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�1 POLITICS

THIS CHAPTER …

discusses what politics is and the ways in which scholars have attempted to understand it. The first serious professional teachers (Greeks such as Plato (427–347 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC)) made politics the centre of the curriculum. In the twenty-first century, academics are still seeking to explain politics ‘scientifically’. This chapter discusses the meaning, importance and problems of such an enterprise. Much of our understanding of politics is what we may refer to as

formal politics, such as debates, meetings and elections, which are indeed part of politics. However, this chapter, in seeking to provide a clearer understanding of what is politics, addresses both its formal and informal components. The concept, and practical application, of politics also includes a host of constraints and opportunities which shape our everyday lives, even if we are not overtly aware of them. Politics is ubiquitous. By the end of the chapter students will be able to:

� understand why politics is important at both a systemic and individual level;

� assess the meaning of politics;

� identify how politics can be studied; � evaluate the different approaches to the study of politics.

DOES POLITICS MATTER?

This book, and the vast majority of political science literature, is based on the assumption that politics does matter, but not everyone automatically agrees. Weldon (1953) notes that while for some politics is a ‘hurrah’ word, for others it is a ‘boo’ word. This implies that politics can be interpreted essentially as a dirty expression. More recently, Tansey (2010) has noted that while the orthodox view is that politics is either a desirable or neutral activity, this is not true for all. We can suggest that any hostility towards politics can be referred to as an undercurrent of anti-politics, and Tansey cites the first poem by Carol Ann Duffy as British Poet Laureate, Politics (2009), as an example of this. Expressions of anti-politics feeling such as Duffy’s can possibly be explained by the context of extensive media coverage given to scandals involving UK politicians. An alternative view to anti-politics is what can be termed

de-politicisation. This is not so much an antagonistic view of politics as an observation of where politics does not, or an author feels should not, exist. For some this is an unintended outcome of aid to the developing world. Thus Ferguson (1990: xv) suggested that the impact of development aid to Lesotho was ‘everywhere whisking political realities out of sight’, with issues discussed in purely tech- nical rather than political or policy terms. Issues that Ferguson believed should have been based on overt political discourse became an implicitly technological process. A different, and norma- tive, approach to de-politicisation emphasises that politics has no role to play in some human activities. For example, Jayasuriya (2002) talks of a post-Washington Consensus that seeks to take the destabilising effects of politician-based bargaining out of the market. This approach suggests that politics has no role to play in the global economic system. De-politicisation is a critique of the boundaries of politics, but unlike anti-politics is not a critique of politics per se. Bernard Crick in his essay In Defence of Politics (2000) set out to

justify politics by saying what it is, and suggested that the negotiating processes of politics are the only practical alternative to government by coercion. This implies that while the practice of politics may

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often be imperfect, it is the main bulwark against anarchy. A more functional reason for why politics matters is its impact on policy choices and societally important acts (Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Schmidt, 1989). The outcome of discourse, and the political process, may explain why some countries prosper and the different access people have to services such as education and health. The shape of government and decisions on policy, resource allocation and indi- vidual rights and responsibilities will dramatically differentiate the daily life expectations and opportunities of a person living in Buenos Aires (Argentina) from those of a person in Abuja (Nigeria). It is not just big policy issues, standards of living or freedom of

choice that politics affects. Many of your friends might say, ‘I am not interested in politics’, without realising the impact it has on them every day. Suppose you are a 17-year-old living in the United Kingdom,

working at a McDonald’s, and hoping for a university place in the autumn. Waking up you realise that Parliament has legislated to con- vert what was a local time of 6:30 to 7:30. Turning on the local radio station, whose franchise was granted by a QUANGO (quasi autono- mous non-governmental organisation), you may hear the weather forecast from the government-financed Meteorological Office. After hearing a few music tracks (legislation outlines the royalties that must be paid to authors and performers by the radio station), you drag yourself out of bed (legally mattress materials must be non-flammable), down to your breakfast cereal (ingredients listed on packet in due form by another law). If you unwisely reach for a cigarette, the government/ European Union has insisted on a health warning on the packet and levies a tax on it. Once you pass through your front door, the impact of government continues via, for instance, air-quality controls, traffic regulations and spending on local government. The bigger issues that might affect you are shaped by government

policy. How is higher education funded? Does the state provide or do you have to pay your way – and if the latter, can you afford it? Is university attendance for an elite, or is much wider participation encouraged? If you are looking for employment your prospects may depend on how the economy has been managed. Your continued employment with McDonald’s could be influenced by government policy towards foreign companies and the extent and effectiveness of health education campaigns.

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So far we have only considered you and the government. Suppose on reaching the kitchen your father snaps at you: ‘Can’t you clear up the pizza cartons you and your friends littered the place with last night?’ Arguably this is a political situation too. Within the family, fathers are sometimes thought to have ‘authority’ – some sort of legitimate power over children. As a 17-year-old, you might react negatively on the grounds that you are no longer a child to be given orders. This situation can be seen as a clash of wills in which only one can prevail. And wider politics might complicate the matter: in some countries your father is your legal guardian until you are 18. Similarly, when you arrive at McDonald’s it may well be you

discover that the assistant manager is busy establishing in the eyes of the area manager that she can do a better job than her boss. Here we have a struggle for power in which people within the organi- sation may take sides (form factions, as political scientists might say) – in short, we have organisational politics. It soon becomes clear that ‘politics’ is used in at least two senses.

