

## MODERN ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENTS

## 1. INTRODUCTION

When treating the pre-modern period of Islamic thought in the preceding chapters, it made sense to organise the bulk of the material in terms of sects and schools. One of many respects in which the Western impact has profoundly changed the Islamic world is that these affiliations have tended to lose their former salience. The significant divisions within Islamic thought are no longer those between Hanafīs and Shāfi'ites, or Ash'arites and traditionals. Even the lines of division between Sunnis, Zaydis and Ibādīs no longer support much in the way of intellectual superstructure, whatever role they may play in the communal politics of the relevant parts of the Islamic world. Of the main sects and schools in terms of which the bulk of this book has been organised, only the Imānī Shi'ites remain strongly differentiated from the broad spectrum of modern Islam.

This remaining division is, however, very real. It is not simply that the heritages of the Sunnis and Imānīs are in some ways very different in content and character. The contrast that will occupy us in this chapter relates rather to the dissimilar fates of the two scholastic traditions. That of the Sunnis has become precisely a heritage (*turāth*): rather like a revered monument, it is cherished by people who no longer really inhabit it. The Imānī scholastic tradition, by contrast, can still be described as a living one, owing its continuity and adaptation to scholars who operate within it. It may be that the difference is in some ways more apparent than real, and that in the long run it will disappear. But to date it remains a striking one. Accordingly this chapter is divided into two major sections. The first deals with the mainstream, overwhelmingly Sunni, forms of modern Islamic thought, and the second with Imānī Shi'ism. I shall return to the comparison between the two evolutions in the concluding section.

The chapter is subject to several limitations. First, in analysing recent Muslim discussions of forbidding wrong, I have deliberately concentrated

on changes which have taken place in response to contemporary conditions of life and thought. Much space in the modern literature is devoted to repeating what was said by the medieval scholars; while this process is an essential part of the background to the developments described in this chapter, it would not be illuminating to investigate it in any detail. Secondly, I have not even tried to achieve a comprehensive coverage of the literature. The documentation for earlier centuries has been reduced to almost manageable proportions by the ravages of time; while much of value has doubtless been lost, it is surely also the case that a great deal of chaff has been winnowed out. This is emphatically not true of contemporary literature, for all that it is conventional for writers on forbidding wrong to lament that their topic is a neglected one.<sup>1</sup> I have made it my business to examine all modern discussions of the subject that have come my way, and in particular I have consulted all monographs on the duty that were available to me, if only in the manner of Ibn Sina' (d. 428/1037).<sup>2</sup> But I have not, for example, made any attempt to cover systematically the large amount of relevant material that can be found scattered in Muslim journals and newspapers. Finally, the fact that we are dealing with the contemporary world opens up the possibility of escaping the confines of the literary record by recourse to field-work. I am all in favour of this; but I have not attempted it myself.

## 2. DEVELOPMENTS IN SUNNĪ ISLAM

For a long time the Western penetration of the Muslim world had little visible impact on the aspect of Islamic thought that concerns us. On the one hand, the religious scholars continued to write about forbidding wrong in the traditional way. This is true, for example, of the handling of Q3:104 in the Koran commentaries of Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834),<sup>3</sup> Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī (d. 1270/1854),<sup>4</sup> and Šiddiq Ḥasan Khān al-Qannawī<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a Sunnī example of this topos, so familiar in our own academic culture, see 'Abd al-ʿAzīz ibn Ahmad al-Mas'ūd, *al-ʿAmr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar wa-t-taharruhunā fi ḥifẓ al-ni'ma*, vol. 1, Riyāḍ 1414, 7.19; this author proceeds to make good by offering us a first volume of 571 pages (for a survey of what is yet to come, see *ibid.*, 26-32). For a Shi'ite example, see Sayyid Maḥmūd Madanī Bajistānī, *ʿAmr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar: ḥo farrāda-i barīdar dar sira-i ma'sūmīn*, Qum 1376 sh., 10.19.

<sup>2</sup> For Ibn Sina's reading habits, see R. Morrahadeh, *The mantle of the Prophet*, New York 1985, 88f. I am also aware of the existence of some dozen monographs on the duty to which I have not had access.

<sup>3</sup> Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834), *Faḥḥ al-qadīr*, Cairo 1964, 1:369.15. In this context we can treat Shawkānī as in effect a Sunnī.

<sup>4</sup> Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī (d. 1270/1854), *Raḥ al-ma'ānī*, Cairo 1301-10, 1:643.9. An unusual feature in a Sunnī work is the reference to 'Shaykh Abū Ja'far [al-Tūsī] among the

(d. 1307/1890).<sup>5</sup> And on the other hand, few Muslims of this period whose thought was strongly influenced by the West seem to have shown much interest in forbidding wrong.<sup>6</sup>

Even when Western influence begins to affect the discussion of the duty, much remains essentially familiar. A good example of this is the salience of Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111). This, of course, is nothing new,<sup>7</sup> but my impression is that it becomes even more pronounced in modern times. Thus Qāsimī quotes Ghazzālī in his commentary to Q3:104,<sup>8</sup> as does Muḥammad 'Abduh (d. 1323/1905).<sup>9</sup> Ḥaydarzāde, as we have seen, based his Turkish account of the duty, written towards the end of the First World War, on that of Ghazzālī.<sup>10</sup> When 'Abd al-Qādir 'Awda (d. 1374/1954) wrote his treatise on Islamic criminal law some three decades later, he too drew most of the structure of his analysis of forbidding wrong from Ghazzālī.<sup>11</sup> More recent writers have followed suit.<sup>12</sup> Thus the Indian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn

Imāmīya' as holding the view that *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is an individual obligation (*ibid.*, 643.25; cf. above, ch. 11, note 156). This information doubtless derives from Tabrisī, *Majma'*, 1:484.3; for the use of Ālūsī made of Tabrisī's commentary, see M. 'Abd al-Ḥamid, *al-Ālūsī muftisīn*, Baghdad 1968, 205f.

<sup>5</sup> Šiddiq Ḥasan Khān al-Qannawī (d. 1307/1890), *Faḥḥ al-bayān*, ed. 'A. I. al-Anṣarī, Sidon and Beirut 1992, 2:304.4. The same is still true of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d. 1332/1914) (*Mahāsīn al-ṭawīl*, ed. M. F. 'Abd al-Bāqī, Beirut 1994, 2:107.10).

<sup>6</sup> For two exceptions, see below, note 37.

<sup>7</sup> See above, ch. 16, 450-5.

<sup>8</sup> Qāsimī, *Mahāsīn*, 2:108.7, 108.18 (the latter a quotation of Ghazzālī's opening statement on *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, a favourite with later generations). Qāsimī also wrote an epitome of the *Ḥiyā'*, in which he naturally summarised Ghazzālī's doctrine of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (*Maw'izāt al-mu'minin min Ḥiyā' ḥakīm al-dīn*, ed. 'A. B. al-Bayātī, Beirut 1981, 243-50).

<sup>9</sup> Rasnād Rāḍā (d. 1354/1935), *Tafḥīr al-Maḥānī*, based on lectures of Muḥammad 'Abduh, Cairo 1367-75, 4:30.13 (quoting 'Abduh), and cf. 30.24, 31.4, 33.17; the set of this work that I used mixes volumes of various printings. For a discussion of the commentary to Q3:104 in the *Tafḥīr al-Maḥānī*, see Roest Crolius, 'Mission and morality', 275-82. Another author of this period who makes marked use of Ghazzālī in a brief account of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is Zammarī (writing 1329/1911) (*al-Ḥikm wa'l-ḥikān*, Aleppo n.d., 26.6, 26.16, 29.8; he also quotes Ghazzālī's opening statement on *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, *ibid.*, 5.4).

<sup>10</sup> See above, ch. 12, 330-3, where the dependence of Osman Nuri on Ḥaydarzāde is also noted. A later Turkish academic writer likewise cites Ḥaydarzāde for the 'fundamental bases' (*temel esaslar*, sc. *arkân*) of the duty (E. Escribanoğlu, 'İslâmîyetteki İhtisâsın prensipleri', *Tarih Dergisi*, 25 (1971), 99).

<sup>11</sup> 'Abd al-Qādir 'Awda (d. 1374/1954), *al-Taḥrīr al-jināḥī al-İslāmī*, Cairo n.d., 1:489-513 §§34-50. The dependence is particularly clear - and acknowledged - at *ibid.*, 495-510 §§34-6. I owe this and several other references in this chapter to the kindness of Turhan Buzupcar of the Islam Araştırmaları Merkezi, Üsküdar, who made available to me the relevant files of the Centre.

<sup>12</sup> In addition to the examples given in the text, see Nashīr at al-Misrī, *al-ʿAmr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar min Tafḥīr Ibn Kabīr wa-sharḥi Ḥāḥimī al-Ghazzālī*, Cairo n.d., the title of which is self-explanatory (I am indebted to Maribel Fierro for sending me a copy of this work); Muḥammad Ahmad al-Rāshid, *al-Mukhtalaḥ*, Beirut 1976, 90.3, 151-4; Fāriq 'Abd al-Majīd Hamūd al-Samarātī, *Mawāḥib al-ḥanīnā fī 'l-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*, Jeddah 1407, 9.2 (quoting Ghazzālī's opening statement), 54.14, 57.7,



ethics of car-parking – this latter an extension of Ghazzālī's discussion of the tethering of animals in the street.<sup>26</sup> Bayānūnī's worries range from the sale of photographs of women to physical contact between males and females in crowded buses, posters advertising dirty films, cafés, playing-cards, and music on the radio and television;<sup>27</sup> but his most insistent concern is the un-Islamic practice of shaving beards.<sup>28</sup>

The novelities also invade the realm of ideas. The formidable curriculum for Islamic missionaries which Muḥammad 'Abduh, or perhaps rather Rashīd Ridā (d. 1354/1935), proposed in commenting on Q3:104 is in large part a modern one;<sup>29</sup> it includes, for example, political science ('*ilm al-siyāsah*), by which Ridā assures us that 'Abduh did not mean the kind of thing that Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) had written, but rather the study of modern states (*dumal al-'asr*).<sup>30</sup> Likewise Western influence presumably played a part in 'Abduh's departure from a strictly revelationist view of right and wrong.<sup>31</sup> Ḥawwā' implicitly acknowledges the seepage of Western thought when he lists among the insults that do not dispense one from performing the duty accusations of reactionariness (*raj'iyah*) and backwardness (*ta'akkhur*).<sup>32</sup> Other Western ideas which eventually make their appearance range from social control<sup>33</sup> to the unconscious.<sup>34</sup> Western ideas are also, of course, attacked. One writer on forbidding wrong finds it necessary to include in his work a

refutation of the determinist fallacies (*aqwal baḥīyah*) of Schopenhauer and Spinoza.<sup>35</sup>

All this, however, is pretty much peripheral to the conception of the duty itself. What of the pull of Western ideas on this? One context in which forbidding wrong has played a part has been the enterprise of proving that all good things found in the West are Islamic.<sup>36</sup> Here the duty has been pressed into service in connection with a spectrum of Western political values ranging from constitutionalism to revolution. A prime example of the constitutionalist invocation of the duty is provided by Rashīd Ridā: building on a hint of 'Abduh's, he contrives to find in Q3:104 a basis for government by a representative assembly such as is found in republics and limited monarchies.<sup>37</sup> Writers linking forbidding wrong to revolution have more to appeal to in their heritage. 'Amrī, in a careful discussion of the question,<sup>38</sup> enlists Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064),<sup>39</sup> Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981)<sup>40</sup> and Juwaynī (d. 478/1085),<sup>41</sup> his conclusion tends to support their views.<sup>42</sup> The Egyptian Muḥammad 'Umāra finds in forbidding wrong a duty of political participation (*al-istithnā' bi'l-shu'ūr al-'ammah*);<sup>43</sup> if non-violent participation is ineffective, then revolution becomes a duty.<sup>44</sup> 'Umāra does not reveal his source of inspiration here, but to the extent that it is not simply modern, it is likely to be Zaydī and Muḥazilī: he has a liking for these secretarians unusual in someone of Sunnī background.<sup>45</sup> An Ibādī

<sup>26</sup> Mūsā, *Amr*, 72.7; cf. above, ch. 16, note 105.

<sup>27</sup> Bayānūnī, *Amr*, 135f. nos. 3 and 6; 138 no. 11; 139 no. 2. These items form part of an updated version of Ghazzālī's survey of wrongs (*ibid.*, 132–41).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.10 (a first-hand anecdote); 91.5; 126.8; 136 no. 8; 189.11; 192.10.

<sup>29</sup> Ridā, *Taḥṣīr al-Manāir*, 4:38–44. The concern with Islamic missionary activity in the commentary to Q3:104 is discussed in J. Jonier, *Le commentaire coranique du Manār*, Paris 1954, 333–7.

<sup>30</sup> Ridā, *Taḥṣīr al-Manāir*, 4:42 no. 8. 'Abduh's personal confession of the difficulty he experienced in rebuking people (*ibid.*, 29.11) also has a modern ring to it.

<sup>31</sup> He stresses that what is needed in order to know them apart is common sense rather than erudition (*ibid.*, 27.10); compare the relativism that Rashīd Ridā infuses into the concept of *ma'rif* in his commentary to Q7:199 (*ibid.*, 9:536.15), and his excesses of Q9:67 (*ibid.*, 10:618.19). By contrast, other Sunnis who pronounce on the question tend to adhere to purely revelationist views of *ma'rif* and *muhak*. 'Awda, *Taḥṣīr*, 1:492.1, 492.8; 'Amrī, *Amr*, 98.12; 'Abd al-Karīm Zaydān, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, Baghdad 1968, 144.13; Sāmarrā'ī, *Manāḥij*, 43.10, 46.4, 262f. no. 5). Two exceptions are Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Mahmūd (*Uṣūl al-mujtama' al-Islāmī*, Cairo and Beirut 1992, 196.5, 199.13, a work brought to my attention by Kamriz Esfami) and Zaydān in a more recent work (*Muḥtasab*, 4:353f. §§3.547–50).

<sup>32</sup> Ḥawwā', *Jawāb Allāh*, 362.13.

<sup>33</sup> S. Ahmed Arvasī, *Imn-i ḥal*, Istanbul 1990, 169. He categorises *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* as an important form of *iqnāt murakkabah*, parenthetically glossed *social kontrol* (he also glosses *nefi muhakeret* as 'auto-critique'). Harun Nasution, an Indonesian neo-Muḥazilī, likewise equates *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* with social control (Martān, *Defenders of reason in Islam*, 191, and cf. 151).

<sup>34</sup> 'Amrī, *Amr*, 273.3. He is discussing the efficacy (*ta'athir*) condition, his point being that a rebuke addressed to a fellow-Muslim may work on his subconscious mind.

<sup>35</sup> Sāmarrā'ī, *Manāḥij*, 32–8.

<sup>36</sup> There are in fact two distinct enterprises which may motivate this search for equivalences: the desire to legitimise the adoption of X from the West by finding an Islamic antecedent for it, and the desire to defend Islam against the charge of lacking X.

<sup>37</sup> Ridā, *Taḥṣīr al-Manāir*, 4:37.20, 38.2, 46.9. Likewise the Tunisian Khayr al-Dīn Pīshā' (d. 1307/1890) sets up an analogy between, on the one hand, representative assemblies and freedom of the press in Europe, and, on the other, the duty of the *ulama'* and notables of the Islamic world to engage in *ḥajjīyāt al-munhakāt*; in both cases the point is to check the arbitrary behaviour of rulers (*al-ḥijāb al-'adwīyah*) (*Muqaddimat kitāb Aqām al-musāḥib*, Istanbul 1293, 14.11). In a similar way 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawāshīrī (d. 1320/1902) sees representative assemblies as entirely in accordance with Q3:104 (*Taḥāṭī' al-istithnā'*, Cairo n.d., 82.11). Both are discussed in K. S. al-Husaynī, *Origins of modern Arab political thought*, Delmar 1980, 46–9, 66f., 138f.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 179–81, citing Ibn Ḥazm, *Fisal*, 4:171–6; cf. above, ch. 14, 390, and ch. 17, note 69. This passage is the most sustained statement of the revolutionary implications of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* I have seen in pre-modern Sunnī literature.

<sup>39</sup> 'Amrī, *Amr*, 182f.; cf. above, ch. 12, 336f.

<sup>40</sup> 'Amrī, *Amr*, 183.3; cf. above, ch. 13, note 56.

<sup>41</sup> Muḥammad 'Umāra, *al-Islām wa-ḥajjīyāt al-ta'ān*, Cairo and Beirut 1989, 82.15, 116.9, and cf. 84.1 (*ḥajjīyāt al-ta'ān al-tāhī' fī sir'at al-muḥtammīn wa'l-adwān*).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.2, 94.9.

<sup>43</sup> He responds enthusiastically to the polemical equation of predestinationism and political quietism by the Zaydī imam al-Ḥādī (d. 298/911) ('Umāra, *Rasā'ih*, 2:12–14; cf. above, ch. 10, note 42). The catholicity of his tastes is indicated by the fact that he is also an admirer of Howard Fast's *Spartacus* (*ibid.*, 1:18). Fast wrote the book so that his readers 'may take strength for our own troubled future and that they may struggle against oppression and

author adds his own tradition to the revolutionary chorus.<sup>46</sup> In the recent efflorescence of literature on Islam and human rights,<sup>47</sup> forbidding wrong occasionally appears in yet another role: as a fundamental guarantee (*dawān*) of human rights in Islam.<sup>48</sup> Thus Shaukat Hussain considers that 'the greatest sanction for the practical implementation of Human Rights' is the duty of forbidding wrong.<sup>49</sup>

Alongside these rather sweeping invocations of the duty, we also find it linked with particular political rights from the Western liberal tradition. Occasionally it is used as a foundation for freedom of association. Thus the deputy postmaster-general of Peshawar quotes Q3:104 as his proof-text for freedom of association, commenting that God has thereby 'given the right to form association for pursuit of righteousness'.<sup>50</sup> (As in this case, political rights in their Islamic versions have a tendency to be rights to do or say good Islamic things, not bad un-Islamic things.)<sup>51</sup> But the standard equation, and it is an old one, is with freedom of speech (or expression, or opinion).

Footnote 45 (cont.)  
wrong' (*Spartacus*, New York 1952, following the copyright page). A modern Zaydi document which identifies *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* with, among other things, opposing injustice (*mughāmat al-zulm*) is the manifesto of the Hizb al-Haq, the main Zaydi political party in Yemen (*Bayān mashrū' Hizb al-Haq*, n.p. n.d., 8f. no. 2; I am indebted to Bernard Haykal for sending me a copy of this passage). For the Hizb al-Haq and *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf*, see also S. Carapico, *Civil society in Yemen*, Cambridge 1998, 145; for a reformist appeal to *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in 1360/1941, see J. L. Douglas, *The Free Yemeni Movement, 1935-1962*, Beirut 1987, 54 (I owe both references to Frank Stewart).  
<sup>46</sup> Bakār Ibn Sa'īd Awash, *Dirā'at Islāmīyya fī 'l-ḥisā al-ḥādīṭa*, Cairo 1988, 107-19, 108-8.

<sup>47</sup> For an uncharitable assessment of this literature see A. E. Mayer, *Islam and human rights: tradition and politics*, Boulder 1995. I owe such familiarity as I have with it to my participation in a conference held in November 1993 at Yale Law School on 'Law, culture and human rights: Islamic perspectives in the contemporary world?'.  
<sup>48</sup> Muḥammad Faḍlī 'Uḥmān, *Min ḥisā al-ḥisā al-Islāmī*, Beirut 1979, 330-13. For a Zaydi author who adduces *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in a discussion proving that Zaydism bestows on the individual the best that modern thought has to offer, see Faḍlī, *Min ḥisā al-Zaydiyya?*, 58-5 (drawn to my attention by Bernard Haykal).

<sup>49</sup> Shaukat Hussain, *Human rights in Islam*, New Delhi 1990, 104, and cf. 49f., 87. It is not far-fetched to see in some aspects of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* a value that could in principle contribute to the creation of a culture supportive of human rights – or some tolerable ecumenic Islamic versions of some of them – in the states of the modern Islamic world.  
<sup>50</sup> Fakhrudīn Malik, 'Islamic concept of human rights', in S. M. Haidar (ed.), *Islamic concept of human rights*, Lahore 1978, 59; similarly Abul A'la Mawḍūdī (d. 1399/1979), *Human rights in Islam*, Delhi n.d., 29 no. 7. Mawḍūdī has a piece devoted to *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in his *Mafāhīm Islāmīyya* (Jeddah and Dammām 1987, 111-21), but it is surprisingly uninteresting.

<sup>51</sup> Thus Shaukat Hussain, who likewise links *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* and freedom of association, specifies that the right is to be used for the propagation of 'virtue and righteousness' (*Human rights in Islam*, 61). As Houchang Chehabi points out to me, this phenomenon has parallels in the history of Catholic thought in modern times. Thus Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903), discussing 'liberty of speech' in an encyclical of 1888, affirms that men have a right to propagate 'what things soever are true and honorable', but that 'ying opinions' and 'voices which corrupt the heart' should be 'diligently repressed by public authority' (J. Wynne (ed.), *The great encyclical letters of Pope Leo XIII*, New York 1903, 152).

Muwayḥīhī (d. 1348/1930) adumbrates this in a jocular passage in which he identifies journalists as playing the part of 'those who command right and forbid wrong to whom Islamic law refers'.<sup>52</sup> A typical example of the linkage is found in a work of Sa'īd Muḥammad Ahmad Bā Nāja.<sup>53</sup> He cites Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding freedom of opinion and expression, emphasising at the same time that governments – both Eastern and Western – have imposed serious restrictions on it. He then turns to Islam, and to the high status it confers on freedom of opinion as an individual right. Forbidding wrong, he points out, is among the most important duties of Islam, and its realisation necessarily requires freedom of opinion, as is apparent from many Koranic verses. He goes on to explain that this is not, of course, a right to propagate views contrary to Islamic beliefs or morals, and so forth. Thus Islam, he concludes, secures freedom of opinion and thought. Numerous authors associate forbidding wrong with freedom of speech in these or similar terms.<sup>54</sup> Some make separate reference to a right of protest or the like against rulers, and they have no problem in grounding this in forbidding wrong.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Muḥammad al-Muwayḥīhī (d. 1348/1930), *Ḥādīth 'īn ḥin Ḥisān*, Cairo 1907, 41-9, translated in R. Allen, *A period of time*, Reading 1992, 137 (I am indebted to Roger Allen for drawing my attention to this passage). Cf. also above, notes 24, 37.

<sup>53</sup> Sa'īd Muḥammad Ahmad Bā Nāja, *Dirā'at muḥarririna banwa 'l-'īlān al-'islāmī li-ḥuqūq al-insān*, Beirut 1985, 49-51.

<sup>54</sup> See Hāseyn Kāzīm Kadī (d. 1352/1934), *Ḥisān ḥikāri bayannanīnīn Islām hukukuna göre tazhīr*, Istanbul 1949, 72-10, 73-3; 'Abd al-Ḥamid Murawwālī, *Mabāḥiṭ muḥim al-ḥukm fī 'l-Islām*, Alexandria 1974, 280-11; Muḥammad al-Mulbārak, *Nisān al-Islām: al-ḥukm wa 'l-tawḥīd*, Beirut and Cairo 1974, 121-1, 121-19 (I am indebted to Yezhak Nakash for drawing this work to my attention); Muḥammad Mā'rūf al-Dawābīh, *al-Dawābī wa 'l-sūfā fī 'l-Islām*, Beirut 1983, 56f., point 3 (also drawn to my attention by Yezhak Nakash); Zaydān, *Uḥl al-dā'ir*, 175-7, §§1-95f.; Subḥī Mahmasānī (d. 1407/1986), *Arḥān ḥuqūq al-insān: baḥḥ muḥarrir fī 'l-sharī'a al-Islāmīyya wa 'l-gawānīm al-ḥādīṭa*, Beirut 1979, 143-16; Muḥammad Ahmad Khidr, *al-Islām wa-ḥuqūq al-insān*, Beirut 1980, 32-6; al-Ḥay' al-'Āmma li-l-ḥisānāt, *Ḥuqūq al-insān fī 'l-Islām*, n.p. n.d., 9-11; Ahmad Bukār, 'al-Damīr al-ḥadī wa-ḥuqūq al-insāniyya fī 'l-Islām', in Université de Tunis, Centre d'Études et de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, *Ilème Rencontre Islamo-Chrétienne. Droits de l'Homme*, Tunis 1985, Arabic section, 152-12; Muḥammad Sayyid Muḥammad, 'Ḥuqūq al-ta'īm wa 'l-īlām fī 'l-Islām', in *Ḥuqūq al-insān fī 'l-Islām: maḥāḥāt al-Ma'tamar al-sāḥī li-l-fīr al-Islāmī*, n.p. n.d. (conference held in Tehran in 1408/1988), 478-17 (speaking of a *ḥuqūq al-'īlām*); Malik, 'Islamic concept of human rights', 57-9; Hussain, *Human rights in Islam*, 51. As with Bā Nāja's exposition, a widespread feature of these accounts is the limitation of the freedom to good opinions. Thus Hussain in the passage just cited explains that 'this freedom of opinion must be used for propagation of virtue and truth and not for spreading evil or wickedness'; cf. Mayer, *Islam and human rights*, 76f., and J. Donnelly, *The concept of human rights*, New York 1985, 49f. (both commenting critically on this feature of Islamic human rights literature); Donnelly's work was drawn to my attention by Rhoda Howard).

<sup>55</sup> Bā Nāja, *Dirā'at*, 30-5, on *ḥuqūq al-insānāt*, Muḥārak, *Nisān*, 38-40, point 6; Khidr, *al-Islām wa-ḥuqūq al-insān*, 43-15; Jamāl al-Dīn 'Aryā, 'Ḥuqūq al-insān fī 'l-Islām: al-nazāriyya al-'isāmīyya', in *Ḥuqūq al-insān fī 'l-Islām: maḥāḥāt al-Ma'tamar al-ḥādīṭa li-l-fīr al-Islāmī*, Tehran 1987, 175 no. 3 (*maḥāḥāt insāniyyāt al-wilāḥāt*); Hussain, *Human rights in Islam*, 49f., 87.

The results of this syncretic activity are uneven. Sometimes they are quite plausible, as when forbidding wrong is linked to protest and revolution. But where the match is with liberal values, the effect can be jarring. The reason is not far to seek. Islam, within certain limits, tells people what to believe and how to live; liberalism, within certain limits, is about leaving them to work this out for themselves. It is this incompatibility that lies behind the unhappy notion of a right to freedom of opinion which protects only good opinions.<sup>56</sup> What makes the disparity so salient in the discussions that concern us is that forbidding wrong is precisely a practice for telling people what to believe and how to live – for imposing family values, not for enabling people to choose their lifestyles. This point has not been lost on modern Muslim writers, who have long been critical of excessive freedom in the West.<sup>57</sup> Sayyid Qutb (d. 1386/1966) remarks that in the Jahili societies of the world today, debauchery and sin are considered to be ‘personal matters’ (*masāʾil shakhsiyya*) in which no one has a right to interfere;<sup>58</sup> you tell people ‘this is wrong!’, and they respond: ‘On the contrary, it’s not wrong; it used to be wrong in the past, but the world “evolves”, society “progresses”, and attitudes vary.’<sup>59</sup> A more earthy writer contemporary with Qutb opens his discussion of forbidding wrong with a characterisation of the modern, as opposed to the Islamic, fashion (*moāda*).<sup>60</sup> The modern fashion has it that people are free, nobody having any authority over anyone else, or any right to interfere in his affairs; if you see someone naked in a tram, or bad-mouthing religion, or drinking wine, or gambling, or kissing girls in the middle of the street, so what? The characterisation he then offers of the Islamic fashion stresses that the community is a single body; a public wrongdoer does harm not just to himself, but to you as well. He invokes a well-known Prophetic tradition about people in a boat who perish or survive together depending on their reaction to some of their number who set about making a hole in the keel – a clear indication that

<sup>56</sup> Amrī, by contrast, simply dismisses the modern notion of freedom of thought where the well-being of the Muslim community is concerned, since it is a community united in its thought (*Amr*, 328.9).

<sup>57</sup> Already in a discussion of *al-amr bi’l-maʿrūf* as the basis of Islamic government, a religious scholar affiliated to the Cairo branch of the Committee of Union and Progress wrote that European states, while forbidding public wrongs, permit many personal vices in order to maximise freedom (*ḥadīth al-ḥurriyyat bahānīyya*) (Mehmed Qadr Nāsīh (fl. early fourteenth century), *Zahm ve uadl*, n.p. 1326, 168.7 (I am indebted to Sükrü Hanoglu for supplying me with a copy of this text); for the author and his role in the Cairo branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, see M. Ş. Hanoglu, *The Young Turks in opposition*, New York and Oxford 1995, 52, 248 n. 253; S. Balıç, *Das unbekanntere Bonifat*, Cologne 1992, 238, drawn to my attention by Sükrü Hanoglu).

<sup>58</sup> Sayyid Qutb (d. 1386/1966), *Fi ḡalīb al-Qurʾān*, Beirut 1973–4, 949.12 (to Q5:79).

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 950.10.

<sup>60</sup> Tantaḡi, *Fuṣūḥ*, 174.2.

the modern enemy is not just liberalism but also individualism.<sup>61</sup> Ibn Hājī attacks those who seek to emasculate the duty on the pretext that we live in a time of democracy and liberty, and that every individual is a free agent, as if democracy could abrogate this duty, which many today regard as interference in the lives of others and in itself a form of violence.<sup>62</sup> In the same article he invites the believers to sympathise with some upstanding young men who had gone to break up a dancing party, and were received by the police with a hail of tear-gas bombs.<sup>63</sup> Anonymous participants in a bottle-smashing incident which took place in B’rāqī near Algiers in 1410/1989 give a vivid account of the affair, in the course of which they highlight the outrageous response of the winner: ‘Boumedienne permits taverns for wine and mosques for prayer; it’s up to you to choose!’<sup>64</sup> It was with some foresight that Louis Gardet once wrote that forbidding wrong as moral reform (‘réforme des mœurs’), though currently held in check by the modern state, was alive in the sentiments of the Muslim people, and could well reemerge in favourable circumstances.<sup>65</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that in the modern Islamic world forbidding wrong appears primarily as a praxis for the spreading of Islamic, not liberal, values. Conceived in this fashion, it is not in any flagrant discord with the old scholastic tradition; but we can nevertheless discern a significant shift of emphasis. The core of the old conception was a personal duty to right wrongs committed by fellow-believers as and when one encountered them; the core of the new conception is a systematic and organised propagation of Islamic values both within and outside the community. A couple of points may serve to illustrate the shift away from the old conception of the duty as primarily one of response by an individual to an immediate situation. One is the view of ‘Abd al-Karīm Zaydān that a Muslim has an obligation to be

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.11; compare ‘Abd al-Muʿizz ‘Abd al-Sarīf, *al-Amr bi’l-maʿrūf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar*, Beirut and Damascus 1980, 10.14 (and cf. *Ibid.*, 7.9, 16.8). For the boat tradition in classical sources, see, for example, Bulḥārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 2:111.19, 164.7; Ibn Hibbān, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, in the arrangement of Fārīsī, 1:306–9 nos. 294f., 297. In Ibn Hibbān’s first version, which is actually more apt than the versions of Bulḥārī which modern Islamic authors cite, someone remarks: ‘Leave him alone! He’s only making a hole in his own place!’ (*Ibid.*, 306.13). Compare a version in an Iḥādī source where the person making the hole says: ‘It’s my place. I can do what I like here!’ (Abū Bakr al-Kinānī, *Miṣnawī*, 12:11.7). The tradition is not usually made much of by pre-modern writers on forbidding wrong; but for an exception, see Ibn al-Nahās, *Taḥṣīḥ*, 87.13–89.17.

<sup>62</sup> ‘Alī Ibn Hājī, ‘Man sāhib al-‘unfī’, *al-Munqidh* (Algiers), 28 Jumādā II, 1410, 3d.49, translated in M. al-Ahnaf *et al.*, *L’Algérie par ses islamistes*, Paris 1991, 139. I owe all my material from *al-Munqidh* to Abdesslam Maghraoui, who kindly supplied me with copies.

<sup>63</sup> Ibn Hājī, ‘Man sāhib al-‘unfī’, 2c.61, translated in Ahnaf, *Algérie*, 135.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 142 = anon., ‘Hal arka nabā’ al-B’rāqī?’, *al-Munqidh*, second half of Rabīʿ I, 1410, 2b.16. The article stresses that the action was taken only after less drastic measures had failed.

<sup>65</sup> L. Gardet, *La cité musulmane*, Paris 1961, 187.

in a state of (psychological) 'readiness (*istī'ādā wa-tahayya'*) to carry out the duty',<sup>66</sup> Zaydān, characteristically, is writing a work in a modern genre which might be called 'mission theory'. The other point is a tendency to emphasise long-term results. An example of this is 'Amr's argument, in the context of a discussion of the efficacy condition, that a reproof which goes unheeded in the short run may nevertheless work on the offender's subconscious mind.<sup>67</sup> But these are subtleties. By far the most obvious and widespread sign of the times is a new concern with organisation.

'Abduh's commentary on Q3:104 as developed by Ridā is an early example of this concern, and it already places it in a context of mission theory. On the assumption that the 'community' who are to perform the duty are a subgroup of the community at large,<sup>68</sup> they proceed to discuss the nature of this subgroup. Sometimes, as we have seen, they appear to be talking about constitutional government.<sup>69</sup> But in one extended passage, they seem to be thinking primarily of missionaries,<sup>70</sup> whether their efforts be directed towards Muslims or non-Muslims.<sup>71</sup> This enterprise needs organisation: it should be in the hands of what these days is called an association (*jam'iyah*), and it needs a leadership (*riyāṣah*) to direct it.<sup>72</sup> The theme of organisation recurs in two anonymous – and somewhat vacuous – reformist letters published in a religious journal in 1333/1915<sup>73</sup> and 1334/1916.<sup>74</sup> Zaydān likewise stresses the need for the duty to be performed by organised groups,<sup>75</sup> and he is far from alone in this.<sup>76</sup> Thus

<sup>66</sup> Zaydān, *Uṣūl al-dīn wa*, 145–14. He is commenting on the 'three modes' tradition, from which he contrives to infer this obligation. <sup>67</sup> See above, note 34.

<sup>68</sup> See above, ch. 2, 17–20. We are not told whether or not this assumption is correct.

<sup>69</sup> See above, note 37. <sup>70</sup> See above, note 29.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Ridā, *Taḥṣīn al-Manār*, 4:27–18, 35–2 (non-Muslims); *ibid.*, 47–4 (both Muslims and non-Muslims).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 45–7, 47–1. Anon., 'Hāḥ al-Muslimīn al-yawm wa-ḥamā'at al-dā'wa wa'l-irshād', *al-Manār*, 18 (1333), 793–17, 794–16, 794–24 (calling for the establishment of such an association).

<sup>73</sup> Anon., 'Hāḥ al-Muslimīn al-ḥimā'iyah wa-ḥādāt al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar', *al-Manār*, 19 (1334–5), 256–20. The reformist platform is clearly articulated in a passage denouncing indigenous tomb-cults and Western materialism (*ibid.*, 251–13).

<sup>74</sup> Zaydān, *Uṣūl al-dīn wa*, 271f. §351, esp. 272–6, 272–17.

<sup>75</sup> See Muhammad 'Izzat Darwāza (d. 1404/1984), *al-Taḥṣīn al-ḥādīth*, Cairo 1962–4, 5:14–12 (speaking of *al-ḥamā'at wa'l-munazzamat al-ḥimā'iyah*, whose role he distinguishes from that of *man bi-madhih 'i-sulṭān*); 'Umārah, *al-Islām wa-ḥuqūq al-insān*, 116–12; 'Uḥmān, *Min ṣulḥ al-fikr al-siyāsī al-Islāmī*, 261–25; Muḥammad 'Alī Mas'ūd, *al-Asmā' bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*, Cairo 1980, 58–4, 94–10; Aḥyāyah, 'Ḥuqūq al-insān fi 'l-Islām', 147–27 (with the qualification that this should not limit the scope of individual activity); see also L. Gómez García, *Marxismo, islam e islamismo: el proyecto de Adil Hāqim*, Madrid 1996, 338, 340 (this study was drawn to my attention by Marcel Ferro). The Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan recommended in 1952 that an organisation should be set up to make the teachings of Islam known to the people and to perform the duty (Basic Principles Committee, *Report*, Karachi 1952, 2, drawn to my attention by Yohanan Friedmann). The manifesto of the Zaydi Ḥizb al-Ḥaqq speaks of the

Ḥawwā explains that Muslims living in a corrupt Islamic state (*amla Islāmiyyah munḥarifa*) should organise performance of the duty 'with the hand'; this operation should avoid collision with the state, and should take as its target wrongs perpetrated by individuals (musical instruments, pictures of nudes, liquor, or the flaunting of female sexuality).<sup>77</sup> Sometimes it is hard to tell whether authors have in mind groups to be formed within the society or the official activity of the state.<sup>78</sup> The former is clearly envisaged in the Islamic human right of free association for the purposes of forbidding wrong.<sup>79</sup> Such societies for forbidding wrong have indeed been established from time to time; one was set up in Palestine in the time of the Mandate,<sup>80</sup> another is mentioned in Egypt.<sup>81</sup>

A sense of what has changed with this espousal of organisation can be obtained from a work in the mission theory genre by Muḥammad Ahmad al-Rāshid.<sup>82</sup> His concern is to show that the great authorities of the past proclaimed the legality of collective action (*al-'amal al-jamā'ī*) in forbidding wrong, and thus to refute the claim that such action is an innovation alien to Islamic norms.<sup>83</sup> To this end, he collects some examples of traditional figures who are said to have performed the duty together with a group of associates.<sup>84</sup> Texts such as these, he remarks, are valuable discoveries which need to develop a proper mode of performance of the duty 'on the part of individuals and groups (*jamā'ih*)' (for this passage, see above, note 45).

<sup>77</sup> Ḥawwā, *Jamā'at* 392 no. 6 (and see 391–1). He speaks here of *tanziḥ* 'amaḥiyat al-jihād bi'l-yad', but he has already defined his terms in such a fashion that *jihād* within the Islamic world is synonymous with *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf, al-ibā*, 364–8. For Ḥawwā's personal experience in this line of duty, see I. Weismann, 'Sa'id Hawwa: the making of a radical Muslim thinker in modern Syria', *Middle Eastern Studies* 29 (1993), 61–3), and for his doctrine of *jihād*, see I. Weismann, 'Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic revivalism in Ba'ḥist Syria', *Sentia Islamica*, 85 (1997), 149–53.

