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Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

• Explain how Tolman’s concept of latent learn- ing sparked a need for theoretical accounts that went beyond basic classical and operant conditioning models.

• Describe the beginning of the cognitive revo- lution and the importance of George Miller’s memory studies.

• Explain how the computer has been used as a metaphor for the way the mind processes information.

• Describe how the cognitive counterrevolution was different from the behavioral revolution before it.

• List and define some of the foundational concepts of cognitive approaches.

• Characterize George Kelly’s personal construct theory and his view of humans as scientists.

Cognitive and Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality 6

Chapter Outline Introduction

6.1 Metacognition: Thinking About Your Thinking

6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories • Edward Tolman and Latent Learning • Chomsky and the Role of Language in

Cognition • George Miller: The Cognitive Revolution • Von Neumann and McCulloch: A Conceptual

Leap From Computers to the Mind

• Describe the contributions of the social learning theorists Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, and Walter Mischel and their contributions to such concepts as reward value, behavioral expectancies, self-efficacy, self-regulation, self-verification, and motivated reasoning.

• Describe the process of modeling in both human and animal models.

• Compare and contrast the cognitive theories of Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck, and Marsha Linehan.

• Name and briefly describe some of the more commonly employed assessment tools used in the cognitive perspective.

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CHAPTER 6

Introduction “There are no facts, only interpretations.” F. Nietzche

It’s December 14, 2012, at approximately 9:30 a.m. It’s an otherwise normal day at Sandy Hook Elementary School in the small town of Newtown, Connecticut. Then, 20-year-old Adam Lanza arrives on the scene carrying an arsenal of high- capacity weapons, and he proceeds to gun down 20 helpless children and 6 adults and terrorize many more. Authorities would later discover that Lanza had also shot and killed his mother prior to coming to the school. Unfortunately, the mas- sacre was not an isolated incident in American history, but it was the second dead- liest school shooting in American history. Some claim that this incident points to the disturbed nature of some individuals. Others point to the need for stricter gun control to limit access to high-capacity weapons. Still others suggest that violence in the media or video games were to blame. What was your take on these events?

If the goal were to predict your behavioral response to this event, could we do so simply by understanding the environment in which you were brought up in and currently live, or would we also need to understand how you cognitively pro- cessed the event? Is it even possible to study and comprehend all of the factors that influence your interpretation and response? Given the considerable interpre- tive variability of the above example, let us consider something far less complex: a physical stimulus.

The simple, visual example shown in Figure 6.1 illustrates variability in how peo- ple interpret the world. Perceptually, you might detect a chalice, where the white

Introduction

6.3 Areas of Specialization Within Cognitive Psychology and Their Relation to Personality • Information Processing • Pattern Recognition • Schema

6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality • George Kelly and Personal Construct

Theory • Julian Rotter’s Model of Behavioral

Expectancy and Reward Value • Bandura’s Social Learning Theory • Walter Mischel’s Self-Regulatory

Theory

6.5* Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality • Ellis’s Rational-Emotive Therapy • Beck’s Cognitive Theory and Therapy • Linehan’s Cognitive-Behavioral Model

6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From the Cognitive Perspective • Kelly’s Repertory Grid • Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) • Other Depression Inventories • Anxiety Inventories • Implicit Association Test • Possible Selves and Self-Schemas • Cultural Influences and Differences

Summary

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CHAPTER 6Introduction

image is the figure and the dark portions are the (back)ground. However, you might instead detect two faces looking at each other, where the dark image is now the figure and white is the (back)ground. Research indicates that your previous experiences and how you formed conceptual categories can influence what you see by, for example, priming you for certain perceptual categories (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005). More importantly, perceptions are also influenced by your beliefs, biases, and both conscious and nonconscious goals (e.g., Tamir, Ford, & Ryan, 2013). Even very simple behaviors like pointing and grasping at objects, which require us to “code” information in our environments, can be influenced by our intentions (i.e., our planned actions; e.g., Wykowska, Schubo, & Hommel, 2009), suggesting that even basic and seemingly automated behaviors are not passive. This suggests that decidedly internal events are important to understanding how we interact with our environments, which brings us to a crucial question: To what extent does your ability to think and experience emotions define your character?

The cognitive movement emerged following the heyday of the behavioral move- ment. Like the behavioral perspective, the cognitive perspective also emphasized scientific rigor and tight experimental methodologies. However, the constructs of interest were now internal processes, with the primary impetus for this perspec- tive being the constructs that had been overlooked by behaviorists (i.e., working on the assumption that there is more to human personality and functioning than mere behavior). Thus, the unique and subjective perspective of the individual is here emphasized, and it is acknowledged that there may be an infinite number of possible perspectives on any one event.