In the narrowest conventional (dictionary) usage – what governments do – politics affects us intimately every day. In the wider sense – people exercising power over others – it is part of social relationships, be they kinship, occupational, religious or cultural. Like it or not, you are, as Aristotle suggests, an inherently political animal.

WHAT IS POLITICS?

The word has its origins in ancient Greece and comes from the Greek word politikos, which means pertaining to citizens. Aristotle is responsible for our association with the polis or city state. From the outset, therefore, the concept of politics linked people with gov- ernment. However, as noted by Sartori (1973), the term ‘politics’ virtually disappeared from common usage for nearly two millennia. Rather, terms such as ethics, power, rights, law and justice – which may be components of politics – were employed, and it was not until the early seventeenth century, as Sartori identifies, that the term politics was used again. If we try to define ‘politics’ more formally and precisely, we run

into the sort of problems which will be found to recur again and again in this book. One of these is associated with whether we are

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talking about politics as a human activity or politics as an academic activity – or, in American terminology, politics or political science. The search for truth about how human beings exercise power might be thought to be completely separate from actually seeking to exercise that power. In practice, political ideas are some of the most important weapons in the politician’s armoury. Attempts to ignore this are either naïve or a deliberate attempt to present a controversial political ideology as a political fact. We shall deal with the exercise of power in more depth in the

next chapter, but here we will consider critically the meaning and implications of some of the standard academic definitions of politics (Box 1.1).

BOX 1.1 DEFINITIONS OF ‘POLITICS’

The science and art of government; the science dealing with the form, organisation and administration of a state or a part of one, and with the regulation of its relations with other states.

(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary)

a way of ruling divided societies by a process of free discussion and without undue violence.

(Bernard Crick, 2000)

who gets what, when, how. (H. Lasswell, 1936)

man moving man. (Bertrand de Jouvenal, 1963)

… the authoritative allocation of value. (David Easton, 1979)

responding to conflict with dialogue. (Charles Blattberg, 2009)

Money is power. Money is politics. (Kirshner, 2003)

The definitions in Box 1.1 show considerable differences. Most political scientists’ definitions of politics are much broader in scope

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than the first, dictionary, definition which focuses on the state (although admittedly ‘part of a state’ could be interpreted widely). In effect, they largely endorse the view suggested above: that politics is about the social exercise of power, rather than just the state. However, this may reflect the natural ‘imperialism’ of academics on behalf of their own discipline. Sociologists might argue that ‘man moving man’ would be more appropriate as a definition of their concerns. Consider also, though, the unit of analysis, in terms of which

these definitions are couched. Lasswell and de Jouvenal appear to be thinking primarily in terms of individuals exercising power, Crick focuses upon whole societies, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary talks about governments. Blattberg focuses on the alter- native to violence for solving public conflicts. Easton links the concept of formal authority to the exercise of power. Contrary to the de-politicisation approach we noted above, Kirshner makes an overt connection between politics and the management of money. This reflects a split between individualistic and collectivist theories. There is a growing sense that politics in the established Western

democracies is struggling. This unease has been referred to as a democratic deficit, political alienation or civic disillusionment. The possible explanations for such changes are examined by Gerry Stoker (2006), but the argument is that citizens have been increas- ingly ‘turned off’ by traditional political behaviour, such as voting in elections. This has manifested itself in a decline in partisanship or a lessening sense of identifying with key political actors and struc- tures. It has been suggested that, increasingly, politically active citizens have ignored the coalitions and compromises offered by the existing political elite and have instead turned to single-issue pressure-group activity. However, this apparent decline in traditional partisan electoral politics in some countries does not automatically indicate a decline in the importance of politics; it may just presage a change in the nature of politics. Another aspect of the democratic deficit has been identified by

Lax and Phillips (2012), who looked at state-level support of 39 policies. They found that only in half of them was policy congruent with the majority will and there was thus a deficit with half the policies. In these examples political professionalisation, ideology and party policy was of more importance than public or interest-group

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opinion. However, we should not necessarily assume this is a major criticism of democracy: it would be unrealistic to expect all decisions to reflect policy-specific opinion. We shall address power in Chapter 2, but we note here its

impact on the meaning of politics. Maurice Duverger (1972: 19) argued that ‘The two-faced god, Janus, is the true image of power’. In other words, both conflict and consensus are essential elements in the creation of a political situation. The imposition of the inter- ests of one person (or group) on others by force, without any element of consent, seems far from what most people understand by ‘politics’, as Crick (2000) argues. On the other hand, a situation (perhaps unlikely) in which a group in total agreement (as to goals and methods) proceed to achieve more and more of their objectives does not sound like a political process either. Thus, ‘politics’ encompasses a broad range of situations, in which

people’s objectives vary but where they work together to achieve the aims they have in common as well as competing when aims conflict. Both co-operation and competition may involve argu- ment, negotiation and coercion. Politics may often be more an art than a science, and the art of politics may often be to seek out the potential of alliances rather than stress antagonisms between differ- ing groups.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS

One of the joys, and frustrations, of the study of politics is the variety of approaches to the subject adopted by academic writers. This is a joy in that you will be introduced to a rich spectrum of writing, ranging from classic philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, through radical sociologists such as C. Wright Mills (1956) and Pareto (1976), to modern social scientists wielding statistical tests of significance to analyse huge volumes of computerised data. For example, Grimmer and Stewart (2013) explain how they use computer-automated analysis of weblogs, press releases and con- gressional speeches. It is frustrating in that the conclusions of such writers cannot be simply accumulated to form a certain body of knowledge representing the political scientist’s view of politics. Students of politics must sift through varied sources and accept what seems to them to be relevant and valid.

