

## THE MU'TAZILITES

## 1. INTRODUCTION

If the bias of Hanbalite thinking was towards the concrete, that of Mu'tazilite thought was towards the abstract. This, in the end, was to carry a certain cost. Whatever may have been the case in the early history of the school, it was becoming clear by the fourth/tenth century that Mu'tazilism could not make a Muslim. Instead it came to function as one element in a package, playing the part of a tradition of abstract scholastic thought that could be combined with a variety of other allegiances. One could be a Hanafī Mu'tazilite, a Zaydī Mu'tazilite, an Imāmī Mu'tazilite – even a Jewish Mu'tazilite. In these various symbioses, Mu'tazilism tended to represent something between a systematic body of substantive scholastic doctrine and an intellectual technique which, as we have seen, even the Hanbalites were eventually to find irresistible.

Mu'tazilism thus tended to become a tradition of socially and politically disembodied intellect. One implication of this is that we are unlikely to be very successful in linking the content of classical Mu'tazilite doctrines to the concrete historical environments in which they flourished. I shall accordingly make no attempt to do for Mu'tazilism what I did for Hanbalism; instead, what lies ahead is the history of ideas in a distinctly narrow sense. There will still be points at which we can link intellectual history to less cerebral realities, but they will be few and far between. We might hope that the situation would be different in the case of early Mu'tazilism; but unfortunately we know too little about its views on forbidding wrong to have much sense of what we are missing.

The symbiosis of originally distinct religious traditions in the classical packages also poses an organisational problem for this study. The course I shall take in this part of the book is as follows. In the present chapter, I shall be broadly concerned with Mu'tazilism as such. After surveying the

little we know of early Mu'tazilite doctrines of forbidding wrong, I shall discuss in some detail the classical doctrines of the fourth/tenth century and later, regarding a few of which we are relatively well informed. In principle I shall not be concerned here with Zaydī or Imāmī Mu'tazilism as phenomena in their own right, though in practice I shall cross the border from time to time. The two following chapters will be devoted to the Zaydīs and Imāmīs respectively. In each case I shall begin with the pre-Mu'tazilite phase of sectarian thought, and go on to the history of the Mu'tazilite tradition in the sect.

## 2. EARLY MU'TAZILITE DOCTRINE

If we take the Mu'tazilite school to have been founded by the Basrans Wāsil ibn 'Aṭā (d. 131/748f.) and 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd (d. 144/761), then its origins go back to the early second/eighth century. The earliest Mu'tazilite author to have left us a systematic and substantial account of forbidding wrong, the Zaydī 'Alid Mānkādm (d. 425/1034), lived in northern Iran some three centuries later. This means that, for the first three hundred years of the movement, our material is fragmentary or summary at best. But it does raise some points of interest.

Forbidding wrong is, of course, one of the celebrated 'five principles' (*al-ḥuṣūl al-khams*) of Mu'tazilism. However, there is no agreement among modern scholars as to the antiquity of this pentad.<sup>1</sup> Such uncertainty need not call in question the assumption that forbidding wrong was a Mu'tazilite precept from the beginning; given its prominence in the Koran, and in early Islamic thought in general, it would be surprising if it had not been. What is missing is specific evidence of the conception of the duty entertained in the time of Wāsil and 'Amr. It has been linked to early Mu'tazilite missionary activity,<sup>2</sup> and this derives a hint of support from its appearance in a poem of Ṣafwān al-Anṣārī (fl. later second/eighth century) describing the emissaries (*ḥuṭāt*) sent out by Wāsil ibn 'Aṭā.<sup>3</sup> It has been connected with movements of local autonomy.<sup>4</sup> And not least, it has been

linked to rebellion against unjust rule.<sup>5</sup> This old allegation<sup>6</sup> is plausible, and it resonates with some of what the sources tell us about 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd. Thus 'Amr is reported to have said that the traditionists (*ḥuṭāt* *al-ḥuṭāt* *al-ḥuṭāt*) were the ruin of the religion; they were the ones who held people back from standing up for justice (*al-qiyām bi'l-qist*) and commanding right.<sup>7</sup> There is also the story transmitted by Kūfān traditionists that 'Amr wrote to the Kūfān Ibn Shubruma (d. 144/761f.) urging him to forbid wrong, or reproaching him for not doing so; it may be significant that Ibn Shubruma's reply makes a point of saying that commanding right is not to be undertaken by taking up the sword against the authorities.<sup>8</sup> However, no explicit mention of rebellion is ascribed here to 'Amr, and Ibn Shubruma's reference to it is only indirect evidence of what 'Amr believed. Once we reach the late second/eighth and early third/ninth century, we have credible reports that a few Mu'tazilite authors wrote on our topic: Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm (d. 200/815f.),<sup>9</sup> Ja'far ibn Muḥashshir (d. 234/848f.),<sup>10</sup> and presumably Ḥishām al-Fuwayḍ (d. c. 230/844) in his work on the 'five principles',<sup>11</sup> other such reports are late and unreliable.<sup>12</sup> But we know almost nothing of actual Mu'tazilite views in this period. The heresiographer Ash'arī (d. 324/935f.) tells us that Aṣamm stood outside the consensus of

<sup>1</sup> Contrast the positive judgement of Madelung (*Qāsim*, 7) with the sceptical view of van Ess (I). van Ess, *Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du Mu'tazilisme*, Paris 1984, 56; *Theologie*, 2:273. <sup>2</sup> Madelung, *Qāsim*, 16; van Ess, *Lectures*, 125; van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:387. <sup>3</sup> Jābir, *Bayān*, 26.8 (noted in van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:387). The duty is paired in the same line with 'fortifying God's religion against every infidel'. The poem, first brought into play by H. S. Nibbeling (*The Encyclopedia of Islam*, first edition, Leiden and London 1913-38, art. 'Mu'tazila', cols. 789a, 790a), is translated in W. M. Watt, 'Was Wāsil a Kharijite?', in R. Granich (ed.), *Islamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Fritz Meier zum sechzigsten Geburtstag*, Wiesbaden 1974, 310f., and most recently in van Ess, *Theologie*, 5:183f.; and see *ibid.*, 2:382-7. <sup>4</sup> Van Ess, *Lectures*, 103, 123, 127.

<sup>5</sup> Madelung, *Qāsim*, 16, and cf. 18; W. M. Watt, *The formative period of Islamic thought*, Edinburgh 1973, 212, 231; van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:390, and cf. 4:675, 704. <sup>6</sup> It appears in Ibn Taymiyya, *Amr*, 20.8; cf. also Muḥabbar, *Kirmil*, 561.3. <sup>7</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmād (d. 415/1025), *Faḍl al-ḥuṭāt wa-taḥqīq al-Mu'tazila*, ed. F. Sayid, Tunis 1974, 242.16 (cited in van Ess, *Lectures*, 123 n. 5, and van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:287). 'Amr likewise held nothing to be more meritorious than standing up for justice (*al-qiyām bi'l-qist*) and being killed for it (Ṭūsī, *Tibyan*, 2:42.18 (to Q3:21), cited in van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:287, 5:166; though there is no explicit reference to *al-amr bi'l-qist* here, this is the context in which Ṭūsī adduces it; cf. below, note 36). This saying is also quoted by al-Ḥākim al-Jisrī (d. 494/1101) in his Koran commentary to Q3:21 (see Zarzūr, *al-Ḥākim al-Jisrī*, 195.4). For the phrase *al-qiyām bi'l-qist*, cf. Q4:135. <sup>8</sup> See above, ch. 4, notes 44, 226. 'Amr's exhortation is noted by van Ess (*Theologie*, 2:286, 390). <sup>9</sup> I. W. Fück, 'Some hitherto unpublished texts on the Mu'tazilite movement from Ibn al-Nadīm's *Kirātib al-Fihrist*', in S. M. Abdullāh (ed.), *Prolegomena Muhammad Sharif presentation volume*, Lahore 1955, 68.8, cited in *ET*, *Supplement*, art. 'Aṣamm', 89a (I). van Ess), and cf. van Ess, *Theologie*, 5:193 n. 12, and *ibid.*, 2:409 n. 5. <sup>10</sup> Khayyāt (d. c. 300/912), *Intihā*, ed. and trans. A. N. Nāder, Beirut 1957, 63.14 = 74; Fück, 'Some hitherto unpublished texts', 64.10; van Ess, *Theologie*, 6:274 n. 8. <sup>11</sup> Fück, 'Some hitherto unpublished texts', 69.3 (*Kirātib al-ḥuṭāt*); van Ess, *Theologie*, 6:222 n. 1. <sup>12</sup> The report that Abū 'l-Hudhayl (d. 227/841f.) wrote on the 'five principles' (cf. D. Gimaret, 'Les *Uṣūl al-ḥuṭāt* du Qāḍī 'Abd al-Gabbār et leurs commentateurs', *Annuaire Islamologique*, 15 (1979), 68 n. 1), and so presumably on *al-amr bi'l-qist* and *al-qiyām bi'l-qist* (cf. Hārb (d. 236/850f.) did so (cf. Gimaret, 'Les *Uṣūl al-ḥuṭāt*', 68 n. 1) is also unlikely (see W. Madelung, 'Frühe mu'tazilitische Heterogenität: das *Kirātib al-Ḥuṭāt* des Ḥārb b. Ḥarb', *Der Islam*, 57 (1980), 227; van Ess, *Theologie*, 6:288 n. 4).

the Mu'tazilites, who consider forbidding wrong to be obligatory – provided they are able to perform it (*ma'a l-imkān wa'l-quḍr*) – with the tongue, hand and sword, in whatever way they are able to effect it.<sup>13</sup> However, he neglects to specify the nature of Aṣamm's dissent,<sup>14</sup> it is doubtless to be linked to a report that he wrote a work directed against 'those who favour the sword'.<sup>15</sup> With this quietism we may contrast the attitude of Saḥl ibn Salāma, who in 201/817 was prepared to fight anyone in performance of the duty, irrespective of whether he was a ruler or not.<sup>16</sup>

Our information is slightly better for the later third/ninth and early fourth/tenth centuries. The earliest surviving work of Mu'tazilite doctrine, a polemical tract by Khayyār (d. c. 300/912),<sup>17</sup> offers a definition of Mu'tazilism in terms of adherence to the 'five principles', with forbidding wrong listed in its classical fifth place.<sup>18</sup> From roughly the same period comes our oldest heresiographical account of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of forbidding wrong, the formulation of the ex-Mu'tazilite Ash'arī already adduced in connection with Aṣamm; he too lists the 'five principles'.<sup>19</sup> Mas'ūdī (d. 345/956), who may or may not have been a Mu'tazilite himself,<sup>20</sup> gives a brief account of Mu'tazilite doctrine: forbidding wrong is obligatory if one has the ability (*istiṭā'a*) to perform it, by the sword and by less drastic means.<sup>21</sup> He likewise lists the 'five principles', defining

<sup>13</sup> Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 278.7, translated in van Ess, *Theologie*, 5:198 no. 13.

<sup>14</sup> According to Ibn Hazm, he believed that *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is not to be performed by deed (including recourse to arms) (*Fisal*, 4:171.10, translated in van Ess, *Theologie*, 5:198 no. 14, and cf. *ibid.*, 2:409; the passage is also adduced by van Ess in *ET*, *Supplement*, art. 'Aṣamm', 83a, where the suggestion that Aṣamm based his view on a deviant excess of Q3:104 seems unfounded). However, Ibn Hazm's presentation brackets Aṣamm with too wide a spectrum of quietist thought (from Ibn Fānbal to the Rafida, both of whom are misrepresented) for us to be able to put much weight on it.

<sup>15</sup> For this *Kitāb al-trād* *alā man qala bi'l-sayf*, see Fück, 'Some hitherto unpublished texts', 68.13, and cf. van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:409 and 5:193 no. 15. As noted by van Ess, Aṣamm held with the sword in the context of hostilities against the *ahl al-bayt* under the leadership of a just imam about whom there is consensus (*ibid.*, 2:409 and 5:207 no. 31, citing and translating Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 451.12). Cf. also below, note 63.

<sup>16</sup> See above, ch. 5, notes 173f., 192.

<sup>17</sup> See *ET*, art. 'al-Khayyār' (J. van Ess); van Ess, *Lectura*, 6f.

<sup>18</sup> Khayyār, *Intihār*, 93.2 = 115 (cited in van Ess, *Lectura*, 56 n. 4).

<sup>19</sup> Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 278.10, concluding Ash'arī's survey of Mu'tazilism. In the thematic survey that constitutes the latter part of Ash'arī's doxography, the account of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* deals only with quietist views disallowing the use of the sword, and makes no mention of the Mu'tazilites (*ibid.*, 452.3); but he includes the Mu'tazilites among those approving the use of the sword in general (*ibid.*, 451.4), and sets out the conditions under which they hold with rebellion against (unjust) rule (*ibid.*, 466.5).

<sup>20</sup> See A. M. H. Shibli, *Al-Mas'ūdī wa-his world*, London 1979, 38f.

<sup>21</sup> Mas'ūdī (d. 345/956), *Murūj al-dhahab*, ed. C. Pellat, Beirut 1965–74, 4:59 §2.256. He adds that the duty is like *jihad* in that there is no distinction between fighting the infidel and fighting the reprobate (*mujāhidat al-kāfir wa'l-fāsiq*).

Mu'tazilism in terms of acceptance of them.<sup>22</sup> We also possess occasional opinions on specific questions attributed to Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, alias Ka'bī (d. 319/931). Thus he holds that recourse to arms is permitted to subjects solely in the absence of a ruler (*imān*) or of someone appointed by him; if there is a ruler, recourse to arms is allowable only under conditions of overriding necessity (*ḥarira*).<sup>23</sup> One reason this is interesting is that Abū 'l-Qāsim belonged to the Baḡhdādī – as opposed to the Baṣran – school of Mu'tazilism,<sup>24</sup> in other words to the branch of the movement that is relatively underrepresented in the surviving literature.

The two scholars of this period whom we know best are the Jubbātīs, Abū 'Alī (d. 303/916) and his son Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933), both members of the Baṣran school; yet even here, we have at our disposal only scattered references in later works. Mānkānī and others give accounts of the views of the Jubbātīs on two main points. The first is the source of the obligation. Abū 'Alī held it to be both reason and revelation, whereas Abū Hāshim held it to be revelation alone, except in so far as the mental anguish (*maḡād* *wa-jarad*) of the spectator provides a reason for him to act in his own interest.<sup>25</sup> Altruism, we understand, is not a duty established

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 4:58 §2.254, and 60, §2.256.

<sup>23</sup> Tūṣī, *Tiḡān*, 2:549.22; and cf. Abū 'l-Furūḡ-i-Rāzi, *Rumad*, 3:141.16 (both to Q3:104).

For another issue in connection with which his name is mentioned, see below, note 27.

<sup>24</sup> See *Encyclopædia Iranica*, art. 'Abū'l-Qāsim Ka'bī' 361a (J. van Ess).

<sup>25</sup> So Mānkānī (d. 425/1034), *Taḡh Shariḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḥikma*, ed. 'A. 'Uṭmān, Cairo 1965 (published as 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad (d. 415/1025), *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḥikma*, see below, note 57), 142.3, and cf. *ibid.*, 742.1 (where Mānkānī endorses Abū Hāshim's view as school doctrine), 743.11 (reporting an argument of Abū 'Alī), 744.8 (again endorsing Abū Hāshim's view). It is assumed that the wrongs in question affect others (see *ibid.*, 145.1, and cf. below, 212f.). The disagreement is noted by Madelung ('Amr bi'l-ma'rūf', 993b), and the following citations will indicate how widely reported it is in the literature: al-Hākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), *al-Uṣūl fī 'l-trād* *alā ahl al-biḡa'*, ms. Milan, Ambrosiana, B. 66, f. 60a.6 (for this manuscript, see O. Löfgren and R. Traini, *Catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, Vercina 1975–2, 89 no. 190); al-Hākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), *Sharḥ 'Uṣūl al-ḥikma* ii, ms. Leiden, Or. 2.584–B, f. 265a.14; al-Hākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), *al-Tahḍīb fī ṭarḥ al-Qur'ān*, ms. Milan, Ambrosiana, F. 184, f. 70a.6 (to Q3:104) (for this work and its manuscripts, see D. Gimaret, *Une lecture mu'tazilite du Coran: Le Taḥḥīṭ al-'Alī al-Diḡībātī* (m. 303/915) *particulièrement reconstruite à partir de ses citations*, Louvain and Paris 1994, 17, 25f.; Gimaret kindly sent me a copy of the commentary to Q3:104–10); Farāḡidhī (fl. late fifth/eleventh century), *Taḥḥīṭ Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḥikma*, ms. San'ā', Great Mosque, *kalām* 73, f. 155a.1 (the character of this work has been analysed by Gimaret ('Les Uṣūl al-ḥikma', 60–3), who kindly made available a microfilm of the manuscript (for this microfilm, see D. Gimaret, *Théories de l'acte humain en théologie mu'tazilite*, Paris 1980, xvi no. 23); I am indebted to Adrien Leites for consulting the microfilm and making a copy of the relevant passage for me); Ibn al-Maḡāḥimī (d. 536/1141), *al-Fiqh fī ṣūl al-dīn*, ms. San'ā', Great Mosque, *kalām* 53, f. 256b.6 (I am indebted to Wilfried Madelung for making available to me his microfilm of this manuscript); Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), *al-Minhaj fī ṣūl al-dīn*, ed. and trans. S. Schmidtke as *A Mu'tazilite creed of al-Zamakhsharī*.

by reason. The second point is a subtle one: to command a supererogatory act is itself supererogatory, while to command an obligatory act is obligatory.<sup>26</sup> This view, Mānkidm tells us, was introduced by Abū 'Alī, earlier Mu'tazilites (*al-mashāyikh min al-salaf*) having failed to make the distinction.<sup>27</sup> Other views of the Jubbā'īs appear here and there in the literature. Zaydī sources report from Abū 'Alī such legal opinions as that one must have actual knowledge that a wrong is being committed before violating the privacy of a home.<sup>28</sup> Further opinions of Abū 'Alī are found in later works of Koranic exegesis, and are likely to derive from his lost Koran commentary.<sup>29</sup> Here again the disagreement between him and Abū Hāshim over the source of obligation is mentioned.<sup>30</sup> He is also quoted for the view that the group which in Q7:164 saw no point in reproving the Sabbath-breakers<sup>31</sup> did so because they despaired of them; this would place them among the saved.<sup>32</sup> More interestingly, he is reported to have

Footnote 25 (*cont.*)

Strugart 1997, 77.4 (drawn to my attention by Eran Kohlberg; the chapter on *al-nam bi'l-um* is translated *ibid.*, 406); Zamakhsharī, *Kashshaf*, 1:397.11; Himmāsī (d. early seventh/thirteenth century), *al-Minqidh min al-ṭiqāf*, Qum 1412-14, 2:211.3; Sawf al-Dīn al-Anīdī (d. 631/1233), in a passage cited below, ch. 13, note 75; Muḥallī (d. 652/1254f.), *Umdat al-mursalin* f. *usūl al-dīn*, ms. Princeton, Arabic, Third Series, no. 347, 292.4 (the manuscript is paginated, not foliated; for this work, see 'A. M. al-Hāshimī, *Makādir al-fih al-fahm fī 'l-ta'imm*, Sidon and Beirut 1988, 117). Ibn Abī 'Hādīd, *Sharḥ Naḥj al-balāgha*, 19:307.17; Abū Ḥayyān, *Bayān*, 3:21.3; al-Mu'ayyad Yāḥyā ibn Ḥamza (d. 749/1348f.), *al-Shāmil li-jawāb al-ṭalīb*, ms. Leiden, Or. 2:587, ff. 181b.27, 182a.25, 187b.6 (for this work, see below, note 115). Ibn al-Murādī (d. 840/1437), *al-Qatā'id fī naḥj al-ṭalīb*, ed. A. N. Nādir, Beirut 1985, 149.8. For references to the position of Abū 'Alī, see also Muwaffaq al-Shārī (first half of the fifth/eleventh century), *Ilmān*, ms. Leiden, Or. 8:409, f. 135b.8 (for this author and his work, see below, ch. 10, 241); also below, note 45 for Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq (d. 424/1032f.), and note 30 for Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1153).

<sup>26</sup> For this question, see below, 213.

<sup>27</sup> Mānkidm, *Ta'rif*, 146.10, and see Yāḥyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 183a.22, citing the *Minqidh* of 'Abd al-Jabbār. Ibn al-Murādī (d. 840/1437) credits the innovation to Abū Hāshim (*al-Durr al-farīd*, in the abridgement of Sāim al-Dīn al-Ḥayyā, ms. Berlin, Glaser 202, f. 243a.15 (for this manuscript, see Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnis*, 4:310 no. 4,910), and cf. Ibn al-Murādī, *Qatā'id*, 149.12, reading *wasā'if* for *yurād*). Ishāmī states that Abū 'Alī-Qāsim al-Balkhī did not distinguish in this way (*Sharḥ*, f. 266a.5; *Umm*, f. 66a.11), while Ibn al-Murādī says that he believed it to be obligatory to command the supererogatory (*Durr*, f. 243a.13; *Qatā'id*, 149.13).

<sup>28</sup> Ibn Miftāḥ (d. 877/1472), *Munazzar*, Cairo 1332-58, 4:587.2. For other such opinions of Abū 'Alī in Zaydī sources, see Muwaffaq al-Shārī, *Ilmān*, f. 141a.9; 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Hādī (fl. early seventh/thirteenth century), *Lum'a*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3:949, f. 221a.11 (for this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplément*, 219f. no. 342); Muḥallī, *Umm*, 302.4. <sup>29</sup> For this work, see Gimaret, *Lectures*.

<sup>30</sup> Zamakhsharī, *Kashshaf*, 1:397.11, and cf. Ṭabrisī, *Majma'*, 1:484.5 (both to Q3:104, though not included thereto by Gimaret).

<sup>31</sup> See above, ch. 2, 28.

<sup>32</sup> Ṭūsī, *Tibyāt*, 5:16.18; Ṭabrisī, *Majma'*, 2:492.6; Gimaret, *Lectures*, 370. However, as Gimaret points out, Ṭabrisī has Abū 'Alī suspend judgement on the fate of the group (*Majma'*, 2:493.14).

held the opinion that forbidding wrong is an individual (as opposed to a collective) duty.<sup>33</sup> But the monograph that Abū 'Alī devoted to forbidding wrong, and which might have given us a rounded picture of his views, does not survive.<sup>34</sup>

For the middle and later fourth/tenth century, we have direct access to some views of the Koranic exegete Rummānī (d. 384/994) and the celebrated Būyid vizier the Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād (d. 385/995). Rummānī, like Abū 'Alī-Qāsim al-Balkhī, belonged to the Baghdadī school.<sup>35</sup> He saw Q3:21, together with the tradition about standing up to an unjust ruler and getting killed for it, as proof that it was permissible to risk death in taking action against wrong (*inhār al-munkar*).<sup>36</sup> From his commentary to Q3:104 we learn his views on a number of points. He inclined to the view that the duty can be known by reason,<sup>37</sup> he held it to be a collective obligation,<sup>38</sup> and he approved of recourse to arms where necessary.<sup>39</sup> The Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād, who was closely connected to the Baṣran school, has left us two very short accounts of the duty. Perhaps their most notable feature is their stress on an escalation (*irrigā'*) which may lead in the end to the gravest measures, including the use of arms. The only condition he mentions is being able to perform the duty (*imkān* or *istīṭā'a*).<sup>40</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Ṭūsī, *Tibyāt*, 2:548.14 (to Q3:104, not included by Gimaret); cf. above, ch. 2, note 17. What Ṭūsī says here is explicit enough. However Zāḥirī, whom he yokes with Abū 'Alī in connection with the interpretation of the *um* of Q3:104, does not himself raise the issue whether the duty is to be classified as individual or collective (see above, ch. 2, note 16); this in turn suggests that we cannot entirely trust Ṭūsī's report of Abū 'Alī's position. For other comments of Abū 'Alī on verses bearing on *al-nam bi'l-um* see Gimaret, *Lectures*, 674, 801.

<sup>34</sup> For this work see D. Gimaret, 'Matières pour une bibliographie des ḡubhāt', *Journal Asiatique*, 264 (1976), 283 no. 8; D. Gimaret, 'Matières pour une bibliographie des jubbāt: note complémentaire', in M. E. Marmura (ed.), *Islamic theology and philosophy*, Albany 1984, 32 no. 8.

<sup>35</sup> For Rummānī's school allegiance, see Ibn al-Murādī, *Tahqīq*, 110.11, and *Et*<sup>2</sup>, art. 'Rummānī', 614b (f. Hanaḡan).

<sup>36</sup> Ṭūsī, *Tibyāt*, 2:422.16; Ṭabrisī, *Majma'*, 1:423.31; cf. above, ch. 2, note 79, and ch. 1, note 18, respectively.

<sup>37</sup> Rummānī (d. 384/994), *Tafṣīr al-Qur'ān*, ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Arabic 6:523, f. 62b.9 (partially reproduced in Ṭūsī, *Tibyāt*, 2:549.11). For this manuscript, see Gimaret, *Lectures*, 18, 23. I am grateful to Adrien Leites for obtaining for me a copy of the commentary to Q3:104-10.

<sup>38</sup> Rummānī, *Tafṣīr*, f. 62a.14, 62b.14.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 62a.9 (copied in Ṭūsī, *Tibyāt*, 2:549.16). Contrast the more restrictive view of his fellow-Baghdādī Abū 'Alī-Qāsim al-Balkhī on this point (see above, note 23).

