployments into long- term, locally sustainable solutions.

Mexico has tackled vio lence and drug traffickers for de cades, with the military given an increased

role beginning in 2006. The military is often touted as the most competent and least corruptible

institution, although it too has been accused of human rights violations during its counternarcotics

campaigns, and vari ous branches suspect the others of leaks. However, the government’s reach

often has been limited to major urban areas. Large swaths of mountainous and rural areas such as

Guerrero remain poorly ser viced, with local and state governments unable or unwilling to provide

ser vices or enforce the rule of law, and at times these areas are tacitly or overtly controlled by

or ga nized criminal organ izations. In communities where a strong TCO exercises decisive control,

residents may benefit from a sort of narco- peace. Other areas benefit from local enforcement by

community policing groups. When and where multiple drug organ izations are actively fighting for

control, there is little security and effectively no rule of law provision whatsoever.

The TCOs are the most significant nonstate actors affecting Mexican stability. Over the last several

years, the TCOs have splintered from nine major drug- trafficking organ izations into an estimated

20- plus smaller, more fractious, and more diversified organ izations. This splintering is attributed

largely to the high- value targeting approach promoted by both the Mexican and U.S. governments

in countering the TCOs. In Guerrero alone, nine criminal organ izations largely supplanted the

Beltrán- Leyva gang after the 2008 arrest of its se nior leader. They currently compete for control of

both urban and rural areas and fund their operations through a combination of drug production

and trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, contraband sales, cargo theft, and “taxing” local businesses.

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World84

It was the significant rise in kidnapping and extortion operations in both Guerrero’s rural and urban

areas that produced multiple community policing or self- defense groups (autodefensas) through-

out the state. Some of these organ izations have since merged across community bound aries and

represent the dominant policing function in their area. These groups represent another conun-

drum for the government as, in some areas, they constitute the only credible security provider,

though their very existence highlights the weakness of Mexican law enforcement. Furthermore,

although there is little evidence that any of the autodefensas in Guerrero have emerged from or

evolved into predatory organ izations themselves, as has happened elsewhere in Mexico, several of

them tacitly or overtly “side” with a local TCO against an encroaching TCO by tolerating the finan-

cial drug- trafficking activities of their local TCO. This likely occurs because income opportunities

are limited for many of the local residents, consisting primarily of traditional farming activities. In

an attempt to constrain the proliferation of informal autodefensas in Guerrero, the state legislature

in 2013 created a route to state legitimacy for policía rural that participated in state training and

incorporated under the State Secretary for Public Security and Civil Protection. Thus far one group

has been recognized near Chilpancingo, Guerrero, and early results indicate a modest drop in

vio lence.

Beyond the borders of Guerrero and Mexico more broadly, several regional challenges directly

impact internal stability. The demand for illegal drugs in the United States pres ents a constant

incentive for continued drug trafficking, and the unchecked supply of weapons from the United

States to Mexican drug organ izations regularly pits Mexican security forces against equally or

better armed criminal counter parts.

Although U.S. efforts to address drug trafficking go back de cades, the Mérida Initiative is the most

recent cooperative approach between the United States and Mexico. Originally agreed by Presi-

dents Felipe Calderón and George W. Bush in 2007, it has been renewed through the current

bud get. Initially focused on operational means for combatting or ga nized crime, the initiative’s

pres ent structure takes a more holistic approach, including assistance for building stronger institu-

tions and an active civil society. The four pillars of the initiative currently include: disrupting the

operational capacity of or ga nized crime; institutionalizing rule of law and human rights reforms;

enhancing border regulation; and building resilient communities. Emphasizing shared responsibil-

ity, Mexico committed to tackling corruption and the United States to addressing domestic drug

demand and the trafficking of weapons and bulk currency from the United States to Mexico. Past

and pres ent efforts have involved cooperative engagement across the spectrum of U.S. govern-

ment agencies including vari ous branches of the Department of Defense, the Department of State,

the Department of Homeland Security and its Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agencies, the U.S. Marshals, the Department of Justice, the

U.S. Agency for International Development, and vari ous intelligence ser vices. The 2017 bud get

request includes $129 million for Mérida, a $10 million decrease from 2016. Congress also has the

power to withhold a portion of Mérida funds based on human rights violations attributed to Mexi-

can security forces.

Although President Enrique Peña Nieto has shown less enthusiasm than his pre de ces sor for work-

ing closely with the U.S. military, he has requested increased assistance for judicial reform and

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 85

prevention efforts, which continue to be implemented at varying speeds and rates of success.

Mexico’s National Anti- Corruption System was passed into law in spring of 2015 and secondary

implementation laws are up for vote in June 2016. More law enforcement training has devolved to

the state and local level, although high turnover rates in these agencies may lessen the impact of

these trainings. Mexico has likewise pressed forward with the transition from a closed- door judicial

system to an adversarial public trial system. Guerrero has undertaken this transition, although

implementation has been slow and both police and prosecutors lack basic skills to enact this

system effectively.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Mexico’s uneven conditions are reflected in its rankings in the major indexes for peace, fragility,

transparency, and development. Freedom House classifies Mexico as partly free, a downgrade

from the “ free” classification it held from 2001 to 2010. On corruption, Transparency International

downgraded Mexico to a 30 out of 100 (a rank of 50 or lower indicates serious institutional cor-

ruption) after fairly stagnant rankings since the late 1990s. In the Fragile States Index compiled by

Fund for Peace, Mexico scores 70.4 out of 120 points (120 being least stable), just placing it in the

“elevated warning” category, and the Institute for Economics and Peace places Mexico at 140 out

of 163 states on its Global Peace Index. Both Freedom House and the Global Peace Index trace

deteriorating rankings to 2007, lagging about a year behind the most recent uptick in TCO vio-

lence. Mexico’s comparatively higher score on the United Nations Development Programme

Human Development Index, 74 out of 188 states, reflects Mexico’s potential and overall improved

capacity in areas other than security and transparency.

Authority

Mexico’s stability, or lack thereof, revolves primarily around the interplay of government and TCOs.

Governing frameworks, particularly at the federal level, are generally fairly strong, and several

long- awaited constitutional reforms have recently been instituted. Elected officials and their di-

rected agencies are the only entities officially recognized as legitimate authorities, despite com-

mon opinion that certain individuals and even entire units may have been delegitimized by the

depth of corruption. The challenge is in the implementation of policy, and many government

agencies, including all levels of the judiciary and police, have been criticized for failing to satisfac-

torily execute their responsibilities or, worse, for enabling a culture of criminal impunity or actively

contributing to Mexico’s security woes. Unofficially, in areas not effectively dominated by state

security forces, real and perceived authority might change hands regularly between the state, one

or another TCO, or community self- defense groups, or exist in a contested state of limbo. The

administration in Guerrero, for example, suffers from conflicts of interests between agents of

Guerrero’s vari ous security and justice agencies and a lack of in de pen dence of the judiciary from

the executive.

The question of legitimacy is likewise mixed. Nationally, elected officials and their agencies have

mostly retained at least a notional hold on legitimacy given that their primary competition, the

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World86

TCOs, are not perceived as a better option. However, in contested areas such as Guerrero, officials’

legitimacy has suffered, particularly in communities where security forces are perceived to have

contributed to the abuse of rights. Indicative of these challenges, not one indictment has been

levied in any of the 90 cases of suspicious disappearances and 54 cases of torture documented by

the Guerrero state Human Rights Commission between 1990 and 2014. Nor in any of the 44 other

disappearances investigated by state investigators.4 Furthermore, in 2014 then Governor Angel

Aguirre effectively neutralized the Human Rights Commission, the one institution generally re-

garded as providing a public check on impunity. Therefore, a fine distinction may be that TCOs

primarily challenge the credibility but not inherently the legitimacy of government authority.

Insofar as TCOs do undermine government legitimacy, it is through their corrupting influence.

In Guerrero, for example, this interplay was emphasized by the kidnap and murder of 43 teaching

students near Iguala in 2014. Following massive protests in the state and across the nation, and at

least three contradictory investigations, the mayors of Iguala and Cocula, the wife of Iguala’s

mayor, and dozens of police officers and members of the Guerreros Unidos TCO were arrested

and await trial for colluding in the students’ deaths. Given the conflicting reports from in de pen-

dent investigators, there also remain significant public suspicions regarding a government attempt

to cover up the incident. As of September 2016, observers were hoping for better results based on

the planned deployment of an Inter- American Commission on Human Rights team to shadow the

government investigation.

Likewise, the community autodefensas do not challenge the government’s authority but do high-

light the government’s lack of credibility. They operate in both urban and rural areas and have had

a particularly established presence in Guerrero since 1995 when several indigenous community

police groups formed, with eventual state recognition and authorization, in response to unchecked

criminal activity in their communities. While the newer self- defense groups do not have formal

authority to operate, most are similarly local and derive their legitimacy from their local roots and

demonstrated local commitment. The more reputable of these organ izations have managed to

build capacity, authority, and legitimacy, though these are limited by their minimal reach. In 2012–

2013, one of the few events to interrupt the surging TCO vio lence in Guerrero was the merging of

three citizen groups into a new policing group to increase their influence. The new organ ization,

Sistema de Seguridad y Justicia Ciudadana (SSJC), incorporates members from across at least five

municipalities. SSJC has opposed the recent state attempts to absorb the community policing

groups, concerned they would be co- opted or lose effectiveness under state control.

