War, conflict and Security.

BOOK TWO

on the fact that the engagement is the only effective means in war—its purely geometrical character, still makes it another lopsided principle that could never govern a real situation .3

ALL THESE ATTEMPTS ARE OBJECTIONABLE It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless.

They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calcula- tions have to be made with variable quantities.

They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.

They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites.

THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS FROM THE RULE Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one- sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules .

Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.

Pity the theory that conflicts with reason! No amount of humility can gloss over this contradiction; indeed , the greater the humility, the sooner it will be driven off the field of real life by ridicule and contempt .

PROBLEMS FACING THEORY WHEN MORAL FACTORS ARE INVOLVED Theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral values. Architects and painters know precisely what they are about as long as they deal with material phenomena . Mechanical and optical structures are not subject to dispute. But when they come to the aesthetics of their work, when they aim at a particular effect on the mind or on the senses, the rules dissolve into nothing but vague ideas.

Medicine is usually concerned only with physical phenomena . It deals with the animal organism, which , however, is subject to constant change, and thus is never exactly the same from one moment to the next. This renders the task of medicine very difficult, and makes the physician's judg- ment count for more than his knowledge. But how greatly is the difficulty

3 The reference is to A . H . Jomini . See P. Paret, “The Genesis of On 'War ," pp . 10-11 above. Eds.

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increased when a mental factor is added , and how much more highly do value the psychiatrist!we

MORAL VALUES CANNOT BE IGNORED IN WAR Military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated.

But moral values can only be perceived by the inner eye, which differs in each person , and is often different in the same person at different times.

Since danger is the common element in which everything moves in war, courage, the sense of one’s own strength , is the principal factor that influ- ences judgment. It is the lens, so to speak, through which impressions pass to the brain.

And yet there can be no doubt that experience will by itself provide a degree of objectivity to these impressions.

Everyone knows the moral effects of an ambush or an attack in flank or rear. Everyone rates the enemy’s bravery lower once his back is turned, and takes much greater risks in pursuit than while being pursued . Everyone gauges his opponent in the light of his reputed talents, his age, and his experience, and acts accordingly. Everyone tries to assess the spirit and temper of his own troops and of the enemy’s. All these and similar effects in the sphere of mind and spirit have been proved by experience: they recur constantly, and are therefore entitled to receive their due as objective factors. What indeed would become of a theory that ignored them?

Of course these truths must be rooted in experience. No theorist, and no commander, should bother himself with psychological and philosophical sophistries.

PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN FORMULATING A THEORY OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR

In order to get a clear idea of the difficulties involved in formulating a theory of the conduct of war and so be able to deduce its character, we must look more closely at the major characteristics of military activity.

FIRST PROPERTY: MORAL FORCES AND EFFECTS HOSTILE FEELINGS

The first of these attributes consists of moral forces and the effects they produce.

Essentially combat is an expression of hostile feelings. But in the large- scale combat that we call war hostile feelings often have become merely hos- tile intentions. At any rate there are usually no hostile feelings between individuals. Yet such emotions can never be completely absent from war.

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Modern wars are seldom fought without hatred between nations; this serves more or less as a substitute for hatred between individuals. Even where there is no national hatred and no animosity to start with, the fighting itself will stir up hostile feelings: violence committed on superior orders will stir up the desire for revenge and retaliation against the perpetrator rather than against the powers that ordered the action. That is only human ( or animal, if you like ) , but it is a fact. Theorists are apt to look on fighting in the abstract as a trial of strength without emotion entering into it. This is one of a thousand errors which they cjuitc consciously commit because they have no idea of the implications.

Apart from emotions stimulated by the nature of combat, there are others that are not so intimately linked with fighting; but because of a certain affinity, they are easily associated with fighting: ambition , love of power, enthusiasms of all kinds, and so forth .

'THE EFFECTS OF DANGER

COURAGE

Combat gives rise to the element of danger in which all military activity must move and be maintained like birds in air and fish in water. The effects of danger, however, produce an emotional reaction, either as a matter of immediate instinct, or consciously. The former results in an effort to avoid the danger, or, where that is not possible, in fear and anxiety. Where these effects do not arise, it is because instinct has been outweighed by courage . But courage is by no means a conscious act; like fear, it is an emotion . Fear is concerned with physical and courage with moral survival. Courage is the nobler instinct, and as such cannot be treated as an inanimate instrument that functions simply as prescribed. So courage is not simply a counterweight to danger, to be used for neutralizing its effects: it is a quality on its own .

EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY DANGER

In order properly to appreciate the influence which danger exerts in war, one should not limit its sphere to the physical hazards of the moment . Danger dominates the commander not merely by threatening him per- sonally, but by threatening all those entrusted to him ; not only at the moment where it is actually present, but also, through the imagination, at all other times when it is relevant; not just directly but also indirectly through the sense of responsibility that lays a tenfold burden on the com - mander’s mind . He could hardly recommend or decide on a major battle without a certain feeling of strain and distress at the thought of the danger and responsibility such a major decision implies. One can make the point that action in war, insofar as it is true action and not mere existence, is never completely free from danger .

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OTHER EMOTIONAL FACTORS

In considering emotions that have been aroused by hostility and danger as being peculiar to war, we do not mean to exclude all others that accompany man throughout his life. There is a place for them in war as well . It may he true that many a petty play of emotions is silenced by the serious duties of war; but that holds only for men in the lower ranks who, rushed from one set of exertions and dangers to the next, lose sight of the other things in life, forego duplicity because death will not respect it, and thus arrive at the soldierly simplicity of character that has always represented the military at its best. In the higher ranks it is different. The higher a man is placed , the broader his point of view. Different interests and a wide variety of passions, good and bad, will arise on all sides. Envy and generosity, pride and humility, wrath and compassion —all may appear as effective forces in this great drama .

INTELLECTUAL QUALITIES

In addition to his emotional qualities, the intellectual qualities of the com - mander are of major importance. One will expect a visionary, high-flown and immature mind to function differently from a cool and powerful one .

THE DIVERSITY OF INTELLECTUAL QUALITY RESULTS IN A DIVERSITY OF ROADS TO THE GOAL

The influence of the great diversity of intellectual qualities is felt chiefly in the higher ranks, and increases as one goes up the ladder. It is the primary cause for the diversity of roads to the goal—already discussed in Book I — and for the disproportionate part assigned to the play of probability and chance in determining the course of events.

SECOND PROPERTY: POSITIVE REACTION

The second attribute of military action is that it must expect positive reac- tions, and the process of interaction that results. Here we are not concerned with the problem of calculating such reactions—that is really part of the already mentioned problem of calculating psychological forces—but rather with the fact that the very nature of interaction is bound to make it unpre- dictable. The effect that any measure will have on the enemy is the most singular factor among all the particulars of action. All theories, however, must stick to categories of phenomena and can never take account of a trulv unique case; this must be left to judgment and talent. Thus it is natural that military activity, whose plans, based on general circumstances, are so frequently disrupted by unexpected particular events; should remain largelv

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OTHER EMOTIONAL FACTORS

In considering emotions that have been aroused by hostility and danger as being peculiar to war, we do not mean to exclude all others that accompany man throughout his life. There is a place for them in war as well. It may be true that many a petty play of emotions is silenced by the serious duties of war; but that holds only for men in the lower ranks who, rushed from one set of exertions and dangers to the next, lose sight of the other things in life, forego duplicity because death will not respect it, and thus arrive at the soldierly simplicity of character that has always represented the military at its best. In the higher ranks it is different. The higher a man is placed , the broader his point of view. Different interests and a wide variety of passions, good and bad , will arise on all sides. Envy and generosity, pride and humility, wrath and compassion—all may appear as effective forces in this great drama .

INTELLECTUAL QUALITIES

In addition to his emotional qualities, the intellectual qualities of the com- mander are of major importance. One will expect a visionary, high -flown and immature mind to function differently from a cool and powerful one .

THE DIVERSITY OF INTELLECTUAL QUALITY RESULTS IN A DIVERSITY OF ROADS TO THE GOAL

The influence of the great diversity of intellectual qualities is felt chiefly in the higher ranks, and increases as one goes up the ladder. It is the primary cause for the diversity of roads to the goal—already discussed in Book 1— and for the disproportionate part assigned to the play of probability and chance in determining the course of events.

SECOND PROPERTY: POSITIVE REACTION

The second attribute of military action is that it must expect positive reac- tions, and the process of interaction that results. Here we are not concerned with the problem of calculating such reactions—that is really part of the already mentioned problem of calculating psychological forces—but rather with the fact that the very nature of interaction is bound to make it unpre- dictable. The effect that anv measure will have on the enemy is the mostJ * singular factor among all the particulars of action. All theories, however, must stick to categories of phenomena and can never take account of a truly unique case; this must be left to judgment and talent. Thus it is natural that military activity, whose plans, based on general circumstances, are so frequently disrupted by unexpected particular events; should remain largely

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a matter of talent, and that theoretical directives tend to be less useful here than in anv other sphere.