<sup>40</sup> See al-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād (d. 385/995), *al-Ilmān wa-madhahibi al-ṭalīb*, in M. H. 'Alī Qāsim (ed.), *Nafā'is al-makhlūqāt*, Najaf and Baghdad 1952-6, 1:24.15; al-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād (d. 385/995), *al-Tadlīb fī 'l-usūl al-ḥumma*, also in 'Alī Qāsim, *Nafā'is al-makhlūqāt*, 2:94.17. Both are cited in E. Kohlberg, 'The development of the Imāmī Shī'ī doctrine of *jihad*', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 126 (1976), 68 n. 30. In the first, the Ṣāhib also mentions a group of the Hashwiyā who deny the obligatoriness of *al-nam bi'l-um* *ṭif*.

We can conclude this survey of the first three centuries of Mu'tazilite doctrine with the well-known Shāfi'ite Mu'tazilite 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad al-Hamadhānī (d. 415/1025), a representative of the Basran school. Though a considerable number of his works survive, among those that are definitely his we find only one that treats forbidding wrong.<sup>41</sup> It does so in two passages of a few lines each. The first begins with the point that commanding right may be either obligatory or supererogatory, depending on whether the right to be commanded is itself obligatory or supererogatory; by contrast, forbidding wrong is invariably obligatory, since all wrong (*munkar*) is evil (*qabīḥ*). 'Abd al-Jabbār then goes on to escalation, stressing that one should not go beyond the minimum measure that is effective (he cites in support Q49:9). He ends the passage by stating that the duty of forbidding wrong lapses (and it is best not to proceed) when there is good reason to believe that it would lead to worse offences and greater harm. The second passage answers the question: 'Do you hold that one who does not forbid wrong disobeys God?' The reply is that this is indeed so if he is able to perform the duty (*in amkanahu dhālika*),<sup>42</sup> does not fear for his life or property, and believes (*ẓanna*) that he would be successful (*ammahu yuqbal minhu*); if despite fear for his life he proceeds anyway, he acts virtuously. Another work which is very probably 'Abd al-Jabbār's devotes a few lines to the grounds of obligation.<sup>43</sup> These are given as scripture, tradition (*sunna*) and consensus – but only the first is illustrated (here by Q5:78–9), further proofs being described as innumerable.

<sup>41</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad (d. 415/1025), *al-Uṣūl al-ḥukumiyya, apud* Gimaret, 'Les *Uṣūl al-ḥukmīyya*', 82.7, 94.16 (the latter passage was drawn to my attention by Haggai Ben Shammai). (This work, for which see *ibid.*, 73, is translated in R. C. Martin *et al.*, *Defenders of reason in Islam*, Oxford 1997, 90–110.) 'Abd al-Jabbār does not treat forbidding wrong in either his *Mughnī* or his *Muḥīṭ* to the extent that they are extant and published, but there are cross-references to such a discussion in the published volumes of the *Mughnī* (see J. R. T. M. Peters, *God's created speech*, Leiden 1976, 34; also *Mughnī*, ed. T. Ḥusayn *et al.*, Cairo 1960–9, 20.2:239.5).

<sup>42</sup> This, as we have seen, is commonly presented as a condition in other Mu'tazilite (not to mention non-Mu'tazilite) accounts, though the wording varies (cf. above, notes 13, 21, 40).

<sup>43</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad (d. 415/1025), *Mukhtasar fī uṣūl al-ḥukm*, in M. 'Umāra (ed.), *Raṣā'īl al-'adl wa'l-tamjīd*, Cairo 1971, 1:248.1. The title of the work is taken by 'Umāra from the author's own description of it (*ibid.*, 168.5). He ascribes it to 'Abd al-Jabbār on various grounds, none of them compelling (*ibid.*, 163–7). Some support for his view can, however, be found in the appearance near the beginning of the work of the statement that the principles of religion with which one must be acquainted are four, namely *taẓwīd*, *taḥl*, *nubuwāna*, and *sharā'ī* (*ibid.*, 168.17); this is identical with a schema adduced by Mānkadh from 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Mukhtasar al-Ḥasanī* (*Ta'fiq*, 122.15, and cf. *ibid.*, 23, in the editor's introduction). However, the rest of what Mānkadh says about this work in the same passage does not fit 'Umāra's text (contrast Mānkadh, *Ta'fiq*, 123.1 with 'Umāra, *Raṣā'īl*, 169.13). The ascription to 'Abd al-Jabbār is accepted by Madelung (*Encyclopaedia Iranica*, art. 'Abd al-Jabbār', 117b item 3).

The author adds that reason declares it an act of benevolence (*iḥsān*) to restrain others from evil (*qabīḥ*). However, our knowledge of 'Abd al-Jabbār's views is much more extensive than direct attestations would suggest. As will be seen in the next section, almost all classical Mu'tazilite treatments of the duty derive from his school, and on occasion they expressly quote him or make explicit reference to his opinions on one point or another. An exception is a short account that is in all probability the work of the Zaydī imam Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq (d. 424/1032).<sup>44</sup> Like 'Abd al-Jabbār, Abū Ṭālib was a pupil of the well-known Ḥanaḥī Mu'tazilite Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980),<sup>45</sup> and what he says can thus help us to work back to the generation preceding 'Abd al-Jabbār.

Before we proceed to the classical accounts of forbidding wrong, we need to pull together the threads of these rather disjointed findings regarding early Mu'tazilite views. There are two issues worth raising here.

The first concerns the evolution of Mu'tazilite thought over time. That it evolved is something we can assume. Indeed in one instance our sources explicitly tell us that it did so: Abū 'Alī introduced a distinction that had not been made by his predecessors.<sup>46</sup> But I have encountered no instance of a reported view of an early authority which we can identify as an archaism in relation to classical Mu'tazilite doctrines of forbidding wrong. The one possible candidate is the equation of forbidding wrong with rebellion against unjust rule, an attitude which has been seen as a casualty of the declining activism of the movement;<sup>47</sup> I shall return in a moment to the question whether the early Mu'tazilites actually made such an equation. This apart, my category of 'early Mu'tazilism' does not identify a stage in the development of the school when its doctrine of forbidding wrong was visibly different from what it later became. In the present (and probably future) state of our knowledge, early Mu'tazilism is simply Mu'tazilism which we do not know very much about.

The second issue is whether modern scholars are right to suppose that the early Mu'tazilite conception of the duty was a particularly activist one.

<sup>44</sup> This account is found in ms. Milian, Ambrosiana, Codex Grifini 27, ff. 63b–6–64a.22. Madelung, who kindly sent me a copy of the passage, has shown that the work in question is likely to be Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq's *Mabāḥīṭ al-ḥukmīyya fī uṣūl al-ḥukm* (as which I cite it below), and that it is in any case by a pupil of Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980) other than 'Abd al-Jabbār (see W. Madelung, 'Zu einigen Werken des Imams Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq bi-l-Ḥaq', *Der Islam*, 63 (1986)). For Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq, see Madelung, *Qāṭim*, 178–82. See *ET*, *Supplement*, art. 'Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī' (J. van Ess). Abū 'Abdallāh is not, however, mentioned in our passage; the only named Mu'tazilite authority here is Abū 'Alī, adduced for his view that the duty is obligatory by reason ('*uḡlān*') (Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq, *Mabāḥīṭ*, f. 63b.7, for this issue, see above, note 25). <sup>45</sup> See above, note 27. <sup>46</sup> See van Ess, *Theologie*, 2:390, 4:675, 704; cf. also McDermott, *Mughnī*, 56, and the polemic of the Imānī Shaykh al-Muḥīd (d. 413/1022) cited *ibid.*, 124.

If we mean by this that they linked forbidding wrong to rebellion against unjust rule, the evidence we have considered above is inconclusive. With regard to 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, it is suggestive, but not much more.<sup>48</sup> It is noteworthy that the linkage is absent from Ṣaīwān al-Anṣārī's poem,<sup>49</sup> as also from Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī's chapter on Mu'tazilite rebels (*khurrij al-bi al-'adl*).<sup>50</sup> The only instance in which the connection is explicit is the view attributed to Sahl ibn Salāma.<sup>51</sup> But if we leave aside the question of rebellion, there is much to be said for the view that early Mu'tazilism took a broadly activist stance with regard to forbidding wrong. With the possible exception of Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm,<sup>52</sup> the Mu'tazilites seem generally willing to contemplate recourse to arms in discharging the duty – in marked contrast to the Ḥanbalites. As we have seen, this theme appears in the accounts of Aṣḥ'arī, Maṣ'ūdī, Rummānī, and the Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād;<sup>53</sup> and although Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī himself significantly limits the use of arms,<sup>54</sup> he says of the Mu'tazilites in general that they agree on the obligation to carry out the duty with the sword, as well as through less drastic measures.<sup>55</sup> Reinforcing this embrace of the sword is a loud, if not quite deafening silence: there is no mention in all this of the third mode of standard Sunnī doctrine, performance in the heart.<sup>56</sup>

### 3. CLASSICAL MU'TAZILISM: THE DOCTRINE OF MĀNKDĪM

There are three classical Mu'tazilite authorities whose views on forbidding wrong are known to us in some detail. Those of Mānkdm̄ (d. 425/1034) and al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101) are directly accessible in their own works. Those of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) are known from the works of a number of later scholars. All three are members of the school

<sup>48</sup> See above, 197. I am not concerned here with the wider question of the early Mu'tazilite attitude to rebellion, though it is worth noting that there never was a rebellion that was both historically significant and specifically Mu'tazilite. Indeed it has been argued with some force that early Mu'tazilism cannot be seen as a movement with a clear political identity (S. Stroumsa, 'The beginnings of the Mu'tazila reconsidered', *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 13 (1990), 280–7, 293).

<sup>49</sup> See above, note 3.

<sup>50</sup> Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, *Maqālāt, apud* 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḥl al-'itizāl*, 115–19.

<sup>51</sup> See above, note 16.

<sup>52</sup> See above, 197f.

<sup>53</sup> See above, notes 13, 21, 39f.

<sup>54</sup> See above, note 23.

<sup>55</sup> Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, *Maqālāt, apud* 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḥl al-'itizāl*, 64.12. The passage reappears in Abū Tamīm, *Shajarat*, 13.7 = 30.

<sup>56</sup> It does appear in the doctrine attributed by Ibn Ḥazm to Aṣamm and others, but this is not serious evidence (see above, note 14). It also figures in the account of Mu'tazilite doctrine given by Mālaḥī (d. 377/987f.) (*Tanbih*, ed. S. Dedering, Istanbul 1936, 30.12), but this is an even less reliable source. See also below, ch. 13, note 8, for a statement of Qaṭīf al-Shāhī (d. 365/976) listing the three modes.

of 'Abd al-Jabbār, who was himself in a line that went back through his teacher Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī to the Jubbā'īs. I shall proceed by giving pride of place to the account of Mānkdm̄; it is relatively clear and systematic, and can stand as a model of what a classical Mu'tazilite doctrine of forbidding wrong is like. The book in question, itself based on a lost work of 'Abd al-Jabbār which it frequently quotes, is a compendium of Mu'tazilite doctrine.<sup>57</sup> Mānkdm̄ discusses the duty in two extended passages,<sup>58</sup> which I summarise and merge in what follows.<sup>59</sup> In the notes I have added frequent references to other Mu'tazilite accounts of the duty,<sup>60</sup> but the more significant features of rival doctrines will be taken up in the next section. As will be seen, Mānkdm̄'s account has something in common with that of the Ḥanbalite Abū Ya'īa ibn al-Farrā' (d. 458/1066),<sup>61</sup> but it is much more elaborate and sophisticated.

#### 1. Definitions

Mānkdm̄ begins, logically enough, by defining the four terms making up the phrase 'commanding right and forbidding wrong'. Thus 'commanding' (*amr*) is telling someone below one in rank (*raḥb*) to do something, while forbidding (*nahy*) is telling them not to; 'right' (*ma'rūf*) is any action of which the agent knows or infers the goodness (*ḥusn*), and 'wrong' (*munkar*) any action of which he knows or infers the badness (*qubḥ*).<sup>62</sup>

<sup>57</sup> The work is Mānkdm̄'s *Ta'liq Sharḥ al-'Uṣūl al-ḥikma*, and I cite it as such; but as already noted, it was published as the *Sharḥ al-'Uṣūl al-ḥikma* of 'Abd al-Jabbār. For the correct ascription and title, see Gimaret, 'Les *Uṣūl al-ḥikma*', 49f., and the detailed discussion that follows there. For the relationship of the work to 'Abd al-Jabbār's, see *ibid.*, 53, 66, and for Mānkdm̄ himself, see *ibid.*, 57–60.

<sup>58</sup> Mānkdm̄, *Ta'liq*, 141–8, 741–9. He has already discussed the question whether *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is one of five irreducible principles of the faith (*uṣūl al-dīn*), referring to various views of 'Abd al-Jabbār (*ibid.*, 122.14). The position he endorses is that there are in fact only two irreducible principles, namely the unity of God and His justice, and that the other three principles of Mu'tazilism – including *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* – fall under His justice (*ibid.*, 123.5).

<sup>59</sup> The numbering and headings of the sections are mine. Sections 1–12 are taken from the first passage, with parenthetical insertions of additional material from the second passage marked [...]. I do not cite material from the second passage when it merely repeats what is said in the first.

<sup>60</sup> As witnesses to the doctrine of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn I cite Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Zamakhsharī, Ḥimmaṣī, Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) and Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓala. I have also made reference to the account of Abū Fātib al-Nāṣiq.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. above, ch. 6, 129–36.

<sup>62</sup> Mānkdm̄, *Ta'liq*, 141.9 (the application of the terms *ma'rūf* and *munkar* to acts of God is restricted). Similar definitions of *ma'rūf* and *munkar* are given by Ibn al-Malāḥimī (*Faḥl*, f. 256a.18) and Ḥimmaṣī (*Munqidh*, 2.209.6), while Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓala defines all four terms (*Shiml*, f. 181b.5). Cf. also Jishumī, *Tahdhīb*, f. 69a.16, 69b.9.

2. *Obligation*

Mānkdm explains that there is no disagreement that commanding right and forbidding wrong are obligatory. [In the second passage he qualifies this by noting the dissent of an insignificant splinter-group of the Imānīs.]<sup>63</sup> The only point at issue is whether the obligation is known to be such by reason (*ʿaql*), or by revelation (*samʿ*) alone. On this he reports disagreement within the Muʿtazilite fold: one view is that the obligation is known from both reason and revelation, the other that it is known only from revelation.<sup>64</sup> An exception is made on the latter view where the wrong being done to another is causing one emotional distress; here reason requires that one should proceed, simply to alleviate one's own discomfort. [In the second passage, Mānkdm identifies the view that the obligation is known only from revelation as the correct school doctrine.]<sup>65</sup> The forms of revelation that establish the duty are Koran, tradition (*sunna*) and consensus (*ijmāʿ*). From the Koran, he adduces Q3:110: 'You were the best community brought forth to men, commanding right and forbidding wrong'; God would not have praised us so had commanding right and forbidding wrong not been obligatory. [The second passage adds Q31:17.]<sup>66</sup> Turning to tradition, he quotes a saying of the Prophet: 'No eye which sees God disobeyed should blink before righting the wrong or departing the scene.'<sup>67</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Mānkdm, *Taʿlīq*, 741.5; Farrāzādī specifies that this group makes obligation conditional on the presence of a ruling imam (*imām muḥfarid al-ʿiṣā*, *Taʿlīq*, f. 154b.14). Compare Mānkdm, *Taʿlīq*, 124.10, where he notes that Imāmī disagreement with the 'five principles' of the Muʿtazilites concerns *al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf*. Ishūnī mentions as dissenters the Rafīdā, the Hashawīya and Abū Bakr al-ʿAsamm (*Shāriḥ*, f. 264b.7, and cf. his *ʿUyūn*, f. 66a.1). His statement of the view of ʿAsamm looks like a conflation of two statements made by Aḥīʿarī, rather than an independent testimony (cf. above, notes 13, 15). Yāhyā ibn Ḥanẓala speaks of the dissent of an Imāmī sect (*bu ḥi firqat al-Imāniyya*, *Shāmiḥ*, f. 181b.25).

<sup>64</sup> For the earlier Muʿtazilite disagreement on this issue, see above, note 25.

<sup>65</sup> Mānkdm, *Taʿlīq*, 742.6, adducing complex arguments which we can leave aside. Similar accounts are given by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq (*Mabāḥiṭ*, f. 63b.7), Ishūnī (*Shāriḥ*, f. 265a.14, and cf. his *ʿUyūn*, f. 66a.6), Ibn al-Malahimī (*Faʿl*, f. 256b.6), Ḥimmaṣī (*Munqidh*, 2.211.3), and Yāhyā ibn Ḥanẓala (*Shāmiḥ*, f. 181b.21). The last three set out the argument of Abū l-Ḥusayn in favour of the rationalist view, namely that altruism leads to reciprocity, and is thus in the altruist's interest (*Faʿl*, f. 256b.14; *Munqidh*, 2.214.13; *Shāmiḥ*, f. 182a.10). Ibn Abī l-Ḥādīd and Zamakhsharī do little more than set out the unpublished volume of 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Minhāj* in A. ʿA. ʿAḥī, *al-Sila bayn al-Zaydiyya wa l-Muʿtazila*, Beirut and Sanʿa 1987, 351.3.

<sup>66</sup> Mānkdm, *Taʿlīq*, 741.8. <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.11, 741.10 (*laysa li-ʿayn tarā yāḥi yuʿā fa-taṭarraf li-ḥaṭāʾi tughayyir naṭanāḥi*, similarly Farrāzādī, *Taʿlīq*, f. 154b.18). It is striking, though not perhaps surprising, that Mānkdm does not cite a better-known tradition. This one is sparsely attested in Sunnī sources. One variant is quoted by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (9th/late third/ninth century)

As to consensus, this is unproblematic in the absence of disagreement.<sup>68</sup>

3. *Conditions*

Having established the basis of the obligation, Mānkdm now turns to the circumstances that trigger it. He gives a schema of five conditions (*shurūʾ*) which must be satisfied for commanding right and forbidding wrong to be obligatory.<sup>69</sup> These conditions are as follows:

1 *Knowledge of law*. One must know that what one commands is indeed right and what one forbids wrong. Without this, one is in danger of commanding what is wrong and forbidding what is right, which is not permissible. More specifically, one must have actual knowledge of the

(*Nawāḥir al-ʿuṣūl*, Beirut n.d., 22.1, whence Murtaqī, *Kanz*, 3:87 no. 5,614); another, ascribed to anonymous sources (*kāna yuqāl*) rather than to the Prophet, is given by Ibn Abī l-Dunayṣ (*ʿAṣṣ*, 78 no. 34, whence ʿAbd al-Ghānī al-Maqdisī, *ʿAṣṣ*, 51 no. 67). On the Imāmī side, a wording almost identical with that of Ibn Abī l-Dunayṣ is found in Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), *ʿAṣṣ*, Najaf 1964, 1:54.17, and subsequently in Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, *Wḥāʾiṭ*, 6:1.399 no. 25, and Majlisī, *Bihār*, 100:77 no. 28. On the Zaydī side, the tradition is quoted in forms close to or identical with Mānkdm's, and ascribed to the Prophet, by such authorities as Ḥuʾayrī (d. 815/1412) (*Taʿlīq*, ms. Berlin, Glaser 145, f. 390a.13 (for this manuscript, see Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnisse*, 4:295 no. 4,883)) and Ibn al-Murraḍā (d. 840/1437) (*al-Baḥr al-zakhibhār*, ed. ʿA. M. Saḍq and ʿA. S. ʿAḥyā, Cairo 1947-9, 5:470.2, and cf. the commentary thereon; also his *Qaṭiʿiḥ*, 152.19 and his *Dirra*, ff. 241b.4, 247a.22). Another version of the tradition is found in a Zaydī source contemporary with al-Ḥādī fī l-Ḥaqq (d. 298/911) (ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Nāṣih*, f. 45b.6). The only version supplied with an *isnād* is that of Ibn Abī l-Dunayṣ, and the Imāmī sources. Here the tradition has an 'Aḥī higher *isnād* which does not seem to be Imāmī, and may be Zaydī. The latest 'Aḥī to appear, the polymath Abū Ṭāhir Aḥmad ibn Ṭasā (d. 200/815), is familiar to the 'Aḥī genealogists (see, for example, 'Aḥī ibn Abī l-Ghānī al-Danghānī, *Qunm* 1409, 294.3, and cf. 292.10 for the chronology), but he is not included by the Imāmī biographers. In short, we cannot be certain whether we have to do with a Sunnī tradition adduced by 'Abd al-Jabbār or a Zaydī tradition supplied by Mānkdm. Ibn al-Malahimī, Zamakhsharī, and Ḥimmaṣī cite a much better known tradition at this point (Ibn al-Malahimī, *Faʿl*, f. 256a.25; Zamakhsharī, *Minhāj*, 77.5; Ḥimmaṣī, *Munqidh*, 2.210.1, for the tradition, see above, ch. 3, note 19). But Ḥimmaṣī also knows Mānkdm's tradition (*Iḥṭā*, 220.13), and Yāhyā ibn Ḥanẓala cites both (*Shāmiḥ*, f. 183a.5).

<sup>68</sup> Mānkdm, *Taʿlīq*, 142.1. Similarly Ibn al-Malahimī (*Faʿl*, f. 256a.22), Ḥimmaṣī (*Munqidh*, 2.209.14), and Yāhyā ibn Ḥanẓala (*Shāmiḥ*, f. 183a.10). See further below, 215.

<sup>69</sup> Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq gives a list of four conditions (which he refers to as *maʿānī*), starting with equivalents of Mānkdm's in the order (3), (4), (3), his fourth condition, that one's *inḥār al-munkar* should not itself be a *minḥār* deserving of *inḥār*, can be taken to correspond to Mānkdm's (1) and (2) (*Mabāḥiṭ*, f. 64a.12). Ishūnī gives pretty much the same conditions as Mānkdm, but in the order (1), (4), (2), (5), (3) (*Shāriḥ*, f. 266b.1). For the different overall approach to the conditions taken by writers in the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn (including Ibn al-Malahimī, Zamakhsharī, Ḥimmaṣī, Ibn Abī l-Ḥādīd and Yāhyā ibn Ḥanẓala), see below, 222f.

point in question; just having good reason to believe (*ghalibāt al-ʿann*) that something is right or wrong is not enough.<sup>70</sup>

- 2 *Knowledge of fact.* One must know the wrong to be in the making (*biʿāṣir*); for example, one might see the wherewithal for drinking or making music already assembled. Mānkdm's treatment of this condition is very brief, but the parallels in other Mu'tazilite accounts make it clear that he is restricting the duty in a way that is significant (and to an extent counter-intuitive). The point of forbidding wrong, in this Mu'tazilite doctrine, is solely to have an impact on the future; blaming or punishing people for what they have already done are thus no part of the duty, except to the extent that they function as deterrents against recidivism. With regard to this condition, it suffices to have good reason to believe.<sup>71</sup>

- 3 *Absence of worse side-effects.* One must know that taking action will not lead to a greater evil (*maḍarrat*). Thus if one knows – or has good reason

<sup>70</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'iq*, 142.16. *jishumī* gives a formidable account of the religious knowledge the performer must possess, but then quotes 'Abd al-Jabbār to the effect that where the status of the wrong is obvious and generally agreed upon by the scholars, the layman is in the same position as a scholar – whereas if *iqṭinā* is involved, only scholars can perform the duty (*Sharh*, f. 266b.4). For the equivalent of this condition in the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Maḍīnī, *Fā'iq*, f. 256b.23; Zamakhsharī, *Mubīn*, 78.1; Zamakhsharī, *Kaṣībī*, 1:397.13, and cf. 396.9; Humaydī, *Munqidh*, 2:216.7; Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharh*, 19:308.20; Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓala, *Shāmi*, f. 185b.28.

<sup>71</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'iq*, 143.1. *jishumī* expresses the condition in terms of the existence of signs that the offender is going to commit the offence (*amārin al-ʿiqān*) (*Sharh*, f. 266b.2), and in expanding on this explains that what has already happened (*al-maḥṣūf*) cannot be prevented, and so cannot be taken as the target of the duty – unless to discourage the offender from doing such things in future (*ibid.*, f. 266b.12). In the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn, this condition is in effect divided into two: that the wrong has not already happened (which is a condition for it to be good to proceed), and that it looks as if it's going to happen (a condition for it to be obligatory to proceed) (Ibn al-Maḍīnī, *Fā'iq*, f. 257a.4, 257a.15; Zamakhsharī, *Mubīn*, 78.2, 77.12; Zamakhsharī, *Kaṣībī*, 1:397.13, 397.16; Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharh*, 19:309.4 (garbled), 309.16; Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓala, *Shāmi*, f. 186a.6, 186b.17). Humaydī complicates the picture by omitting the first (cf. *Munqidh*, 2:216.11), and giving the second in a form that owes its key term (*amārin al-ʿiqān*) to the account of the Sharīf al-Murādā (d. 436/1044) (*ibid.*, 218.7; cf. below, ch. 11, 276, condition (2)); in other words, he speaks of an offence that is now in progress, and at the same time likely to recur in the future. On the handling of the conditions in the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn in general, see further below, 222f.; what concerns us here is the condition that the wrong has not already happened. The key word in this is *maḥṣūf* (see the wordings quoted below, note 123), used in the sense of 'having already happened'. The garbled wording of Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd's *Sharh* at this point is no doubt the result of a failure (very likely his own) to understand this usage: *maḥṣūf* has thus been taken in the sense of 'real' or 'actual'. (For the temporal force of the participle here, compare Muwaffaq al-Shāfi, *Uṣūl*, f. 138a.20: *idhū ikhrījūhu 'an kamūsh fā'iqan li-mā qad fa'atūhu lā yunkūn*, where *fā'iqan* clearly has the sense of 'having done'.) One result of this Mu'tazilite doctrine is that the past tense of *fa'atūhu* in Q5:79 becomes a problem; Zamakhsharī seeks to explain it away (*Kaṣībī*, 1:667.9; for this verse, see above, ch. 2, 15f.).

to believe – that telling off wine-drinkers will lead to the killing of Muslims or the burning of a quarter of a town, there is no obligation to proceed, nor is it good to do so.<sup>72</sup>

- 4 *Efficacy.* One must know – or have good reason to believe – that speaking out will have an effect (*in ṭhīr*). However, there is disagreement as to whether or not it is still good to proceed even when it is not obligatory. Some say that it is good because it is tantamount to calling others to the faith (*istid'ā' al-ghayr ilā 'l-dīn*); others say that it is bad because futile (*'ubūth*).<sup>73</sup> Mānkdm does not state his own view on this point.