<sup>78</sup> For passages where the term *tanziḥ* clearly refers to the latter, see 'Awda, *Tashrīḥ*, 1:501–5; 'Amr, *Amr*, 244–2; Zaydān, *Maḥṣal*, 4:370 §3.584. Mahmūd speaks of *tanziḥ* as desirable (*Uṣūl al-ḥimā'iyah* 'al-Islāmī, 203–21), but is vague as to what he has in mind. A clear case where *tanziḥ* does not refer to the efforts of the state is the passage by Ḥawwā cited in the preceding note.

<sup>79</sup> Hussain, *Human rights in Islam*, 114, art. XIV(a), and Mayer, *Islam and human rights*, 91 (both quoting the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the Islamic Council of Europe in Paris in 1401/1981); cf. Munazzamat al-Ma'tam al-Islāmī, *Wahdāt huqūq al-insān fi 'l-Islām*, in *Ḥuqūq al-insān fi 'l-Islām: maqālāt al-Ma'tam al-ḥimā'iyah* (Beirut al-Islāmī, Tehran 1987, 559, art. 22(b)).

<sup>80</sup> See U. M. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine*, Leiden 1987, 249f., on the *jam'iyat al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar al-marḥuziyah* of 1353/1935, note that the founders rendered the name of the society into English as 'Central Society for the Preservation of Public Morals'. I owe this reference to Mike Doran.

<sup>81</sup> E. Swan, *Radiant Islam: medieval theology and modern politics*, New Haven and London 1985, 85. <sup>82</sup> Rāshid, *Muniriyyat*, 146–54. <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 146–14, 148–6.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 149–12. The three examples given are the Companion Ḥishām ibn Ḥakīm ibn Ḥizām (see above, ch. 4, note 97), 'Abd al-Rahīm al-'Alḥī (see above, ch. 6, note 105), and Abu Bakr al-Aḥqāfī (see above, ch. 17, note 204).

should take their place in the law of Islamic activism (*al-fiqh al-ḥarakī*).<sup>85</sup> He then quotes Ghazzālī's view that the permission of the ruler is not needed for the performance of forbidding wrong by armed bands.<sup>86</sup> This text, he adds, is one that should be written in letters of gold, and memorised by missionaries (*al-ḥāḍi*); it shows that the literature of the heritage (*ḥatīb al-turāth*) abounds in sources for the law of activism.<sup>87</sup> Two things are noteworthy here. One is the gap between the precedents he invokes and the current practice he seeks to legitimise: the occasional examples of group action in the literature of the heritage never involve the kind of formal associations that have sprung up in the Islamic world under Western influence. The other is the sense of surprise that Rāshid displays.<sup>88</sup> He takes it for granted, not that his concerns and those of the heritage are identical, but that they come from different worlds; the relevance of the views of the medieval scholars to his own world is not an axiom but a discovery.

Who is it who is to engage in all this activity? One group that had traditionally been central to the performance of the duty gets remarkably little attention: the religious scholars. Two authors who still take them seriously are Sāmarrāī and Muḥammad 'Alī Mas'ūd. Much of what Sāmarrāī says about them is negative; but his high-flown rhetoric regarding the horrendous consequences of their silence in the face of wrongdoing does at least pay them the compliment of supposing that they matter.<sup>89</sup> In one of his rare expressions of personal opinion, he tells us that he feels it to be better for the duty to be undertaken by the scholars (*ḥalimā*).<sup>90</sup> It may be that wrongdoing will become so rampant that they alone cannot handle it; in that case the individual members of the community are obligated to act – but under the leadership of their scholars.<sup>91</sup> Mas'ūd seems to have in mind the old saying about the tripartite division of labour, though he does not quote it. The duty is to be performed in three modes (*ḥarātib*). First, there is the mode of the rulers (*ḥukūm*),<sup>92</sup> who alone can use force. Second, there is that of the scholars, who are to perform the duty with their pens, tongues and ideas – but not with violence.<sup>93</sup> Finally, there are the common people (*amānīn*), for whom he reserves a fairly energetic version of performance 'with the heart' – again without violence.<sup>94</sup> This ascribes a major

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.9.

<sup>86</sup> For this view see above, ch. 16, 441. Another figure who is very partial to this text is Ibn Ḥājj (see below, note 168).

<sup>87</sup> Rāshid, *Munziḥat*, 152.12.

<sup>88</sup> See also *ibid.*, 147.5.

<sup>89</sup> Sāmarrāī, *Manāḥij*, 8–11. Salāh al-Dīn al-Munajjid introduces a little anthology of encounters between 'alimā' and rulers of the past with a similar lament (*al-Āmirīn bi'l-ḥatīb*, 5.3).

<sup>90</sup> Sāmarrāī, *Manāḥij*, 61.13.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.17.

<sup>92</sup> Muḥammad 'Alī Mas'ūd, *Amr*, 24.2.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.1.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.15.

role to the scholars, though Mas'ūd's concept of them is a broad and somewhat modernised one.<sup>95</sup>

A group that traditionally received rather little attention, and now gets significantly more, is women.<sup>96</sup> While no author actually denies their eligibility to perform the duty, 'Amr comes close to it: for although he is clearly composing his account with Ghazzālī's in front of him, he chooses to open his analysis of the conditions of obligation by stating that 'a man' (*al-rajul*) must be legally competent.<sup>97</sup> By contrast, an Egyptian academic writing on Zaydī thought reacts to the exclusion of women by the imam al-Mu'ayyad Yahyā ibn Ḥamza (d. 749/1348f.) with the remark that he sees no ground for stipulating that the performer be male.<sup>98</sup> The Palestinian exegete Darwaza understands Q9:71 to establish the equality of women with men, in particular with regard to forbidding wrong.<sup>99</sup> The fact that he is alone in raising the question among the seventeenth-century modern Sunnī exegetes whose commentaries I checked may suggest some reluctance to broach a sensitive issue.<sup>100</sup> Outside Koranic exegesis, however, the verse is quite often invoked to include women. Ibn Ḥājj takes it to say that the duty is incumbent on women as well as men – though he adds that women are a special case.<sup>101</sup> Muḥammad Sharif Chaudhry interprets the verse to mean that Muslim men and women 'are severally and jointly responsible for enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong';<sup>102</sup> appropriately, his book has an introduction penned by his wife, Dr Nasreen Sharif of the Fatimah Jinnah Medical College. Faḍl Ḥāhī, who teaches at a religious college in Riyāḍ, ends an otherwise somewhat acid work on the duty by calling on all male and female believers to concern themselves with forbidding wrong, and quoting the verse to

<sup>95</sup> He includes among them authors, school-teachers, preachers, spiritual guides, and whoever is learned in matters of religion (*ibid.*, 27.2).

<sup>96</sup> See above, ch. 17, 482–6.

<sup>97</sup> 'Amr, *Amr*, 246.11 (for his dependence on Ghazzālī, see above, note 13, and for the passage of the *ḥimā* that he is following at this point, see above, ch. 16, 429). Likewise in his comments on Q9:71, he does not take the opportunity to mention women (*ibid.*, 218.11). He does allow a wife to counsel her husband despite her subordination to him (*ibid.*, 344.1, citing Ghazzālī; cf. above, ch. 16, 431f.). An author who uses wording derived from Ghazzālī to include women is 'Abd al-Wāḥab Rāshid Abū Saḥīya (*Sharḥ al-Ārṭh* in *al-Nawawīyya fi ḥimāh jadīdā*, n.p. 1988, 399.15).

<sup>98</sup> Subḥī, *Zawāḍiq*, 310 n. 26; cf. above, ch. 10, notes 140f.

<sup>99</sup> Darwaza, *al-Tafsīr al-ḥadīth*, 12:186.8 (to Q9:71); and cf. *ibid.*, 9:71.21 (to Q4:34).

<sup>100</sup> Another plausible example of such reluctance is an article on forbidding wrong which appeared in an Egyptian women's journal, and yet never directly confronts the question ('Abd al-'Azīz al-Sharīf, 'al-*Amr* bi'l-*ma'rūf* wa'l-*nahy* 'an al-*munkar*', *al-Nahḍa al-ḥadīṯiyya*, 9 (1931), 220–2, drawn to my attention by Beith Baron).

<sup>101</sup> Ibn Ḥājj, *Amr*, 1.2. There may be a fuller discussion of this verse on cassette 2.

<sup>102</sup> Muḥammad Sharif Chaudhry, *Women's rights in Islam*, Delhi 1991, 148 no. 2.

make his point.<sup>103</sup> Fathū 'Uthmān cites the verse to show that in Islam women are not stripped of rights and duties, nor denied legal personality and social responsibility.<sup>104</sup>

A particularly strong proponent of female participation is 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa, a pupil of Nāsīr al-Dīn al-Albānī. He adduces Q9:71 as a proof-text,<sup>105</sup> and finds examples in tradition (*ḥadīth*) of women performing the duty against men.<sup>106</sup> One of these is a story set among a tribal group which converted to Islam after the conquest of Mecca in the year 8/630. The best they could do for a prayer-leader was a boy of six or seven who happened to have learnt some of the Koran from travellers. Unfortunately his garment was so short that his bottom was exposed each time he prostrated himself. In response to this spectacle, a tribeswoman called out: 'Aren't you going to cover up your Koran-reciter's bottom from us?' (*a-lā tuḡabbatūn 'annā 'īr qārī'ikum?*). The tribesmen thereupon made the boy's day by providing him with a shirt.<sup>107</sup> This is an original use of a tradition that plays no part in pre-modern discussions of forbidding wrong by women or anyone else.

What is less common is for these writers to face squarely the tensions between such views and the traditional subordination and seclusion of women. A generation ago Zaydān published a work in which he held that women should be involved in Muslim public affairs (though not in elections); he spoke of them performing the duty towards members of the family, neighbours, and other women<sup>108</sup> – but not, by implication, towards men in general. In a massive work on the legal status of women in Islam published a quarter of a century later, he is emphatic that women are obligated to perform the duty just as men are,<sup>109</sup> but again, he does not seem to think

that they should do it to men, at least not outside the immediate family.<sup>110</sup> Instead, his earlier mention of women doing it to other women now reappears as a programme for endowing women with a parallel public space of their own. Thus where the state organises the duty officially, it may open a college to train female officers to perform it (*mubtatahāt*).<sup>111</sup> Likewise Muslim women at the present day should undertake the duty as organised groups, forming female associations (*jam'iyyāt masā'iriyāt*) for the purpose. These associations should operate among women, whether seeking them out in their homes or inviting them to their centres; they should publish weekly or monthly magazines, and arrange classes, lectures and discussions.<sup>112</sup> This, of course, is a rather progressive view. A more conservative attitude is represented by the Sa'ūdī Khālid al-Sabr. Following Ghazzālī, he has no hesitation in taking the position that to be male is not a condition of obligation.<sup>113</sup> However, he goes on to make it very clear that we are talking about a woman in her own home; this is no licence for women to go outside their homes to practise the duty, involving themselves in religious and other affairs, as unfortunately happens so much these days.<sup>114</sup> Another conservative Sa'ūdī author, 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn Ahmad al-Mas'ūd, states that for women the normal mode of performance of the duty with respect to men is in the heart.<sup>115</sup> He does, however, take the view that they should do it to other women, and verbally to those males who are related to them.<sup>116</sup> This includes their husbands,<sup>117</sup> and, of course, their children; as he points out, they are well placed to perform the duty with regard to their children since, unlike men, they spend all their time at home.<sup>118</sup>

statement on the question of the performance of the duty by women because the answer was so obvious; he is at least able to invoke Ghazzālī's explicit statement on his side (*Ibid.*, 358 §3.558; cf. above, ch. 16, note 15).

<sup>110</sup> He repeats the old view that a wife may reprove her husband (*Ibid.*, 362 §3.565; cf. above, ch. 16, 431f.); he adds a new twist by stating that a daughter may do it to her father (*Ibid.*, 361 §3.564).

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 370 §3.584. <sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 370 §3.585.

<sup>113</sup> Sabr, *Amr*, 171.5; he quotes Q9:71 as a proof-text, *Ibid.*, 172.6.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.11. He likewise disapproves of women showing their hands and faces (*Ibid.*, 305.8), but he is by no means totally inflexible: in this age when the media have brought evil into every home, he is prepared to countenance Islamic summer centres for women on the principle of choosing the lesser evil (*Ibid.*, 242.16). His general conservatism is indicated by the fact that he regards tobacco as a wrong on a par with drink, drugs, and the like (*Ibid.*, 120.4, 217.11, 273.18, 353.11, and cf. 313.17).

<sup>115</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Mas'ūd, *Amr*, 529.10. <sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 528.12.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 564.1.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 562.7. Comparable views are briefly set out by 'Abd al-Ḥasib Radwān: a woman is obligated, but her sphere is her home (including her husband) and her own sex (*Diri'āt fī 'īshān*, Cairo 1990, 31.3, 32.20, 71.2; the author's name is vocalised 'Radwān' on the title-page). 'Alī ibn Ḥasan al-Qurānī says that a woman may forbid wrong within limits that do not lead her into anything legally perilous (*Ḥisb*, 111.8). Samarāṭī remarks that some scholars have held that a woman may undertake the duty, but omits to name them (*Mantāhī*, 68.5); he adduces traditions about 'Ā'isha which would not support the idea of a woman reproving a man outside her immediate family.

<sup>103</sup> Faal Iahī, *al-Ḥisba: ta'rifuhā wa-mashrū'iyyatuhā wa-wujūbuhā*, Gujranwala 1993,

82.14. Iāhī, whose work was drawn to my attention by Kambiz Esalami, uses the term

*ḥisba* to cover both the official and individual duties.

<sup>104</sup> 'Uthmān, *Min usūl al-fīr al-islāmī*, 255.20.

<sup>105</sup> 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa, *Talḥīr al-mar'a fī 'asr al-risāla*, Kuwait

1990–1, 1.89.6, and cf. 2.49.2, 223.2.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.29.8, 2.49.16, 50.4, and cf. 226.9, 227.9.

<sup>107</sup> Bukhārī, *Sahīh*, 3:144.7. It is the boy, 'Amr ibn Salīma al-Jarīdī (d. 85/704), who nar-

rates the story in Basra in later life (see also Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, 5:30.1, 71.4; Abū

Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 1:393f. no. 585; Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, 7:1:63.16, 64.8, and cf. 64.12). This is not the only tradition of Bukhārī's that is manifestly intended to amuse us.

<sup>108</sup> Zaydān, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 136.2, quoting Q9:71.

<sup>109</sup> Zaydān, *Mufḥḥal*, 4:211f. §3.288, §3.291 (arguing that for this reason women too have freedom of opinion); 358 §3.557 (his key statement on the question). He inserts frequent references to women in rewriting the traditional rules (see, for example, *Ibid.*, 356 §3.555

(*Muḥim ma-Muḥim*); 360 point *d* (*ra'yān kāna am'imra'n*); 363 §3.569 (*al-Muḥim am al-Muḥim*)); the even does so in a text he takes from Qurṭubī (*Ibid.*, 356 §3.554, citing Qurṭubī, *Jam'*, 4:47.11). He likewise extends Ghazzālī's remarks on boys who have not yet attained puberty to include girls in the same position (Zaydān, *Mufḥḥal*, 4:360, point *a*; cf. above, ch. 16, 429). He states that some scholars had made no explicit

What of the role of the state? This has always been a focus of tension, and it has become even more so with the rise of the modern state – under whatever ideological aegis – in the Islamic world. Thus Ḥawwā aptly remarks that the state in our epoch has come to hold sway over everything: education, instruction, the economy, the army, society, politics, intellectual life, culture.<sup>119</sup> In some Sunni countries this has issued in forbidding wrong becoming a function of the state apparatus; this has long been the case in Saudi Arabia,<sup>120</sup> and more recently such a system has been established in Afghanistan.<sup>121</sup> The Sa'ūdī model is not, however, widely discussed outside the kingdom, though it is occasionally mentioned.<sup>122</sup> Elsewhere there are broadly speaking two very different ways to react to the new salience of the state. One is to give ground and limit the performance of the duty to what modern conditions permit; the other is to capture the state for Islam, if necessary by revolution.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Ḥawwā, *Jana' al-Ilāh*, 396.10. Cf. also Mahmūd, *Uṣūl al-muḥimmān al-Islāmīn*, 207.10.

<sup>120</sup> See above, ch. 8, section 4.

<sup>121</sup> The Afghan system is known to me only from reports in the Western press, according to which the Jalālīn established a 'Department for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice' (or similar title) after their capture of Kabul in 1417/1996 (*New York Times*, 1 October 1996, 1; 29 August 1997, 4; 6 October 1997, 9; some of this material was sent to me by Robert Wisnowsky). According to the second of these reports, the rank and file of the religious police are called 'mohazabs'. A photograph that appeared in a Madrid newspaper shows a member of the religious police armed with scissors good-humouredly cutting the fringe of a malfactor with curly hair at a crossroads in Kabul; he was apparently the fifty-seventh offender to get an involuntary haircut that day ('Fiequillos satánicos en Afganistán', *El País*, 5 November, 1997, 7, given to me by Mariel Ferrer).

<sup>122</sup> When 'Awda makes reference to a *bay'a* in connection with the organisation of *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* (*Taḥrīr*, 1:500.12), it is likely enough that he has the Sa'ūdī case in mind. The same is true when Muḥammad 'Alī Mas'ūd, a state-friendly author, calls for the formation of a *bay'a* of those involved in the *da'wa* (*ʿAmr*, 94.15). Ibn Ḥājī says that if the government of Algeria were Muslim, it could set up a special police force (*shurṭat al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf*) which would use force; such a police force does not, he continues, exist in any contemporary Muslim state – though by way of exception he makes a dismissive reference to the Hijāz (*ʿAmr*, 3:2). It is, of course, no surprise that Abū Bakr Jābir al-Jazā'irī, who preaches in the Prophet's mosque in Medina, holds that Q3:104 requires the existence of committees (*bay'at*) of *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* in all Muslim cities and villages (*ʿAṣar al-taḥāzīn*, Medina 1994, 1:358.16); in the same way Qurān extols the Sa'ūdī system as a model for other Islamic countries (*Ḥishāb*, 719.14, 831.7). But the enthusiastic endorsement of this system by the Egyptian 'Abd al-Qādir Ahmad 'Aīa in the introduction to his edition of Khallīl (*ʿAmr*, 67–9) is unusual in the literature I have consulted. Cf. also the view of the Jordanian Ibrahim al-Qarīn (d. 1404/1984) that the special group performing the duty laid down in Q3:104 should be appointed by the ruler (*al-ḥakīm*) so that anarchy can be avoided (*Taḥrīr al-taḥāzīn*, Amman 1982–, 1:286.15).

<sup>123</sup> I should perhaps also mention in passing the *ḥishāb* procedure that has become notorious in the West through its recent use by Egyptian Islamists seeking to bring about the divorce of Nasr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd from his Muslim wife on the ground that his views on the Koran constitute apostasy. This procedure is not, however, a form of *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* (nor of *ḥishāb* in the sense of the official censor). A *da'wa ḥishāb* is a suit which someone brings out of concern for God's rights – or in less theocratic language, the public inter-

We have already encountered the accommodationist reaction in the rewriting of Ghazzālī by the Ottoman Shaykh al-Islām Ḥaydarzādē (d. 1349/1931).<sup>124</sup> But the characteristic expression of this tendency in the Arab world is the view that carrying out the duty 'with the hand' is reserved for those in authority. This idea is not new; but whereas it was rare outside Ḥanaḥī circles in traditional Islam,<sup>125</sup> it is significantly more common in modern writings. Perhaps surprisingly, it seems to owe its prominence to Ḥasan al-Bannā (d. 1368/1949). In the years immediately preceding the Second World War, the Muslim Brothers were divided by a dispute over the proper means of moral reform in Egypt; a group which in due course succeeded from the movement believed in proceeding 'with the hand' in accordance with the 'three modes' tradition, whereas Bannā himself inclined rather to the 'good admonition' (*al-taw'īza al-ḥasana*) of Q16:125.<sup>126</sup> This origin has probably bestowed a certain prestige on an idea which might otherwise have seemed merely time-serving.

As could be expected, this notion is current in Egypt in quarters friendly to the state. Thus it is the main theme of an interview given by the Muftī ʿasī – as opposed to one in which he has a personal stake (see Tyan, *Historie de l'organisation judiciaire*, 618 no. 1; Gardet, *Cité*, 187 n. 2; H. al-Labīdī, *Da'wat al-ḥishāb*, Asrūt 1983 (a monographic study); for the sense of *ḥishāb* here, cf. above, ch. 16, note 135). The role of the individual in this procedure is essentially to lay testimony before the *qaḍī*, who is then responsible for any commanding or forbidding (cf. *ibid.*, 4:19, 165.14; for a classical use of the phrase *shahīdat al-ḥishāb*, see Ghazzālī, *Waḥīd*, 2:163.15). What this has in common with *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* is the disinterested motivation of the individual who takes action. However, this feature does not make the procedure an aspect of *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* and accounts of the duty of forbidding wrong do not treat it as such. Modern discussions of the procedure nevertheless make reference to *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf*, perhaps by a kind of terminological osmosis (cf. Labīdī, *Da'wat al-ḥishāb*, 44–8, 163.4). The Egyptian Court of Cassation (*Mabkamat al-naqā*) in its decision (*ḥukm*) of 20 Rabī' I, 1417/5 August 1996 in the Abū Zayd case included in its discussion of the *da'wa ḥishāb* a paraphrase of the definition of *ḥishāb* in terms of *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* with which Māwardī (d. 450/1058) opens his discussion of the censorship (the passage is at 9.10 of the type-written decree, of which I owe my copy to Khalid Fahmy; for Māwardī's definition, see above, ch. 16, note 134; cf. Labīdī, *Da'wat al-ḥishāb*, 2.6, 51.17). As in the Abū Zayd case, couples deemed not to be legally married are a longstanding target of the procedure (*ibid.*, 4:19, 132.9, 167.10, 201.16; Labīdī gives no extended discussion of this theme).

<sup>124</sup> See above, ch. 12, 332. For the rewriting of Ghazzālī, see further below, 526f.

<sup>125</sup> See above, ch. 17, notes 29f.

<sup>126</sup> R. P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, London 1969, 18, citing 'Abd al-Khabīr al-Khālīl, *Qaḍī al-dīn al-Islāmīya Ḥasan al-Bannā*, Cairo 1952, 73.15. In one of his talks, Bannā remarks that righting wrongs 'with the hand' (*al-taḥāzīn bi'l-yad*) is the responsibility of the ruler (*al-ḥakīm al-ḡalībī*) (*Nazarīyat fi ṣūb al-taḥāzīn wa'l-muḥimmāt*; recorded by Ahmad 'Isā 'Ashūr, Cairo 1980, 42.9). This summary observation follows a lively discussion of the verbal performance of the duty (*ibid.*, 41.2), culminating in an anecdote about a Brother who was invited to a party in Isnaṭīlyat; foreigners were present, together with alcohol and other abominations, but the Brother was able to put things right with a relatively mild rebuke to his host (*ibid.*, 41.24). There is no discussion of the question in the talk devoted to *al-ʿamr bi'l-ma'rūf* in Bannā's *Ḥaḍīth al-ḥishāb* (recorded by Ahmad 'Isā 'Ashūr, Cairo 1983, 119–28).

of the Republic, Muhammad Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī, in an Egyptian magazine in 1408/1988.<sup>127</sup> He argues, among other things, that if everyone could right wrongs 'with the hand', the result would be anarchy.<sup>128</sup> (He is, of course, against anarchy: he brings up the awful example of Lebanon.)<sup>129</sup> It is not that he limits the requisite authority to the state; he himself, for example, has such authority over his children – but not over the children or wives of others.<sup>130</sup> Confronted with the view that Ibn Taymiyya had approved of performance of the duty 'with the hand',<sup>131</sup> the Muftī avers that great scholar to have been innocent of any such thing.<sup>132</sup> This interview should not be seen in isolation; it clearly reflects a period marked by vigorous polemical exchanges on the issue. Some of these are described by the Azhar scholar 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibrāhīm al-Ma'ānī, himself a careful critic of the position represented by the Muftī,<sup>133</sup> he considers the view that performance 'with the hand' is restricted to the authorities to be a recent Egyptian heresy.<sup>134</sup>

The Muftī's views have also had less exalted adherents. One Ahmad Ḥusayn tells a story about his youthful involvement in some activity 'with the hand' against liquor stores and his subsequent change of heart in prison; the setting is the schism among the Muslim Brothers.<sup>135</sup> 'Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī, like his namesake, makes the point that for individuals to take to executing the duty 'with the hand' would lead to anarchy.<sup>136</sup> Other Egyptian writers in this camp are Muhammad 'Alī Maṣ'ūdī<sup>137</sup> and Yāsir Muḥammad al-'Adl.<sup>138</sup> Outside Egypt the same thinking can be found in

<sup>127</sup> Muhammad Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī, interview in 'Sālin Okṭōbr wa-hiwār ma' fadhlat al-Muftī', *Okṭōbr*, year 12, no. 601, 1 May 1988, 38–40. I am indebted to Emmanuel Swan for drawing this interview to my attention.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 38d.11. Compare the view of Ḥānẓ Wahba (above, ch. 8, note 115).

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 39d.6. <sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 38d.31, 39a.1. <sup>131</sup> Cf. above, ch. 7, note 60.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 39d.24.

<sup>133</sup> Ma'ānī, *Ṭaḥqīq al-munkar*, esp. 3–8; for his position at the Azhar, see *ibid.*, 80.3. His account makes it clear that the idea of the tripartite division of labour was in the air at the time (*ibid.*, 4.12, 15.11). See further F. Burgat, *L'Islamisme en face*, Paris 1995, 117 n. 8 (this book was drawn to my attention by Marcel Fierro).

<sup>134</sup> Ma'ānī, *Ṭaḥqīq al-munkar*, 45.15; he uses the phrase *taḥqīq bid'īn* in connection with this view, *ibid.*, 15.24.

<sup>135</sup> Ahmad Ḥusayn, al-*Amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar* wa'ib al-*yaḥall dā'imān fī ḥudūd al-ḥikma wa'l-maw'iza al-ḥasana*, *Majma'at al-Azhar*, 50 (1398), 742b.4. I owe this reference to the files of the Islām Araḡumalan Merkezi.

<sup>136</sup> Ṭanṭāwī, *Ḥisāb*, 175.20.

<sup>137</sup> Muhammad 'Alī Maṣ'ūdī rejects unofficial violence (*Amr*, 20.4, 27.3, 31.7, 76.14; note his partiality for *man'isa ḥasana*). His book seems still to reflect the conditions of the period in which the Islamists were the allies of President Sādāt against the left.

<sup>138</sup> Righting wrongs 'with the hand' is for those in authority (Yāsir Muḥammad al-'Adl, *al-Fiḥ al-ghā'ib*, Mansūra 1993, 280.5). This includes you with respect to your own home, should you find your son in his cups; but as to duplers over whom you do not have authority, you can only counsel them (cf. above, note 130). 'Adl also quotes the saying about

Saudi Arabia,<sup>139</sup> as also in a European setting in the preaching of the Lebanese Shaykh Fayṣal Mawlawī.<sup>140</sup> Action against wrong 'with the hand', he says, is only for someone in authority within his proper sphere (*ṣāhib al-wilāyah fī sulṭānīyah*); and you are not such a person.<sup>141</sup> The Palestinian Darwaza is clearly thinking along the same lines: he ties the role of individuals to ethical and personal matters in which their activity will not lead to anarchy or the like.<sup>142</sup>

This view is both a flagrant divergence from the mainstream of traditional Islamic doctrine and an unmistakable assertion of political quietism. The combination guaranteed that it would not prove generally acceptable in a period of highly politicised Islamic resurgence. Writers with more respect for the heritage, or less respect for existing states, were naturally disinclined to go against the plain sense of the 'three modes' tradition. Thus 'Awda, repeating the standard rejection of the view that the permission of the ruler is required, makes it clear that he believes that individuals have the right to perform the duty 'with their hands';<sup>143</sup> and 'Amrī takes the position that ordinary people – or at least ordinary men – are entitled to perform the duty by force.<sup>144</sup> But those who reject the view that only the authorities may proceed 'with the hand' are not necessarily in favour of violence. Ma'ānī, who considers the idea to be without foundation and

the tripartite division of labour (*ibid.*, 281.18), but offers no comment on it, and goes on to pile up further restrictions on action 'with the hand' (*ibid.*, 282f.). The book is a reaction to the fragmented violence of the Islamist movement in Egypt; 'Adl has no tolerance for attacks on other Muslims with knives and machine-guns, or for the burning of churches and monasteries (*ibid.*, 271.14). To help the militants look bad, he presents them as a threat to the unity of Islam at the very time when the religion is the object of a world-wide conspiracy to destroy it (*ibid.*, 12.17, and cf. 289.16), and as a disruptive force in a context in which organisation is desperately needed to take action against such major wrongs as the fact that the *sharī'a* is in abeyance (*ibid.*, 286.15). What a sad contrast the Muslims make to the Jews, every one of whom is fully involved in the Zionist movement, and knows his duty with regard to the state of Israel (*ibid.*, 290.1)! Despite his Mu'tazilite sympathies (see below, note 309, and cf. above, note 45), he quotes a Ḥanbalite condemnation of rebellion with implicit approval (*ibid.*, 269.1); the neo-Mu'tazilites are not the revolutionaries they were a generation ago. Cf. also Gómez García, *Muruzuma*, 339.

<sup>139</sup> 'Abd al-Rahmān Ḥasan al-Mawḍānī, who holds a professorship at the University of Umm al-Qurā in Mecca, expresses similar views (*Fiḥ al-nā'wa wa'illā ḥillā*, Damascus 1996, 2.237.15, 242.18, 243.2, with a broad definition of those in authority).

<sup>140</sup> Kepel, *Banishment*, 261f.

<sup>141</sup> Mawlawī, *Amr*, side 2. Mawlawī doubtless derives this view from Ḥasan al-Bannā, to whom he makes frequent references on this cassette.

<sup>142</sup> Darwaza, *al-Ṭaḥqīq al-ḡā'ib*, 5:14.18.

<sup>143</sup> 'Amrī, *Amr*, 297.1, 303.2 (in the latter passage he speaks of *kuḏ ṛajūl*). He quotes, but does not endorse, the saying about the tripartite division of labour (*ibid.*, 296.5). Zaydān is in the same camp as 'Awda and 'Amrī in making no move to limit performance 'with the hand' to the authorities (*Muḡni*, 4:364–83, 570), and the same is true of Ḥāhī (*Ḥāhī*, 80.12).

has no difficulty in proving his point,<sup>145</sup> deplores the waves of terrorism and violence sweeping over Egypt.<sup>146</sup> He eventually makes it clear that, in his view, violence has no part in the performance 'with the hand' that is the province of individual subjects,<sup>147</sup> his key argument, or rather assumption, is that the use of violence constitutes punishment ('*ṣuqūba*'), and as such is reserved to the ruler and his subordinates.<sup>148</sup> Khālid al-Sabṭ shares with Ma'āni the formal rejection of the view that performance 'with the hand' is reserved for the authorities,<sup>149</sup> but in the next breath he speaks only of the action someone might take 'in his home or his market or the like'.<sup>150</sup> Others compromise in a less subtle way: they make the point that proceeding 'with the hand' is in the first instance a duty for the authorities, but do not exclude ordinary individuals from it.<sup>151</sup> They may also employ a very broad notion of who the authorities are. One such author, in a modern commentary on the forty traditions of Nawawī (d. 676/1277), includes those in charge of schools, factories and offices; someone in charge of a school is in a position to stamp out indecorous songs (*al-ḡhānā al-majāna*), while someone in charge of a factory or office can stop employees wasting time.<sup>152</sup> Looming behind this whole discussion of performance 'with the hand' is the appeal of the 'three modes' tradition to revolutionary fundamentalists.<sup>153</sup>

More direct indications of the attitudes of modern writers towards the use of violence in forbidding wrong can often be gleaned from their reactions to Ghazzālī's views on the subject. Several are clearly embarrassed.

<sup>145</sup> Ma'āni, *Taḡhīr al-munkar*, 15.8. Ma'āni returns to this battleground repeatedly in the rejoinders to a literary antagonist reprinted in the volume.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.5, and cf. 32.12, 107.16, 117.10.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.10, and cf. 116.7. Whatever its political merits, this assumption seems as ill-founded as the view he is attacking; obviously violence is sometimes used as a punishment, but why should this always be the case? The whole tract is an instructive example of an Ashar scholar attempting to position himself in the moral and political force-field of Muḥarrak's Egypt.

<sup>149</sup> Sabṭ, *Amr*, 331.13. <sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.14.

<sup>151</sup> Zaydan, *Uṣūl al-da'wa*, 455 §587; Khālid al-Bayṭar, *al-Bayṭar fī sharḥ al-Arḥān al-Nawawīyān*, Zaqqā' 1987, 207.11; similarly Maḥmūd (*Uṣūl al-majānima' al-Islāmī*, 202.3, but contrast *ibid.*, 202.24). Cf. the view of Ibn Taymiyya, above, ch. 7, 155.

<sup>152</sup> Bayṭar, *al-Bayṭar fī sharḥ al-Arḥān*, 207.13. A comparable attitude towards such intermediate authorities is taken by Mawlawī in the context of the factory (see his remarks quoted in Kepele, *Barīhiyya*, 262; and cf. above, note 139, on Mawḍūnī). Ibn Ḥājī, by contrast, is asked about a man who works in an agricultural market (*ṣuq al-falāḥī*), where he seeks to right such wrongs as the mixing of men and women; the man in charge (*mas'ūl*) tells him that this is not his job, and is on the point of punishing him. Ibn Ḥājī's response is that he should pay no attention to the manager (*muḥarrir*) and persist; it is God who provides the means of subsistence (*ar-rizq*) (*Amr*, 7.11).

<sup>153</sup> Svām, *Radiical Islam*, 117, citing esp. S. E. Ibrahim, 'Islamic militancy as a social movement: the case of two groups in Egypt', in A. E. H. Dessouki (ed.), *Islamic resurgence in the Arab world*, New York 1982, 127; cf. also Burgar, *L'Islamisme en face*, 118, and 'Umāra, *al-Islām wa-ḥuqūq al-insān*, 94, 18.

Thus Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī in his epitome of Ghazzālī's *Revival of the religious sciences* omits the last three of Ghazzālī's levels of performance, and limits the fifth to officialdom when it involves the destruction of offending objects.<sup>154</sup> A similarly queasy response to Ghazzālī's attitude to armed conflict is that of a certain Ṣāliḥ Ahmad al-Shāmī, who in his epitome of Ghazzālī's work discreetly omits to mention such conflict, not to speak of armed bands.<sup>155</sup> Khālid al-Sabṭ lists Ghazzālī's levels,<sup>156</sup> and gives a few pages each to the first two; but thereafter he tacitly forgets them, turning instead to the 'three modes'.<sup>157</sup> The many examples of performance 'with the hand' that he proceeds to give convey the message that it consists of violence directed against things (breaking and pouring) rather than people.<sup>158</sup> He has thus spared himself the awkwardness of confronting Ghazzālī's more aggressive levels of performance; and with regard to recourse to arms, he offers only the passing remark that more than one scholar has made this conditional on the ruler's permission.<sup>159</sup> A similar strategy is adopted by another Ṣa'ūdī, 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Mas'ūd: his account of the levels simply drops those involving violence to the person,<sup>160</sup> and restricts performance 'with the hand' to objects;<sup>161</sup> he requires the permission of the ruler for recourse to arms.<sup>162</sup>

Others, within limits, are more comfortable with Ghazzālī's approach. Thus 'Amr approves the use of force,<sup>163</sup> but dislikes the idea of armed bands.<sup>164</sup> 'Awda in his discussion of the use of violence follows Ghazzālī without flinching, even espousing his views of armed conflict and armed bands,<sup>165</sup> though he does adopt Ghazzālī's position that the subject may not use violence against the ruler.<sup>166</sup> Some recent figures lack even these inhibitions. Thus Ḥawwā strongly endorses Ghazzālī's views on

<sup>154</sup> Qāsimī, *Manẓūrat al-nu'mānīn*, 246.18. (Ghazzālī's fifth level is the fourth in Qāsimī's numbering.)

<sup>155</sup> Ṣāliḥ Ahmad al-Shāmī, *al-Muladhānah min ḥijā' ṣulūm al-ān*, Damascus and Beirut 1992, 1474.10; similarly Bayṭarī, *Amr*, 50.6.

<sup>156</sup> Sabṭ, *Amr*, 316.2 (he comes up with ten levels).

<sup>158</sup> As *ibid.*, 328.5.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 332.9. <sup>160</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Mas'ūd, *Amr*, 519–26.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 205.7, claiming Ghazzālī's authority for this. In a discussion independent of Ghazzālī's, he makes it clear that the use of violence is excluded in normal circumstances where the ruler has set up an effective committee (*ḥay'ā*) to discharge the duty (*ibid.*, 104 no. 3). Qurānī, who is well disposed towards the Ṣa'ūdī state, takes Ghazzālī's series no further than blows, and in any case denies this option to the individual forbiddler of wrong (*Ḥidāya*, 256.10). For an author using Hanbalite sources, a good way to avoid confronting Ghazzālī's views on violence is to rely on the bowdlerised version of Ibn Qudāma's epitome of Ibn al-Jawzī's *Minhāj al-ḡhāṣiḥīn* (cf. above, ch. 6, 139–41, for an example, see Kadwān, *Dīrāḡāt fī ḥijāb*, 60.5).

<sup>162</sup> See above, note 144.

<sup>163</sup> 'Amr, *Amr*, 309.13; cf. above, ch. 16, 441.

