2 page essay book review

THE NEOLIBERAL CITY

Govenzance, Ideology, and Development in Ame1'ican UrbaniS77z

JASON HACKWORTH

Camel! University Press Ithaca and London

Chapter I

Tbe Place, Tinze, and Process of Neoliberal Urbanisnz

During his largely symbolic quest for the 2004 Democratic Party pres- idential nomination, Dennis Kucinich became an iconoclast for the eco- nomic justice Left in the United States. After entering the race, he immediately separated himself from the rest of the candidates by calling for the abolition of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the unilateral withdrawal of troops in Iraq, and the creation of universal health care. Soon he became featured in .Motber Joues and Tbe Nntiou and began appearing at ftmdraising outings in Hollywood that were remarkably suc- cessful-at least compared to other candidates with his politics. One of the central narratives he used to promote his candidacy was an experience that he had as the youngest mayor in the history of Cleveland, Ohio, nearly thirty years earlier. Already !mown for his confrontational style after a few months in office, Kucinich faced a financial crisis that threatened to bank- rupt the city. Banks were willing to continue extending credit to the belea- guered city on the important condition that Kucinich privatize the city's electricity provider, Muni Light. \Vhen he refused to agree to this condi- tion, the banks cut off the city's credit, and Kucinich was ignominiously re- called, ironically for doing what he was elected to do in the first place. Largely because of this episode, many considered Cleveland the classic prototype of municipal mismanagement in the United States. The city's in- dustrial base was eroding, its coffers empty, and, for a brief while, its river ablaze. Kucinich took the fall for most of it. The local press deemed him a

2 The Neoliberal City

"vain, yappy, little demagogue," ~nd a panel of historians later rated him the seventh worst mayor in the lustory of the country (Bowden 2003).

Considering such bad publicity, it is initially difficult to understand why someone running for political office would advertise his involvement in the af£,ir. Mter all, his political career was side lined for nearly a decade because of it, and Cleveland still lives \\~th the stigma of being a mismanaged city. But, as Kucinich points out in the denouement of his vignette, the city's power supply is still publicly owned, and service is more widely available than would be the case had he acquiesced. He had won a small battle against tl1e recldess rollback of public subsidies but was simply underappreciated for it at the time. Yet while vindicated enough to use tl1e e>:perience to gar- ner votes now, it is uulikely tl1at he (or anyone in his situation) would be treated any differently if the same situation were to occur today. The no" tion that city officials should do everything in their power to placate cor- porate financial interests that threaten to leave or penalize the locality has become so unquestioned tl1at it is considered common sense by public ad- Ininisttators and the popular press. Though the collectivization of public resources was once held sacrosanct in American cities, l(ucinich was judged a fool by critics for trying to apply such principles in such an ostensibly dif- ferent era.

IVhat changed to make the privatization of erstwhile public resources so axiomatic? Was it something structural or a sinlple matter of populist back- lash? Is it long-lasting or more ephemeral? This book attempts to answer some of these questions by e:qJ!oring tl1e physical, political, and economic changes experienced by large American cities in the past thirty years. The book is titled Tbe Neoliberal City because it is my contention tl1at much of tl1e shift reflected in the vignette above can be traced to the utterly aston- ishingrise and reproduction of"neoliberalism" as an ideology, mode of city governance, and driver of urban change. As Anderson points out, the scope, power and extent ofwhatwas as recently as the 1960s considered little more tl1an the workings of a "lunatic right fringe" (Girvetz 1963) is nothing short of remarkable:

For tl1e first time since the Reformation there are no longer any sig- nificant oppositions-tl1at is, systematic rival outlooks-within the tlwught-world of the West; and scarcely any on a world scale either, if we discount religious doctrines as largely inoperative archaisms, as the experiences of Poland or Iran indicate we may. vVhatever limita- tions persist to its practice, neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided across the globe: the most successful ideology in world his-

