HRM 4570 ILR Homework 2
Rain Ashbell
14HRM4570ILRCh8.22DisputeResolutionOnlineLecture2019-20audio.pptxChapter 8 Part 2
Dispute Resolution
Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Hi Class, Welcome to Industrial and Labor Relations. Today we are going to discuss Chapter 8 Part 1 Dispute Resolution
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Use of a neutral third party to settle bargaining impasses with the goal of avoiding costly strikes
In private sector third party dispute resolution mechanism is voluntary, but in public sector is it compulsory
Three primary third-party dispute resolution mechanisms are:
Mediation
Arbitration
Fact-finding
Third-party Dispute Resolution
Third-party dispute resolution mechanisms use a neutral third party to settle bargaining impasses with the goal of avoiding costly strikes.
In the private sector, a strong sense of property rights and the freedom to enter economic contracts of one’s own choosing means that the use of third-party dispute resolution mechanisms is usually voluntary—they are rarely forced on labor and management.
In the public sector, however, the primacy of serving the public interest means that third-party dispute resolution mechanisms are often compulsory—labor and management must use them before or instead of striking.
Three primary third-party dispute resolution mechanisms are:
Mediation
Arbitration
Fact-finding
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Table 8.4 - Options for third Party Dispute Resolution
Table 8.4 presents the four options for third Party Dispute Resolution
In Mediations—the neutral third party is a mediator who tries to facilitate an agreement but lacks the power to force an agreement; a mediator has a high level of control over the negotiating process but not the outcome; a mediator can be either an independent practitioner or full-time employee of mediation agencies at the federal level (the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the National Mediation Board) or the state level.
In Arbitrations—the neutral third party is an arbitrator who forces an agreement on both parties by issuing a ruling that specifies the settlement terms; an arbitrator has a high level of control over the outcome but no involvement in the negotiating process; arbitrators usually either are full-time, self-employed arbitrators or are lawyers or university professors (typically in law or industrial relations) who arbitrate on a part-time basis.
In Fact-findings—the neutral third party is a fact finder who investigates the dispute and makes nonbinding recommendations for a settlement; fact finder lacks control over both the process and the outcome. Fact-finding has the worst of both worlds—low control over both the outcome and the negotiating process—because of which it is often evaluated negatively.
Hybrid mechanisms can also be created, such as “med–arb,” in which the mediator becomes the arbitrator if mediation fails.
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A dispute resolution process
A neutral third party, the mediator helps negotiators avoid or resolve an impasse by reaching an agreement
Mediation is essentially “assisted negotiation”
In practice mediation involves a series of meetings with the mediator some joint meetings and some individual meetings with union and management negotiators
Mediation
Mediation is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party—the mediator—helps negotiators avoid or resolve an impasse by reaching an agreement.
Unlike striking or going to arbitration, the use of mediation does not need to wait until an impasse occurs.
By definition mediators lack the authority to force a resolution by imposing a settlement on the negotiators; rather, mediation is essentially “assisted negotiation.”
In practice mediation involves a series of meetings with the mediator—some joint meetings with the union and management negotiating teams together, and some individual meetings with only the union or management negotiators.
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The mediation process evolves through several stages
Setting the stage in which the mediator collects information and establishes ground rules
Problem solving wherein the mediator works on clarifying the disputed issues and on developing alternative solutions
The focus of the mediator is achieving a workable agreement
Mediation
Through these meetings the mediation process typically evolves through the following stages:
1. Setting the stage—the mediator collects information and establishes ground rules; one of the most important keys to success for mediators needs to be achieved during this stage: establishing a report so that the parties trust the mediator.
2. Problem solving—the mediator works on clarifying the disputed issues and on developing alternative solutions.
3. Achieving a workable agreement—the focus is on encouraging the negotiators to reach a settlement.
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Depending on the types of tactics emphasized, individual mediators can be classified as follows:
1. Orchestrators.
They focus on trying to facilitate productive negotiations; this is the traditional view of mediation that targets improved dialogue between negotiators.