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The remainder of this chapter attempts to provide tools to help the student do this ‘sifting’ and explain why writers on politics differ so radically. We shall be outlining the boundaries of political study and also highlighting some of the schisms within the dis- cipline. We shall look at three main approaches to the study of politics and, within these, various schools of thought. This can only be a sort of preliminary crude map of the terrain to be covered, not a rigorous analysis of what kinds of writing on politics is possible or series of watertight divisions. However, two writers within a ‘school’ generally have more in common, and are more likely to agree on what has already been established and perhaps refer to each other, than two writers in different schools. The three main contemporary academic approaches to the study

of politics can be described as ‘traditional scholarship’, ‘social science’ and ‘radical criticism’. With an element of exaggeration they might also be thought of as the British, American and French approaches. ‘Traditional scholars’ often approach matters on a rather piece-

meal basis, looking at one specific country, political institution, theoretical concept or writer in depth, often with the tools and preconceptions of another academic discipline – especially history or philosophy. Thus, the core of the politics curriculum in Britain, at least until recently, has been the study of individual political institutions in their historical context; the great political philosophers; and what was misleadingly titled ‘comparative government’. The latter was, in practice, largely the separate study of American, French and Soviet government and politics. In continental Europe, politics has often been a subsidiary part of departments or faculties of law, sociology or history. ‘Social scientists’ would denounce the traditional approach as

‘idiographic’ (a word derived from ‘ideogram’ – a personal mark or signature), espousing instead a ‘nomothetic’ or generalising approach in which the endeavour of scholars of politics must ultimately be to derive general theories or laws about the nature of political behaviour. Thus a typical American-style curriculum pre- sents political science as one of a group of related social science disciplines, including sociology and economics, all using modern computer-orientated methods of ‘analysing data’ scientifically. ‘Radical critics’, while not denying the need to produce useful

generalisations from the study of politics, have denounced the

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conservative bias of US-dominated political science. Their primary allegiance has appeared to be to a general doctrine calling for the radical change of existing (Western) societies. Most frequently this has been a variety of Marxism, but similar criticism can be produced from an ecological, theological or feminist perspective. The basis of the distinction being drawn is mainly in terms of

what writers see their task to be, the methods they employ, the level and type of their analysis, and the values they espouse, rather than the details of specific theories advanced. Where writers from different approaches and schools deal with what is apparently the same topic (e.g. ‘democracy’, ‘elections’, ‘society’), their concerns and assumptions are often so different that no real dialogue can be said to have occurred. Table 1.1 offers an overview of these major approaches and schools.

Table 1.1 Major contemporary approaches to politics

Traditional Social science Radical

Task Piecemeal explanation Science of politics Radical social change

Methods Descriptive, historical, philosophical analysis

Quantitative or theorising illustrated

Ideological criticism

Values Liberal Democratic Pro-US democracy and ‘development’

Anti-establishment

Levels of analysis

Political, philosophical and psychological

Political and social Multi-level

Scope Individual institutions or countries

US or area studies Global and historical

Content Constitutional consensus disturbed by cataclysmic events

Pluralism Class/Gender/ Species conflict

Schools (a) Liberal-institutional (b) Historical (c) Philosophical

(a) Functionalist (b) Economic (c) Systems

(a) Marxist (b) Feminist (c) Ecologist (d) Religious Fundamentalist

(e) Post-modernist

Typical concepts

Constitutional Convention Great Man

Political culture Market Feedback

Contradiction Patriarchy Jihad

Source: Adapted from Tansey (1973)

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Before we explore each of these three approaches in more depth we offer a health warning: each of them reflects a primarily Western culture – there is not yet a distinctive African, Asian and South American approach to politics. We shall explore this point in more depth in Chapter 6, but it is worth noting here that if you are studying politics beyond the North American and European heart- land of the discipline, you need to take into account differing context, culture and historical practices.