The Place, Time, and Process of Neoliberal Urbanism

wry . ... VIrtually the entire horizon of reference in which tl1e gen- eration of tile sixties grew up has been mped away-tile landmarks of reformist and revolutionary socialism in equal measure. (2000,

p. 17)

3

But just what is neoliberalism and what does it have to do with American cities? This chapter attempts to address tl1is question in order to better sit- uate tl1e exploration of examples of "actually existing" neoliberalism in American cities. 1

The Time and Place ofNeoliberalism

Genealogy of an idea

The language of neoliheralism is quite common mtl1in contemporary so- cial tl1eory, but because so little time is spent defining tl1e term and associ- ated tenus, tl1e meaning of me ideas tends to be unmoored and somewhat variable. This section attempts to clarify tl1e way that liberalism and ne- oliberalism have recently been conceptualized by briefly revisiting tl1e evo- lution of botl1 ideas. Understanding the evolution of the wider liberal tradition (see Girvetz 1963) is the first step toward a workable definition of late twentieth-century ueoliberalism and its policy framework, the "New gr.,Iitical Fcononw" (Chang 1 997; M•ier 1 9<Q). Though the ideas under- lying liberalism as~general concept are evident in Greek, Roman, and re- fonnist Christian writings, tl1e most commouly cited root to the project is the classical liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Classi- calliberals varied in their politics, method, and purpose (see Gray 1989) but were relatively unified on several counts. First, there was an intense fo- cus on me individual within liberal political thought. Following Hume, Pa- ley, Bentham, andJames Mill in particular, classical liberalism asserted that the highest virtue of a society is me degree to which its individuals are allowed to pursue pleasure. Individuals themselves are seen as the most qualified at understanding tl1eir needs and wants, so society should be structured around lowering barriers to tl1e individual realization of tlus pleasure. Classical liberals varied on whetl1er the right to pursue pleasure was "natural" (I-Iume) or part of a "social contract" (Locke), but virtually every classjcalliberal tl1inker believed that individual autonomy should be .

) 1. Tl!__~phra~e "'actuallye..Usting neoliberalism" is borrowed from Brenner and Theodore (2002)

-uncrCxplaincd later in the chapter.

4 The Neoliberal City

venerated above all else. The second major tenet of classical liberalism, fol- lowing largely fromAdam Smith (and the classical school of economics that he inspired), is that an unfettered market is the most efficient and effective means for encouraging individual autonomy and assuring that the simulta- neous pursuit of individual pleasure did not devolve into anarchy. iVIthin this frame, society is best served when individuals are able to pursue their needs and wants through the mechanism of price; producers, moreover, are servants of consumers, who demand certain goods from these producers based on their w:mts. The third majortenet of classical liberalism is a non- interventionist state. Classical liberals-in particular Smith, Bentham, and Acton-argued that the most effective way to achieve the aforementioned society of pleasure-seeking, market-oriented individuals is for the nation- state to be miuimalist or "laissez-faire." According to classical liberals, the state should focus only on the pursuit of safety, competitive (unfettered and nonmonopolistic) markets, and a constitution guaranteeing individual rights, particularly the right to retain property (Sally 1998).

Though never fully implemented in any society, the ideas of liberalism took one of their strongest institutional forms in the founding documents of rl1e United States-the Federalist Papers, the Constitution, and the Declaration oflndependence in particular. Though all of these documents were the result of complicated political leanings at least a century old at the time, they institutionalized what Isaiah Berlin would much later char- acterize as "negative liberty" (1969). "Negative liberty" is freedom from state interference in one's daily life and is contrasted \vith "positive lib- erty," which is simply a vision for how the current power structure should be replaced. The formal separation of powers, the electoral college, and the separation of church and state, for example, were all designed to "pro- tect" people from imposing a deleterious form of "positive liberty" upon themselves. "Negative liberty," in essence, was seen as the highest form of liberalism, and rl1e founding documents of American statehood, superfi- cially at least, defended its virtues. Actually existing negative liberty, how- ever, was far more elusive than its initial institutional form in the United States. Early liberal idealism in the United States was also counterbal- anced by strong residual feudalisms: legalized slavery, highly selective suf- frage, debtor's prisons, and genocide of native peoples, to name but a few examples.