They think that if they can improve the climate and structure of negotiations, the parties will be able to resolve their differences on the issues.
Mediation
Depending on the types of tactics emphasized, individual mediators can be classified as follows:
1. Orchestrators.
They focus on trying to facilitate productive negotiations; this is the traditional view of mediation that targets improved dialogue between negotiators.
They think that if they can improve the climate and structure of negotiations, the parties will be able to resolve their differences on the issues.
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2. Dealmakers
They see negotiations as over when they enter and are therefore not very concerned with facilitating renewed negotiations.
They focus their attention on the bargaining issues and trying to pressure the negotiators to make concessions.
They are more direct in their attempts to shape the final outcome—not the process—by getting the negotiators to change their positions and strike a deal.
They are more likely to produce agreements, but they are also more likely to be perceived as antagonistic or biased, which can reduce negotiators’ acceptance of mediators.
Mediation
2. Dealmakers
They see negotiations as over when they enter and are therefore not very concerned with facilitating renewed negotiations.
They focus their attention on the bargaining issues and trying to pressure the negotiators to make concessions.
They are more direct in their attempts to shape the final outcome—not the process—by getting the negotiators to change their positions and strike a deal.
They are more likely to produce agreements, but they are also more likely to be perceived as antagonistic or biased, which can reduce negotiators’ acceptance of mediators.
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Depending on the sector, mediation can be voluntary or mandatory
Under the NLRA mediation is voluntary.
Employers and unions are required to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) that they will be renegotiating a contract; this advance notice lets the FMCS offer the assistance of a mediator, but either party can refuse this offer.
Mediation
Depending on the sector, mediation can be voluntary or mandatory
Under the NLRA mediation is voluntary.
Employers and unions are required to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) that they will be renegotiating a contract; this advance notice lets the FMCS offer the assistance of a mediator, but either party can refuse this offer.
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Railroads and airlines are prohibited from changing the existing terms and conditions of employment, and unions are forbidden from striking, until the National Mediation Board releases the parties from mediation.
In difficult disputes the parties may be kept in mediation longer than they would like; but the objective of the mediator, and of the Railway Labor Act, is to resolve disputes without strikes and other forms of conflict.
The National Mediation Board is also obligated to offer arbitration to the parties as a method for resolving their dispute, but either party can reject this offer.
Mediation
The Railway Labor Act, however, makes mediation mandatory for negotiators in the railway and airline industries; railroads and airlines are prohibited from changing the existing terms and conditions of employment, and unions are forbidden from striking, until the National Mediation Board releases the parties from mediation.
In difficult disputes the parties may be kept in mediation longer than they would like; but the objective of the mediator, and of the Railway Labor Act, is to resolve disputes without strikes and other forms of conflict.
The National Mediation Board is also obligated to offer arbitration to the parties as a method for resolving their dispute, but either party can reject this offer; if the parties are released from mediation and one party rejects arbitration, a strike can legally occur after a 30-day cooling-off period.
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A diverse pattern of voluntary and mandatory mediation is also present in public sector labor law across different states.
Public sector mediation is typically the first step in a multistep dispute resolution process. In states that allow public sector workers to strike, mediation is commonly required before strikes can legally occur.
Mediation is also frequently used before arbitration or fact-finding; in only a handful of states the final dispute resolution step is mediation.
Mediation
A diverse pattern of voluntary and mandatory mediation is also present in public sector labor law across different states.
Public sector mediation is typically the first step in a multistep dispute resolution process. In states that allow public sector workers to strike, mediation is commonly required before strikes can legally occur (similar to the Railway Labor Act).
Mediation is also frequently used before arbitration or fact-finding; in only a handful of states the final dispute resolution step is mediation.