TRADITIONAL SCHOLARSHIP

The first academic writers on politics – Plato and Aristotle, whose works are still studied in detail in most British universities – were unaccustomed to the modern practice of compartmentalising knowledge into separate disciplines. They combined insights from history and current affairs with discussions of big moral issues such as ‘What is the best form of government?’ This somewhat ‘eclectic’ approach (combining insights from various different sources) was also adopted by some of the more readable classic writers in the nineteenth century such as John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Bryce (1838–1922) and de Tocqueville (1805–1859). These writers saw the rise of democracy as the major political development of their time and sought to analyse not only the idea but also its emerging reality in different countries. Commentators on ‘political theory’ have tended to divide into

two main camps. One group comprises the philosophers who see their main task as the elucidation of political concepts (such as justice and democracy), with at least an eye to their relevance to contemporary concerns. A second group consists of the historians of ideas who are concerned with tracing the evolution of writings on politics, the intent of the writers of these texts and their influence on events. Those who have written on ‘political institutions’ have often

been less explicit in their theoretical intent, but writers such as Ridley (1991), Rhodes (1997) and Liu (2011) have articulated the rationale and assumptions of much of this writing. In established and relatively stable democracies like Britain and the United States, much of what we call politics centres around important governmental institutions like assemblies, elections, government departments and

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local government. The study of how these institutions have evolved and the rules and practices surrounding them and consideration of how they may be improved is clearly of the utmost importance. However, the sceptical and the ambitious may combine to throw

doubt upon the academic credentials of such activities. Is the result really ‘knowledge’ which can be legitimately examined in uni- versities or merely pragmatic common sense which can be used by those who agree with its (conservative and liberal) assumptions? To meet such objections there has been the development of more methodologically aware ‘new institutionalism’, of which Peters (1999) discerns no less than seven varieties. The sceptical will con- tinue to argue that the operations of representative institutions are merely a deceptive mask for the real politics of exploitation (see ‘radical criticism’ below), while the ambitious see scientifically established theories as the only acceptable basis of knowledge. We note one trend which is challenging this approach, namely

the growth of international relations courses. This reflects increasing global economic, political, technological and social developments which mean that single countries cannot solve all the issues facing them on their own. This is inherently placing the study of politics within a broader perspective. Such courses, while not overly called politics, are essentially about politics between and beyond the state. The study of politics does not remain static.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS

The proposition that our knowledge of politics should be scientifi- cally derived seems, at first sight, undeniable. The application of scientific method in many other spheres (e.g. physics, biochemistry and astronomy) has yielded not only a broad consensus regarding the truth of various scientific ‘laws’ but also practical results in the shape of space travel and ‘miracle’ drugs. If the application of systematic observation, computerised analysis of data, the testing of hypotheses through experiment and the painstaking building of small bricks of fact into enormous edifices of knowledge can work in one sphere, why not in another? The problems of creating a valid science of politics seem, how-

ever, to be so enormous that they place the whole project in some doubt. They include problems of value conflict, of complexity, of

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method and of philosophy. Not all political science can be objective: some is clearly normative, positing a particular view, often reflecting the nature of the political society that the author is writing in or what they want their society to become. For example, it is no surprise that the work of Professor John Makumbe (1949–2013), an activist in the opposition MDC-T looked at political events in Zimbabwe (Makumbe, 2003) from a different perspective to that of the ruling ZANU PF government. Such normative analyses pro- vided by Makumbe are not always neutral; rather they are part of the political process. So what he said and wrote about the Zimbabwean political system could have an impact on it by shaping the opinions of other political practitioners and citizens. It is tempting to dismiss conflicts of value as irrelevant to scien-

tific investigation. The conventional argument is that science is morally neutral (‘value-free’) but can be used for good or evil. Thus, the structure of the atom is the same everywhere, whether our knowledge of this structure is used to destroy civilisations, fuel them, or merely understand their most basic constituents. It is easier to apply knowledge of biochemistry to creating

individual health than it is to use knowledge of politics to create a healthy society. This is because there is more agreement on what an ill person looks like than on what an ill society is. As a result, in social analysis it is impractical to create a ‘value-free’ vocabulary acceptable alike to social democrats, neo-liberals, Marxists and feminists. For example, creators of the Internet such as Tim Berners-Lee wanted information freely available online, but this idea is now challenged by the different values of those who want to control access to such information for political or economic reasons. A social democrat might observe a form of e-representation in operation (Jackson and Lilleker, 2012). A neo-liberal may see only a series of businesses asserting their commercial interests (McLaughlin and Pickard, 2005). A Marxist may identify how the Internet helps capitalism by encouraging commodification (Fuchs and Dyer- Witheford, 2012). Meanwhile a feminist might suggest that the dominant culture of the Internet ignores the politics of gender inequalities (Adam, 2005). The same ‘fact’ could be interpreted in a variety of different ideological or normative ways. Typically, science is seen as characterised by the testing of

hypotheses, through experiment. The experimental method is largely

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closed to political scientists since they do not possess the power to dictate to whole human societies how they should behave. In any case, experiments require identical control groups for comparison which, it is arguable, cannot be created. Although there has been an attempt to use ‘natural experiments’ as a means of assessing political participation, elections and political psychology, Sekhon and Titiunik (2012) note that the treatment and control groups may not be comparable. It is possible to control what information the treat- ment sample have access to, say knowledge of a political event, but it is much more problematic to ensure the knowledge the control group might have of it. Some small-scale laboratory simulations of human power situations have been attempted with interesting results (e.g. Milgram, 1965), but the applicability of the results of these to whole societies is disputable. Statistical manipulation of existing sets of data about human

societies may be a partial substitute for experimental techniques, but it could be argued that few convincing data sets exist. Attempts at marshalling these include those of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983) and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project at Carleton University, Canada (www.carleton.ca/cifp). One very basic problem for inter- national data sets is that many countries do not have reliable population figures; for example, Nigerian census figures have been politically contested because of their influence on the ethnic bal- ance of power. It is also difficult to compare financial values in different currencies because of artificial exchange rates and differences in purchasing power. Scholars committed to a scientific approach to politics have

sought to overcome this problem by collecting quantitative data about political behaviour. Classically this has been done through social surveys which may be carried out on a large scale by market research firms or on a smaller scale by researchers themselves. For example, Jansen et al. (2013) created a quantitative data set from the questionnaires of 188 national studies to assess the impact of party ideology on the strength of class voting. Modern statistical analysis enables the researcher to make judge-

ments regarding the existence, or not, of significant associations between variables. There is a logical gap between a statistical association and a causal relationship, which is what such researchers