THIRD PROPERTY: UNCERTAINTY OF ALL INFORMATION

Finally, the general unreliability of all information presents a special prob- lem in war : all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which , like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.

Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeble light has to be guessed at by talent, or simply left to chance. So once again for lack of objective knowledge one has to trust to talent or to luck .

A POSITIVE DOCTRINE IS UNATTAINABLE

Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. When - ever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice .

ALTERNATIVES WHICH MAKE A THEORY POSSIBLE

THE DIFFICULTIES VARY IN MAGNITUDE

There are two ways out of this dilemma . In the first place, our comments on the nature of military activity in

general should not be taken as applying equally to action at all levels. What is most needed in the lower ranks is courage and self -sacrifice, but there are far fewer problems to be solved by intelligence and judgment. The field of action is more limited , means and ends are fewer in number, and the data more concrete: usually they are limited to what is actually visible. But the higher the rank, the more the problems multiply, reaching their highest point in the supreme commander. At this level, almost all solutions must be left to imaginative intellect.

Even if we break down war into its various activities, we will find that the difficulties are not uniform throughout. The more physical the activity, the less the difficulties will be. The more the activity becomes intellectual and turns into motives which exercise a determining influence on the command - er’s will, the more the difficulties will increase. Thus it is easier to use theory to organize, plan, and conduct an engagement than it is to use it in deter- mining the engagement’s purpose. Combat is conducted with physical weap- ons, and although the intellect does play a part , material factors will domi-

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nate. But when one conies to the e f f e c t of the engagement, where material successes turn into motives for further action, the intellect alone is decisive. In brief, tactics will present far fewer difficulties to the theorist than will strategy.

THEORY SHOULD BE STUDY, NOT DOCTRINE The second way out of this difficulty is to argue that a theory need not be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action . Whenever an activity deals primarily with the same things again and again—with the same ends and the same means, even though there may be minor variations and an infinite diversity of combinations—these things are susceptible of rational study. It is precisely that inquiry which is the most essential part of any theoryy and which may quite appropriately claim that title. It is an analytical investiga- tion leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience— in our case, to military history—it leads to thorough familiarity with it . The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent. It will, in fact, become an active ingredient of talent. Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to any- one who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.

A specialist who has spent half his life trying to master every aspect of some obscure subject is surely more likely to make headway than a man who is trying to master it in a short time. Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self - education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is care- ful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.

If the theorist’s studies automatically result in principles and rules, and if truth spontaneously crystallizes into these forms, theory will not resist this natural tendency of the mind. On the contrary, where the arch of truth culminates in such a keystone, this tendency will be underlined . But this is simply in accordance with the scientific law of reason, to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield. Even these principles and rules are intended to pro- vide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take.

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A l S O O f l 7 4 5 b T 7

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ,v

ON WAR V

Edited, and Translated by

MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET

Introductory Essays by PETER PARET, MICHAEL HOWARD, and BERNARD BRODIE;

with a Commentary by BERNARD BRODIE

Index by ROSALIE WEST

I 1 • j

P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

P R I N C E T O N , N E W J E R S E Y

C O N T E N T S t

BOOK TWO On the Theory of War

Classifications of the Art of War

On the Theory of War

Art of War or Science of War

Method and Routine

Critical Analysis On Historical Examples

1 2 7i x 3 32

1483 1314 1565

6 1 7O

BOOK THREE

On Strategy in General Strategy Elements of Strategy Moral Factors

The Principal Moral Elements Military Virtues of the Armv

Boldness

Perseverance

Superiority of Numbers Surprise Cunning Concentration of Forces in Space Unification of Forces in Time The Strategic Reserve Economy of Force The Geometrical Factor

The Suspension of Action in War The Character of Contemporary Warfare Tension and Rest

1771

1 8 32 1843 1 8 64 1873

6 1 9 0

* 937 8 * 9 4

1 9 89 2 0 21 0

2 0 411

20512

210x 3 2 1 3x 4

1 3 2 1 4 2 1 616

l l 2 2 0 1 8 2 2 1

vi