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Arbitration resolves disputes by a neutral third-party arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators)
It involves the issuing of a settlement that is binding on the employer, union, and employees
A hearing is held, evidence is presented by each side, and an arbitrator issues a decision
Interest Arbitration
Arbitration resolves disputes by a neutral third-party arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators)
It involves the issuing of a settlement that is binding on the employer, union, and employees
A hearing is held, evidence is presented by each side, and an arbitrator issues a decision
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Interest arbitration: To resolve interest disputes that results in new contractual terms governing wages and terms and conditions of employment
Imposes a settlement on the parties to the dispute
Once invoked arbitration has a 100 percent settlement rate
The typical standard for arbitration, therefore, is the extent to which the threat of arbitration encourages negotiated rather than arbitrated settlements.
Interest Arbitration
Interest arbitration is an arbitration to resolve interest disputes that result in new contractual terms governing wages and terms and conditions of employment; grievance arbitration to settle rights disputes is also important in U.S. labor relations.
Unlike mediation and fact-finding, interest arbitration imposes a settlement on the parties to the dispute and so, once invoked arbitration has a 100 percent settlement rate; a common objective in labor relations is to have parties peacefully settle their own differences.
The typical standard for arbitration, therefore, is the extent to which the threat of arbitration encourages negotiated rather than arbitrated settlements.
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The two primary forms of interest arbitration are:
Conventional arbitration
The arbitrator is not constrained in deciding the settlement terms
Final offer arbitration
Created such that the arbitrator must choose between the union’s final offer and the employer’s final offer
Interest Arbitration
The two primary forms of interest arbitration are:
In Conventional arbitrations, the arbitrator is not constrained in deciding the settlement terms.
The employer likely argues for a certain wage increase, the union tries to justify a higher wage increase, and the arbitrator can choose any wage increase seen as warranted.
Final offer arbitration was Created such that the arbitrator must choose between the union’s final offer and the employer’s final offer
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Chilling effect of arbitration
The uncertainty of the arbitrator’s choice and the loss of control by the negotiators over the settlement terms motivate negotiators to reach their own negotiated agreement without resorting to arbitration.
If arbitrators simply split the difference between the positions of labor and management, each side might hold back from making compromises during negotiations.
Interest Arbitration
What is Chilling effect?
The uncertainty of what the arbitrator will choose and the loss of control by the negotiators over the settlement terms motivate negotiators to reach their own negotiated agreement without resorting to arbitration.
It has traditionally been believed that such a system suffers from the chilling effect; if arbitrators simply split the difference between the positions of labor and management, each side might hold back from making compromises during negotiations; it is a significant concern in labor relations because many believe that arbitration should encourage negotiated settlements.
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Final offer arbitration - Created such that the arbitrator must choose between the union’s final offer and the employer’s final offer
It was created to try to lessen the potential chilling effect of conventional arbitration.
The arbitrator must choose between the union’s final offer and the employer’s final offer.
Lessens potential chilling effect
The underlying logic is that because the arbitrator cannot choose a compromise value, it is riskier for a negotiator to present an extreme offer because this will increase the chances that the arbitrator chooses the other side’s final offer.
Interest Arbitration
Final offer arbitration – was Created such that the arbitrator must choose between the union’s final offer and the employer’s final offer
It was created to try to lessen the potential chilling effect of conventional arbitration.
The arbitrator must choose between the union’s final offer and the employer’s final offer.
Final offer arbitration Lessens potential chilling effect
The underlying logic is that because the arbitrator cannot choose a compromise value, it is riskier for a negotiator to present an extreme offer because this will increase the chances that the arbitrator chooses the other side’s final offer.
If both sides present extreme offers, final offer arbitration is not necessarily any riskier than conventional arbitration, so both types of arbitration might induce a chilling effect.
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Final offer arbitration has two variations
(a) total package final offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator must select one party’s final offer on all the disputed contract terms; and
(b) issue-by-issue final offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator can choose either party’s final offer on an issue-by-issue basis.