- 5 *Absence of danger to oneself.* One must know – or have good reason to believe – that one's action will not bring harm to one's person or property. This, however, depends on the kind of person one is. A man who will not be greatly affected by insults and blows is hardly exempted from the duty by such a prospect; on the other hand, one who would suffer and lose standing has no obligation. Again the question arises whether it is still good to proceed, even for someone who is not obligated to do so. In this case the answer is that it depends: if the man's suffering would be for the greater glory of the faith (*'iṣṣat al-dīn*), then it is good that a man should act, but if not, not. This is how we should understand the case of Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī (d. 61/680), who persisted in commanding right and forbidding wrong till he was killed.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'iq*, 143.3 (when this condition is picked up a little later, the quarter is specified to be a Muslim one, *ibid.*, 146.2). For various versions of this condition, see above, 202 ('Abd al-Jabbār); Abū Talīb al-Nāṣiq, *Mabūdī*, f. 64a.13; *jishumī*, *Sharh*, f. 266b.4, 266b.15; Ibn al-Maḍīnī, *Fā'iq*, f. 257a.5; Zamakhsharī, *Mubīn*, 78.3; Zamakhsharī, *Kaṣībī*, 1:397.15; Humaydī, *Munqidh*, 2:216.11; Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharh*, 19:309.6; Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓala, *Shāmi*, f. 186a.10.

<sup>73</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'iq*, 143.6; similarly Abū Talīb al-Nāṣiq, *Mabūdī*, f. 64a.13, and *jishumī*, *Sharh*, f. 266b.10 (but without discussion of the point of disagreement). For the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn (in which prospective efficacy is in the first instance a condition for it to be good to proceed, cf. below, note 151), see Ibn al-Maḍīnī, *Fā'iq*, f. 257a.6; Zamakhsharī, *Mubīn*, 78.3, and his *Kaṣībī*, 1:397.15, and cf. 396.12; Humaydī, *Munqidh*, 2:216.13; Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharh*, 19:309.10; Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓala, *Shāmi*, f. 186a.15. Yahyā quotes from 'Abd al-Jabbār two antithetical views on the question whether it is still good to proceed, one espoused in his *Ta'iq al-Maḥṣūf* (*ibid.*, f. 186a.25), and the other in his *Mubīn* (*ibid.*, f. 186b.4); he supports the more positive view cited from the *Mubīn*, which is also that of 'Abd al-Jabbār in his *al-Liḥ al-ibḥār* (see above, 202).

<sup>74</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'iq*, 143.10 (I read *yujūnū* for *yujūnū*). *jishumī*'s formulation of the danger condition is similar (*Sharh*, f. 266b.3, 266b.13), and his position on the question whether it is good to proceed is the same (*ibid.*, f. 264b.17). In his Koran commentary he takes the view that Q3:21 shows it to be good to proceed with *al-tawr bi'l-in ṭhīr* even at risk to one's life; he comments that this confirms the view of the Mu'tazilites ('our teachers') that in the face of such danger it is best to go ahead for the greater glory of the faith (*'iṣṣat al-dīn*) (see Zarqān, *al-Hādīth al-judayd*, 194.16, where the passage is quoted). Muḥallī does not use the phrase *'iṣṣat al-dīn*, but makes the same point by distinguishing between people who serve as religious role models, for whom heroism is virtuous, and people who

## 4. Escalation

By what means is the duty to be performed? Here Mānkidm sets out a basic principle: since the object of the exercise is simply to bring about good and put a stop to evil, one may not have recourse to drastic measures (*al-narr al-sa'ib*) where the purpose is achieved (*idhā 'atfa'a 'l-gharad*)<sup>75</sup> by gentler ones (*al-narr al-sahib*). This is established by both reason and revelation. As to reason, when one of us has an objective, it is impermissible (*lā yajīz*) for him to take a difficult course where an easy one would suffice. As to revelation, God first commands us to try to put things right between groups of believers who are fighting each other, and only then does He go on to tell us to fight the group that is in the wrong (Q49:9), thus prescribing a process of escalation.<sup>76</sup> [The second passage approaches escalation from a different angle, establishing a difference between commanding right and forbidding

Footnote 74 (cont.)

do not fulfil such a role, for whom it is not ('*Umda*, 299.23). For the equivalent of the condition in the school of Abū 'l-Husayn (where it is a condition for obligation, cf. below, note 152), see Ibn al-Malāḥim, *Fa'iq*, f. 257a.17; Zamakhsarī, *Minhaj*, 77.13 (for *al-narr al-sahib*); *Minhaj*, 77.17, and revise the transition accordingly); Zamakhsarī, *Kashshaf*, 1.398.1; Himmāsī, *Minhaj*, 2.218.18; Ibn Abī 'l-Hadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19.309.19; and Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 186b.28. Ibn al-Malāḥim states that the distinction turning on *'iṣā' al-dīn* was made by 'Abd al-Jabbār, and that it was rejected by Abū 'l-Husayn, who took the view that it is good to proceed in all such cases, because all alike involve *'iṣā' al-dīn* (*Fa'iq*, f. 257a.24; similarly Himmāsī, *Minhaj*, 2.219.10, and Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 187a.17 (endorsing the view of Abū 'l-Husayn)). We have already encountered this view in the doctrine of the Hanbalite Abū Ya'la (see above, ch. 6, note 142, and cf. below, ch. 10, note 112, for Ibn al-Murādā). However, this forms part of an account in which Ibn al-Malāḥim has already stated that, in cases where there is good reason to believe that one's action would be effective, it is the doctrine of 'our teachers' that it is wrong to proceed where the offence in question is less weighty than the danger courted (*Fa'iq*, f. 257a.19, likewise Zamakhsarī, *Minhaj*, 77.13; Himmāsī, *Minhaj*, 2.219.2; Ibn Abī 'l-Hadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19.310.2; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 187a.5). Ibn al-Malāḥim goes on to a discussion of danger to property more elaborate than Mānkidm's (*Fa'iq*, f. 257b.1; similarly Himmāsī, *Minhaj*, 2.220.2, and Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 187a.22). Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḥiq, having stated that the obligation turns on the absence of moral danger (*Mabdh'*, f. 64a.13), quotes 'our teachers' as holding that where one has good reason to believe that proceeding will be for the greater glory of the faith (*'iṣā' al-dīn*), one may do so (*ibid.*, f. 64a.15); this suggests that the distinction was inherited by 'Abd al-Jabbār, and not originated by him. The distinction does not in fact appear in the account of *al-narr bi'l-ma'rifa* given by 'Abd al-Jabbār in his *al-Uṣūl al-ḥamān*, but the treatment given there is after all brief (see above, 202). Muwaffiq al-Shajafī reports a deviant Mu'tazilite view to the effect that heroism for the greater glory of the faith was commendable when Islam first began, but is no longer so now that the religion has spread and become dominant (*Ḥifāṭ*, f. 138a.8).

<sup>75</sup> This phrase recurs (*ibid.*, 148.17, 741.16; in the first passage, read *al-gharad* for *al-fa'iq*). *ibid.*, 144.1. Similarly above, 202 ('Abd al-Jabbār'), Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḥiq, *Mabdh'*, f. 64a.9; Ibn al-Malāḥim, *Fa'iq*, f. 257b.4; Zamakhsarī, *Minhaj*, 77.8; Zamakhsarī, *Kashshaf*, 1.398.1; Himmāsī, *Minhaj*, 2.220.15; Ibn Abī 'l-Hadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19.310.12; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 191a.20. Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḥiq's account is unusual in that he makes use of the 'three modes' of Sunni doctrine (*qalb, lisan, yad*), but it seems clear from the context that by *karāḥat al-qalb* he intends a manifestation of disapproval which could have a real impact on the offender.

wrong. In the first, the verbal act of commanding is all we are obligated to perform; we have no duty to force a man to pray. In the second, forbidding alone is not enough; rather, provided the conditions are satisfied, we have a duty actively to prevent the wrong being committed. Thus if we have a wine-drinker in our power, we should first forbid him gently (*bi'l-qawl al-layyin*);<sup>77</sup> if he continues, we should speak harshly to him (*biḥashshannā lishu 'l-qawl*); if he persists, we should beat him (*darabnāhu*); if even this does not deter him, we should fight him (*qāṭnāhu*, sc. with weapons) till he desists.<sup>78</sup>

## 5. Manifesting disapproval

At this point Mānkidm quotes 'Abd al-Jabbār asking himself a question.<sup>79</sup> Suppose that, by reason of the non-fulfilment of the specified conditions, someone is not obligated. Does he then have any other obligation in this context (*in kālif ākhar fī ḥālāhā 'l-bāb*)? The answer is that it depends on his character. If he is the sort of virtuous and respectable person who would never be supposed to approve of what was going on, he has no obligation. If, on the other hand, he is the kind of man who might be expected to go along with wrongdoing, he should make a point of manifesting his disapproval (*karāḥa*) in order to avoid any suspicion to the contrary – and also because doing so is benevolent and beneficial (*li-anna fihī lufḥan wa-maḥabba*).<sup>80</sup>

## 6. Categories of wrong

Wrongs (*munākir*) are the kind of thing that invites taxonomy, and Mānkidm, again quoting 'Abd al-Jabbār, now proceeds to provide it. He

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Q20.44.

<sup>78</sup> Mānkidm, *Za'iq*, 744.13. Note that when Mānkidm refers to fighting, he does not use the ugly word 'sword'. It is equally unmentioned in the accounts stemming from Abū 'l-Husayn (see the references given above, note 76). Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḥiq, however, speaks bluntly of arms (*silāḥ*) (*Mabdh'*, f. 64a.11, and see f. 64a.18), and Farrādhī talks of the sword (*Za'iq*, f. 154b.23).

<sup>79</sup> The formula used is: 'Then he (may God have mercy on him) asked himself'. Mānkidm is here directly quoting 'Abd al-Jabbār (see Gimaret, 'Les *Uṣūl al-ḥamān*', 56). He continues to quote him through sections 6–8 below, and again in section 10, and also refers to him in the second passage in section 13. In the other sections it is not clear what is 'Abd al-Jabbār's contribution and what is Mānkidm's (cf. *ibid.*, 56f.), unless the introductory phrase 'know that...' (*wa-'lānu...*) is a marker of the latter. It opens sections 4, 9, 11 and 12, and forms part of the opening of section 2; it also occurs twice in the second passage (*ibid.*, 744.13, 745.3, the latter a parallel to section 8).

<sup>80</sup> Mānkidm, *Za'iq*, 144.9. Note that this is the section in which Mānkidm should have discussed the residual duty of performing *al-narr bi'l-ma'rifa* in one's heart – had he believed in it. He does not even speak of *karāḥat al-qalb* in the sense in which it is used by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḥiq (cf. above, note 76).

divides them up in two ways. His first partition of the field divides wrongs into those affecting oneself (*mā yakhṣas bihi*) and those that affect others (*mā yata'addūhu*).<sup>81</sup> Those affecting only oneself may in turn be subdivided into the significant (*mā yuqa' bihi l-i'tiānā*) and the trifling (*mā lā yuqa' bihi l-i'tiānā*). An example of a trifling wrong would be the theft of a dirhem from someone as rich as Korah; here reason establishes no obligation on the victim to rebuke the perpetrator [since he himself suffers no harm],<sup>82</sup> though revelation does so. An example of a significant wrong would be the theft of a poor man's only dirhem; here the poor man's obligation to respond is established by both reason and revelation. [The second passage fills in the details: the obligation is established by reason, because the poor man thereby averts harm (*ḥanar*) from himself, and this is an obligation; and by revelation, inasmuch as Q3:110 makes no distinction between cases where the harm affects only oneself and those where it affects others.]<sup>83</sup> As to wrongs that affect others, there is disagreement among the Mu'tazilites as to whether the duty to forbid such wrongs is established by both reason and revelation, or by revelation alone.<sup>84</sup> [The second passage makes no mention of this disagreement, and instead sets out the same distinction according to whether the wrong is significant or trifling; it specifies that there is a rational basis for the duty to forbid a significant wrong affecting others if it disturbs one.]<sup>85</sup> Thus far the first partition. The second partition of the field of wrongs set out by Mānkidīm (or 'Abd al-Jabbār) is closely related to the first, but has a different starting-point. In one category he places wrongs that are excusable (*yataḡṣṣayr ḥālūhu*) if they result from duress (*ikrāḥ*), namely those in which the harm done affects only oneself: in the other he places wrongs that are not so excusable, namely those in which the harm affects (*yata'addū ilā*) others. Thus eating carrion, drinking wine or affirming unbelief are permitted if someone compels one to do them. However, in the last case one may not believe the words one is saying, but should inwardly affirm something like: 'It is you who are forcing me to say: "God is the third of three"' (cf. Q5:73). As for wrongs not excusable when perpetrated under duress, such as killing a Muslim or making false accusations of adultery (*qubḥ*), these are not permitted. An exception is made where the wrongs involve only the property of others: it may be permissible to destroy the property of others

<sup>81</sup> It is not immediately clear from the text to whom or to what the pronominal suffixes refer.

<sup>82</sup> The second passage, however, specifies *mā yakhṣas al-mukhlif* (sic, *ibid.*, 745.10).

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 746.3. <sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 745.13. <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.15; cf. section 2 (above, 206).

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 746.4 (cf. above, 206). Here again we see that, for Mānkidīm, *al-tamīm* is not a duty founded in reason. The first division of wrongs is also given by Yaḥyā ibn Ḥamza (*Shimā*, f. 184b.21).

under duress, subject to subsequent compensation (*ḥamān*).<sup>86</sup> Thus the fundamental distinction in both partitions is between harm to oneself and harm to others.

### 7. *Proceeding in the absence of obligation*

An action can be virtuous without being obligatory. Suppose that someone who is legally competent is nevertheless not obligated to perform the duty (sc. because the conditions are not satisfied); is it still good (*ḥaṣ ḡayḡā l-ḥusn*) for him to proceed? The answer is that it depends. If the unfulfilled condition is one of the first three (viz. knowledge of law, knowledge of fact or absence of worse side-effects), then it is not good. If it is the fourth or fifth (viz. the efficacy or danger condition), then the situation is as already described in setting out those conditions.<sup>87</sup> This still leaves up in the air the question whether it is good to proceed without any prospect of success, but endorses heroism where it redounds to the greater glory of the faith.

### 8. *Obligation and supererogation*

The fact that an action can be virtuous without being obligatory now leads to a further question. If right (*ma'rūf*) can be either obligatory or non-obligatory, what is the status of the act of commanding such right? The answer is that it is obligatory to command the obligatory, but supererogatory (*māḡḡā*)<sup>88</sup> to command the supererogatory; the principle behind this is that the command cannot be more obligatory than what is commanded. We are given details of the history of this distinction among the Mu'tazilites.<sup>89</sup> Wrong (*mankar*), however, cannot be divided in this manner. It is thus obligatory to forbid any wrong without distinction, provided always that the conditions are satisfied. One cannot argue for a category of wrongs that are minor (*ṣaḡḡira*), and so do not have to be forbidden, since permitting a minor wrong is itself a major wrong (*ḡabīra*); moreover, the obligation arises from the badness (*ḡubḥ*) of the

<sup>86</sup> Mānkidīm, *Ta'ḡīq*, 145.3. This second division of wrongs is likewise given by Yaḥyā ibn Ḥamza (*Shimā*, f. 184a.25). The topic of duress is not normally treated within the doctrine of *al-tamīm bi'l-ma'rūf*, though some writers go on to discuss it immediately afterwards (see, for example, Ḥammāsī, *Munḡaḡḡā*, 2:222.1), and Yaḥyā ibn Ḥamza himself includes a long treatment of it within his discussion of *al-tamīm bi'l-ma'rūf* (*Shimā*, ff. 187b.20–190b.8). Cf. also Muwaffaq al-Shayḡī, *ḡāḡa*, 139a.1; Muḡallī, *Uḡḡā*, 302.18.

<sup>87</sup> Mānkidīm, *Ta'ḡīq*, 145.12. For the way this question is handled in the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn, see below, 222f. <sup>88</sup> The second passage uses *mandūḡ ilayhi* (*ibid.*, 745.5).

<sup>89</sup> See above, note 27.

wrong, and this is as much inherent in a minor wrong as it is in a major one.<sup>96</sup> The objection could be made that we cannot lump all wrongs together, since there are some about which expert opinion (*ijtihād*) may differ. The answer to this is essentially that expert opinion is concerned solely with determining whether something is wrong or not; once it has been established that it is wrong, there is no place for argument over the obligation to forbid it.<sup>91</sup>

### 9. *Relevance of law-schools*

Once again, Mānkidīn reverts to taxonomy, but in a different way. Wrongs are of two types, those known to be wrong by reason, and those known to be so by revelation. Examples of the first are injustice (*ẓulm*), lying and the like. It is obligatory to forbid all such wrongs; this does not depend on who is being forbidden, provided he is legally competent. The second type, those known to be wrong by revelation, subdivides into two groups: those on which expert opinion may not differ, and those on which it may do so. The first group includes such things as theft, adultery and drinking wine; it is obligatory to forbid all of this, and again it does not depend on who is being forbidden. The second group includes drinking a type of liquor (*muthallath*)<sup>92</sup> that is considered forbidden by some scholars but not by others.<sup>93</sup> In such a case, it does make a difference who is being forbidden. Thus if a Shāfi'ite sees a Ḥanafī drinking such liquor, he has no business forbidding him, whereas if a Ḥanafī sees a Shāfi'ite doing so, he should indeed forbid him. This does not, however, mean that a wrong thereby ceases to be one.<sup>94</sup>

### 10. *Back to consensus*

We come now to a point that might well have been considered earlier.<sup>95</sup> How, it could be asked, can one maintain that commanding right and forbidding wrong are obligatory (on the ground of consensus), when there are people who hold them to be so only if there is a legitimate ruler (*imām muftarad al-ḡā'a*)?<sup>96</sup> Essentially the answer is that one who takes this view must maintain one of two positions: either that they are not obligatory by either word (*qawl*) or deed (*fi'l*) in the absence of a legitimate ruler; or that in such a situation they are not obligatory by deed, but are so by word.<sup>97</sup> But both views are without foundation, since the evidence of Koran, tradition and (antecedent) consensus does not differentiate between a situation in which there is a legitimate ruler and one in which there is not.<sup>98</sup> Consequently no attention is paid to such views.

### 11. *Role of the ruler*

At this point, by an association of ideas, Mānkidīn takes up the role of the ruler in earnest. There are two varieties of the duty: what only rulers (*a'imma*) can carry out, and what people at large (*raffat al-nās, aḡnā' al-nās*) can undertake. Examples of the former are such tasks as inflicting the set punishments (*ḡuḡūd*), defending the Muslim heartland and frontiers, dispatching armies, and appointing judges and governors. Examples of the latter are taking action against wine-drinking, theft, adultery and the like; if, however, there is a legitimate ruler, then even in such cases it is better to have recourse to him.<sup>99</sup> [In fact most of what falls under the duty can

<sup>90</sup> Read *taḡyīzūhā* for *bi-jawāzihā* (*ibid.*, 146.17), and *li-qubūḡihī* for *li-ḡubūḡihī* (in the following line, cf. the parallel in the second passage, *ibid.*, 745.9).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.9. The main lines of Mānkidīn's account in this section are standard Mu'tazilite doctrine (see above, 202 ('Abd al-Jabbār); Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḡi, *Maḡhāzī*, f. 64a.5; Jishumī, *Sharḡ*, ff. 265a.4, 266a.5; Jishumī, *Uṣūl*, f. 66a.11; Jishumī, *Taḡhīb*, f. 70a.8; Zamaksharī, *Mubḡaj*, 77.2; Zamaksharī, *Kashshaf*, 1.397.9; Ibn al-Malāḡimī, *Fī ḡig*, f. 265a.21; Ḥimmaṣī, *Muḡḡidh*, 2.209.9; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shamīl*, f. 183a.21; and, with regard only to wrongs, Ibn Abī ḡ-Ḥaḡdīf, *Sharḡ*, 19.307.15).

<sup>92</sup> Lane gives the sense as 'wine cooked until the quantity of two thirds of it has gone', or 'the expressed juice of grapes so cooked' (*Lexicon*, 349b).

<sup>93</sup> For the conflicting attitudes of Shāfi'ites and Ḥanafīs to this type of liquor, see Marghānī (d. 593/1197), *Ḥidāya*, Beirut 1990, 3-4:450.13. Cf. also above, ch. 5, note 35, and ch. 6, note 151.

<sup>94</sup> Mānkidīn, *Ta'ḡig*, 147.5; cf. also Zamaksharī, *Kashshaf*, 1.396.10, and the taxonomy of wrongs given by Ibn al-Malāḡimī (*Fī ḡig*, f. 256b.25), Zamaksharī (*Mubḡaj*, 78.4), Ibn Abī ḡ-Ḥaḡdīf (*Sharḡ*, 19.308.6), and Yahyā ibn Ḥamza (*Shamīl*, f. 184a.8). This latter taxonomy is taken up below, note 144.

<sup>95</sup> It belongs above, 206f.

<sup>96</sup> This is a distorted version of an Imānī view (see below, ch. 11, 266-8).

<sup>97</sup> The second view is closer to the actual Imānī position. In the *ḡāḡn* of Muwaḡḡag al-Shajarī, the question is raised how one can claim consensus on the obligatoriness of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* when the Imānīs do not consider it obligatory; the answer given is that this is not how things are, since what the Imānīs actually hold is that it is obligatory by word but not by deed (f. 136b.21). Muḡallī states the Imānī position in the same way ('*Uḡda*, 296.2).

<sup>98</sup> Mānkidīn, *Ta'ḡig*, 148.1. Earlier Mānkidīn has stated that one who disagrees with the principle of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* by denying its obligatoriness outright is an infidel; if, however, he accepts its obligatoriness but makes it conditional on the presence of an imām, then he is merely in error (*mukḡir*) (*ibid.*, 126.7). Jishumī strongly endorses the view that there does not have to be an imām (*Sharḡ*, f. 265a.5; *Uṣūl*, f. 66a.4).

<sup>99</sup> Mānkidīn, *Ta'ḡig*, 148.9. Jishumī makes the same distinction (*Sharḡ*, f. 265a.5), but does not ascribe any preferential status to rulers in matters in which all can perform the duty. For the school of Abū ḡ-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Malāḡimī, *Fī ḡig*, f. 256b.1 (supporting the view that the duty is not restricted to rulers even in cases involving beating and fighting); Ḥimmaṣī, *Muḡḡidh*, 2.210.5; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shamīl*, ff. 183a.10, 183b.28; and cf. ff. 181a.25, 184b.29 (tending to the same view); and the references given below, note 148.

only be performed by rulers.<sup>100</sup> This emphasis on forbidding wrong as the business of the state is in part contextual: the passage forms part of Mānkdm's opening statement in his discussion of the imamate, and justifies considering this institution under the rubric of forbidding wrong.<sup>1</sup>

## 12. Collective obligation

Again Mānkdm brings up a point that would have been better placed towards the beginning of his account. The purpose of the duty is to prevent right from being thwarted and wrong from occurring; so if this is achieved by one person, it ceases to obligate others. We accordingly classify the duty among the collective obligations (*furūd al-ḥifẓiyyāt*),<sup>101</sup> as opposed to the individual ones.

## 13. Proceeding against beliefs

We now turn to the question of forbidding wrongs that take the form of beliefs (*i'tiqānāt*). The basic point is that, with regard to the obligation to forbid wrongs, there is no difference between those that are mental acts (*aḥāl al-qulūb*) and those that are bodily acts (*aḥāl al-jamā'iri*). What makes it obligatory to forbid them is that they are bad, and this is a quality shared by both categories of act. It may be objected that mental acts are unobservable, and thus hidden (*mughayyab*) from us, which would mean that there is no duty to forbid them. Our reply to this is that some mental acts are in fact ascertainable; thus we know from the way 'Alids behave (*min ḥāl al-'Alawīyya*) how they hate the Umayyads and what they believe about them, just as we can be certain from the behaviour of a man who spends his life teaching and promoting a doctrine that he believes in it himself.<sup>102</sup> Presumably no duty arises in regard to mental acts that are not manifested in such ways.

<sup>100</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'īq*, 749.9. Ibn al-Malāhīmī likewise makes a transition here to his treatment of the imamate (*Fā'iq*, f. 257b.15), while Yahyā ibn Ḥamza invokes the salience of the role of the imam to justify his presentation of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* as an aspect of the imamate (*min jumlat rawābi' al-imāma*, *Sūmūl*, f. 181a.25).

<sup>101</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'īq*, 148.16. Similarly Abū Ṭālib al-Nāḥiq, *Mabādī'*, f. 64a.7; Jishumī, *Tahḍīb*, ff. 69b.3, 70a.10; Ibn al-Malāhīmī, *Fā'iq*, f. 256b.20; Zamaḥsharī, *Minhaj*, 77.8; Zamaḥsharī, *Kashshaf*, 1.396.8; Ibn Abī Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19.308.3; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Sūmūl*, f. 190b.19. Himmāsī here follows the contrary view of Ṭūsī (*Mintqill*, 2.220.7; see below, ch. 11, note 156). Muwaffaq al-Shajā'ī takes the view that it can be either and supports this with sophisticated arguments (*Jāfā*, f. 138a.23).