<sup>164</sup> 'Awda, *Taḥrīr*, 1:507.19, 508.15; cf. above, ch. 16, 441.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 509.22; cf. above, ch. 16, notes 33f.

violence.<sup>167</sup> Ibn Hājī quotes Ghazzālī's passage on armed bands with obvious relish, as also the denunciation of the quietist traditionalists by Jassās.<sup>168</sup>

Against this background, it must seem paradoxical that it is precisely one of the most radical of fundamentalist visions that has gone farthest in modern times towards voiding the duty of the individual to forbid wrong. When Sayyid Qutb comments on Q3:104, he seems almost to deny the existence of this duty: 'commanding' and 'forbidding' are things only someone in authority (*dhā al-sulṭān*) can do, and accordingly we need an authority (*ṣulṭā*) to perform the duty.<sup>169</sup> This authority would seem to be the Muslim community;<sup>170</sup> there is no mention of the Muslims as individuals. But it is not until he comments on Q5:79 that we learn what has become of the duty of the individual. Here Qutb remarks, promisingly, that the Muslim community is one in which no one who sees another act wrongly can say 'What's that to me?'<sup>171</sup> But there is a catch. A Muslim society is indeed one that enables a Muslim to devote himself to forbidding wrong, without his attempts being reduced to pointless gestures or made impossible altogether as is the case in the Jāhili societies that exist today. The real task is thus to establish the good society as such, and this comes before the righting of small-scale, personal and individual wrongs (*al-shāhāt jaz'iyā, shakhsīyā wa-fardīyā*) by way of forbidding wrongs; such efforts are vain when the whole society is corrupt.<sup>172</sup> All the sacred texts bearing on forbidding wrong, he argues, concern themselves with the duty of the Muslim in a Muslim society.<sup>173</sup> Thus in commenting on Q9:112, Qutb invokes the early history of the Muslim community in

support of his view: the followers of the Prophet first devoted their efforts to establishing the Muslim state and society, and only then turned to forbidding wrong in secondary matters.<sup>174</sup> It is noteworthy that this rationale of Qutb for voiding forbidding wrong in the present is very much his own. Thus he does not invoke the authority of the eschatological traditions that foretell such a time.<sup>175</sup> He does at one point make use of the notion of performance in the heart,<sup>176</sup> but it plays no central role in his argument.

Although it is known to have been current among the followers of Qutb, this renunciation has not become standard fundamentalist doctrine. Thus Rāshīd, after quoting Qutb's commentary to Q9:112, feels compelled to add that this does not mean that missionaries (*dhū āt*) should not instruct themselves and their followers in their Islamic duties, or that they should abstain from forbidding the kind of secondary wrongs that can in fact be stopped.<sup>177</sup> Mawlawī takes the view that in a non-Islamic society – particularly in Europe – it is utterly inappropriate for us to cut off relations with (Muslim) offenders, since all it does is to isolate us; instead we should persist, warning them once, twice, thrice, even ten times.<sup>178</sup> Ibn Hājī does not mention Qutb, but he makes a point of identifying many of the Koranic verses he discusses as Meccan;<sup>179</sup> he asks rhetorically if the Prophet told his followers to be silent and abstain from performing the duty till they were established in Medina, and goes on to reject the idea that one can do away with forbidding wrong on the pretext that we do not live in an Islamic state (*ḥawla Islāmīyā*).<sup>180</sup> The activist tinge of this passage is likely to reflect his role as a populist leader in a revolutionary situation: he strongly endorses

<sup>167</sup> Hawwā, *Junad Allāh*, 386, 8; and cf. *ibid.*, 382, 1, and above, note 77.

<sup>168</sup> Ibn Hājī, *Amr*, 6:2; cf. above, ch. 12, 336f. Unfortunately his views on performance with the hand<sup>2</sup> are on cassette 5 (see *ibid.*, 6:1). Cf. also above, notes 86f.

<sup>169</sup> Qutb, *Fi ṣūlāt al-Qur'ān*, 444, 5, noted in O. Carté, *Mystique et politique: lecture révisée-tomante du Coran par Sayyid Qutb. Entre musulman radical*, Paris 1984, 193.

<sup>170</sup> Qutb, *Fi ṣūlāt al-Qur'ān*, 444, 24, 444, 29, 445, 10, 445, 16, and cf. his *Ma'ālim fī l-ḥaqīqā*, n.p. n.d., 143, 15 (quoting Q3:110). The language does not explicitly speak of an Islamic state, but it is doubtless what he has in mind.

<sup>171</sup> Qutb, *Fi ṣūlāt al-Qur'ān*, 949, 3; cf. Carté, *Mystique et politique*, 211.

<sup>172</sup> Qutb, *Fi ṣūlāt al-Qur'ān*, 949, 10. He repeats this message more than once in the next two pages, and again in commenting on Q9:112 (*ibid.*, 1720, 1). Compare the deferral of the duty till the coming of the imam in the Sunnī caricature of the Imānī view (see above, ch. 11, note 116).

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, 949, 28. He gives the example of the tradition on speaking out in the presence of an unjust ruler, here referred to as an imam: an imam is a ruler who accepts the authority of God and His law – otherwise he is simply an infidel ruler. Other writers, by contrast, invoke this or similar traditions in support of heroism ('Amr, *Amr*, 260–4, quoting the tradition at 262, 4; Rāshīd, *Munīyatā*, 229, 10, quoting a *ḥadīth*, 'Abd al-Sattār, *Amr*, 25, 9, in a discussion making it clear that this relates only to exceptional circumstances; and cf. 'Umāra, *al-Islām wa-ḥuqūq al-insān*, 95, 4, and Ibn Hājī, *Amr*, 7, 2).

<sup>174</sup> Qutb, *Fi ṣūlāt al-Qur'ān*, 1720, 7. <sup>175</sup> Cf. above, ch. 3, 39–42.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 951, 18. He stresses that such performance is a positive, not a negative stance, because it creates the mental prerequisite for action when the time comes; but he seems not to conceive of it as having any outward behavioural manifestations. Some modern Sunnī writers, by contrast, tend to emphasise such manifestations (Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d. 1332/1914), *Islām al-masā'ib*, Beirut and Damascus 1983, 32, 7 (this work was drawn to my attention by Maribel Fierro); 'Awda, *Tadhīr*, 1:497, 14; Tanāwī in Sālim Okrōbīr wa-ḥuwar ma a fadlār al-Mulīr, 39b, 6; Muḥammad 'Alī Mas'ūd, *Amr*, 31, 1; Sāmarrāṭ, *Munāḥih*, 66, 15); but others seem to have in mind a purely mental act ('Amr, *Amr*, 284–7, esp. 286, 12; Mahmūd, *Uṣūl al-muṣṭafanna' al-Islāmī*, 203, 16; Zawādn, *Muḥāsasāt*, 4:364f, esp. 572, 366 §3.576).

<sup>177</sup> Rāshīd, *Munīyatā*, 202, 14; similarly Yāsīn, *Junad*, 182, 18.

<sup>178</sup> Mawlawī, *Amr*, side 2.

<sup>179</sup> This is not a traditional concern of the scholars (for an exception, see above, ch. 4, note 12), but it has a modern precedent in Rāshīd Rūḍā (*Tadhīr al-Muḥannīr*, 9:534, 18 (to Q7:199)), 535, 7 (regarding Q31:17)). Rūḍā's motive in making the point is, however, quite different.

<sup>180</sup> Ibn Hājī, *Amr*, 1:2; for *al-amr bi'l-iḥsān* in Mecca, see also *ibid.*, 4:1. For an approving reference to Qutb in a different context, see *ibid.*, 7:2. Compare also 'Amr, *Amr*, 127, 1, 278, 3, 282, 9.

heroism,<sup>181</sup> and directs himself to a youth that is zealous in performing the duty and needs only to be instructed in its principles.<sup>182</sup> Even Ibn Hājī does not always speak with this voice.<sup>183</sup> But Khālid al-Sabr, who is not a radical,<sup>184</sup> reacts to Qutb's position in much the same way;<sup>185</sup> lots of wrongs, he points out, can be dealt with perfectly well even in the absence of an Islamic state.<sup>186</sup>

### 3. DEVELOPMENTS IN IMĀMĪ SHĪ'ISM

According to Ibn Hājī, some of the Shī'a – he specifies the Imāmiyya – believe that forbidding wrong is not obligatory in the absence of an imam; he refutes them effortlessly by quoting Ghazzālī.<sup>187</sup> His Egyptian contemporary Ahmad Hījāzī al-Saqā is better informed. In the course of editing the commentary of a certain Abū Bakr ibn Maymūn on a work by Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), he comes upon a condemnation of the view of some of the Rawāfi'd that the duty is suspended until the manifestation of the imam.<sup>188</sup> He begins his footnote to this by identifying the Rawāfi'd as the Shī'a, and goes on to observe that in our time the Shī'a do not adhere to this position, but call people to forbid wrong. He explains that after the

Shāh of Iran (Muḥammad Ridā Pahlawī, ruled 1360–98/1941–79) sided with America, and spread corruption among the population by introducing American-style cinema and television, Khumaynī (d. 1409/1989) arose. He still prevails despite the war being waged on Iran by the Ba'hist secularists of Iraq; the Ba'thists are of course inspired by the Americans, who fear that Khumaynī may become the caliph of Shī'ites and Sunnis alike.<sup>189</sup> This account may not have been a sophisticated piece of political analysis, but it correctly identifies two major features of the recent Imāmi development of forbidding wrong: enthusiasm for revolutionary politics and hostility to cultural pollution. Both are familiar from the Sunnī experience.

In the early decades of the Western impact on Iran, such an evolution might have seemed unlikely. What we find is rather the same lax syncretism that we saw on the Sunnī side. Initially this is the work of laymen. A fine early example is a brief account of freedom of expression given by Mirzā Yūsuf Khān Mustashār al-Dawla (d. 1313/1895f.). He states that resistance to oppression (*mudāfa'a-i zulm*) is a law (*qānūn*) in Europe (*Farangistān*), which explains European prosperity; this value is also enjoined in several passages of the Koran, of which the first he quotes is Q3:104.<sup>190</sup> One of the benefits of this law, he continues, is that freedom of expression (*ihtibiyār wa āzādi-i zabān wa qalam*) has become prevalent. This law too, he states, is in accordance with the law (*qānūn*) of Islam, and he proves his point by quoting one of the accounts of forbidding wrong given by Tūsī (d. 460/1067).<sup>191</sup> He then goes on to freedom of the press, and remarks that some aspects of this fall within the scope of forbidding wrong. He adds that in Paris there are a hundred presses and six hundred book shops.<sup>192</sup> The same idea appears in a discussion of 'freedom of speech and pen' by Mirzā Malkum Khān (d. 1326/1908).<sup>193</sup> This very freedom,

<sup>181</sup> Ibn Hājī, *Amr*, 7:2, dwelling on appropriate quotations from Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 543/1148) (see above, ch. 14, note 59) and Ghazzālī (see above, ch. 16, 433 case (4)).

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 4:1, 6:1, 7:1. Note in this connection his remarks to the effect that temporary marriage (*zawāj al-murā'*) is a matter on which there is disagreement, and cannot therefore be the target of the duty (*ibid.*, 4:2; for reports that this was permitted by Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), see A. Gröber, *Strange bedfellows: murā'at al-nisā' and murā'at al-ḥujjāt*, Berlin 1994, 111f.).

<sup>183</sup> In an article reflecting the changed atmosphere following the local elections held in Algeria in 1410/1990, Ibn Hājī strongly condemns hot-headed activism ('*ḥidāat al-taḥbir fī bayān qawā'id al-taḥyīr, al-Munghidh*, 5 Dhū 'l-Hijja, 1410, 9–11). That this marks a change of tone is confirmed by the reaction of a moderate Salafī couple of numbers later, in effect welcoming Ibn Hājī back to the (politically marginalised) Islamist mainstream (Yāhya Muḥammad, 'Nazarāt fī mawḍū' qawā'id al-taḥyīr li-shaykh 'Alī ibn Hājī, *al-Munghidh*, 4 Muḥarram, 1411, 20, I am grateful to Abdelslam Maghroui for explaining the political background to me). However, most of the arguments deployed here by Ibn Hājī owe nothing to the eccentric ideas of Qutb (nor to Bannā). He stresses the need for knowledge of the law, for a reckoning of costs and benefits, for experts to determine the priorities, for doing it nicely, and the like; and he is very explicit in noting the failings of Muslim youth ('*ḥidāat*, cols. 9c, 33, 11c, 7, 11c, 13). There is, nevertheless, a clear echo of Qutb in his argument that most behavioural wrongs are manifestations of the more fundamental wrong of recognising norms other than God's, and that it is here that we should engage on such behavioural wrongs are falling into a trap set by the political authorities. <sup>184</sup> For his rejection of rebellion, on utilitarian grounds, see Sabr, *Amr*, 235, 6; and see above, notes 156–9.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.1 (stating Qutb's position); *ibid.*, 261.17 (his reply). Like Ibn Hājī, he leaves Qutb unnamed.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 263.4.

<sup>187</sup> Ibn Hājī, *Amr*, 3:2; similarly Ma'ānī, *Taḥyīr al-munkar*, 113.22. Cf. above, ch. 11, note 116.

<sup>188</sup> Abū Bakr ibn Maymūn, *Sharḥ al-ḥidāat*, 605.17.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, 605 n. 1 (the book was published in Egypt in 1407/1987). For Sunnī sympathy for the Iranian revolution and its limits, see E. Sivan, 'Sunnī radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian revolution', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21 (1989); W. Buchta, *Die iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit 1979–1996*, Hanburg 1997, 227–34 (this study was drawn to my attention by Houchang Chehabi).

<sup>190</sup> Mirzā Yūsuf Khān Mustashār al-Dawla (d. 1313/1895f.), *Tak kalimā*, ed. S. Sajjādi, Tehran 1364 sh., 32.5, cited in A. Haini, *Shī'ism and constitutionalism in Iran*, Leiden 1977, 34f. (and see *ibid.*, 30f., for the career of this reformist official); the work is dated 1287/1871 (*Tak kalimā*, 61.6).

<sup>191</sup> Yūsuf Khān, *Tak kalimā*, 33.4; cf. Tūsī, *Nihāya*, 299.8.

<sup>192</sup> Yūsuf Khān, *Tak kalimā*, 34.1.

<sup>193</sup> Mirzā Malkum Khān (d. 1326/1908), *Nidā'iyat taḥiilat ba-'imāliyyat-i musawwāt-i Irān*, in *Majmū'a-i āthār-i Mirzā Malkum Khān*, collected by M. M. Ṭabātabā'i, Tehran 1327 sh., 206–8 (cited in Haini, *Shī'ism and constitutionalism*, 35 n. 97). The tract dates from 1323/1905 (see *Nidā'iyat taḥiilat*, 194.2, and H. Algar, *Mirzā Malkum Khān*, Berkeley 1973, 245–7), shortly before the Constitutional Revolution.

he says, which all civilised nations recognise as fundamental, is one which Muslims have established for the whole world in the two phrases 'commanding right' and 'forbidding wrong'. What positive law (*qānūn-i awlātī*) has proclaimed this freedom more explicitly?<sup>194</sup> The Constitutional Revolution of 1324/1906 was likewise defended in terms of forbidding wrong.<sup>195</sup> Such thinking still continues. Recently the dissident cleric Husayn-'Alī Muntaẓarī is reported to have issued a responsūm calling for the formation of political parties in Iran as a modern way to apply the principle of forbidding wrong.<sup>196</sup> In all these cases the motivation of the syncretism is to render a Western idea acceptable in a Muslim context; but just as among the Sunnīs, we also find the same device used to defend Islam against the charge of deficiency. Thus when the Iraqi clergyman Muḥammad Baqir al-Ḥakīm wishes to argue the superiority of Islam in providing guarantees (*ḡammānāt*) of human rights, he quotes Koranic verses on forbidding wrong.<sup>197</sup>

Among the Imānīs, as among the Sunnīs, the resurgence of Islam as a political doctrine in a modern setting has been a development of the last two generations. But whereas in the Sunnī case the revival has throughout been primarily the work of laymen, this has not been so for the Imānīs. There have certainly been laymen who have concerned themselves with such matters: 'Alī Shar'afī (d. 1397/1977) is an obvious example.<sup>198</sup> At least one layman, Mahdī Bāzargān (d. 1415/1995), was involved in the rethinking of the duty of forbidding wrong at an early stage.<sup>199</sup> But the

<sup>194</sup> Mulkum Khān, *Nida'ī 'adālat*, 207-18.

<sup>195</sup> Haidi summarises the views of a cleric who defends constitutionalism in this way (*Shī'ism and constitutionalism*, 100); and see Āgha Buzurg, *Nuqūḡāt al-baḡhar*, 568-14, for another instance.

<sup>196</sup> This report appeared in the London newspaper *al-Hayāt*, 25 November 1997, 6c, in the last paragraph of the news item on Iran.

<sup>197</sup> Muḥammad Baqir al-Ḥakīm, 'Ḥuquq al-insān min wiḡhat nazar Islāmīyā', in *Ḥuquq al-insān fī 'l-Islām: maḡalāt al-Ma'īrāt al-ḡamā'īsi ḥi-ḡfīr al-Islāmī*, Tehran 1987, 339-14. Cf. also Muḥammad Muḡaharī (d. 1399/1979), *Tijānāt*, Qumm n.d., 42-12.

<sup>198</sup> See S. Akhavi, 'Shahari's social thought', in N. R. Keddie (ed.), *Religion and politics in Iran*, New Haven and London 1983, 133f. Shar'afī's discussion of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* in his *Shī'a* (n.p. 1362 sh. (= *Majmū'at-i ābḡn*, vol. 7), esp. 68-76) has themes also found on the clerical side (see below, notes 239, 329, 333).

<sup>199</sup> Mahdī Bāzargān (d. 1415/1995), *Marr-i miyān-i dīn wa sīyāsat*, Tehran 1341 sh., 39-5, 40-1, 40-9 (placing the duty in a context of modern oppositional politics); see H. E. Chehabi, *Iranian politics and religious modernism*, Ithaca 1990, 57 (this book provides extensive discussion of Bāzargān's ideas and politics). Akhavi suggests that it was laymen who rediscovered the political potential of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (S. Akhavi, *Religion and politics in contemporary Iran*, Albany 1980, 120). However, the chronological data available to me would not establish this. Bāzargān's *Marr* was published at the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1963 (Darymāh 1341 sh.). Two clerics had already given relevant talks devoted to *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* in 1960 (1339 sh.), later published in *Guḡfāt-i maḡ* (for Muḡaharī's talk see above, ch. 11, note 298; for Āyāfī's, see below, note 208; for this

events of the Islamic revolution of 1399/1979, and the subsequent consolidation of the clerical regime, have tended to eclipse lay thinkers. It is the role of the clerics, and the continuing vitality of their literary tradition, that distinguishes and dominates the Imānī development.

The Imānī clerics have reshaped their doctrine of forbidding wrong in two major respects. Roughly speaking, one concerns the process by which they eventually came to power, and the other the manner in which they now exercise it. We may consider each in turn.

The traditional Imānī doctrine of forbidding wrong displayed a marked political quietism on two points. One was the danger condition, which in its Imānī version voided not only the duty to proceed but also the virtue of doing so. The other was the requirement that the imam give permission for any serious recourse to violence. Recasting the Imānī heritage as an ideology of political revolution was likely to put some strain on the traditional doctrine at both these points.

The best starting-point with regard to the danger condition is an account of forbidding wrong written by Khumaynī himself.<sup>200</sup> The framework of the account is provided by a set of brief and unremarkable general statements of doctrine; each such passage is followed by a string of specific points, most of them of no particular political significance. The presentation of the danger

series of talks, see Chehabi, *Iranian politics*, 170-2). And in the same month that Bāzargān published his *Marr*, Muḥammad Bīsharī (d. 1401/1981) briefly discussed *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* in an equally untraditional way in his 'Rūḡānāt dar Islām wa dar miyān-i Muslīmīn', in Muḥammad Husayn Ṭabātābā'ī *et al.*, *Balīḡāt dar bīnā'i mā'iyāt* (n.p. n.d., 160-9) (this second printing of the work notes that the first appeared in Daymāh 1341 sh., for Bīsharī's contribution to the volume, see A. K. S. Lambton, 'A reconsideration of the position of the *marjī'a al-muḡallā* and the religious institution', *Sarāfāt Islāmīya*, 20 (1964), 129-31). Moreover, clerical writing about *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* in a modern vein seems to go back considerably before this period. While there is no hint of it in the treatment of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* by the early Shī'ite modernist Khānqāhī (d. 1355/1936) (see his *Mabīn al-mawāḡib*, n.p. 1379, 372-5), it is already apparent in the title of Luḡī Allāh Ṣāḡī Gulpāyāḡānī's *Rūḡ-i isḡāb wa amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa nahy az munkar*, Qumm 1376 sh.; the work was mostly written at the beginning of 1369/1949, and completed in 1369/1950 (see *ibid.*, 108-5, and cf. 90-2). The theme of this short popular work is that *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is the solution to the problem of the decline and backwardness of the Muslim world (see esp. *ibid.*, 6-17).

<sup>200</sup> Khumaynī, *Tahzīb*, 1:462-84 (cf. K.-H. Göbel, *Modernne Schī'itische Politik und Staatstheorie*, Opladen 1984, 188-92). The work is a commentary on the *Wasāīāt al-najā'āt* of Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Isḡāhānī (d. 1365/1946) (for which see Modarressi, *Introduction*, 58 no. (x), 94); the *Wasāīāt*, however, contains no treatment of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, so that Khumaynī at this point is on his own. There is an article in Japanese on the modern development of the doctrine of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* among the Imānīs (K. Nakata, 'Shī'a-ha hōgaku ni okeru "Zen no meirei to aku no soshi" riron no hatten to Homonji ni voru sono kōkaku', *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies*, 12 (1997)), from its references to primary sources, it appears to be well informed (I am indebted to Eran Kolbberg for bringing this article to my attention, and to Yasuko Makino for transcribing the title for me).

condition initially conforms to this pattern.<sup>201</sup> Much of what is said is fully compatible with the traditional doctrine. Thus one of the points made is that the prospect of any significant harm (*ḥāzar*) to the performer or those associated with him voids the obligation,<sup>202</sup> while another is that if he fears for his life or honour, or those of other Muslims, it is forbidden to him to proceed.<sup>203</sup> But in the middle of this generally familiar scholastic material we come upon a jarring block of fourteen points which transparently relate to a contemporary political context, the confrontation between Khumaynī and the Shāh.<sup>204</sup> Many of these points do not in fact relate to forbidding wrong in any obvious way, but rather prescribe the boycotting of religious institutions controlled by the regime. The first six points are the ones that concern us. Taken together, they enunciate the doctrine that there is a category of wrongs of such relative weight (*abāmmīyya*)<sup>205</sup> that the obligation to right them overrides the danger condition, particularly for the clergy (*‘ulamā’ al-āim wa-ru’asā’ al-madhāhib*); typically such wrongs involve some threat to the very basis of Islam.<sup>206</sup> This new doctrine is inserted without any attempt to integrate it with the old.<sup>207</sup>

<sup>201</sup> Khumaynī, *Tahrīr*, 1:472–6. The term used by Khumaynī is *mafsada*.  
<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 472 no. 1.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 472 no. 4. Khumaynī goes on to make distinctions regarding harm to property (cf. above, ch. 11, note 280).

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 472–5 nos. 6–19 (there is more material of this kind in the discussion of the three modes, esp. *ibid.*, 477 nos. 3–6, but it lacks doctrinal interest). Khumaynī mentions in the preface to the *Tahrīr* that he worked on the book after he was banished from Qum in 1384/1964 and came to Bursa as a result of distressing events which history would perhaps record (*ibid.*, 4.5) – as indeed it did (see, for example, S. Bakhtash, *The reign of the Ayvanshahs*, New York 1990, 24–35). Already in the previous year he had enunciated a version of his new doctrine in the context of his struggle with the Shāh: given the way in which the regime was attacking the fundamentals of Islam, *taḥqīq* was forbidden, whatever the consequences (*wa-law baḥāqha mā baḥāqha*) (Markaz-i Madārik-i Farhang-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī, *Sāhifa-i mīr-majmū‘a-i rāhnamā-ḥā-ri imām Khumaynī*, Tehran 1361–9 sh., 1:40.5).

<sup>205</sup> Khumaynī uses this concept elsewhere in his discussion of the duty in contexts that are not politically loaded (see, for example, *Tahrīr*, 1:464 nos. 9f., 467–9 nos. 4, 7, 16). It was of course no invention of his; see, for example, ‘Alī al-Mishkātī al-Ardābilī, *Masālahāt al-‘amī*, Qum 1383, 88.9 (on the role of *abāmmīyya* in deciding which of two conflicting legal provisions overrides the other); Muḥammad Ridā al-Muzaffar, *Uṣūl al-fiqh*, Najaf 1959–62, 3:186.16 (the principle), 189.11 (listing some considerations that take precedence, including the safeguarding of Islamic territory and the preservation of life).

<sup>206</sup> All but the first of these points also specify that this duty of the religious leaders to speak out overrides the efficacy condition (Khumaynī, *Tahrīr*, 1:473 nos. 7–11). It is typical of the lack of systematic integration of the new doctrine into the old that no hint of this is given in the discussion of the efficacy condition itself (*ibid.*, 467–70).

<sup>207</sup> This is likewise true of the account of *al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf* in the appendices to Khumaynī (d. 1409/1989), *Risāla-i tanwīl al-ma‘rūf*, Tehran 1399, 573–81 (for the danger condition, see *ibid.*, 584.11; for the new doctrine, *ibid.*, 574f. nos. 2, 792–6). An innovative, though secondary, feature of this work is its very inclusion of *al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf* according to Ayatullah Mahfūzī. It was the first work of this title to cover the topic, whence the

Khumaynī was not alone among the major scholars of his generation in qualifying the danger condition. Kazim Sharī‘amādārī (d. 1406/1986) holds that what the condition excludes is suffering harm over and above the intrinsic inconveniences of performing the duty, and on a scale that outweighs the utility of the initiative; it is not every kind of harm that voids the duty.<sup>208</sup> Abū ‘I-Qāsim al-Khūī (d. 1413/1992), after stating the danger condition in the usual way,<sup>209</sup> makes a rather clumsy addition in which he says that – provided the efficacy condition is satisfied – what has to be considered is the relative weight (*abāmmīyya*) of the two considerations; forbidding wrong could thus be obligatory even with actual knowledge of consequent harm.<sup>210</sup> Khwānsārī (d. 1405/1985) remarks that it may be said that some wrongs are not such that they are not to be forbidden just because of bearable harm of whatever kind; that he means that there could be an actual obligation to forbid them despite such harm is indicated by the parallel he adduces from the duty of pilgrimage, which in the past was not voided by virtue of the protection money (*ukhuwwa*) that used to be levied on the pilgrims.<sup>211</sup> Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Shīrāzī in a short treatment of the duty states that the condition is overridden when Islam is in danger.<sup>212</sup> In a longer account, he adds a distinction between much and little harm. He takes the view that much harm voids the duty unless Islam is in danger; such a threat can be to the fundamental beliefs of the religion or to public morals.<sup>213</sup>

treatment of its possession as a crime by Sawak (anon., ‘Guzāshī az simnār-i amr bah ma‘rūf wa nahy az munkar dar Dānīshgāh-i Tihān’, in *Risālah, pūsh shunāra* 3, 12 Abān, and *peju shunāra* 4, 23 Abān, 1364 sh., here 12 Abān, 4a.27). The work did not, however, originally include this section; it is not found in the printing of 1342 sh. Cf. also H. Dabashi, *Theology of dissent: the ideological foundations of the Islamic revolution in Iran*, New York and London 1993, 455, citing a brief response of Khumaynī’s dated 1391/1971.

<sup>208</sup> Ibrāhīm Sawīd, *Niḡārat-i ‘amāmi-i Isfāhān*, Tehran 1347 sh., 130.11, 131.7. The ‘author’ of this little work explains rather belatedly in a postscript that it is a record of lectures given by Sharī‘amādārī in Qum (ibid., 143). For a rather similar view, see Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Āyatī (d. 1384/1964), ‘Amr bah ma‘rūf wa nahy az munkar’, *Guhān-i nuāh*, 1 (1339–40 sh.), Tehran n.d., 53.10, 53.22 (in a talk given in 1339 sh./1960, see *ibid.*, 42.1).

<sup>209</sup> Khūī, *Mafhūm*, 7:150.5.  
<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.2. Note that the identical text appears, but without the addition, in the work of the same title by Muḥsin al-Tibābātī al-Hakīm (d. 1390/1970) (*Minhāj al-ghālibīn, gīsm al-‘ibādāt*, Beirut 1976, 489.1). The problematic relationship in Khūī’s text between the addition and the statement of the condition itself is pointed out in the commentary of Taqī al-Qumī (*Mabāni*, 7:152.9). The view put forward there is that there is no proof that danger voids the obligation (*ibid.*, 151.9, with the long activist tradition invoked in support); but the motivation is unlikely to be political (cf. above, ch. 11, 295f.).

<sup>211</sup> Khwānsārī, *Jāmi‘*, 5:406.5.  
<sup>212</sup> Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Shīrāzī, *Risāla-i tanwīl al-ma‘rūf*, n.p., n.d., 388 no. 2, 163; his statement of the condition itself is traditional (*ibid.*, 388.6). This work was drawn to my attention by Kambiz Estani.

<sup>213</sup> Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī, *Fiqh*, Qum c. 1374–1408, 38:132–5 no. 6, esp. 134.18, 135.6.

Gulpāyagānī (d. 1414/1993) states uncompromisingly that we have no business modifying conditions we don't like, but then effectively compromises by saying that if what is at stake is the standing of a religious precept, that is another matter; the analogy would then be with holy war, and the issue would have no connection with forbidding wrong.<sup>214</sup> Even Muhammad Amīn Zayn al-Dīn (d. 1419/1998), who as the head of the Akhbāfī community in Bahrayn might be expected to stand apart from developments among the Imāmī mainstream, adopts the principle of relative weight (*abhanmīyā*) with regard to the danger condition.<sup>215</sup>

It is no surprise to find more recent scholars following Khumaynī. His pupil Murradā Muraharī (d. 1399/1979), in a talk given in 1390/1970, expresses his regret that some Imāmī scholars of the past, from whom one would not have expected such a thing, had maintained the danger condition without qualification.<sup>216</sup> He accepts that the duty may be overridden when the result would be greater damage (*mafsada*) to Islam;<sup>217</sup> but, appealing to the example of Husayn ibn 'Alī (martyred in 61/680), he does not accept that mere personal harm (*aharar*) dispenses one from performing the duty.<sup>218</sup> It may be that what is at stake is something on which Islam sets a higher value (*abhanmīyāt*) than it does on life, property or dignity – as when the Koran is in danger.<sup>219</sup> 'Alī Tīhrānī, a cleric who was active in Mashhad, composed before the revolution a work on forbidding wrong in which he quietly adopts much material from Khumaynī,<sup>220</sup> in his

<sup>214</sup> Muhammad Ridā Gulpāyagānī (d. 1414/1993), *Majma' al-mnasā'ih* (in Persian), Qumm 1403–6, 1:419 no. 1,273; cf. his classical statement of the danger condition, *ibid.*, 4:18 no. 1,271, and 4:38.19. An authority who makes no modification to the danger condition is Shihāb al-Dīn Mar'ashī Najāfī (*Risāla-i tanwīsh al-masā'ih-i jadīdā*, Qumm 1409, 500.13). Gulpāyagānī's point about holy war is also made by Tālib al-Rifā'ī in a rejoinder to an article by Fādīl al-Husaynī al-Mīlānī ('al-Amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar', *al-Najaf*, 2 no. 2 (March 1968), 104.21; for Mīlānī's article, see below, note 219).

<sup>215</sup> Muhammad Amīn Zayn al-Dīn (d. 1419/1998), *Kalimat al-taqwā*, Qumm 1413–14, 2:308.9 no. 10. He assimilates cases involving serious harm to *ihād* in a manner reminiscent of Gulpāyagānī (*ibid.*, 308.17). He also invokes the principle of *abhanmīyā* in an unrelated context (*ibid.*, 317.20, no. 35); he there observes that one has recourse to *al-fajh al-jāmi'* *hā-sharā'* in order to determine relative weight (*ibid.*, 318.2; cf. below, note 243).

<sup>216</sup> Murradā Muraharī (d. 1399/1979), *Hāmiyāt-i Husaynī*, Tehran and Qumm 1364 sh., 2:128.6. For the date of the series of talks to which this one belongs, see *ibid.*, 7.3. It is noteworthy that there is no anticipation of this attack on the traditional danger condition in a talk by Muraharī on *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy* which was given in 1380/1960 ('Amr ba'ma'rūf wa nahy az munkar', for this talk, see Akhbarī, *Religion and politics*, 120).

<sup>217</sup> Muraharī, *Hāmiyāt*, 2:131.12.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.1. Modern writers on *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy* make frequent references to Husayn, and like to quote the form of salutation used by pilgrims to his tomb (*ibid.*, 67.15, 179.11; Husayn-'Alī Muntaẓirī, *Dirāsāt fi ma'ārif al-fajh al-jāmi' al-dawla al-Islāmīyā*, Qumm 1408–11, 2:228.2 (this account was brought to my attention by Kamībīz Eslami); and cf. Nūrī, *Amr*, 112.13; for the formula, see the references given above, ch. 11, note 50).

<sup>219</sup> Muraharī, *Hāmiyāt*, 2:129.3. A similar position is taken by Fādīl al-Husaynī al-Mīlānī ('al-Amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar', *al-Najaf*, 2 no. 1 (January 1968), 44.17).

<sup>220</sup> 'Alī Tīhrānī, *Amr ba-ma'rūf wa nahy az munkar dar Islām*, Mashhad n.d. The work was

treatment of the danger condition, he integrates Khumaynī's new thinking more closely with the rest of this material.<sup>221</sup> Pupils of Khumaynī who have published legal handbooks for their followers tend to follow him closely, though again they may make changes to smooth over the intrusiveness of Khumaynī's innovation.<sup>222</sup> In a work free of the constrictions of this genre, Husayn-'Alī Muntaẓirī – at one time Khumaynī's designated successor – takes the position that since the duty is one intended for the reform of society (*ishāb al-mujtama'*) and the eradication of evil and corruption, one must weigh the prospective harm against the targeted wrong, and give precedence to the weightier (*abhanmā*).<sup>223</sup> He goes on to speak of the kinds

written in 1393/1974 (*ibid.*, 188.15), and appears to have been published before the revolution – which may explain why Khumaynī is nowhere referred to by name (note the vague reference to views of 'major scholars' with which material deriving from Khumaynī's *Tahẓīr* is introduced, *ibid.*, 164.2; compare the similarly anonymous way in which another pre-revolutionary author, 'Abbas-'Alī Islāmī, introduces the same material in his *Do az yād rafā'*, *amr bah ma'rūf wa nahy az munkar*, Tehran 1354 sh., 121.9). For Tīhrānī's involvement in opposition activities within a couple of years of the revolution, see Bakhash, *The reign of the Ayatollahs*, 134, 138–41.

<sup>221</sup> He revisits the condition itself to specify that the harm must be significant (*mu'annāb* *ihād*), and more importantly, he incorporates the principle of *abhanmīyāt* (Tīhrānī, *Amr*, 173.18, 173.21; cf. Khumaynī, *Tahẓīr*, 1:472.1). He likewise rewrites the efficacy condition to make a place for the category of issues of overriding religious importance (Tīhrānī, *Amr*, 168.20, to be compared with Khumaynī, *Tahẓīr*, 1:467.9; and see Tīhrānī, *Amr*, 175f. no. 44). He inserts references to this category at several other points (*ibid.*, 168 nos. 18, 21; 172 nos. 31f.; 175 no. 42; 180 no. 62; 183 no. 74). He also seeks to neutralise quieter traditions (*ibid.*, 153–62, esp. 157.7, 162.1).

<sup>222</sup> Of the treatments of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy* in the various appropriations of Khumaynī's *Risāla-i tanwīsh al-masā'ih*, that of Sādiq Khalīkhalī comes closest to being an example of *rafā'* of a dead *mujtahid* (*Risāla-i tanwīsh al-masā'ih*, Qumm 1372 sh., 540–7). That of Husayn-'Alī Muntaẓirī (*Risāla-i tanwīsh al-masā'ih*, Qumm 1362 sh., 363–70) is only slightly more adventurous in departing from the master's text (he adds an item which states account of the existence of the Islamic Republic, *ibid.*, 367 no. 2, 162); but unlike Khalīkhalī, he revises the danger condition to incorporate the principle of *abhanmīyāt* (*an-khā dar amr wa nahy, anfasāda'* *mubimmāt mahādā'*, *ibid.*, 364.16; contrast Khumaynī, *Risāla*, 574.11, and Khalīkhalī, *Risāla*, 541.11, where the word *mubimmāt* does not appear). Nisr Makārahm Shīrāzī gives only a brief account of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy* (*Risāla-i tanwīsh al-masā'ih*, Qumm n.d., 494f.), but most of what he does say is taken from Khumaynī, in his treatment of the danger condition, he begins with a classical formulation of it, but then appends the substance of Khumaynī's statement on *abhanmīyāt* (*ibid.*, 494.7; cf. Khumaynī, *Risāla*, 574f. no. 2, 792). Muhammad Sādiqī Tīhrānī offers an account of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy* which is not a clone of Khumaynī's and does not really observe the conventions of the genre (*Risāla-i tanwīsh al-masā'ih*, Qumm n.d., 237–43); but he firmly endorses the principle of *abhanmīyāt* (*ibid.*, 239.20), saying that it makes no sense for the condition to hold without qualification (*ibid.*, 240.11; he also rejects the efficacy condition, *ibid.*, 240.16).