Interest Arbitration
Final offer arbitration has two variations—
total package final offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator must select one party’s final offer on all the disputed contract terms; and
(b) issue-by-issue final offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator can choose either party’s final offer on an issue-by-issue basis.
The underlying logic is that because the arbitrator cannot choose a compromise value, it is riskier for a negotiator to present an extreme offer because this will increase the chances that the arbitrator chooses the other side’s final offer.
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Narcotic effect of arbitration: Negotiators might become addicted to or over dependent on arbitration
Interest arbitration is voluntary in the private sector and mandatory in the public sector
Interest Arbitration
Arbitration might also have a narcotic effect—that is, negotiators might become addicted to or overdependent on arbitration; this posits that when negotiators see how they can “pass the buck” to the arbitrator, they will develop an overdependence on arbitration to settle their negotiations.
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Interest arbitration is voluntary in the private sector and often mandatory in the public sector
Most interest arbitration occurs in the public sector.
Interest Arbitration
As with mediation, interest arbitration is voluntary in the private sector and often mandatory in the public sector; the most visible use of private sector interest arbitration is the final offer arbitration system used in major league
Most interest arbitration occurs in the public sector.
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A mediator has a high level of control over the negotiating process but not the outcome
Mediators can be either independent practitioners or full-time employees of mediation agencies at the federal level or the state level
An arbitrator has a high level of control over the outcome and not the negotiating process
Arbitrators either are full-time, self-employed arbitrators or are lawyers or university professors who arbitrate on a part-time basis
Interest Arbitration
A mediator has a high level of control over the negotiating process but not the outcome
Mediators can be either independent practitioners or full-time employees of mediation agencies at the federal level or the state level
An arbitrator has a high level of control over the outcome and not the negotiating process
Arbitrators either are full-time, self-employed arbitrators or are lawyers or university professors who arbitrate on a part-time basis
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Hybrid mechanisms can also be created, med-arb, in which the mediator becomes the arbitrator if mediation fails.
Although many states that use arbitration also use mediation as a first step, med–arb is a special case in which the same neutral individual serves as both the mediator and the arbitrator.
Med–arb
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Some states (Wisconsin, for example) use a hybrid mediation–arbitration procedure, often called “med-arb.”; although many states that use arbitration also use mediation as a first step, med–arb is a special case in which the same neutral individual serves as both the mediator and the arbitrator.
Although many states that use arbitration also use mediation as a first step, med–arb is a special case in which the same neutral individual serves as both the mediator and the arbitrator.
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The main advantage of med–arb over other third-party dispute resolution mechanisms is that the mediator–arbitrator develops detailed knowledge of the situation during the mediation phase that can result in a better arbitration award if arbitration becomes necessary.
The threat of arbitration might also give the mediator–arbitrator more leverage during the mediation phase.
On the other hand, negotiators may not be completely forthcoming during the mediation phase for fear that the revealed information could be used against them during the arbitration phase.
Med–Arb
The main advantage of med–arb over other third-party dispute resolution mechanisms is that the mediator–arbitrator develops detailed knowledge of the situation during the mediation phase that can result in a better arbitration award if arbitration becomes necessary.
The threat of arbitration might also give the mediator–arbitrator more leverage during the mediation phase—in other words, med–arb can be thought of as “mediation with a club.”
On the other hand, negotiators may not be completely forthcoming during the mediation phase for fear that the revealed information could be used against them during the arbitration phase.
Few individuals are effective at both mediation and arbitration because different skills are needed for each.
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Third-party dispute resolution method
A neutral third party called the fact finder investigates a bargaining impasse and issues a nonbinding recommendations for settlement
It does not guarantee a resolution
It does not assist the negotiators
Fact-Finding
Fact-finding is a third-party dispute resolution method in which a neutral third party—a fact finder—investigates a bargaining impasse and issues nonbinding recommendations for a settlement; it is essentially nonbinding arbitration.