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http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

generally aspire to establishing (see Johns, 2002). On a philosophical level it has been argued that the sort of causal explanation that would be perfectly satisfactory in physical science would be unsa- tisfactory in explaining social phenomena – social explanations need to explain the motives of the persons involved, not just predict successfully what will happen (Runciman, 1969). Additionally, if we accept that human knowledge and motivation are an important part of each political system, every advance in political knowledge is potentially available to the members of the systems we study. The knowledge we produce by analysing political systems becomes potentially a part of those systems and may, of course, upset any predictions we make about them (Popper, 1960). Such considerations often lead to an emphasis on more qualitative

methods of investigation, such as participant observation, in-depth interviews, case studies, textual deconstruction and focus groups. The stress in such investigations is often on contextualising and understanding the meaning of events to participants (see Devine, 2002). Such methods are more frequently applied by traditional or radical scholars – especially postmodernists. One recent interesting trend has been an attempt to combine

natural science research with political science. For example, Frienda et al. (2013) tested over 5,000 respondents on false memories, the respondents being asked about their memories of three true and one fabricated political event. The fabricated event was accom- panied by a photographic image purportedly depicting that event. Approximately half the participants remembered that the false event happened, with 27 per cent suggesting that they saw the event happen on the news. This however is more an example of psy- chology within the political sphere than political science per se. Another example of this hybrid between science and political science research has involved behavioural genetics, the so-called ‘genopolitics’, which explores the influence on political behaviour of a person’s genes. One of the best-known pieces of research in this field was by Alford et al. (2005), who suggested that genes more than environment shape whether a person views themselves as a liberal or conservative. Fowler and Dawes (2008) suggested that a gene, MAO-A, existed which had an effect on the likelihood of someone voting or not. However, in assessing the work on ‘geno- politics’ Charney and English (2012) suggest that the analysis has

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been too simplistic, that it is unlikely that single genes alone are the key to understanding voting behaviour, ideology and policy views.

SCHOOLS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Perhaps the most influential group of ‘political scientists’ are those stemming from Gabriel Almond and the deliberations of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association in the 1960s. Although much criticised on theoretical grounds, the terminology and approach adopted by these ‘functionalist’ writers is still widely prevalent in empirical studies of American, British and comparative politics. In a vastly influential early work, Almond and Coleman (1960)

argued that we should speak of:

‘Political System’ instead of ‘State’ ‘Functions’ instead of ‘Powers’ ‘Roles’ instead of ‘Offices’ ‘Structures’ instead of ‘Institutions’ ‘Political Culture’ instead of ‘Public Opinion’ ‘Political Socialization’ instead of ‘Citizenship Structure’.

Their argument was that by studying the processes necessary to maintain any political system in a variety of environments, rather than focusing on conventional liberal democratic institutions, they were creating a conceptual vocabulary that was the basis for a ‘probabilistic science of politics’. This attempt has been highly successful in that thousands of

writers have employed the vocabulary suggested. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the vocabulary is used any more pre- cisely than its ‘old-fashioned’ predecessors (Sartori, 1970) or that the assumptions implicit in the approach are any less arguable than (or, indeed, very different from) the liberal institutional approach. For instance, there has been no substantial agreement on what functions are necessary to maintain a political system (Dowse, 1972) or on the desirability of understanding politics in terms of the maintenance of the stability of existing sovereign states. Luard (1990) argues for a global perspective.

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A good illustration of some of the problems of employing this newer vocabulary is to consider the concept of ‘political system’. This is used rather loosely by most of the functionalists to indicate that politics is not merely limited to traditional constitutional institutions but encompasses the influence on them of social and economic conditions within a country. As Nettl (1966) has pointed out, this usage often assumes that the system is an entity that exists and carries out some defined role – such as ‘the allocation of value’. Alternatively, the idea of system may be used more as a conscious analogy with engineering systems, as with Deutsch (1963), who sees the political system as a steering mechanism for society – a flow of information through decision-making mechanisms which can be improved. This idea has been updated by Buechler (2000), who takes into account a more global approach to present a world-systems theory, one which reflects the growing importance of transnational social movements and the corresponding loss of hegemony by nation states. Systematic sociological thinkers such as Talcott Parsons (1957)

see that ‘functions’ are highly theoretical processes analytically distinguished from a messy empirical reality. The difficulty then becomes seeing what predictions such a theory is making. The ‘emptiness’ of system theory is perhaps most clearly seen if the writings of David Easton (1979) are considered. Easton states that ‘political system’ is a purely analytical concept which can be applied to any collection of entities the theorist finds convenient. He then suggests the possibility of the system responding to ‘input’ from the outside ‘environment’ by ‘outputs’ which in turn may affect the environment so as to stabilise it. In such a case a stable ‘homeostatic’ system has been achieved. However, such an outcome is by no means inevitable – the problem then is to know when such an analysis is appropriate, and when a breakdown of the system might occur. Thus, many writers now claim to be adopting a ‘system’ approach, but it is often unclear whether they believe that political systems are observable entities, analytical frameworks, useful analogies or a problem-solving device. By way of contrast, let us consider a more recent and perhaps

trendier group of political scientists – the ‘rational choice’ theorists. They have adopted an alternative approach which, instead of starting with the behaviour of whole societies, focuses on the behaviour of