<sup>223</sup> Muntaẓirī, *Dirāsāt*, 2:251.14, 255.20, 256.5. For other expressions of the idea that what counts is relative harm, see also Muhammad Sādiqī, *al-Furqān fi tafṣīr al-Qur'ān*, Tehran, Qumm and Beirut 1397–1410, 10–11:221.17 (to Q:9:71) (again this author rejects the efficacy condition entirely, *ibid.*, 221.15); Muhammad Jawād Mughniyyā (d. 1400/1979), *al-Furqān al-Kāshif*, Beirut 1968–70, 2:124.11 (to Q:3:104); anon., 'Amr bah ma'rūf wa nahy az munkar yā 'amal bah ma' 'tharāt-hā-yi ijtimā'ī', a series of six articles which appeared in *Jamhīrīyāt-i Islāmī*, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21 and 22 Urdūbīshār, 1366 sh., on pages 9, 9, 7, 9 and 7 respectively; here no. 6, col. f32.

of evil where a modicum of harm could hardly be held to override the duty; these include contagious social ills and threats to the foundations of Islam.<sup>224</sup> Husayn al-Nūrī al-Hamadānī in a rather noisy monograph on forbidding wrong gives a lengthy discussion of the danger condition,<sup>225</sup> mounting a sustained attack on the traditional Imāmī view. Like others he argues that, just as there can be no holy war without cost, so also there can be no forbidding wrong without cost.<sup>226</sup> He rehabilitates the long activist tradition with its contemptuous reference to those who perform the duty only 'when they are safe from harm'.<sup>227</sup> He greatly widens Khumaynī's view of the circumstances in which the condition is overridden: stopping a single act of fornication is worth a bloody nose.<sup>228</sup> And he strongly rejects any suggestion that martyrdom is tantamount to suicide<sup>229</sup> – indeed he suspects that the hidden hand of colonialism might have played a part in creating and spreading this misconception.<sup>230</sup> A more recent monograph on the duty is that of Muḥsin al-Kharāzī.<sup>231</sup> His approach is dry and scholastic, and he avoids Nūrī's flights of rhetoric.<sup>232</sup> In his discussion of the danger condition, he makes no effort to conceal the weakness of the attestation of

the long activist tradition.<sup>233</sup> But he accepts the principle of relative weight where omission to perform the duty would have major untoward consequences.<sup>234</sup> He also quotes from Muḥsin al-Ṭabāṭabāī al-Ḥakīm (d. 1390/1970) a distinction between two kinds of wrong. On the one hand, there are extraordinary wrongs which threaten the foundations of the faith or the integrity of Islamic territory; the righting of these is not subject to the conditions of forbidding wrong. And on the other hand, there are commonplace wrongs – failing to pray, drinking wine – the righting of which is indeed subject to these conditions.<sup>235</sup> The Lebanese jurist Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh likewise makes frequent use of the principle of relative weight in his account of forbidding wrong.<sup>236</sup>

An interesting figure who does not fit into the analysis given above is Ahmad Tayyibī Shabīstārī, who nevertheless provides the prototype for much of Nūrī's work. A cleric who had not passed the age of forty when he died in 1350 sh./1971, he wrote a rather hot-headed work on precautionary dissimulation (*taḡyīw*) and forbidding wrong which was published soon after his death.<sup>237</sup> What is remarkable about it in the present connection is that Tayyibī, in his revolutionary enthusiasm,<sup>238</sup> was not content to qualify the danger condition more or less heavily; instead he rejected it outright,<sup>239</sup> just as he rejected the knowledge and efficacy conditions.<sup>240</sup> As we

<sup>224</sup> Munazzarī, *Dirāʾat*, 2:252.2.

<sup>225</sup> Nūrī, *Amr*, 99–135. According to my copy, Nūrī wrote the book in 1395/1975 (*ibid.*, 255.16), in other words a few years before the revolution. There was apparently a printing in Lahore for which I have seen the dates 1354 (sh.)/1975 (so in the bibliography of Ḥasan Islāmī Ardakānī, *Amr baḥ mā ʿrif wa nahy az munkar*, Qumm 1375 sh., 207.15) and 1393/1973f. (*Tarāḥunā*, 12 (1417), nos. 45–6, 400b.6, drawn to my attention by Eran Kohlberg); these dates do not quite tally. The equation of Shīʿism (as opposed to Sunnism) with revolution is a prominent theme of the book (see *ibid.*, 182–90, 253f. point 3).

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.5, 117.9. This argument is also advanced by, for example, Shūrāzī (*Fiḡh*, 38.134.11) and ʿAlī-Akbar al-Sayfī (*Daḥil Taḡyīr al-Wasāʾil li-Imām al-Khumaynī* (9) *ʿi-yamr bi-ʿl-mā ʿrif wa-ʿl-nahy ʿan al-munkar*, Qumm 1415, 163.3).

<sup>227</sup> Nūrī, *Amr*, 110.17, quoting and refuting the efforts of Najaf (d. 1266/1850) to explain the tradition away (cf. above, ch. 11, note 282). This tradition is a favourite of Nūrī; as well as quoting it at length (*ibid.*, 43.1), he repeatedly echoes its wording (*ibid.*, 16.3, 65.10, 65.21, 90.13, 106.20, 247.13), and never casts doubt on its reliability. This is in sharp contrast to his treatment of quietist traditions which get in his way (*ibid.*, 85.13, 86.16). Munazzarī, who might have been expected to be equally tendentious in his treatment of the long activist tradition, is too much of a scholar to attempt to conceal its defects (*Dirāʾat*, 2:218.6, 231.1).

<sup>228</sup> Nūrī, *Amr*, 118.18. What he says is comparable to Shūrāzī's view of cases where the prospective harm is small (see above, note 213). <sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 119–35.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.15. He is inhibited from pursuing this insight by the fact that he finds the misconception already present in the Koran commentary of Tabrīzī (d. 548/1153).

<sup>231</sup> Muḥsin al-Kharāzī, *al-Amr bi-ʿl-mā ʿrif wa-ʿl-nahy ʿan al-munkar*, Qumm 1415. The work is a commentary on the relevant part of the Muḥaqqiq's *Sharḥ*ʿi, but it also addresses systematically specific points (*fiḡh*ʿ) often taken from Khumaynī's *Taḡyīr*. He makes only one reference to Nūrī, in connection with the latter's activist assault on the tradition about not confronting a man with a whip or sword (*ibid.*, 71.20, with reference to Nūrī, *Amr*, 85.14; for the tradition, see above, ch. 11, note 14). My impression is that he finds Nūrī's tone somewhat unprofessional.

<sup>233</sup> Kharāzī, *Amr*, 100.15 (*al-fannāhiyya*); cf. also *ibid.*, 121.1, 130.1.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.19; also *ibid.*, 104.15, 115.3.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.11. He later picks up the distinction (*ibid.*, 114.13).

<sup>236</sup> Muḥammad Husayn Faḍl Allāh, *al-Masāʾil al-faḡhiyya*, Beirut 1995–6, 2:305–13. He speaks of *abannīyya* in nos. 761 (on the conditions under which the duty overrides such prohibitions as that of entering a home without leave), 763 (on the danger condition), 771 (on the duty of the *ʿulamāʾ al-ʿin* in particular to speak out in the face of oppressive government), 774 (on the right of a wife to deny her husband sexual relations in order to induce him to reform), and cf. no. 770 (on *bidʿ*).

<sup>237</sup> Ahmad Tayyibī Shabīstārī (d. 1350 sh./1971), *Taḡyīw, amr baḥ mā ʿrif wa nahy az munkar*, Tehran 1350 sh. He studied in Qumm and later at the University of Tehran (see the brief notice of his life, *ibid.*, 276f.). His picture (*ibid.*, 275) shows him as a cleric, and his editor, Ḥasan Tihānī, dignifies him with the title *Ḥujjat al-Islām* (*ibid.*, 276.3). He was still engaged in writing the book a few days before his death (*ibid.*, 273.4). Tayyibī's views were well summarised by Hamid Enayat (*Modern Islamic political thought*, Austin 1982, 179f.); I am much indebted to Anna Enayat for lending me what had been his copy of the work. Tayyibī's work is typified by a fusion of Islam and modern revolution. He speaks of 'the revolution of Islam' (*intihāb-i Islām*, see, for example, *Taḡyīw*, 202.13, 225.5), 'the black forces of reaction' (*qawwā-yi siyāh-i irāziyāʿ*, *ibid.*, 92.12), 'betraying the revolution' (*khayānat baḥ inḡilāb*, *ibid.*, 213.10) and the like. Words such as 'ideology', 'dynamic', 'revisionist' and 'opportunist' are shown in Latin characters (*ibid.*, 26.2, 53 n. 1, 58 n. 1f., 213 nn. 1f.).

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.44. The absence of Khumaynī's principle of *abannīyyat* is striking (see particularly *ibid.*, 143.3); the most he concedes is to distinguish *al-amr bi-ʿl-mā ʿrif* from suicide (*irihāb*) and the like (*ibid.*, 143.16). Tayyibī's rejection of the danger condition finds a parallel in the thought of Sharʿaf (*Shrʿa*, 71.17).

<sup>240</sup> Tayyibī, *Taḡyīw*, 104.2, 114.2; and cf. 234.14.

have seen, not even Nūrī follows him so far, despite obvious similarities between them.<sup>241</sup>

The other quieter feature of the traditional doctrine was the requirement of the imam's permission for the performance of the duty in its more violent forms. Here one possibility would have been to reject the requirement altogether, a position that had distinguished representatives among the classical Imāmī jurists.<sup>242</sup> However, recent Imāmī scholars have shown no interest in so drastic a manoeuvre. Instead they have opted to render the necessary permission more accessible; this has been done most explicitly through the modification of a minority view of the early Ṣafawid period, according to which such action could be undertaken by a suitably qualified jurist.

Again, we can best begin with Khumaynī. He starts by telling us that, according to the stronger view, wounding and killing require the permission of the imam (*al-imām 'alāyahī 'i-salām*); he then goes on to say that in our time the jurist who satisfies the relevant conditions (*al-faqīh al-jāmi' li-sharā'iḥ*) takes his place.<sup>243</sup> (The reference here is clearly to any suitably qualified jurist.<sup>244</sup>) Khumaynī's contemporaries are less explicit. Khwānsārī speaks only of the imam's permission,<sup>245</sup> Khūṭī does not mention permission at all, and restricts the higher levels of violent action to the imam or

his deputy (*na'īd*).<sup>246</sup> However, Gulpāyagānī requires the permission of a jurist (*ibn az-faqīh*),<sup>247</sup> and Shīrāzī requires the permission of the judicial authority (*ibān az-shar'*) where killing is involved.<sup>248</sup> Among more recent writers, Muntazirī and Makārim Shīrāzī are aligned with Shīrāzī's formulation,<sup>249</sup> while Nūrī echoes Khumaynī.<sup>250</sup> Kharāzī comes to the conclusion that such action is reserved to the Supreme Guide to the exclusion of other jurists.<sup>251</sup> Thus where Khumaynī had originally allowed righteous violence to be unleashed by individual members of the clergy, for Kharāzī it is a monopoly of the state.<sup>252</sup> Unsurprisingly, this latter view has the endorsement of the current Supreme Guide: Khāminā'ī declared in a speech of 1413/1992 that in an Islamic society the duty of ordinary people (*'āmma-i marāḥim*) is to command right and forbid wrong with the tongue; if the matter would lead to violence (*agar kār bah barkhūrud bi-kashād*), it is for the authorities (*mas'ūlin*) to step in.<sup>253</sup>

<sup>246</sup> Khūṭī, *Minhāj*, 7:159.2 (the mention of the imam's deputy is reminiscent of Najāfi, see above, ch. 11, note 234). A view close to this is that of the Akhbār Zayn al-Dīn (*Ākhbar al-taqwā*, 2:311.13 no. 17). For similar views, in which the question of permission is likewise not raised, see Murtabhān, 'Amr ba-na'īd', 81.12 (reserving violence to the *ibān-i shar'*), and Muḥammad Ridā Aškūtibānī *et al.*, *Tafīr-i rumūz*, Tehran 1353-8, sh. 3:40f. no. 5 (to Q3:104) (excluding violence from the individual performance of the duty; otherwise the result would be mayhem); and cf. Bihshārī, 'Rajhāniyat', 160.9. These views come close in substance to those of Sunnis who deny to the individual the execution of the duty 'with the hand' (see above, 523-5); indeed the Lebanese Faḍl Allāh would seem to have been exposed to such thinking (*Masā'il*, 2:307 no. 759).

<sup>247</sup> Gulpāyagānī, *Mafaynāt al-manzū'i*, 1:417 no. 1.268 (regarding blows that inflict wounds).  
<sup>248</sup> Shīrāzī, *Risāla*, 389 no. 2.168; and cf. his *Fiqh*, 38:145.19 (*ijāzāt al-ibān al-shar'*). Cf. above, ch. 11, note 238, on Muḥsin al-Fayḍ.

<sup>249</sup> Muntazirī, *Dirāsāt*, 2:219.18 (*ibān al-ibān*); Makārim Shīrāzī, *Risāla*, 495 no. 2:419 (*ijāzāt al-ibān-i shar'*); likewise Sawfī, *Da'īf*, 210.4 (*ibān al-ibān*).

<sup>250</sup> Nūrī, *Amr*, 247.8, 255.5 (but cf. 248.20). In one passage he observes that the layman (*al-'āfī min al-nās*) may have difficulty figuring out the intricacies of the duty, and may be subject to inappropriate motivations where it leads to violence; the oversight of the jurist is therefore necessary, if only through the designation of a virtuous person or persons in each district to superintend the performance of the duty (*ibid.*, 247.22). Tayyibī does not discuss the question.

<sup>251</sup> Kharāzī, *Amr*, 152.13; and see *ibid.*, 146.11, 150.16, 155.17. He uses the term (*al-*)*mawī al-faqīh*.

<sup>252</sup> A similar tendency is apparent in Muntazirī's treatment of the duty. He makes violence and even, in some contexts, aspects of the verbal performance of the duty a matter for the ruling authority (*al-ibān al-mutassallif*) (*Dirāsāt*, 2:225.3). Compare his similarly strict interpretations of Q3:104 (*ibid.*, 227.7), and of the long activist tradition, which makes no mention of the state (*ibid.*, 231.4, and cf. 228.19).

<sup>253</sup> This speech is reported in 'Amr bah mā'rif wa nahy az munkar bayād hanānand-i namāz farāgīr shawad', in *Jumhūrī-i Islāmī*, 23 Tr. 1371 sh., 144.98; the passage is quoted in, for example, Muḥammad Ishaq Mas'ūdī, *Pizhīshihī dar amr bah mā'rif wa nahy az munkar az dīgāh-i Qur'ān wa riwāyāt*, Tehran 1374 sh., 148 no. 3, 264.11. Mas'ūdī naturally adopts this view himself (*ibid.*, 264.5), as do Khusrāw Tagaddūsī Nūrī (*Dar-lūy' az amr bah mā'rif wa nahy az munkar*, Qumm 1375 sh., 65.14) and Muḥammad Ridā Akhbārī (*Tahfīlī naw wa tamāz az amr bah mā'rif wa nahy az munkar dar 'aḡ-i ḥādīr*, Isfahān 1375 sh., 134.18).

<sup>241</sup> See Khumaynī, *Talwīz*, 1:482 no. 2, where he equates the general deputies (*jumhūr*) of the imam in his absence with the suitably qualified jurists (*al-faqāhā' al-jāmi'īn li-sharā'iḥ al-farwā mā'i-qadā'*). Such is also the clear understanding of the English translation of the *Risāla* (Khomeini, *A clarification of questions*, trans. J. Borujerdi, Boulder and London 1984, 378f. nos. 2,823-5).

<sup>242</sup> Khwānsārī, *Jāmi'*, 5:410.9 (drawing heavily on Najāfi). This goes well with his minimalist view of clerical authority (cf. *ibid.*, 3:98.17, 100.3; 5:411.8, 412.19).

<sup>243</sup> Khumaynī, *Talwīz*, 1:481 no. 11 (and cf. nos. 10 and 12); similarly his *Risāla*, 580f. no. 2,824 (speaking of *mutashāhīd-i jāmi'* *al-sharā'iḥ*; cf. also *ibid.*, nos. 2,823, 2,825). Khumaynī may owe this view to Burūjirdī (d. 1380/1961). In his book written in 1369/1949-50, Ṣaḥīḥ Gulpāyagānī devotes a few pages to points of legal doctrine according to the view (*muḥābiq-i farwā*) of Burūjirdī (*Rāḥ-i ṭibāh*, 82-4), and he states there that killing and wounding require *ibān-i faqīh-i jāmi'* *al-sharā'iḥ* (*ibid.*, 84.16). For the precedents for this view in the early Ṣafawid period, see above, ch. 11, note 234.

<sup>244</sup> See Khumaynī, *Talwīz*, 1:482 no. 2, where he equates the general deputies (*jumhūr*) of the imam in his absence with the suitably qualified jurists (*al-faqāhā' al-jāmi'īn li-sharā'iḥ al-farwā mā'i-qadā'*). Such is also the clear understanding of the English translation of the *Risāla* (Khomeini, *A clarification of questions*, trans. J. Borujerdi, Boulder and London 1984, 378f. nos. 2,823-5).

<sup>245</sup> Khwānsārī, *Jāmi'*, 5:410.9 (drawing heavily on Najāfi). This goes well with his minimalist view of clerical authority (cf. *ibid.*, 3:98.17, 100.3; 5:411.8, 412.19).

The other major innovation in modern Imānī thought on forbidding wrong parallels a development we have already documented on the Sunni side: the increasing sense of the importance of being organised.<sup>254</sup> In a talk of 1380/1960, Murtaharī observes that individual action is not very effective, particularly in the world as it is today; what is needed is cooperation.<sup>255</sup> Ten years later he simply equates forbidding wrong with fellow-feeling (*hamāhātī*), solidarity (*hambastagī*), cooperation (*hamkārī*) and other such qualities.<sup>256</sup> Tayyibī speaks of the need for institutions and for an Islamic state.<sup>257</sup> Shūrāzī remarks that in this age commanding and forbidding require something like industrial planning (*tasnīʿ wa-tasnīq*).<sup>258</sup> Nūr argues that in our time the forces of evil are well equipped (*mujaḥḥaza bi-tajhīzāt*), and we have to respond in kind.<sup>259</sup> What is called for today is accordingly something much more concerted and systematic than the view of the duty enshrined in the old juristic tradition. It is not the business of the writers who concern us to tell us exactly what this revamping would consist of; but a couple of indications are given by Šādiqī, who infers from Q3:104 a duty to form a group of guardians (*ḡāsārān*) of Islam,<sup>260</sup> and requires the Islamic state to establish a Ministry of Forbidding Wrong.<sup>261</sup>

In this new emphasis on organisation, the Imāmīs sound very much like the Sunnīs. Where they differ from them is that the Imāmīs have moved to provide a conceptual foundation for this emphasis through a development within their scholastic tradition. Specifically, what is involved is a new twist in the handling of three conditions of the classical four: the knowledge, efficacy and danger conditions.

<sup>254</sup> We already find Saīf Gulpāwagānī devoting a section to the need for cooperation in forbidding wrong (*Rūḥ-i-yūsh*, 53-6). For the Sunnīs, see above, 516f.

<sup>255</sup> Murtaharī, 'Amr ba-ma'rūf', 89.5. The limited extent of the powers of individuals is also remarked on in Aḡhāyānī, *Taḡḡīr-i-mumīna*, 3:36.7. Whether Murtaharī would have liked the kind of cooperation that emerged in the Islamic Republic may be doubted. Expounding a proposal of Khumaynī in an interview that he gave two weeks before he was killed, he set aside the idea of a ministry for *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* on the ground that this would mean an undesirable clerical role in government (*ḡirānān-i-jamhūrī-i-Islāmī*, Tehran and Qum 1364 sh., 25.8); he called for organisation, training and central authority, but in the framework of an institution independent of the state (*ibid.*, 27.9).

<sup>256</sup> For the idea of a ministry for *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, see also below, note 261.

<sup>257</sup> Murtaharī, *Ḥamāsa*, 2:160.4. <sup>258</sup> Tayyibī, *Taḡḡīn*, 160.7, 165.11, 166.7, 253.9. <sup>259</sup> Shūrāzī, *Fiqh*, 38:145.13. His examples of ways in which it might be appropriate to perform the duty include opening a college, founding a club and creating a library (*ibid.*, 145.8).

<sup>260</sup> Šādiqī, *Risāla*, 242.9. For the *ḡāsārān-i-Ingīlīsh*, or Revolutionary Guard, as established during the revolution, see Bakhash, *The reign of the Ayatollah*, 63f.

<sup>261</sup> Šādiqī, *Risāla*, 243.5. For this idea, cf. also W. Floor, 'The office of muḥtasib in Iran', *Iranian Studies*, 18 (1985), 53 (I owe this reference to Giorgio Vercellani); *al-Māḡas wa'l-Faḡh*, 6 no. 3, November 1996, 7d.3; and above, note 255. Nūr mentions that the jurist (sc. the Supreme Guide) should oversee the performance of the duty, if only by naming a good man or men in each locality (*ṣuq' wa-shaḡad*) to superintend it (*Amr*, 248.2; cf. above, ch. 13, note 51).

It will be simplest to begin with Nūr's account, since this presents the ideas in a fully developed form, and then to go back to trace their evolution. What Nūr argues is more or less as follows. In a situation in which performance of the duty has been aborted because one of these conditions was not satisfied, we might be tempted to assume that we are thereby morally in the clear: we had no duty, and accordingly did nothing. But what such an outcome in fact suggests is that we were negligent in a prior duty to prepare ourselves for such eventualities. If the problem was that we did not know right from wrong, we should have been at pains to educate ourselves in advance.<sup>262</sup> If the problem was that we lacked the means to perform the duty effectively, we should have expended effort to prepare those means beforehand.<sup>263</sup> And if the problem was that we were in danger, that points to a weakness which again we should have had the foresight to remedy.<sup>264</sup>

This style of thought does have a root in the older Imānī doctrine of forbidding wrong.<sup>265</sup> In discussing the knowledge condition, scholars of the early Šafāwīd period had suggested circumstances in which one might have a duty to get to know. It is a condition for valid prayer that one be in a state of ritual purity; but failure to put oneself into such a state does not mean that one is entitled to forget about prayer. In the same way, might it not be argued that in certain circumstances one has an obligation to inform oneself about right and wrong? The situation the jurists envisaged was that one knew (say from the testimony of two witnesses of good character) that what someone was doing was wrong, but that one did not oneself know just what was wrong about it. As this may suggest, the Šafāwīd jurists were not engaged in confronting a burning contemporary issue; in a style that was very typical of them, they were simply being clever. But the idea they put forward was one that could be applied to all three of the relevant conditions, and used to quite different effect.

<sup>262</sup> Nūr, *Amr*, 77-83, esp. 79.10, 83.5; cf. also *ibid.*, 94.17.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, 89-95, esp. 95.9 (with analogy to the knowledge condition). He draws an analogy with *jihād* (*ibid.*, 89.14), defining the relation of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* to *jihād* in a manner reminiscent of Saīd Ḥawwā (*ibid.*, 90.6; cf. above, note 77). He admits that the jurists have not explicitly addressed the issue of preparing the means of efficacy in advance, but finds a precedent in their argument that there is a duty to take office under an unjust ruler where one will thereby be enabled to forbid wrong (*ibid.*, 91.3; for an early statement of this view, see W. Madelung, 'A treatise of the Sharīʿ al-Murtaḍā on the legality of working for the government', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 43 (1980), 23.14 = 27). The power he is talking about may be cultural, social and financial (Nūr, *Amr*, 92.15), or financial, economic and military (*ibid.*, 94.12). He speaks of *ḡāzāḥ muqaddamat al-ta'tīr* (*ibid.*, 89.10), or uses similar phrases. <sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.18.

<sup>265</sup> See above, ch. 11, notes 288f. The underlying technical distinction is between a condition for being obligated (*shart al-muḡīb*) and a condition for valid performance of the duty (*shart al-muḡīb*); the latter, unlike the former, imposes a duty to take action to fulfil the condition (see Sayyid Alawī, *Nizāma*, 38.8).

To my knowledge, the first scholar to move significantly in this direction was Sharʿamadārī.<sup>266</sup> After raising the question with regard to the conditions in general,<sup>267</sup> he discusses the knowledge condition, and concludes that it is of the kind that one must take action to fulfil.<sup>268</sup> With regard to the efficacy condition, his position is more complicated. He has already introduced a typically modern distinction between a social (*ijtimāʿī*) and a personal (*farḍī*) form of the duty; the former, unlike the latter, is performed by an organised group (*ḡurūh, jamʿiyat*) of suitably trained and qualified people.<sup>269</sup> He now says that in the case of the social and collective form of the duty – as opposed to the personal form – there is an obligation to satisfy the efficacy condition;<sup>270</sup> we must lay the foundations for the social duty so that its performance will be effective.<sup>271</sup> He does not discuss the question when he comes to the danger condition, though he remarks in his account of it that students of the Islamic sciences in particular need to be prepared to carry out the social duty.<sup>272</sup>

This style of thought does not seem to have been widespread in Sharʿamadārī's generation. Shīrāzī shared it, but only with respect to the knowledge condition;<sup>273</sup> Khumaynī was untouched by it, which helps to explain its rather unsteady progress. Two younger authors who took it up were Muṭahharī and Ṭayyibī. Muṭahharī showed no familiarity with it in his talk of 1380/1960, though his plea for logic (*manṭiq*) – by which he meant something like creativity and ingenuity in social engineering<sup>274</sup> – could be construed as a concern to secure the means of efficacy.<sup>275</sup> In his

<sup>266</sup> The lectures written down by Sayyid ʿAlawī cannot have been given later than 1387/1967, the date that appears at the end of the book (*Ibid.*, 137.13; cf. also the dating of the introduction, *Ibid.*, 22.11). There is a rather vague anticipation (or echo?) of Sharʿamadārī's thinking in Bihshūtī, Rūhāniyāt, 160.21. <sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.2.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.7.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.3, 31.13; and cf. *Ibid.*, 17.7 in Sayyid ʿAlawī's introduction. Sharʿamadārī remarks that the social form of the duty brings into being a government which is one hundred per cent virtuous and Islamic (*Ibid.*, 36.10). <sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.8.

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.4. <sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.8. <sup>273</sup> Shīrāzī, *Fiqh*, 38.127.6.

<sup>274</sup> Muṭahharī, ʿAmr ba-mā ʿatīf, 89.14. For example, if we want to put a stop to vicious gossip among our traditional Iranian women, pious exhortations get us nowhere; we have to think up some other way for them to relax in their spare time (*Ibid.*, 90.14).

<sup>275</sup> Cf. Muṭahharī, ʿAmr ba-mā ʿatīf, 91.8. His insistence on logic goes with his emphasis on the fact that forbidding wrong, unlike praying or fasting, is an activity that turns on getting results (see Muṭahharī, ʿAdālat az nazār-i Islām, 45.9; his *Ḥamāsa*, 2:190.5; and his *Jadīdah wa dāfir-a-ʿAlī*, 124.18). One root of Muṭahharī's thinking here is the scholastic doctrine that the duty of forbidding wrong is *ṣarāʿiḥī* (that is, the duty is discharged if the purpose is achieved irrespective of the intention of the performer), not *ṭaʿabūhī* (the duty is only discharged if the action is performed with the intention of obeying God) (for this distinction, see Miškīnī Ardabīlī, *Muḡalabāt al-ḡiḡāh*, 191.17; for its application to forbidding wrong, see Khumaynī, *Tabṭīr*, 1:465 no. 13, and Masʿūdī, *Pishbinīh*, 254.2). It is, of course, good that the duty be performed with a pious intention; one medieval Imāmī jurist provides appropriate verbal formulae for such performance (Ibn Ṭayy, *Durr*, 104.5).

talk of 1390/1970 he continued to speak of logic.<sup>276</sup> But he also insisted on the duty to secure the power needed for efficacy. The response of Islam to the man who says he doesn't have the power to perform the duty is: 'Fine, but go and acquire the power!'<sup>277</sup> The other author who adopted the doctrine of prior duty, and with regard to all three conditions, was Ṭayyibī.<sup>278</sup> His doctrine is essentially Sharʿamadārī's, but extended to cover the danger condition, and expressed in a language suffused with political activism.<sup>279</sup> His call for the fulfilment of the prior duty of preparing the means of forbidding wrong is insistent.<sup>280</sup> Such views are by now widely known,<sup>281</sup> but they have not achieved the same recognition as the revision of the danger condition. The intellectually conservative Kharāzī, in his recent monograph on forbidding wrong, does not pay much attention to them;<sup>282</sup> nevertheless, an equally recent commentator on one of Khumaynī's accounts adopts them.<sup>283</sup>

Alongside these doctrinal questions, the history of forbidding wrong as it has been established in the Islamic Republic over the last twenty years is a subject of considerable social, cultural and political interest. According to the Constitution, the duty is one that must be fulfilled 'by the people, with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government'.<sup>284</sup> In practice, the first

<sup>276</sup> Muṭahharī, *Ḥamāsa*, 2:190.5.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.22, and cf. 201.8 (speaking also of the knowledge condition). He gives the analogy of the traditional discussion of taking office under an unjust ruler (*Ibid.*, 194.5; see above, note 263).

<sup>278</sup> This was already noted by Enayāt (*Modern Islamic political thought*, 180).

<sup>279</sup> See esp. Ṭayyibī, *Taqyīm*, 97–101, note the emphasis on extending the analysis of the knowledge condition to all three (*Ibid.*, 101.10, 105.3). Ṭayyibī makes what is basically the same distinction as Sharʿamadārī between the personal and social forms of the duty (*Ibid.*, 165.11), though in the context of the social duty he lays more emphasis on popular participation (*Ibid.*, 166.7) and the role of the state (*Ibid.*, 165.14, 253.12, 261.4); however for Ṭayyibī this distinction seems to have no special bearing on the efficacy condition.

<sup>280</sup> See, for example, *Ibid.*, 144.4, 145.7, 165.3. He anticipates Nūrī's talk of *munḡaddamāt* (see, for example, *Ibid.*, 98.9, 146.15).

<sup>281</sup> An indication of this is the way in which authors who do not adopt the approach in any systematic way will nevertheless refer casually to the 'prerequisites' (*munḡaddamāt*) of the duty. See Muntazirī, *Dirāzāt*, 2:256.1 (*ʿIḡād al-munḡaddamāt*); Sādiqī, *Rāʿīla*, 239.9 (*ṭabīʿa-i munḡaddamātish nīz waǧīb ast*), and cf. 239.19, Kharāzī, *Amr*, 155.15 (*muǧīb talabī munḡaddamātih*); Ibrahim Amīnī in anon., ʿGuzarāshī az simnāh-i amr bah maʿatīf, 23.3 Abān, 4b.77 (*uǧwād ān munḡaddamāt farḡān shawāb*).

<sup>282</sup> For his casual use of the term *munḡaddamāt*, see the preceding note. He accepts – with due qualification – the duty to get to know (Kharāzī, *Amr*, 63.10), but that is as far as it goes. Contrast his endorsement of Khumaynī's qualification of the danger condition (see above, note 235).

<sup>283</sup> Sayyī, *Daʿīl*, 101.4, 104.6 (on the knowledge condition); *Ibid.*, 121.13 (on the efficacy condition). He emphasises the institutional aspect of the prior duty with regard to efficacy (*Ibid.*, 121.16). He offers no comparable analysis of the danger condition, but this is because he more or less rejects the condition as such (*Ibid.*, 167.3).

<sup>284</sup> Islamic Propagation Organization, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, Tehran n.d., 21 article 8.

and third have been relatively muted by the din of the second.<sup>285</sup> Iran, like Saudi Arabia, has become a society in which forbidding wrong is overwhelmingly a function of the state apparatus, in this case involving a plurality of organs which do not always act in concert.<sup>286</sup> Because Iranian society is culturally richer than that of Saudi Arabia, and Iranian politics more open, there is a better story to be told here, and much more material with which to tell it.<sup>287</sup> 'It has been bad all morning,' as a pious Iranian confided to an American journalist regarding his task of forbidding wrongdoing by couples hiking in the mountains behind Tehran in the high summer: 'Girls in baseball caps, covered with makeup, coming up here without proper headscarves. And the boys use words I can't repeat and strip off their shirts. It is a dirty, lonely job. But we must be ready to die for God.'<sup>288</sup> Yet for all its considerable interest, this would not be a study which I am qualified to attempt; nor does it relate to the individual performance of the duty.

One source that does shed some light on the performance of the duty 'by the people with respect to one another' is a collection of responsa of Khumayni which date mostly from the early years of the revolution.<sup>289</sup> The section on forbidding wrong contains twenty-three questions with

<sup>285</sup> I was told some years ago that the Supreme Guide issued a pronouncement stressing individual responsibility for *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* – this being a way to get the state off people's backs somewhat – and that discussion followed. I have no written record of this development.

<sup>286</sup> For a complaint about the lack of central coordination (*imnāq markazi*) between the various parts of the Iranian state apparatus whose activities bear on *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf*, see 'Abbas 'Ali 'Amid Zanjanī, 'Yāq al-mushāka fi syāghat al-nizam al-siyāsī wa'l-ijmā'ī, in *Huqūq al-insān fi 'l-Islām: maqālāt al-Mu'tamar al-khāmīs al-fī al-Islāmī*, Tehran 1987, 75.21. A case in point is an incident in which the 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib Foundation organised a competition to test the general public's knowledge of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf*. The Foundation ran into a storm of criticism because it had announced that one of the prizes would be a video – this at a time when traffic in videos had been declared illegal, and there were daily reports of clashes between the forces of order and the owners and distributors of videos (anon., 'Inbāq az 'ilām-i jāyza-i "vādi'o" barā-yi musabāq-i 'amr bah mā'ruf wa nahy az munkar', *Iran Times* (Washington), 2 October 1992; I am indebted to Shohreh Ghoborli for giving me a copy of this article).

<sup>287</sup> For two contrasting perspectives, see the lectures of Nābi Sādiqī published in Dākārā-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī-i Mubāraka bā Mawādd-i Mukhaddar wa Munkarāt-i Tihān, *Shimāh-yi sajjī-i amr bah ma'ruf wa nahy az munkar*, Tehran 1371 sh., and Geraldine Brooks, 'Teen-age infāds hanging out', *The New York Times Magazine*, 30 April 1995, 44–9. As Sādiqī sees it, the problems are not confined to teenage delinquents; he considers it intolerable that marriage-halls (*zāwājāt-yi 'arāsī*) in the Islamic Republic, though private, should not be under official supervision (*Shimāh*, 228.11).

<sup>288</sup> Chris Hedges, 'With Mullahs' sicus cluded, hinks in the hills', *The New York Times*, 8 August 1994, 4. 'When we see couples go up the peaks, we must follow to make sure they are brothers and sisters or are married', the poor man explained. 'But all this climbing, all this walking, is hard. By the end of the day I collapse.'

<sup>289</sup> Khumayni (d. 1409/1989), *Ja'fī'āt* (in Persian), Qum 1366–72 sh. The introduction states that most of the questions were put to Khumayni in 1360–2 sh. (i.e. 1981–3).

Khumayni's answers.<sup>290</sup> Sometimes the questioner makes explicit reference to the duty,<sup>291</sup> but more often it is the answer that does so.<sup>292</sup> One question is about our obligation with regard to strangers 'under today's conditions',<sup>293</sup> but with few exceptions,<sup>294</sup> the common thread of the questions is a concern about our duty towards people with whom we have regular social relations. Can one, for example, be friends with an observant Muslim who lacks faith in the authority of the Supreme Guide (*wilāyat-i faqīh*) and has an eclectic (*ibṭā'ī*) style of thought?<sup>295</sup> Many of these problems concern family ties. Every Iranian family, it seems, is unhappy in the same way: one member or another remains mired in the immorality, irreligion or political allegiances of the fallen Tāghūt regime. One questioner has four nephews and a niece who are not in the least religiously observant, make their living mostly from gambling and drug-peddling, and even now live in hope of a Tāghūt restoration – may they never see it even in their dreams!<sup>296</sup> A woman laments that her father does not believe in God, the Prophet, or the world to come, never prays, and is strongly opposed to the revolution – whereas her mother, sister and brothers are all believers. Talking to him nicely doesn't work, and things are getting worse by the day. At this point she mentions that she is married, and explains that matters have now reached a point where her husband refuses to visit her parents' house. What is she to do?<sup>297</sup> One husband of an impious wife complains that she never performs the dawn prayer.<sup>298</sup> Another has a wife who prays only once in a while, and then after much aggravation; he suffers mental anguish, and is worried as to whether he will be held responsible at the Resurrection.<sup>299</sup> In the years that

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, 1:482–90. In what follows, I shall refer to the questions by their numbers within the section.

<sup>291</sup> Nos. 1, 4, 8.  
<sup>292</sup> Nos. 2, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 20, 22. In other cases the answer refers to counselling (*irshād*) (nos. 7, 9, 13, 19) or guidance (*hidāyat*, *raḥimāt*?) (nos. 21, 23). In some instances the reference to the duty is at most implicit (nos. 3, 5f., 17).

<sup>293</sup> No. 1. The point of the question seems to be that so many of our interactions under modern conditions are impersonal, and therefore uncondicive to the performance of the duty.

<sup>294</sup> No. 5 is about the political stance to be adopted towards people with a lukewarm (but not overtly hostile) attitude to the struggle against 'World Tāghūt and Uncle's', no. 6 poses the same question regarding pseudo-clerics who are openly pro-American, and no. 10 is about people who throw away food.

<sup>295</sup> No. 8. The answer is that one should counsel him.

<sup>296</sup> No. 13. Here, as in several other cases where ties of kinship are at issue, Khumayni warns against severing such ties and enjoins counselling or reproving the offender (nos. 12f., 18, 21, and cf. nos. 17, 20). Where such ties are not at stake, cutting off relations, though not necessary in itself (no. 3, and cf. no. 8), may be a way to perform the duty (no. 2, and cf. no. 4).

<sup>297</sup> No. 21.  
<sup>298</sup> No. 16.  
<sup>299</sup> No. 15. Some of the same concerns occur in the responsa of Gulpūyāgānī (see, for example, *Majmū'at al-manā'ih*, 1:426 no. 1.298, 427 no. 1.301, 428 no. 1.304, 429 no. 1.309, 431 no. 1.315, 432 no. 1.317); but the presentation of the questions is rather dry, and the sharp political focus is absent.

have passed since Khumaynī pronounced on these questions, the tensions they reflect are likely to have diminished to the extent that sharp polarisation has given way to shared cynicism in the Iranian population.

We may end this survey by glancing at modern Imāmī attitudes towards the performance of the duty by women – an issue which the Imāmī scholars of the past had not thought to raise. Here those scholars who discuss the question – and many do not – usually quote Q9:71 and infer that women too are obligated.<sup>300</sup> Imāmī exegetes are significantly more likely than their Sunnī counterparts to highlight this aspect of the verse: of the fifteen modern Imāmī Koran commentaries I consulted, five did so.<sup>301</sup> But there is little discussion of how other aspects of the legal position of women might affect their performance of the duty. Tayyibī says that Muslim women must participate in the duty ‘shoulder to shoulder’ (*āshshāshsh*) with Muslim men, which certainly suggests that segregation should not be much of a barrier; and although his youthful enthusiasm is unlikely to represent settled clerical opinion, his phrase is echoed by two recent clerical writers of a more or less liberal bent.<sup>302</sup> Khumaynī himself was once consulted by a nurse (*parastār*) who was concerned about her duty with regard to war-wounded patients who failed to pray because of the inadequacy of their faith; he replied that it was her duty to forbid wrong.<sup>303</sup>

<sup>300</sup> Tayyibī, *Tafṣīr*, 206, 15 (a strong statement); Muntazirī, *Dirāsāt*, 2:225, 11; Muhammad Khānīna ĩ, ‘al-Ḥuquq al-insāniyya lil-mar’ā fi ‘l-Islām wa-fi ‘l-qawānīn al-waḍ’iyya’, in *Ḥuquq al-insān fi ‘l-Islām: maqālāt al-Muṭarrif al-bḥāth al-ḥāthir al-Islāmī*, Tehran 1987, 379.2 (explicitly putting men and women on an equal footing in this regard); Muhammad Jawād Bahonar, ‘Islam and women’s rights’, in Muhammad Taqī Meshbah *et al.*, *Status of women in Islam*, New Delhi 1990, 38 (cited in Mayer, *Islam and human rights*, 121). In a seminar on the duty, Ayatullahs Muhammad Ḡilāni and Ibrāhīm Amīnī mention the inclusion of women, though without quoting the verse (anon., ‘Guzāshī az simnār-i amr bah mā’rāf’, 23 Abān, 4a.23, 4b.72), and Taqaddusī Nūrā relates a story in which a woman corrects the caliph ‘Umar (r. 13–23/634–44) (*Dar-shayr az amr bihi mā’rāf*, 104f. no. 13). The Akhbār Zayn al-Dīn, likewise without quoting the verse, remarks in a domestic context that a believing woman is obligated (*Kāfiyat al-tarīqā*, 2:316.26 no. 32).