For its part, the United States has ramped up its efforts to develop civil society capacity and con-

tribute to solidifying authority. USAID implements a $76 million rule of law program that assists

state and federal authorities in all 31 of Mexico’s states and the capital (Distrito Federal) and civil

society organ izations that help monitor and oversee reform efforts. Separate from the Mérida

Initiative, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has overseen Department of Defense training

and equipment programs for counternarcotics support. A variety of U.S. domestic programs to

combat drug demand and trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering, particularly in

4. Eric A. Witte et al., Broken Justice in Mexico’s Guerrero State (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2015), 10,

https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/broken-justice-mexicos-guerrero-state-eng-20150826.pdf.

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https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/broken-justice-mexicos-guerrero-state-eng-20150826.pdf

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 87

the southwest, are funded through regular and supplemental appropriations to a variety of do-

mestic U.S. agencies.

Capacity

Mexico demonstrates adequate and increasing capacity on social, po liti cal, and economic fronts,

but inadequate capacity in justice, security, and law enforcement. Despite gaps in implementation,

particularly in rural areas, the Mexican government has demonstrated the ability to capably provide

many of its basic ser vice responsibilities, including managing one of the world’s highly respected

antipoverty programs, Prospera (formerly Opportunidades).

The state of Guerrero predictably ranks poorly on many indicators of capability as well. According

to the Mexico Peace Index 2015, in addition to its high crime statistics, which reflect poor law

enforcement capability, it also ranks second to last in justice efficiency. In the 2016 Index, it ranked

last overall in positive per for mance criteria. Nonetheless, despite this ranking, Guerrero demon-

strates a potential foundation for pro gress, ranking in the top half of states for police funding and

ac cep tance of the rights of others.5

In terms of capacity, security and rule of law remains the biggest challenge for the Mexican gov-

ernment at national and state levels. Given the demonstrated ability of the Mexican government to

make substantive pro gress against other complex social challenges like health and education, the

likely impediment is not capacity per se, but active obstruction of reform and interdiction efforts

by corrupt individuals within the vari ous security and justice agencies.

Security

Although overall levels of vio lence and insecurity remain high, Mexico’s rates of vio lence have

fallen every year since 2011, with violent crime, or ga nized crime, and hom i cide rates each falling

by nearly 30 percent since 2011. Guerrero similarly saw marginal annual improvements in security

between 2011 and 2014, although those improvements were reversed in 2015, and Insight Crime

reports that kidnapping rates specifically bucked declining national trends to rise again in the first

quarter of 2016.6 As many experts attribute the declining crime and vio lence primarily to narco-

peace (i.e., crime being curtailed because one drug organ ization successfully exerts dominance

over an area) rather than increased law enforcement, it is likely that continued seesawing could

occur pending TCO activity.

In the absence of strong rule of law, vio lence has become the common currency of entrenched

TCOs as well as the organ izing justification for the new generation of autodefensas. Ele ments of all

armed groups— government security forces, criminal organ izations, and even some community

police— have been accused of unnecessary use of force and human rights violations.

Although neither an international war nor an internal insurgency per se, Mexico’s vio lence can be

considered high intensity as defined by the Human Security Report, resulting in far more than the

5. Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Mexico Peace Index 2016 (New York: IEP, March 2016), http://economic

sandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mexico-Peace-Index-2016_English.pdf.

6. Patrick Corcoran, “Gang Breakdown Coincides with Kidnapping Rise in Mexico States,” InSight Crime, June 14, 2016,

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/gang-breakdown-coincides-with-kidnapping-rise-in-mexico-states.

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http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mexico-Peace-Index-2016_English.pdf

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/gang-breakdown-coincides-with-kidnapping-rise-in-mexico-states

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World88

categorical 1,000 deaths per year. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 60,000 people

were killed between 2006 and 2012 in drug- related vio lence, and more than 26,000 dis appeared.

Overall, between 2011 and December 2014, Mexico experienced a total of 141 mass displacement

events in 10 states, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Internal Displacement

Monitoring Centre (UNHCR- IDMC).7 Though widespread, Mexico’s vio lence concentrates heavi ly

along the main drug- trafficking routes to the United States. Many of the deaths represent killings

between and among vari ous TCOs, but government officials, police, and other security forces are

regularly targeted and, according to the UN, public insecurity became more acute and human

rights vio lence, hom i cides, forced disappearances, kidnapping, extortion, and other forms of

nonlethal vio lence against citizens became rampant following the start of joint military operations

with the local and federal police.

The victims of this vio lence are predominantly Mexican, but U.S. citizens also have been victims of

cargo theft and hijacking, kidnapping, and murder, such as the 200 cases of kidnapping involving

Americans in 20148 and 103 U.S. citizens murdered in Mexico in 2015.9 While some Americans

killed have been involved in drug trade, others were like Harry Devert, an American killed near

Ixtapa- Zihuatanejo while passing through Mexico en route to the World Cup in Brazil in 2014.

Notably, Ixtapa- Zihuatanejo is the only city excepted from the April 2016 U.S. State Department

prohibition on government staff travel to Guerrero. American Ronald James Wooden was beaten

and held by municipal police officers allegedly linked to Guerreros Unidos in Taxco in 2014. Sup-

ported by the Guerrero Human Rights Commission, a judge ordered a rare formal criminal investi-

gation for Wooden’s case, though that has not yet occurred. The entire Taxco police department

was disarmed by the federal government 18 months later.10

Some police and military units act effectively and cohesively to counter this vio lence in isolated

instances, particularly the Mexican Navy, which regularly works with U.S. counter parts. Neverthe-

less, the overall inadequacy of government law enforcement reach and quality results in substan-

tial security gaps that are filled by TCOs or autodefensas or both. The state on the ground in

Guerrero reflect this patchwork real ity, wherein limited areas at the city or neighborhood level are

under reliable or contested civilian- controlled security while others are secured to varying degrees

by self- defense groups and yet others are clearly dominated by one or multiple criminal organ-

izations. To shore up this weakness, both Mexican and U.S. attention has moved to engage with

7. These figures do not include disaster- induced displacement, which includes another 158,000+IDPs as of Decem- ber 2013 due to floods, storms, and landslides. Data from Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Mexico IDP

Figures Analy sis,” accessed September 19, 2016, http://www.internal-displacement.org/americas/mexico/figures

-analysis.

8. Overseas Security Council (OSAC), “Mexico 2015 Crime and Safety Report: Mexico City,” February 13, 2015,

https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17114.

9. Dolia Estevez, “State Department Renews Travel Warning for Large Parts of Mexico; 103 Americans Killed in 2015,”

Forbes, January 20, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2016/01/20/state-department-renews-travel

-warning-for-large-parts-of-mexico-103-americans-killed-in-2015/#3be045b27c4d.

10. Mark Stevenson, “Torture Scandal in Mexico: American Nearly Beaten to Death,” Associated Press, July 12, 2016,

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d7fd4ff0ba8d4c49b51ffda025d4d2c7/torture-scandal-mexico-american-nearly -beaten

-death.

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http://www.internal-displacement.org/americas/mexico/figures-analysis

https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17114

http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2016/01/20/state-department-renews-travel-warning-for-large-parts-of-mexico-103-americans-killed-in-2015/#3be045b27c4d

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d7fd4ff0ba8d4c49b51ffda025d4d2c7/torture-scandal-mexico-american-nearly-beaten-death

Rebecca K. C. Hersman 89

law enforcement at the subnational level. Recent efforts include establishing new institutions, like

internal affairs departments and a customs training acad emy, and strengthening Mexican local and

state civic planning and crime prevention efforts.

The most controversial aspect of efforts to counter drug trafficking has been balancing law en-

forcement and military approaches, as instigated by Calderón’s decision to place the Mexican

military in the leading role in order to allow for reform and reor ga ni za tion of the vari ous police

departments. The high- level interdiction strategy is cited as cause of the splintering, increased

vio lence, and reor ga ni za tion among the TCOs, while drug availability dropped then revived. Critics

note that proposals such as the national gendarmerie have been watered down or delayed and

question whether the “breathing space” that the use of the military was intended to create has

been used adequately to vet police, remove corrupt officers, and instill better policing practices.

This debate goes hand- in- hand with the ongoing debate over balancing security and human rights

both domestically in Mexico and bilaterally with the United States. The military’s heavy- handed

presence and perpetration of human rights violations has been roundly criticized, and some critics

have argued that the pres ent focus on high- value individuals and drug interdiction prioritizes U.S.

or ga nized crime objectives at the expense of average Mexicans’ security.

Additionally, although the Mérida Initiative does not include an active U.S. military presence in

Mexico, largely due to Mexican concerns about sovereignty, military cooperation is increasing

through Department of Defense training and equipment programs for the Mexican military, in-

cluding the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and intelligence.