In this chapter we will discuss the nature of cognition and its influence on person- ality. We will see how a cognitive revolution in psychology created a new frame- work for looking at human behavior and personality. The cognitive perspective has proven very useful for theorists, researchers, and clinicians and has led to dif- ferent models that have been applied to personality theory and clinical treatment.

Figure 6.1: Figure-ground perception

Do you perceive faces or a vase? What you perceive in this image is influenced by previous experience, beliefs, biases, and both conscious and nonconscious goals.

Source: Science Source/Photo Researchers

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CHAPTER 66.1 Metacognition: Thinking About Your Thinking

6.1 Metacognition: Thinking About Your Thinking

Cognitive theories focus on how our thought processes impact our personalities. There is an important concept related to this called metacognition. This term literally means thinking about our thinking, and while the term is not used widely by the primary theorists in this model, thinking about our thinking is exactly what they are asking us to do. Unless we can take a step back and analyze our thinking processes from almost a third person perspective, we cannot change faulty cognition. As you will read in the following pages, analyzing and challenging our faulty thinking systems is at the heart of cognitive theories.

We all view the world through the filter of our personal and cultural experiences. This is human nature. What speaks to us as true is often determined by our cultural experience or our personal frame of reference. People who practice metacognition constantly assess how their experiences and perspectives are affecting how they process information. Metacognition means that they understand themselves and know the dynamics at play within their own psyche. Most people simply assume that if they think that something is right (or wrong), it is just that.

Akin to the idea of metacognition is the concept of critical thinking. You have probably heard the term before, but definitions vary. Stephen Brookfield’s (1987) approach aligns with the underlying concepts of cognitive psychology and metacognition. He contends that critical thinking is a process. Although his definition includes emotional as well as rational components, and clearly acknowl- edges the importance of culture and context, it contains the following common characteristics:

1. Identifying and challenging assumptions. 2. Challenging the importance of context. 3. Trying to imagine and explore alternatives. 4. Reflective skepticism. (pp. 7–9)

Brookfield (1987) defines reflective skepticism as the act of constantly questioning the status quo. Just because something has been believed for years does not necessarily mean that it is true. Just because someone of perceived importance (like professors, for example) says something is right, that does not prove that it is right. As was discussed in the introduction, reality is subjective, and what we “think” we know is not always objectively accurate.

Can you see the parallels with the cognitive model? We should make it a habit to challenge assumptions (including our own) and to understand the cultural implications that underlie our interactions with others. For example, Ellis says that while it would be nice to be loved by all around us, it is not a catastrophe if we are not. We create the catastrophe by failing to question our assumptions; in this case, the assumption that we should be loved by everyone. Understand- ing the cultural contexts helps us to also recognize that often, someone not liking us is not even about us—it is about them.

It is helpful to examine thinking through the construct of cognitive development theory, because thinking about our thinking requires higher level thinking skills and logic. Many cognitive theorists believe that concrete logic is not possible until at least age six or seven and that only in the highest levels of cognitive development can critical thinking take place. Jean Piaget, a noted psychologist and developmental theorist, postulates the following stages of development:

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CHAPTER 6 6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories

1. Sensorimotor Stage: Birth to age 2 (approximately). Children begin with no thinking structures (called schema) and develop them through exploration of their senses and experimentation on the environment. Significant cognitive development occurs, but children in the sensorimotor stage are incapable of logical thought.

2. Pre-operational Stage: Ages 2 to 7 (approximately). Children rapidly develop language skills and more sophisticated cognitive structures but are still pre-logical. They are not capable of conservation (the ability to understand that substance does not change although it changes shape or form). They are also incapable of de-centering (the ability to see things from another’s perspective). Conservation and de-centering are prerequi- site to logical thinking.

3. Concrete Operational Stage: Ages 7 to adolescence. Children begin to grasp conservation and de-centering. They begin to question: How does Santa really get to all those houses in one night? They can now reason logically but only on a concrete level, not hypotheti- cally or abstractly. They solve problems logically but haphazardly.

4. Formal Operations Stage: Adolescence and above. The person is now capable of sophisti- cated logical thought. He or she can think in the abstract, can think hypothetically and can solve problems using the logic of combinations (Dworetzky & Davis, 1989).