<sup>102</sup> Mānkdm, *Ta'īq*, 746.8. There follows a discussion of repentance of wrong beliefs (*ibid.*, 747.7) which, Mānkdm remarks, 'Abd al-Jabbār had placed at this point, although it really belongs elsewhere (*ibid.*, 746.9); we can disregard it. The parallel passage in

This concludes our survey of the doctrine of Mānkdm. Before we leave him, however, there is one question that needs to be taken up. As already mentioned, Mānkdm was both a Zaydī and a Mu'tazilite. In which doctrinal persona is he speaking in these passages? All the indications point to the Mu'tazilite persona. The work is devoted to the classic 'five principles' (*al-ḥuṣūl al-khamsa*) of the Mu'tazilites; it is a commentary on a work by a non-Zaydī Mu'tazilite from which it quotes extensively;<sup>103</sup> the earlier scholastic authorities whose views it adduces are likewise non-Zaydī Mu'tazilites;<sup>104</sup> and in general, when Mānkdm speaks of 'our teachers', the reference is to Mu'tazilites, not Zaydīs.<sup>105</sup> Even the adduction of Ḥusayn as an exemplar could well be of Mu'tazilite provenance.<sup>106</sup> Thus despite the uncertainty as to the extent of Mānkdm's departure from the underlying work of 'Abd al-Jabbār when not actually quoting it,<sup>107</sup> we can take it that his doctrine is in all essentials Mu'tazilite. In this sense, we can validly treat his account as representative of classical Mu'tazilism. It does not follow that all of it is equally representative. Certain sections of the summary given above belong to the core of Mu'tazilite doctrine on forbidding wrong; others are more peripheral.<sup>108</sup> At the same time, opinions differed on particular points. The next section should convey a sense of the extent – and the limits – of this variation.

## 4. CLASSICAL MU'TAZILISM: RIVAL DOCTRINES

We can now turn from Mānkdm to the other members of our trio, Abū Ḥusayn and Jishumī. In the case of Abū Ḥusayn, the discussion will centre on lines of transmission and differences of scholastic presentation. In the case of Jishumī, the focus will be on his strident political activism.

<sup>103</sup> Farrāzādī's *Ta'īq* includes an account of escalation in response to heresy (f. 135b.20); we start with kind words ('don't hold that belief, it's false, and leads to perdition and hellfire'), and end with recourse to the sword, executing the heretic after he has refused to repent for three days. Yahyā ibn Ḥamza likewise discusses action against heretics (*al-madhḥib min al-ṭā'ifa*, *Sūmūl*, f. 191b.22), but his treatment has little in common with Mānkdm's. <sup>104</sup> See above, note 79. <sup>105</sup> See Madelung, *Qasim*, 182f. In our passages, the term *madhḥibun* occurs once (Mānkdm, *Ta'īq*, 745.3); it clearly refers to the Mu'tazilites, since it echoes the *madhḥib min al-ṭā'ifa* (*ibid.*, 146.11) of an earlier passage quoted from 'Abd al-Jabbār.

<sup>106</sup> See above, 209, section 3, condition (5). For 'Abd al-Jabbār's recognition of the imamate of Ḥusayn, see 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 20.2:149.7, cited in McDermott, *Mughnī*, 124; and cf. Madelung, *Qasim*, 182f.

<sup>107</sup> For contrasting views on this point, compare McDermott, *Mughnī*, 7, with Gimaret, 'Les *Ḥuṣūl al-khamsa*', 56f.; and see above, note 79.

<sup>108</sup> I would assign sections 1–4, 7–9 and 12 to the core.

Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) was a Ḥanafī Mu'tazilite, a pupil of 'Abd al-Jabbār who had a mind of his own;<sup>109</sup> he exercised a considerable influence on later Mu'tazilism, both Sunnī and Shī'ite.<sup>110</sup> No relevant work of his is extant, but we can reconstruct the outlines of his doctrine of forbidding wrong with fair confidence from the writings of five later scholars who were linked to his school: the Khwārazmians Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141)<sup>111</sup> and Zamaksharī (d. 538/1144),<sup>112</sup> the Imāmī Ḥimmaṣī (d. early seventh/thirteenth century),<sup>113</sup> the Iraqi Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258),<sup>114</sup> and the Yemeni Zaydī al-Mu'ayyad Yaḥyā ibn Ḥama (d. 749/1348f.).<sup>115</sup> It is Ibn al-Malāḥimī's account<sup>116</sup> that stands in the clearest relationship to the heritage of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn. The work in question (the *Fā'iḡ*) is Ibn al-Malāḥimī's own abridgement of his larger theological treatise (the *Mu'tamad*), which in turn was based directly on a work of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn (the *Tasaffiḡ al-adilla*);<sup>117</sup> and at several points in his treatment of forbidding wrong he refers to Abū

<sup>109</sup> See *EF*, *Supplement*, art. 'Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī' (W. Madelung), and *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, art. Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (D. Gimaret).

<sup>110</sup> See Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), *al-Mu'tamad fi usul al-dīn*, ed. M. McDermott and W. Madelung, London 1991, iii-x of the editors' introduction.

<sup>111</sup> For Ibn al-Malāḥimī's membership of the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn, see *ibid.*, iii, vi, xii.

<sup>112</sup> For Zamaksharī's links to the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn, see W. Madelung, 'The theology of al-Zamaksharī', in *Union Européenne d'Arabistes et d'Islamistes, Actes del XII Congress*, Madrid 1986, 488-93.

<sup>113</sup> See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Mu'tamad*, viii; Kohlberg, *Ibn Tawmā*, 19, 75, 354f. no. 590.

<sup>114</sup> For a general account of the religious affiliations of this somewhat protean figure, see *EF*, art. 'Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd', 685f. (L. Vecchia Vaglienti).

<sup>115</sup> For Yaḥyā ibn Ḥama and his relationship to the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn, see Madelung, *Qasim*, 221f. The Leiden manuscript Or. 2.587 contains the latter part of a Zaydī Mu'tazilite *kaḥīm* treatise composed in 711-12/1311-12; the author is not named, but the title is given at the end of the manuscript as *al-Shāmī li-ḥaqīq al-adilla al-naghiya wa-usul al-faṣṣaḥ* (see P. Voorhoeve, *Handlist of Arabic manuscripts in the Library of the University of Leiden*, Leiden 1957, 328; Or. 2.587, f. 194a.6). Now Yaḥyā ibn Ḥama is known as the author of a work the title of which is given by Hübsh as *al-Shāmī li-ḥaqīq al-adilla wa-usul al-faṣṣaḥ* (sic) (*Muḥṣat al-fih al-Iṣṣān fi 'l-Tamam*, 620 no. 31, noting two eleventh/seventeenth-century manuscripts). That the Leiden manuscript does indeed contain the latter part of the *Shāmī* of Yaḥyā ibn Ḥama is clinched by the quotations from a Cairo microfilm of the work given by 'Aṭī (*Shā*, 350-3); thus the quotation from the *Shāmī* footnoted in n. 9 corresponds to f. 182a.4 in the Leiden manuscript; that footnoted in n. 11 to f. 182a.28, and that footnoted in n. 15 to f. 181b.22. 'Aṭī's foliation is different from that of the Leiden manuscript, and his microfilm presumably derives from a copy found in Yemen. I am grateful to Gautier Juvonvil for examining the Leiden manuscript for me, and to the Leiden University Library for supplying me with a microfilm. All references to the *Shāmī* of Yaḥyā ibn Ḥama are to this manuscript.

<sup>116</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, ff. 256a.17-257b.16. What is extant of Ibn al-Malāḥimī's much fuller *Mu'tamad* unfortunately contains no treatment of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*.

<sup>117</sup> He explains in the preface to his *Mu'tamad* that this work is based on Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's *Tasaffiḡ al-adilla* (see the editors' introduction to the *Mu'tamad*, xi); in the preface to the *Fā'iḡ* he describes it as a condensed version of the *Mu'tamad* (see *ibid.*, xiv, and *Fā'iḡ*, f. 1b.6).

'l-Ḥusayn by name.<sup>118</sup> Zamaksharī, by contrast, gives no indication of the provenance of the related material he incorporates, in a highly condensed form, in his well-known Koran commentary, as also in a short work on the principles of the faith which has recently been published.<sup>119</sup> Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd is a little more helpful in introducing his account:<sup>120</sup> he at least makes it clear that he took his material on forbidding wrong (he leaves aside commanding right) from Mu'tazilite authorities,<sup>121</sup> and at one point he refers to Abū 'l-Ḥusayn.<sup>122</sup> When the three accounts are compared, it becomes evident that those of Zamaksharī and Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd belong to a single tradition as against that of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>123</sup> An obvious hypothesis would be that both go back to a work of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn other than that which is behind Ibn al-Malāḥimī's account.<sup>124</sup>

Turning to Ḥimmaṣī's account,<sup>125</sup> this can be seen as a conflation of material from two distinct lines of the Baṣran Mu'tazilite tradition. The first

<sup>118</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, ff. 256b.15, 257a.9, 257a.22, 257a.25.

<sup>119</sup> Zamaksharī, *Kashshaf*, esp. 1:397.9-398.8 (to Q3:104); Zamaksharī, *Minhāj*, 77f.

<sup>120</sup> Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd offers a systematic account of the duty, or more precisely of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, towards the end of his *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāḡ* (*Sharḥ*, 19:307-11). He gives cross-references to discussion of the duty earlier in the work (*ibid.*, 305.13, 306.12); however, none of the earlier passages I have found offers a comparably systematic account. In one passage he mentions that he had treated the subject in his works on *kaḥīm* (*ḥanbī al-ḥanbīyāt*) (*ibid.*, 16.65.5).

<sup>121</sup> It is presented as 'a summary of what our companions say' about the subject (*ibid.*, 19:307.10, and cf. 311.3); these companions are manifestly Mu'tazilites, since Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd remarks that they consider *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* as one of the five principles (*ibid.*, 306.12; cf. *ibid.*, 16.65.2, presenting this directly as his own view ('*ḥanbīyāt*')).

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 19:308.1, stating that 'our sharḥ' Abū 'l-Ḥusayn inclined to Abū 'Alī al-Jabbār's view that treason shows *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* to be obligatory. Note also that, at two points, views that Ibn al-Malāḥimī explicitly characterises as those of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn (*Fā'iḡ*, f. 257a.22, 257a.25) are presented by Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd as standard doctrine without attribution (*Sharḥ*, 19:310.5, 310.11).

<sup>123</sup> This can be seen by comparing both the sequence of topics and the wording. With regard to sequence, the one respect in which Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd's *Sharḥ* departs significantly from the order of topics found in Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *Fā'iḡ* is that it discusses the question who is to perform the duty before the question whom it is to be performed against; Zamaksharī's treatments side with the *Sharḥ* (*Fā'iḡ*, f. 257b.7, *Sharḥ*, 19:310.16; *Minhāj*, 78.7; *Kashshaf*, 1:398.3). With regard to wording, the formulation of the third condition for it to be good to proceed is typical. *Fā'iḡ*, *wa-minhāj an lā yuḥim al-munkar waḡḡan li-annahu yuḥimuh* 'alawhi baḥa 'l-wuḡḡ li-annahu yuḥimuh' (*f. 257a.4*); *Sharḥ*, *wa-minhāj an yuḥim nū yuḥim 'an lā yuḥim ghayr al-wuḡḡ' lā yuḥim al-munkar* 'anhu wa-tinnam yuḥimuh al-dhannu 'alawhi wa 'l-wuḡḡ an amtiḥāli' (19:309.4; the sense is garbled, one way to restore it being to move *ghayr* so that it precedes *waḡḡ* (n)); *Minhāj*, *wa-an yuḥim al-amr ghayr waḡḡ 'li-annahu nū waḡḡa 'lā yuḥim 'anhu wa-tākin 'an yuḥimuh* (78.2); *Kashshaf*, *wa-an lā yuḥim nū waḡḡ 'anhu waḡḡ 'an li-annahu al-wuḡḡ' lā yuḥim al-munkar* 'anhu wa-tinnam yuḥimuh al-dhannu 'alawhi wa 'l-wuḡḡ 'an amtiḥāli' (1:397.13).

<sup>124</sup> Elsewhere in his work Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd makes several references to Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's *Ghinay* (*Sharḥ*, 4:10.3, 10:212.4, 17:158.13, 18:115.7, 227.11), and mentions his own commentary on it (*ibid.*, 5:157.2). However, he also knows the *Tasaffiḡ* (*ibid.*, 3:256.15, 258.3).

<sup>125</sup> Ḥimmaṣī, *Minhāj*, 2:209-21.

line, and the source of the greater part of his account, is the school of Abū Ḥusayn, who is mentioned several times.<sup>126</sup> Some of this material is taken from Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>127</sup> Some of it cannot derive from this source,<sup>128</sup> and must therefore go back to some other work of Abū Ḥusayn or his disciples.<sup>129</sup> But in general, we have no way to tell whether we have to do with material copied from this source, or with extensively paraphrased material from Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>130</sup> The other line of the Basran Mu'tazilite tradition drawn on by Ḥimmaṣī is that represented by his fellow-Imāmīs the Shari' al-Murraḍā (d. 436/1044) and Abū Ja'far al-Tūsī (d. 460/1067).<sup>131</sup> Here again, while Ḥimmaṣī does not conceal his debt,<sup>132</sup> the extent of his borrowing is greater than his explicit acknowledgements would indicate.<sup>133</sup> It is clear, however, that he owes all this material to a single work of Tūsī.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.13, 217.7, 217.16, 219.6, 219.11.

<sup>127</sup> He is quoted twice as *ṣāhib al-Fā'iḡ* (*ibid.*, 214.20, 217.19). The first passage (*ibid.*, 214.17-215.3) is taken from Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, f. 256b.16-20, the second (*Munqidh*, 2.217.19-218.4) from *Fā'iḡ*, f. 257a.10-14. Two further passages are so close to the corresponding discussions in the *Fā'iḡ* that they are likely to be unacknowledged borrowings (*Munqidh*, 2.218.18-219.12 and *Fā'iḡ*, f. 257a.17-257b.1; *Munqidh*, 2.220.2-6 and *Fā'iḡ*, f. 257b.1-4); the first has a parallel in Ibn Abī Ḥadīd (*Sharh*, 19.309.19-310.11), but this is significantly more distant.

<sup>128</sup> The substantial quotation from Abū Ḥusayn at *Munqidh*, 2.217.7-15 cannot derive from *Fā'iḡ*, f. 257a.9, and that at *Munqidh*, 2.217.16-18 has no parallel in the *Fā'iḡ*.

<sup>129</sup> The obvious candidate would be Abū Ḥusayn's *Ghurr*, or a work deriving from it; this is what the editor of the *Munqidh* assumes (2.217 nn. 16), and cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Ma'ānīd*, viii of the editors' introduction. The fact that the second quotation from Abū Ḥusayn finds an unscripted parallel in Ibn Abī Ḥadīd (*Sharh*, 19.309.10) would tend to bear this out.

<sup>130</sup> For example, *Munqidh*, 2.209.14-210.8 stands in such a relationship to *Fā'iḡ*, f. 256a.22-256b.2; likewise *Munqidh*, 2.210.14-211.2 and *Fā'iḡ*, f. 256b.3-6. In some instances Ibn Abī Ḥadīd offers a closer parallel to the *Munqidh* than does the *Fā'iḡ* (a case in point is *Munqidh*, 2.221.16-20; *Fā'iḡ*, f. 257b.7-11; *Sharh*, 19.311.1-3; and cf. Zamakhsharī, *Minhāj*, 78.7-9, and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshaf*, 1.398.6-8). But in other instances Ibn Abī Ḥadīd's version is yet more distant (a case in point is *Munqidh*, 2.209.6-13; *Fā'iḡ*, f. 256a.18-22; *Sharh*, 19.307.15f.).

<sup>131</sup> Murraḍā (d. 436/1044), *Dhakhīrā*, ed. A. al-Husaynī, Qum 1411, 553-60; Abū Ja'far al-Tūsī (d. 460/1067), *Tamhīd al-nigā*, ed. A. Mubhāt al-Dīn, Tehran 1362 sh., 301-6. These accounts will be considered among those of the Imāmī scholars (see below, ch. 11, section 3).

<sup>132</sup> For references to Murraḍā, see *Munqidh*, 2.210.9, 213.10, 213.18, 220.9, 221.8; for references to Abū Ja'far al-Tūsī, see *ibid.*, 213.10, 213.17, 220.10, 221.7. He mentions both the *Dhakhīrā* (*ibid.*, 213.10) and the *Tamhīd* (*ibid.*, 213.11, 220.11).

<sup>133</sup> Thus *Munqidh*, 2.213.1-8 is taken from *Tamhīd*, 302.7-13 (which is closer than *Dhakhīrā*, 553.6-12); *Munqidh*, 2.218.9-11 is taken from *Tamhīd*, 303.5-7 (slightly closer than *Dhakhīrā*, 556.10-12).

<sup>134</sup> A good example is *Munqidh*, 2.210.9-14, where Ḥimmaṣī explicitly quotes Murraḍā; the quotation, though deriving ultimately from *Dhakhīrā*, 560.6-9, reveals through its wording that it has been filtered through *Tamhīd*, 305.22-4. The parallel in Abū Ja'far al-Tūsī (d. 460/1067), *Iqtīḡān*, Qum 1490, 150.10-13 is significantly less close. In general, there is no evidence in Ḥimmaṣī's discussion of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* that he had direct access to the *Dhakhīrā*, or made any use of the *Iqtīḡān*.

Ḥimmaṣī's own contribution is limited.<sup>135</sup> If we set aside the material derived from Murraḍā and Tūsī, we can thus treat Ḥimmaṣī as a fourth representative of the school of Abū Ḥusayn.

This leaves Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓa's account.<sup>136</sup> This treatment is clearly in the tradition of Abū Ḥusayn, inasmuch as it adopts his binary schema of conditions.<sup>137</sup> Abū Ḥusayn himself is mentioned from time to time,<sup>138</sup> as is Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>139</sup> But Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓa seems also to be in direct contact with the works of 'Abd al-Jabbār.<sup>140</sup> To all his material he brings a very clear and explicit expository format which, so far I can judge from the sources available to me, is his own. The similarities between all five of these representatives of the school of Abū Ḥusayn<sup>141</sup> are extensive enough to suggest that they could ultimately stem from a single underlying text.

What of the relationship between all these accounts taken together and that of Mānkadmī? Here the similarities are not such as to suggest an origin in a common text. There is, however, a substantial identity of basic doctrines,<sup>142</sup> as might be expected given that both traditions stem from 'Abd al-Jabbār. There are, of course, matters covered exclusively by Mānkadmī.<sup>143</sup> Equally there are others that appear only in the treatments of the duty under consideration here. Thus we find in several of these accounts a taxonomy of potential wrongs that contains significant elements to which Mānkadmī offers no parallel.<sup>144</sup> According to this classification, one category consists of things that are invariably wrong, such as injustice (*ẓulm*); we could call these intrinsic wrongs. The other category consists of things that may or may not be wrong; we could call these contingent wrongs. Within

<sup>135</sup> The only substantial passage that looks like his own work (*Munqidh*, 2.213.17-214.12) is one in which he asks how one might support a certain view of Tūsī's against Abū Ḥashim and Murraḍā, and proceeds to supply an answer.

<sup>136</sup> Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓa, *Shāmil*, ff. 181a-192b. For a digest, see A. M. Subḥī, *Zawāḍiq*, Cairo 1984, 306-11. <sup>137</sup> Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓa, *Shāmil*, ff. 185b.18-187b.4.

<sup>138</sup> *As ibid.*, ff. 182a.10, 187a.14, 192a.26. No work of his is mentioned.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 182a.28, 182b.14, 182b.28, 185a.22 (referring to him as 'al-Khawārazmī'). The last reference, on the question of the performance of the duty by infidels, could well be to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, f. 257b.12.

<sup>140</sup> He makes several references to the *Mughnī* (Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓa, *Shāmil*, ff. 183a.22, 186b.4, 189b.9) and one to a *Ta'liq al-Minhaj* (*ibid.*, f. 186a.25).

<sup>141</sup> For example, the account of varieties of wrong in the *Sharh* (19.308.6) makes it possible to decipher the parallel in the *Fā'iḡ* (f. 256b.25).

<sup>142</sup> Cf. the references given in the notes to my rendering of Mānkadmī's account, above, 205-16.

<sup>143</sup> The main items here are the theme of Mānkadmī's section 5, and the substance of his section 13 (above, 211, 216). As already indicated (see above, note 108), neither belongs to the core of topics regularly associated with the duty.

<sup>144</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, f. 256b.25; Zamakhsharī, *Minhāj*, 78.4; Ibn Abī Ḥadīd, *Sharh*, 19.308.6; Yahyā ibn Ḥanẓa, *Shāmil*, f. 184a.8. Ḥimmaṣī has no parallel. Cf. sections 6 and 9 of Mānkadmī's account (above, 211-13, 214; the overlap is greatest with section 9).

the latter category, we again distinguish. There are cases that turn on the thing itself, as with archery, which is good or bad depending on whether the purpose of the activity is military preparedness or social frivolity. And there are cases that turn on the person, as with playing chess, which may be forbidden for an adherent of one law-school but not for a member of another.

More centrally, these accounts fill a major gap in Mānkadm's treatment of the duty by addressing two obvious questions: who is obligated to forbid wrong, and to whom?<sup>145</sup> The answer to the first question is every Muslim who is able to perform the duty and satisfies the conditions,<sup>146</sup> and perhaps in principle infidels too.<sup>147</sup> However, the imam and his deputies are better placed to undertake the duty where it involves fighting (*qitāl*).<sup>148</sup> The answer to the second question is every legally competent person (*mukhal-laf*) who satisfies the conditions.<sup>149</sup> At the same time the legally incompetent, such as boys and lunatics, should be restrained from doing harm to others, and boys should be broken in to religious duties such as prayer, even though these do not yet obligate them.

The most striking differences, however, relate to the conditions. One aspect of this is the way in which they are set out.<sup>150</sup> Where Mānkadm has one set of five conditions for obligation, the accounts deriving from Abū ʿI-Husayn have one set of five for it to be good to proceed,<sup>151</sup> and a further

set of three (or two) for it to be obligatory.<sup>152</sup> (Himmāsī's account, while retaining the binary structure, is in some respects divergent.<sup>153</sup>) Mānkadm does not, of course, ignore the distinction between what is good and what is obligatory, but he handles it in a way that is structurally less prominent, and indeed less elegant.<sup>154</sup> So far as I can see, there is no question of substantive doctrine at issue here except in one respect. This concerns the danger condition, or more precisely, situations in which this condition is not met. In such cases it is agreed that the obligation is voided; but as we have seen, the question arises whether it might still be virtuous to proceed in the face of danger. Here the standard doctrine of the school of 'Abd al-Jabbār makes its distinction between cases where heroism would be for the greater glory of the faith, and cases where it would not; the school of Abū ʿI-Husayn, by contrast, refuses to make this distinction, holding the greater glory of the faith to be at stake in all such cases.<sup>155</sup> This could reflect a greater zest for heroism on the part of Abū ʿI-Husayn; but it could also arise from a concern not to compromise the elegance of his two-set schema by including forms of the danger condition in both sets.

With al-Ḥakīm al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101) we are moving towards Zaydī Mu'tazilism. A Ḥanaḥī Mu'tazilite of the school of 'Abd al-Jabbār, Jishumī was himself an 'Alid, recognised the Zaydī imams, and was in some sense a Zaydī.<sup>156</sup> Much of what he has to say about forbidding wrong is close to, or identical with, the doctrine of Mānkadm.<sup>157</sup> The most conspicuous

<sup>145</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fāʾiq*, f. 257b.7; Ibn Abī ʿI-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19:310.16; Zamakhsharī, *Minhāj*, 78.7; Zamakhsharī, *Kaṣībī*, f. 1:398.3. Himmāsī treats only the second issue (*Munqith*, 2:221.16), while Yahyā ibn Ḥamza discusses these topics within a framework borrowed from Ghazzālī (see below, ch. 10, note 139).

<sup>146</sup> Presumably this would include women, but for Yahyā ibn Ḥamza's negative view, in tacit response to Ghazzālī, see below, ch. 10, 247.

<sup>147</sup> This question is raised by Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who inclined to give infidels some role (*Fāʾiq*, f. 257b.12). Yahyā ibn Ḥamza adopts Ghazzālī's negative view, but also quotes Ibn al-Malāḥimī's (*Shāmil*, f. 185a.19; for Ghazzālī's position, see below, ch. 16, 429f.).

<sup>148</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fāʾiq*, f. 257b.13; Zamakhsharī, *Minhāj*, 78.8; Zamakhsharī, *Kaṣībī*, f. 1:398.5; Ibn Abī ʿI-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19:310.19.

<sup>149</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī (*Fāʾiq*, f. 256b.22; Zamakhsharī, *Minhāj*, 77.12; Zamakhsharī, *Kaṣībī*, f. 1:397.12; Himmāsī, *Munqith*, 2:216.1; Ibn Abī ʿI-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ*, 19:308.5; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 185b.18. Cf. section 3 of Mānkadm's account (above, 207–9).

<sup>150</sup> The relationship of this set of conditions to Mānkadm's is as follows. The second, fourth and fifth conditions are essentially Mānkadm's first, third and fourth. The first condition is a stipulation that unaided common sense would tend to include in the second (knowledge of law): that the supposed wrong which is the target of the duty must actually be bad (this condition is omitted in the account in Zamakhsharī's *Kaṣībī*). The third condition is roughly speaking a weakened form of Mānkadm's second (knowledge of fact): the wrong must not be one that has already happened (*waḡiʿ*, see above, notes 71, 123).