STATE OF PLAY

Currently, the situation in Mexico can be characterized as a “high simmer.” Some experts suggest

that the small improvements in peace over the last three years give Mexico an impor tant win dow

of opportunity, although violent crimes escalated throughout 2016, with hom i cides on pace to

return to 2011 levels.11 There is also no evidence that the TCOs have cause to rein in their diversi-

fied activities. In fact, the need (and inability) of any of the con temporary, smaller, and more frac-

tious TCOs to decisively consolidate territory or gain financial advantage over others, when paired

with limited law enforcement focused on interdiction and high- value targeting, create conditions

in which TCO targeting of average citizens remains lucrative and low- risk, exacerbating overall

vulnerability of the general population.

Furthermore, the ramifications of renewed policy discussions between Mexico and the United

States under the administration of President Donald Trump are unclear. Uncertainty about border

taxes, immigration initiatives, and other points of tension between the two governments may

reduce or increase both legal and illegal travel and illicit trafficking between Mexico and the United

States in the near and medium term as people either attempt to take advantage of the status quo

or adopt a wait- and- see approach to potential changes. In par tic u lar, it is unclear what impact(s)

11. Christopher Woody, “The Number of Killings May Fluctuate, but a Brutal Trend Is Emerging in Mexico,” Business

Insider, November 23, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-homicides-deadly-violence-trend-2016-2016-11.

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http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-homicides-deadly-violence-trend-2016-2016-11

Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World90

rumored or actual pro gress on a border wall will have on TCO activity, though one pos si ble and

immediately relevant result could be to quickly and unpredictably affect drug- trafficking routes

and, thereby, TCO territorial disputes, changing or increasing the areas at risk of heightened TCO

vio lence and crime. Beyond that, any substantive deterioration in U.S.- Mexico cooperation at the

federal level is likely to complicate efforts to address fragility at the Mexican substate level.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

Corruption and Impunity

Corrupt officials have so tainted perceptions of the government that the high levels of distrust lead

not only to direct challenges to government authority, such as the rise of self- defense groups, but

also to inefficiencies within the government as suspicion, poor communication, and limited coor-

dination undermine potentially critical alliances between law enforcement agencies and between

local and federal officials. Wariness is justified. Between 2008 and 2013, more than 300 assassina-

tions took place of local officials that confronted drug organ izations. This stress takes a toll with

high turnover rates resulting in the loss of trained and experienced personnel. Po liti cal turnover,

specifically, carries the additional challenge of policy discontinuity. Also, municipal and state

politics remain very opaque and members of drug organ izations continue to infiltrate such admin-

istrations, ensuring their own and their allies’ impunity. Fi nally, the levels of entrenched corruption

mean that potentially significant proportions of governing officials at all levels remain interested in

obstructing the very reform efforts the government is entrusted to enact. Regardless of any poli-

cies passed or the success of individual interdiction efforts, the subsequent lack of judicial law

enforcement and the resulting environment of impunity ensures continuation of the current

vicious cycle.

Engaging Subnational Actors

Identifying potential insertion points in the border region requires effective interactions with

subnational authorities and actors. The changing status of municipal and state agencies as the

Mexican federal government pursues accountability and reform efforts greatly complicates the

United States’ ability to identify and sustain relations with subnational partners. Moreover, some of

the more effective potential local partners, the autodefensas, are not government sanctioned,

presenting diplomatic, legal, and technical obstacles. In Guerrero, multiple municipal police de-

partments have been temporarily or in defi nitely disarmed or disbanded during recent reform

efforts, and autodefensas often constitute the only realistic security presence with significant local

knowledge and capacity.

Lack of U.S. Domestic Legislation and Enforcement

The firepower imbalance between the TCOs and law enforcement/autodefensas remains substan-

tial, and the United States has not made pro gress in addressing its commitment to curbing the

flow of weapons trafficking into Mexico. No meaningful new weapons management legislation has

been passed, nor has law enforcement under current U.S. legislation been notably enhanced to

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 91

reduce opportunities for illicit organ izations to procure weapons. Some attempts have been made

to improve border control on both the U.S. and Mexican sides to increase interdiction of weapons

during transport, but such reactive tracking and discovery efforts are more difficult and expensive

than preventive efforts.

Citizen Mobility and Financial Interdependence

The United States cannot prohibit its citizens from traveling to Mexico, nor would that be a wise

course of action in most cases. The risk to Americans can be somewhat abated by ongoing com-

munication of travel warnings. However, analy sis and warnings rarely achieve mass public aware-

ness and will never be able to fully keep pace with the rapid and continual evolution of Mexico’s

TCO dynamics, nor will warnings help or deter those who travel to visit family or those business

concerns established in areas that are riskier. In addition to strong cross- border family connec-

tions, hundreds of billions of dollars in trade depend on human exchanges between the two

countries. In addition, tourism is a critical facet of Mexico’s economy, and excessively discouraging

travel to Mexico would increase tension between the two governments.

OPPORTUNITIES AND ASSETS

Significant Capacity and Resources

Despite the chronic weaknesses in Mexican law enforcement and governance more broadly, there

are wells of professional effectiveness and proficiency. These have been demonstrated, repeatedly,

by the capture of Mexico’s most elusive, influential, and well- protected TCO leaders. There are

successful examples of local institutions at state and local levels and in executive, police, justice,

and civil society posts that can be shared, scaled, enabled, adapted, and integrated to leverage and

increase their success. Furthermore, in the case that an international incident should occur, such

as the mass kidnapping of U.S. citizens, Mexican assets, with U.S. support, are capable of effecting

tactical interventions. Organ izations like the Guerrero Human Rights Commission have proved

able and willing to conduct risky and credible investigations into high- profile cases, and the judicial

system, while perhaps the weakest remaining link in the law enforcement chain, has cooperated

with the United States in cases involving significant U.S. interests, particularly when there is intense

public pressure. In a worst- case scenario, such as mass kidnapping of Americans, the United States

can expect to effect a credible and joint response in cooperation with its Mexican partners.

In addition, should the Mexican government prove amenable, there is significant pre ce dent for

working with semiofficial armed groups or militias, such as the autodefensas, under structured

par ameters that outline acceptable actions and authorities. The United States could support the

Mexican government in incorporating or cooperating with pro- government aligned autodefensas

in high- priority states or municipalities.

Deep Multidimensional Relationship

Mexico and the United States have built a strong foundation for future cooperation, forging rela-

tionships across a wide spectrum of government and civil society agencies. These include

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World92

operational agencies like Defense, Customs, Trea sury, and Justice, as well as executive bodies.

There are also many official and unofficial relationships in civil society, including business associa-

tions, investigative journalists, watchdog organ izations, research bodies, and social ser vice agen-

cies. Collectively, these institutions either directly or indirectly touch on nearly every facet of the

or ga nized crime issue. To take just two disparate examples: on the security side, Mexican federal

police participated in the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Border Enforcement

Security Task Force; on the private side, U.S. and Mexican business leaders have convened the

U.S.- Mexico CEO Dialogue and other forums to explore ways to improve bilateral relations. Past

and current relations lay the groundwork for increased collaborations that have and will maximize

reform and counter- TCO efforts.

Ripe Opportunities for Cross- Border Partnerships in Law Enforcement, Civil Society, and the Private Sector

Mexico’s growing number of civil society organ izations have gained significantly in diversity,

organ ization, and sophistication since 2007. Many are mature and savvy enough to act credibly as

watchdogs, partners, and interlocutors. In addition, Mexico’s large youth population, which in-

cludes both victims and perpetrators of or ga nized vio lence, is increasingly connected to the global

network via technology, presenting new opportunities for outreach, information gathering, and

ser vice provision. The private sector has also been largely untapped, despite its expanding pres-

ence and influence and its growing recognition of the benefits of reducing corruption. The exam-

ple of private- sector support for relaunching the Police Acad emy in Nuevo Leon may serve as a

model for other joint ventures. Other institutional assets such as the National Program for the

Social Prevention of Vio lence and Delinquency (PRONAPRED), Peña Nieto’s signature platform for

crime and vio lence prevention, and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, which has

developed a uniform data platform to track incidences of vio lence, provide new opportunities and

capacities for collaboration

RECOMMENDATIONS

Guerrero has been highlighted as an example of the extent and severity to which former safe

havens commonly accessed by American citizens can become penetrated by unavoidable, unpre-

dictable, and indifferent criminal activity. In the current climate, however, the examples presented

here can and do take place throughout Mexico, particularly among the northern border and

Pacific coastal states frequented by Americans. In that light, while the following sections reflect

certain conditions par tic u lar to Guerrero, they can be extrapolated as considerations for engage-

ment in situations of weak federal governance with strong substate actors.

Given the multifaceted and finely woven nature of the U.S.- Mexico relationship, the security of the

United States and its citizens will remain intertwined with that of Mexico. The nature of the long-

standing partnership to improve permanent security conditions may, in the near term, depend

largely on the approach of the United States. Best efforts to preventively warn Americans away

from high- risk areas in Mexico will not eliminate the threat or deter the millions of U.S. citizens

annually choosing or requiring travel to Mexico. Nor is it desirable practice, ethical, or legal for the

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 93

Departments of State and Defense to track such persons while in Mexico. It is therefore reasonable

to assume that pres ent or increased levels of orga nizational crime in Mexico may endanger signifi-

cant numbers of Americans, requiring a U.S. response.