Obvious on-the-ground contradictions like these (and the various social movements that they inspired) were part of the reason that prominent fis- sures within the classical liberal project began to emerge by the late nine- teenth century. Social movements critical of liberalism were paralleled by

The Place, Time, and Process of Neol'lberal Urbanism 5

like-minded intellectual movements. Though much of the academy fa- vored classical liberalism, not all mid-nineteenth century scholars-par- ticularly socialists-were convinced of the liberal idea that capitalism was intrinsically neutral. The middle part of the nineteenth century saw the rise of the first progressive corn1terresponse to classical liberalism, its most fa- mous advocates being Marx and En gels. To Marx in particular, classical lib- eralism represented little more than an elaborate justification for capitalist exploitation. He was critical of the seamless apology for capitalism that lib- erals like Bentham had constructed. In one memorable passage from Cap- ital, Marx mockingly paraphrases the simplistic appeal of liberal thought:

This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Benrl1am. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a com- modity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own free \vill. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common ,vi]!. Equality, because each enters into relation \vith the other, as \vith a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just be- cause they do so, do they all, in accordance \vith the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspice of an all-shrewd providence, work together to rl1eir mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all. (1996, p. 172)

Marx goes on, of course, to argue that the capitalist economic system pro- duces a series of institutions that actually perpetuate (rather than over- come) social inequality. Far !Tom being a system that could, if left alone, produce the greatest good for the greatest number, capitalism, Marx ar- gued, was a system premised on exploitiog some for the benefit of others.

It is difficult to assess the influence of Marx and Engels on late nine- teenth-century American political thought, but at a minimum their appeals in the widely distributed Cmllu!lmiJtlvlanifesto (1848) and periodic columns in the New Yrn·k Dai6' 11·ibzme inspired a consciousness that had been lack- ing in America's urban worltiog class until that point. This consciousness

6 The Neoliberal City

was enhanced by deplorable working-class living conditions in many cities and the origin countries of new immigrants, many of which were more hos- pitable to "anti-liberal" political thought. Sympathy for such ideas con- gealed into radicallabor movements in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Milwaukee first, then spread to smaller, less militant cities by the end of the century. Workers demanded better conditions (at home and at work) and increasingly came to reject the ideology oflaissez-faire.

Other scholars less skeptical than Marx were no less insistent that the ideals of classical liberalism could not be enjoyed by a significant number without some redress of economic conditions. Following John Stuart Mill in particular, an increasingly egalitarian strand ofliberalism began to argue that the tenets of classical liberalism were neither being attained nor even attainable \vithout a strong secular state that redistributed wealth among the populace. Mill's calls for a strong estate tax and compulsory education are among the suggestions for intervention that this variant of liberalism began to inspire. Partially in response to the negative material outcomes of classical liberalism, an egalitarian liberal movement emerged (Kekes 1997).

Egalitarian liberalism is a loose assemblage of ideas with fewer foun- dational thiulcers than classical liberalism, but the work of Jolm Stuart Mill, Keynes, and much later Rawls (1971; 1993), Dworkin (1985), and Nagel (1978) became inspirational works for this line of reasoning. Egali- tarian liberalism took root most firmly in places where anti-socialism was strongest-the United States being the most acute example (N. Smith 2002)-and became increasingly mdespread after Keynes (1936; see also 1926), and the American New Deal demonstrated that such an approach could actually promote (rather than impede) economic growth.1 Egalitar- ian liberalism combined several basic tenets of classical liberalism-partic- ularly the focus on the individual and the elegance of the market-with a redistributive nation-state d1at would more aggressively intervene to pro- vide some of the basic economic conditions necessary for experiencing the putative political freedoms of classical liberalism (Girvetz 1963). As Kekes explains,

The core of egalitarian liberalism continues to be autonomy. The au- tonomous life, however, is seen as requiring bod1 freedom and wel- fare rights. It requires that individuals should be guaranteed certain

2. Outside ofNorth America, such political thought more often than not congealed into "dem- ocratic socialism," which shares many ideas with egalitarian liberalism but is nonetheless a dif- ferent project.