<sup>151</sup> Something is missing in Yahyā ibn Ḥamza's account of the first condition (*Shāmil*, f. 185b.21), but cf. his account of the difference between this and the second condition (*ibid.*, f. 186a.3).

<sup>152</sup> The first of these is roughly speaking the rest of Mānkadm's second condition: one must believe that the wrong is going to happen (unless prevented), as when one sees a man failing to prepare for prayer although his set time is fast approaching. The second and third conditions are Mānkadm's fifth: absence of danger to oneself or one's property respectively. (No specific mention of the third is made by Ibn Abī ʿI-Ḥadīd and Zamakhsharī.) The distinction between the two sets of conditions has a faint echo among the Mālikīs (see below, ch. 14, 363f., 374f.).

<sup>153</sup> He omits the third condition of the first set (cf. *Fāʾiq*, f. 257a.4, and *Sharḥ*, 19:309.4; it would have found its place at *Munqith*, 2:216.11); perhaps he regarded it as redundant in the light of the first condition of the second set. His discussion of this latter condition (*ibid.*, 218.7–17) mixes material from both the lines he draws on (cf. *Fāʾiq*, f. 257a.16 and *Sharḥ*, 19:309.16 on the one hand, and *Tamhīd*, 303.5–12 on the other); in particular, he takes the key term he uses to formulate the condition (*amānāt al-ʿirṣīn*) from the *Tamhīd* (303.8). When he comes to the second and third conditions of the second set (absence of danger to person and property respectively), he is careful to distance himself from the implied approval of heroism (*Munqith*, 2:218.18, 219.19; cf. below, ch. 11, note 211).

<sup>154</sup> He discusses it within his presentation of his fourth and fifth conditions, and returns to it in section 7 of his account (see above, 213). <sup>155</sup> See above, note 74.

<sup>156</sup> See Mädelung, *Qāṣm*, 186–91; al-Ḥakīm al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), *Rasāʾil Ihis ilā ʾibn al-ʿimān al-ʿimān*, ed. H. al-Mudarrisi al-Ṭabāḥbāʾī, n.p. 1986, 8–11 of the editor's introduction (for the vocalisation of the *nisā*, see *ibid.*, 8 n. 4); Ginnact, *Lectures*, 25f. <sup>157</sup> This is apparent from the references to Jishumī's views given in the notes to my rendering of Mānkadm's account, above, 203–16.

respect in which it differs from it is a strongly activist tone which it shares with Zaydī Shī'ism.

This activism finds a particularly lively expression in a short polemical tract by Jishūnī entitled 'The epistle of the devil to his bateful brethren'. Here Jishūnī has the devil explain that he has disseminated quietist notions of rendering obedience to every usurper, with the purpose of subverting the imamate, the forbidding of wrong, and rebellion against unjust rule. His brethren, the devil continues, had accepted this internal propaganda, and were busy relating traditions in support of it. The Mu'tazilites, by contrast, had vigorously opposed it: they stood for the imamate of the just and the forbidding of wrong, and transmitted traditions accordingly.<sup>158</sup>

It is thus more than dry scholasticism when Jishūnī opens one of his systematic discussions of the duty with the statement that it is obligatory by word and sword.<sup>159</sup> How strongly he identifies forbidding wrong with resistance to unjust rule is apparent from his formulation of the contrary view espoused by the traditionalists (Hashwīyya): 'Obedience (*inghiyāh*) is due to whoever wins (*ghalaba*), even if he is an oppressor (*ẓālim*).'<sup>160</sup> And as might be expected, Jishūnī repeats the view that it is good to forbid wrong even in the face of mortal danger, provided always that this would be to the greater glory of the faith.<sup>161</sup>

## 5. CONCLUSION

Three general features of Mu'tazilite views of forbidding wrong have become apparent in the course of this survey. The first is the consistently analytical style in which these views are presented.<sup>162</sup> Against the background of the Hanbalite attitudes discussed in the preceding chapters, the structured approach of the Mu'tazilites stands out in stark relief. Abū Ya'īā's account does, of course, provide a significant parallel, but what he represents is precisely a Hanbalite appropriation of a Mu'tazilite format. It is no accident that in this chapter I have told no entertaining stories, and reported no casual conversations. Apart from Jishūnī's impersonation of the devil, all is dialectic.

<sup>158</sup> Jishūnī, *Risālah* *Thā*, 97.8.

<sup>159</sup> Jishūnī, *ʿUyūn*, f. 65b.20; and cf. his *Sharḥ*, f. 264b.12. It should be noted that the relationship between these two works is not that of text and commentary; rather the *Sharḥ* is a much-expanded version of the *ʿUyūn*.

<sup>160</sup> Jishūnī, *Sharḥ*, f. 264b.8. The parallel passage in the *ʿUyūn* formulates their position on forbidding wrong simply as 'It is not obligatory' (f. 66a.1).

<sup>161</sup> See above, note 74.

<sup>162</sup> The account I have given in this chapter considerably underplays the dialectical intricacy that Mu'tazilite accounts of forbidding wrong can attain. The reader who does not find my presentation of Mānkadīn sufficiently advanced should try the account of the duty given by Muḥallī, a later representative of the same line (*ʿUmda*, 290–304).

This systematisation of Mu'tazilite thinking is by no means perfect: even Mānkadīn's account, after a well-organised start, tails off into a miscellany in which opportunities are missed and items are out of place.<sup>163</sup> The analytical impulse in Mu'tazilite thought is nonetheless a strong one. What pleased Abū 'l-Ḥusayn about his presentation of the conditions of obligation is doubtless what pleases us: the result is more of a structure and less of a list.

The second feature of Mu'tazilite views is the underlying homogeneity of doctrine over space and time. The school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn differs from other members of the school of 'Abd al-Jabbār on two related questions: how to organise the conditions of obligation, and how widely to apply the principle that it is virtuous to proceed for the greater glory of the faith.<sup>164</sup> Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq, representing a tradition that goes back to the teacher of 'Abd al-Jabbār, gives an account of the duty which diverges only in detail from those of the pupils of 'Abd al-Jabbār.<sup>165</sup> At a still earlier date, the Jubbā'īs disagree on the question of the source of the duty in a manner that sets the terms of all later presentations of the issue.<sup>166</sup> All this, of course, goes back to a single line of the Basran school; we know too little of the doctrines of other lines, or of the Baghdadī Mu'tazilites. But the little we do know, as in the case of the Baghdadī Rummānī, does not suggest that the blank areas on our map were filled with anything very exotic;<sup>167</sup> the same is true of the earlier Baghdadī Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī.<sup>168</sup> I have already noted the lack of any positive evidence of doctrinal archaism among the early Mu'tazilites.<sup>169</sup> In sum, these and other divergences do not

<sup>163</sup> Cf. above, ch. 6, 137f.

<sup>164</sup> See above, 222f. Cf. also the anonymous disagreement reported by Mānkadīn regarding the question whether it is good to proceed if it will not work (see above, note 73).

<sup>165</sup> See the references to his account in the notes to my summary of Mānkadīn's doctrine (above, 205–16). Only Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq's use of the 'three modes' of Sunni tradition stands out as an anomaly in the context of formal statements of Mu'tazilite doctrine (see above, note 76). Elsewhere this idea makes sporadic appearances, but in works that belong to other genres. Thus Jishūnī refers to the 'three modes' tradition in his Koran commentary, where he endorses its categories, including performance in the heart (*Taḥḥib*, f. 70a.7). Likewise Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥādīd seems quite receptive to the idea when he is not quoting Mu'tazilite school doctrine (see *Sharḥ*, 19.3.12.7, where he speaks of performance in the heart (*al-inḥār bi'l-qalb*) as the last of the modes).

<sup>166</sup> See above, note 25. As we have seen, Abū Ḥāshim's revelationist view is standard, but Abū 'Alī had occasional sympathisers (see above, note 37, for Rummānī, and note 122, for Abū 'l-Ḥusayn). <sup>167</sup> See above, 201.

<sup>168</sup> For his rather restrictive view of recourse to arms, see above, note 23; for his failure to make a certain distinction with regard to obligatory and supererogatory acts, see above, note 27.

<sup>169</sup> See above, 203. From the material covered in this chapter, it might appear that reference to 'being able to' perform the duty constitutes an archaic way of expressing some or all of the conditions that appear in the classical texts (cf. above, notes 13, 21, 40). But the fact that 'Abd al-Jabbār still speaks this way' (see above, note 42) counts against such a hypothesis; and Ināmi authors in the Mu'tazilite tradition continue the usage (see below, ch. 11, 278–80).

amount to deep cleavages; it would not be a wild guess that all the basic elements of the doctrine of forbidding wrong had been pretty much the same for all Mu'tazilites since the first half of the third/ninth century.

The third and final feature of the Mu'tazilite accounts of the duty is the activism that runs through them in varying degrees. To start with a negative point, most of these accounts are silent regarding performance in the heart, an idea with an obvious quietist potential.<sup>170</sup> At the same time, Mu'tazilite opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of heroism that redounds to the greater glory of the faith.<sup>171</sup> Most tellingly, all are willing to countenance lethal combat (*qitāl*) where the duty requires it. There may, however, be a significant nuance here. Mānkidī and the writers in the tradition of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn make no explicit reference to the use of weapons,<sup>172</sup> and either recommend recourse to the ruler, or emphasise that he is better placed to engage in such combat than ordinary believers.<sup>173</sup> Jishumī, by contrast, has no qualms about referring to the sword, and makes no such qualification.<sup>174</sup> It goes well with this that Jishumī, alone among the classical writers, identifies forbidding wrong with rebellion against unjust rule, and does so in a tone of marked enthusiasm.<sup>175</sup>

<sup>170</sup> For the exceptions, see above, notes 76, 165.

<sup>171</sup> See above, notes 7, 36, 74, 155. The only dissent comes from the anonymous view reported by Muwaffaq al-Shajafī (above, note 74).

<sup>172</sup> See section 4 of Mānkidī's account (above, 210f.), and esp. note 78.

<sup>173</sup> See section 11 of Mānkidī's account (above, 215f.), and above, note 148. Compare Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī's restrictive view of recourse to arms (above, note 23).

<sup>174</sup> See above, notes 159 and 99 respectively. Yet Jishumī is one of the few Mu'tazilite authors to mention performance in the heart (see above, note 165).

<sup>175</sup> See above, 224. When 'Abd al-Jabbār discusses the death of Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, he does not raise the issue of rebellion (see above, note 74). For two other instances of a strikingly activist tone in authors with Mu'tazilite links, see below, ch. 12, 336–8 (and cf. ch. 13, 347), and ch. 13, 340f.

## CHAPTER 10

### THE ZAYDĪS

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

This and the following chapter are concerned with Shī'ite conceptions of forbidding wrong. Shī'ite Islam is a ramified phenomenon. But of the numerous Shī'ite sects that have existed at one time or another, only two will receive sustained attention in this study: the Zaydīs in this chapter, and the Imāmīs in the next. The reasons for this limitation are not far to seek. These sects have preserved large bodies of religious literature down to the present day, so that their doctrines are accessible to serious study. At the same time, they have always been sufficiently close to the mainstream of Islamic thought to support a body of ideas comparable to those of Sunnī Islam. The other major Shī'ite sect of Islamic history, the Ismā'īlīs, has less to offer on both counts, but I shall devote a short excursus to it at the end of the chapter on the Imāmīs.

The Zaydīs and Imāmīs have much in common. Both are Shī'ite sects, both developed elaborate traditions of legal scholarship, and both adopted Mu'tazilite theology. But they also diverged in significant respects. The most important of these differences for the purposes of this study concern religious politics. Here both sects were firmly committed to doctrines of 'Alid power, but they disagreed on two basic questions. The first was precisely who among the 'Alids should rule: where the Zaydīs saw the family of the Prophet as a large and continuing pool of potential rulers, the Imāmīs were committed to a single line of Imāms which eventually ended in occultation. The second question was what, if anything, was to be done if the right 'Alid was not in fact ruling: where the Zaydīs were activists, the Imāmīs were quietists. As will be seen, these contrasts strongly colour their respective conceptions of forbidding wrong.

## 2. EARLY ZAYDĪ DOCTRINE

The study of Zaydī Shī'ism is adversely affected by the fact that large numbers of Zaydī manuscripts remain unpublished.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, most Zaydī literature represents a form of the sectarian tradition already marked by an extensive adoption of Mu'tazilism. As a result our knowledge of pre-Mu'tazilite Zaydism is limited, both in general and in the specific case of the doctrine of forbidding wrong.<sup>2</sup>

One of the more accessible early Zaydī sources is a collection of traditions ascribed to Zayd ibn 'Alī (d. 122/740). In substance its traditions are often more or less familiar from Sunnī sources, in which they are likely to be found with Kūfian chains of transmission; in form they are transmitted by Zayd from his 'Alid forbears. The work contains some seven traditions that bear on forbidding wrong.<sup>3</sup> The doctrinal payload of these traditions is slight – they make much of the duty, but do not analyse it. They fall into two groups. The first relates forbidding wrong to holy war. Forbidding wrong is equivalent in virtue to holy war.<sup>4</sup> The dominance of the wicked no more vitates forbidding wrong than unjust rule invalidates holy war or the pilgrimage.<sup>5</sup> One who performs the duty (and is killed) is a martyr (*shahīd*).<sup>6</sup> He has the same status as one who wages holy war in the way of God, irrespective of whether he is obeyed.<sup>7</sup> The second group is concerned with the prospects or consequences of the abandonment of forbidding wrong. Its decay will affect first the hand, then the tongue, then the heart.<sup>8</sup> If the community ceases to perform the duty, God will give the wicked power over them.<sup>9</sup> No community that fails to perform it

is deemed holy.<sup>10</sup> Two things are noteworthy about this small corpus of traditions. One is the activist strain evident in the first group,<sup>11</sup> with their linkage of forbidding wrong to holy war. The other is the fact that it is the traditions of the second group, not the first, that have close Sunnī parallels;<sup>12</sup> particularly striking here is the appearance in the second group of the notion of performance in the heart.<sup>13</sup>

The earliest Zaydī authority of whose opinions we know something in this field is the rather circumscribed Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm al-Rasīd (d. 246/860f.).<sup>14</sup> In general, Qāsim has rather little to say about forbidding wrong.<sup>15</sup> I have noted three responsa in which he is asked about it. In the first he gives an anodyne definition of right (*ma'rūf*) and wrong (*munkar*) in terms of obedience and disobedience to God.<sup>16</sup> In the second he insists that one has a duty to reprove one's neighbours for such offences as drinking, even should this elicit their hostility, unless one is afraid that they will do one a mischief.<sup>17</sup> In a third responsum, he is asked at what point one incurs the duty to obey the imam, and whether he will make himself known; in the course of answering the latter question, Qāsim states that the imam will

<sup>10</sup> Zayd, *Majmū'ī*, 294 no. 996 (from the Prophet). For Sunnī parallels, see above, ch. 3, note 36.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. the long activist tradition quoted from 'Alī with a partly 'Alid *isnād* through Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. c. 118/736) in Abū Ṭalīb al-Nāṭiq, *Amnā'ī*, 294.9. This tradition also appears in Imānī sources ascribed to al-Bāqir himself; the key figure in the *isnād* is, however, a Ḥanafī (see below, ch. 11, 256).

<sup>12</sup> In each case these are found with Kūfian *isnāds*.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. also the tradition quoted in Abū Ṭalīb al-Nāṭiq, *Amnā'ī*, 299.8, with a Sunnī *isnād*.

<sup>14</sup> On Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 86–152. Madelung in this study categorised Qāsim as in no real sense a Mu'tazilite, and declared spurious certain works of a marked Mu'tazilite character which the Zaydī tradition ascribes to him. Both these points were contested by B. Abrahamov (see the introduction to his *Al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the proof of God's existence*, Leiden 1990). Madelung, however, has maintained his position on both counts, and has adduced convincing new evidence in support of it (see his 'Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm and Mu'tazilism').

<sup>15</sup> Abrahamov, who as is to be expected is concerned to maximise any Mu'tazilite resonances in Qāsim's thought, states that the idea, but not the term, appears in some passages of Qāsim's *Ḥijra* (*Kāsim*, 52). I have not seen this work, for which see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 138–40. Qāsim's view that one may not reside in a land in which wrong prevails and cannot be righted (or the like) is widely reported, as for example by Ṭishmī (*Shimī*, f. 270b.5, and his *Uyūn*, f. 68b.2) and Ibn al-Murrada (*Qudrī*, 152.15, and *Durr*, f. 247a.4); and it is shared among others by al-Mahdī Ahmad ibn al-Husayn (d. 656/1258) (*Mufīd*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.81.1, f. 134b.6, for this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 221f. no. 346, item I); and see R. al-Sayyid, 'al-Dār wa'l-ḥijra wa-ahkāmuhā' (ind. Ibn al-Murrada, *Iṭṭihād*, 3 (1991), 220. Abrahamov also cites the explicit discussion of the duty in a short work entitled *al-ʿAdl wa'l-ʿimān* ('Ummā, *Rasāʾil*, 1.130.15, with emphasis on the sword). However, Madelung has shown the ascription of this work to Qāsim to be spurious (*Qāsim*, 97f., and 'Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm and Mu'tazilism', 47).

<sup>16</sup> Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 246/860f.), *Maʿāʾil manāḥir*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.977, f. 24a.17 (for this collection, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 124–6 no. 203, item II).

<sup>17</sup> Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, *Maʿāʾil*, f. 55a.17. He uses the term *raḡyā*, and cites Q3:28 (cf. below, ch. 12, note 204).

<sup>1</sup> As will be seen, I have made considerable use of Zaydī manuscripts in this chapter (as also in the preceding one); but those I have consulted are only a small proportion of those available, and more extensive research in them would refine and extend much of my analysis. I regret that I realised too late the possible interest of the one surviving Muḥarrif dogmatic treatise for the Baghdādī Mu'tazilite tradition (cf. below, ch. 11, note 142).

<sup>2</sup> For pre-Mu'tazilite Zaydī doctrine in general, see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 44–86.

<sup>3</sup> Zayd ibn 'Alī, *Majmū'ī*, *al-fajh*, 235–8 nos. 831, 853, 856; 273 no. 942; 294 nos. 994–6 (cited in Madelung, *Qāsim*, 56 n. 79). The first three of these traditions are in the *ṭiḥāṭ al-sayr*. On the *Majmū'ī*, *al-fajh*, see *ibid.*, 54–7.

<sup>4</sup> Zayd, *Majmū'ī*, 235f. no. 851 (from the Prophet). <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 236 no. 853 (from 'Alī).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 238 no. 856 (from the Prophet). The tradition has obvious Sunnī parallels in that it lists five categories of people who are accounted martyrs (see, for example, Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 1.521 nos. 1.914f.); but the Sunnī versions make no reference to *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*.

<sup>7</sup> Zayd, *Majmū'ī*, 273 no. 942, also found in Abū Ṭalīb al-Nāṭiq, *Amnā'ī*, 295.15 (both from Zayd himself).

<sup>8</sup> Zayd, *Majmū'ī*, 294 no. 994 (from 'Alī). For a Sunnī parallel, see Ibn Waddāh, *Bihar*, 231 = 361 no. 64 (the *isnād* is Kūfian; for 'Abū Ḥanifa' read 'Abū Ṭahyā'); and cf. Abū Ṭalīb al-Nāṭiq, *Amnā'ī*, 295.21, with a similar *isnād*.

<sup>9</sup> Zayd, *Majmū'ī*, 294 no. 995 (from 'Alī); Abū Ṭalīb al-Nāṭiq, *Amnā'ī*, 293.15 (from the Prophet). For Sunnī parallels, see above, ch. 3, note 19.

make himself known through forbidding wrong<sup>18</sup> – a rather pale adumbration of a classic Zaydī theme. Finally, there is a short text of Qāsim's from which forbidding wrong is strikingly absent. Here he sets out five Islamic principles which every Muslim must know.<sup>19</sup> The first three are indeed those of the classic Mu'tazilite schema. The last two, however, are conspicuously different, with forbidding wrong being replaced by a statement on the illegitimacy of making a living under unjust rule.<sup>20</sup> The practical import of this stance is not indicated; but given what we know of Qāsim's politics, it is unlikely to have been activist.<sup>21</sup>

The only other pre-Mu'tazilite Zaydī authority for whom I have attestations – all deriving from later sources – is al-Nāṣir al-Uṭrūsh (d. 304/917), a more typically Zaydī figure.<sup>22</sup> He is the only pre-Mu'tazilite Zaydī scholar cited in the account of forbidding wrong given by Ibn al-Murādā (d. 840/1437) in his work on comparative law: he held that it was permissible for one to raid (*an yabḥim*) a house if one had reason to believe (thanks to noise or the like) that a wrong was being perpetrated there.<sup>23</sup> He likewise took the view that no compensation is payable for breaking a wine-jar when one cannot otherwise pour out the wine.<sup>24</sup> These views look like isolated fragments of a larger picture that is mostly lost to us. One source, however, quotes from Uṭrūsh a brief scholastic account of forbidding wrong (*inkār al-munkar*): one should do it so far as one is able, by words if it seems likely to one (*alḥā ḡhalaḡa fī zamān*) that they will suffice, by the whip if words are of no avail, and finally, if one can, by the sword if the offender has not desisted; he adds that the performer of the duty is like a doctor.<sup>25</sup>

This is a poor yield. It is not until Uṭrūsh that we encounter anything suggestive of an organised Zaydī doctrine of forbidding wrong. Before that, our only significant finding is the existence of an activist tendency articulated in early traditions, alongside a quietist mood that appears in the thought of Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm. As we will see in the next section when we turn to Zaydī politics, it was the activist strain that was to prove typical of the Zaydī mainstream down the centuries.

### 3. ZAYDĪ ACTIVISM

The context in which forbidding wrong figures most prominently in the record of early Zaydism relates directly to the political activism that is characteristic of the sect. Zaydism laid claim to, and continued, an old 'Alid pattern: rebellion against unjust rule with the aim of establishing a legitimate imamate. References to forbidding wrong are a recurring (though not an inevitable) feature of accounts of such 'Alid risings.

As might be expected, these references are not confined to narrowly Zaydī sources and figures. Thus Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157/773f.), a Shī'ite historian well known to mainstream historiography, reports a speech made by Ḥusayn (d. 61/680) prior to the battle of Karbalā' in which he quotes the Prophet as condemning anyone who fails to take action against an unjust ruler (*lān yuḡḡayyir 'alayhi*) by deed or word.<sup>26</sup> Abū 'l-Faraj al-Iṣḡānī (d. 356/967), a Zaydī<sup>27</sup> but likewise well known to mainstream literature, has Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) speak of rebellion for the sake of forbidding

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 57b.12; see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 143.

<sup>19</sup> The text was published in E. Griffini, 'Lista dei manoscritti Arabi. Nuovo Fondo della Biblioteca Ambrosiana di Milano', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, 7 (1916–18), 605f., item xv; it appears also in 'Umāra, *Rasā'ih*, 1:142. On this text see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 103f., and Gmirei, 'Les *Usūl al-ḡamār*', 66–8.

<sup>20</sup> Griffini, 'Lista', 606.7; 'Umāra, *Rasā'ih*, 1:142.15. The legality of earning a living is linked to *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in the long activist tradition referred to above, note 11 (see, for example, Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq, *Amāl*, 294.15).

<sup>21</sup> See Madelung's commentary, *Qāsim*, 138 (and cf. *ibid.*, 68). 'Umāra, who is interested in Zaydī texts for their political radicalism, reads the principle in an activist sense (*Rasā'ih*, 1:142 n. 2, quoted in turn in Y. A. al-Fadlī, *Man ḡm al-Zawāḡir?*, Beirut 1975, 93.9; this latter work was brought to my attention by Bernard Haykel).

<sup>22</sup> For his anti-Mu'tazilite stance, see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 161–3. Uṭrūsh quotes a bland Prophetic exhortation to *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* near the beginning of his *ḡhida* manual (R. B. Serjeant, 'A Zaydī manual of husband of the 3rd century (H)', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, 28 (1953), 11.15, with an 'Alid *ismāf*), but this work, as might be expected, is not otherwise concerned with the individual duty.

<sup>23</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Bayḡ*, 5:466.5, also 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Lama'*, f. 221a.10, and cf. the scholion thereto.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn Miṭṭāl, *Mumīna'*, 4:587.7, and the scholion to 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Lama'*, f. 221a.17.

<sup>25</sup> See al-Manṣūr 'Abdalāsh ibn Ḥamza (d. 614/1217), *al-Durr al-yatīn*, ms. London.

British Library, Or. 3.976, f. 179b.19 (for this manuscript see Rieu, *Supplément*, 132 no. 210, item III), cited in E. Landau-Tasseron, 'Zaydī imams as restorers of religion: *ihmā'* and *tuḡḡāh* in Zaydī literature', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 49 (1990), 255 n. 34.

<sup>26</sup> Tabarī, *Ta'rib*, series II, 300.6 (I owe this reference to Nurit Tsafrir, who acutely read *yugḡayyir* for the *yugḡayyir* of the printed text); Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157/773f.), *Maḡal al-Ḥusayn*, Quam 1362 sh., 85.9. Ḥusayn goes on to refer to himself as *alim* *muḡḡayyir*.