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individual political ‘actors’. Mainstream economists have analysed markets starting with the behaviour of individual consumers and entrepreneurs who are assumed to rationally pursue their own interests (maximise utility or profit). The behaviour of individual voters, bureaucrats or legislators can be considered in the same way (Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1965; Himmelweit et al., 1985). For example, Aldrich (1993) suggests that rational choice by looking at costs and benefits can explain in which situations citizens are more or less likely to vote. Stokman and Zeggelink (1996) extended the basic principle of rational choice at individual level to apply a mathematical approach to understand the development of policy within policy networks. As with economics, it is not asserted that all actors are rational. The assumption is only that the system func- tions on the basis that most actors will be rational and that irrational actors will cancel each other out.

BOUNDARIES AND SCHISMS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Marsh and Savigny (2004) estimate that 75 per cent of the world’s political scientists work in US universities; therefore, it is there that we need to identify and assess any conflict between different approaches. Over a 150-year period, Dryzek (2006) suggests, there has been

at least four phases in the history of political science in the US. In the first, statism – from the mid-nineteenth century through to the early twentieth century – the focus was on the state as the central player in politics. However, US society was not as static as this approach implied, and from the early twentieth century pluralists such as Harold Laski suggested that different and competing power centres existed. From the 1950s pluralism was challenged by those who, like Dahl, took a behavioural approach, which was scientific in nature. The last distinct phase which Dryzek identifies is the New Political Science, in which writers such as Bachrach focused on the social problems and political crises of the time. Clearly, this implies that there exist tensions within the study of political science. This friction is especially to be found in considerations of the

correct methodological means of conducting political science research. The orthodox view in US universities is judged to be a rational choice approach, which encourages the collection of empirical

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data through primarily quantitative methods. The rationale behind this methodology is to create a more scientific approach aiming at universal understanding. This orthodoxy is to be found not only within US universities but also in the American Political Studies Association (APSA), the body representing political scientists. This perceived scientific hegemony was challenged in October 2000 when an anonymous Mr Perestroika sent out an email critiquing both APSA and the teaching of political science in the US. This email soon gained some support, and a loosely formed perestroika movement evolved; indeed, it became successful enough to gain positions on the decision-making bodies of APSA. The perestroikans support a pluralist approach, applying a range of methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, and maintaining that political science should focus more on providing contextual knowledge within specific situations (Schram, 2003; Jacobsen, 2005). The debate was not just about how to conduct research but also a suggestion that those who followed a scientific approach actively recruited and promoted those who saw the world through the same prism. So that as Marsh and Savigny (2004) argue, the supporters of the dominant positivist paradigm are the gatekeepers of the profes- sion, who have control through key appointments and the type of articles accepted in academic journals. Anecdotally, one of the authors has witnessed an interesting

example of this debate in the UK. At a political science conference addressing a general election, the vast majority of paper presenters had used a quantitative methodology based upon the statistical interpretation of questionnaires. There was an almost audible gasp when one presenter got up and discussed voting behaviour based on a series of detailed interviews with less than ten voters. At the time this qualitative approach to psephology (the study of elections) was extremely unusual. Interestingly, by the end of the presentation the feedback was effusive and enthusiastic, and the speaker was told how refreshing their paper was. This whole debate about whether political science requires the

collection of mass data analysed by computer software programs or can be smaller case studies assessed by the researcher in itself demonstrates some of the political discussions we have addressed earlier. One approach appeared to be dominant and able to exercise power by appointing like-minded researchers and influencing the

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agenda through favourable journal output, but was challenged by another. Amusingly, this suggests that the study of political science is an example of pluralism in practice. It would be too rigid to suggest an unbreakable divide; there

have clearly been shifts on both sides. Indeed, Roger Smith (2002), although preferring political science to address issues of interest, does recognise the value of scientific contributors. More overtly, Keating (2009) suggests that there exists a third way, where it is possible to work across disciplinary boundaries and so encourage the cross- fertilisation of ideas. The future of political science should allow for a range of methodologies, which would reduce the current schism. One other boundary question exists, and it is a normative one:

namely, what is the relationship between the study of political science and the practice of politics? The answer appears to be that political science supports a democratic approach. The history of democracy is tied up with the health of the study of political science. Huntington (1988) believes that political science, by looking at issues such as justice, order, liberty and responsible government, helps democracy by generating understanding of political processes. If he is correct this does raise the issue of whether political science can be of value to non-democratic countries, though as we shall see later the definition of democracy can be broad.