Piaget’s stages ended with Formal Operations, but Riegel (1973) has postulated a fifth stage called Dialectical Reasoning. This is a stage beyond logic where metacognition and critical thinking can take place. It is the ability to perceive the frequent paradoxes in life (to see the dialectic) and to question and analyze the assumptions that underlie the logic. Dialectical thinkers “readily recog- nize, accept, and even enjoy conflict and contradictions in values and possible courses of action because sorting out these conflicts forces them to grow intellectually” (Dworetzky & Davis, 1989, p. 360).

6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories

Cognitive science, which emerged in the 1950s, was a revolutionary development in the field of psychology. In 1977, Mahoney used the term cognitive revolution in describing this shift in the field of psychology—a shift that was partly driven by dramatic advances in computer science. The cognitive revolution reflected the notion that consciousness is the ultimate product of evolution. Consciousness is what allows us to reflect upon ourselves and to wonder about the nature, the origin, and the purpose of our existence. This capacity for reflective thinking is con- sidered the “essence of the self” (Corr, 2006, p. 563)—small wonder that Descartes should have accepted as proof of his existence the fact that he could think, summarized in his immortal phrase, “I think, therefore I am.”

The goal of cognitive approaches to psychology is to understand how we think—that is, the goal is to explain topics such as how we process information, how we remember, how we perceive, how we solve problems, and how we process language. This was a radical departure from behaviorism, which emphasized empiricism and insisted that psychology should concern itself with the observ- able, objective aspects of human behavior. Recall that it was behaviorism’s avoidance of specula- tion about the mind and mental processes that had fueled its break from what was then main- stream psychology. Now a new cognitive science was again suggesting that psychology should be concerned with some of the old challenges of psychology that behaviorism had set aside. The cognitive sciences were concerned with what occurs in the mind. And this presented a strong chal- lenge to the supremacy of behaviorism.

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CHAPTER 6 6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories

Edward Tolman and Latent Learning Ironically, the roots of the cognitive perspective can be traced to learning theory, where a num- ber of findings began to emerge from behavioral research that undermined some of the domi- nant beliefs within that tradition. One of the first was Edward Tolman’s (1949, 1955) work that introduced the concept of latent learning. Latent learning is a special form of learning that is not immediately evident or behaviorally observable. Moreover, latent learning occurs in the absence of any reinforcement of either the behavior or any associative learning (which means any learn- ing process in which a new response becomes associated with a particular stimulus due to their occurring at the same time).

In a classic demonstration of latent learning in animals, Tolman (Tolman & Honzick, 1930) assigned hungry rats to one of three experimental conditions that varied with respect to the delivery of food (a reinforcer). In one condition, the rats were given food only when they reached the end of a maze, and this resulted in improved maze running with each attempt. In the second condition, the rats were not reinforced with food after running the maze, and consistent with traditional learning principles, they failed to demonstrate learning of the maze. A third condition also initially received no food for maze running, and predictably they too failed to learn the maze—at least as indicated by their behavior. However, after a series of unreinforced trials, the rats were then rein- forced for their maze running. This resulted in a dramatic improvement (learning), and the rate of learning indicated that they were in fact learning the maze in the earlier trials, despite the lack of reinforcement. The acquisition of maze running was so proficient that they even outperformed the rats in the first condition who had been reinforced throughout the task. Tolman concluded that rats in all three conditions were learning the maze and were forming internal cognitive maps (i.e., mental representations) of the maze. However, they simply failed to demonstrate the behav- ior until such a time as they were reinforced, which is why those in the third condition could do as well and even outperform the rats in the first. In this respect, Tolman reasoned that the rats’ behavior did not reflect their internal mental processes, they did not demonstrate learning until a later time, and they appeared to learn even in the absence of a reinforcer (reflecting the features of latent learning). Tolman’s findings were soon replicated both in animals (e.g., Karn & Porter, 1946) and in humans (e.g., Postman & Tuma, 1954; Stevenson, 1954).

Tolman’s work sparked an inter- est in understanding the role of human thought in the process of learning, but his was not the only research to challenge one of the most basic assumptions of learning theory, and cognitive psychologists now looked at topics like percep- tion, attention, thinking, memory, and language (Neisser, 1967).

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

In this breakthrough paper, Tolman introduces the idea of cognitive maps in animal and human models. Read it at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Tolman/Maps/maps.htm

Reference: Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. The Psychological Review, 55(4), 189–208.