Unlike arbitration, fact-finding does not guarantee a resolution, and
Unlike mediation, it does not assist the negotiators.
Typically hearings allow each side to make its case, and then the fact finder issues a report containing specific terms of a settlement; but unlike in arbitration, these terms are not binding on the parties
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Even without a binding award, the fact-finding report helps resolve dispute in three ways:
By establishing a set of unbiased settlement terms, the fact-finding report can help the negotiators reevaluate their positions find an acceptable compromise settlement
A fact-finding report can let union or management negotiators save face by making concessions under the guide of the report rather than appearing weak
Making the fact-finding report public can use the glare of publicity to push the parties to a settlement
Fact-Finding
Even without a binding award, the fact-finding report helps resolve dispute in three ways:
1. By establishing a set of unbiased settlement terms, the fact-finding report can help the negotiators reevaluate their positions and find an acceptable compromise settlement.
2. As with the narcotic effect in arbitration, a fact-finding report can let union or management negotiators save face by making concessions under the guide of following the report rather than appearing weak.
3. Making the fact-finding report public can use the glare of publicity to push the parties to a settlement—typically along the lines of the fact finder’s recommendations because they are publicly viewed as neutral and fair.
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The public pressure that underlies the rationale of fact-finding frequently does not exist.
The fact-finding report is useful as a basis for the substance of this action, but enacting legislation is an inefficient way to end bargaining disputes.
The emergency strike procedures in both the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA are essentially fact-finding procedures.
In the public sector, fact-finding is specified as the final dispute resolution step in many state bargaining laws.
Fact-Finding
The public pressure that underlies the rationale of fact-finding frequently does not exist.
As a last resort, a legislative body might need to intervene and legislate an end to the dispute. The fact-finding report is useful as a basis for the substance of this action, but enacting legislation is an inefficient way to end bargaining disputes.
The emergency strike procedures in both the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA are essentially fact-finding procedures.
In the public sector, fact-finding is specified as the final dispute resolution step in many state bargaining laws. The widespread incorporation of fact-finding in state laws is perhaps a political compromise between unions’ demands for binding arbitration and public sector employers’ demands for only mediation as the final step for resolving interest disputes; but it is reasonable to question whether this compromise effectively serves the labor relations process.
In fact, fact-finding appears to actually increase labor conflict relative to public sector jurisdictions that settle disputes with strikes or arbitration.
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No method is best along all dimensions; each of the alternatives involves trade-offs
Strikes and lockouts can be particularly inefficient and costly to employers, employees, and the public
Private sector unions and employers are almost always adamantly opposed to giving up the right to strike or to lock out employees.
Employers insist on retaining control over the terms of the settlement (rather than handing control over to an arbitrator), while unions insist that striking is a fundamental right that underlies the ability of employees to achieve equity and voice.
What’s Best?
From a practical standpoint, preparing for any type of bargaining impasse, but especially a strike through the creation of a strike contingency plan, is complex and contains significant challenges for labor relations professionals on both the management and union sides.
From a policy perspective, there are a number of ways to resolve bargaining impasses—allowing the parties to use their economic weapons, providing mediation, requiring binding arbitration, publicizing a fact finder’s recommendations, and various hybrid combinations of these alternatives
No method is best along all dimensions; rather, each of the alternatives involves trade-offs. Like other aspects of labor relations, dispute resolution systems need to strike a balance between these trade-offs.
Strikes and lockouts can be particularly inefficient and costly to employers, employees, and the public.
However, private sector unions and employers are almost always adamantly opposed to giving up the right to strike or to lock out employees.
Employers insist on retaining control over the terms of the settlement (rather than handing control over to an arbitrator), while unions insist that striking is a fundamental right that underlies the ability of employees to achieve equity and voice. Whether the use of strike replacements destroys this right is an important question for the future of U.S. labor relations and again is a question of balancing the rights and interests of employers and employees.