To enable the most effective U.S. response, the U.S. government should undertake the following

recommendations:

1. Enhance readiness of response plans and assets

Develop more detailed emergency protocols. As a basic mea sure, the United States,

through its embassy and consular ser vices, should review and update its resources and

protocols for contacting and evacuating U.S. citizens in anticipation of needing to help

those who may find themselves suddenly trapped in situations of explosive TCO vio lence.

This will likely entail prearranging protocols with local officials and/or prepositioning re-

sources in likely hot spots. Such cooperation is especially impor tant in conjunction with

high- value TCO targeting operations, given likely knock-on effects of these operations, such

as increased vio lence directed at American citizens. Options to counter such collateral

effects include force prepositioning and collaboration with civil society groups.

Review standby plans for potential extraction operations. The United States should reevalu-

ate its potential partners, including autodefensas groups, and consider whether a strategy of

embedding U.S. assets into Mexican units and planning for joint missions or, in extreme

cases, whether unilateral extraction operations are the most likely to uphold U.S. objectives

of protecting and recovering U.S. citizens.

2. Deepen direct interactions at the local level and direct resources accordingly

Direct tangible and intangible resources to supporting proven and strategic subnational

partners. Entities like the state Human Rights Commissions can undertake critical operational

tasks on behalf of the United States and its citizens on a case- by- case basis. Moreover, they

constitute one of the few institutional checks on executive impunity and contribute to

improved transparency and accountability. U.S. support may entail financial resourcing,

technical assistance, the provision of good offices, public shows of support, or application

of diplomatic pressure on its behalf.

3. Promote more effective coordination/serve as liaison

Seek a constructive role in liaising between government bodies and the community self-

policing groups/autodefensas. Not only can such groups be valuable sources of information

and the most knowledgeable partners in certain areas during a crisis, but it is in the best

interests of both the United States and Mexico to find a clear way forward to maximize the

near- term value of such volunteer groups while reestablishing the authority of the state.

Under Mérida, the United States could fund studies of these groups and efforts to share,

scale, or adapt efforts that are both successful and aligned with human rights.

4. Improve information gathering

Improve information- gathering capabilities, particularly through expanded engagement of

local and state- level civil society organ izations, watchdog groups, volunteer groups,

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World94

journalists, and private- sector associations. In par tic u lar, this information can help to better

target subnational- level Mérida Initiative efforts toward municipal and micro- geographies

identified as specific hot spots, and identify potential local and state- level partners for

collective action under Mérida’s pillar four— resilient communities—as prioritized by Peña

Nieto. With better information gathering, the United States can also encourage and support

targeting of critical operational- level players, rather than top- level players, which can reduce

vio lence by degrading TCO functional capabilities without sparking the same levels of

violent competition that arise when group leaders are removed.

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PART THREE

Conclusion

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LONG- TERM CHALLENGES SHAPING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN THE FRAGILITY LANDSCAPE

While each of the case studies highlights diff er ent challenges and operating environments, taken

together, they serve to accentuate broader systemic challenges that are shaping and characteriz-

ing the fragility landscape. There are five main characteristics that are converging and complicat-

ing instability around the world and making it increasingly difficult to operate: the chronic,

long- term duration of crises; the widespread weakening of national, state- based systems of gov-

ernment as the dominant organ izing structure; expanding gray zone conflicts that feed tension

and conflict short of war; complacency and disregard for international rules and norms that are

further victimizing civilians; and the escalation of great power tensions that raise both the stakes

and risks associated with national security responses. These characteristics are straining response

mechanisms, draining resources, and heightening spillover risks. This study concludes by high-

lighting areas of opportunity upon which the United States can build to operate as effectively as

pos si ble in the face of the systemic challenges and across the range of operating environments

the CSIS authors explored.

Chronic, Long- Term Crises

Chronic conditions of instability, insecurity, and fragility directly contribute to the emergence of

security challenges such as epidemics, humanitarian disasters, terrorism, criminality, or military

intervention, which in turn tend to last longer and recur more frequently absent of improvements

in the under lying conditions. Security crises caused by fragility or instability are increasingly

chronic events— occurring with greater frequency and over longer durations than existing interna-

tional and domestic assistance and development support mechanisms are designed to sustain.

Too often the United States and the international community do not adequately respond until a

crisis is dire. Moreover, due to the complexity of the crises and a desire to avoid long- term

Key Themes and Takeaways

0 7

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 97

interventions, the United States has a limited ground presence in many unstable regions. This

creates less capacity and capability and, in many instances, less access to traditional intervention

options.

The growing scale, complexity, and duration of crises— measured in years rather than months or

weeks— are taxing the international system both at the point of ser vice and at the periphery. A

series of high- intensity, protracted crises— Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, to name a few—

defy traditional assistance approaches designed to respond quickly to short- term needs and then

transition to longer- term stabilization, development, and capacity- building efforts dependent on

national- level partnerships. Increasingly, such transitions never seem to arrive. Strain is placed on

regions absorbing the ramifications of instability, but also on the international organ izations,

structures, and entities charged with response. The frequency and duration of these crises are

stretching available human and financial resources at both the national and international levels.

The delay of development support aimed at addressing under lying conditions only worsens these

dynamics. And yet, such long- term deferrals of long- term assistance are a real ity.

The premise of this study suggests that the United States will at times be forced to operate in the

presence of instability and fragility overseas. Improving our effectiveness at doing so is central to

securing our interests in those environments. This pragmatic approach does not require or en-

courage a short- term perspective in the pursuit of security objectives— just the opposite. As dem-

onstrated by the case studies, these complex crises, even in their more urgent and time- sensitive

manifestations, require sustained efforts, durable collaborations, and reliable access over time.

Breakdown of Traditional State Structures

As fragility and instability continue to expand, particularly in concentrated areas of the Middle East

and Africa, the Westphalian system of states that orders our institutions, diplomacy, and interna-

tional legal system weakens. Po liti cal fragmentation and loss of faith in state institutions permeates

weak and unstable environments. If national governments recede as the principal organ izing

entities in the international system, so too will the concept of state sovereignty as the international

system’s most fundamental concept.

Po liti cal fragmentation, weak state institutions, and corruption were common themes across the

case studies— states that have been unwilling or unable to provide for their populations have left a

void to be exploited by nonstate actors and other powers. In several unstable environments out-

lined in the case studies, national governments do not fully control their own territory and often

lack the ability or interest to provide critical ser vices for their own citizens. In other cases, subna-

tional or transnational actors have established alternative governing structures and public ser vices,

often superior to those provided in state- controlled areas. In the Syria- Iraq context, the Kurdish

region, which extends across the borders of three countries, is relatively stable and functioning in

an other wise incredibly insecure and violent region. Kurdish authorities are capable of effective

partnering but doing so is often opposed by regional and national actors, especially Turkey.

Additionally, nonstate actors and nongovernmental organ izations increasingly perform state

functions in the face of instability. Sometimes these entities are benign, existing solely for the

purpose of providing vital ser vices, but on other occasions these ser vices are offered by malicious

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World98

actors intent on advancing par tic u lar missions and agendas. This has blurred the line between

state and nonstate institutions as traditional functions of the state are no longer only provided by

the state— yet disaggregating “good” actors from “bad” is very difficult.

For example, on the positive side, nongovernmental organ izations, often funded by national

governments, are providing basic ser vices and health care to civilians in conflict or unstable re-

gions on a prolonged basis and at considerable risk as state ser vices have collapsed. In many

instances, the international community is relying on the NGOs to bear the brunt of the burden in

these complex environments since they have relatively better access or fewer restrictions to act

than direct national- level assistance providers. Even entities like the Syrian American Medical

Society or Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), however, are facing ever- growing difficulties with

access to the most unstable areas, forcing them to rely extensively on local contractors and imple-

menters to execute their programming. Even more problematic is the rise of nonstate actors like

ISIS and Boko Haram that use the provision of ser vices to control and coerce local populations.

They control access and delivery of ser vices based on loyalty and favoritism and obstruct other

actors and the state from providing ser vices to populations under their control.

In other cases, the lack of state control over the use of force has prompted the formation of

militias, gangs, and policing units to provide local security when the state fails to do so. This is

particularly evident with the Mexico and Libya case studies. In some cases, like Iraq or Af ghan i stan,

these militias are sanctioned and encouraged by domestic and international authorities, thereby

undermining broader state- based control of and accountability for security forces, even as they

might assist in responding to immediate security challenges.

The United States, as well as the majority of international institutions with which it cooperates, rely

heavi ly on the Westphalian system of nations and princi ples of sovereignty to structure and guide

international efforts, create and support legal authorities, and engage diplomatically— especially

with regard to dictating the terms and conditions of access. As the case studies and broader trends

evince, the United States will increasingly be forced to find ways to better navigate at the subna-

tional and regional levels when national authorities are weak, illegitimate, or absent, while at the

same time not undercutting further the system of nations on which we depend overall. This is

likely to include expanding legal frameworks and authorities to work more directly with subna-

tional entities while at the same time carefully establishing criteria and review pro cesses to address

risks and downsides.