THEORIES, MODELS AND PARADIGMS

Faced with a thicket of rival approaches and theories, readers may be tempted to demand who is right and who is wrong. However, no simple, omniscient answer is available, so what may help clarify matters is to try to separate out a number of activities that are frequently confused in the effort to generate a science of politics. To do so, we need to consider how scientists normally work. Popper (1960) has convincingly argued that scientific laws are

useful general predictive propositions, which have been extensively tested and not disproved. Few of the propositions advanced by political scientists seem to meet this test, especially applying theo- retical propositions to the real world of politics. However, some more limited propositions might be regarded as testable hypotheses, the production of which constitutes a preliminary to the creation of usable theories.

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It used to be thought that scientists derived their hypotheses for testing from the observation of as many ‘facts’ as possible (the ‘positivist’ view of science). More recently it has been suggested that most innovative hypotheses come from a combination of acute observation and the application of ‘models’ of reality often derived from another area of science. A ‘model’ is a simplification of reality that enables us to suggest relationships between the things we observe. In politics, numerous different models have been, and still are,

applied. For instance, medieval thinkers tended to prefer an organic model of the state – e.g. seeing the parts of a state as being like the parts of the human anatomy. Easton/Deutsch’s application of a cybernetic (information system) model in the age of the computer thus becomes unsurprising in the ‘postmodern’ age. Clearly, as Deutsch (1963) points out, models are not in them-

selves right or wrong, merely helpful or unhelpful. Choice of models will depend on their relevance, economy and predictive power – the latter encompassing ideas of rigour (do theories based upon it give unique answers?); combinatorial richness (the number of patterns that can be generated from it) and organising power (can a model be applied in many different circumstances?). Really successful models can be at the heart of what Kuhn (1970)

terms a scientific paradigm. Thus, the Newtonian model of matter as a series of particles whose relationships could be described in terms of a series of simple mathematical equations dominated physics for several centuries. Evolutionary development proposed by Darwin continues as the dominant paradigm in modern biology. Despite the positivist view of scientific development referred to above, Kuhn argues that most scientific endeavour (‘normal science’) consists of the further application of existing models to new areas or the explanation of apparent deviations from the dominant model in terms derived from it. Nor should this be despised: a great deal of modern technological and scientific progress has rested on this process of ‘pygmies standing on the shoulders of giants’ – ordinary knowledge workers amassing detailed information within the dominant paradigm. In these terms, political studies can be seen as an academic dis-

cipline in the pre-scientific stage, in which no dominant paradigm has yet emerged. What are described here as ‘schools’ can be seen as

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aspirant paradigms. The main question that has to be asked is how useful a source these are of models applicable to new situations, of testable hypotheses, and of concepts for helpfully describing and analysing events? Absolute truths cannot be found.

RADICAL AND POSTMODERNIST CRITICISM

One characteristic of a scientific theory is that it should be value- free – there is no left-wing physics and right-wing physics, just good physics and bad physics. Yet consideration of many approaches put forward by political scientists reveals that the models upon which they are based, the concepts they employ and the theories they espouse frequently imply a clear set of values which others might well wish to dispute. As we noted earlier, they are subjective and normative, not objective, observations. For example, Almond’s functionalist model seems to view politics as a matter of maintaining political stability by enabling political interests in a system to be conciliated (‘interest articulation and aggregation’). This is done by a state that functions through a traditional liberal pattern of legal rules (‘rule making, rule enforcement and rule adjudication’). The model thus stresses values of ‘pluralism’ and consensus which may be uncontroversial in the United States but less acceptable in sub- Saharan Africa. Moreover, it creates a set of interesting challenges for China’s political elite. Similarly, a glance at the individualistic model put forward by the ‘economists’ reminds one of Margaret Thatcher’s famous remark that ‘there is no such thing as society – only individuals’. Such theories clearly imply a fashionable suspicion of big government and stress the ‘profit motive’. Political models and political science cannot be divorced from the culture and values of the authors that subscribe to them. The obvious alternative approach to political analysis stressing

individualism and consensus is the collectivist and conflict-orientated view of politics put forward by Marxists. At this stage we shall generalise, and the basic model, stemming back to Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto (1848), is of a society divided into large collectivities (classes) whose interests are in basic conflict. The only long-term resolution of such conflicts, which stem from the basic relationship of exploitation between the capitalist bourgeoisie (the owners of the ‘means of production’) and the proletariat

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(‘wage-slaves’), is through a socialist revolution. This analytical approach may seem perfectly acceptable in some countries but totally alien to others because of different norms and values. A number of writers (Miliband, 1969; Gramsci, 1969) have

approached the analysis of modern politics through a variety of Marxist models with, in some cases, enlightening results. Conventional assumptions have been questioned and further economic and poli- tical dimensions to problems exposed. In the Western world, for instance, the cultural and media influence of capitalism has been emphasised, while in the ‘third’ world the Marxist emphasis on the international economic environmental influences (Williams, 1976) seems much more realistic than analysis of political parties who are liable to disappear overnight in a military coup (Sklar, 1963). Two other approaches which have developed since the 1970s