The Place, Time, and Process of Neoliberal Urbanism

basic goods dmt are needed for living according to any conception of a good life. The role of government, therefore, is to protect not merely freedom rights but also welfare rights. (1997, p. 13)

7

Justifiable interventions included but were not limited to public housing, corporate antitrust laws, food stamps, and basic income redistribution. 1\ventieth-century classical liberals generally loathed this turn in liberal d1ought and rejected it (see I-Iayek 1944; 1960; Friedman 1962). Hayek in particular argued d1at egalitarian liberalism was not liberal at all, and he worked both to discredit it and distance himself from it. Incidentally, he was just as keen to distance hirnself from the American conservative move- ment. Though neoconservatism and neoliberalism are now part of a com- plicated political amalgam in d1e Uuited States, Hayek argued d1at true liberals did not share d1e conservative desire for d1e status quo, much less its ideas of racial and gender exclusivity. Both Friedman and Hayek argued that liberalism was progressive and transformative in nature and that d1e practices of egalitarian liberals (welfare, regulation, and so on) would even- tually lead to the erosion of personal freedom. Their belief, however, was relatively marginal until the 1970s, as the basic ideas of egalitarian liberal- ism (particularly Keynesianism) inspired (and were in turn inspired by) a massive shift in governance during the mid-twentieth century toward a stronger, openly regulatory nation-state.

Interventions were justified on several counts. First, a foundational gov- ernance principle of Keynesianism, among other ideologies, is dmt mar- kets are far from perfecdy self-regulating; rad1er, they can .self-destruct ,vithout targeted intervention by various levels of govermnent. The cen- tral principle upon which this form of governance rests is the maintenance of effective demand. By providing some forms of income redistribution, government was able to assist growd1 in the collective ability to consume more commodities. It was felt, furthermore, that such government expen- ditures would not be a net weight on the economy because of the "multi- plier effect." The multiplier effect suggests that if the conditions for circulation are protected and the populace saves some portion of its in- come, government expenditures can generate economic value greater than the original investment. Though the idea actually preceded Keynes (see Canterbery 1995), the multiplier effect transformed the way that govern- ment e.xpenditures under capitalism were viewed.

But Keynesian policy intervention was not limited to a demand-side cover for capitalism. There were also a set of theoretical market failures that justified regulatory and redistributory interventions. Four such theo-

8 The Neoliberal City

rized failures emerged as justifications for intervention. First, markets would fail when there was "imperfect competition"-industries, if left alone, would actually tend toward a limited number of firms, a pure mo- nopoly being the most extreme case. Without adequate competition, out- put would be lower and prices higher than under "perfect competition." The most tangible institutional manifestation of this idea is the anti- monopoly wave of regulations that emerged to varying extents in North America and Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, some goods were considered "public" or "social" to the extent that they are collectively consumed and very difficult to price on an individual basis. The most commonly used example of this type of good is nanonal defense, but infrastructure and transportation networks have been financed using a similar justification. Third, the presence of"externalities" (primarily negative) could induce a form of market failure that would ne- cessitate government intervention. Many firms do not factor the full (ex- ternal) cost of production into their price, so it was acceptable for governments to intervene through taxation and regulation to make sure that the firms that generate such externalities have to pay at least a portion of their costs, whether directly or indirectly. The pollution generated in the pr?duction of an automobile, for example, is not directly factored into its pnce even though it is a tangible cost tl1at often gets transferred to a city, state, or province. Finally, mainstream economists considered "imperfect in formation" a source of market failure, because ideal markets cannot work pr~perly 'vithout full or near full information on product prices, charac- tenst:lcs, and so on.