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If the primary goal of the dispute resolution system is putting pressure on negotiators to settle and guaranteeing a settlement, arbitration is best.
However, if the goal of the dispute resolution system is assisting negotiators in resolving their own disputes —mediation is best.
Fact-finding lacks significant control over both the negotiating process and the outcome
In practice, many labor relations systems combine various dispute resolution methods
What’s Best?
If the primary goal of the dispute resolution system is putting pressure on negotiators to settle and guaranteeing a settlement, arbitration is best.
However, if the goal of the dispute resolution system is assisting negotiators in resolving their own disputes—and thereby fostering healthy collective bargaining relationships—mediation is best.
Fact-finding lacks significant control over both the negotiating process and the outcome
In practice, many labor relations systems combine various dispute resolution methods—especially (usually voluntary) mediation with economic weapons in the private sector and (sometimes mandatory) mediation with fact-finding in the public sector.
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Dispute Resolution Quiz Lecture Notes
Please take out your lecture notes for chapter 8 and work on the Dispute Resolution Quiz
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Third-party dispute resolution mechanisms use ____________________ to settle bargaining impasses with the goal of avoiding costly strikes. A. a neutral third-party B. decertification elections C. boycotts D. a local county judge
Question 1
Third-party dispute resolution mechanisms use which of the following to settle bargaining impasses with the goal of avoiding costly strikes. A. a neutral third-party B. decertification elections C. boycotts D. a local county judge
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Third-party dispute resolution mechanisms use ____________________ to settle bargaining impasses with the goal of avoiding costly strikes. A. a neutral third-party B. decertification elections C. boycotts D. a local county judge
Question 1
That’s right. The answer is A. a neutral third-party
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Which of the following is not a typical stage of mediation? A. Setting ground rules and building trust between parties B. Clarifying disputed issues and developing some alternative solutions C. Determining whether any unfair labor practices were committed during negotiations D. Working with negotiators to identify a mutually acceptable agreement
Question 2
Which of the following is not a typical stage of mediation?
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Which of the following is not a typical stage of mediation? A. Setting ground rules and building trust between parties B. Clarifying disputed issues and developing some alternative solutions C. Determining whether any unfair labor practices were committed during negotiations D. Working with negotiators to identify a mutually acceptable agreement
Question 2
C. Determining whether any unfair labor practices were committed during negotiations.
Through these meetings the mediation process typically evolves through the following stages:
1. Setting the stage—the mediator collects information and establishes ground rules; one of the most important keys to success for mediators needs to be achieved during this stage: establishing a report so that the parties trust the mediator.
2. Problem solving—the mediator works on clarifying the disputed issues and on developing alternative solutions.
3. Achieving a workable agreement—the focus is on encouraging the negotiators to reach a settlement.
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then chooses the one that seems, overall, to be the most reasonable and responsible settlement.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 3
Which of the following is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then chooses the one that seems, overall, to be the most reasonable and responsible settlement?
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then chooses the one that seems, overall, to be the most reasonable and responsible settlement.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 3
The answer is B. Whole package arbitration, or total package arbitration. Also known as whole package or total package final offer aribritation.
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In _______________________ arbitration, the arbitrator is not constrained to choose either the management or union's offer(s); rather she can make up whatever final contract terms she deems appropriate and fair. A. Conventional B. Issue-by-issue final offer C. Whole package final offer D. Mediation
Question 4
In which kind of arbitration arbitration, the arbitrator is not constrained to choose either the management or union's offer(s); rather she can make up whatever final contract terms she deems appropriate and fair.
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In _______________________ arbitration, the arbitrator is not constrained to choose either the management or union's offer(s); rather she can make up whatever final contract terms she deems appropriate and fair. A. Conventional B. Issue-by-issue final offer C. Whole package final offer D. Mediation
Question 4
That’s right. The answer is A. Conventional. In Conventional arbitrations, the arbitrator is not constrained in deciding the settlement terms.