and provide different frameworks are the green movement and feminism. They are normally considered radical, often with links to Marxism, though they can be critiques to both left and right ideologies and have developed their own unique approaches. From a green perspective politics is seen in a very particular light: as Torgerson (1999) notes, nature is placed at the centre of its attention. He suggests that the political focus goes beyond human concerns to consider non-human interests such as individual species and the planet as a whole. This means that a central tenet of this approach has been to challenge the view that industrialisation is good. So where both a Marxist and a liberal democrat would be interested in achieving growth, though of different natures, the likely green approach is to ask why should we have economic growth at all since it will further harm the earth. This is a very different outlook on politics, cogently expressed by Schumacher (1973) in Small is Beautiful, where he suggests that modern economies based on growth are unsustainable because of finite natural resources. A large part of green politics is therefore based on a green economics, but as noted by Cato (2012) there is also an ethical approach that emphasises equality. However, as with the other approaches there is not one single agreed view. Barry (1999) has identified at least two different interpretations, a green ideological view which is utopian in nature and a more pragmatic approach. The latter is more likely to make compromises on the issue of economic growth. Jamison (2001) has referred to this potential divide within green politics as a

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bifurcation – between the green politics of the industrialised north which views science as the answer and a cultural critique of science from Asian green politics. With the latter the concern is with the effect on individual societies of environmental issues caused by two centuries of Western industrialisation. With the former there is a belief that a synthesis is possible between capitalism and sustain- ability: green growth. Certainly, we see some Western governments viewing the development of green technologies as the solution to the problem of slowing economic growth and unemployment. Radical feminists have questioned the assumptions implicit in

conventional political analysis (for a good introduction see Bryson, 2003). They too have seen society primarily in terms of an exploitative relationship (‘patriarchy’) between collectivities (adult heterosexual males versus the rest). (It should be emphasised that this is a discussion of radical feminist writers – many feminists adopt a more liberal and moderate stance.) Like later Marxists they have stressed cultural and media aspects of political relationships, but also the political aspects of personal relationships. Whereas conventional analysis has looked at explicit political conflicts reflected in con- ventional party divisions, these writers have seen potential (seismic) splits repressed by conventional politics. Lest the idea of repressed political divisions is dismissed out of

hand it is worth considering the case of Afro-Americans in the United States. As recently as the 1950s in many parts of the US they were deprived of basic human rights and discriminated against. Although they lived in a ‘democracy’ and resented their condition, sometimes even as the majority in their local community, Afro-American concerns still did not even feature on the political agenda. Starting from this situation, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) put forward an interesting model of political activity, combining insights from both the pluralist and Marxist models. They suggest that an apparently free play of political interests in a ‘democratic’ system may coexist with suppressed conflicts in which the interests of certain groups often fail to reach the political agenda. Policies favouring suppressed groups, even if nominally adopted by governments, will not be fully implemented by the machinery of government. In short, what Schattschneider (1960: 71) calls a ‘mobilization of bias’ is built into the system against them. While Bachrach and Baratz are mainly concerned with racial biases, clearly

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these biases can equally well be those of gender, ethnicity or religion. The radical writers discussed do not necessarily dismiss the

enterprise of a science of politics – old-style Marxists frequently claimed that ‘scientific’ socialism gave them a superior insight into contemporary economy and society. They merely question the assumptions on which contemporary analysts base their work. However, postmodernist critics, influenced by philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Foucault, throw doubt upon the possibility of an impartial analysis of political behaviour. They stress that the very language used to describe political events is the product of struggles between different users of language and is ‘internally complex, open, appraisive and fought over’ (Gibbins and Reiner, 1999: 7). A good illustration of this is the contemporary concept of ‘a war on terrorism’. Traditionally political science uses a vocabulary that assumes the primacy of the nation state, and political conflicts based upon producer interests. Postmodernist critics often stress the impact of globalisation and consumerism in undermining these assumptions (Gibbins and Reiner, 1999). A postmodern approach would abandon the idea of a unitary study with a consensus on methods, and encourage greater use of writing by a global network of excluded and non-professional groups (Gibbins and Reiner, 1999).

CONCLUSION

This chapter suggests that it is relatively easy to understand why politics matters, be it at a society level, the impact on the wider economy or just how our everyday lives are influenced by it. However, we have seen that there is no one single agreed defini- tion of what politics actually means. It could include the formal mechanisms of government, but also the informal relationships between individuals and groups. This divide between the govern- mental and society levels of politics is something we shall explore further in the next chapter. It is not a surprise that there is no one agreed approach to the study of politics, but, as Box 1.2 outlines, the key differences concern the methodologies for understanding politics. What we can say as students of politics is that the important question is whether their methodology is appropriate, consistently applied and helpful.

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BOX 1.2 ASSESSING THE USE OF METHODOLOGY IN POLITICS

Is the approach employed appropriate to the problem in hand? Are theories, concepts and models clearly defined and consistently applied?

Are theoretical assumptions distinguished from empirically established conclusions?

Is all the evidence on the issues examined?

There is good work published by writers of all persuasions. Conversely, some authors seem only to look for evidence sup- portive of their theoretical assumptions. In the present state of knowledge, it will often be found that a combination of insights derived from different approaches often throws the most light on an issue. What we shall see in later chapters is that politics does not exist

in a vacuum: context is important to understanding it. Politics is a fluid concept which is based on behaviours and institutions set in different environments, subject to a variety of stimuli and motivations.