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CHAPTER 6 6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories

Chomsky and the Role of Language in Cognition A second, and somewhat independent, line of research that further sparked the cognitive move- ment was that of linguist Noam Chomsky (1972, 2000) who noted that humans appear to have a preparedness (a readiness) to learn and develop speech. Thus, much in the way that fish have a preparedness for swimming, monkeys for climbing, and birds for flying, humans have a readi- ness to acquire and use language. Chomsky believed that language and mental processes develop hand-in-hand, and that language can be used to access mental constructs. Chomsky firmly believed that the prevailing behavioral model, with its exclusive use of learning theory, was unable to explain the complexities of language. Instead, he believed that understanding thought pro- cesses, which occur between the stimulus and the response, is necessary if one is to understand language—a point with which Skinner strongly disagreed (Skin- ner, 1957; Chomsky, 1959).

Philosopher and cognitive psy- chologist Jerry Fodor expanded these ideas by suggesting that beliefs and desires, which are decidedly mental events, are explained through what he called the language of thought. Fodor suggests that mental rep- resentations are more than mere explanatory tools; rather, they reflect what has been codified in the brain (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). In Fodor’s model, con- ceptual thinking is essentially an internally represented language, but it is not equivalent to lan- guage. Rather, it exists in a for- mat that reflects how the mind represents concepts using symbols, which are organized as mental sentences that follow the grammatical principles of language. Much of Fodor’s theory was based on the idea of computer intelligence, in which symbols are manipulated by a computer following basic algorithms to reflect psychological processes (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1976).

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Can cognition be shown to exist separate from behavior?

In a thought experiment (known as the Knowledge Argu- ment) originally proposed by Frank Jackson (1982; see also Jackson, 1986), the premise is that Mary is a brilliant neuro- physiologist who studies vision, but must investigate the world from a black and white room, with her only access to the outside world being a black and white TV. She learns everything there is to know about color, but she never expe- riences color directly. The question posed is whether she will learn anything once released from the room. Essen- tially, Jackson uses this to illustrate that physicalism, which is the thesis that everything is physical, and that everything is necessitated by the physical, is false. For a summary of the philosophical argument and counterviews, see http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/.

Reference: Nida-Rümelin, M. (2010). Qualia: The knowl- edge argument. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta (Ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu /archives/sum2010/entries/qualia-knowledge/.

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CHAPTER 6 6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories

George Miller: The Cognitive Revolution Miller’s work focused largely on human memory. In a thought-provoking and widely cited article, Miller (1956) suggested that immediate memory is limited to seven items, plus or minus two items. That is, most people are able to keep in mind (be immediately conscious of or think about) approximately seven distinct items. However, he soon discovered that these seven items did not have to be single units such as seven letters, but could be groupings of letters or other items, which he labeled chunks. Because information could be grouped in different ways by different individuals, and because this chunking predicted how people perceived the physical world, it began to establish the supremacy of thought over the outside world (and observable behavior).

In Miller’s work, there is an emerging cognitive perspective that concerns itself with how mental processes may be structured and information pro- cessed. What occurs in the human mind no longer needed to be studied using highly subjective speculation, but could now be brought into the realm of the scientific method.

Miller had a significant impact on the field when he looked to computer pro- grams as a form of simulated thought processes. He believed that the com- puter made an excellent metaphor for how the brain processes information. He thought that the computer could provide cognitive psychology with an enormously powerful tool for simu- lating mental processes. After all, the computer suggests an easy analogy for human cognitive processes. In this

analogy, the computer’s hardware is equivalent to the brain, and its software to the mind and its mental processes. Carrying the analogy further, input corresponds to stimuli, and output to responses.

Von Neumann and McCulloch: A Conceptual Leap From Computers to the Mind The development of computer science was crucial in the cognitive revolution. Mathematicians such as John von Neumann and Claude Shannon reasoned that symbols such as numbers could be substituted for letters and that mathematical computations could be used to express relationships among these symbols. This notion was developed into programs in which information is repre- sented by a 0 or a 1 (binary representation) and where that information can be manipulated and analyzed using rules of logic and algebraic equations (Corr, 2006; Newell & Simon, 1972). Simon and a young graduate student, Allen Newell, took up the challenge of developing a computer that could reason.

iStockphoto/Thinkstock Hemera/Thinkstock

Since the 1950s, theoreticians and researchers have considered the computer as a metaphor for the inner working of the mind. Thus, computer chips would be akin to neurons in both their complexity as individual units and their interconnectedness.