Expanding Gray Zones

Not surprisingly, geographic regions of severe fragility and instability often coexist with “gray

zones,” the term increasingly used to describe the space between peace and war on the contin-

uum of conflict. States use gray zone efforts such as po liti cal coercion, support for proxies and

militias, information (and disinformation) campaigns, and other forms of deception, infiltration, and

manipulation to achieve their objectives when the costs of direct conventional military confronta-

tion appear too high. The conditions of instability that exist in these regions provide easy opportu-

nity for the introduction of gray zone tactics as dominant regional actors seek to manipulate

instability to serve their interests. In these areas, the line between state and nonstate actors is

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 99

blurred as states fail to fulfill their role, nonstate actors step in to fill the void, and third- party states

seek to manipulate the environment to their advantage.

In the Syria- Iraq and eastern Ukraine cases, these gray zone dynamics are particularly acute and

significantly complicate the United States ability to meet and manage impor tant security impera-

tives. In Ukraine, Rus sia has actively used such tactics to advance its strategic position and prevent

Ukraine’s national government from reasserting effective control. In the Syria- Iraq border region,

multiple states— Russia, Iran, Turkey— have used proxies and surrogates to manipulate the conflict

and shift the balance of control to entities that better suit their interests.

Such gray zone tactics, however, are not limited to cross- border conflicts involving national- level

interference. Similar tactics also emerge in areas of subnational tension and conflict as diff er ent

sources of authority compete for dominance and control. Throughout the case studies and be-

yond, it is evident that areas of instability or stability coexist alongside each other. Increasingly,

these pockets of fragile and less fragile spaces have evolved into a mottled landscape of instability,

further facilitating gray zone tensions at the subnational level. Mexico is a functioning state that

many would not define as unstable, but there are pockets and localities within the state that face

threats of fragility through criminality and illicit activities. Gang leaders and drug lords use corrup-

tion, intimidation, and vio lence to coerce and co- opt local authorities while intimidating local

citizens— resulting in many of the same destabilizing proxy- related activities that we see on the

national level.

Strain on International Laws and Norms

International rules, norms, and institutions face increasing strain, particularly given weakening state

structures and growing gray zone or subnational violent conflict. In numerous conflict zones,

international laws and norms designed to protect civilians and preserve humanitarian assistance

have virtually collapsed as the frequency and severity of attacks against civilians, health workers,

and hospitals have increased. Additionally, resourcing, capacity, and the will to enforce interna-

tional standards are complicated by the number of crises and extent of violations. The rules, laws,

and norms developed by international institutions have been ignored or violated in many in-

stances. Strict re spect for sovereignty was blatantly violated in Crimea with little reprisal beyond

U.S. and EU sanctions. The deliberate targeting of civilians and humanitarian workers by vari ous

parties to the conflict has occurred consistently in Syria and even Libya as well as in other crises

around the globe.

In part, many of the subnational and transnational actors driving these conflicts see themselves as

outside of the system and not subject to the rules. Moreover, especially in gray zone conflicts, the

parties are deliberately using techniques and activities designed to skirt the rules and norms asso-

ciated with armed conflict. Spoilers have always been a challenge to international law and norms,

but with more and more violations by parties that do not adhere to international law, those who

observe the norms are increasingly the exception rather than the rule. Over time, violations by

nonstate actors have created conditions where it is easier for state actors to do the same.

The long- term damage of this erosion in standards and expectations is substantial. Nongovern-

mental organ izations and international institutions on which these deeply fragile regions rely

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World100

cannot operate in conflict zones if their noncombatant, neutral status cannot be secured and

relied on. Without these actors on the ground providing essential ser vices, access to these com-

plex regions will grow even more difficult both in terms of security and partnering.

Reemergence of Great Power Tensions

The breakdown of state structures has been a significant feature of the security environment and

caused widespread instability in several regions over the last de cade. Compounding these trends,

however, are the rising tensions between great powers of the international community. Tension

between the United States and Rus sia is palpable in Ukraine, Syria, and beyond, which is hindering

the ability to come to long- term solutions to conflicts. Regional powers in the Middle East are

stoking conflicts and tension beyond their borders as Yemen and Libya continue to descend into

vio lence. Rus sia and China increasingly reject American interference in their regional zones and

are prepared to assert influence and stoke conflict as needed to discourage U.S. involvement and

maintain positions of regional dominance.

Some of these “strong” states are tempted to include, accelerate, or perpetuate the disintegration

and weakness of other states when they believe it to be to their advantage. The involvement of

other significant powers requires the United States, in turn, to consider broader escalatory risks

with those states when pursuing its national security imperatives in these regions. The cases

addressing humanitarian assistance in the Syria- Iraq border region and regional aggression in

Eastern Ukraine drive home the point that region powers will seek to use state weakness or fragil-

ity to their advantage and how this phenomenon will substantially curtail U.S. freedom of action in

these regions.

RESPONDING TO SECURITY IMPERATIVES IN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENTS

Security imperatives— humanitarian or disaster- related crises, terrorist threats, disease epidemics,

hostage crises, or military intervention, among others— can and will increasingly force the United

States to operate in environments of extreme fragility and instability, often commingled with high

levels of conflict or vio lence. Understanding that terrain, mapping its contours, and developing

countervailing strategies, relationships, and tools can allow the United States to respond more

nimbly, achieve higher rates of success, and limit collateral damage to longer- term objectives. This

requires that the United States take a much more deliberate and detailed approach to planning for

crisis in fragile or unstable areas. By studying and characterizing these regions in advance, identify-

ing the gaps and opportunities that shape the environment, and pre- identifying or prepositioning

expertise, resources, mechanisms, and authorities, the United States can lay vital groundwork and

achieve more of its security objectives with fewer long- term costs.

Characterizing the Operating Environment

The three gaps— capacity, authority, and security— provide a useful checklist for evaluating and

assessing the operating environment and isolating the most impor tant challenges. Most fragile,

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 101

unstable regions reflect all three “gaps” at least to some degree. But as these five case studies

show, most such environments have a dominant gap to which other gaps are subordinate or from

which they largely derive. This assessment points toward some generalizable conclusions regard-

ing best strategic approaches in each of these areas of deficiency, both in terms of immediate

crisis response and longer- term crisis management and planning.

Capacity Gaps

In most of the cases, state and institutional capacity shortfalls emerge as a direct result of the

deeper gaps in authority and/or security. In places like eastern Ukraine, the Syria- Iraq border

region, and Libya, targeted vio lence, security- driven loss of expertise, and manipulation or distor-

tion by authorities of essential institutions, ser vices, and resources at the national or local levels

drive the severe shortfalls in health, education, basic infrastructure, and other essential ser vices.

On the other hand, in West Africa, while some authority and legitimacy challenges hinder local

access, the primary limitations are resources, infrastructure, and personnel— fundamentally the

result of capacity gaps. In West Africa, high rates of poverty and underdeveloped economies have

led to limited infrastructure, inadequate health and education systems, and economies deeply

dependent on foreign assistance. While less prominent in the rest of the case studies addressed in

this report, it is likely that capacity- driven fragility and instability could grow in the future in the

face of expanding resource pressures from water constraints, climate change, and population

growth.

Such fragile economies, institutions, and infrastructure cannot absorb the shock of a major event

(e.g., a natu ral disaster or major disease outbreak) without risking a broader systemic collapse. In a

crisis, direct assistance to shore up these vulnerabilities is desirable, but absorptive capacity is

limited. In these cases, hub- and- spoke approaches to assistance— direct assistance to weakest

links but also bolstering pockets of strength in the perimeter region— will better contain the crisis,

deepen regional resiliency, and manage the crisis in ways less likely to overwhelm already-

overburdened structures and institutions at the center of the crisis. The hub- and- spoke model of

capacity building places a premium on the ability of the international community to work at the

regional level rather than at the national level exclusively.

Authority Gaps

In most cases, authority gaps are the most vexing, pernicious, and complex challenge from a U.S.

policy perspective. Legitimate and credible sources of authority that align with national structures

and borders are few and far between in these fragile and unstable areas. For Libya, the Mexican

province of Guerrero, as well as eastern Ukraine, authority gaps, particularly the need to work with

and through subnational actors that behave in de pen dently of national- level authorities, pose the

greatest obstacle to delivering an effective response by greatly complicating effective partnering. It

is true those areas can be highly insecure and dangerous on the ground, but this insecurity derives

from the presence of localized authority figures that use force to defend their areas of control and

enforce their authority at the expense of national- level entities.

While gaps in legitimate, recognized authority persist, the opportunities to work though and

around these challenges exist and are underutilized. Time and again the case studies point to the

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World102

value of leveraging strong relations with civil society, utilizing inclusive approaches that engage a

range of stakeholders and expanding connections with local and regional sources of authority as

essential for operating in these environments. These approaches are not easy and certainly are not

conducive to “business as usual” models for state- based cooperation and assistance. That said,

unlike so many challenges in these regions, there are options to improve the U.S. ability to prepare

and respond for crisis. Robust civil socie ties and legitimate local authorities can be engaged effec-

tively if the United States develops the required inclusive approaches, adaptable authorities and

resources, and deeper regional knowledge.