<sup>27</sup> Compare the speech that Abū Mikhnaf ascribes to 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Abī Layḡā (d. 82/701) at the battle of Jamānīn, in which the latter in turn quotes 'Alī at the battle of Siffin: whoever sees people being called to wrong, and disapproves of it in his heart (*imkinnih bi-ḡhib*), has acquitted himself of his duty; whoever speaks out against it has done better; and whoever responds with the sword has found the path of right guidance (*ihmā'*, series II, 1:886.9, whence the *Nahī al-ba'ḡ* of the Sharīf al-Raḡf (d. 406/1015) *apud* Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥādīd, *Sharḡ*, 19:305.6; Hur al-ʿAmīl, *Wasā'ih*, 6:1:405 no. 8; Majlis, *Bihār*, 100:89 no. 69; Goldziher, *Le livre de Mohammad ibn Tawm*, 94f.). Cf. also the avowal of Zayd ibn 'Alī that he would be ashamed to meet the Prophet at the resurrection if he had not performed the duty, apparently also transmitted by Abū Mikhnaf (Ibn Ṭināba (d. 828/1424), *Undar al-ḡhib*, ed. N. Rida, Beirut 1390, 207.20, a reference which I owe to Amīkan Elad; the same avowal occurs with other *ismāfs* in Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq, *Amāl*, 100.24, 103.15).

<sup>28</sup> That he was a Zaydī is stated by Abū Ja'far al-Juṣī (d. 460/1067) (*Fihrist*, ed. M. S. 'Al-Baḡir al-'Uṭmī, Najaf 1960, 223f. no. 896, cited in van Ardenonk, *Dubūz*, xv) and it finds support in his work (see his *Maḡal al-ḡhib*, 659.5, showing his participation in a sectarian Zaydī academic milieu; see also Madelung, *Qāsim*, 59 n. 102).

wrong.<sup>28</sup> He also recounts how Mūsā al-Kāzīm (d. 183/799), confronted with the head of the Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī who was killed at Fakhkh in 169/786, pronounced him to have been one who commanded right and forbade wrong,<sup>29</sup> and he describes Ibn Ṭabāṭabā (d. 199/815) in his appeal to the people of Kūfā as calling them to forbid wrong.<sup>30</sup>

This theme is continued in accounts of properly Zaydī pretenders.<sup>31</sup> An example is Ḥasan ibn Zayd (d. 270/884), who established the first Caspian Zaydī state, though he does not seem to have claimed the imamate;<sup>32</sup> when he initiated his venture in 250/864, forbidding wrong was part of the terms of allegiance.<sup>33</sup> Similarly al-Nāsir al-Uṭrūsh is described as setting up his rule in Daylam and Gīlān in 287/900 by converting pagans to Islam; thereafter he continued to rule there, commanding right and forbidding wrong, abolishing oppressive taxes and the like.<sup>34</sup> Clearly this link between forbidding wrong and state formation does not imply any denial of the individual Zaydī's duty to command and forbid. Indeed we have already encountered some pronouncements of Uṭrūsh on this aspect of the duty.<sup>35</sup> But the politically excited

form of forbidding wrong associated with the Zaydī pretenders does tend to displace the duty of the ordinary individual from the centre of the stage.

This conjunction of forbidding wrong with political activism remains a prominent feature of the Zaydī tradition during and after the adoption of Mu'tazilite doctrine. The first major figure in the history of the Zaydī-Mu'tazilite symbiosis is al-Ḥādī ilā 'l-Ḥaqq (d. 298/911), the founder of the Zaydī imamate in the Yemen.<sup>36</sup> We are fortunate in possessing a fair number of his works, together with an account of his career stemming from his immediate followers. This material has relatively little to say about forbidding wrong as a duty of the individual Muslim,<sup>37</sup> but a great deal that links it to the Zaydī conception of the imamate.<sup>38</sup>

Thus in a law-book written by a follower of al-Ḥādī, we find a polemic against the (typically Imāmī) view that the imām does not have to rebel; he need only be learned, pious and trustworthy. The Zaydī retort is that such a man is merely an authority on legal matters (*imām ḥalāl ma-ḥrām*), not one to whom obedience is due (*muṭṭarād al-rī'a*), 'since he is sitting at home (*jālis fī bayt*ih), neither commanding nor forbidding; for God does not enjoin obedience to one who sits [quietly at home] as He does to one who arises (*al-qā'im*), commanding right and forbidding wrong.'<sup>39</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Ifār is distinguishing between such rebellion and the role of the future Mahdī, the context is the rising of Muḥammad al-Nās al-Zakīya (d. 145/762) (*Maḥṣn*, 207.8). Cf. the anecdote quoted in Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq, *Amāl*, 131.22, and van Arendonk, *Dihna*, 56 n. 1; cf. also *ibid.*, 34 n. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Abū 'l-Faraj, *Maḥṣn*, 453.11. Cf. also Ahmad ibn Saḥl al-Rāzī (*H*, later third/ninth century), *Al-Jabār Fakhkh*, ed. M. Jarrah, Beirut 1995, 149.9 (drawn to my attention by Eran Kolbberg).

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, 523.13, on the authority of the Shī'ite Naṣr ibn Muzaḥim (d. 212/827); van Arendonk, *Dihna*, 96f. Of Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan, who died in prison in 145/763, Abū 'l-Faraj remarks that he followed the Zaydī path in *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (*Maḥṣn*, 183.4). The Imām al-Shākh al-Muḥd (d. 413/1022) has Zayd ibn 'Alī going forth with the sword, commanding right and forbidding wrong (*irshād*, Tehran n.d., 2.168.2).

<sup>31</sup> As noted by Madelung, 'Amr be ma'rūf', 993b. During his rebellion in Daylam in the reign of Ḥārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170-93/786-809), Yāḥyā ibn 'Abdallāh had seven learned missionaries whose message included *izhār al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (Rāzī, *Al-Jabār Fakhkh*, 197.8; on Yāḥyā, see van Arendonk, *Dihna*, 65-70). Cf. also the characterisation of the Bāṭinīya in Nawbakhtī (alive in 300/912), *Firaq al-Shī'a*, ed. H. Ritter, Istanbul 1931, 51.2, translated in van Ess, *Theologie*, 5:52.

<sup>32</sup> For his title *al-ḥādī ilā 'l-ḥaqq*, see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 154f. A distinction is made by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq (d. 424/1032f.) between actual imams and 'Alids who merely took the path of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* and rebellion against the oppressors without claiming the imamate (see the passage from the introduction to his *iftāh* published in R. Strothmann, 'Die Literatur der Zaiditen', *Der Islam*, 2 (1911), 74.3 of the Arabic text).

<sup>33</sup> Ibn Isḥāq (writing 613/1216f.), *Tarīkh-i Ṭabaristān*, ed. A. Iqbāl, Tehran n.d., 1:229.7, cited in Madelung, *Qāsim*, 154.

<sup>34</sup> W. Madelung (ed.), *Arabic texts concerning the history of the Zaydī Imāms of Ṭabaristān, Daylamān and Gīlān*, Beirut 1987, 88.9, 225.7. This report was drawn to my attention by Ella Landau-Tasseron from manuscript. Another source (which states that Uṭrūsh was successful only on his fifth attempt) likewise associates his venture with *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (*ibid.*, 75.9).

<sup>35</sup> See above, 230. In his public statements Uṭrūsh remarks that the formerly pagan Gilites and Daylamites now perform *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq, *Amāl*, 204.14; Madelung, *Arabic texts*, 214.17); he speaks of how he calls to *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (*ibid.*, 215.14); and he calls upon people to perform it (*ibid.*, 217.8; Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq, *Amāl*, 201.19).

<sup>36</sup> For his career, see van Arendonk, *Dihna*, 127-305. For his Mu'tazilism, which derived from the Baghdādī school, see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 163-8. A key passage at the beginning of his work *al-Manzila bayn al-manzilatayn* gives a list of five principles (*usūl*), including *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* which are in fact the five principles of the Mu'tazilites (ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.798, f. 53b.22, and see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 164; for the *Manzila*, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 127-9 no. 206, item XVI, and van Arendonk, *Dihna*, 287-91). By contrast, the list given in al-Ḥādī's *Usūl al-dīn* (ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.798, f. 69a.26), while retaining *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, drops the *manzila bayn al-manzilatayn* and adds the 'Alid imamate (for this work, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 127-9 no. 206, item XIX, and van Arendonk, *Dihna*, 298f.).

<sup>37</sup> Even al-Ḥādī's treatment of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* in his law-book has nothing to say on this subject (*al-Mabāhīm fī 'l-ḥukm wa 'l-ḥarām*, n.p. 1990, 1:503-5, the volume numbers in this printing are transposed).

<sup>38</sup> See the brief remarks of Landau-Tasseron, 'Zaydī imams', 255.

<sup>39</sup> Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Kaṭīf (alive in 309/921), *Muḥṣn*, San' 1993, 14.12, cited in Madelung, *Qāsim*, 145 n. 204. This is a standard theme of Zaydī polemic against Imāmism. It is prominent in the *libnā* of the Zaydī polemicist Abū Zayd al-'Alawī (*H*, later third/ninth century), preserved in the refutation of the Imāmī Mu'tazilite Ibn Qibā al-Rāzī (d. not later than 319/931) (see H. Modarressi, *Crises and consolidation in the formative period of Shī'ite Islam*, Princeton 1993, 193.4, 194.11, and cf. Ibn Qibā's retorts, *ibid.*, 196.16, 198.21, 200.16, 201.10); the date of this exchange cannot be earlier than 271/884 (*ibid.*, 169, and cf. 83 n. 161) nor later than 319/931 (*ibid.*, 117, 119). Three centuries later, the imām al-Manṣūr 'Abdallāh ibn Ḥanẓala (d. 614/1217) replies to the assertion that God has not given the imām permission to rebel by saying that this is contrary to Islam, for God has ordered His servants in general, and the imams in particular, to perform *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* and *al-nahy bi'l-ma'rūf*; he claims that he has not been commanded to engage in such activities as *jihād*, the implementation of the *jihād*, resistance to the oppressors (*ẓulm*), and *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, we ask him: 'So what were you commanded to do, and to what purpose?' (*al-ṭiḡ al-ḥamīd*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.976, f. 159b.19, cited in Landau-Tasseron, 'Zaydī imams', 255 n. 34; for this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 132 no. 210, item I).

Elsewhere al-Hādī argues that commanding and forbidding are vested in the best members of the family of the Prophet (*ibayār al-Muhammadi*) to the exclusion of Pharaohs and tyrants (*jahūbūn*);<sup>40</sup> he adduces a set of Koranic proof-texts of which the first is Q22:41.<sup>41</sup> His polemical target here is the anthropomorphist predestinationists (in other words, the Sunnīs) who believe that God has Himself decreed the oppression they suffer; were they to come to know God as He really is, and then to set about commanding right and forbidding wrong, their prayers would be answered and they would be delivered from their oppressors.<sup>42</sup> The same linkage appears in a tradition quoted by al-Hādī to establish the Zaydī doctrine of the imamate. Here the Prophet states: 'Whoever of my descendants (*min aburriyatī*) commands right and forbids wrong is God's caliph on His earth...'<sup>43</sup>

The narrative of the career of al-Hādī in founding the Zaydī imamate in the Yemen is accordingly one in which forbidding wrong figures prominently.<sup>44</sup> The duty is central to the enterprise in which he is engaged: it is one of the things he does when he first calls people to his cause,<sup>45</sup> just as it is part of what the true 'Alid does when he unsheathes his sword and

<sup>40</sup> See al-Hādī *ibid.* 1: Haqq (d. 298/911), *Kitāb fihī ma'rifat Allāh*, in 'Ummā, *Rasā'il*, 2: 83-6. *Ibid.*, 83.15. Cf. the Zaydī use of Q3:104 as a proof-text for the imamate noted by Landau-Tasseron ('Zaydī imams', 255 n. 36), and the similar appeal to Q3:110 at the end of the refutation of the Rawāfiḍ ascribed to Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (see the quotation in R. Strothmann, *Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen*, Strasbourg 1912, 42 n. 1; for the ascription of the work, see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 98f.).

<sup>41</sup> See al-Hādī, *Kitāb fihī ma'rifat Allāh*, 86.8. This is a fine yoking of Mu'tazilite dogmatic positions to Zaydī activism.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.2 (here al-Hādī immediately draws attention to the phrase *min aburriyatī*, which is not found in the Sunnī version of the tradition, see above, ch. 3, note 27). al-Hādī, *Alfakāh*, 1:505.22. The tradition was duly included by Qādī Ṣāda (d. 646/1248f.) in his collection of Prophetic traditions transmitted by al-Hādī (*Dirr al-nabātīn*, ed. Y. A. al-Fadl, Beirut 1979, 48.4, whence Crone and Hinds, *God's call*, 98 n. 12, and Landau-Tasseron, 'Zaydī imams', 255 n. 35). Strothmann, who cited the tradition from manuscript, noted the marginal annotation of a reader: 'This is an explicit stipulation (*inṣag*) of the imamate of the descendants of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*)' (*Staatsrecht*, 43 and n. 2, with the comment that this reader was 'ein echter Zaidit').

<sup>43</sup> A painfully spurious tradition has the Prophet predict the appearance in the Yemen of a descendant of this named Yaḥyā al-Hādī who would command right and forbid wrong, and through whom God would bring life to truth and death to falsehood (al-Manṣūr Sharaf al-Dīn Ibn Badr al-Dīn (d. 670/1271f.), *Amṣār al-yaghr*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.868, f. 150a.4, cited in Landau-Tasseron, 'Zaydī imams', 255 n. 34; for this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 331f. no. 538).

<sup>44</sup> 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-'Alawī (*fl.* late third/ninth century), *Sīrat al-Hādī ilā 'l-Haqq Tahyā' ihn al-Husayn*, ed. S. Zakkar, n.p. 1972, 17.8; cf. also *ibid.*, 92.4, and van Arendonk, *Dībura*, 135. In an extant written *da'wa*, al-Hādī stresses the obligations of *jihad* and *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* (*Da'wa*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.798, f. 85a.2, with a string of Koranic verses), and calls upon the addressee to join him in *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* (*ibid.*, f. 88b.7, and cf. f. 89b.24; for this text, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 127-9 no. 206, item XXIV, and cf. van Arendonk, *Dībura*, 302f.). In all the passages cited from this *da'wa*, we find the expanded form *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf al-nikah wa'l-ndiy 'an al-faṣāhim wa'l-munkar*, as also at 'Alawī, *Sīra*, 25.2.

proclaims his imamate.<sup>46</sup> It makes a simple meal of three buns and a little condiment shared by al-Hādī and one of his followers tantamount to a banquet.<sup>47</sup> It figures as a formal component of the allegiance done to al-Hādī by those who follow or submit to him.<sup>48</sup> It is one of the most salient roles of his governors<sup>49</sup> and emissaries.<sup>50</sup> It appears as a duty of the people at large, indeed of all believers.<sup>51</sup> It lies at the core of the enterprise in which his band of followers is engaged.<sup>52</sup> He tells the people of the localities that join his state to perform it.<sup>53</sup> Few of these references have much to say about concrete and particular wrongs;<sup>54</sup> several have rich associations with the tradition of 'Alid insurrection against injustice.<sup>55</sup> Likewise after his death the absence of forbidding wrong, and the need for someone to undertake it, figure prominently in the story of the anarchy that ensued.<sup>56</sup>

The same idiom remains prominent in the later history of Zaydī state formation. Thus forbidding wrong appears repeatedly as an activity characteristic of (though far from confined to) imams and similar figures exercising religiously validated political power. This is readily illustrated from the annals of Caspian Zaydism. The imam al-Mu'ayyad Ahmad ibn al-Husayn (d. 411/1020)<sup>57</sup> issued a call to his cause which deplored the conditions of anarchy and oppression that had arisen; among them he

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.4. By contrast, the xaw'-at-home 'Alid pretenders fail to do it (*ibid.*, 28.1, 28.10, the latter from Zayd ibn 'Alī). He likewise stresses the role of armed conflict in the performance of the duty in a passage in his *Munzila* (f. 55a.3); most of the passage is quoted in 'A. M. Zayd, *Min tanzīlat al-Tannān*, Ṣan'ā and Beirut 1981, 180f.

<sup>47</sup> 'Alawī, *Sīra*, 57.3.

<sup>48</sup> See the text of the form of allegiance, *ibid.*, 117.9, and the accounts of the submission of local rulers, *ibid.*, 115.6, 207.3.

<sup>49</sup> See the text of this letter of appointment, *ibid.*, 45.1 (= van Arendonk, *Dībura*, 320.12, and cf. *ibid.*, 136f.); cf. also 'Alawī, *Sīra*, 211.3. For particular instances, see *ibid.*, 80.5, 94.9, 115.16, 211.16, 212.17, 214.9, 214.19, 341.7. In another such document, *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* is a duty in which governors are to instruct their subjects ('*Alid*', London, British Library, ms. Or. 3.798, f. 179b.14, likewise using the expanded form; for this document, which is now printed in Küf, *Minṭakabih*, 505-7, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 127-9 no. 206, item XXXV, and van Arendonk, *Dībura*, 302 and n. 2).

<sup>50</sup> 'Alawī, *Sīra*, 115.10. Cf. also *ibid.*, 298.10.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.2 (and cf. *ibid.*, 24.12, citing Q3:104 and Q3:110). See also *ibid.*, 22.6, 123.4, 52. *Ibid.*, 50.15, 51.1.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 94.9 (mentioning unspecified *fawā'id*), 115.6 (mentioning wine), 115.13 (mentioning a case of drunkenness); and see van Arendonk, *Dībura*, 164.

<sup>53</sup> See 'Alawī, *Sīra*, 22.6 (where *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* is associated with separating from the oppressors and fighting the wicked on the side of just imams descended from Hasan and Husayn), 25.2 (associated with assistance to the imams - the caliphs descended from the prophets - and with a hard line against wicked and oppressive tyrants and those who follow them), 29.4 (associated with the 'Alid imam who unsheathes his sword and plants his standard).

<sup>54</sup> W. Madelung (ed.), *The Sira of Imām Ahmad b. Tahyā' al-Nasir li-Din Allāh from Minṭakabih al-Lahjā' Kitāb Akhbār al-Zaydiyya bi'l-Tannān*, Exeter 1990, 7.1, 7.16, 8.11, 8.19; cf. also *ibid.*, 46.20, 48.11, 62.17. This material derives from a contemporary source (see Madelung's introduction, v f.). The most interesting of these passages were drawn to my attention from manuscript by Ella Landau-Tasseron.

<sup>55</sup> See Madelung, *Qāsim*, 177f.

mentioned that the practitioners of the duty had become few and impotent.<sup>58</sup> He went on to call people to assist him in his enterprise, and to help him in the task of forbidding wrong which he had undertaken.<sup>59</sup> After his death he was succeeded by his brother Abū Tālib al-Nāṭiq (d. 424/1032f.),<sup>60</sup> who continued to command right and forbid wrong in the tradition of the family of the Prophet till he died.<sup>61</sup> Later, between 472/1079f. and 490/1097, there were in effect two imams, al-Hādī al-Huṣaynī (d. 490/1097) and Abū 'l-Ridā al-Kisūnī (who died soon after).<sup>62</sup> When the timely sabotage of a bridge prevented what might have been an ugly encounter between their forces, they agreed to divide and rule: one reigned in Daylāmān, while the other (Kisūnī) commanded right and forbade wrong in Gīlān.<sup>63</sup> Nearly a century later – in the 560s/1160s – 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Ghaznawī, an 'Alid from Ghazna, set up in Gīlān, though without claiming to be a full imam,<sup>64</sup> he established right and took action against wrongs.<sup>65</sup> As late as the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century a descendant of his, 'Alī ibn Amīr Kiyā Malāwī (d. 781/1379f.), was established as a fully fledged Zaydī imam,<sup>66</sup> our account of his career refers to forbidding wrong as a part of his role in such contexts as the duty of the imam to reduce a fractious local ruler to obedience,<sup>67</sup> and the forced conversion of a conquered Ismā'īlī community to Zaydism.<sup>68</sup>

What is true of Caspian Zaydism is true also for its Yemeni offshoot. The imam al-Mansūr al-Qāsim ibn 'Alī al-'Iyānī (d. 393/1003) sent out letters reminding his subjects that the terms of their mutual allegiance were the Book of God and the normative practice (*sunna*) of His Prophet, which include forbidding wrong and mutual help in performing it.<sup>69</sup> Two centuries later the terms of allegiance to the imam al-Mansūr 'Abdallāh ibn Ḥamza (d. 614/1217) included the Book of God, the normative practice

of His Prophet, and forbidding wrong.<sup>70</sup> Another four centuries take us to the time of the imam al-Mansūr al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad (d. 1029/1620), who wrote a letter calling people to his cause in which the rhetoric of forbidding wrong is as conspicuous as ever.<sup>71</sup> At the same time the language retains its old formulaic quality. Even after so many centuries, we have little sense that this Zaydī tradition of forbidding wrong implied a concrete and practical programme of moral reform. In marked contrast to what we saw in the case of the later Sa'ūdī state, we have here little more than a banner under which an 'Alid can rebel, establish a state, and maintain his power.

#### 4. THE ZAYDĪ LEGAL TRADITION

There was, of course, more to Zaydism than this inflammatory brand of religious politics. As we have seen, forbidding wrong was also a duty of the individual Zaydī believer, and it is regularly treated as such in legal works.<sup>72</sup> A good deal of what the scholars have to say here is Mu'tazilite, or heavily influenced by Mu'tazilism, as will be seen in the next section. But as might be expected, there is much in the legal tradition that seems to be independent of Mu'tazilite sources. We can best approach this material through a work on the legal doctrine of the imam al-Mu'ayyad Ahmad ibn al-Husayn (d. 411/1020) put together by his disciple Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Hawṣamī. Although al-Mu'ayyad was a Mu'tazilite,<sup>73</sup> it hardly shows in the part of the work that concerns us. In what follows I shall reproduce the substance of his treatment,<sup>74</sup> respecting the order of topics found in it.

<sup>58</sup> The wording of the *bay'a* is quoted in Muḥallī (d. 652/1254f.), *al-Hādī'iq al-mawḥiyya*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.786, f. 167a.7 (for this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 329f. no. 534).

<sup>59</sup> This incomplete *da'wa* is found in Jurniānī (d. 1077/1667), *al-Niḥdān al-muḥḥim*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.329, ff. 52b–54a (= 88–90 in the published facsimile, n.p. n.d.), note the borrowing at f. 53a.20 (= 89.23) of some of the rousing language of the long activist tradition mentioned above, note 11. For this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 336f. no. 543.

<sup>60</sup> The Zaydīs are like the Imānīs, and unlike the Sunnis, in including discussion of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in their law-books. But the two Shī'ite sects differ with regard to the location of the topic in the law-book: whereas the Imānīs place it in their *kitāb al-jihād*, which normally follows the discussion of the rites of pilgrimage, the Zaydīs treat it in their *kitāb al-shūr*, which includes both *jihād* and the imamate, and is placed at the end of the law-book. For more details on the Imānī practice, see below, ch. 11, note 2.

<sup>61</sup> See Madelung, *Qāsim*, 177.

<sup>62</sup> Viz. al-Mu'ayyad Ahmad ibn al-Husayn (d. 411/1020), *Yānā*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 4.031, ff. 80b.19–81b.9 (for this manuscript see Rieu, *Supplement*, 216f. no. 338). I have also consulted a Berlin manuscript of the work and made use of its readings where I had difficulty with the London manuscript (ms. Berlin, Glaser 188, ff. 12a.16–13a.1, for this manuscript, see Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnis*, 4:292f. no. 4.878, item 1); but unless otherwise indicated, my references are to the London manuscript. I have also made some use of the parallel passages and further materials found in 'Alī ibn al-Husayn, *Imām*, ff. 220b–223a.

<sup>63</sup> Madelung, *Arabic texts*, 311.11.  
<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 314.2, quoting Q5:78 and Q3:110; cf. also 354.1  
<sup>60</sup> See Madelung, *Qāsim*, 178–82.  
<sup>61</sup> Madelung, *Arabic texts*, 320.16. Cf. his own statement of the duties of the imam in his *Tahzīb*, *agud* Strothmann, *Staatsrecht*, 105.4.      <sup>62</sup> See Madelung, *Qāsim*, 208f.  
<sup>63</sup> Madelung, *Arabic texts*, 145.5. Cf. also *ibid.*, 151.15, 332.5 (on the fate of Kisūnī's wine-bibbling son).      <sup>64</sup> Madelung, *Qāsim*, 217f.  
<sup>65</sup> Madelung, *Arabic texts*, 159.2 (*aghāna 'l-ma'rif wa-nāzila 'l-imnānīyāt*). The text goes on to remark that he was a Zaydī in *usūl* and *furu'*.  
<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 12f. of the introduction, citing Zahr al-Dīn Mar'ashī (ninth/fifteenth century), *Taḥṣīl al-Gīlān wa-Daylāmān*, ed. M. Surtida, Tehran 1347 sh., 41.8.  
<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.18. It is also mentioned as the duty of such a ruler and his followers on submission to the imam (*ibid.*, 34.17).  
<sup>68</sup> Mar'ashī, *Taḥṣīl*, 67.18. The conquest itself is presented as a consequence of the duty of the 'people of Islam' to see that *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* is carried out (*ibid.*, 66.12).  
<sup>69</sup> Husayn ibn Ahmad ibn Yāqūb (fl. later fourth/teenth century), *Sira al-imām al-Mansūr bi'l-ḥil*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 3.816, f. 40a.8 (for the distribution of the letter, see *ibid.*, f. 38a.3); and cf. also *ibid.*, ff. 42b.3, 57b.12, and cf. 111a.13, 112a.20. For this manuscript, see Rieu, *Supplement*, 328 no. 532.