<sup>301</sup> Muhammad al-Karāmī, *Tafṣīr*, Qumm 1402, 4:102.11; Muhammad Thaqafī Thirāfī (d. 1404/1983f.), *Ramān-i jadīd*, Tehran n.d., 2:600.9; ‘Alī-Akbar Qurāshī, *Tafṣīr-i alīan al-ḥādīth*, Tehran 1366–71 sh., 4:269.23; Muhammad Baqir Ḥujūfī and ‘Abd al-Kārim Bī-rāzī, *Shūrāt*, *Tafṣīr-i kāshīf*, Tehran 1363–sh., 5:415.13; Akbar Ḥāshīmī Rāstānī, *Tafṣīr-i rāshidīnā*, Qumm 1371–sh., 7:189 no. 8. A commentary that does not address the point is that of Banī Mujtahida-i Amin (d. 1403/1983), *Mabḥāth al-ṣifāh*, Isfahan n.d., 6:73. For Sunnī exegetes, cf. above, note 100.

<sup>302</sup> Tayyibī, *Tafṣīr*, 208.5, and cf. 209.4. One of the authors who echo him is Abū ‘Alī Khadākaramī (*Do asf-i usūmār-yā amr bihi mā’rāf wa nahy az munkar*, Qumm 1375 sh., 137.13, and see 69.1; this author is in the tradition of Muṭahhari, see for example *ibid.*, 178.15). The other writer, and the more liberal, is Isfānī Ardakānī (*Amr*, 35.2). Women, he says, have the duty of commanding and forbidding men, who have to accept this from them (*ibid.*, 35.15). Tayyibī’s work appears in Isfānī’s select bibliography (*ibid.*, 206.13). Khumaynī, *Isfīhāt*, 1:489 no. 22 (it was well known at the time that such nurses were female). Khumaynī also says that, subject to the observance of Islamic norms, a girl may give guidance and assistance to a boy (*ibid.*, 490 no. 23). Gulpāyāgānī tells a woman that

#### 4. SUNNĪS AND IMĀMĪ SHĪ‘ITES COMPARED

So far I have presented the evolution of Sunnī and Imāmī attitudes towards forbidding wrong in modern times as two separate stories. It is now time to bring them together by considering the links between them and examining the major similarities and differences.

The links between the two camps have been notably asymmetrical – as might be expected from the disparity in size between the two communities. It is rare indeed for Sunnī authors to show awareness of Imāmī views, let alone a willingness to learn from them. As we have seen, the Egyptian Ahmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā knows and approves of the fact that his Imāmī contemporaries are not following the doctrine attributed to them by the medieval Sunnī scholars.<sup>304</sup> The Jordanian Koran commentator Ibrāhīm al-Qaṭān (d. 1404/1984) quotes at length, and with implicit approval, a passage from a work of his Imāmī colleague Muḥammad Jawād Maghniyya (d. 1400/1979);<sup>305</sup> this is the only such case I have encountered. Egyptian writers sympathetic to the Mu‘tazilites make occasional reference to Imāmī views in accordance with their catholic approach to the resources of the wider Islamic tradition.<sup>306</sup> A recent work in this vein by the leftist ‘Ādil al-Sukkarī is a case in point.<sup>307</sup> But for all his openness, he knows little about traditional Imāmī thought,<sup>308</sup> and nothing about modern developments;

if she can, she should forbid wrong to some improperly dressed women with whom she interacts socially (*Majma‘ al-ma‘ārif*, 1:434 no. 1, 324); but the question of her reproving men is not raised. Fādī Allāh discusses the related question of pious young men admonishing women to whom they are not related, approving the practice with suitable qualifications (*Ma‘ārif*, 2:313 no. 775).

<sup>304</sup> Qaṭān, *Tafṣīr al-tafṣīr*, 1:287.5 (to Q3:104), quoting Maghniyya, *al-Tafṣīr al-kāshīf*, 2:124.1. However, the passage from which Qaṭān is quoting includes a footnote citing the *Tafṣīr al-Manār* (Maghniyya, *al-Tafṣīr al-kāshīf*, 2:125 n. 1) which Qaṭān discreetly omits (*Tafṣīr al-tafṣīr*, 1:288.22); in it ‘Abdūh compliments the Shī‘ites on their proselytising zeal, and backs this up with a reminiscence about a proselytising Muzawwīl waitress whom he took into service in Beirut (Rida, *Tafṣīr al-Manār*, 4:35.9). Cf. also above, note 4.

<sup>305</sup> ‘Ādil al-Sukkarī, *al-Amr bi-‘l-mā’rāf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar ‘inda ‘l-ḥāthirīn*, Cairo 1993. This author advertises his catholic approach (*ibid.*, 12.3), and makes frequent reference to Mu‘tazilite sources and views (see, for example, *ibid.*, 21.5, 42.17, 69.6, 82.1), while Zaywād, Iḥāḍīs and Imāmīs are also represented in his footnotes (see, for example, *ibid.*, 56 n. 4 for the Zaywāds and Iḥāḍīs, and *ibid.*, 31 n. 2, 39 nn. 2f., 47 n. 3 for the Imāmīs). Most strikingly, he shows no discomfort in jumping together Ja‘far al-Sādiq (d. 148/765) and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) as quietists (*ibid.*, 120.8). This gives him wide room to manoeuvre, which he uses to privilege a view intermediate between activism and quietism: we should maintain a truce (*ḥudna*) with unjust rule until such time as we are in a position to overthrow it (*ibid.*, 128.11, 131.15, 133.5). The elegance of this view is twofold. It enables him to distance himself from the current fundamentalist violence, which he dislikes (*ibid.*, 14.14, and cf. his unfavourable account of Hanbalite rampages in Baghdad in the time of Barbahārī (d. 329/941), *ibid.*, 122.15). And yet at the same time he is able to endorse the full range of Ghazzālī’s levels (*ibid.*, 134–8), and to remain a revolutionary at heart.

<sup>306</sup> See particularly *ibid.*, 37.9, 59.11, 110.9.

the traditional Imāmi doctrine of forbidding wrong has in any case little to offer a leftist. 'Adl is another contemporary author with Mu'tazilite sympathies, though he keeps them more in check.<sup>309</sup> He knows enough to tell us that some Imāmi scholars consider forbidding wrong to be obligatory by reason, but spoils the effect by going on to say that they hold it not to be obligatory by revelation.<sup>310</sup>

Imāmi scholars, by contrast, are often prepared to make some use of the resources of Sunnī Islam. They like to draw on the first modern commentary on Q3:104, that of 'Abduh and Riḍā. Thus 'Abbās-'Alī Islāmī, a preacher,<sup>311</sup> takes a mass of material from it,<sup>312</sup> while Nūrī summarises its curriculum for prospective missionaries;<sup>313</sup> it is likewise cited in Koran commentaries,<sup>314</sup> and even finds its way into the newspapers of the Islamic Republic.<sup>315</sup> Imāmi authors also go back to older Sunnī sources. On occasion they quote Ghazzālī,<sup>316</sup> and they develop a liking for some Sunnī Prophetic traditions. One is the tradition about the people in the boat,<sup>317</sup> another states: 'Each of you is a shepherd, and each of you is responsible for his flock.'<sup>318</sup> As these examples suggest, the borrowing is not random:

<sup>309</sup> For these sympathies, see, for example, 'Adl, *al-Figh al-ghā'ib*, 252.7, 254.3.

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.3; cf. above, ch. 11, notes 130f., 241f.

<sup>311</sup> Islāmī, *Do az yād rafān*, 16.9 of the introduction.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*, 94–112. He also makes use of other Sunnī Koran commentaries, such as those of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) (*Ibid.*, 82.6) and Sayyid Quṭb (*Ibid.*, 89.8), though not on the same scale. Cf. also Jāfir Mu'Azimī, *Do farāda-i buzurg; amr bah mā'rūf wa nahy az munkar*; Qum 1372 sh., 20.14.

<sup>313</sup> Nūrī, *Amr*, 30.14; cf. above, note 29.

<sup>314</sup> Maghinīyā, *al-Tajfīr al-kāshif*, 2:125 n. 1; Āshūrānī, *Tajfīr-i munīmā*, 3:42.6 (to Q3:104).

<sup>315</sup> Anon., 'Guzarīshī az simnā'i-amr bah mā'rūf', 23 Abān, 4b.68; anon., 'Amr bah mā'rūf wa nahy az munkar yā 'amal bah mā'rūf-hā-yi jūmā'ī', no. 3, col. d.19. Cf. also Sādiqī, *Shimāhā*, 123.11.

<sup>316</sup> Āyātī, 'Amr ba-ma'rūf', 48.2, 53.13 (from Ghazzālī, *Ihyā'*, 2:306.4), 58.21, and cf. 66 n. 2–4; Murīsharī, *Hanā'ā*, 2:44.18, 45.9; Sādiqī, *Shimāhā*, 1:38.9 (quoting the *Kimiyā-yi sa'ādāt*). Both are rather eclectic authors; Murīsharī quotes Sartre (*Hanā'ās*, 2:107.19), while Sādiqī drops such names as Mendeleev, Jung, Freud, Schopenhauer, Hammarubi, Samuel Smiles, Gustave Le Bon and Max Planck (*Shimāhā*, 18.11, 48.13, 48.16, 64.6, 67.4, 68.5, 113.1).

<sup>317</sup> Sāfī Gulpāyagānī, *Rāb-i ishlāh*, 14.13 (citing the *Saḥīḥ* of Bukhārī (d. 256/870)); Sayyid 'Alavī, *Nizārāt*, 81.4 (an unacknowledged paraphrase); Āshūrānī, *Tajfīr-i munīmā*, 3:37.20, whence Khumaynī (d. 1409/1989), *Risāla-i nawīn*, Tehran 1359–67 sh., vol. 4: *Ma'ad-i-i sīnā'i wa huqūq*, collected by 'Abd al-Karīm Bī-āzār Shirāzī, 206.3; Abū 'I-Qāsim 'Alī-'āda Ḥasanābādī, *Nizārāt-i millī yā amr bah mā'rūf wa nahy az munkar*, Qum 1371 sh., 25.18; anon., 'Amr bah mā'rūf wa nahy az munkar yā 'amal bah mā'rūf-hā-yi jūmā'ī', no. 1, col. b.37; and cf. Mas'ūdī, *Pezhūhishī*, 347.12; Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 'Tashrīh-i falsafa wa angāza-i amr bah mā'rūf wa nahy az munkar', in *Nizārāt-i sālihān*, Tehran 1371 sh., 35.5; 'Iṣqādusī Nīyā, *Dars-hāyī az amr bah mā'rūf*, 105f. no. 14. For the tradition, see above, note 61.

<sup>318</sup> Sāfī Gulpāyagānī, *Rāb-i ishlāh*, 45.12 (citing a Shi'ite source); Sayyid 'Alavī, *Nizārāt*, 81.1 (saying that it is transmitted by Sunnis and Shi'ites alike); Muḥabbatī, *Hanā'ā*, 2:155.4 (with a footnoted reference to a work of Suyūfī (d. 911/1505); Islāmī, *Do az yād rafān*,

the theme, once again, is solidarity and organisation. It is in line with this that modern Imāmi writers show a marked interest in the classical Sunnī institution of the censorship (*hisāb*) and its literature,<sup>319</sup> and even make occasional reference to the organisation of forbidding wrong in contemporary Islamic countries – by which they presumably intend Saudi Arabia.<sup>320</sup>

Turning to politics, Sunnis and Imāmi Shi'ites have found themselves in rather different situations in recent decades. On the Imāmi side, the picture has been clear-cut. The fact that Iran is a major Islamic country, and also the only major Imāmi one, has given it an indisputable predominance in the Shi'ite world. This is fully reflected in its intellectual role; most of the Imāmi authors quoted in this chapter are Iranian, and it is the Iranian political scene to which their thinking is primarily related. Elsewhere, Imāmi communities usually find themselves within the borders of countries in which other communities predominate, often exercising outright hegemony – a situation that has not changed in the last few decades, and may well not do so in any foreseeable future. Meanwhile in Iran, the political context of Imāmi thought has changed sharply. Before the Islamic revolution, Imāmiism faced a state that was at best inhospitable, and at worst inimical to its clergy; the choice was between putting up with the state and confronting it. Since the revolution, the state has been Islamic by definition, and revolution is now for export only; the choice has been between

11.8 (without a source); Mir 'Azimī, *Do farāda-i buzurg*, 7.12 (without a source); Hasanābādī, *Nizārāt-i millī*, 94.2 (with a reference to the *Saḥīḥ* of Muslim (d. 261/875)); Mas'ūdī, *Pezhūhishī*, 169.13 (citing both a Sunnī source and a rather contradictory Shi'ite one). Khumaynī showed a liking for the tradition in the first year of the revolution (*Saḥīḥ-i nūr*, 7:34.9, 8:47.7, 9:194.13). It is mentioned once in Majlisī's *Bihār* (75:38.23). Note also the pride of place given to the Sunnī 'three modes' tradition in Muḥammad Mahdī al-Āshūrī, 'Dirāsa fīḥiyā mujaza 'an hukm al-Islām fī ma'ālāt al-i'tirād 'alā 'I-anzama wa'l-hukm', *al-Nūr*, no. 44 (Shābān 1415/January 1995), 37a.33, and cf. 37a.20 (I am indebted to Yitzhak Nakash for sending me a copy of this article). Other Sunnī traditions are quoted by Āyātī ('Amr ba-ma'rūf', 65.7, 65.19, 66.7).

<sup>319</sup> Muḥabbatī, 'Amr ba-ma'rūf', 78–82; Murīsharī, *Hanā'ā*, 2:197.21 (with a warm word for Orientalists, may God forgive their fathers, who publish such texts as the *Ma'ālim al-gariba* of Ibn al-Ukhuwwa – the reference is to Ruben Levy, though he is not named); Millānī, 'al-Amr bi'l-nā'rūf', 46.12 (with reference to the *Ma'ālim al-gariba*, *Ibid.*, 47.4); Abū 'I-Faḍl Shakrī, *Figh-i riyāṣī-i Islām*, Qum 1361 sh., 194.4 (with the suggestion that, with some revision of detail, the *Ma'ālim al-gariba* could be adopted by the courts of the Islamic Republic in the struggle against wrongs; *Ibid.*, 195.13); anon., 'Amr bah mā'rūf wa nahy az munkar yā 'amal bah mā'rūf-hā-yi jūmā'ī', no. 2, col. f.49, and no. 3, col. a.1; Islāmī Adakānī, *Amr*, 59–74 (with an account of the *Ma'ālim al-gariba*, *Ibid.*, 67.3); Khādakaramī, *Do isht-i usmūnī*, 77–106 (with many references to the *Ma'ālim al-gariba*); Kamaqānī, *Do isht-i usmūnī*, 77–106 (with many references to the *Ma'ālim al-gariba*); Qum 1375 sh., 87–97 (with a long extract from Muḥabbatī).

<sup>320</sup> Thirānī, *Amr*, 156.9; Ibrāhīm Amīnī in anon., 'Guzarīshī az simnā'i-amr bah mā'rūf', 23 Abān, 4b.61; and cf. below, note 330.

identifying fully with the regime and pursuing a mildly dissident course within the limits of the system. This transition is readily apparent in the evolving doctrine of forbidding wrong, as it moved with considerable fanfare from quietist pessimism to revolutionary optimism, and then inconspicuously gave way to post-revolutionary concern for social order.<sup>321</sup>

By comparison with the Imāmī communities, the Sunnī world is enormously diverse and confusing. There is no one country whose politics set the pace, no single defining event, and in place of the stark contrast between the Shāh and Khumaynī there are many shades of grey. Few regimes are as adamantly secular as was that of the Shāh, while revolutionary Islamic regimes exist only in countries such as the Sudan and Afghanistan which are marginal to the intellectual life of the Muslim world; the one other self-consciously Islamic regime, that of Saudi Arabia, is deeply suspect in the eyes of many Islamic activists. Small wonder that the history of Sunnī political values as seen in modern Sunnī doctrines of forbidding wrong shows no clear and unequivocal evolution. Ironically, and in marked contrast to the Imāmī evolution, the most striking developments are in a quietist direction: the doctrine that performance of the duty 'with the hand' is for the state,<sup>322</sup> and the effective voiding of the duty by Sayyid Qutb.<sup>323</sup>

The main concern that Sunnīs and Imāmīs have in common is solidarity and organisation.<sup>324</sup> It is in line with this that neither group shows much excitement about the humble traditional core of forbidding wrong: the duty of the individual to right wrongs as and when he comes across them, and to the best of his knowledge and abilities. The increased attention paid to the duty by modern Imāmī scholars<sup>325</sup> does not point to a revival of interest in this traditional core. Instead, the driving concerns of both Sunnīs and Imāmīs are at once more ambitious and characteristically modern, even when authentic features of the tradition can be adduced in support. Rāshid is excited to discover that the medieval scholars did on occasion touch on the law of Islamic activism.<sup>326</sup> Politically engaged Imāmīs were doubtless just as gratified to encounter in a work of the fourth/teenth-century author Ibn Shu'ba a speech of the martyr Ḥusayn in which forbidding wrong is the central term of a cascade of revolutionary rhetoric.<sup>327</sup> But it is precisely the rarity of such passages in the traditional

sources that makes them finds, and by the same token the concern for organisation is very much a modern one. It is the result of living in a world in which the competitors for political power, whether states or parties, tend to be far more organised than ever before.

The countervailing tendency to marginalise what was previously central becomes explicit in some recent discussions. On the Sunnī side, we have seen how Qutb downplays the individual aspect of the duty.<sup>328</sup> On the Imāmī side, such thinking abounds. Sharī'atī denounces the reduction of the duty to a merely personal (*farḍī*) one,<sup>329</sup> and the restriction of its scope to such trivialities as beards, hair and dress<sup>330</sup> — this at a time when the wrongs that really matter are such things as international imperialism, world Zionism, colonialism old and new, not to mention infatuation with the West (*Gharbzadagi*).<sup>331</sup> Tayyibī describes forbidding wrong as 'the most social of social questions';<sup>332</sup> he laments the fact that in recent centuries its 'social, progressive and revolutionary content' has been distorted, reducing the duty for the most part to a personal (*infirāḍī*) affair of little or no significance.<sup>333</sup> Muntazirī speaks of the performance of the duty by 'ordinary people in minor contexts' (*al-ashkhās al-'ādhwān fī ḡ-mawāwīd al-yuz'iyān*);<sup>334</sup> this petty form of the duty is clearly not much of a contribution to the grand objective of 'reforming society (*islāh al-mujtama'*) and extirpating corruption and wrong' — the purpose for which, he avers, the duty was created.<sup>335</sup> Nūrī formalises this attitude by distinguishing two circles.<sup>336</sup> In the first, our agenda is the total reform of society — moral, credal, economic and social — through the preparation and organisation of the means appropriate for the realisation of right in its broadest sense.<sup>337</sup> In the second, we are simply concerned with specific rights and wrongs that are actually happening or likely to do so.<sup>338</sup> God, as might be expected, is

Tayyibī, *Taqyīn*, 158. 11. For Ibn Shu'ba see above, ch. 11, note 49. Akbarzāda's anthology represents lay, not clerical activism; his immediate source for the speech is a work by Jawād Fadlī which was published in 1334 sh./1955 (1 am indebted to Azar Ashraf for obtaining this date for me).

<sup>328</sup> See above, note 172. His dismissive reference to *islāhāt yuz'iyān* is echoed by Yāsīn (*Jihād*, 181. 10, on not wasting all one's time on *'ilāhī al-yuz'iyāt*), and he in turn is quoted by Ibn Hājjī ('Ijādāt', 10c.55). Ibrahim Dastgīr al-Shāhīrī has a schema distinguishing three levels of *yahūd*, of which the third is *al-ḥā' wa al-yuz'iyān (al-ḥishā fī ḡ-Ḥāḥm, Cairo 1962, 26.5)*; while he does not actually disparage it, he passes over it very quickly (*Ibid.*, 27. 1). Cf. also Gómez García, *Marrakusho*, 339.

<sup>329</sup> Shaḥrī'atī, *Shī'a*, 71. 17, 74. 11, 75. 15. <sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*, 74. 13, 75. 5; cf. also the disparagement of the Sā'īdī practice of *al-ḥamr bi ḡ-ma' ḡ-ḥijf*, *Ibid.*, 71. 6.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, 76. 1, and cf. 75. 8. <sup>332</sup> Tayyibī, *Taqyīn*, 160. 7. <sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, 160. 17. He concedes a little later that action on a personal basis (*infirāḍī-farḍī*) is indeed part of the duty, but he does not want to see more important aspects of it sacrificed to this (*ibid.*, 163. 17). See also *ibid.*, 254. 1.

<sup>334</sup> Muntazirī, *Diryāsāt*, 2:256. 13. <sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*, 251. 14. <sup>336</sup> See Nūrī, *Amr*, 66. 23, where the distinction is introduced. <sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*, 69. 12. <sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 67. 5, and cf. 65. 15, 66. 16.

<sup>321</sup> See above, 533–41. <sup>322</sup> See above, 523–5. <sup>323</sup> See above, 528f.

<sup>324</sup> See above, 516–18, 542. <sup>325</sup> Cf. above, notes 200, 207. <sup>326</sup> See above, 517f.

<sup>327</sup> See the anthology of Mahmūd Akbarzāda, *Ḥisāb al-yuz'iyāt fī inṣāb al-Mashhad* 1343 sh., 158. 4; Khumaynī (d. 1409/1989), *al-Ḥukūma al-Islāmīya*, n.p. n.d., 102. 13 (the key passage, *ibid.*, 104. 1, is repeated *ibid.*, 112. 3); Khumaynī, *Wilāyat al-faḥīh dar ahwāl-i jukhūmāt-i Islāmī*, n.p. n.d., 124. 14 (cf. Nagel, *State and Gläubensgemeinschaft*, 2:317f.).

much more concerned with the first circle.<sup>339</sup> Other Imānī scholars express similar attitudes.<sup>340</sup>

A Sunnī text that indirectly conveys a strong sense of the shift is found in a volume containing a separate printing of Ghazzālī's treatment of forbidding wrong.<sup>341</sup> In this format, this classic text becomes a little book of some 130 pages. It is not a scholarly edition, and was presumably aimed at a wide market. It is, however, accompanied by a short introduction by a scholar well known in the West, Ridwān al-Sayyid. Sayyid's main concern in these pages is clearly to forestall the likely disappointment of the Muslim general reader. You might expect, he tells him, that Ghazzālī would take the opportunity of a discussion of forbidding wrong to set out the social and political problems confronting the Muslim world of his day, and propose solutions to them. And yet for whatever reason, Ghazzālī elected not to do this.<sup>342</sup> Sayyid's sense of what the contemporary reader might be looking for in a tract on forbidding wrong is doubtless accurate.<sup>343</sup> There are, of course, passages here and there in Ghazzālī's discussion that such a reader – like Rashīd – will find intensely rewarding, but all in all they are few and far between.<sup>344</sup> The core of Ghazzālī's message, however well articulated, is not one that speaks to the concerns of political Islam today.

While modern Sunnī and Imānī thinkers show the same interest in getting organised, there is a significant divergence with regard to the identity of the organisers. On the Imānī side the clergy has played the central role, whereas among the Sunnis their position has been rather marginal. One might infer from this that Imānī doctrine would be likely to differ sharply from that of the Sunnis in conferring a much more prominent role in forbidding wrong on the clergy. But whatever the situation in real life, no such prominence is reflected in doctrine; as in the past, forbidding wrong is not a part of the law-book in which clerical authority is strongly entrenched.<sup>345</sup>

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, 69–72.

<sup>340</sup> See Ashūvānī, *Tafsīr-i numāna*, 3:36–2; and cf. Akbarī, *Tafhīl*, 140–3, 142–2, and above, note 235.

<sup>341</sup> Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), *Kitāb al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'n-nahy 'an al-munkar min Dīnā 'alīm al-āim*, Beirut 1983. <sup>342</sup> See esp. *ibid.*, 5.16, 6.18, 8.1.

<sup>343</sup> Sayyid writes as if he himself were looking for it, but given his wide knowledge of medieval Islamic texts, he would hardly expect Ghazzālī's treatment of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* to be a tract in the same genre as Lami's *What is to be done?*

<sup>344</sup> For a particularly striking passage, see above, ch. 16, 445f.

<sup>345</sup> The main exception is, of course, Khumaynī's version of the doctrine of the imam's per-mission (see above, notes 243f.). Otherwise, authors may emphasise the special obligations of the clergy (see above, note 206, for Khumaynī), or state that the clergy have a special role in carrying out the duty (Nāfī, *Amr*, 28–9; Nāfī Hādī, *al-Amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'n-nahy 'an al-munkar*, Qumm n.d., 220, 10 (the most elaborate discussion I have seen,

Where the contrast does signify is in the relationship of modern to traditional scholastic thought. In the Sunnī world, the austere traditionalist intellectual heritage of the scholars has combined with their marginalisation by social and political change to make it hard for their scholasticism to provide convincing Islamic solutions to modern problems. Ma'ānī's literary polemics on righting wrongs 'with the hand'<sup>346</sup> provide a good example of their predicament. It is not just that neither the state nor 'religious youth' (*al-shabāb al-murādāyyin*), the two forces that define the political context of his thinking,<sup>347</sup> are likely to pay much attention to him. What he says is in itself problematic. When he attacks the view that action 'with the hand' is reserved to the authorities, the traditional Sunnī horror of doctrinal innovation is on his side. Like many a medieval scholar, he wins by rightly insisting that his position is not some innovation he thought up for himself (*lam abradīhu min 'indi nafsi*).<sup>348</sup> In the same vein, he describes the view he is rejecting as an unknown and innovative interpretation (*tafsīr bid'ī ghayr ma'rūf*),<sup>349</sup> and as a recent opinion which not one of the scholars of the community had held in the past (*qawl muhādath lam yaqul bihi abūh min 'ulamā' al-ummā*).<sup>350</sup> Having said all this in the manner of a medieval traditionalist, it is superfluous for him to argue that the position he is attacking is a bad idea. But when he puts forward his own idea – severely limiting the type of action 'with the hand' permitted to individuals – he is hoist with his own petard. We wait in vain for the roll-call of authoritative opinions from the past which alone could make his view respectable. Among the Sunnis, therefore, new thinking – and in a new world there has to be some – cannot easily take place within the framework of the scholastic heritage; instead the locus of intellectual creativity of necessity shifts outside it. Among the Imānīs, this does not have to be so. In their discussions of forbidding wrong, the modern Imānī scholars have attacked and gone behind the traditional view of the conditions of obligation in a way that Ma'ānī could never have done. Tayyibī, for example, invents a novel conception of a 'collective obligation'. He then considers the possibility that someone might object that it is new, and responds 'So be it!'<sup>351</sup> Other Imānī scholars are not so brazen, but they are significantly less constricted than their Sunnī colleagues; witness the elaboration of the

the preface is dated 1416/1996). Islāmī Arādkānī, *Amr*, 34.11). But they do not go beyond this. <sup>346</sup> See above, notes 133f., 145–8.

<sup>347</sup> See, for example, Ma'ānī, *Taqyīm al-munkar*, 3.8.

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.14, and cf. 15.24. <sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.11.

<sup>351</sup> Tayyibī, *Taqyīm*, 166.13. He later proudly repeats the word 'new' in referring to his concept (*ibid.*, 253 n. 2, 261.7).

essentially novel doctrine of the prior duty to secure the prerequisites for forbidding wrong.<sup>352</sup>

The collective and political orientation of the Islamic revival also helps to explain another feature of contemporary writing on forbidding wrong in both communities: the fact that the traditional concern with rights of privacy<sup>353</sup> receives relatively little attention.

On the Sunnī side, the old material may be repeated, but it does not generate excitement.<sup>354</sup> Thus 'Awda stipulates that a wrong must be manifest (*zāhir*) without spying or prying, among other things because God has said so (Q49:12), and because of the inviolability (*hurma*) of homes and persons until such time as sin is apparent.<sup>355</sup> To emphasise the point he relates the story of the three sins of the caliph 'Umar (r. 13–23/634–44).<sup>356</sup> But when there is reliable evidence or good reason to believe that someone is engaging in covert wrongdoing in his home, these restrictions no longer apply.<sup>357</sup> The presentation is clear and balanced, but there is nothing electric about it. Likewise Khālid al-Sabṭ has some short discussions of aspects of privacy.<sup>358</sup> Thus the first sets out the conditions under which it may or may not be permissible to refrain from exposing sins (*sabr*); but he says nothing here of any conditions under which one has an actual duty to refrain, or of any rights of sinners to privacy.

On the Imāmī side, where privacy was never a standard topic in the traditional discussion of the duty,<sup>359</sup> we usually hear even less of it. Imāmī authors attack Western individualism just as Sunnīs do,<sup>360</sup> and they frequently report and rebut the invocations of freedom and charges of mediocrity made by those subjected to forbidding wrong.<sup>361</sup> But this

<sup>352</sup> See above, 542–5. <sup>353</sup> See above, ch. 17, 479–82.

<sup>354</sup> See, in addition to the examples that follow, Bayānūnī, *Amr*, 44–7; Yāsīn, *Jihād*, 192f. no. 12; Muḥammad 'Alī Mas'ūd, *Amr*, 17.1; 'Amrī, *Amr*, 320–4; Malimūd, *Uṣūl*, 204.10; Sukkarī, *Amr*, 82–6. For a recent Sunnī study of the law of privacy in Islam, see below, ch. 20, note 24; but the book is not concerned with forbidding wrong.

<sup>355</sup> 'Awda, *Tashrīḥ*, 1:502.20.

<sup>356</sup> *Jihād*, 503.8. For the story, see above, ch. 4, note 269, and ch. 17, note 85; it is also told by Bayānūnī (*Amr*, 45.1), 'Amrī (*Amr*, 321.12) and Sukkarī (*Amr*, 83.5).

<sup>357</sup> 'Awda, *Tashrīḥ*, 1:504.4. <sup>358</sup> Sabṭ, *Amr*, 296.13, 298.7, 316–19.

<sup>359</sup> It appears only, I think, in the accounts of authors who base themselves directly or indirectly on Ghazzālī (Fayd, *Mabāhij*, 4:109.5; Muḥammad Mahdī al-Narāqī, *Jihād*, *Jihād*, 2:242.14; Ahmad Nārāqī, *Mi'rāj al-sā'ida*, 516.3). For Ghazzālī's discussion, see above, ch. 16, 436.

<sup>360</sup> Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 'Tashrīḥ', 34.1, and cf. Mas'ūdī, *Pishhishāh*, 109.16, 346.2. For the Sunnīs, see above, note 61.

<sup>361</sup> Akbarī gives a practical list of objections which those subjected to the duty come out with, together with apt replies for the pious forbidders of wrong. The first is 'I'm a free person!' (*hazān-ni*); the second is 'This has nothing to do with you!', or, alternatively, 'Don't

does not lead them to a systematic discussion of the limits placed on intrusion by traditional Islamic values. Themes connected with privacy appear here and there in the modern Imāmī literature on the duty,<sup>362</sup> but there is no move to consolidate them into a bulwark against abuse, whether perpetrated by the state apparatus or by individual pietists.

To this there is one significant exception, though it is not entirely isolated inasmuch as the author in question owes some of his inspiration to Murtaharī. One of many recent books on forbidding wrong by junior clerics is by Sayyid Ḥasan Islāmī Ardakānī. This one is skilfully written and nicely produced.<sup>363</sup> It opens with a graphic scene of a city asleep — we are

interferer' (*Tahfīl*, 204.3, 204.7). For a reasoned response to this challenge, which starts by taking seriously the value of individual freedom (*hurriyat al-fird*) and the fact that *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is a form of intrusion (*intakhāb*) which limits this right, see Hātim, *Amr*, 207–13. See also Gulpāyegānī, *Majma' al-ma'ā'if*, 1:433 no. 1321 (on a man who both drinks and recites the Koran in his home, and claims that this is nobody else's business); 'Alī Kūrānī, *Amr bab mā'rif wa nuly az munkar*, Tehran 1373 sh., 3.9, 7.12 (a much reprinted little work first published in 1359 sh.; the author says that of course *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* means interfering in other people's affairs, and naturally people with their heads stuffed full of Western ideas don't like it); Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 'Tashrīḥ', 34.1 (commenting that as a result of Western influence, contemporary society regards forbidding wrong as mediocrity (*faḥshā*), and noting the characteristic response 'what's it to you?' (*bah to dūh?*)), and cf. *Jihād*, 56.16; Mas'ūdī, *Pishhishāh*, 169.16 (reporting the equation of forbidding wrong with improper interference (*intakhāb*) in the affairs of others), and cf. also *Jihād*, 346.2; Tagaddusī Nūrā, *Dar-rūḥ az amr bab mā'rif*, 84.4 (resolving the conflict in a few lines with the argument that human freedom does not consist in doing bad things), 105.12 (appealing to the tradition about the people in the boat); Muḥsin Qirānī, *Amr bab mā'rif wa nuly az munkar*, Tehran 1375 sh., 76 no. 2 (describing freedom as a holy word in the shadow of which thousands of unholy deeds are done); and below, ch. 20, note 28.

<sup>362</sup> For occasional brief mentions or discussions of the prohibition of spying, see Saif Gulpāyegānī, *Rāh-i-tāh*, 83.16, in the sections reflecting the views of Burūjirdī. Qirānī, *Amr*, 141.14, 299.13; Khudākaramī, *De as-i-nasimāt*, 94.2. Sometimes the category of hidden sin is mentioned (Qirānī, *Amr*, 153.15; 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Dasgahayb, *Amr ba-nā'rif wa nuly az munkar*, Tehran 1371 sh., 15.4, in the introduction by Muḥammad Ḥashim Dasgahayb; also, implicitly, Khumaynī, *Tahzīb*, 1:468 no. 6). Bishrī's introduction into the affairs of others ('Rūḥānāt', 160.16). For Murtaharī's brief but pregnant remarks on privacy, see below, notes 373–6. For Khumaynī's emphasis on respect for privacy in his pronouncements in the winter of 1403/1982–3, see *Sūfiyāt-nūr*, 17:106f., no. 6f., 118.1, 145 no. 5; for the political context, see Bakhash, *Reign of the Ayatollahs*, 227–32.

<sup>363</sup> The book was published in 1375 sh./1996 in Qumm, the centre of religious publishing in Iran; it is the fifth of a projected 110 volumes in a series entitled, with an obvious French resonance, 'What do we know about Islam?' (*Az Kifān chih mīdānim?*). The series is under the direction of Hujjat al-Islām Mahdī Karūrī, who has been described by Douglas US-Iran dialogue, *The New York Times*, 6 June 1999, WK 4). The book is in Persian, the language in which clerics write for laymen. The author had already published a book on *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* with the Ministry of Culture and Guidance in 1375 sh./1994 (see Islāmī Ardakānī, *Amr*, 208.7), so he is not an outsider: I have not seen this earlier book.

not told when or where – and a man patrolling the streets.<sup>364</sup> He comes to a house, sniffs wrongdoing, finds the door closed, and enters by climbing over the wall and descending through the roof. He catches a man and a woman in their cups, and denounces the man as an enemy of God for his sin. The malefactor immediately responds by accusing the intruder of not one but three contraventions of divine law: spying on him, entering his home other than by the door, and doing so without asking his leave or greeting him. Thus someone who sought to expose the sin of another found that he himself had fallen into no less than three mortal sins. It is only now that the lay reader, who might at first have been under the disturbing misapprehension that the scene was set in our own dear Islamic Republic, gets to learn that the triple sinner was the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. Not being an old-fashioned bigot, Islāmī does not curse this traditional enemy of the Shi‘ites; but neither does he find it necessary to bless him.<sup>365</sup> All told, this is not a story calculated to raise ‘Umar in the esteem of the Imāmī reader;<sup>366</sup> by the same token, and more to the point, it is well calculated to give intrusiveness a bad name among good Imānīs today.

Later in the book, Islāmī uses another strategy to the same effect. In line with Murtaḥarī and those who followed him, he gives considerable attention to the Sunnī institution of the censorship (*ishāra*) as a mechanism for forbidding wrong.<sup>367</sup> By the time Islāmī was writing, of course, the novelty of Murtaḥarī’s discovery had long worn off. What excites Islāmī is not so much the institution itself as the reasons for its decay over the centuries.<sup>368</sup> Of these reasons, there is one he presents with particular eloquence: the abusive behaviour of those purportedly engaged in forbidding wrong. In this way the very institution that was supposed to be the solution itself became part of the problem.<sup>369</sup> Islāmī returns to the theme of abuse in the context of the question why the duty is in such a bad way in our own age, for all that we live at a time when Islam is being revived and an Islamic Republic has been established.<sup>370</sup> He reviews a number of factors, but one stands out: abuses which have given the duty a bad name.<sup>371</sup> There is, he

says, no need to call witnesses; we have all encountered shamefully abusive conduct on the part of people supposedly engaged in forbidding wrong – people whose actions lead in fact to the ruin of the duty, and indeed of religion itself.<sup>372</sup> He then enlists in this protest an almost incontrovertible authority: the martyred Murtaḥarī, a man who devoted his life to reviving the duty and died for the cause of establishing an Islamic government.<sup>373</sup> In his talk of 1380/1960, Murtaḥarī had indeed shown strong antipathy to thuggery and intrusion. Referring to some recent activities carried out in the name of forbidding wrong, he commented that, if this was indeed what forbidding wrong amounted to, it was better that it should remain in oblivion.<sup>374</sup> We only have the right to intervene, he insisted, where wrongs are out in the public domain; we have no right to engage in spying (*tajassus*) and interference (*mudākhala*) in matters relating to people’s private lives (*zindāqī-i khusūsī-i marḍum*).<sup>375</sup> He had then told a searing story of over-zealous religious students who raided a wedding by scrambling across the rooftops, smashing musical instruments, and boxing the ears of the bride; later they were roundly rebuked by a senior cleric for their multiple sins.<sup>376</sup> Islāmī, of course, makes excellent use of this material.<sup>377</sup> All this is exciting, but also perhaps a trifle alarming: is the virtuous reader not in danger of being drawn into a profoundly subversive attack on the entire apparatus of religious enforcement in the Islamic Republic? Islāmī has thought of this, and slips in a timely reassurance. Fortunately, he tells us, the horrible activities to which Murtaḥarī was alluding are quite unknown today, and it is devoutly to be hoped that such things will never again sully the purity of Islam.<sup>378</sup> The reader relaxes, albeit still slightly puzzled by the information that we have *all* witnessed abuses of this kind. Many of us can scarcely remember the bad old days before the revolution; and even if we do, over-zealous religious policing is not conventionally included among the crimes of the fallen regime.