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The tendency for management and labor to rely on an arbitrator to make decisions for them, rather than come to an agreement themselves, is known as: A. The chilling effect. B. The narcotic effect. C. The dependency effect. D. The arbitrator authority effect.
Question 5
The tendency for management and labor to rely on an arbitrator to make decisions for them, rather than come to an agreement themselves, is known as what effect?
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The tendency for management and labor to rely on an arbitrator to make decisions for them, rather than come to an agreement themselves, is known as: A. The chilling effect. B. The narcotic effect. C. The dependency effect. D. The arbitrator authority effect.
Question 5
The answer is B. The narcotic effect. Narcotic effect of arbitration occurs when negotiators might become addicted to or over dependent on arbitration
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party assists the parties in reaching a mutually-acceptable resolution.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue, final offer arbitration
Question 6
Which of the following is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party assists the parties in reaching a mutually-acceptable resolution?
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party assists the parties in reaching a mutually-acceptable resolution.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue, final offer arbitration
Question 6
The answer is Mediation. A mediator has a high level of control over the negotiating process but not the outcome.
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then designs a contract by choosing either the union or management's offer on each issue.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 7
Which of the following is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then designs a contract by choosing either the union or management's offer on each issue?
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then designs a contract by choosing either the union or management's offer on each issue.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 7
That’s right. The answer is E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration. The arbitrator can choose either party’s final offer on an issue-by-issue basis.
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then creates a new contract which may or may not reflect the parties' positions on each issue.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 8
Which of the following is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then creates a new contract which may or may not reflect the parties' positions on each issue?
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party examines the final offers of each party and then creates a new contract which may or may not reflect the parties' positions on each issue.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 8
That’s right. The answer is A. Conventional. In Conventional arbitrations, the arbitrator is not constrained in deciding the settlement terms.
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party investigates the claims and positions of each party and provides a public assessment of the situation.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 9
Which of the following is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party investigates the claims and positions of each party and provides a public assessment of the situation?
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A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party investigates the claims and positions of each party and provides a public assessment of the situation.
A. Conventional arbitration
B. Whole package arbitration
C. Mediation
D. Fact-finding
E. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration
Question 9
The answer is D. Fact-finding. Fact-finding is a third-party dispute resolution method in which a neutral third party—a fact finder—investigates a bargaining impasse and issues nonbinding recommendations for a settlement; it is essentially nonbinding arbitration.
Unlike arbitration, fact-finding does not guarantee a resolution, and
Unlike mediation, it does not assist the negotiators.
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The tendency of labor and management to take extreme positions in their final offers in the hopes that an arbitrator will "split the difference" between offers is known as the:
A. The chilling effect.
B. The narcotic effect.
C. The dependency effect.
D. The arbitrator authority effect.
Question 10
The tendency of labor and management to take extreme positions in their final offers in the hopes that an arbitrator will "split the difference" between offers is known as what effect?
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The tendency of labor and management to take extreme positions in their final offers in the hopes that an arbitrator will "split the difference" between offers is known as the:
A. The chilling effect.
B. The narcotic effect.
C. The dependency effect.
D. The arbitrator authority effect.
Question 10
The answer is A. The chilling effect which occurs when the uncertainty of what the arbitrator will choose and the loss of control by the negotiators over the settlement terms motivate negotiators to reach their own negotiated agreement without resorting to arbitration.
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Dispute Resolution Quiz Answer:
Q1 A
Q2 C
Q3 B
Q4 A
Q5 B
Q6 C
Q7 E
Q8 A
Q9 D
Q10 A
Here is answer for the dispute resolution quiz. Please check and make sure you know the answers for all quiz questions.
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We have come to the end of our lecture today. If you have any questions, please feel free to email me.
See you next class!
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