Though most Keynesian economists never intended for non-market forms of failure to serve as justifications for intervention, one could also add. a fifth type of failure to this typology, because of its importance for jus- t:J.fying government expenditures in cities. Specifically, some state inter- vent:J.on was justified because markets tended not to protect minimum soCially acceptable standards for important commodities like housing and workplace conditions. Many economists never considered such failures to be the responsibility of the market, but the transparent inability of stand- alon~ markets to generate housing, health care, safe working conditions, ~nd mfr~structure served as a powerful social justification 'vi thin tl1e egal- Itanan liberal frame. Collectively, d1e egalitarian liberal architecture of governance justified and led to a very different set of government inter- vent:J.ons than are acceptable today. At the municipal level, tl1ese ideas helped to justifY regulations like Euclidean zoning, property taxes, and brnldmg codes, not to mention (federally funded, locally managed) redis-

The Place, Time, and Process of Neoliberal Urbanism 9

tributions such as ·public housing, unemployment insurance, and food stamps. These were justifiable in part because they fit within the ideologi- cal bounds ofKeynesian managerialism in particular and egalitarian liber- alism in general (see Harvey 1989b).

The federal government, newly educated to the ways of such interven- tion, also did tl1eir part in tllis agreement by facilitating and protecting tl1e conditions for urban growtl1. A "spatial fix" to tl1e Great Depression emerged in which tl1e federal government targeted massive outlays for de- fense, freeway construction, and suburban real estate (I-Iarvey 1989a). The synergy was very powerful. The defense industry produced jobs; tl1e free- way system allowed for suburban living; suburban living required automo- bile usage. In tl1e process, real estate capital was revived via a transfer to the urban fringe, but tl1e inner city was left to disinvest for several decades in the nlid-twentieth century (see N. Smitl1 1990). It would not be until the early 1970s that tl1is bundle of political and economic forces would begin to unravel.

Neoliberalism increasingly came to be seen as a salve for tl1e economic crisis tl1at had emerged ,vith this umaveling. Neoliberalism, simply de- fined, is an ideological rejection of egalitarian liberalism in general and the Keynesian welfare state in particular, combined ,vith a selective return to the ideas of classical liberalism, most strongly articulated by Hayek (1944; 1960) and Friedman (1984; 1962). Both Hayek and Friedman argued tlmt government should be used only sparingly and in very specific circum- stances, ratl1er tl1an interfering 'vitllin the marketplace. They revived clas- sical notions of liberalism (particularly from Smitl1, Bentham, and James Mill) by arguing that the greatest good would be encouraged by using gov- ernment only as a protector of free exchange. Hayek and Friedman were deeply troubled by the results of government intervention in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy, and argued tl1at such atrocities could happen anywhere if personal political freedoms were not protected above all else. Hayek's firsthand experience as an Austrian exile gave his work an unusual passion, but his ideas would not be ,videly accepted by governments until the very end of his life (he died in 1992).

By the 1990s, neoliberalism had become naturalized as the proper mode of governance for a variety of geo-institutional contexts. In the United States, neoliberalism became tenuously connected to an equally pervasive form of social consenratism.lt would be a mistake, however, to group neo- conservatism and neoliberalism into one monolithic whole. As Hayek (1961) argued, the two projects have different roots and distinguishable characteristics. Neoliberalism is rooted in the aforementioned trilogy of

10 The Neoliberal City

the individua1, d1e market, and the noninterventionist state. Neoconser- vatism, by contrast, is fundamentally rooted in an effort to resurrect a past set of social conditions. Though the two can often seem indistinguishable in American politics, it is important to point out that their union is neither naturally compatible nor consistently replicated elsewhere in tl1e world.3