When it comes to legal prescription, Islāmī again has a strategy. He proceeds by enlarging and enriching the category of the ‘norms’ (*āhād*) of the duty which had originally been developed by Ghazzālī.<sup>379</sup> Happily, Islāmī

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.3. Islāmī is not the only modern Imāmī author on forbidding wrong to mention the anecdote, but he is alone in highlighting it in the way he does (cf. Fu‘ādīyān, *Sayrī*, 254.21; Khundkaramī, *Do raf-i hastinār*, 94.4). For modern Sunnī writers, see above, note 356.

<sup>365</sup> Islāmī Ardakānī, *Amr*, 8.7. He has the story from Ghazzālī (*ibid.*, 8.18). For current standards of political correctness in Iran with regard to the first three caliphs, see Buchta, *Diz-i Iranishūr Shāh*, 71–4.

<sup>366</sup> This is why Muḥsin al-Fayḍ (d. 1091/1680) liked the story (see above, ch. 16, note 185).

<sup>367</sup> See above, note 319.

<sup>368</sup> Islāmī Ardakānī, *Amr*, 69–73.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.4, and cf. 159.7.

<sup>370</sup> The question is posed *ibid.*, 77.7.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, 82–7. Islāmī is not alone in surveing the reasons why *al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf* is not doing as well as it should, or why people are reluctant to perform or submit to the duty;

but other writers do not include such abuses among these reasons (Mas‘ūdī, *Pizīshīsīrī*, 320–32; Hātim, *Amr*, 227–38; Akbarī, *Tahfīl*, 144–53, 189–203; Qarī‘atī, *Amr*, 101–7).

<sup>372</sup> Islāmī Ardakānī, *Amr*, 83.5.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.13.

<sup>374</sup> Murtaḥarī, *Amr ba-naṣa’if*, 84.12.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.20.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.5.

<sup>377</sup> For the story of the students on the rooftops, see Islāmī Ardakānī, *Amr*, 84.16.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.3.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, 171–98. For Ghazzālī’s norms, see above, ch. 16, 441f. That Islāmī is aware of this percentage is suggested by his observation that the norms have been discussed more by writers on ethics (*akhlāq*) than by jurists (*ibid.*, 173.1); a leading writer on ethics is none other than Ghazzālī (*ibid.*, 113.2).

is able to find an Imāmī precedent for the category; in any case, as he goes on to indicate, bringing a number of points together under this heading is to an extent just a matter of convenience.<sup>380</sup> Having justified his use of the category, he goes on to present his set of ten norms. The first is that there must be no spying (*taḥāṣṣis*).<sup>381</sup> Indeed the most important point there is to be made about forbidding wrong, he tells us, is that the forbidded should abstain from interference in the private lives of others (*dikhālat ḥar zinālagh-i khushūsi-i kassān*) and from prying into their worldly affairs.<sup>382</sup> What Islam requires is the elimination of manifest sin; secret sin is reserved for the jurisdiction of God.<sup>383</sup> The second, closely linked norm is that there should be no curtain-ripping (*parāda-darī*), in other words no exposure of hidden sins.<sup>384</sup> In all this, Islāmī's leading quoted sources are Ghazālī and Sa'dī (d. 691/1292); Imāmī authorities tend to take a back seat. Looming behind these Sunnī, it does not take a very sharp eye to discern the ghostly presence of Western conceptions of rights. Sinners, Islāmī remarks, are human like us; they too have rights, and these are not to be trampled underfoot.<sup>385</sup>

Islāmī's ideas are certainly not representative of the prevailing religious culture in Iran. But they are likely to have considerable resonance for a significant part of the educated population. What this means for the future could perhaps be expressed in a highly conditional sentence. If civil society is fated to remain a globally relevant notion,<sup>386</sup> if Iran – and other Islamic countries – are to become recognisably civil societies, and if they are destined to do so under an Islamic aegis, then Islāmī's thinking about forbidding wrong can help us to imagine what such a development might look like.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.8. The work he cites is not available to me.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.7, esp. 173.16. See also *ibid.*, 9.14. <sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.7.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.9. See also *ibid.*, 9.12, 175.1, 175.5 (quoting Ghazālī and the younger Nārāqī (d. 1245/1829), who owes his Ghazālīan material to his father, see above, ch. 16, note 192), 176.12.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*, 178–81. This is a vernacular rendering of *sarr*, as is apparent from the Sunnī Prophetic traditions quoted. <sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.8. See also *ibid.*, 182.5, 196.15.

<sup>386</sup> I choose the word 'notion' rather than 'concept' advisedly. I do not know anyone who knows exactly what civil society is, but most of us have some broad ideas about what it is not.

## CHAPTER 19

# ORIGINS AND COMPARISONS

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The expression 'to command right and forbid wrong', for all its salience in Islam, is not without parallels outside it. In England it was proposed in AD 1801 to establish a 'Society for the Suppression of Vice and the Encouragement of Religion and Virtue'.<sup>1</sup> A German legal document of AD 1616 offers the phrase 'recht gebieten und unrecht verbieten' with regard to the conduct incumbent on the judge of a certain court.<sup>2</sup> Blackstone (d. AD 1780) in his celebrated treatise on the laws of England defines municipal law as 'a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong'.<sup>3</sup> His definition echoes one already adopted by the Stoics. Thus Chrysippus (d. 207 BC) opened his book on law with the statement that the law must, among other things, command what should be done and forbid what should not be done.<sup>4</sup> This in turn echoes Aristotle (d. 322 BC).<sup>5</sup> But it

<sup>1</sup> D. Thomas, *A long time burning: the history of literary censorship in England*, London 1969, 188f. (drawn to my attention by Frank Stewart). The society was indeed established, and proceeded to concern itself mainly with pornography.

<sup>2</sup> G. F. Führer, *Kurse Darstellung der Mevverrechtlichen Verfassung in der Grafschaft Eppre, Lemgo 1804*, 327 (cited in J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, Leipzig 1899, 1.38, which was drawn to my attention by Frank Stewart). I am indebted to the library of the Oberlandesgericht Celle for a copy of the relevant pages of Führer's work.

<sup>3</sup> William Blackstone (d. AD 1780), *Commentaries on the laws of England*, Oxford 1765–9, 1.44; and cf. his commentary, *ibid.*, 53–8 (drawn to my attention by Frank Stewart).

<sup>4</sup> H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Stuttgart 1978–9, 3.77 no. 314 (I am indebted to Ruth Webb for help with this text). A similar formulation is already quoted from Zeno of Citium (d. 263 BC), the founder of the Stoic school (*ibid.*, 1.42 no. 162; and cf. *ibid.*, 3.158 nos. 613f.). The definition of Chrysippus is quoted near the beginning of the *Digest* of Justinian (r. AD 527–65) (ed. T. Mommsen and trans. A. Watson, Philadelphia 1985, 11), and Cicero (d. 43 BC) says something similar (*De republica*, III.xvii.53 (= ed. and trans. C. W. Keyes, London and Cambridge, Mass. 1951, 210.5 = 211)). I was put on the track of this material by Patricia Crane.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle (d. 322 BC), *Nicomachean ethics*, VII.10 (= ed. H. Rackham, London and Cambridge, Mass. 1956, 264.21 = 265).

would be hard to argue that all occurrences of such phrases go back to a single origin. As will be seen later in this chapter, they also crop up among the Buddhists and Confucians,<sup>6</sup> and further parallels doubtless lurk elsewhere in the world's literatures.

If the phrase has such echoes in other cultures, should we think of the duty itself as a universal human value? Or is there in fact something peculiarly Islamic about it? The basic principle involved in the value is that if one encounters someone engaged in wrongdoing, one should do something to stop them. My guess is that this principle, or something like it, is to be found embedded (though not necessarily articulated) in just about all human cultures.<sup>7</sup> That is to say, I would expect that in almost any culture there will be occasions on which it makes sense to say something like: 'You can't just stand there and let him do that.' I have no idea how one might amass the empirical evidence that would put such a guess on a firmer foundation. The principle does not have a name either in common English or in the technical language of anthropologists; consequently ethnographers are not looking for the value, and if they happen to describe it, they are unlikely to signal this in a way that makes the information easy to locate in their ethnographies. In what follows, I shall simply assume that the value is pretty much universal.

The existence of this degree of uniformity would still leave room for a great deal of variation between cultures, not to mention the individuals who belong to them. Most obviously, there are extensive differences between cultures regarding what is considered right or wrong: witness the collision between West African and Islamic attitudes to female nudity.<sup>8</sup> But while such differences are clearly crucial for the practice of the value, they are not intrinsic to the way in which it is conceived.

More interestingly for our purposes, there are likely to be considerable variations regarding the extent to which our value is identified or emphasized in the moral vocabularies of different cultures. The same is true of the relative weight attached to it in relation to such antithetical principles as minding one's own business and keeping out of trouble. It would be a plausible guess that the vernacular subcultures of the Islamic world have tended to assign more weight to such antithetical principles than the mainstream religious tradition has done,<sup>9</sup> and it would not be surprising to find comparable differences obtaining between cultures at large. This would

surely apply even within the set of the world's historic literary cultures. Here again, I do not know how one would go about making comparisons on a serious scale – neither the tables of contents nor the indices of ethnographies being of much assistance in this regard. I have accordingly made no serious attempt in this direction, except in one case of obvious historical relevance: pre-Islamic Arabia.

There is, however, a relevant difference between the literary heritages of high cultures which is relatively accessible to comparative exploration. This is the extent to which they subject our value to formal, systematic elaboration. I have consequently made it my business to ascertain which cultures make of our value what might be called scholastic doctrines. It is, for example, a striking and perhaps historically relevant fact that in the world of late antiquity, monks would rebuke the powerful with the same abrasiveness as ascetics in the Islamic world.<sup>10</sup> There was, moreover, an old Greek term for such outspokenness (*παρηβασία*).<sup>11</sup> But for all that the phenomenon was there, and possessed of a name, it does not seem to have given rise to any body of systematic thought in the Christian literature of the time; whereas some other cultures, as will be seen, have more to offer. Once we have collected some scholastic doctrines from different cultures, we can go on to make comparisons between them.

There are in fact two distinct projects that the existence of similar phenomena outside Islam can validly give rise to. One is genetic: here the question is whether the Islamic conception of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong' has identifiable pre-Islamic origins. The other is purely comparative: here the object is to learn what we can from the study of analogous, perhaps genetically unrelated, phenomena in different settings. In what follows, however, I have not formally separated the two exercises. What begins as a genetic inquiry into the origins of the Islamic value will end up as a comparative attempt to identify and explain what is distinctive about it.

## 2. THE JĀHILIYYA

There are two separate (though related) questions to be answered regarding the role of pre-Islamic Arabia in the origins of the Islamic conception

<sup>6</sup> See below, notes 113, 121.

<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the Ik as described by Colin Turnbull lacked it; but this was a society that had lost its human values in general (C. M. Turnbull, *The mountian people*, New York 1972).

<sup>8</sup> See above, ch. 14, note 228.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. above, ch. 17, 498f.

<sup>10</sup> P. Brown, *Power and persuasion in late antiquity*, Madison and London 1992, 106, 126, 135, 140. On the other hand, monks were not supposed to rebuke each other (C. White, *Christian Friendship in the fourth century*, Cambridge 1992, 168f.).

<sup>11</sup> Brown, *Power and persuasion*, index s.v. The term is also well attested in relevant senses as a loan-word in Syriac (R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus syriacus*, Oxford 1879–1901, 3242).

of forbidding wrong. The first concerns the terminology of the duty. Is the language used to describe it in Islam inherited – in whole or in part – from the Jāhiliyya? Or is it new to Arabic, perhaps derived from some extra-Arabian source? The second question concerns the idea of the duty. Did Jāhili society give prominence to the notion that it is a man's business to right wrongs and seek to prevent their occurrence? Or was such activity highly valued only when it took place within the limits of specific social relationships that required it?<sup>12</sup>

Let us first examine two traditions relating to Mecca in the late pre-Islamic period, and then consider the evidence of Jāhili poetry.

The first tradition concerns Ḥakīm ibn Umayya, a member of a Sulamī family well established in Mecca and a confederate (*ḥalīf*) of the Umayyad clan; he later converted to Islam.<sup>13</sup> It is reported that in pre-Islamic Mecca he exercised the role of restraining and disciplining the hot-blooded young men (*shufhān*) of Quraysh, with the general consent of the tribe.<sup>14</sup> In this connection he is referred to in some sources as a 'censor' (*muhāsib*); these sources then go on to describe him as '(commanding right and) forbidding wrong'.<sup>15</sup> Altogether their wording is so similar that their testimony must be treated as reflecting a single source. With regard to their terminology, are these authors then reporting actual Jāhili usage, or are they merely retrojecting Islamic usage onto a Jāhili phenomenon which happens to remind them of an Islamic one? Since they do not make any explicit claim to be reporting Jāhili usage, the safest assumption is that they are retrojecting. With regard to the activity itself, what we have here is – as these authors indicate – a precedent for the official censorship (*ḥisāb*), rather than for the duty of the individual believer. The account could further be held

to imply that disciplining wild young men across the board was not a normal activity of individuals, since it required a special arrangement to establish it and make it work,<sup>16</sup> but this implication is weak.

The case is somewhat different with a much more widely known institution of pre-Islamic Mecca, an alliance (known as the *ḥilf al-fudūl*) which was created for the purpose of righting wrongs.<sup>17</sup> A typical account of the formation of this alliance (*ḥilf*) is the following.<sup>18</sup> A member of the Yemeni tribe of the Banū Zubayd came to Mecca with commercial goods which he sold to a member of the Qurashī clan of the Banū Salm. The latter, however, failed to pay for them. The public protest of the wronged merchant (in verse, of course) gave rise to such concern among Quraysh that four clans (other sources commonly list five) gathered and made a pact (*ḥubūlaḥḥā*) in the following terms: 'If anyone is wronged in Mecca, we will all take his part against the wrongdoer until we recover what is due to him from the one who has wronged him, whether he is noble or humble, one of us or not.'<sup>19</sup> As a result the Salmī wrongdoer was prevailed upon to pay the Zubaydī merchant his due. Thereafter, if anyone wronged anyone else in Mecca, the members of the alliance were there to put matters right.<sup>20</sup> Again, we are in the generation before the rise of Islam; the Prophet himself is reported to have been present at the formation of the alliance.<sup>21</sup> To my knowledge, there are no other reports of such institutions in pre-Islamic Arabia, except that it is said by some that the alliance owed its name (*ḥilf al-fudūl*) to a similar alliance among Jurhum,<sup>22</sup> the somewhat shadowy possessors of the Meccan sanctuary in an earlier period.

Again, the story tends to suggest – but not very strongly – that righting wrongs in general was not the business of the individual: it required a

<sup>12</sup> Cf. the remark of an ethnographer of the mountain tribesmen of the Yemen that it would be insulting for a man to presume to right some wrong done to another man's dependants or womenfolk (P. Dresch, *Tribes, government, and history in Yemen*, Oxford 1989, 61).

<sup>13</sup> One source has it that it was his great-great-grandfather who came to Mecca and became a confederate of 'Abd Manāf himself (Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, 8:13.4). For Ḥakīm's allegedly early conversion, see M. Lecker, *The Banū Sulaym*, Jerusalem 1989, 138 n. 151, citing Ibn Ḥishām, *Sira*, 1-2:288.15, and other sources.

<sup>14</sup> See M. J. Kister, 'Some reports concerning Mecca from Jāhiliyya to Islam', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 15 (1972), 83 (with the two addenda to this page, the first published *ibid.*, 93, and the second with the reprint of the article in M. J. Kister, *Studies in Jāhiliyya and early Islam*, London 1980, item II, 'Additional notes', 1); Chalmeica, *El señor del zoco*, 350f.; Lecker, *The Banū Sulaym*, 120-2; 'Amad, 'Nuṣūṣ turāthiyya'. The references to primary sources discussed below are taken from these studies.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-Kalbi (d. 204/819f.), *Jamharat al-nabāh*, ed. N. Ḥasan, Beirut 1986, 407.4; Balāḥūrī (d. 279/892f.), *Anṣab al-aṣṣḥāf*, quoted from manuscript in Lecker, *The Banū Sulaym*, 122 n. 79; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharat*, 263.20.

<sup>16</sup> Presumably we should understand that Ḥakīm's formal status as an outsider in Mecca was an asset in this context. But then why did his special relationship to the Banū Umayya not disrupt his role?

<sup>17</sup> See E1, art. 'Ḥilf al-fudūl' (C. Pellat), and P. Crone, *Meccan trade and the rise of Islam*, Princeton 1987, 143f., with references to a wide range of primary sources.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muṣannaf*, 45-7.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.6. The key terms are all forms of the root *ḥ-l-m*. I have not seen the term *mumkir* in any account of the alliance other than those mentioned below, note 25.

<sup>20</sup> Ibn Ḥabīb goes on to report two such incidents, one involving the goods of a Thumālī (*ibid.*, 47.10), the other the daughter of a Khath'ani merchant (*ibid.*, 48.9).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.8. We are told here that this was five years before he began to receive revelation, which would take us to the first decade of the seventh century AD. Another version would place the event a decade earlier (Abū 'l-Faraj, *Aghānī*, 17:289.16, stating that the Prophet was aged twenty-five at the time).

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, *Ibid.*, 288.14, 292.10, 293.3, 300.8. The point is that the Jurhumīs involved were all called Fādī, or variants of the same root. This is one of a number of rival explanations of the puzzling term *ḥilfīn*.

formal agreement to establish a group pledged to do this in a single locality.<sup>23</sup> This leaves us with the question of terminology. Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) remarks of forbidding wrong (*al-nahy 'an al-munkar*) that it was known to the pre-Islamic Arabs, and he establishes his point by adducing our alliance.<sup>24</sup> He does not here actually attribute such terminology to the pre-Islamic Arabs. However, a report transmitted by Zubayr ibn Bakr (d. 256/870) does just this: it explicitly includes 'commanding right and forbidding wrong' in the terms of the agreement.<sup>25</sup> This is a clear-cut ascription of the phrase to the Jāhiliyya.<sup>26</sup> But the report is an isolated one among our many accounts of the agreement,<sup>27</sup> and this suggests that we would be right to regard it as anachronistic. Our sources, after all, are happy to impute statements about forbidding wrong to the Byzantines.<sup>28</sup>

The other source that calls for attention is poetry.<sup>29</sup> There are, of course, considerable problems regarding the authenticity of poetry ascribed to the

<sup>23</sup> Presumably the fact that a number of clans had come together to establish the arrangement was vital to its effective functioning. The omission of other clans might have been expected to be problematic in cases (such as that of the Salmī) where the wrongdoer belonged to a clan outside the alliance, but we do not hear of this.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19:305.13. Earlier in the work he gives accounts of the *ḥifẓ al-Jāhili* quoted from Jāhiz (d. 255/868f.) (*ibid.*, 15:203-6) and Zubayr ibn Bakr (d. 256/870) (*ibid.*, 224-8).

<sup>25</sup> Abū 'l-Faraj, *Aghāni*, 17:291.4 (for the ascription to Zubayr ibn Bakr, see *ibid.*, 287.2); Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ*, 15:226.6. In Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd's version, Zubayr ibn Bakr gives an *imād* going back to the Medinese Muhammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ḥarith al-Fayrī (d. 120/737f.); in that of the *Aghāni*, the same *imād* appears but is combined with others into a composite *imād*. The two versions have peculiarities in common over and above the reference to *al-amr bi'l-iḥsān*, suggesting that they are indeed a single account.

<sup>26</sup> Likewise in a report which he transmits to the effect that the original Juhaymī participants had agreed that they would put right any wrong in the valley of Mecca, the word used is *ghaywarūn* (Abū 'l-Faraj, *Aghāni*, 17:288.14; the authorities for this report are vaguely referred to as 'others').

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Ibn Hishām, *Sira*, 1-2:133.8; Muṣ'ab al-Zubayrī, *Nasab Quraysh*, 291.11; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥammada*, 46.6, 219.6, 341.1; Jāhiz (d. 255/868f.), *Faḍl Ḥāshim 'alā Abī Shāma* in Ḥ. al-Sandūbi (ed.), *Rasā'ir al-Jāhiz*, Cairo 1933, 71.23; Balādhurī, *Anṣab*, ed. Mahnūfī, 12.15, 15.4; Abū 'l-Faraj, *Aghāni*, 17:299.14. Abū 'l-Faraj also gives several versions from Zubayr ibn Bakr by *imāds* other than that referred to above (note 25); none of these makes reference to *al-amr bi'l-iḥsān* (*ibid.*, 288.8, 289.18, 290.9, 292.6, 292.13, 294.1).

<sup>28</sup> A Byzantine elder, explaining to the emperor Heraclius (r. AD 610-41) why the Muslims were winning, describes them as, among other things, commanding right and forbidding wrong (Dinawari, *Musūfāqa*, 193.14; whence Ibn Kathir, *Bidāya*, 7:15.22); likewise a Christian Arab spy speaks in the same way about the Muslims to a Byzantine general (Azdi (fl. c. 190/805), *Faḥḥ al-Shām*, ed. W. N. Lees, Calcutta 1853-4, 189.6; I owe this reference to Larry Conrad). On the other hand van Ess, who cites the story of the formation of the *ḥifẓ al-Jāhili* in the version of the *Aghāni*, treats the wording as authentic (*Theologos*, 2:387).

<sup>29</sup> My data derive almost entirely from the Concordance of Pre-Islamic and Umayyad Poetry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. They are unlikely to be complete, but they are certainly representative. I am much indebted to Albert Azaiz for making this material available, to Nurit Tsafir for copying the relevant cards for me, and to Andras Hamont for help with some of the texts.

pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods; but as will be seen, these problems are not of overriding significance in the present context. My main findings are as follows:

First, the words I have translated 'right' (*ma'rūf*, with its synonym 'urf) and 'wrong' (*munkar*, with its synonym *mukr*) are widely attested in pre-Islamic poetry.<sup>30</sup> What is more, they are not infrequently used as antithetical terms. In their etymological senses of 'known' and 'unknown', they are already paired in a much-repeated hemistich of Murāqish al-Akbar, who is perhaps our oldest Arab poet: speaking of dusty deserts, he tells of crossing the unknown wilderness to reach the known (*qatā'na ilā ma'rūfihā munkarātihā*).<sup>31</sup> In more evaluative senses, we find the words similarly paired by the Jāhili poets Zubayr ibn Abī Sulmā,<sup>32</sup> 'Urwa ibn al-Ward,<sup>33</sup> Ḥātim al-Tā'i,<sup>34</sup> and Nābiḡha .

<sup>30</sup> For some examples, see the following notes.

<sup>31</sup> Muḥaddal al-Dabbī (d. 168/784f.), *Ikhtiyārāt* (= *Muḥaddalīyat*), ed. C. J. L'vell, Oxford and London 1918-24, 1:465 no. 47, line 7 (with translation, *ibid.*, 2:172). For Murāqish al-Akbar, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:153f. The same hemistich is found in verses of the following: the Jāhili Bishr ibn Abī Khāzīm (*Dīwān*, ed. 'I. Hasan, Damascus 1960, 114 no. 24, line 4; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:211ff.); the *mukhannam* Shamākh ibn Dīrāt (*Dīwān*, ed. Š. al-Ḥādīd, Cairo 1968, 84 no. 2, line 31; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:239f.); the *mukhannam* Dābī' ibn al-Ḥārith (Āṣma'ī (d. c. 216/831), *Āṣna ḥyār*, ed. W. Ahlwardt, Berlin 1902, 56 no. 57, line 15; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:205f.); the late first/seventh-century Tirmadhī (F. Krenkow (ed.), *The poems of 'Ufayfī ibn 'Auf al-Ghannawī and al-Tirmadhī ibn Ḥakīm al-Fā'if*, London 1927, 76 no. 1, line 40; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:351ff.); and his contemporary Farazdaq (*Dīwān*, *qūḍā* I, al-Ḥāwī, *Sharḥ Dīwān al-Farazdaq*, Beirut 1983, 1:210 no. 100, line 3; Ibn Qutaiba (d. 276/889), *al-Shi'r wa'l-shi'r ar'*, ed. M. J. de Gooijer, Leiden 1904, 334.2; Marzubānī (d. 384/994), *Muḥammada*, ed. 'A. M. al-Bajawī, Cairo 1965, 273.14; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:359-63). Compare also the verse of the Jāhili 'Urwa ibn al-Ward (for whom see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:141f.) in which he describes an owl (*hāmā*) as complaining to whomsoever she sees, whether known or unknown to her (*tashtakī/ḥā kulī mā 'rūfihā wa'ar-ḥā wa-munkarā*, 'Urwa ibn al-Ward, *Dīwān*, ed. 'A. al-Mulūhī, n.p. 1966, 67.1; see also Āṣma'ī, *Āṣna ḥyār*, 29 no. 31, line 4).

<sup>32</sup> He has a line speaking of a desert land in which his generosity is not held in low esteem (*ma'rūf bihī ghayrū munkarā*) (W. Ahlwardt (ed.), *The Dīwān of the six ancient Arabic poets*, London 1870, English section, 114 no. 30). The same line is quoted (with a variant) by Ibn Hishām, who ascribes it to a certain 'Ubayd ibn Waḥb al-'Abṣī (*Sira*, 1-2:305.15). For Zubayr, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:118-20.

<sup>33</sup> Here we find the hemistich *ma'rūfihā ma'rūfihā ma'rūfihā munkarā* ('Am I to show him my kindness rather than my unkindness?', Abū Tamīmān (d. 231/846), *Ḥamānān*, *qūḍā* H. M. Naqsha, Beirut 1991, 1047 no. 681, line 2). The same hemistich appears in a poem of the Jāhili poet Ḥātim al-Tā'i (*Dīwān*, 300 no. 113, line 2; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:208f.); it is also found in one of the late first/seventh-century poet 'Ujayr al-Salīfī (Abū 'l-Faraj, *Aghāni*, 13:66.15; for this poet, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:334f.).

<sup>34</sup> In one hemistich the poet who claims to have turned a new leaf, says that he is no longer one who responds rudely to someone who behaves pleasantly to him (*ma'rūf gh'īlīn yanmanu bi-dīnī 'l-'urūf munkarā*, Ḥātim al-Tā'i, *Dīwān*, 267 no. 68, line 11). Two lines earlier in the same poem we have the hemistich *idhā quḥu ma'rūfihā labūn galā munkarā* ('When I speak nicely to him, he responds rudely', *ibid.*, line 9, in the text of Zubayr ibn Bakr, *Akhbār*, 419.2). See also the preceding note.

al-Dhubayānī.<sup>35</sup> We even find precedent for one of our Islamic phrases for taking action against a wrong (*amkaru 'i-munkar*).<sup>36</sup> This latter might be dismissed as retrojection, since it is not widely attested. But it would require a categorical rejection of the corpus of pre-Islamic poetry to dispose of the attestations of 'right' and 'wrong', and a high degree of scepticism to disallow the evidence for their pairing.

Second, the locutions 'commanding right' and 'forbidding wrong' are unknown to pre-Islamic poetry. They only begin to appear – and then sporadically – in poetry of the early Islamic period.<sup>37</sup> The most that can be said is that one of these early Islamic attestations purports to be describing a scene set in the pre-Islamic period.<sup>38</sup> In other words, it would require a high degree of credulity to find in poetry evidence that these phrases were used before Islam.

The situation is thus fairly clear-cut. Pre-Islamic Arabia knew well the terms 'right' and 'wrong', and seems to have paired them. But if we can judge from its poetry, it did not possess the notions of 'commanding' or 'forbidding' them. Nor, to my knowledge, is there evidence in poetry of

such a value expressed in other terms. Protecting those who have been wronged is a familiar theme in pre-Islamic Arabia, but it is a protection extended to those who seek it, not to the wronged as such.<sup>39</sup>

From what has been said in this section, we can conclude that the Koran owes the terms 'right' and 'wrong' (*ma 'rifā* and *munkar*) to pre-Islamic Arabia.<sup>40</sup> But what of 'commanding' and 'forbidding' them? We have no serious precedent for such a usage from within Arabia; nor, to my knowledge, do we have any from outside it that is likely to be historically relevant.<sup>41</sup> It is accordingly an obvious hypothesis, though not one we can hope to prove, that the usage which provides the Islamic duty with its name was a Koranic innovation. As far as terminology is concerned, there is little more to be said.

The religious recognition of the duty is another matter. As we have seen earlier in this book, it is by no means clear that the Koranic verses that speak of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong' are in fact talking about the duty we know from later Islamic thought, and this opacity is strongly reflected in early exegesis.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, an early usage which clearly does refer to our duty speaks not of 'forbidding' wrong but rather of 'righting' it.<sup>43</sup> We therefore have some reason to put the Koranic terminology to one side and to look elsewhere for the antecedents of the conception itself.

### 3. MONOTHEIST PARALLELS

Goldziner, in an extended discussion of the duty,<sup>44</sup> adduced two parallels from outside Islam. One was the institution of the censorship in Confucian China;<sup>45</sup> to this he might have added the more familiar censorship of Republican Rome.<sup>46</sup> Both were institutions maintained by the state, and as

<sup>35</sup> Here we have the hemistich *fa-lā 'i-mukar ma 'rifān wa-lā 'i-'arfa ātā'ih* ('Neither is evil good, nor does a good deed perish', Nabigha al-Dhubayānī, *Dihān*, ed. S. Faysal, Beirut 1968, 53 no. 3, line 35; also Khalīl ibn al-Muḍarrī (d. 170/786f.), *Kitaḥ al-'ayn*, ed. M. al-Makhlūmī and I. al-Samarā'ī, Qum 1405–10, 2:121–7). For this poem, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:110–13. The context of the hemistich is strongly religious, which renders its jāhili character somewhat suspect; compare the antithesis of *munkar* and *ma 'rifā* in an equally religious context in a hemistich from a suspect poem of Umayya ibn Abī 'i-Salt, who lived into Islamic times (*Dihān*, ed. 'A. al-Saifī, Damascus 1974, 354 no. 10, line 2; for this poem, see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:298–300).

<sup>36</sup> The jāhili Qays ibn Zuhayr al-'Absī (for whom see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:216) has the line: *uḥāḡ min 'rifāhīn munkarātin/fa-wkirtuhā wa-mā ana bi-'i-ghashāmī* (*apud* Beyan, *Makā'id*, 97.6; also Muḥaddal ibn Salāma (β. later third/ninth century), *Fāḥih*, ed. 'A. al-Tahāwī, Cairo 1960, 228.1, with *zālim* for *ghashām*). Cf. also the phrase *wakirtuhā 'i-munkarā* in a poem of the jāhili Abū Jundab al-Hudhāli (Sakkārī (d. 275/888f.), *Shiḥ* *Abī 'ār al-Hudhāliyyīn*, ed. 'A. A. Farrāḡi, Cairo 1965, 361 no. 9, in an isolated couplet; for this poem see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, 2:258).

<sup>37</sup> I have the following four attestations. (1) We find *amarrā bi-ma 'rifā* in a poem of Ḥasān ibn Ṭāhib (d. c. 54/674) (*Dihān*, ed. W. N. 'Arāf, London 1971, 1:235 no. 111, line 3); for the context, see the following note. (2) A poem of 'Amr ibn Ma dī Karb has *amar-tuhā bi... 'i-ma 'rifā* (Ibn Hishām, *Sira*, 3–4:583.22 (but contrast *ihād*, 584.13); Tabari, *Ta 'riḥ*, series 1, 1733.2, likewise from Ibn Ishāq (d. 150/767f.)). 'Amr had just returned from a visit to the Prophet during which he had converted to Islam, and was addressing a tribal chief who had ignored his advice to do likewise. (3) The phrase *alladhī wa 'murā bi-'i-'urfi* (cf. Q7:199) appears in a poem of Muḥammad ibn Yaṣ ibn al-Bakayr (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥammad*, 384.8). The context is the fatal wounding of Zayd ibn 'Umar ibn al-Kharāṭib in an attempt to break up a fight, apparently during the reign of Mu 'āyya (r. 41–60/661–80). (4) The words *mābīna... 'ani 'i-mukar* occur in a poem mourning the Ibādī rebels who perished in 130/747f. (see above, ch. 15, note 18).

<sup>38</sup> The context in attestation (1) in the preceding note is the death of Mālik ibn al-Najfīr, who is being addressed by his sons. Mālik was an ancestor of Ḥasān, and lived eight generations before him (Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamhara*, 347.8).

<sup>39</sup> Describing pre-Islamic Beduin society, Jacob remarks that when a man who has been wronged can get no help from his own tribe, he often turns to a more powerful tribe or prince; the latter is likely to see it as a point of honour to stand up for the weak, particularly when he can expect his deed to receive poetic recognition (G. Jacob, *Alamantiches Beduinleben*, Berlin 1897, 217–18). Cf. also B. Faris, *L'hommeur des les Arabes avant l'Islam*, Paris 1932, 88–91, 151–3.

<sup>40</sup> As suggested in R. Levy, *The social structure of Islam*, Cambridge 1957, 194.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. above, 561f. <sup>42</sup> See above, ch. 2, section 1 and 22f.

<sup>43</sup> See above, ch. 3, 34f. <sup>44</sup> Goldziner, *Leve*, 85–102.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 87. On this institution see C. O. Hucker, *The censorial system of Ming China*, Stanford 1966, esp. ch. 1 (drawn to my attention by Andy Plaks). Goldziner's parallel is not a good one: the traditional Chinese censorship was an official institution concerned with the monitoring of the state apparatus, not of society at large (see, for example, *ibid.*, 147); that its tone was moralistic and its operations involved frequent remonstrations is beside the point.

<sup>46</sup> For a brief account of the Roman censorship and its *regimen mortu*, see H. F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, *Historical introduction to the study of Roman law*, Cambridge 1972, 51–4.

such might bear comparison with the Islamic censorship (*hisba*) – itself a special case of forbidding wrong. But they are quite unlike the general Islamic conception of an executive power of individual believers existing outside any institutional framework. The other parallel adduced by Goldziher is from Rabbinic Judaism,<sup>47</sup> and this is considerably more to the point.<sup>48</sup>

In the first place, a comparable duty is already prescribed in scripture: 'you shall reprove your neighbour (*hokheah tokhiah et-amitekha*), or you will incur guilt yourself' (Lev. 19:17). This is adduced by the rabbis, appropriately enough, to show that if a man sees something unseemly in his neighbour, it is his duty to rebuke him.<sup>49</sup> (Here and below, all Jewish sources adduced are pre-Islamic, unless otherwise indicated.) He also has the duty of repeating his rebuke if the offender does not take the point (*lo gibbe*).<sup>50</sup> How much come-back does he have to put up with in the performance of the duty? Here there is disagreement: till he is beaten? till he is cursed? till the offender becomes angry?<sup>51</sup> There is also dispute as to where one's duty lies if one's initiative will be of no avail. One rabbi declined to rebuke the members of the household of the exilarch on the grounds that they would not accept (*gabbe*) it from him; another held that he should rebuke them notwithstanding.<sup>52</sup> There should be no respect of persons: a disciple has the duty of rebuking a teacher.<sup>53</sup> Failure to perform

the duty can lead to collective divine punishment: Jerusalem was destroyed because 'they did not rebuke one another'.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, there is a preference for private rebuke: Jeroboam merited the kingship because he reproved Solomon, but was punished for reproving him in public (*ban-rabbin*).<sup>55</sup> Reproving people is not a way of making friends: if a young scholar is popular with his fellow-townsmen, it is because he does not rebuke them in religious matters.<sup>56</sup> As might be expected, the duty does not flourish in the present: no one in this generation is able to reprove, or able to accept (*le-gabbe*) reproof, or even knows how to reprove.<sup>57</sup>

In the second place, there is a duty (perhaps to be equated with the preceding) to protest (*le-mahot*) at the misdeeds of others. This duty is aired in connection with the celebrated scandal of Rabbi Eli'azar ben 'Azariah's cow. This cow would go out on the Sabbath with a strap between its horns, a practice on which the sages looked askance,<sup>58</sup> though Rabbi Eli'azar himself deemed it permissible.<sup>59</sup> So far, these commotions hardly concern us. In the Babylonian Talmud, however, a discussion takes place which puts a quite different complexion on the matter. Here it is suggested that the cow was not in fact Rabbi Eli'azar's at all, but rather the property of a female neighbour; it was accounted his because he failed to protest about it (*lo miyah bab*).<sup>60</sup> The ensuing Talmudic discussion endorses the principle here suggested: that failure to protest when one is in a position to do so saddles one with responsibility for what one has failed to prevent.<sup>61</sup> In this way one can acquire an unwelcome responsibility for the sins of one's household, of one's fellow-townsmen, even of the world at large.<sup>62</sup> Elders are liable to divine punishment for failing to protest against the misdeeds of princes.<sup>63</sup> But what if

<sup>47</sup> Goldziher, *Livre*, 86 n. 1, quoting (or rather misquoting) Babylonian Talmud, *Vinius* 1880–6, *Shabbat*, f. 54b.51, and noting in passing a certain 'parante' (I cite the Babylonian Talmud by the standard foliation, which appears also in the Soncino translation, ed. I. Epstein, London 1935–52.) Goldziher's rabbinic parallel has not received much attention from subsequent scholarship, but it has been noted by van Ess (*Theologic, medieval Islam and Bible criticism*, Princeton 1992, 145 and n. 9).