Security Gaps

Violent and unsafe operating conditions sharply limit the ability of the United States, partner-

nations, and international organ izations to access and address security challenges at the source. In

the Syria- Iraq border regions, security is the primary hindrance, although the mottled, uneven lines

of authority across the region, including areas that fall within the de facto authority of designated

terrorist entities, severely impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In that region, the secu-

rity challenges and sustained violent conflict have created an authority vacuum that localized

ele ments seek to fill. In Libya, the Mexican province of Guerrero, and eastern Ukraine, violent

insecurity occurs in localized pockets and is generally tied to militias acting on behalf of alternative

authorities.

In these environments the United States is forced to act though surrogates and proxies (e.g.,

contractors, international providers, and local authorities and entities) to meet security challenges.

But simply delegating responsibility for these security challenges is unlikely to secure U.S. interests

especially over the longer haul as sustained vio lence continues to diminish the ranks of like-

minded implementers. Moreover, the more conflict- ridden the environment the more likely that

multiple security imperatives— managing regional conflict, counterterrorism, and humanitarian

assistance— will coexist and compete. Fi nally, it is precisely in these most complex environments

where the United States has sharply reduced or eliminated its embassy presence and wrapped

what remains in an impenetrable security blanket. While the security of U.S. personnel must be the

top priority, the fortress embassy model dramatically limits available expertise, curtails movement,

and limits access and interaction with the population in the very situations where those are most

needed.

These environments call for a better civil- military cooperation, enhanced training and prepared-

ness for responders forced to operate in these environments, routinized and exercised deconflic-

tion procedures, and establishment of a fused operational picture that includes improved

information sharing between and across the U.S. government and international partners. In addi-

tion, the United States must prioritize restoring normative constraints on armed conflict, including

the indiscriminate use of vio lence against civilian and humanitarian targets, and enforce mecha-

nisms to better separate noncombatants. The combination of enhanced education and enforce-

ment of humanitarian norms and better preparedness of those called to operate in these

environments can help to reduce risks for those providing critical ser vices in these embattled

areas.

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 103

CROSSCUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Taken together, these case studies emphasize that, even in the most fragile or difficult settings, the

United States has assets and opportunities for building near- term strategies and meeting pressing

operational needs. There are five primary crosscutting areas where the United States can focus to

better operate in unstable environments: enhancing cross- agency operational planning and

execution, improving access, identifying and utilizing opportunities and assets, managing knock-

on effects and unintended consequences, and securing and sustaining gains.

Enhancing Cross- Agency Operational Planning and Execution

Addressing complex and multifaceted security imperatives requires that the United States develop

more effective mechanisms for internal coordination. All the cases in this report illuminate chal-

lenges in developing and operationalizing policies on the ground, particularly across U.S. agencies

and often spanning the civil- military spectrum. The United States can respond to gaps and chal-

lenges in unstable environments more effectively by improving mechanisms for cross- agency and

sectoral coordination. Enhancing advanced planning and embracing more diverse expertise into

these planning and implementation pro cesses can greatly improve operational synchronization.

Build Tailored Playbooks with Pre- identified Plug- and- Play Teams

The United States cannot anticipate most emergent national security crises. Who imagined the

sudden emergence of ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya or the rapid spread of Ebola in West Africa? But

the United States can do far more to map these complex environments; pre- evaluate partners,

challenges, and opportunities for access; and pre- identify key organ izations and experts with deep

knowledge and experience in specific zones of instability. Selected zones should reflect a range of

regions and fragility gaps (capacity, authority, security). These preparatory assessments cannot be

limited to threat- based intelligence analy sis. Threat analyses remain impor tant, but these assess-

ments must also identify areas of opportunity— partners, points of access, or positive

relationships— where the United States can potentially make strides. Developing this groundwork in

advance would better prepare the United States to respond quickly and effectively in a crisis. U.S.

government agencies including USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense can

lead in these capacities particularly with personnel with regional expertise.

Incorporate Unconventional Expertise to Enhance Cultural, Po liti cal, and Resource Situational

Awareness and Provide Deep Regional Knowledge

Existing government bureaucracies, including the U.S. military, may not include the deep and

varied cultural, geographic, linguistic, and po liti cal knowledge of these complex regions, and

where such expertise exists it is not always easily accessible. Identifying such expertise in aca-

demia, nongovernmental organ izations, and the private sector, as well as internal to the U.S.

government, and pre- establishing consultative relationships could put critical knowledge and

expertise at the ready before a crisis hits. For example, USAID works closely with contractors and

partners on the ground in many unstable environments. These contractors, who have direct

knowledge of other key experts and partners with local knowledge and relationships, can provide

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World104

invaluable assistance in communicating cultural aspects and expertise to enhance a larger U.S.

response.

Fuse Operational and Assistance Efforts as Close to the Source as Pos si ble

Too often major security (generally led by the defense or intelligence agencies) and assistance

efforts (generally led by the State Department and USAID) rely on interagency coordination pro-

cesses in Washington supported by the country team approach at the key embassies. Meanwhile

Department of Defense efforts are commonly coordinated with and through the responsible

geographic combatant command. While these pro cesses suffice for most day- to- day activities,

when faced with complex security crises in highly fragile and unstable environments, the prob lems

with these traditional approaches are many. First, neither interagency policy coordination bodies in

Washington or embassy country teams are equipped for detailed operational coordination, espe-

cially across complex operating environments and sensitive or complex interventions. Moreover,

country teams are naturally tied to and must work with and through the national governments to

which they are accredited.

Tools such as cross- sector task forces, incentivized rotations to encourage a stronger U.S. govern-

ment presence in challenging environments, and enhanced analytics can facilitate the U.S. posture

and presence in identified high- priority fragility zones. During large- scale disaster operations,

USAID’s OFDA usually deploys a Disaster Assistance Response Team or DART to coordinate efforts

on the ground, support and enhance country team capacities, and coordinate directly with Wash-

ington and regional assistance and relief entities, including key international organ izations. While

an excellent and well- rehearsed model, DART teams remain narrowly focused on emergency

disaster efforts and are not used to coordinate broader, complex interventions (although to some

extent their roles were expanded in the Japan Fukushima crisis and in the West African Ebola

crisis). Expanding on this model and extending it to include fusing a variety of ongoing operational

responses in these complex environments could be a helpful step.

Improving Access

Gaining access is job one when it comes to meeting national security challenges in highly fragile

or instable regions. Meeting the security imperative reflects the fundamental requirement to

deliver specific effects, in a specific location, with as much precision as pos si ble. Capacity gaps in

fragile states generally produce resource- based limitations on access— geographically or institu-

tionally. Lack of infrastructure, resources, and personnel in these environments can greatly impede

the delivery of ser vices or support as well as the ability to absorb ser vices or assistance constructively,

especially when such access is required outside of the primary, urbanized population centers. Effec-

tive access almost always requires partnering with credible and legitimate actors as close to the

point of impact as pos si ble. In fragile environments with severe authority gaps, however, especially

between national and localized or subnational sources of authority, such partnering is severely

challenged and often faces significant legal hurdles for U.S. action and engagement. Fi nally, highly

insecure environments produce an array of physical barriers that severely limit options for deliver-

ing effective results, impede traditional civilian mechanisms for response, and place a premium on

defensive posturing, standoff delivery of effects, and the use of surrogates and interlocutors.

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 105

Learn to Operate at the Seams

Instability and fragility do not re spect bound aries or borders, whether geographic, po liti cal, or

bureaucratic— and herein lies the heart of the challenge. Whether it is the bound aries between

nations, between national and subnational authorities, or even the bound aries between agencies,

missions, and responsibilities, these seams confound U.S. policies and operations and favor those

who can cross or disregard them more easily. To more effectively meet security challenges in

these regions, the United States needs legal authorities that can bridge these divides more easily,

policy and operational approaches that are far more interdisciplinary in character, and interagency

and international deconfliction/coordination mechanisms that bring more holistic efforts as close

to the source of crisis as pos si ble, preferably through direct physical proximity or through better

integration of on- the- ground partners. It is essential to establish these authorities, relationships,

and mechanisms before a crisis rather than waiting until the crisis is upon us.

Improve Authorities and Mechanisms to Engage at the Subnational Level and

Transregional Levels

The world is changing, and even if some of these highly complex, fragile, and dangerous environ-

ments stabilize, a simple return to strong national entities with clear and respected national bor-

ders may not be forthcoming. And where such entities do emerge, they may not share or support

the U.S. values, laws, and princi ples that govern our state- to- state interactions. The United States

must have better authorities and mechanisms to engage subnational and transnational entities

when necessary to meet our national security needs.