The account opens with a general statement about the manner of taking action against wrongs (*ḥaṣṣyat iṣālat al-munkar*). Whoever has good reason to think that he is able to do so has a duty to proceed against wrong. If words suffice, he should not resort to blows; but if neither words nor blows are enough, he can escalate further as the situation requires, since the sole object is to eliminate the wrong.<sup>75</sup> This formulation is quite likely to derive from a Mu'tazilite source, but it does not have to: Utrūsh had said much the same.<sup>76</sup>

With these generalities out of the way, the account turns to detail. There is no overall structure; the following topics are addressed in succession:

1 *Smashing offending objects*: With regard to objects used in wrongful activities – mandolins and the like – a distinction is made between those normally used for illicit purposes (even if a licit use is possible) and those used for both licit and illicit purposes (such as cups and bottles). Objects in the first category are to be smashed,<sup>77</sup> and the bits returned to the owner; those in the second are not to be smashed.<sup>78</sup>

2 *Dealing with wine*: The basic techniques for dealing with wine or the like are to pour it out or to put into it something such as dung (*sarḡin aw 'adhirān*) which will render it unfit for consumption.<sup>79</sup> However, dung (*zibḥ*) – or sand (*ramḥ*)? – is not to be put into amphorae (*dinār*) because of the inconvenience (*ra'āb*) this gives rise to.<sup>80</sup> If you see a man carrying a jar with wine in it, you pour it out; if the jar gets broken in the process, you are – rather surprisingly – liable for its cost.<sup>81</sup> If the

<sup>75</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Iḥḍāḍ*, f. 80b.20; cf. 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Liḥmā*, f. 220b.10, with explicit reference to killing.

<sup>76</sup> See above, 230. That we are not in a Sunnī milieu is underlined by the absence of any mention of performance in the heart, and perhaps by the implicit authorisation of recourse to arms.

<sup>77</sup> For the uncompromising Zaydī attitude to musical instruments, compare the view of Utrūsh in Scriegert, 'A Zaidī manual of ḥishāb', 17.7, and cf. below, note 124.

<sup>78</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Iḥḍāḍ*, f. 80b.22. Authority for such smashing is found in the Koranic account of Abraham's treatment of the idols of his people (Q21:58), and in an anecdote about 'Alī's harsh reaction of 'Alī to some chess-players he encountered. The anecdote about 'Alī is quoted from al-Ḥādī, *Alḥikm*, 1:553.1; for the severe Zaydī attitude to chess, see also Scriegert, 'A Zaidī manual of ḥishāb', 17.1 (where a version of the same anecdote follows). A later Zaydī source states that objects in the second category may be broken only by the authorities (*ahl al-wilāyat*) (Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīzza*, 4:589.3). For the smashing of offending objects in Ibn Ḥanbal's responsa, compare above, ch. 5, note 99, and cf. ch. 7, notes 28f.

<sup>79</sup> A later source also names urine as a possible additive (*ḥidī*, 4:587.23, in the scholia).

<sup>80</sup> The readings *zibḥ* and *ramḥ* are those of the London and Berlin manuscripts respectively; the reading in the parallel passage in 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn's *Liḥmā* is ambiguous (f. 221a.19), while in Šu'ayrī's *Ta'īq* it is clearly *ramḥ* (f. 391a.24). We may perhaps have to do with Caspian realla which were already obscure to Yemeni copyists.

<sup>81</sup> In the *Iḥḍāḍ* mention is made of the contrary opinion of the Ḥanafī Abū Yūsuf (d.

only way to pour out the wine is to break the jar, you may do so subject to compensation. If you do not know for sure that there is wine in the jar, but have good reason to think there is, you must proceed; if afterwards it turns out that you were wrong, you are liable for compensation.<sup>82</sup>

3 *Entering a home*: When you hear the sound of music – such as singing or the noise of musical instruments – coming from inside a home (*al-ḥir*), and recognise (the signs of) wine-drinking, it is your duty to enter the home. Likewise if you know (or just have good reason to think) that there is wine there, you must go in and pour it out.<sup>83</sup>

4 *Turning in a drunk*: On the other hand, if you come across a drunk, you have no duty to turn him over (*raf*) to the authorities (*ḥakīm*). You should keep the matter quiet, and counsel him.<sup>84</sup>

5 *Unjust rulers*: When a reprobate ruler (*sulṭān fāsiq*) calls people to establish right and eliminate wrong, the Muslims may not assist him. However, it is permissible to seek his help in forbidding wrong. If one thinks that by addressing oneself orally or in writing to an unjust ruler (*munāghilib*) one may be able to persuade him to release someone he has wrongfully imprisoned, or the like, one should do so. What if there are two unjust rulers (*ḡālimān*), one worse than the other, and the less bad seeks the help of the Muslims against his rival, and the Muslims in question have reason to believe that their help will be effective in getting rid of the worse ruler, and that the less bad one will expend the taxes he collects from the Muslims in ways advantageous to the faith? The answer is that it is still impermissible to assist the less bad ruler in any wrongdoing, and the taxes he collects are illegal. On the other

182/798) (al-Mu'ayyad had studied Ḥanafī law; see Madelung, *Qāṣim*, 177, and cf. 179); cf. also the position mentioned in a scholion to the parallel passage in 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn's *Liḥmā* (f. 221a.15) that there is no duty to pour out wine when this would lead to (the obligation to pay) compensation, and the view of Utrūsh cited above, note 24.

<sup>82</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Iḥḍāḍ*, f. 81a.1. For the treatment of vessels containing wine in Ibn Ḥanbal's responsa, see above, ch. 5, notes 101f.; for the question of compensation, see ch. 5, note 99, and cf. ch. 6, note 33; for the problem of uncertainty, cf. ch. 5, notes 143, 148.

<sup>83</sup> *Iḥḍāḍ*, f. 81a.8. For the view of Utrūsh, see above, 230; and cf. Šu'ayrī, *Ta'īq*, f. 391a.20; 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Liḥmā*, f. 221a.8. Confronted with the problem of the sound of music, Ibn Ḥanbal says one should reprove the offenders, but he does not say that one should push one's way in (see his responsa cited above, ch. 5, note 63; cf. also ch. 6, note 32). <sup>84</sup> *Iḥḍāḍ*, f. 81a.10. Cf. the view of al-Mu'ayyad that if one has a neighbour who gives one trouble, and one knows that if one hands him over to the ruler he will harm him (in some unlawful way), one may not involve the ruler ('Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Liḥmā*, f. 222a.13, in the scholion; also Šu'ayrī, *Ta'īq*, f. 391b.26, and Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīzza*, 4:592.15, in the scholia). For the problem of involving the authorities as dealt with in Ibn Ḥanbal's responsa, see above, ch. 5, 90, 102f.; and cf. ch. 4, note 268.

hand, (cooperating with him with a view to) eliminating the worse ruler is permissible, indeed obligatory.<sup>85</sup>

6 *Conduct of boys*: Boys must be prevented from wearing silk, golden rings, anklets or earrings, and from drinking wine and the like.<sup>86</sup>

7 *Errors in Korans*: If you find a mistake in someone else's Koran, you must erase it. If, however, you would damage the Koran, whereas someone more skilful than you could erase the mistake without such damage, you are not obliged to act.<sup>87</sup>

8 *Conduct of women*: When women speak up (*idhā azharra kalāmahunna*), they are not to be forbidden or rebuked. This point is supported from cases of women at the beginning of Islam who spoke to men, transmitted what they had seen and heard from the Prophet, or even gave legal opinions.<sup>88</sup> You do have a duty against a woman who makes a habit of so raising her voice when declaiming poetry or singing that she can be heard outside her home (*min warā' al-dār*). How could this be permitted, when it is disapproved of for a woman to recite even the call to prayer because she would have to raise her voice to do so?<sup>89</sup>

9 *Minstrels*: Finally, two points are made about minstrels. First, the question is raised of an otherwise virtuous and pious Muslim who listens to minstrels (*ḡawwālīn*) and enjoys their melodies. The answer is that this is to be considered a sin, and the man a sinner. Second, suppose that a male and a female minstrel inside a home are singing amorous verses in a manner that is liable to excite someone outside it; do the Muslims have a duty to stop them? The answer is that they do.<sup>90</sup>

As already indicated, there is not much in this account that evokes either Mu'tazilite scholasticism or Zaydī activism – though the opening statement

<sup>85</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Ḥifāḍa*, f. 81a.11. Note also the view that when confronting the wicked (*fussāq*) without an imam, the Muslims may appoint someone to discipline the malefactors, and turn the matter over to him ('Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Lumna'*, f. 221a.6).

<sup>86</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Ḥifāḍa*, f. 81a.20. However, beating, wounding, and killing are not admissible in such a context, though they may be required to deal with boys whose actions harm others, as in cases of arson ('Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Lumna'*, f. 221a.2). The prohibition of beating does not, of course, apply to the boy's legal guardian (*walī*) ('Shā'aynī, *Ta'ḥqīq*, f. 391a.15).

<sup>87</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Ḥifāḍa*, f. 81a.22. For the point about the more skilful eraser, compare Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Minṭaḥ*, 4:588.7. In 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn's *Lumna'* we also find provisions regarding books of *ḥadīṭ* and anthropomorphists: these may be burnt and compensation paid to the owner, or, better, (the offending passages) may be dealt with by blacking out (*taswīḍ*) and the expurgated books returned to the owner (f. 221b.5). In the scholia to the *Minṭaḥ* the term *taswīḍ* is glossed *imnā* i.e. obliteration (4:588.24).

<sup>88</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Ḥifāḍa*, f. 81a.24. We can take it that what is problematic about women speaking up is the temptation (*ḥimā*) it may give rise to for men (cf. Shā'aynī, *Ta'ḥqīq*, f. 391a.25). Note that no mention is made of women performing *al-amn bi'l-imn* 'rif.

<sup>89</sup> Mu'ayyad, *Ḥifāḍa*, f. 81b.1. <sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 81b.4.

could be an example of the first, and item (5) of the second. What it offers is rather the kind of detailed guidance on the everyday practicalities of the duty that we found in the responsa of Ibn Ḥanbal.<sup>91</sup> There is the same simple menu, predominantly wine and music. Several of the main themes are shared: breaking instruments and vessels, pouring out or spoiling wine, and the problems raised by uncertainty and liability for compensation. There is, of course, no identity of views on the finer points. The Zaydīs seem less inclined to smash vessels than the Ḥanbalites, but harsher in their choice of pollutant – dung rather than salt – for spoiling wine.<sup>92</sup> There are also topics considered in our Zaydī text which are not covered by Ibn Ḥanbal, such as mistakes in Korans. But it is striking that two legal traditions with such different political attitudes should agree in their negative view of turning in a drunk to the authorities,<sup>93</sup> and the overall similarity in the character of the material is unmistakable.

That this material represents for the most part a Zaydī legal tradition distinct from Mu'tazilism is confirmed by the treatment of forbidding wrong given by a follower of al-Mu'ayyad more distinguished than Abū Ḥāsim al-Ḥawṣamī, namely the 'Alid Muwaffaq al-Shajā'ī (first half of the fifth/eleventh century).<sup>94</sup> His account falls into two main parts. The first is a thoroughly Mu'tazilite analysis comparable in coverage, style and doctrine to Mānkadīm's.<sup>95</sup> The second is more practical in scope, and deals with questions relating to musical instruments, amphorae, blasphemous books (*ḥurūf al-illāh*), Biblical texts, toys, images, chess, backgammon, liquor of contested status, vessels of gold and silver and the like.<sup>96</sup> The treatment is somewhat more theoretical than that of al-Mu'ayyad, but broadly similar. Now in this part of his account Muwaffaq, unlike al-Mu'ayyad, cites numerous authorities. He once cites a Mu'tazilite,<sup>97</sup> and quite often makes reference to Sunnī views.<sup>98</sup> But overall, his pattern of citation places him firmly in the Zaydī legal tradition.<sup>99</sup> What is true for Muwaffaq is likely to be true also for al-Mu'ayyad. The roots

<sup>91</sup> Cf. above, notes 78, 82–4.

<sup>92</sup> For the views of Ibn Ḥanbal on these points, see above, ch. 5, notes 101f.

<sup>93</sup> See above, note 84. <sup>94</sup> For this scholar, see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 182, 183f.

<sup>95</sup> Muwaffaq, *Ḥifāḍa*, ff. 135b.3–138b.25. The only authorities named are Abū 'Alī and Abū Ḥāsim (*ibid.*, ff. 135b.8, 136a.6, 137a.6).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 141a.4–144b.13. The intervening passage deals with duress (*ikrāh*).

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 141a.9, citing Abū 'Alī (see above, ch. 9, note 28).

<sup>98</sup> Sec. for example, *ibid.*, f. 141a.8 (Shāfi'ite doctrine), f. 141a.10 (a view of Abū Ḥanīfā), and cf. f. 143b.19 (an action of 'Umar).

<sup>99</sup> Sec. for example, *ibid.*, f. 141a.19 (citing an action of the Amīr al-Mu'mīnīn – i.e. 'Alī – with the comment that his actions and words are definitive proof for us), 141b.16 (citing the consensus of the Prophet's family (*ijmā' ahl al-bayt*) as indefeasible), 141a.13 (citing Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm in the *Maṣā'ir* of Nawrūsī), 141a.7 (citing Yahyā ibn al-Ḥusayn, i.e. al-Ḥādī). For Nawrūsī (third/ninth century), see Madelung, *Qāsim*, 153, 160.

of this legal tradition doubtless go back to the early evolution of Zaydism in Kūfa.

We have thus identified the two major components of the property Zaydī heritage with respect to forbidding wrong: a political activism which is unmistakably Zaydī, and a legalistic tradition which is presumably so. Apart from their common Zaydī origin, they have little intrinsic connection to each other. Alongside these components, as we have already seen in the case of Muwaffaq al-Shajānī, we find a scholastic doctrine of the duty which is manifestly Mu'tazilite.

## 5. THE ZAYDĪ—MU'TAZILITE SYMBIOSIS

Probably the best-known Zaydī Mu'tazilite is the Yemeni Ibn al-Murādā (d. 840/1437), whose writings became standard works and attracted much attention from later commentators.<sup>100</sup> As he explains in one of them, forbidding wrong is a topic that receives double coverage.<sup>101</sup> It is treated once under the rubric of theology (*'ilm al-kalām*) – the basic principles of the faith (*usūl al-dīn*), knowledge of which is incumbent on every legally competent Muslim; he observes that any comprehensive Zaydī or Mu'tazilite work in the field includes it. And it is discussed again in the exposition of substantive law (*'ilm al-furū'*).<sup>102</sup> When Ibn al-Murādā treats the subject himself in the theological context, his account is solidly Mu'tazilite.<sup>103</sup> By contrast, when he treats it in the legal context, he mixes Mu'tazilite scholasticism with a legal tradition close to that of al-Mu'ayyad. No systematic account of his theological treatment of the duty is called for; what he has to say falls squarely within the tradition of 'Abd al-Jabbār with which we are already familiar.<sup>104</sup> The following survey will therefore concentrate on the mixture found in his legal works, which is typical for what I have called the Zaydī–Mu'tazilite symbiosis.

Ibn al-Murādā includes a brief, highly concentrated treatment of forbidding wrong at the end of an epistle of Zaydī law which he composed during his years in prison following an unsuccessful imamate.<sup>105</sup> This terse

<sup>100</sup> For the biography of Ibn al-Murādā, see Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834), *al-Baḥr al-rīfī*, Cairo 1348, 1:122–6. In what follows I leave aside his *Tabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*. He there refers only once to *al-amr bi'l-ḥaqq*, stating that its obligationness is one of the things the Mu'tazilites agree on (*Tabaqāt*, 8.10).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. above, note 72.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 240b.8–244b.15; cf. also the very brief coverage in Ibn al-Murādā, *Qaṭṭī'īd*, 149f.

<sup>103</sup> See above, ch. 9, section 3. There is no sign of influence from the school of Abū Ḥusayn, except on one point (cf. below, notes 110, 112). I shall include a few points of interest from the *Durr* in the notes to what follows.

<sup>104</sup> Ibn al-Murādā (d. 840/1437), *Azhar*, ed. S. Mūsā, Beirut 1975, 529–31 (the editor gives the title as *Uṣūl al-ʿAzhar* to include his own footnoted commentary). The work was a standard textbook of Zaydī law for students (Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834), *al-Sayf al-jamrī*).

statement of his views can be filled out from the account he gives in a much larger work on comparative law.<sup>106</sup> To convey a sense of the character of the material, I shall follow the text of the epistle, with parenthetical expansions from the larger work.

Ibn al-Murādā's opening lines<sup>107</sup> are considerably more elaborate than the introductory statement of al-Mu'ayyad's account,<sup>108</sup> but he leaves aside such theoretical questions as the basis of the obligation in revelation, whether the duty is also grounded in reason, and whether it is individual or collective. [In the larger work he touches on the first point, but not on the others.]<sup>109</sup> He does, however, attend to the practical matter of the conditions of obligation: rather than mentioning only the ability to carry off the task, as al-Mu'ayyad does, he works in four of the five standard conditions. [In the larger work he sets out the full schema of five conditions, which are essentially those of Mānkadīm; but the order is not the same, and one condition is slightly different.]<sup>110</sup> He also specifies that every legally competent

ed. M. I. Zāwīd, Beirut 1985, 1:3–7). The writing is so dense that, taken on its own, much of it would be unintelligible. I have also used the standard commentary on the *Azhar* by Ibn Miṭṭāḥ (*Munīza*, 4:582–97, with numerous scholia reproduced at the foot of the pages); it is stated on the title-page that the copy from which the text was printed derives from one that had belonged to Shawkānī. Shawkānī describes this commentary as that on which students relied down to his own day (*Baḥr*, 1:394.16); as he remarks, the work is an abridgement of a larger commentary written by Ibn al-Murādā himself (*Ibid.*, 394.19). The scholia are rich in detail culled from a variety of Zaydī sources. Among other things, they raise a very practical question which I have not seen discussed elsewhere: how exactly is one's obligation to right a wrong affected by the physical distance intervening between oneself and it? (Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīza*, 4:582.21, and cf. 583.20, 585.20; an idea advanced in the first passage is that the obligation is extinguished beyond a one-mile radius).

<sup>106</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Baḥr*, 5:464–8 (cited in Madelung, *ʿAmr bi'l-ḥaqq*, 9935). This account incorporates a good many passages from the *Azhar*, but changes their order, adds much new material, and gives divergent opinions with attribution.

<sup>107</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Azhar*, 529.15.

<sup>108</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Baḥr*, 5:464.10. In the *Durr* he deals adequately with the first two questions (f. 241a.25, 241b.13), but on the third he merely quotes a statement that all who consider *al-amr bi'l-ḥaqq* obligatory hold it to be a collective obligation (*Ibid.*, 241b.11). With Najmī (d. 877/1473), by contrast, we have clear statements that it is a collective duty (see his *Shifāʾ al-ḥaqq*, ed. A. A. al-Shamī, Ṣanʿā and Beirut 1987–, 1:422.2, and the citation from his commentary to the introductory books of the *Baḥr* in Strothmann, *Sanāʾid*, 92 n. 3, stating that the Zaydīs and Mu'tazilites agree on this point). The *Munīza* is similarly explicit (Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīza*, 4:582.8). See also above, ch. 9, note 101.

<sup>110</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Baḥr*, 5:465.4. The fifth condition is that one must know, or at least think, that if one takes no action, the corresponding condition requires that the right or wrong in question should not already be past (*lam yafīd*) (f. 242a.13). With regard to the condition that proceeding should not lead to (worse) side-effects, Ibn al-Murādā here notes an unusual contrary view: if the offender reacts by doing something worse, the entire responsibility is his (*Ibid.*, f. 242b.9). It should be added that there is no trace in any of Ibn al-Murādā's accounts of Abū Ḥusayn's distinctive approach to the conditions (cf. above, ch. 9, 222f.). In his *Lumʾa*, *ʿAlī* Ibn al-Husayn introduces his brief statement of the conditions by making a distinction between those that must be satisfied for it to be good to proceed, and those that must hold for it to be obligatory; but he then goes on to list the usual five conditions (f. 220a.5; similarly Muḥallī, *Uṣūl*, 298.13).

Muslim is subject to the obligation,<sup>111</sup> slips in a statement that when the conditions (which ones?) are not satisfied it is usually bad to proceed,<sup>112</sup> makes the usual point about tolerating the divergences of rival law-schools,<sup>113</sup> and restricts taking action against a minor who is not in one's charge<sup>114</sup> – all this in just over five lines. He further states that escalation may extend to killing.<sup>115</sup> [In the larger work he charts a more elaborate escalation: admonition, insult, smashing up musical instruments, clubbing people with sticks, confronting them with arms – but in the public interest he reserves the gathering of an army (*jaysh*) to the imam.]<sup>116</sup> So far, then, almost all of what Ibn al-Murādā has to say is in the Mu'azilite tradition. Then follows a passage similar in content to al-Mu'ayyad's guidance on

<sup>111</sup> In the scholia to the *Munīza* we find the view that the infidel too is obligated (Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīza*, 4:582.14; cf. above, ch. 9, note 147).

<sup>112</sup> Ibn al-Murādā contradicts himself in his fuller discussions of the question whether, if the obligation is voided by danger, it is still good to proceed. In the *Baḥr* he takes the usual view that it depends on whether such action would be for the greater glory of the faith, though he also quotes the contrary view of Yahyā ibn Ḥamza (d. 749/1348f.), with citation of Q9.111 (*Baḥr*, 5:465.14). In the *Dirar*, however, Ibn al-Murādā rejects the view that one may distinguish those cases in which the greater glory of the faith comes into play from those in which it does not (f. 242a.25). The latter, unlike the former, aligns him with Yahyā ibn Ḥamza on the side of Abū Ḥusayn against 'Abd al-Jabbar (cf. above, ch. 9, note 74; note, however, that Yahyā ibn Ḥamza does not cite Q9.111 in his discussion of danger to oneself in his *Shāmi*). In the *Munīza* the view is raised (and rejected) that it might be good to proceed even when one lacks actual knowledge of the law (Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīza*, 4:583.7; also *Shāmi*, *Taḥqīq*, f. 390a.27).

<sup>113</sup> Cf. above, ch. 9, 214. In the *Baḥr* he mentions a view of Yahyā ibn Ḥamza that the imam is exempt from this restriction, but indicates doubt about this (*Baḥr*, 5:466.12; cf. also *Shāmi*, *Taḥqīq*, f. 391a.9). However, this view does not appear in the discussion of the relevance of disagreement among law-schools in Yahyā ibn Ḥamza's *Shāmi* (f. 184a.21). In the *Munīza*, consideration is given to such contentious matters as exposure of the knee (Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīza*, 4:585.5) and the procedure to be adopted if one does not know the law-school of the putative offender (*ibid.*, 586.2); a scholion excludes tolerance in matters on which there is consensus among the *ahl al-bayt*, such as drinking *muthalith* and singing (*ibid.*, 588.28; for *muthalith*, see above, ch. 9, notes 92f.). *Shāmi* (or his source) states that those who hold that every *muthalith* is right (*kull muthalith munib*) are in favour of tolerance, whereas those who hold that truth is one (*al-ḥaqq waḥid*) are against it (*Taḥqīq*, f. 391a.13).

<sup>114</sup> The text runs: *wa-lā yḥayr waḥid ḥalā yḥayr bi-ḥiṭṭat illā 'an idrār*, which sums up all the main points made in earlier discussions (see above, note 86). Elsewhere Ibn al-Murādā includes lunatics in the analysis (*Baḥr*, 5:466.13); Ibn Miṭṭāḥ extends it to animals (*Munīza*, 4:586.9). See also 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Limna*, f. 221a.6, in the scholion; above, ch. 9, note 149.

<sup>115</sup> Elsewhere Ibn al-Murādā contrasts the positive attitude of the Mu'azilites towards the use of the sword in *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* with the negative view of the Ḥashwiyya and the Imānī view that the presence of the imam is required (*Qulā'id*, 149.3; *Dirar*, f. 241a.20). In the *Munīza* a distinction is made: individuals may kill in *ḥiṭṭat al-minām*, but only the authorities may do so in *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* (*ibid.*, 588.2; and cf. 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Limna*, f. 220b.13).

<sup>116</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Baḥr*, 5:466.8. He notes the contrary view of Ghazzālī (for which see below, ch. 16, 441). In fact Ghazzālī's account – at one remove – lies behind the whole set of eschatology struggles (see below, ch. 16, 438–41). The intermediary source can be identified as a work of Yahyā ibn Ḥamza (*Taḥqīq al-ḥaqq*, Cairo 1985, 490–4). See below, 246.

practicalities, though it adds to it here and there.<sup>117</sup> Thus Ibn al-Murādā allows uninvited entry when there is good reason to believe that a wrong is being committed.<sup>118</sup> [In the larger work he rules out spying on people, quoting Q49:12; the duty applies to what is out in the open.]<sup>119</sup> He goes on to pouring out what is suspected to be wine,<sup>120</sup> subject to compensation in the event of error.<sup>121</sup> There is a new provision that one should correct errors that affect the sense in works of religious guidance,<sup>122</sup> but the treatment prescribed for books containing unbelief is familiar.<sup>123</sup> Likewise musical instruments not normally used for any other purpose are to be smashed or ripped, subject to the return of the pieces to the extent that they retain any value, unless they are withheld by way of punishment.<sup>124</sup> He then treats decorative art (where the problem begins with free-standing images of whole animals) and slander.<sup>125</sup> [In the larger work, a long list of wrongs against which action should be taken is inserted, divided according to context.]<sup>126</sup> The next topic is the question of unjust rulers. It is obligatory to assist an oppressor (*ẓālim*) in establishing a right or eliminating a wrong, and to aid the less bad against the worse oppressor, provided this does not strengthen him in his oppression.<sup>127</sup> Finally Ibn

<sup>117</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Azhar*, 530.7; cf. above, 238–40.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. above, 239 item (3). In the *Baḥr* this is given as the view of Ḥanbalī (see above, note 23). Shawkani in his commentary on the *Azhar* puts forward the view that actual knowledge is required here, but then in effect takes it back (*Sayf*, 4:591.6). In both works Ibn al-Murādā adds that one should enter even an unlawfully possessed property (*Azhar*, 530.7; *Baḥr*, 5:466.7); in other words, the duty overrides respect for the rights of the true owner.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 466.5.