In eitl1er case, neoliberalism achieved hegemonic status tlrrough anum- ber of important channels, including the Thatcher and Reagan adminis- trations of tl1e 1980s, both of which openly sought to roll back many elements of tl1e Keynesian state, such as public housing, income supple- ments, and medical subsidies. "Libertarian" think tanks such as the Cato Institute also served to promote and reproduce neoliberalism, as did large global institutions like the International Monetary Frmd, the World Ban!;:, and bond rating agencies (see Gill 1995; Sassen 1996; Hackworth 2002a). The boundaries of urban governance have shifted dramatically in tl1e past thirty years, partially because of structural constraints to governments (mu- nicipal or otl1erwise) in the capitalist world (see Harvey 1989b) but also be- cause of a related ideological shift toward neoliberal governing practices (Goonewardena 2003). As Meier (1993) and Chang (1997), among otl1ers, point out, the ideology of market failures has given way to a generalized set of government failures. According to this logic, whatever failures typical of markets are eclipsed by tl1e inefficiency, inequity, and corruption of gov- ernments tl1at try to regulate outside of a market mechanism. Moreover, generalized redistribution is now seen as an impediment to international competitiveness Qessop 2002), labor "flexibility" is seen as crucial for a working economy (Peck 2001a; Moody 1997), and monetarism is seen as the only proper macroeconomic intervention for the nation-state (Canter- bery 1995). Government failures are the central justification for tl1e roll- back of intervention, while tl1e notion of market failures has virtually disappeared from the policy (urban or otherwise) dialogue (Chang 1997). "Good" governance at the municipal level is now largely defined by the ability of formal government to assist (I-Iarvey 1989b; Leitner 1990), col- laborate with (EIIcin 1987; Stone 1989), or function like (Box 1999) the cor- porate community. Extant regnlatory powers such as land-use zoning have

3. The recent rift in the U.S. Repuhlic:m Party over federal intervention in the case of Terry Schiavo-a brain-dead Florida woman whose husband had decided to remove her from life sup- port after 10 years-partially revealed the namral inrumputibility of these two political projects. Many neoliberals (deeming themselves "process conservatives") were publicly disturbed by such a use of state intervention, while most neoconservatives were ag~:,rressively supportive of the action.

The Place, Time, and Process of Neoliberal Urbanism 11

been weakened, as ·have redistributive impulses in tl1e area of social services and housing. Neoliberalism has become naturalized as the "only" choice available to cities in the United States and elsewhere.

Locating Neoliberalism

It would be easy to end with this relatively linear, aspatial genealogy of ne- oliberalism. It might also be possible to end by suggesting that cities, as complex manifestations of a wider politico-econmnic sphere, have some- how organically absorbed tllis turn in ideology. But as an increasingly large number of geographers and social scientists have argued, tllis wonld be mis- take. Neoliberalism, like many other "-isms," is a highly contingent pro- cess tl1at manifests itself, and is e:qJerienced differently, across space. The geography of neoliberalism is much more complicated than the idea of ne- oliberalism. There are several dimensions to this point.

First, neoliberalism is not a tl1ing as much as a process-one tl1at occurs alongside and in combination \vitl1 many other processes tl1at affect ur- banization (see Jessop 2002). Some of tl1ese parallel processes are compli- mentary or supportive (like neocorporatism), while others are blatant contestations of neoliberalism (like neo-communitarianism). A segment of critical scholarship on neoliberalism is particularly concerned with rmder- standing the "actually existing" nature of the ideology-tlmt is, less the in- tellectual lineage of liberal thought than the way that such ideas permeate, and are experienced at various geographical scales. One particularly useful concept in this literature is the notion that actually existing neoliberalism is a more highly contingent process than the pure end-state it is often framed to be within neoliberal ideology (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell2002; Tickell and Peck 1995; Mitchell 2001; Lamer 2003, 2000). Brenner and Theodore (2002) have described this process as a di- alectical one, composed of the conflicting tendencies toward destruction and creation. Neoliberal destruction consists of the removal ofKeynesian artifacts (public housing, public space), policies (redistributive welfare, food stamps), institutions (labor rmions, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development), and agreements (Fordist labor arrangements, fed- eral government redistribution to states and cities), while neoliberal cre- ation consists of the establishment of new, or coaptation of extant, institutions and practices to reproduce neoliberalism in tl1e future (gov- ernment-business consortia, workfare policies). Peck and Tickell (2002)