<sup>48</sup> For helpful surveys of the Jewish material, see *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem 1971–2, 13:1605f, art. 'Rebuke and reproof', *Encyclopaedia Talmudica*, Jerusalem 1969–, 2:616–18, art. 'Afroshe me-issara'; E. E. Urbach, *The Sages: their concepts and beliefs*, Cambridge, Mass. and London 1975, 563f. I am indebted to Mark Cohen and Menachem Lorberbaum for assistance with several of the references to primary sources in what follows.

<sup>49</sup> Babylonian Talmud, *'Arakhin*, f. 16b.14. In another passage the duty is elicited from 1 Sam. 1:14, where Eli tells the apparently inebriated Hannah to put away her liquor (*ibid.*, *Berakhot*, f. 31a.61).

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, *'Arakhin*, f. 16b.16. Another passage states that one must repeat the rebuke even after four or five attempts (*Sifra*, Jerusalem 5743, second part, 4:8, f. 39a.10 = trans. J. Neuser, *Sifra: an analytical translation*, Atlanta 1988, 3:109 (to Lev. 19:17)); yet another that one should repeat the rebuke as much as a hundred times (Babylonian Talmud, *Baba Me'i'a*, f. 31a.43).

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, *'Arakhin*, f. 16b.31. <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, *Shabbat*, f. 55a.11. The scriptural advice not to rebuke (*al-tohiat*) a scoffer (Prov. 9:8) is quoted in support of the view that one should speak out only when one will be heard (*ibid.*, *Tehumot*, f. 65b.18). <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, *Baba Me'i'a*, f. 31a.44.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, *Shabbat*, f. 119b.42.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, *Sanhedrin*, f. 101b.43 (citing 1 Kings 11:27). Cf. the comment of Rashi (d. ad 1105) to Lev. 19:17 (*Perrishe Rashi al ha-Torah*, ed. H. D. Chavel, Jerusalem 1982, 373:21; I owe this reference to Simon Cook).

<sup>56</sup> Babylonian Talmud, *Kerubot*, 105b.19.

<sup>57</sup> *Sifra*, second part, 4:9, f. 39a.11 (to Lev. 19:17), and cf. Babylonian Talmud, *'Arakhin*, f. 16b.17.

<sup>58</sup> Mishnah, *Shabbat*, 5:4 = H. Danby (trans.), *The Mishnah*, Oxford 1933, 104. (I cite the Mishnah by the standard division of the text.)

<sup>59</sup> Mishnah, *Besit*, 2:8 (trans. Danby, 184); *ibid.*, *'Eruvot*, 3:12 (trans. Danby, 428).

<sup>60</sup> Babylonian Talmud, *Shabbat*, f. 54b.49. <sup>61</sup> This principle is stated explicitly in the Palestinian Talmud: whoever is able to protest (*le-mahot*) and does not do so is himself guilty of the offence (Palestinian Talmud, *Shabbat*, 5:4 (Venice c. 1522, f. 7c.28 = trans. J. Neuser et al., *The Talmud of the Land of Israel*, Chicago and London 1982–, 1:1:183); *ibid.*, *Kerubot*, 13:1 (f. 35c.51 = trans. Neuser, 22:358f.); the first passage makes reference to the Babylonian discussion of the female neighbour and the cow). <sup>62</sup> Babylonian Talmud, *Shabbat*, f. 54b.51. <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 55a.1, offered in explanation of Isa. 3:14.

protest would achieve nothing?<sup>64</sup> The issue is raised in a discussion between God and Justice regarding certain righteous men among the sinners of Jerusalem. Justice alleges against them that 'it was in their power to protest, but they did not do so'; God's retort is that it was already known that, had they protested, the sinners would not have accepted it from them.<sup>65</sup>

Finally, there is a duty to restrain others from forbidden actions (*le-afshoh me-issura*).<sup>66</sup> It is clear from the Talmudic passages in question that we have to do with a definite principle of law; it has a set phrasing, and in two instances is held to override other legal principles. Its performance, it emerges, may be by word (telling someone what to do, or shouting at them to restrain them from a violation), or by deed (stalking an unmarried couple with the intention of restraining them from performing a forbidden act). There is no reference to violence.

Here, then, we have the beginnings of a scholastic elaboration of a religious duty or duties similar in character to forbidding wrong, though relatively far less salient. So far as I know, there is nothing comparable in Syriac Christianity before Islamic times. A Jewish background to the Islamic duty is thus quite plausible. It is not, of course, proved by the general similarity, and I doubt if the case could be clinched. But this Jewish precedent would provide a starting-point for the development of the Muslim duty which is closer to the classical Islamic conception than are the vague Koranic verses that give the duty its name.<sup>67</sup>

It may be added in passing that the terminology of the Muslim duty was readily adopted by Jews writing in Arabic in Islamic times.<sup>68</sup> At the same

<sup>64</sup> It is here that we find the discussion already cited on rebuking members of the exilarch's household (see above, note 52). This strongly suggests that the duties of 'rebuking' (*le-hokhikh*) and 'protesting' (*le-mahsh*) are, as might be expected, one and the same. They are clearly taken to be so by Maimonides (d. ad 1204) in his discussion of the commandment to rebuke, see his *Mishneh Torah*, De'ot, 6:7 (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 1965-7, 1:58b-26, 58b-32; for a translation of the chapter, see Maimonides, *The book of knowledge*, trans. H. M. Russell and J. Weinberg, Edinburgh 1981, 44-7).

<sup>65</sup> Babylonian Talmud, *Shabbat*, f. 52a.23. Compare the principle stated in the Palestinian Talmud: when one is not in a position to protest (*le-mahsh*) (effectively), one should not do so (*Seviva*, 8:2 (f. 22b.41 = trans. Neusser, 27:201E)).

<sup>66</sup> Babylonian Talmud, *Shabbat*, f. 40b.36; *ibid.*, *Erubin*, f. 63a.27; *ibid.*, *Sukkah*, f. 52a.53. Though the pre-Islamic material does not explicitly say so, one assumes that those to be restrained are other Jews.

<sup>67</sup> For Muslim awareness of the Jewish precedent, cf. above, ch. 4, 47.

<sup>68</sup> Sā'ādhā (d. ad 942) speaks of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* in his work *al-Amānāt wa'l-i'tiqānāt* (ed. S. Landauer, Leiden 1880, 256.17, noted by Goldziher in his review in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 35 (1881), 775 (drawn to my attention by Frank Stewart). The fourth/tenth-century Qarāṭī Qhṭisānī adopts the terms *mankar* and *shayyār*. The fourth/tenth-century Qarāṭī Qhṭisānī adopts the terms *mankar* and *shayyār*. *man ra'ā min karān wa-kānu qādiran 'alā inkārah* (Qhṭisānī, *al-Amwār wa'l-jawāyib*, ed. L. Nemoy, New York 1939-43, 416.9, and cf. 416.10); *ihdā him lam yanāharā wa-yughayyirū (ibid.*, 416.20). One fifth/eleventh-century Rabbanite document lists (*al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*) *wa'l-mahsh* 'an *al-manakar* among the prerogatives of the head of

time, some themes found on the Muslim side now make their first appearance in Jewish discussions of the duty of rebuke.<sup>69</sup> Christians seem to have been less receptive;<sup>70</sup> but we possess a Syriac account of forbidding wrong by Barhebraeus (d. ad 1286), derived as might be expected from that of Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111).<sup>71</sup>

While a Jewish point of departure for the scholastic elaboration of the duty in Islam is by no means implausible, there is a comparative observation which significantly weakens the case. Judaism and Islam are not the only cultures in which a duty of this kind receives formal scholastic development. Such a duty was also well known to the Latin West, where it was termed 'fraternal correction' (*correctio fraterna*). Rebuking others for their sins was, of course, a Christian habit of hoary antiquity and firm scriptural foundations,<sup>72</sup>

the *yeshiva* (*ru' s al-mushib*) (in Jerusalem) (see S. D. Goitein, 'Arabic documents on the Palestinian Gaonate (in Hebrew)', *Eretz-Israel*, 10 (1971), 103 line 7, and see *ibid.*, 105, for Goitein's comments on the phrase, and *ibid.*, 100, for his dating of the document to the late 420s/1030s; I owe this reference to Gideon Libson). In another Rabbanite document from the same period, ten elders are to assist the head of the community in Old Cairo in, among other things, *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-mahsh* 'an *al-manakar*' (see S. D. Goitein, 'The local Jewish community in the light of the Cairo Geniza records', *The Journal of Jewish Studies*, 12 (1961), 156 line 9, and see *ibid.*, 144). As noted by Lazarus-Yachin (*Intermediate worlds*, 145), Ibn Paquda (*Il. later fifth/eleventh century*) uses the phrase in several passages of a pious work (*al-Hidāya lila fanā'ih al-ghayb*, ed. A. S. Yahuda, Leiden 1912, 172.15, 196.11, 211.5, 248.20, 272.8, 330.18); in the latter two of these passages he makes mention of the three modes, and in the last (as noted by the editor in his introduction, 82 n. 2) he equates the duty with that of Lev. 19:17. Judah ha-Levi (d. ad 1141) uses the term of the philosophers in his *Kuzari* (*Kitāb al-radd wa'l-dalīl*, ed. D. H. Baneth, Jerusalem 1977, 170.11), as noted by Goldziher in his review of the first edition of the text (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 41 (1887), 692, drawn to my attention by Frank Stewart).

<sup>69</sup> In addition to the adoption of the three modes by Ibn Paquda (see the preceding note), there are two examples to be found in the chapter on the duty in the *Mishneh Torah* of Maimonides. First, he states that a man living among evildoers should emigrate (De'ot, 6:1 (1:58a.8)). Second, he stresses the importance of performing the duty gently (*ibid.*, 6:7 (1:58b.28)) and without initial harshness (*ibid.*, 6:8 (1:59a.3)). It is a pity that we have no account of the duty in the extant parts of the *Kifāyat al-ābidin* of his son Abraham Maimonides (d. ad 1237) (for this work, see S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967-93, 5:475-81).

<sup>70</sup> The closest parallel I have seen to the Muslim terminology in Christian Arabic is in a work of Theodor Abu Qurra (*fl. later second/eighth century*) in which he quotes Muslims describing the mission of the Prophet: *wa-ra'ā nuwraha bi'l-halāl wa-'ammā al-kibār wa-yunāhiha 'an al-harām wa-'ammā al-sī'* (*Miftāḥ fī wujūh al-khāliq wa'l-dīn al-ḡayrīn*, ed. L. Chekhal, *al-Mashrif*, 15 (1912), 770.14, drawn to my attention by Robert Hoyland; this is presumably the passage to which van Ess refers, *Theologie*, 2:387).

<sup>71</sup> See below, appendix 2.

<sup>72</sup> See, for example, Lev. 19:17 and Matt. 18:15-17. The wording of Matt. 18:15 (*si autem peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade, et corrip'e eum inter te et ipsum solum*) can provide justification for the term *correctio fraterna*, 'fraternal rebuke'. For a study of the New Testament conception and its background, see A. Shenk-Ziegler, *Correctio fraterna in Neuen Testament*. *Die 'fratellische Zurechtweisung' in biblischen, frühchristlichen und hellenistischen Schriften*, Würzburg 1997 (drawn to my attention by Sebastian Brock). The author, a Catholic, is interested in reviving the practice.

But to my knowledge, it was not the object of systematic doctrinal exposition until the thirteenth century AD. The tradition then established has remained a part, though not perhaps a very prominent one, of Catholic Christianity ever since.<sup>73</sup> The classic account is that of Thomas Aquinas (d. AD 1274),<sup>74</sup> and it will give us most of what we need.

Much of the detailed argumentation of Aquinas's account is naturally peculiar to the Christian tradition, and more particularly to its Latin form. Yet no reader who is familiar with the Islamic doctrine of forbidding wrong could fail to be struck by the broad similarities. Fraternal correction is a duty (*in praecepto*),<sup>75</sup> but not an absolute one: it is not to be carried out without regard for place and time,<sup>76</sup> and we are not to set ourselves up as investigators of the lives of others (*exploratores vitae aliorum*).<sup>77</sup> Correcting a sinner for his own sake by simple admonition (*admonitio*) is the business of everyone<sup>78</sup> who possesses charity, whether he be an inferior or a superior (*vere sit subditus sive praelatus*) – though the duty presses more heavily on superiors.<sup>79</sup> An inferior may thus correct a superior, provided this is done in private and in a gentle and respectful manner, without impudence and harshness (*non cum protervia et duritia*,

*sed cum mansuetudine et reverentia*),<sup>80</sup> however, if there is imminent danger to the faith, it must be done in public<sup>81</sup> (but not, it seems, harshly). Does a sinner have a duty to correct a wrongdoer?<sup>82</sup> He at least commits no sin if he reproves him with humility.<sup>83</sup> Do we have a duty to refrain from correction if we fear that it will merely make the sinner worse? In such a case, where it is judged probable (*probabiliter asseritur*) that the offender will not accept the reproof (*admonitionem non recipit*), fraternal correction is not to be attempted.<sup>84</sup> Does the duty require us to admonish the wrongdoer in secret before going on to public denunciation?<sup>85</sup> The answer, in general, is that it does.<sup>86</sup> What is more, we should continue to admonish him in private as long as there is hope that this will work (*quandiu spes probabiliter habetur de correctione*). But when we judge that private admonition is unlikely to succeed, we escalate (*procedendum est ulterius*).<sup>87</sup>

In later Catholic doctrine further resemblances appear. The duty is held to be established by both reason (*iure . . . naturali*) and revelation (*iure divino positivo*),<sup>88</sup> a point Aquinas had not addressed. (This, of course, aligns Catholicism with an opinion held only by a minority of Muslim scholars.) The question whether it is obligatory to perform fraternal correction in the case of a venial sin is discussed.<sup>89</sup> Aquinas's treatment of the conditions of obligation is by Islamic standards unsystematic,<sup>90</sup> this is made good with the appearance of a schema of five conditions.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>73</sup> For surveys, see the article 'Correction fraternelle' in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, Paris 1903–50 (G. Blanc), and J. A. Costello, *Moral obligation of fraternal correction*, Washington D.C. 1949. Both are written from within the tradition, Costello includes guidance on the proper response to some of the evils afflicting Catholic life in modern times (*ibid.*, 105–12). In general, the Catholic literature I have consulted on the duty lacks the wealth of anecdote and consideration of particular cases that we find on the Muslim side. To my surprise, I was unable to locate any systematic discussions in Protestant literature.

<sup>74</sup> Thomas Aquinas (d. AD 1274), *Summa theologica*, 2a2ae. 33, 1–8. In what follows I cite the Blackfriars edition, with facing English translation (London and New York 1964–76, 34:274–305). Another account by Aquinas, this one using the term *correctio fraterna* (cf. above, note 72), is found in his *In quartum libros Sententiarum*, IV, 19, 2, in his *Opera omnia*, ed. R. Busa, Stuttgart 1980, 1:549c–552c; I cite this only for some points not found in the *Summa theologica*.<sup>75</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, 34:278f. (art. 2).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 280f. (art. 2).  
<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 282f. (art. 2).  
<sup>78</sup> On this point Aquinas quotes a passage from Gratian (writing c. AD 1140) to the effect that the rebuking (*redargutio*) of sinners is a duty not just of prelates, but also of all the rest of the faithful (*regimini fidelis omnes*) (*ibid.*, 284 (art. 3), citing Gratian, *Decretum*, second part, XXIV, 3, 14 = Rome 1584, 1334). This citation is exceptional: fraternal correction is not a topic that is developed in canon law (cf. *Dictionnaire de droit canonique*, Paris 1935–65, art. 'Correctio' (H. Durand), 690).

<sup>79</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, 34:284f. (art. 3). A *praedilectus* is someone exercising public authority (see Aquinas, *In quartum libros Sententiarum*, 550a ra6, and 551a co). In his handling of the relationship between fraternal correction and formally constituted authority, Aquinas is addressing an issue that was controversial in Latin Christendom both before and after his time. For a richly documented discussion, see P. Buc, *L'ambiguïté du Latere prince, pape, roi, et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible au Moyen Age*, Paris 1994, 352–6, 380–92, 394–8. Buc contrasts an egalitarian tendency with a hierarchic tendency (*ibid.*, 399); it is clear from his study that the hierarchic tendency was far more salient in Latin Christianity than its equivalent was in Islam (cf. above, ch. 17, notes 29f., 41, 158). Buc's study was drawn to my attention by Patricia Cronin.

<sup>80</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, 34:286f. (art. 4).  
<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 288f. (art. 4).

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 288f. (art. 5).  
<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 290f. (art. 5). At one point the familiar argument is adduced that if sinners could not correct others, then no one could perform the duty (*ibid.*, 288f. (art. 5)).

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 292–5 (art. 6).  
<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 294f. (art. 7).

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 298f. (art. 7). This applies to hidden sins without public implications.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 302f. (art. 8). He here takes issue with unnamed authorities who are against such escalation (*dicabant non esse ulterius procedendum*).

<sup>88</sup> See Alphonsus Liguori (d. AD 1787), *Theologia moralis*, ed. L. Gaudé, Graz 1954, 1:331 §34; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, art. 'Correction fraternelle', 1908. The work of Saint Alphonsus lies behind numerous Catholic treatises of moral theology written since his day, several of which are cited by Blanc (*ibid.*, 1911).

<sup>89</sup> Alphonsus, *Theologia moralis*, 1:331 §34; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, art. 'Correction fraternelle', 1909, reporting disagreement among the scholars.

<sup>90</sup> Something more like a set of conditions is given by Albert the Great (d. AD 1280), a teacher of Aquinas. In responding to the question whether fraternal correction is to be performed by all against all, he answers that it is, according to the discretion of the wise, however, it is to be done with moderation, and with attention to four points: (1) the extent of the wrongdoer's guilt; (2) the expectation that he will reform (*spes emendationis*); (3) the status of the admonisher; and (4) his motivation. In his brief comments on these points, he says that if the guilt is slight and it is feared that the result would be worse disorder (*turba gratior*), there is no obligation (*Commentarii in quartum librum Sententiarum*, XIN, E, 20 = *Opera omnia*, ed. A. and E. Borgnet, Paris 1890–9, 29:825f.).

<sup>91</sup> Alphonsus, *Theologia moralis*, 1:332f. §§38f. Such five-condition schemas appear in, for example, A. Lehmkuhl, *Theologia moralis*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1898, 1:365, and the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, New York 1967, art. 'Correction, fraternal' (F. J. Connell), 349n.

What then of the major differences between fraternal correction and forbidding wrong? In the first place, two issues are treated at length which are alien to the Islamic doctrine of forbidding wrong. The first of the eight articles into which Aquinas divides his discussion is concerned with the question whether fraternal correction is an act of charity or of justice.<sup>92</sup> – the answer being that it is the former.<sup>93</sup> The last of the eight articles likewise deals with an unfamiliar issue: whether witnesses should be brought in prior to public denunciation<sup>94</sup> – the answer being that in general they should.<sup>95</sup> This concern, which has no equivalent in Islam, is directly driven by Christian scripture (Matt. 18:16).

In the second place, there are two points worth noting where the issues are the same, but the answers somewhat different. First, Aquinas is by Islamic standards strikingly inflexible regarding the conditions that dispense one from performing the duty: it is a mortal sin to omit it out of fear (*propter timorem*). Thus fear would be no excuse in a case where one had reason to believe that one could persuade a sinner to pull back.<sup>96</sup> Later Catholic doctrine, however, is much more cautious on this point, voiding the obligation where it would involve serious harm (*grave damnum*) to oneself.<sup>97</sup> Second, Aquinas, as we have seen, does not envisage situations

Footnote 91 (cont.)

Noldin has four conditions (H. Noldin, *Summa theologiarum moralis*, Innsbruck 1955–6, 2:90f. §96). Other authors adopt a schema of three conditions, as in the case of A. Koch and A. Preuss, *A handbook of moral theology*, St Louis, Mo. and London 1924, 5:31, and *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, art. 'Correction fraternelle', 1910. In this last source the three conditions are listed as follows: (1) the offender must definitely have committed the sin in question; (2) there must be good reason to expect success ('espoir fondé de réussir'); (3) the performer of the duty must not thereby place himself in serious danger ('aucun grave danger'). As will be seen below (notes 96f.), the third condition involves a substantive, though tacit, departure from the doctrine of Aquinas.

<sup>92</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, 34:274f. (art. 1).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 300f. (art. 8).

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 302f. (art. 8).

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 280–3 (art. 2). Aquinas here yokes with fear the love of worldly things (*cupiditas*) as an unacceptable motive for failing to perform the duty. Presumably this would also rule out danger to one's property as an excuse. This whole discussion (including the term *cupiditas*) derives from an argument set out by Augustine (d. AD 430) in Book I, ch. 9 of the *City of God*; the Christians too deserved what they suffered in the sack of Rome because they had not done their duty in rebuking the sinners whose misdeeds provoked God's wrath (*De civitate Dei*, Turnhout 1955, 8–10 = *The City of God*, abridged translation, ed. V. J. Bourke, New York 1958, 46–9; cf. the Rabbinic discussion between God and Justice, above, note 65, and above, note 54). To make the argument work, Augustine naturally has to minimise excuses, and it is this residue of an ancient polemical context that probably lies behind Aquinas's inflexibility.

<sup>96</sup> Alphonsus, *Theologia moralis*, 1:333 §39, condition 5; how this is to be squared with the view of Aquinas (cf. *ibid.*, 332–37) is not clear to me. Other authors follow this stipulation (so, for example, Lehmküh, *Theologia moralis*, 1:365; *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, art. 'Correction, fraternal', 349a; and see above, note 91). Noldin resolves the tension by specifying groundless fear (*vanus timor*) (*Summa*, 2:91 96, condition a, and cf. condition c).

in which it would be appropriate to speak harshly to a superior; the goldsmith of Marw has accordingly no place in his scheme of things.<sup>98</sup>

In the third place, there is a basic structural difference between the Christian and Islamic conceptions. What I did not make clear above is that Aquinas repeatedly distinguishes two kinds of correction. The first is the fraternal correction with which we are now familiar. This kind is done in the interests of the offender (whence it is an act of charity);<sup>99</sup> it is carried out by simple admonition, without any form of coercion (*non habens coercionem sed simplicem admonitionem*);<sup>100</sup> and it is the business of everyone.<sup>101</sup> The other kind of correction is carried out for the common good (*bonum commune*) (whence it is an act of justice);<sup>102</sup> it is marked by coercive force (*habet vim coactivam*), is reserved for superiors (*prelati*);<sup>103</sup> and may involve punishment (*punitio*).<sup>104</sup> Aquinas offers no term for this second type, but it passes under the name of 'juridical correction'.<sup>105</sup> How does this compare with Islamic conceptions? Fraternal correction has its equivalent in the verbal rebuke that any believer should administer to an offender. Juridical correction is part of the exercise of superior authority against wrongdoers.<sup>106</sup> What is missing on the Christian side is thus the entire domain of forbidding wrong as performed by the individual believer 'with the hand', whether or not this includes recourse to arms.

Finally, it is worth noting that later Catholic doctrine, unlike that of Aquinas, tends to minimise the extent to which private persons are obligated to perform 'fraternal correction'. One authority concludes his account of the conditions of obligation with the observation that it is clear that little or no blame attaches to private persons (*privati*) who fail to perform the duty.<sup>107</sup> Another stresses that it hardly ever extends to correcting a stranger, the reason being lack of good grounds to expect success in such a case; hence it is rare for private persons to be obligated to perform

<sup>98</sup> See above, notes 80f. The whole tone of the account suggests that illegitimate power was far less of a problem for Aquinas than it was in Islamic thought.

<sup>99</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, 34:276f. (art. 1).

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 292f. (art. 6). Noldin says that the rebuke need not necessarily be verbal, but the alternative steps he mentions (e.g. putting on a sad face) are, in Islamic terms, in the nature of avoidance rather than action (*Summa*, 2:90 94(a)). Costello is unusual in stating that the duty can be performed by 'word or deed' (*Moral obligation*, 23); this goes beyond the authority he cites (*ibid.*, 21 n. 22), but he does not elaborate.

<sup>101</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, 34:284f. (art. 3).

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 276f. (art. 1), 284f. (art. 3).

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 284f. (art. 3), 292f. (art. 6).

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 284f. (art. 3).

<sup>105</sup> *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, art. 'Correction fraternelle', 1907 ('correction juridique'). In his *In quartum libro Sententiarum*, Aquinas makes the distinction by contrasting the terms *correctio* and *correctio*: 'while correction (*correctio*) is an act of justice, rebuke (*correctio*) is an act of charity' (*ibid.*, 550a ra6).

<sup>106</sup> This distinction would have appealed to 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731) (see above, ch. 12, 326f.).

<sup>107</sup> Alphonsus, *Theologia moralis*, 1:333 §39.

the duty among themselves unless they know each other, and rarer still for an inferior to be obligated to correct a superior.<sup>108</sup>

Now it would be satisfying to argue that this Christian scholastic doctrine was in turn inspired by that of Islam. Latin Christendom and Islam were neighbours, and Aquinas lived in a period when a considerable volume of material had been translated from Arabic into Latin and received with great excitement. In this general historical context, an Islamic influence on the elaboration of the Christian doctrine of fraternal correction is eminently plausible. But again, clinching the argument is another matter. The process of translation from Arabic into Latin is reasonably well known, and the books translated were overwhelmingly works of science and philosophy; the limited corpus of specifically religious texts translated under the patronage of Peter the Venerable (d. AD 1156) offered no coverage of the scholastic tradition of Islam.<sup>109</sup> We thus have no knowledge of a tradition that would have included a systematic account of forbidding wrongs, and the likelihood that there ever was such a translation is probably small. At the same time, much that is reminiscent of Islamic doctrine in the account of Aquinas is missing from the slightly earlier discussion of William of Auxerre (d. AD 1231).<sup>110</sup> The systematic doctrine of fraternal correction could thus be seen as generated by the application of the new scholastic method to an old religious duty.<sup>111</sup> This in turn would tend to support the

<sup>108</sup> Lehmkuhl, *Theologia moralis*, 1:366; Noldin (*Summa*, 2:91 §96, condition 4) and Koch and Prouss (*Handbook*, 5:31, 33) take a similar view. Compare the question put to Khumaynī (d. 1409/1989) (above, ch. 18, note 293). Another difference between later Catholic thought and that of the Muslim scholars is that among the Catholics a question arises about the scope of the duty of fraternal correction where the offence is a violation of a human law (Alphonsus, *Theologia moralis*, 1:331f. §36; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, art. 'Correction fraternelle', 1909f, reporting considerable disagreement on the question and a shift of views).

<sup>109</sup> For this corpus, see J. Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, Princeton 1964, ch. 3; and see also M.-T. d'Alverny, 'Deux traductions latines du Coran au Moyen Âge', in her *La connaissance de l'Islam dans l'Occident médiéval*, Aldershot and Brookfield 1994, 125-7, and M.-T. d'Alverny and G. Vajda, 'Marc de Tolède, traducteur d'Ibn Tūmār', in the same volume. For an unusual work of this period which draws on a wider range of Arabic material to produce a handbook of practical morality, see J. Soliveri, 'The Arabic inheritance', in P. Dronke (ed.), *A history of twelfth-century Western philosophy*, Cambridge 1988, 132f., on the *Disciplina clericalis* of the Spanish Jewish convert Petrus Alfonsi. But 1988 contains nothing relevant to forbidding wrong. I am indebted to Antony Black for bibliographical assistance in this field.

<sup>110</sup> William of Auxerre (d. AD 1231), *Summa aurea*, ed. J. Riballer, Paris and Rome 1980-7, 3:1034-44. His account deals only with three major questions. The first is whether all are obligated, to which he gives essentially the same answer as Aquinas (*ibid.*, 1037-89). The second is about escalation: here to an extent he seems to side with the unnamed scholars with whom Aquinas takes issue (*ibid.*, 1040.41, 1041.70; cf. above, note 87). The third is concerned with rebukes administered by superiors (*ibid.*, 1042.3); in other words, he does not yet distinguish this topic from fraternal correction proper.

<sup>111</sup> The question whether, or to what extent, the scholastic method as such had an Islamic

view that the Islamic doctrine originated independently of the Jewish conceptions considered above. In short, while we certainly should not rule out a monogenetic view of the incidence of the scholastic doctrines we have reviewed, the fact is that we have little chance of establishing such a hypothesis.

#### 4. NON-MONOTHEIST PARALLELS

What then of the major non-monotheist traditions? I shall briefly consider here the belief-systems of ancient India and China, together with Zoroastrianism. To my knowledge, none of these traditions gives our duty a name, lays much emphasis on it, or elaborates it in a scholastic fashion.

To start with the Indians. I have not found anything of note in a sampling of the mainstream tradition deriving from the Vedas. Turning to the Buddhists, most of their literature is for monks, but there are exceptions; one of them (the *Sigālonādasuttā*) is part of the Theravāda (Pāli) canon.<sup>112</sup> Here the Buddha (c. fifth century BC) includes among the virtues of the good friend who tells one what one needs to do that 'he restrains [one] from wrong; he establishes [one] in right' (*pāpā nipīretī; kalyāṇe niveṣṭī*).<sup>113</sup> This has a formulaic ring, and indeed the phrase is shortly repeated: in one passage it is the parents who do this to their child, and in another the leaders in religious life who do it to the young layman of good family.<sup>114</sup> Yet the formula seems not to have achieved a wider currency in the canon.<sup>115</sup> Nor does the passage receive much attention in the exegetical literature,<sup>116</sup> or even in the one post-canonical Pāli work devoted to a systematic exposition of the proper conduct of the layman.<sup>117</sup> In short, the value

background does not concern us here (for the view that it did, see G. Maddisi, *The rise of colleges*, Edinburgh 1981, 245-60).

<sup>112</sup> See K. R. Norman, *Pāli literature*, Wiesbaden 1983, 42.

<sup>113</sup> *Digha nikāya*, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, London 1947-60, 3:187 §24 = T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (trans.), *Dialogues of the Buddha*, London 1899-1921, 3:179 §24). For this work as a whole, see Norman, *Pāli literature*, 32-44.

<sup>114</sup> *Digha nikāya*, 3:189 §28, and 191 §33 = Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, 3:181 §28, and 183 §33.

<sup>115</sup> See F. L. Woodward *et al.*, *Pāli Tipiṭakāṃ concordance*, London 1952-, 2:517f., entries for *nīpīretī* and *niveṣṭī*.

<sup>116</sup> There is a brief commentary on two of our texts in Buddhaghosa (fifth century AD), *Samyagata-vīṭāṇī*, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids *et al.*, London 1886-1932, 3:950.22 §24, and 953.13 §28, and an equally brief supercommentary in the *Dighanikāyaṭṭhākaṭṭhāṭṭhā* *ṭhāṭṭhā*, ed. L. de Silva, London 1970, 3:175.16 §24, and 180.1 §28. For these works, see Norman, *Pāli literature*, 122, 149. I do not have a very clear idea what either of them has to say, but it does not seem to be of much interest to us.

<sup>117</sup> *Uḍḍāṅgāyānīkāvāṇī*, ed. H. Saddhatissa, London 1965, 269 §64, and 273 §82 (merely repeating the commentary of Buddhaghosa). The work probably dates from the twelfth century AD (Norman, *Pāli literature*, 170).

failed to catch the eye of Buddhist scholasticism. For the Jains again I have nothing significant to report.<sup>118</sup>

The Chinese record, so far as it is known to me, is no richer. Confucius (d. 479 BC) has a saying to the effect that one should admonish friends, but give up if they fail to respond.<sup>119</sup> Mencius (fourth century BC) describes the admonition of the ruler by his ministers in similar terms: 'If repeated remonstrations fell on deaf ears, they would leave him.'<sup>120</sup> In the T'ang period (AD 618-907) it was reckoned one of the duties of the historian 'to encourage good and to reprove evil'.<sup>121</sup> Such stray parallels could doubtless be multiplied; but here again, there seems to be no single central value corresponding to ours, and no scholastic elaboration of such a duty.<sup>122</sup>

What this discussion of the Indian and Chinese cases might suggest is that there is something about the development of the duty in the Jewish, Christian and Islamic cases that has to do with the character of the monotheist tradition. The relevant features of this tradition might include the following: a sublimely ethical but personal conception of the divine (or

to put it less respectfully, a supremely self-righteous deity); a degree of active divine and human engagement in the affairs of this world (much posting o'er land and ocean without rest); and a tight sense of religious community (believers are their brothers' keepers). It could be argued that this combination is alien or peripheral to the central message of Buddhism, Jainism, the Vedic mainstream and Confucianism. But if this approach makes some sense, it does not in fact work out very neatly.

Consider the case of Zoroastrianism. Here we have a religion whose basic doctrines display relevant features of the monotheist tradition. It is true that Ahura Mazdā is not an overbearing personal god in the style of Israelite monotheism. But what better sanction for moral activism here and now than a conception of individual moral life as part and parcel of the cosmic struggle between good and evil? 'Every person ought to know: "Where have I come from? For what purpose am I here? Where do I return?" I, for my part, know that I came from Ohrmazd the Lord, that I am here so as to make the demons powerless, and that I shall return to Ohrmazd.'<sup>123</sup> Yet in a characteristic text containing several hundred moral sayings,<sup>124</sup> we find no set phrase identifying the value of preventing others from doing wrong, and little of its substance. We do learn that it is a duty to prevail on someone 'to turn away from a sin through which he might become wicked'.<sup>125</sup> Likewise it is good to find a friend who will tell one one's faults so that one can correct them.<sup>126</sup> Yet in general it is a vice, not a virtue, to reproach a sinner for his sin,<sup>127</sup> rather, it seems, one should correct one's own faults and learn from the goodness of others.<sup>128</sup> In a couple of sayings the suggestive phrase 'the preservation of the good and the uprooting of the wicked' appears; but it seems to describe a function of rulers and magnates, not of the individual believer.<sup>129</sup>

The overall effect of the non-monotheist parallels is to confirm that there is some link between doctrines of forbidding wrong (to generalise the Islamic term) and the monotheist tradition. But these parallels do not give

<sup>118</sup> There is a systematic presentation of the considerable Jaina scholastic literature on the duties of the layman in R. Williams, *Jaina yoga: a survey of the meditative practices*, London 1963. There are a few points at which a principle of preventing fellow-believers from acting wrongly might perhaps seem in place, but it does not actually appear (*ibid.*, 42, item (v); 67f., items (i), (ii) and (v); 272, item 4(ii)). I owe to K. R. Norman the information that the Jains sometimes affirm the principle 'Do not permit (or consent to) the doing of evil'.

<sup>119</sup> Confucius (d. 479 BC), *Analeks*, XII:23 = trans. D. C. Lau, Harmondsworth 1979, 117. Admonishing friends is a theme easily attested elsewhere; see, for example, the Pāli text cited above, note 113. Cicero (d. 43 BC), *Laelius de amicitia*, XXV:91 = cd. and trans. J. G. F. Powell, Warminster 1990, 68f. (*et monere et moneri proprium est vere amicitiae*); White, *Christian friendship*, 119, 193. Confucius also has a saying on remonstrating with one's parents which would not have displeased the Muslim scholars (*Analeks*, IV:18 = trans. Lau, 74).

<sup>120</sup> Mencius (fourth century BC), *Mencius*, VB:9 = trans. D. C. Lau, Harmondsworth 1970, 159. It is ministers who are not of royal blood who merely retire in this way if not listened to; those who are of royal blood depose a ruler who has made a serious mistake and does not respond to remonstrations.

<sup>121</sup> See D. Twitchett, *The writing of official history under the T'ang*, Cambridge 1992, 71, 78, and D. McMullen, *State and scholars in T'ang China*, Cambridge 1988, 194. The phrase goes back to the *Tso chin*, which uses it (with the two components in the opposite order) to praise the style of the *Spring and autumn* chronicle (*ch'ing o erh sh'ian shan*, see J. Legge (ed. and trans.), *The Chinese classics*, Hong Kong and London 1861-72, 5:384.12 = 385 par. 5; I am grateful to Andy Plaks for this reference). For the *Tso chin*, a commentary on the *Spring and autumn* classic dating from between the fifth and first century BC, see M. Loewe (ed.), *Early Chinese texts: a bibliographical guide*, Berkeley 1993, 67-71.

<sup>122</sup> The Chinese milieu in which one might have expected to find our value most clearly articulated is Mohism, with its egalitarian and utilitarian ethic. But no such value is attested in what we know of Mohist ethics (see A. C. Graham, *Later Mohist logic, ethics and science*, Hong Kong and London 1978, esp. 44-52).

<sup>123</sup> S. Shaked (trans.), *The wisdom of the Sasanian sages (Denkart VI)*, Boulder 1979, 184f. no. D9. Ohrmazd is Ahura Mazdā. Compare also: 'At least three times a day one should reckon with oneself in the following manner: "... Have I been today an assistant of the gods or of the demons?"' (*ibid.*, 200f. no. E31c).

<sup>124</sup> I.e. the sixth book of the *Denkart*, in the translation of Shaked cited in the previous note.

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, 128f. no. 322.

<sup>126</sup> *ibid.*, 46f. no. 115, and 204 = 207 no. E38a; cf. also 28f. no. 78.

<sup>127</sup> *ibid.*, 6-9 no. 14, and the parallels noted by Shaked, *ibid.*, 235, to no. 13.4.

<sup>128</sup> *ibid.*, 82f. no. 212, and cf. 110f. no. 284.

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, 44f. no. 113, and 48f. no. 118 (*ānāyishn ī wchān ud a-rōyāshn ī martarān*). I am grateful to Shaal Shaked for confirming my impression that the value that concerns us is not a prominent one in Zoroastrianism.

us much guidance as to how we should see the link. The Indian and Chinese material would fit the view that there is some elective affinity between forbidding wrong and monotheism; whereas the Zoroastrian comparison tends to restore the suspicion that there may be something monogenetic about the monotheist value. The result is to leave the question of origins undecided.

#### 5. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE ISLAMIC CASE

In his commentary to Q3:110, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) asks why the fact that the Muslims command right, forbid wrong and believe in God should have made them the best religious community, given that other communities have shared these qualities.<sup>130</sup> In answer he quotes the Transoxanian Shāfi'ite exegete Qaffāl (d. 365/976).<sup>131</sup> According to this scholar, the difference between the Muslims and their predecessors is that the Muslims perform the duty in its most stringent form (*bi-ākān al-mayyib*): fighting (*qital*), which involves the risk of being killed. Though this view was not well received by Rashīd Ridā (d. 1354/1935),<sup>132</sup> it is clear from the data on Judaism and Christianity presented above that Qaffāl cannot be faulted on his facts. Neither the Jewish nor the Christian accounts of the comparable duties provide any basis for recourse to violence by individual believers.<sup>133</sup> Nor, for that matter, do they incite them to confrontation with unjust rulers;<sup>134</sup> and the general tone of later Catholic doctrine is particularly tame.<sup>135</sup> All this is in striking contrast to the political salience and frequent abrasiveness of forbidding wrong in Islam. There are no Jewish or Christian parallels to the ways in which Muslim scholars link the duty to holy war<sup>136</sup> and Muslim rebels invoke it to grace insurrection.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, 8:191.21.