<sup>120</sup> Shawkani again requires actual knowledge (*Sayf*, 4:591.13). For an exposition of the complexities of the law of winegar, see Ibn Miṭṭāḥ, *Munīza*, 4:587.10.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. above, 238f. item (2).

<sup>122</sup> In the scholia to the *Munīza*, some doubt is expressed on this point other than in cases where the legal status (lawful, forbidden, etc.) of an action is at stake, or where the text in question is a Koran (*ibid.*, 588.18).

<sup>123</sup> Cf. above, note 87.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. above, 238 item (1). The reference to punishment (*'iqāba*) is out of place in the context of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*; Shawkani adds as a condition for return to the owner that it must not be possible to reuse the pieces in making a new instrument (*Sayf*, 4:593.4). For brief statements of the Zaydī law of music, see Ibn al-Murādā, *Baḥr*, 5:27.5 (singing), 30.6 (instruments) (cited in Serjeant, 'A Zaydī manual of justice', 17 n. 7).

<sup>125</sup> On these topics see also 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Limna*, f. 221b.3, 222a.3.

<sup>126</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Baḥr*, 5:466.15. The framework and a good many of the examples derive from Ghazzālī's survey of common wrongs (for which see below, ch. 16, 442–6), again through Yahyā ibn Ḥamza's recension (*Taḥqīq*, 494–505). That Ibn al-Murādā was using the *Taḥqīq* rather than the *Ḥayr* itself is indicated by such agreements as the following: (1) Ibn al-Murādā and Yahyā both use the word *ḥibṣ* in a context in which Ghazzālī does not (*Baḥr*, 5:466.18; *Taḥqīq*, 496.1; *Ḥayr*, 2:308.14); (2) Ibn al-Murādā and Yahyā use the term *dārīya* where Ghazzālī does not (*Baḥr*, 5:466.20; *Taḥqīq*, 499.21; *Ḥayr*, 2:310.32).

<sup>127</sup> Cf. above, 239f. item (5). This is not a topic discussed in the mainstream Mu'azilite tradition on *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*; Yahyā ibn Ḥamza briefly considers the question whether those who hold illegitimate power (*al-ḥaqq min ummān al-ẓālim wa-lā al-ḥayr*) have a duty to right wrongs (*Shāmi*, f. 185a.24), but even this is isolated.

al-Murādā turns to relations with the wicked in general. One can be on friendly terms with a wicked man (*fāsiq*) in the interests of the faith; more than this is forbidden.<sup>128</sup>

In all this there was little that was new, and little that would change for some centuries to come. The only significant exception is some traces of an encounter with the thought of Ghazzālī, from whom the escalatory schema cited above ultimately derives.<sup>129</sup> The encounter had in fact taken place a century earlier; the Zaydī protagonist was the imam al-Mu'ayyad Yahyā ibn Ḥamza (d. 749/1348f.), more familiar in this study as a Mu'tazilite in the school of Abū Ḥusayn.<sup>130</sup> Yahyā must have owed his knowledge of Ghazzālī's *Revival of the religious sciences* to the Yemeni Shāfi'ites.<sup>131</sup> One of his books can fairly be described as a Zaydī recension of this work of Ghazzālī,<sup>132</sup> and it includes an account of forbidding wrong abridged from parts of Ghazzālī's treatment with some degree of modification.<sup>133</sup> In the case of the escalatory schema, Yahyā reproduces Ghazzālī's succession of stages,<sup>134</sup> including the gathering of armed supporters. But Yahyā takes issue with Ghazzālī on this last stage, adopting the position that such activity is not for individuals, and endorsing this as the view of the Zaydī and Mu'tazilite authorities.<sup>135</sup> We are thus treated to a somewhat unusual spectacle: the view of a Sunnī scholar is rejected by a Zaydī imam as too activist.<sup>136</sup> This, in fact, is Yahyā's only serious challenge to Ghazzālī's doctrine of forbidding wrong in this work.

But Yahyā's encounter with Ghazzālī's thought was not limited to this context.<sup>137</sup> His account of forbidding wrong in his major theological

treatise<sup>138</sup> is likewise influenced by Ghazzālī. Here he introduces a schema, central to Ghazzālī's presentation, in which forbidding wrong is analysed in terms of four basic elements (*arkān*).<sup>139</sup> However, the substantive doctrine which Yahyā presents within this framework differs from Ghazzālī's in some respects, most strikingly in excluding women and slaves from performing the duty.<sup>140</sup> Women are excluded for two reasons: first, because of their frivolity and impotence; and second, because the law does not give them authority (*imārah*) over themselves, let alone over such weighty matters.<sup>141</sup> Slaves are likewise excluded for two reasons: the first is their low status in people's eyes, which renders them unsuitable to undertake the duty; the second, omitted in our text, should presumably have been the same lack of authority that afflicts women.<sup>142</sup>

If Yahyā allowed Ghazzālī to shape some of his discussion of forbidding wrong in a major theological treatise, it is not unlikely that he did the same in his major legal work,<sup>143</sup> but I do not have access to the relevant part of it, if indeed it is extant.<sup>144</sup> Be this as it may, the intrusion of Ghazzālī's thought into the Zaydī heritage is significant. We see in it an early example of a Sunnī penetration of the sect that was to become increasingly pervasive with the passing of the centuries.

## 6. THE SUNNISATION OF ZAYDISM

Almost all the Zaydī material considered so far in this chapter, whether Mu'tazilite or not, is consistent on two points. One is the absence of the

<sup>128</sup> Ibn al-Murādā, *Ashār*, 531.5. The discussion of unjust rulers clearly goes back to al-Mu'ayyad, and that of relations with the wicked has a precedent in his school (see the treatment of interaction with a wicked neighbour quoted from a *Ta'liq al-Ḥifāḍa* in 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Lum'a*, f. 222b.1). There is no treatment of these topics in the discussion of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in the *Baḥr*. Shawkānī in his commentary to the *Ashār* makes a series of points which considerably soften Ibn al-Murādā's view (*Say*, 4:601.3).

<sup>129</sup> See above, note 116. <sup>130</sup> For Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, see above, ch. 9, note 115. <sup>131</sup> See below, ch. 16, notes 160f., 184. <sup>132</sup> As noted in Hübsh, *Majāzīr*, 618 no. 13. <sup>133</sup> Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Taḥf*, 484-515, abridged from Ghazzālī, *Ihyā'*, 2:280-5, 301-5, 307-26. Yahyā inserts occasional references to Zaydī doctrine on this point or that (*Taḥf*, 494.1, 495.5, 500.17-501.7); he customises Ghazzālī's references to heretics so that they now refer to predesignationists and anthropomorphists (*ibid.*, 496.7, 503.9; cf. *Ihyā'*, 2:308.19, 312.15); he omits the discussion of snow as a public nuisance (*ibid.*, 310.29, cf. *Taḥf*, 499.16); he makes an egregious prosopographical error whereby he presents Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) as a contemporary of the caliph al-Mu'tadid (r. 279-89/892-902) (*ibid.*, 512.19; cf. *Ihyā'*, 2:325.29); and so forth.

<sup>134</sup> Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Taḥf*, 490-4. <sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 494.1. <sup>136</sup> For Yahyā's understandable stress on the role of the imam in *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf*, cf. also *Taḥf*, 506.1, where he inserts a passage not found in *Ihyā'*, 2:314.5. For Ghazzālī's radical tendencies – unexpected in the Sunnism of his day – see below, ch. 16, 456f. <sup>137</sup> Hübsh notes a pamphlet of Yahyā's refuting Ghazzālī's lenient view of *sanat* (*Majāzīr*, 620 no. 36).

<sup>138</sup> For the *Shāmil* of Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, see above, ch. 9, note 115. There are explicit references to Ghazzālī in the work (as at ff. 3b.19, 4b.20), but not in the discussion of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf*.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 185a.4–185b.17; compare Ghazzālī, *Ihyā'*, 2:285–305, for which see below, ch. 16, 428f. and the exposition that follows there. Yahyā does not adopt Ghazzālī's distinctive *ḥish* terminology, but the equivalences are clear. His discussion is much less extensive than Ghazzālī's.

<sup>140</sup> Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, *Shāmil*, f. 185a.7, specifying that the performer of the duty must be, among other things, male and free. Note also Yahyā's categorical exclusion of boys (*ibid.*, f. 185a.9; contrast below, ch. 16, 429). Likewise the discussion of Islam as a prerequisite for the performance of the duty (*ibid.*, f. 185a.19) owes nothing to Ghazzālī's discussion of the issue (see below, ch. 16, 429f.), and uses material from Ibn al-Maḥmūd (see above, ch. 9, note 139). Similarly the discussion of restraint of boys from wrongdoing is in the Mu'tazilite tradition (*ibid.*, f. 185b.4; cf. above, ch. 9, 222, and below, ch. 16, 438).

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 185a.12. The view that a woman possesses no authority over herself is no doubt linked to the doctrine that only her guardian (*walī*) can give her in marriage; but I do not have access to a statement of Yahyā ibn Ḥamza's view on this point. <sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 185a.16.

<sup>143</sup> For the *Intiḥ* of Yahyā ibn Ḥamza, see Hübsh, *Majāzīr*, 617 no. 8. The full title of the work as given there suggests that it may have served as a major source for Ibn al-Murādā's *Baḥr*. <sup>144</sup> That it covered *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* is confirmed by a later author's citation (see below, note 146). Ibn al-Murādā twice cites views of Yahyā which cannot be taken from the *Shāmil* (see above, notes 112f.); their most likely source is the *Intiḥ*.

notion of performing the duty in the heart.<sup>145</sup> The other is the endorsement of recourse to arms where necessary,<sup>146</sup> – a recourse which fits effortlessly into the long Zaydī tradition of rebellion against unjust rule. On both points, Zaydism and Mu'tazilism were in accord.<sup>147</sup> However, the later history of Yemeni Zaydism is marked by two parallel phenomena: the decay of the Mu'tazilite tradition,<sup>148</sup> and the penetration of the sect by Sunnī traditionism.<sup>149</sup> The result was that Zaydī conceptions of forbidding wrong

<sup>145</sup> In Zaydī texts earlier than those about to be discussed, I know of very few instances of this idea. One is the tradition in the *Maḡnī* *al-fiqh* (see above, note 8, for this tradition and a Sunnī parallel; and cf. above, note 13, for what seems to be a Sunnī tradition in a Zaydī work). Another instance is found in a tract ascribed to Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (for the ascription, see above, note 15). Here the discussion of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in some ways fits well into the Zaydī Mu'tazilite tradition: the author speaks positively of recourse to the sword, and refers to the use of the tongue as the minimal (*adhā*) form of the duty (*al-'Adl wa'l-ṭamīd*, in 'Umara, *Kaṣṣa* II, 1:130.18, something seems to be missing before *bi-kull*). Then follows a reference to *inhiṭ* ... *bi'l-qul*, combined with determination to act once it becomes possible to do so (*ibid.*, 1:30.20). The only other unusual feature of this discussion is that reference is made to the duty to avoid offenders socially (*ibid.*, 1:30.15, 131.2; it is not presented as performance with the heart). For whatever reason, this theme is not usually included in Zaydī or Mu'tazilite accounts of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* (for what might be a Mu'tazilite exception see below, ch. 12, note 206). For a third instance, see above, ch. 9, note 76. Note, however, that 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ḥusayn (al-Hādī's brother) speaks of the duty as one to be carried out against offending Muslims by hand and tongue, according to one's ability (*Nāṣiḥa*, f. 43b.1) – with no mention of the heart. The idea is likewise absent from the scholia to Ibn Mithāb's *Munṣaḥ*.

<sup>146</sup> Contrary opinions are rare. Ša'arī quotes from the *Imāhī* (sc. of Yaḥyā ibn Ḥanzala) the view that, when action against a wrong requires killing and fighting, this is for the imam to undertake, and not for individual Muslims (*Ṭaḥṭā*, f. 390b.31; cf. above, note 135, also above, ch. 9, note 23). Less sweeping qualifications are also found. Thus one view is that, if what is at issue is a matter of *ṣawā* (e.g. prayer) as opposed to *ṭaḥ* (e.g. repayment of a debt), then under the rubric of *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* (as opposed to *al-nahy 'an al-munkar*) the use of the sword is restricted to the imam (see 'Aṭī, *Šiḥa*, 349f., and particularly the quotation from Najāf, *ibid.*, 350.8). 'Aṭī states that this is a Zaydī position upheld against the Mu'tazilite view. See also above, note 115.

<sup>147</sup> With regard to recourse to arms, this agreement is pointed out by Najāf (see the passage quoted in Strochmann, *Šaṭṭar*, 92 n. 5).

<sup>148</sup> Maḡlūḡ, *Qāsim*, 221. Imām al-Mansūr al-Qāsim ibn Maḥammad (d. 1029/1620) still discusses *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf* in the old scholastic tradition in his *al-Aḥās li-'aḡā'id al-ahyā*, ed. A. N. Nādir, Beirut 1980, 176–8. He takes the unusual view that the prescriptive inefficacy of one's action does not dispense one from the obligation to proceed (*ibid.*, 176.13); this is a view characteristic of Nawawī (d. 676/1277), and could reflect Šāfi'ite influence (see below, ch. 13, 352f.). He also transmits a subtle point I have not seen elsewhere: if, by the time one has reflected on the correct point in the escalatory sequence at which to pitch one's intervention, the wrong will already have been committed, then one should act without reflection (*ibid.*, 177.19). For Qāsim's Mu'tazilism (and formal anti-Mu'tazilism), see Maḡlūḡ, *Qāsim*, 220.

<sup>149</sup> An early representative of this trend is Ibn al-Murād's contemporary Ibn al-Wazīr (d. 840/1436). For example, he attacks such Zaydī *ḥaḍiṭh* collections as there were as worthless (*al-Ramḍ al-ḥaṣīm fi 'l-ḥaḍiṭh 'an sunnat Aḥl 'l-Qāsim*, Cairo n.d., 1:89.20), and asks rhetorically how one can rely on them in preference to the works of the (Sunnī) traditionists (*ibid.*, 91.6). Shawkānī remarks approvingly of him that he writes like Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Taymiyya, and not like his (Zaydī) contemporaries and successors (Baḥr, 2:91.16); he takes his biographical entry on Ibn al-Wazīr as an opportunity for a long statement of his own Sunnising traditionist views (*ibid.*, 83–90). Contrast the dismissive

were increasingly assimilated to those of Sunnī Islam. Most obviously, the notion of performance in the heart became ever more commonplace, followed eventually by the repudiation of rebellion against unjust rule.

Already in the tenth/sixteenth century Bahrān al-Ša'fī (d. 957/1550) composed a work tracing the traditions quoted in Ibn al-Murād's work on comparative law to the classical Sunnī collections.<sup>150</sup> He includes the standard Sunnī 'three modes' tradition, with its reference to performance in the heart as the minimal form of faith<sup>151</sup> – unnecessarily, since characteristically Ibn al-Murād had not adduced it. In the eleventh/seventeenth century, the Sunnising Maḡbalī (d. 1108/1696)<sup>152</sup> remarks that, in treating the subject of forbidding wrong in one of his works, he had adorned his discussion with some seventy Prophetic traditions – most of which can only have been Sunnī.<sup>153</sup> In the twelfth/eighteenth century Ibn al-ʿAmr al-Šanʿānī (d. 1182/1768), a well-known traditionist who at one point had some sympathy for the Wahhābīs,<sup>154</sup> was able to take the idea of performance in the heart for granted. He used it in a philo-Wahhābī pamphlet to refute the idea that a consensus established by silence legitimises the toleration of polytheistic practices among (supposed) Muslims: since the duty could be performed in the heart, it followed that the silence of earlier authorities could not be read as consent.<sup>155</sup> He applied the same argument in refuting the view that such a consensus validated the failure of the Muslims to expel the Jews from the Yemen in accordance with the Prophet's instructions.<sup>156</sup>

attitude to Sunnī *ḥaḍiṭh* of al-Mahdī al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Qāsim (d. 404/1013f.): 'most of the *ḥaḍiṭh* of this community (*umma*) is noxious, hypocritical and frivolous' (cited in Strochmann, 'Die Literatur der Zaiditen', 73).

<sup>150</sup> Bahrān al-Ša'fī (d. 957/1550), *Jamāliyyat al-akḥbār*, printed at the foot of the page in Ibn al-Murād, *Baḥr*.

<sup>151</sup> Ša'fī, *Jamāliyyat*, 5:464.19, mentioning its appearance in Muslim and elsewhere. For this tradition, see above, ch. 3, section 1.

<sup>152</sup> Shawkānī regards Maḡbalī as a man after his own heart: on the one hand an opponent of *ṭaḥ*, and on the other an enemy of the extreme Shi'ism of the Yemeni 'Jarāḥiyya' (*Baḥr*, 1:288.10, 289.5, 291.10).

<sup>153</sup> Maḡbalī (d. 1108/1696), *al-Munāḥ fi 'l-muḥṣir*, Beirut and Šanʿā 1988, 2:563.7. For his use of Sunnī materials, compare his bruising discussion of the traditional inclusion of the Shi'ite *ḥajj* *naḥ* *ḥajj* *fi 'l-muḥṣir* in the Zaydī *adhiḥ* (*ibid.*, 1:145–7). Qāsim al-Mansūr, by contrast, still happily cites the consensus of the family of the Prophet (*ṭiḥā' al-ṭiḥā*) (*Aḥās*, 177.16, 178.15).

<sup>154</sup> See M. Cook, 'On the origins of Wahhābism', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, series 3, 2 (1992), 200f.

<sup>155</sup> Ibn al-ʿAmr al-Šanʿānī (d. 1182/1768), *Taḥṭīr al-ṭiḥāḥ 'an adhiḥ al-ḥaḍiṭh*, ed. M. ʿA. Khāṭib, Cairo 1954, 46–8, esp. 46.17, 47.2 (echoing the three modes tradition). For negative attitudes to the idea of consensus established by silence in *naḥ* *al-fiqh*, see H. Modarressi Tabatabā'i, *Kānūn fi ṭalawāt*, London 1983, 86.

<sup>156</sup> Ibn al-ʿAmr al-Šanʿānī (d. 1182/1768), *Subul al-ṭiḥān*, Beirut 1960–71, 4:62.20 (with reference to the three modes, *ibid.*, 62.25). He observes that his argument is an original one (*ibid.*, 62.29).

The culminating figure in the Sunnisation of Zaydism was Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834).<sup>157</sup> One of his works was a commentary on Ibn al-Murādā's epitome of Zaydī law.<sup>158</sup> When he reached the section on forbidding wrong, he formally laid out the doctrine of the three modes, and stressed the Prophetic authority behind them.<sup>159</sup> Performance in the heart, he noted, is an unobservable mental act.<sup>160</sup> A less formal appeal to the notion occurred in his lifetime during a visit by a Sa'ūdī embassy to San'ā in 1222-3/1807-8. The Sa'ūdī ambassador accused the Yemenis of unbelief because of their failure to confront the imam and his followers with regard to their current misdeeds. The Yemeni historian Jahhāf (d. 1243/1827f.), a pupil of Shawkānī,<sup>161</sup> responded that forbidding wrong is divided into parts, since the Yemenis were unable to perform it with the hand or tongue, they were left only with the third part, viz. performance in their hearts.<sup>162</sup> The assimilation of this notion can be set alongside the adoption by Shawkānī of the characteristic Sunnī traditionalist rejection of rebellion against unjust rulers.<sup>163</sup>

This development did not mean that Shawkānī and those who thought like him took the duty less seriously than their forbears. Shawkānī himself regarded forbidding wrong as a matter of overriding importance for the welfare of the Muslim community at large, and of the people of Yemen in particular.<sup>164</sup> Nor was this just a matter of generalities. He describes a

scholar of whom he approved, 'Abdallāh ibn Luṭf al-Bān al-Kubṣī (d. 1173/1759f.), as a noted performer of the duty,<sup>165</sup> and is pleased to recount an anecdote set in the streets of San'ā in which our scholar separated a lascivious soldier from a woman, ignoring the abuse that was heaped upon him in consequence, but refusing to have recourse to the state.<sup>166</sup> In short, Shawkānī had not joined the Ḥashwīyya. The notion of performance in the heart, for all that it lends itself to quietism, does not preclude an active engagement in forbidding wrong.<sup>167</sup> More significantly, Shawkānī holds that performance with the hand extends where necessary to fighting (*mugātala*), and that someone who thereby gets himself killed is a martyr (*shahīd*).<sup>168</sup> Yet this conception of forbidding wrong is no longer a distinctly Zaydī one.<sup>169</sup>

*al-Dawānī al-ṣūfī*, printed in the same volume, 51f., and cf. 56.2 (on this tract, see 'Amnī, *The Yemen*, 121-3).

<sup>165</sup> Shawkānī, *Baḥr*, 1:393.4, 394.6. Kibāf shared Shawkānī's hostility to *mughāṭ* (*ibid.*, 393.7).

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 393.8. Compare the incident noted above, ch. 4, 70.

<sup>167</sup> In three instances we have seen performance in – or with – the heart mentioned by Mu'tazilite or Zaydī writers who also speak of recourse to arms: in a work ascribed to Qasim ibn Ibrāhīm (see above, note 145), in one likely to have been written by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṣiq (see above, ch. 9, notes 76, 78), and in the Koran commentary of al-Ḥakīm al-Jishūmī (see above, ch. 9, notes 159, 165). Pseudo-Qasim, like Shawkānī, is speaking of a performance confined within the heart; al-Nāṣiq, by contrast, has in mind a performance with the heart which is externally manifested, while Jishūmī's intention is not clear.

<sup>168</sup> Shawkānī, *Sayf*, 4:586.14, 587.3. I have not, however, seen Shawkānī speak of the sword in connection with the duty, except in one purely rhetorical context (Shawkānī, *Raḥf al-rīḥa*, 36.1). This is in marked contrast with traditional Zaydī formulations (see above, notes 15, 25, 115, 145, 147, but cf. the restrictive views cited above, note 146).

<sup>169</sup> It is pity that Shawkānī's traditional Zaydī antagonist, Ibn Ḥarwa (d. 1241/1825), was executed well before his vigorous rebuttal of the *Sayf* reached the topic of forbidding wrong (I owe this information to Bernard Haykel; see his 'Order and righteousness', esp. 231-4). A relatively recent commentator on the *Aslām*, Qādī Ahmad ibn Qasim al-'Ansī (d. 1390/1970) (*al-Taj al-mudhlab li-ṭibḥān al-mudhlab*, San'ā n.d. (preface to this edition dated 1380/1960), 4:468-79 sections 473f.), retains much detail from the old Zaydī commentarial tradition (for the one-mile radius, see *ibid.*, 470.6), and still mentions predestinationism and anthropomorphism as leading heresies (*ibid.*, 475.20 and n. 1); but he cites Sunnī *imād* as authoritative (*ibid.*, 469.10, 477 n. 1), regards only the Koran readings of the Seven as permissible (*ibid.*, 475.17), and speaks of unobservable performance in the heart (*ibid.*, 471.1 and n. 1), modernity makes its appearance with his insistence that the kind of printed pictures we have today do not count as images (*ibid.*, 477 n. 1). I am indebted to Bernard Haykel for drawing this work to my attention and supplying me with a copy of the relevant pages (and see his 'Order and righteousness', 276f.).

<sup>157</sup> For a recent discussion of this key figure, see B. Haykel, 'N-Shawkānī and the jurisprudential unity of Yemen', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 67 (1994). The publication of the author's dissertation will much advance our understanding of Shawkānī and of the wider trend in the history of Yemeni Zaydism which he represents (B. A. Haykel, 'Order and righteousness: Muḥammad 'Alī al-Shawkānī and the nature of the Islamic state in Yemen', Oxford D. Phil. 1997).

<sup>158</sup> On this work, see H. 'A. al-'Amnī, *The Yemen in the 18th & 19th centuries*, London 1985, 152-64 (this study was drawn to my attention by Frank Stewart).

<sup>159</sup> Shawkānī, *Sayf*, 4:586.11; cf. also *ibid.*, 587.4, 587.20, 600.9. Again, compare his negative stance towards the inclusion of *ḥajya* *alā ḥajyāt* 'l-'amal in the *adḥān* (*ibid.*, 1:205.4).

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 4:587.7 (*amr kān fī 'l-qalb lā yajīz fī 'l-ḥarīṭ*). The other noteworthy feature of Shawkānī's commentary is his diatribe against the law-schools (*ibid.*, 388.15), inevitably triggered by Ibn al-Murādā's concession to their differences.

<sup>161</sup> On Jahhāf, see A. F. Sayid, *Maṣāḥir al-ṭibḥ al-ṭaman fī 'l-ḥajr al-islāmī*, Cairo 1974, 289-91 no. 15. Shawkānī states that Jahhāf was his pupil (*Baḥr*, 2:60.21).

<sup>162</sup> Jābir, 'al-ṣīlāt bayn San'ā wa'l-Dīrīyya', 447.

<sup>163</sup> See Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834), *al-Durar al-bahīyya*, in his *al-Dawānī al-mudhīyya*, Cairo 1986, 505.2, together with the torrent of quietist traditions in his own commentary thereto (*ibid.*, 505.8; there is a brief confrontation with the old Zaydī activism, *ibid.*, 506.16). His son's commentary to the *Durar* conveys the same message (Ahmad al-Shawkānī (d. 1281/1864), *al-Sunniyy al-ḥababīyya*, ed. I. B. 'Abd al-Majīd, Beirut 1990, 326.17).

<sup>164</sup> For a general statement of its importance, see Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834), *Raḥf al-rīḥa*, printed with his *Sharḥ al-sūfīyāt bi-ṭibḥān ṭaḥf al-qubūr*, ed. M. H. al-Fiqī, n.p. 1366, 32-7. For similar rhetoric in a pamphlet on the problems of the Yemen, see Shawkānī's