Empower Regional, Perimeter, and Local Actors Who Possess Better Access, Resources,

and Relationships

Learning to operate more effectively at the seams requires development, support, and sustained

relationships with perimeter, regional, and local actors— those players who are capable of bridging

the divides and engaging across access barriers. Several of the case studies point to the value of

focusing on highly localized implementation supported by regional enabling partners that lie

outside of national authorities. Utilizing regional and local partners becomes especially impor tant

in areas where national- level authorities are absent, in whole or in part, from their own national

territories such as in Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

Pre- negotiate Access Agreements

Access agreements should no longer simply be considered as enabling military activities in sup-

port of traditional military- to- military partnerships between and among military partners seeking

to counter state- based threats. Part of the advanced preparatory work that is needed to map

highly vulnerable or insecure regions and operating environments before crisis strikes must in-

clude the identification of critical access gaps, either in terms of access agreements, status of

forces agreements, or other po liti cal or legal authorities that enable the United States to enter

these complex environments quickly and relatively safely. Perhaps more of these agreements

could be interagency or across civilian agencies in multiple countries rather than purely military in

character. Civilian agencies can develop agreements to provide support for critical assistance

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World106

particularly if one state is better positioned in terms of relationships and access to reach vulnerable

populations. The existence of such agreements and mechanisms in advance can greatly facilitate

the ability of the United States to safely and quickly access these complex environments when

needed, even if the imperative derives from a humanitarian or health security crisis rather than a

more traditional foreign military intervention.

Identifying and Utilizing Opportunities and Assets

In every context, there are areas of opportunities that create the space to work around and

through challenges and access the prob lem or crises with appropriate effects. These opportunities

can help offer paths to access critical territories and build the requisite partners by working

through intermediaries, leveraging effective partners and regional or local leaders, building on civil

society and other structures, or enhancing geo graph i cal proximity. As each case study points out,

areas of opportunity exist in even the most difficult environments that can be leveraged and

encouraged to facilitate crisis response in these fragile or unstable areas. The assets are essential

jumping- off points that provide access, relationships, or resources that enable and support effec-

tive responses— they are the key to more effective and less costly responses. Many opportunities

can be fairly sui generis to the specific territory or operating environment in question, and under-

standing these areas of opportunity in terms of details and specificity is essential for success.

Identify Intermediary Actors and Access Points

In several cases where direct access is difficult or even impossible, intermediary access points or

actors are essential. In the Syria- Iraq region, the Kurds provide some of this function and proximity.

Looking carefully at the perimeters of fragile regions, whether within a country or outside of it, is

more likely to produce an opportunity for effective access than relying entirely on standoff pen-

etration of inaccessible areas. In some instances, the United States can work with allies and part-

ners that might have better relationships with key governments or organ izations to help access

vulnerable populations.

Locate Active Civil Society and Localized Credible Authority Structures

Civil society, where it exists, can provide an essential beachhead and source of partners. The trick

is to develop these institutions as partners as close to the point of delivery as pos si ble rather than

forcing engagements through national government- to- government channels. Eastern Ukraine

provides an excellent example of the critical role these institutions and structures can play.

Leverage Favorable Public Sentiments

Does the local population support U.S. involvement and engagement or not? Are those senti-

ments at odds with that of the national- level government? In Libya, public sentiment against ISIS

(and other foreign- based extremist groups) runs high, which pres ents impor tant opportunities to

facilitate counterterrorism efforts there in ways that minimize knock-on effects. Preserving those

sentiments is essential.

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 107

Foster Positive Bilateral Relationships

Responding to a subnational security crisis, such as hostage taking or other threats to U.S. citizens,

takes on an entirely diff er ent character if positive relations exist with the national authority. In the

Mexico case, the depth and breadth of our bilateral relationships must be viewed as a critical

enabler of effective response rather than just something to worry about or protect defensively.

These relationships often may not exist, but where they do they are critical.

Utilize Credible/Strong Regional Actors

Engaging and supporting effective regional actors can go a long way to containing crises and

providing intermediary points to enter and manage crises in these complex areas. In capacity poor

West Africa, higher capacity regional leaders, such as Nigeria, provide critical waypoints, regional

credibility, and expertise.

Build Habitual Partner Relationships

It is far more difficult to cultivate relationships mid- crisis. Maintaining consistent mechanisms for

assistance and communication with key partner countries is vital. In West Africa, existing capacity-

building partnerships with the key ministries were limited and slowed early efforts. Where they

existed, or where relationships with international organ izations such as the WHO were leveraged,

collaboration and coordination unfolded much more quickly.

Managing Knock-On Effects and Unintended Consequences

Meeting security challenges or imperatives in highly complex, fragile, or unstable areas involves

substantial risks— risks that the effort will fail to deliver the desired result (the epidemic is not

slowed, the humanitarian assistance not delivered, the terrorist attack not disrupted) but also risks

that negative collateral outcomes will outweigh any positive gains of the action itself. Some ex-

amples of these knock-on effects include triggering additional external intervention or a broader

escalation of vio lence as discussed in the Syria- Iraq and eastern Ukraine cases. Other such effects

include inadvertently shifting the balance of power in areas of contested authority or empowering

illegitimate actors or entities (e.g., warlords, terrorists, or criminal gangs) in the name of expedient

partnering.

In many cases, knock-on effects emerge from conflicting priorities in these troubled regions and

the considerable difficulty in balancing the trade- offs and effectively coordinating or deconflicting

U.S. actions across a range of activities and efforts. In Syria, the immediate goals of humanitarian

assistance can be in tension with the requirements of countering ISIS or the broader negotiations

for an end to the conflict. In West Africa, emergency epidemic response must avoid discrediting or

undermining emergent national po liti cal systems and plunging the region into further instability or

collapse while the response must also avoid perpetuating de pen dency on international systems

during crises. In Libya, immediate counterterrorism imperatives, especially as part of the campaign

against ISIS, drive operational responses, but actions that empower one group over the other or

further weaken central authority in the country will set back other priority efforts. In Mexico, the

need to work directly with local entities and criminal ele ments to protect U.S. citizens in rogue

districts or gang territories risks undercutting vital national- level partnerships between the United

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World108

States and Mexico on issues from counter- drug policy to immigration. The stakes associated with

knock-on effects are particularly acute in the eastern Ukraine context given the risks of wider

conflict escalation and implications for great power dynamics on a range of vital issues. In all

operating environments, there are unintended consequences of actions that could cause more

harm than good, so it is vital to plan through some of the potential negative outcomes and to

manage trade- offs when planning or implementing tools.

Don’t Kill the Opportunity

While it is impor tant to identify and use opportunities, these assets are not immune to the dynam-

ics of the environment. Policies and tools that the United States implements to employ assets will

inherently alter them and may put them at risk. The United States must think not only about what

assets we have, but how to preserve, reinforce, and expand them as the United States pursues its

interests—or at least be conscious that in leveraging the asset, the United States might lose them.

For example, one of the main opportunities in the Syria- Iraq context is Kurdish partnership, but

due to regional dynamics in the region particularly with Turkey and the Iraqi government, it is vital

that the United States does not over- rely on the Kurds or partner too closely with them.

Beware the Pernicious Partner

The United States needs better tools and approaches to discern the difference between a difficult,

challenging, and problematic partner and a totally unacceptable one. The current pro cess, largely

dictated by legislative mandates regarding “terrorist lists,” lacks the range of criteria, rationale, and

flexibility for exception and mechanisms for exceptions that are essential to successfully engage

and protect U.S. security interests in fragile and unstable environments. The United States needs

more flexible options in the toolkit that nevertheless address the need for robust accountability

and tracking. Enhancing advanced vetting procedures for potential substate and regional partners

and working across agencies to share information can assist in agilely identifying good or bad

partners in advance and in the midst of crisis. Additionally, during long- term crises, the United

States must develop procedures and ave nues for evaluating partners as allegiances and circum-

stances change on the ground.

Securing and Sustaining Gains

Delivering the necessary responses in the required locations, with a minimum of negative knock-

on effects, is essential but insufficient when addressing urgent security imperatives in complex,

fragile security environments. The United States must undertake deliberate efforts to secure and

sustain the results of these efforts or simply risk a never- ending game of “whack a mole,” as the

same response must be repeated over and over again with little lasting impact. Standoff strikes at

emergent counterterrorism- related targets yield only temporary benefits if those gains cannot be

sustained and reinforced by and with local partners in key areas. The provision of military support

to like- minded actors may dissuade great power intervention, but without strong support for civil

society these gains will be fleeting at best and backfire at worst.

In areas where capacity gaps dominate, sustainment requires par tic u lar focus on absorptive ca-

pacities, ensuring follow-on resourcing support and promoting long- term training and capacity

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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 109

building, lest cycles of invention take hold. Empowering local partners, streamlining pro cesses and

protocols, and establishing patterns of be hav ior can lower barriers to future responses. Similarly, to

secure and sustain efforts, strong assessment tools are required to mea sure effectiveness and

evaluate future needs.

Get on the Right Side of History

Security imperatives cannot and should not provide the rationale to cast our values and princi ples

aside. Neither should we assume that humanitarian values cannot be balanced with security

imperatives. Yet too often U.S. policymakers pose these priorities as competing rather than com-

plementary. The United States must balance security imperatives and humanitarian values to

secure and sustain gains. In real ity, forces on the ground provide the opportunity to bridge these

gaps if we are prepared to approach challenges in an integrated fashion. By harnessing local

opprobrium to terrorism, extremism, and vio lence, the United States can better sustain normative

values while also mitigating security risks.

Build Linkages across Security Imperatives

The U.S. national security system is designed to see differing security and humanitarian impera-

tives in a single region or territory as first competitive rather than complementary or mutually

reinforcing. The winner- takes- all mindset of the interagency pro cess will not serve the develop-

ment of win- win solutions and approaches unless our own internal pro cess and coordination

mechanisms draw more direct linkages between priorities and incentivize collaboration over

secrecy or turf.