12 The Neoliberal City

have depicted this evolution in a slightly more linear way, arguing tl1at ne- oliberalism consists of an initial "roll-back" phase, which is followed by a "roll-out" phase. In this process, Keynesian policies and artifacts are de- stroyed to make way for a roll-out of more proactively neoliberal practices ~nd ideas. Gl~bally, some have suggested tl1at tl1e restructuring ofKeynes- Ian urban pohcy has had ilie aggregate effect of "hollowing out" ilie na- tion-state-decreasing its role as an institutional buffer between localities and tl1e machinations of ilie global economy Qessop 2002). Because of ti1e reduction of national interventions in housing, local infrastructure, wel- fare, and ilie like, localities are forced eitl1er to finance such areas t11em- selves or to abandon them entirely. Swyngedouw (1997) has deemed tlus larger process "glocalization," as it involves a simultaneous upward (to the global economy and its institutions) and downward (to the locality and its governance structures) propulsion of regulatory power previously held or exercised by ilie nation-state.

_Given its geographically and temporally contingent nature, however, tlus pro_ cess has affected different national contexts in different ways. The aggressive rollback of ilie welfare state in ilie United States, for example, preceded that in Canada, and in boili cmmtries one can think of examples where tl1e rollback has been incomplete for some sectors and more com- plete for oiliers. The roll back/destruction ofKeynesian interventions and ilie r~ll-out/ creation of more proactively neoliberal policies are tlms highly contmgent, mcremental, uneven, and largely incomplete. The resultant policy landscape is highly segmented-geographically and socially-and almost randomly strewn wiili concentrations of Keynesian artifacts (such ~s p~blic housing) alongside roll-out neoliberal policies (such as workfare) m different places and in different stages of creation or destruction. Thus while it is useful to suggest tl1at policy ideas in North America and Europ~ are mcreasmgly dommated by a unified, relatively simple set of ideas (ne- oliberalism): it is just as clear iliat tl1e institutional manifestation (mainly tl1rough pohcy) of iliese ideas is highly uneven across and >vitl1in countries.

Given all of tl1is geographical specificity, it is reasonable to ask why ilie inn_er city-particularly ilieAmedcnn inner city-is a useful space tl1rough wh1ch to evaluate tl1e process of neoliberalism. After all, much ofthe liter- ~ture on neoli~eralism is neither particularly urban nor particularly Amer- Ican-onented m nature. Much of the work iliat uses this concept looks at ilie impacts of neoliberalism on developing countries, particularly iliose \viili a large agricultural sector tl1at has been absorbed by ilie capitalist economy. Furtl1ennore, tl1e meaning of liberalism is complicated in the

The Place, Time, and Process of Neoliberal Urbanism 13

context, wh.ere the egalitarian variant of liberalism became asso- llu•en<:an_t]1 the putative left wing of ilie U.S. polity, while tl1e right wing·

he-canle,:ssociated with tl1e ideals of classical liberalism. The United States ver the most thoroughly liberalized environment in tl1e devel-

moreold Wl, 1at tl1en would be novel or useful about identifying tl1e in-war . :flu.en<:e of neoliberalism in already-liberalized spaces?