<sup>131</sup> For whom see above, ch. 13, 340f.

<sup>132</sup> Ridā, *Tafsīr al-Mantāz*, 4:61.24, 62.11 (to Q3:110), noted in Roest Crolius, 'Mission and morality', 281.

<sup>133</sup> See above, 572, and note 100. As Gerald Hawting points out to me, it is striking that the Christian accounts discussed above make no mention of the New Testament story of the cleansing of the Temple by Jesus (Matt. 21:12f., etc.). This is a fine example of fighting a wrong 'with the hand': Jesus drives out those engaged in buying and selling, and overturns the tables of the money-changers and the seats of the dove-sellers; in one account he uses a whip to drive sheep and cattle out of the Temple (John 2:15). Cf. below, appendix 2, notes 21f.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. above, notes 52, 80, 98.

<sup>135</sup> See above, notes 107f. As pointed out to me by Alexander Nchemas, the fact that the Catholic church – unlike the scholars of Islam – is an organisation with executive authority must be part of the explanation for the relative tameness of the Catholic doctrine of fraternal correction.

<sup>136</sup> See above, ch. 17, 490f.

<sup>137</sup> See above, ch. 17, 477f.

At the same time, the basic idea of the duty is antithetical to a hierarchic conception of society.<sup>138</sup> It is founded in the axiom that each and every legally competent Muslim possesses an executive power of the law of God.<sup>139</sup> And as elaborated in scholastic doctrine, the duty usually takes no account of differences of social standing. There are, as we have seen, some exceptions to this. In particular, there is the saying that allocates the 'three modes' to three groups in society: the rulers are to perform it with the hand, the scholars with the tongue, and the common people with the heart.<sup>140</sup> But it is uncommon to find a major scholar who commits himself to such notions in his formal account of the duty; perhaps the only significant example is the Shāfi'ite Ḥāfiṣī (d. 403/1012).<sup>141</sup> Since hierarchic conceptions of society were commonplace in the thought of medieval Muslims,<sup>142</sup> it is the relative absence of such notions in formal statements of the doctrine of forbidding wrong that is striking. Thus while parents are regularly presented as a special case, this is not so with social superiors in general.<sup>143</sup> It does not follow that the duty should be seen as actively subversive of all hierarchy. From this point of view, it is remarkable that its implications for some of the most fundamental inequalities are rarely explored: those between slaves and the free,<sup>144</sup> and between women and men.<sup>145</sup> Nevertheless, the egalitarian bias of the duty was by no means entirely neutralised in its exposure to a society that was in many ways saturated with hierarchic conceptions. Perhaps the everyday character of the duty and its individual locus rendered it fitter to survive the realities of medieval Islamic society than, for example, the contractual conception of political legitimacy.<sup>146</sup>

We have, then, a duty of an unusual character. It is an integral part of the mainstream scholastic tradition of Islamic societies; and yet it retains a marked potential for violence, subversion and egalitarianism.<sup>147</sup> In this combination lies the distinctive character of the Islamic conception of the duty.

<sup>138</sup> As Khumaynī puts it, commanding and forbidding are in the nature of an exercise of authority (*muṭawarrif*), even when undertaken by someone of humble station (*saʿfīf*), and are to be expressed accordingly (*Tafsīr*, 1:465 no. 12).

<sup>139</sup> Compare the story of the ascetic who was challenged by the Samānīd Nāṣr ibn Ahmad (r. 301–31/914–43) with the question who had charged him with *hijrah*, and responded to the effect that God had done so (Yā qub ibn Sawayd *Alf. Sīrīyā*, 497.24; for similar anecdotes, see above, ch. 16, notes 133, 226).

<sup>140</sup> See above, ch. 17, notes 159f. for similar trends.

<sup>141</sup> See above, ch. 13, 341f.

<sup>142</sup> L. Marlow, *Hierarchy and egalitarianism in Islamic thought*, Cambridge 1997, esp. 6–10.

<sup>143</sup> See, for example, Kāshif al-Ghīṭā, *Kaṣṣa* 420.19.

<sup>144</sup> See above, ch. 17, 486.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. B. Lewis, *The political language of Islam*, Chicago and London 1988, 58.

<sup>147</sup> Or as Goldzihner rather sourly put it, appeal to this exalted duty provided a ready occasion for all sorts of disturbances ('roules les agitations') (*Liṭwā*, 88, and cf. the examples given, *ibid.*, 88–96).

Here the question of origins is arguably more straightforward. Strothmann, who was much intrigued by what he called the 'democratic' character of the duty,<sup>148</sup> was inclined to see its origin in a combination of two elements: on the one hand the 'inclinations of a democratic Arabian ethos to a law of the jungle' (*faustrechtliche Neigungen eines demokratischen Arabertums*), and on the other an 'idea of a religious community' (*ein religiöser Gemeinschaftsgedanke*).<sup>149</sup> We have already touched on the relevance of a sense of religious community,<sup>150</sup> what concerns us here is Strothmann's invocation of the ethos of Jāhili society.

Pre-Islamic Arabian society was tribal, and in considerable measure nomadic, inhabiting a land whose meagre resources favoured neither strong state authority nor elaborate social stratification. It was accordingly a society in which every man was an uncrowned king.<sup>151</sup> Or to put it in more prosaic terms, political and military participation were very widely spread, far more so than in the mainstream of human societies – whether those of the steppe nomads,<sup>152</sup> the later Islamic world, or the modern West. It was the fusion of this egalitarian and activist tribal ethos with the monotheist tradition that gave Islam its distinctive political character. In no other civilisation was rebellion for conscience sake so widespread as it was in the early centuries of Islamic history; no other major religious tradition has lent itself to revival as a political ideology – and not just a political identity – in the modern world.<sup>153</sup>

The uniqueness of the Islamic doctrine of forbidding wrong can be understood against this background. In Islam, of course, the sovereignty of God means that it is no longer admissible for every man to be a king. But as Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 543/1148) put it, individuals (*āḥād al-nās*) act as God's deputies (*nuṣarāh Allāh*) in forbidding wrong.<sup>154</sup>

<sup>148</sup> Strothmann, *Staatsrecht*, 92–4. Strothmann's remarks are aptly highlighted by van Ess (*Theologia*, 4:675 n. 15, 705 n. 14), who himself follows Strothmann in describing *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* as rooted in the egalitarian tribal ethos of pre-Islamic Arabia (*ibid.*, 707).  
<sup>149</sup> Strothmann, *Staatsrecht*, 93. My translation of *Faustrecht* (literally 'first-law') as 'law of the jungle' is perhaps misleading to the extent that it suggests the absence of any kind of law. Strothmann may rather have had in mind the practice of the late medieval German feud (see *Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, Berlin 1971–97, 1:1079f., art. 'Faustrecht' (E. Kaufmann)).  
<sup>150</sup> See above, 580f.

<sup>151</sup> 'Every man of us is a power unto himself' (*ḥull rajul minnā fi ḥaḥḥih fa'z*), as the Kurāna described their rather similar society to Abū 'Abdallāh al-Shīrī (d. 298/911) ('Nu'mān, *fīḥāh al-dā'ira*, 65–4).

<sup>152</sup> For the contrast with the richer, more stratified and politically more developed nomadic societies of the Eurasian steppes, see P. Cronin, *Slaves on horses*, Cambridge 1980, ch. 2.

<sup>153</sup> P. Cronin, 'The tribe and the state', in J. A. Hall (ed.), *States in history*, Oxford and New York 1986, 74–7.  
<sup>154</sup> See above, ch. 14, note 53, and cf. Gardet, *Cité*, 185.

## CHAPTER 20

# CONCLUSION

### 1. INTRODUCTION

One culture which was conspicuously absent from the comparisons made in the previous chapter is our own. This culture may not have much standing *sub specie aeternitatis*, but here and now it has a certain call upon our attention, if only by virtue of being ours. I shall therefore conclude this book with an attempt to identify some key ways in which the attitudes bound up with forbidding wrong resemble or differ from those of the mainstream of contemporary Western culture.<sup>1</sup>

There is clearly no problem with the intelligibility, and indeed acceptability, of the basic idea of the value in Western culture. A contemporary Muslim writing in Arabic relates an anecdote about a Swede who told off a rich American tourist for speeding on a quiet Swedish country road; he comments that this is an instance of commanding right and forbidding wrong.<sup>2</sup> More than this, almost everything of substance that Muslim scholarship has to say about the doctrine is intelligible to a Western reader who knows nothing about Islam; and a lot of it makes good sense. To see this, one has only to make the experiment of translating the doctrine of, say, the classical Imānī scholars into plain English. It might go something like this:

'If you see someone doing something wrong, you ought to try to get them to stop. You should say something, or if that doesn't work, you

<sup>1</sup> All references to Western culture in this chapter are to its prevailing modern form – which I would describe as broadly secular and liberal. It is, of course, readily compatible with a non-fundamentalist allegiance to a variety of traditional religions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

<sup>2</sup> 'Abd al-'Aziz Kānūl, 'Ḥuqūq al-insān fī 'l-Islām: nazra fī 'l-mushkāt al-naw'iyā', in Université de Tunis, Centre d'Études et de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, *Hikme Rencontre Islamo-Chrétienne, Droits de l'Homme*, Tunis 1985, 43–5. Kānūl's use of the anecdote trades on the moral solidarity of all civilised people (or at least, of Arabs and Europeans) against Americans. The American, of course, tells the Swede to mind his own business, but backs down in the face of the manifest solidarity of the Swedish bystanders with the author of the rebuke.

should do something. Failing that, well, you can just wish them to stop.<sup>3</sup> But don't get too violent – that's for the police. If somebody really ought to take a certain course of action, then you really ought to tell them to; but if it's just that it would be nice if they did, then maybe it's a nice idea to suggest it to them. If there's a lot of people there, and somebody else speaks out, you don't have to; but if nobody does, it's up to you. But don't think you ought to jump in just like that. There may be several good reasons for keeping out of it, such as: "Come on, what's wrong with what he's doing?"; "Look, they've stopped anyway"; "Forget it – those people just don't listen"; "Forget it – he's bigger than you"; "Last time somebody told them to stop they smashed up his car"; "Try that and you'll just end up making matters worse".<sup>4</sup>

What then of the differences? One respect in which the Muslim doctrine of forbidding wrong immediately strikes us as alien is the scholastic manner of its presentation – whence my attempt to naturalise it by translating it into plain, rather than academic, English. In part, this reflects a widespread feature of the moral thinking of Western populations today. Whatever people may say about us, we have our moral values, and we think, talk and argue about them. But we do not do so in a technical language characterised by formal definitions and rules. We might like to describe our moral language as more spontaneous, more nuanced, more sensitive to the uniqueness of each individual case. Others might call it subjective, arbitrary and inconsistent – a primitive and untritored colloquial. Whether our way of handling moral questions is a good thing or a bad thing is beside the point;<sup>5</sup> what seems clear is that in this respect the Muslims have something we don't.

We do, of course, have moral philosophers in our universities. They are known to have a lot of sophisticated and inconclusive things to say about the foundations of morality, none of which they agree upon among themselves. But they have tended to provide us with relatively little direct assistance

<sup>3</sup> We may not have much use for this notion, but then neither did the *Mu'tazilites*. Of course if the idea is to scowl at the offender, that would make sense as a strategy.

<sup>4</sup> It would be harder to render into so plain an English the *Imānī* discussion of the question whether the source of the obligation is revelation alone, or revelation and reason. But there are still a good many people in Western societies for whom this raises an intelligible issue.

<sup>5</sup> My opinion, for what it is worth, would be that the scholastic approach does not help much with the more intractable problems, such as assessing the relative costs of action and inaction. On this one might compare Wāzler's observation on the indeterminacy of the 'proportionality maxim' with regard to the morality of war: 'We have no way that even mimics mathematics of comparing the costs of fighting to the costs of not fighting, since one set of costs is necessarily speculative, while the other comes in, as it were, over an indeterminate time span' (M. Wāzler, *Just and unjust wars*, New York 1992, xv). On the other hand, checklists can be very useful in everyday life. One cannot land a plane by mentally reciting a checklist, but even experienced pilots who fail to do so sometimes forget to put down the undercarriage.

when it comes to thinking through the moral problems that most of us actually face.<sup>6</sup> In any case, we are not in the habit of taking our moral dilemmas to moral philosophers, any more than a scientist would refer a research problem to a philosopher of science. Nor do they seem to expect us to consult them in this way.

This straightforward contrast between the scholastic moral thought of Islam and the vernacular thought of the West is not, however, quite right. For one thing, we can take it for granted that the overwhelming majority of Muslims down the ages did not think scholastically. For another, academic writers in the West have in fact produced a measure of systematic thought that is of interest to us. This thought is not precisely concerned with our duty, but it does grapple with a theme sufficiently close to be relevant. The theme in question is the duty – assuming it is one – of rescue.

## 2. RESCUE AND FORBIDDING WRONG

The difference between rescue and forbidding wrong can be set out as follows. The duty of rescue is by definition an obligation to come to the aid of people in trouble. Whether or not the trouble is an intentional consequence of human wrongdoing is to this extent irrelevant. Consider the case of rape at a local train station in Chicago with which we began this book. If the woman had been the victim, not of rape, but of falling masonry in an earthquake, then – other things being equal – the bystanders would still have been under an obligation to try to assist her. Forbidding wrong, by contrast, is not a duty to help people in trouble, but rather to stop people doing wrong. In this case what is irrelevant is whether or not the wrongdoing has a human (or animal) victim. If we assume for the sake of argument that consensual sex between an unmarried couple is wrong, then there would still have been a duty to stop the man having sex with the woman even if the two had been lovers. Each duty thus extends to an area which is foreign to the other. Where the woman is trapped by falling masonry, there is no wrong to be forbidden; where she is willingly having sex, there is no victim to be rescued.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> They are likely to contribute more to our understanding of issues that are at once very new and frighteningly technical, as with the ethics of genetic engineering.

<sup>7</sup> There are ways in which one could seek to minimise the difference. On the one hand, the Muslim duty in respect of victimless wrongdoing could be seen in terms of rescuing a sinner who is in spiritual danger (a point I owe to Mark Johnson; cf. above, ch. 14, note 169). And on the other, there is a tendency for tort litigation in the United States to be based on the axiom that there is no such thing as bad luck (a formulation which I owe, I think, to the *Economist*).

But what of the intersection? When the man rapes the woman, we have both a wrongdoer and a victim. On this common ground, the two duties remain distinct in principle: one focuses on putting a stop to the wrongdoing, the other on coming to the aid of the victim. Yet in practice, things may not be so neatly compartmentalised. Real life is such that the two duties are easily conflated, not to say confused, and the results are apparent both in our thinking and in that of the medieval Muslims.<sup>8</sup>

On our side, the conflation is strikingly illustrated by the disparity between the words and deeds of Randy Kyles, the hero of the Chicago rape case. What he did was to ensure that a wrongdoer was brought to justice. Yet the reason he later gave for his conduct was that he 'had to do something to help that woman'.<sup>9</sup> This may be conceptually infelicitous, but it articulates a basic psychological reality: when we see one person maltreating another, our anger against the perpetrator and our sympathy for the victim are two sides of the same emotional coin. It would be untrue to the emotions we characteristically feel in such cases to say, for example: 'I have every sympathy with rapists, it's just that unfortunately their actions are harmful to their victims.'

A similar conflation is latent on the Muslim side. There is systematic thought in Islam about the duty of rescue, and in principle there should be no problem distinguishing this from the doctrine of forbidding wrong. But in fact, most of what I have learnt of Muslim views on rescue derives from material incorporated into accounts of forbidding wrong. A particularly striking example is found in a major Ibādī account of the duty. Here at one point we encounter a statement of one's duty in a situation in which a boy is stuck up a palm-tree and shouting for help.<sup>10</sup> This, clearly, is a case of rescue pure and simple: there is no question of any wrongdoing on the part of either the boy or the palm-tree, or of any right conduct that could be enjoined upon either. It is not, of course, that the Muslim scholars are unable to make the distinction between forbidding wrong and rescue when they

want to,<sup>11</sup> but rather that the border tends not to be well demarcated. Again, this corresponds to the way things are. In real life, it would surely go against the natural flow of emotion for a Muslim engaged in forbidding wrong to be a zealous antagonist of rapists and yet at the same time more or less indifferent to the sufferings of their victims. In the reign of the caliph al-Mu'tadid (r. 279–89/892–902), the story goes, a tailor of Baghdad sought helpers to join him in confronting a high-ranking Turkish military officer who had abducted a beautiful young woman as she left the baths. He made his appeal in these terms: 'You know what this man has done. So come with me so that we can go and protest against him and save the woman from him' (*fa-qimni mā 'i ilayhi li-munkir 'alayhi wa-mukhalis al-mar'a minhu*).<sup>12</sup> In the circumstances, Randy Kyles might have said the same.

This close affinity between rescue and forbidding wrong is perhaps linked to a character trait shared by those who habitually practise them. Modern Western study of rescuers suggests that, alongside their courage, they are characterised by what might be described as the lack of a faculty of social discrimination found in normal human beings. A Silesian countess who helped Jews in the Second World War explained that she did so because they were persecuted, not because they were Jews; their ethnicity, she emphasised, 'was not important to me at all', though it was clearly very salient to many Jews and non-Jews at the time.<sup>13</sup> But research suggests that it is not just ethnicity to which confirmed rescuers are blind: they fail to discriminate, in the way that the rest of us do, between their kith and kin on the one hand and strangers on the other.<sup>14</sup> This trait would probably have been immediately recognisable to many medieval Muslims who made a practice of forbidding wrong. At a certain level we greatly admire such

<sup>11</sup> See above, ch. 15, notes 183–5. One modern author makes a relevant distinction, including among his examples one that goes to the heart of the Chicago rape case: intervening to prevent illicit sex is an instance of forbidding wrong where the woman is willing, but not where she is unwilling (*'Awda, Taḥrīr*, 1:511 ff. no. 349).

<sup>12</sup> Ibn Kāthir, *Bidāya*, 11:90.9. Likewise the tailor says of his initial attempt to act on his own: *fa-qimni ilayhi li-munkir 'alayhi wa-ayrādn khāṭis al-mar'a min yadayhi* (*ibid.*, 90.6). Later the caliph exhorts the Turk for his conduct, and denounces his violent treatment of the tailor: 'who commanded you right and forbade you wrong' (*ibid.*, 91.3). The whole story goes back to Tanūkhī (d. 384/994) (*al-Faraj ba'd al-shidda*, 218.20–221.9, and *Mishmār al-mubāḍara*, 1:312–18); here the wording is different, but the concern for both the enormity of the sin and the well-being of the woman is just as clear in the narrative. A version also appears in Nizām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), *Siyar al-munīẓ*, ed. H. Darke, Tehran 1372 sh., 66–78 (I owe this reference to Patricia Cronje). The story is quoted from Ibn Kāthir in *Sabr, Amr*, 289–92.

<sup>13</sup> K. R. Monroe, *The hearts of altruists: perceptions of a common humanity*, Princeton 1996, 148. She expressed her world-view as follows: 'You cannot just look at all this and do nothing. During my whole life, I've always been intervening in things I found unjust.' This is not how most of us think or act; if we intervene once in a while, it is illicitly to be in reaction to something that touches us much more closely than 'all this'.<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 19, 165.

<sup>8</sup> It is noteworthy that such confusion is not in evidence in the aspects of Jewish and Catholic thought described above, ch. 19, section 3. The reason is perhaps that the duties analogous to forbidding wrong in these faiths are too low key to overlap with that of rescue.

<sup>9</sup> See above, preface, note 3. In other words, he presents himself as a good Samaritan, but what the Samaritan of the parable did was to attend to the needs of the victim, not to confront the long-departed robbers (Luke 10:29–37).

<sup>10</sup> Abū Bakr al-Kindī, *Muṣannaf*, 1:241.2, in a short chapter on coming to the help of those who cry out for it. Likewise the following statement forms part of an account of forbidding wrong: 'If he sees someone trying to kill another person, he is obligated to defend him as he would defend himself, for since he is obligated to save the life of another by giving him his food, and to save him from drowning, so likewise he is obligated to defend him' (Abū Yāliā, *Amr*, f. 109a.13).

indifference, and we are sometimes ready to emulate it at the level of ethnicity – which for an educated Westerner today is usually not too difficult. But even such Westerners are much less likely to maintain this indifference where their friends and relations are concerned. In other words, habitual rescuers and inveterate forbidders of wrong may have something in common that separates them from humanity at large. A pragmatic Yemeni ruler of the seventh/thirteenth century, refusing to take action against a pious who had sabotaged plans for a party in Aden by pouring out large quantities of wine, remarked succinctly: 'Anyone who does that must be either a saint or a madman, and either way we have nothing to say to him.'<sup>15</sup> He could perhaps have said the same about outstanding rescuers.

Be this as it may, we can conclude that rescue and forbidding wrongs, though conceptually distinct, overlap in a sufficiently intimate way to make them broadly comparable. With that much established, we can go on to ask about the relative salience of systematic thought about the two duties in the respective cultures. My overwhelming impression is that the scholastic doctrine of forbidding wrong is far more salient in Islamic culture than comparable discussion of rescue is in ours. The best evidence I can adduce for this is autobiographical: as I remarked at the outset, it was only as a by-product of my study of forbidding wrong in Islam that I became aware of the existence of a body of academic writing on the duty of rescue in my own culture.<sup>16</sup> This in turn tends to reinforce the finding of the previous chapter that there is something distinctly unusual about the development of the duty to forbid wrong in Islam.

### 3. RIGHT AND WRONG

Muslim and Western notions of the duty to stop wrongdoing also differ in another important area: the understanding of right and wrong. The differences are real, though not always as profound as they look.

<sup>15</sup> Yāqūt, *Ma'ādh*, 4:227.1. The ruler was the Rasūlid al-Malik al-Muzaffar (r. 647–94/1250–95), and the pious was a certain 'Abdallāh ibn Abī Bakr al-Khatīb. I owe this reference to Tamer El-Leithy.

<sup>16</sup> See above, preface, xi. The recent Western attention to rescue has been driven partly by philosophical concerns, and partly by legal ones. For examples of the former, see E. Mack, 'Deontologism, negative causation, and the duty to rescue', in E. Regis Jr. (ed.), *Genseth's ethical nationalism*, Chicago and London 1984 (and cf. A. Gewirth, 'Replies to my critics', *ibid.*, 233–41); T. Young, 'Analogical reasoning and easy rescue cases', *Journal of Philosophical Research*, 18 (1993). The legal concern is more immediately practical. Against the background of long-standing differences between legal systems, there has been a good deal of debate over the desirability or otherwise of laws imposing penalties for failure to rescue without good cause (see, for example, the references given above, preface, note 8, and Hunt, *The compassionate heart*, 150–2). Thanks to questions raised under a French law of this kind regarding the role of the paparazzi in the death of Princess Diana in a car-crash in Paris in 1997, this concern is now better known than it used to be in the English-speaking world.

Most obviously, there are significant differences as to which particular things are right and which are wrong. As we have seen repeatedly in this book, these differences are at their most colourful with regard to wine, women and song. Yet even here, Muslim norms are usually intelligible to us to the extent that they tend to be closely related to what we recognise as moral dangers. Mainstream Western culture has little use for an outright prohibition of alcohol; but we do not approve of drunken drivers or like to see people become alcoholics. Our ideas as to how women should be dressed and the degree to which they should be segregated, while puritanical by some West African standards, are a long way from traditional Islamic mores; yet we worry a great deal about the less desirable consequences of the interactions we permit between the sexes. It is perhaps only in the case of the stance of the Islamic scholars against music that cross-cultural intelligibility breaks down almost completely. It would be hard in the West to present the Sa'ūdī campaign against the mouth organs of the street urchins of Jeddah as anything but a comedy.<sup>17</sup> Yet even here, such attitudes to music can strike a chord in our past, not to mention the fringes of our present. There is, after all, nothing uniquely Islamic about puritans who do not like other people to have fun, and nothing exclusively Western or modern about anti-puritanism.<sup>18</sup> Nor should we forget one remarkable, if adventurous convergence: middle-class America has come to regard smoking with an intolerance verging on that of unreconstructed Wahhābism. But whether we dwell on the similarities or the differences, the fact remains that questions about the rightness or wrongness of particular activities have only an indirect bearing on the way in which the duty itself is conceived. They are merely the circumstances that trigger it.

There is, however, a contrast between the Muslim and Western views of rights and wrongs which takes us somewhat closer to the core of the value. This has to do with conceptions of public and private. We can best approach this contrast by going back to the moral – or amoral – principle that is so often pitched against forbidding wrong: minding one's own business.

As we have seen, telling a busybody to mind his own business was a stock response to unwelcome attempts to forbid wrong in the traditional Islamic world.<sup>19</sup> During his westward journey through North Africa, Ibn Tūmār

<sup>17</sup> See above, ch. 8, note 128.

<sup>18</sup> The late Qājir poet Īraj Mīrzā (d. 1344/1926) has a short poem ridiculing some pious in Mashhad who rushed to a caravanserai to cover up a plaster image of a beautiful woman (*Dīnān-i kāmilī*, ed. M. J. Mādījīb, Van Nuys, Ca. 1989, 177f. no. 36, and see *ibid.*, 273 there). We can see this poem as the work of someone who had modern ideas and was at home in Russian and French (see J. Rypka *et al.*, *History of Iranian literature*, Dordrecht 1968, 384f.). But at the same time it is not out of place in an indigenous anti-puritan tradition going back to Hāfiz (d. 791/1389) (see above, ch. 17, notes 241–3).

<sup>19</sup> See above, ch. 17, 498f.

(d. 524/1130) found the people of Dahr Qallā engaged in making music in mixed company. He sent two of his followers to forbid this wrong, but the response they met with was: 'This is how we do things.' When the disciples insisted to the offenders that Ibn Tūmart was commanding them right (*ma'rif*), they received the retort: 'We go by our kind of right, and you go by yours; go away!'<sup>20</sup> The replies are laconic, but they clearly assert the moral sovereignty of the local community and the wider moral relativism this implies. In general, however, our sources give us little sense of the thinking behind the stock response. Is it the cynical irritation of the hardened wrongdoer who has no intention of mending his ways, or the moral outrage of someone confronting intrusion into what are properly his own affairs?

The idea of minding one's own business is doubtless more complex than it looks in either Muslim or Western culture. Perhaps the main point that needs to be made is that this value, though it may sound individualistic or parochial, is not necessarily so. What constitutes my business has as much to do with the social groups to which I belong as it does with the particular type of business in hand, and these groups may be large ones. For example, it was under the rubric of minding one's own business that, as a British child growing up in a Mediterranean country, I was counselled by fellow-nationals not to interfere when the locals were cruel to animals. The corollary, I take it, was that within the British moral community cruelty to animals would indeed have been my business. A national group of this kind falls well short of embracing the entire human race, but it goes considerably beyond the social groups we usually encounter in everyday life.

In modern Western thought, the demarcation of our business tends to be dominated by a pair of strongly articulated principles. The first is that where wrongdoing inflicts harm on others, it is everybody's business.<sup>21</sup> In accordance with this principle, we concern ourselves with violations of human rights in such culturally exotic regions as East Asia, the Middle East

<sup>20</sup> Lévi-Provençal, *Documents inédits*, 63.3 (*biḥādhā 'l-sira 'inḥād*), 63.5 (*ma 'rifḥinā 'inḥād ma-na 'rifḥinū 'inḥādīm, sīrā*), I have departed from Lévi-Provençal's translation (*ibid.*, 98). For the context, see above, ch. 16, 458f.

<sup>21</sup> A few years ago a black Princeton undergraduate recounted how she was exposed to racial slurs in a local store. She stood up to her verbal assailants, and was subsequently complimented for this by white bystanders. But why, she asked, had the bystanders done nothing at the time? 'Obviously they felt it was right what I was saying, and maybe they felt scared or whatever or it wasn't any of their business.' But it is their business, and it's everyone's business when something like that happens' (D. Vogl, 'The other side of Paradise: race relations and the minority community at Princeton', *The Princeton Echo*, Fall 1993, 6). The answer to her question is likely to have been the 'bystander effect' (see above, preface, note 5); but her observation about 'everyone's business' seems an entirely natural use of our moral language.

and Africa. Here our business is coterminous with that of the human race, and our censoriousness has no geographical or cultural bounds. The second principle is that wrongdoing that affects only the wrongdoer is nobody's business but his own;<sup>22</sup> indeed it may be argued that, for this very reason, there is no justification for calling it wrongdoing at all. In accordance with this second principle, we deny that moral puritans, social conservatives, missionaries and paternalists of all sorts have any business encroaching on our right to decide for ourselves how to live – and by extension, on the right of others to make the same decision for themselves. Here our business is transacted within the immunity of our castles, and would-be censors are contemptuously turned away. The two principles are in marked contrast to each other. But the combination is not illogical, and it makes very good sense – to us.

The situation in traditional Islamic thought is somewhat different, though once again not unrecognisably so. The distinction between wrongdoing that harms others and wrongdoing that affects only the wrongdoer is well established. The first is the business of a very large, though not in practice universal, group: the Muslim community.<sup>23</sup> If members of this community respond to fellow-Muslims who reprove them for this kind of wrongdoing by telling them to mind their own business, this riposte will sound more like cynical irritation than moral outrage.

With regard to wrongdoing that does no harm to others, the situation in traditional Islamic thought is more complicated. It is beyond question that in Islamic terms such wrongdoing is indeed wrongdoing. This is related to the fact that it is necessarily the business of at least one other person, namely God; in other words, it is sin. But the most significant point for our purposes is perhaps that such wrongdoing, while not in itself the business of other members of the community, can nevertheless become so. As we have seen, while Islam has definite notions of privacy and gives them

<sup>22</sup> Cf. the classic formulation of John Stuart Mill (d. AD 1873): 'the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others'; whereas in the part of his conduct that merely concerns himself, this independence is, of right, absolute' (*On Liberty*, London 1859, 22; note that in speaking of power he intends here not just legal sanctions, but also 'the moral coercion of public opinion', *ibid.*, 21). This suggests that the two principles are complementary, thus removing any basis for proceeding against a category of wrongs which, while they could not be said to do actual harm to others, nevertheless cause them great offence (see the highly imaginative list of such wrongs in Feinberg, *Moral Limits*, 2:10–13).

<sup>23</sup> The believers are brothers (Q49:10). Compare the familiar idiom in which Randy Kriks constructs a wider moral community: 'It could have been my mother, my aunt, one of my mother's friends' (see above, preface, note 3). Conversely, as pointed out to me by Alexander Nelimass, cases of failure to rescue trigger laments about 'the breakdown of community'.

strong articulation, there seems to be a difference between Islamic and Western thinking along the following lines.<sup>24</sup> In a Western perspective, certain kinds of behaviour tend to be thought of as an inherently private matter, whether or not they happen to become public knowledge.<sup>25</sup> In Islamic thought, by contrast, such behaviour may be only contingently private.<sup>26</sup> Wrongdoing that does not affect others will tend for that very reason to remain in the private domain; and by and large, it is urged, it should be allowed to remain there. But once it ceases to be private, the cat is out of the bag; and more drastic norms may properly come into play. Here the initial response to the censorious intruder that he should mind his own business does indeed bespeak a valid moral outrage;<sup>27</sup> but the Muslim's home may in the event prove to be something less than his castle.

These differences between modern Western and traditional Islamic views have clear consequences in the modern Islamic world. In consequence of the Western impact, the Muslim doctrine of forbidding wrong now confronts a theory of minding one's own business significantly different from its own. In the global setting in which we now live, there is a much stronger sense than before that the Muslim community is just one among others, and in consequence that it enjoys no monopoly of moral judgement. Its members are accordingly liable to be subjected to moral scrutiny and condemnation from outside their own community. At the same time the focus of this scrutiny is often precisely on the attempts of zealous Muslims to impose their own standards of virtue on their coreligionists. Such zealots may be materially assisted in this by the power of the modern state, which has a way of turning castles into sandcastles. But in the long run these states are not proving very successful in insulating the societies

they rule against the influence of the West. A contemporary Iranian cleric complains that attempts to forbid wrong now meet with the following riposte: 'What's it to you? I'm free, it's a free country, it's a democracy, everybody does whatever he wants!'<sup>28</sup> The opening question is traditional, but the continuation is not. The prevalent Western values thus tell Muslims that it is *our* business how they treat other Muslims; and at the same time they tell them that it is not *their* business how other Muslims choose to live. Both messages involve sharp departures from the traditional – and modern – Islamic conception of forbidding wrong. It should not therefore be surprising that there has been considerable friction between Muslim and Western moral attitudes in such matters.

One example of this friction is a bruising exchange which took place between Ayatullah Khumayni (d. 1409/1989) and the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci some months after the Iranian revolution.<sup>29</sup> With regard to the undemocratic direction in which the Islamic Republic was moving, Fallaci prompted Khumayni to make these remarks: 'If you foreigners do not understand, too bad for you. It's none of your business, you have nothing to do with our choices. If some Iranians don't understand it, too bad for them. It means that they have not understood Islam.'<sup>30</sup> Later Fallaci raised the even more contentious topic of the segregation of women. She made pointed reference to Islamic norms governing behaviour on the beach, and mischievously posed the question: 'By the way, how do you swim in a chador?' To this, Khumayni responded tersely: 'This is none of your business. Our customs are none of your business.'<sup>31</sup> In claiming the standing to ask her impudent question, was Fallaci simply including herself in the brotherhood of all mankind? Or worse yet, was it her nefarious purpose to deny Khumayni the standing to answer the question by excluding him from the sisterhood of all womankind? It is striking that in the face of this provocation, Khumayni should have been reduced to talking like the people of Dahr Qallā; as one commentator indicates,<sup>32</sup> an Ayatullah might have been expected to appeal to a higher authority than local custom. Towards the end of the interview, Khumayni's irritation increased perceptibly: 'And now that's enough. Go away. Go away.' Even at that point, however, Fallaci did not take the hint.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>24</sup> See above, ch. 17, 481f. For Muslim attitudes to privacy more generally, see above, ch. 17, section 3, and cf. above, ch. 18, 556–60. A brief but useful modern survey of the field is Muhammad Rāḥim al-Dughmī, *Ḥimāyāt al-ḥayāt al-ḥāṣṣa fī 'l-sharī'a al-Islāmīyya*, Cairo 1985. The author represents a moderate Jordanian Islam.

<sup>25</sup> Writing in the United States in the last years of the millennium, I am compelled to make an exception with regard to the attitude of the local culture towards adultery among American politicians and military officers. But even here, Venetia Grant of Harlan seemed in the event to speak for a considerable part of the American public when she summed up the scandal over President Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky in these words: 'This is a nation of busybodies. If he's guilty, let his wife handle it' (*The New York Times*, 27 January 1998, B1).

<sup>26</sup> The concept of 'private life' (*al-ḥayāt al-ḥāṣṣa*), which appears in Dughmī's title and shapes his work, is a Western one, without precedent in his Islamic sources (cf. the comment of 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Khayālī in his introduction to the book, *ibid.*, 3, 19). The indigenous concepts (*sirr*, *raḥīsiyya*) typically relate to the processes by which what is secret remains or ceases to be so.

<sup>27</sup> As in the story of 'Umar's three sins (see above, ch. 4, note 269; ch. 17, note 85; and ch. 18, 557f.).

<sup>28</sup> Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 'Tashīḥ', 34, 3. Cf. above, ch. 18, note 361.

<sup>29</sup> Oriana Fallaci, 'An interview with Khomayni', *The New York Times Magazine*, 7 October 1979. This interview is cited in Feinberg, *Moral Limits*, 4:39, and partly quoted *ibid.*, 3:42 n. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Fallaci, 'Interview', 30c. <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 31b.

<sup>32</sup> Feinberg, *Moral Limits*, 4:39.

<sup>33</sup> Fallaci, 'Interview', 31d.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the two major differences between Muslim and Western ideas discussed in this chapter are closely linked. The reason why Western thought concentrates on rescue and neglects forbidding wrong is bound up with the fact that in Western thought the category of victimless wrong – pure sin, so to speak – has been stripped of most of its practical moral significance, if not denied to exist altogether. ‘They’re not doing any harm’ is regularly given as a sufficient reason for leaving them alone. If all wrongs must have victims, then what is left of the moral ground is covered by rescue. This, of course, takes us back to a fundamental point of tension between the two world views: the standing, if any, of God in human affairs.

## APPENDIX 1

## KEY KORANIC VERSES AND TRADITIONS

Certain Koranic verses and traditions recur frequently in the preceding chapters. For the reader's convenience, I give here the text and translation of the more important verses, and a translation of the traditions most often referred to. Where relevant verses also contain material that does not bear significantly on forbidding wrong, I have omitted it. I have given traditions in a standard form without noting variants. For each verse or tradition, a cross-reference is given to the place where it is first discussed (not necessarily first cited).

## A. KORANIC VERSES

- (1) Q3:104: *wa-l-takun minkum ummatun yad'ina illā 'l-khayri wa-ya'murūna bi'l-ma'rūf wa-yahnabūna 'ani'l-munkar* ('Let there be one community of you, calling to good, and commanding right and forbidding wrong'). See above, ch. 2, 13f.
- (2) Q3:110: *kuntum khayra ummatin ubhrijat lil-nāsi ta'murūna bi'l-ma'rūf wa-tanhabūna 'ani'l-munkar* ('You were the best community ever brought forth to men, commanding right and forbidding wrong'). See above, ch. 2, note 5.
- (3) Q5:78f: *lu'ina 'l-ladhina kafarū min Banī Isrā'īla . . . kānū lā yatanābūna 'an munkarin fa'alāha* ('Cursed were the unbelievers of the Children of Israel . . .; they forbade not one another wrong that they committed'). See above, ch. 2, 15f.
- (4) Q5:105: *yā-ayyuhā 'l-ladhina āmanū 'alaykum anfasakum lā yadurrukum man dālla illāhā 'itadāyrum* ('O believers, look after your own souls. He who is astray cannot hurt you, if you are rightly guided'). See above, ch. 2, 30f.