Own the Narrative

Too often the United States provides the critical action in support of a national security imperative

only to lose the narrative to opposing ele ments who can distort and mischaracterize the message.

The importance of narratives and information is evident in cases like eastern Ukraine, where

misinformation is used as a tool to spur discontent. It is not enough to be effective; the United

States needs to do a better job of speaking effectively about U.S. intentions and actions rather than

letting actions become an instrument in the opposing narrative.

Better Link and Synergize Crisis Response with Longer- Term Developmental Assistance

Crisis response should build a bridgehead to the longer- term needs of these stable environments,

but to do so, response mechanisms must take into account longer- term priorities and objectives.

There is no planning pro cess for contingencies or transitions outside of the regular steady- state

pro cess, but the humanitarian and development communities must develop more formal pro-

cesses to link and synergize planning and coordination. Similarly, assistance efforts should be

channeled in ways that reinforce and sustain security priorities. This will require longer- term focus,

collaboration, and trust building between and among international organ izations and bureaucratic

entities that often view their relationships as competitive or adversarial. Nevertheless, initiatives

such as the Global Health Security Agenda point to how such collaborative approaches can be

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Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World110

developed and supported— better allowing capacity building and other forms of assistance to

address and mitigate future security imperatives.

Create Favorable Incentive Structures

For more durable results, assistance efforts— even those intended to address urgent security crises

in fragile environments— should seek to create favorable incentive structures for the recipients that

harness the po liti cal economy in positive and sustainable ways. Such approaches are far more

likely to produce durable results that support rather than conflict with longer- term stabilization

and state- building efforts. These approaches can support civil society, build essential human

resource capacities, and support linkages rather than divisions between economic and security

imperatives. This can only be done through more interdisciplinary rather than strictly military

approaches to security crises.

Track and Assess Effectiveness to Target Resources Efficiently for Sustainability

Effective metrics and evaluative methodologies are essential to provide assessments, feedback,

and course- corrections to ongoing responses in these complex and dangerous regions. These

criteria would then better shape the assessments of the security environments, provide additional

clarity with regard to obstacles and opportunities, and frame alternative approaches for future

crises. If these environments will be enduring aspects of the security environment for the near to

medium term, then it is essential to find better ways to share best practices, observe and learn

essential lessons, and better evaluate the longer- term impacts of our assistance and our

interventions.

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111

Environments beset by chronic fragility, ongoing instability, and feeble authorities span today’s

disordered world. Such conditions promise to remain a pervasive characteristic of the security

environment for the foreseeable future, complicating the United States’ ability to operate and

pursue security objectives in these regions facing such intractable challenges.

As recent interventions in Iraq and Af ghan i stan have shown, addressing root causes of instability in

fragile regions, while desirable, is exceedingly difficult. The results of these long- term efforts could

take generations to materialize, if they do at all. In the meantime, the United States faces urgent

security imperatives, such as humanitarian emergencies, terrorism and violent extremism, great

power aggression, health security crises, and international criminal vio lence. These threats de-

mand more immediate action— for example, humanitarian assistance, military cooperation with

subnational partners, or law enforcement— that in turn requires the United States to have not only

the foresight to put anticipatory plans into place, but also the creativity and the flexibility to adapt

those plans as operational requirements on the ground take shape in crisis.

This report’s case studies of Syria- Iraq, Libya, eastern Ukraine, West Africa, and Mexico underline

that this is an ambitious but not impossible task. Improvement, however, will require innovation,

adaptation, and collaboration. Success will depend on the United States’ ability to better assess

and characterize these environments, improve coordination and access, enhance planning, and

diversify partners while at the same time maintaining a longer horizon perspective.

Conclusion

0 8

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112

Anthony Bell is a research associate with the International Security Program at CSIS, where he

works on a broad range of U.S. defense and security policy issues related to Eu rope and the

Middle East. Before joining CSIS, he worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on coun-

terterrorism and security issues in Libya and North Africa. He previously worked as a research

assistant at the Institute for the Study of War, focusing on po liti cal and security dynamics in Libya,

Af ghan i stan, and Iraq. Since 2013, he has served as an instructional assistant at the George Wash-

ington University for courses on foreign policy decisionmaking and international security politics.

He graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from the George Washington University with

a BA in international affairs and received his MA in security studies from Georgetown University.

Kathryn McNabb Cochran is managing director at Good Judgment Inc. and is responsible for ana-

lyzing strategic- level risks to identify key short- and medium- term geopo liti cal questions for

clients. She developed the organ ization’s training materials for question generation and has given

workshops on how to develop rigorous short- term forecasting questions that can inform immedi-

ate operational decisions and longer- term planning. Cochran has a PhD from Duke University and

her research on the reputational consequences of war won the Waltz Award for the Best Disserta-

tion in the Field of International Security. She is an adjunct professor at American University’s

School of International Ser vice and has written on geopo liti cal forecasting, civilian victimization in

war, and military effectiveness. Prior to gradu ate school, she worked as a legislative assistant for

then- Representative Stephen Buyer (R- IN).

Melissa Dalton is a se nior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at CSIS.

Her research focuses on U.S. defense policy in the Middle East, global U.S. defense strategy and

policy, and security cooperation with U.S. allies and partners. As deputy director, she advises the

director on a broad range of strategic and management issues. Prior to CSIS, she served in a

number of positions from 2007 to 2014 at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. She most recently was a se nior adviser for force plan-

ning, where she contributed to the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and DoD’s planning

About the Authors

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About the Authors 113

guidance. Previously, she served as special assistant to the undersecretary of defense for policy, as

policy adviser to the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Af ghan i-

stan, and as country director for Lebanon and Syria. Prior to her DoD ser vice, she taught En glish to

middle and high school students in Damascus, Syria, in 2006. From 2003 to 2005, she served as

an intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. She holds a BA in foreign affairs from

the University of Virginia and an MA in international relations and international economics from the

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Marc Frey is an executive director at Bancroft Global Development, a nonprofit that helps or ga-

nize, mentor, and equip government institutions that are working to end wars, protect civilians, and

improve stability. Before joining Bancroft, he was a se nior director in the Washington office of

Steptoe & Johnson, an international law firm, and served in several roles with the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security, including as chief of staff in the Office of Policy Development and as direc-

tor of the Visa Waiver Program. Frey is a nonresident fellow of the International Security Program

at CSIS and a member of the American Council on Germany and the Atlantic Council of the

United States. He holds a BA from Duke University and a PhD in U.S. diplomatic history from

Temple University.

Alice Hunt Friend is a se nior fellow in the International Security Program at the CSIS, where she

focuses on civil- military relations and African security issues. Friend is also a doctoral student at

American University’s School of International Ser vice, where she focuses on civil- military relations

and use- of- force decisionmaking. From 2012 to 2014, she was the principal director for African

affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where she focused primarily on

North and West African counterterrorism policy. She joined the Department of Defense in 2009 as

special assistant to the undersecretary of defense for policy and also served as the se nior adviser

to the deputy undersecretary of defense for strategy, plans, and forces and as country director for

Pakistan. She has held previous research positions at CSIS and the Center for a New American

Security in Washington, DC, and has worked at the International Labor Organ ization in Geneva and

with the Senegalese Association for Research, Study, and Aid to Development. She is a term mem-

ber of the Council on Foreign Relations and holds a master’s degree in international relations from

American University and a bachelor’s degree in government from Smith College.

Rebecca K. C. Hersman is director of the Proj ect on Nuclear Issues and se nior adviser for the

International Security Program at CSIS. Hersman joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Department of

Defense, where she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of

mass destruction (WMD). In that capacity, she led DoD policy and strategy to prevent WMD prolif-

eration and use, reduce and eliminate WMD risks, and respond to WMD dangers. She was a key

leader on issues ranging from the nuclear security summit to the elimination of Syria’s chemical

weapons to the global health security agenda. She served as DoD’s principal policy advocate on

issues pertaining to the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear

Non- Proliferation Treaty, and Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Before joining DoD, Hers-

man was a se nior research fellow with the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD Center) at the National Defense University from 1998 to 2009. Her primary proj ects focused

on the role of DoD in mitigating the effects of chemical and biological weapons attack, concepts

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About the Authors114

and strategies for eliminating an adversary’s WMD programs, as well as proliferation issues facing

the United States. Hersman also founded and directed the WMD Center’s Program for Emerging

Leaders, an initiative designed to shape and support the next generation of leaders from across the

U.S. government with interest in countering weapons of mass destruction. She previously held

positions as an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, special assistant to

the undersecretary of defense for policy, and member of the House Armed Ser vices Committee

professional staff. She holds an MA in Arab studies from Georgetown University and a BA from

Duke University.

Sarah Minot is a research associate and program man ag er for the Proj ect on Nuclear Issues (PONI)

at CSIS. She is responsible for leading PONI’s programs and initiatives to develop the next genera-

tion of nuclear experts. Her research focuses on crisis response and management and the inter-

section of health and security. She holds an MA in conflict resolution from Georgetown University

and a BA in po liti cal science and international relations from the College of Wooster.

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