'· ·· This book takes tl1e position tl1at precisely because tl1e United States is

I tlloroughly liberalized environment, tl1e identification of changes sue 1 a . . ·tiun tlus context could very likely be harbmgers of changes globally. That

:Vl wlule t]1e transition to neoliberalism in agriculture-oriented developing ~~untries is easier to identify, documenting tl1e influence of neoliberalism on American cities likely portends similar changes in oilier parts of ilie world. Furthennore, tl1e inner city-seen widely as a vestige of ilie Keynes- ian national welfare state Qessop 2002)-is an area of extreme transition. It has served as tl1e focus oflugh-profile real estate investment, neoliberal

olicy experiments, and governance changes; Marcuse and van Kempen P dtl . . " ft ,. I . I . f (2000) have deeme 1e tnner ctty a so spot wr t 1e tmp ementatton o neoliberal ideals. The intent of this book is to use tl1e physical, political, and discursive space of tl1e American inner city as a vehicle for under- standing tl1e nature of neoliberalism as it actually exists.

Organization of the Book

The variability of actually existing neoliberal urbanism is impressive, in progress, and not very linear. However, we can begin ilie journey of un- derstanding botl1 tl1e nature of contemporary urbanism and ilie nature of contemporary neoliberalism by examining tl1e various empirical fragments tl1at exist today. This book is divided into tl1ree sections to shed light on the larger issue at hand. Part 1 (chapters 2 tlrrough 4) deals ex-plicitly \viili tl1e neoliberalization of local governance. It address why cities "choose" a neoliberal path and some of tl1e material consequences for doing so. Part 2 (chapters 5 through 8) deals \viili ilie landscape changes associated wiili tl1e neoliberal city. It seeks to document ilie impact of massive changes in real estate investment during tl1e past thirty years-much of which is at- tributable to changes in ilie local state. It does so by focusing on changes occurring at four different levels: metropolitan areas, individual cities, neighborhoods, and single-site mega-projects. Examining changes at each scale helps to shed light on how the ideological changes of neoliberalism

14 The Neoliberal City

manifest themselves as material landscape changes. Part 3 (chapters 9 and 10) deals with the various efforts afoot to replace neoliberalism-either in a discursive or n1aterial sense. The consequences of neoliberalism have been fairly negative for the urban poor in the United States, and there are various projects attempting to either carve out an entirely new policy space or to dramatically reform the current one. The book ends with a consider- ation of such efforts.

PART 1

GOVERNING THE NEOLIBERAL CITY

Competition between local authorities or between larger entities within an area where there is freedom of movement provides in a large measure that oppommity for e.xpcriment-ation with alternative methods which will secure most of the advan- tages of free f:,'TOWth. Though the majority of residents may never contemplate a

clumgc of residence, there will usually be enough people, especially among the young and more enterprising, to make it necessary for the local authorities to pro- vide as good services at as reasonable costs as their competitors.

F. Hayek in Omstitutirm of Lilm1J• (1960, p. 263 -64)

It has taken several decades since Hayek penned his famous paean to ne- oliberalism to become evident, but his dream of decenttalized and entre- preneurial urban governance reads as though it were a contemporary guide to "best practices" in American local government. The relatively regula- tory Keynesian local state of the mid-twentieth century has been sup- planted by a neoliberal version that seems itself to be regulated by local capital. The 1990s were a particularly important phase in the transition to- ward neoliberal urban governance.' As Robert Lake recently remarked, "in the turbulent politics of the 1990s, the major parties agree on perhaps only one thing: tl1at tl1e era of'big government' [is] over" (1997, p. 3). Local au- thorities-cities, states, provinces, special districts-now have more re-

l. Arguably the iconic document of this transition was the Republican-led Coutrttct 1vitb Amrr- im that was drafted before, and enacted after, the Republicans were elected to majority status in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives in 1994. In clmt document, cl1e Republicans promised to leg- islate according to five key principles: individual liberty, economic opportunity, limited govern- ment, personal responsibility, and national security (Gillespie and Schellhas 1994, p. 4). The specific policy agenda entailed a massive rollbackof mid-twentiecll century social probrrams and a return of"powcr" to localities.