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CHAPTER 6 6.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive Psychology and Their Relation to Personality

As researchers began to model the association between computers and thought, the term and subdiscipline of artificial intelligence (AI) emerged, which further positioned cognitive psychology as the natural successor to behaviorism (e.g., Casti, 1987; Sharples, Hogg, Hutchinson, Torrance, & Young, 1989). This line of investigation has examined some of the more rudimentary cognitive pro- cesses, such as basic perception (or “bottom-up” processing; e.g., Achler, 2012), as well as meta- analytic (“top-down”) views of intelligence (e.g., Hutter, 2012). Researchers have also attempted to replicate with computers such human experiences as emotions and social skills, which involve the challenge of predicting and reacting to the emotions and motivations of others (e.g., Minsky, 2006). Currently, the Human Brain Project (Chapter 4) hopes to provide solutions to the many mysteries of consciousness and brain disorders.

6.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive Psychology and Their Relation to Personality

Cognitive psychologists believe that not all inferences or hypotheses need be based only on direct observation. The scientific method, they insist, can make inferences about unseen events and states, and this parallels practices in other disciplines of science. For example, when physicists speculate about particles like quarks and neutrinos, or when evolutionary theo- rists describe long-extinct life forms on the basis of fossil records, they are discussing concepts to which there is no direct access. For their part, cognitive psychologists make inferences about the inner workings of the mind (Hunt, 2007).

Within cognitive psychology, several areas of focused research have developed over the years, such as information processing, pattern recognition, and schema. Each of these areas will be explored here.

Information Processing Emerging from the use of the computer as a potential model for how the mind works was an ever- expanding field termed information processing. In everyday usage, the term information may be thought of as an ordered sequence of symbols that has a meaning that can be transmitted and understood. Data, on the other hand, consist of unorganized symbols that are without meaning in their current form. Think of the difference between a random list of names and phone numbers (raw data) and these names ordered alphabetically (information). Information processing is what happens when data are manipulated and transformed into information. Information has a rela- tional connection that distinguishes it from raw data and makes it useful (Ackoff, 1989).

Computers and the brain share some complex information-processing operations. In comput- ing science, these are mathematical operations often in the form of algorithms. In humans, our information-processing processes are often not as certain as are algorithms. Instead, they tend to be more “rule of thumb” and are referred to as heuristics. These include processes for which we have a high degree of awareness, as well as those for which we have limited awareness. As an illustration, consider the availability heuristic, which is the tendency to assume that some events occur with greater frequency than they do in reality because those events are readily available to us. For example, because every airline crash receives so much media attention, it fosters the idea (and perhaps subsequently the fear) for some that air travel is unsafe, though it is statistically far safer than traveling by car.

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CHAPTER 66.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive Psychology and Their Relation to Personality

Researchers have established that although there are some common heuristics and biases that are expressed by everyone (e.g., the availability heuristic, the representative heuristic, etc.; see Kahne- man & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; for a more recent review, see Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), individual differences can also dictate a preference for some heuristics and biases. For example, mood states appear to influence heuristics, such that positive mood states increase reliance on heuristics, resulting in an increased tendency to make false racial identifications of members of stereotyped groups (Park & Banaji, 2000). Moreover, researchers have shown that personality differences, such as sociability, can influence heuristics (such as the representative- ness heuristic), but only under specific conditions, such as when sociability is relevant (e.g., judg- ment problems dealing with rejection and abandonment; Moore, Smith, & Gonzales, 1997). These and other findings suggest that there is a complex interaction between the use of heuristics, the situational context, and longstanding personality differences; with each of these factors contribut- ing to the prediction of outcomes (e.g., Marszal-Wiśniewska & Zajusz, 2010).

Information processing is cognitive psychology’s attempt to describe what actually occurs in the mind. When researchers and theorists investigate human information processing, they are exploring the internal workings of the mind. But since we cannot observe information processing directly, the models cognitive psychology presents are derived by inference. For example, when you see a threatening dog, neural receptors in your eyes immediately send information to the part of your brain responsible for pattern recognition. And when a scary dog template is found in your limbic system, there is an immediate fight-flight (and recall from Chapter 4 that freeze has also been added to this automatic response) decision implicit in the signals that are sent to your muscles. In this information-processing model, information signifies various serially ordered men- tal representations that result in some mental or physical change or action (J. R. Anderson, 1990).

Of course, the above-noted example is a more universal response, as most individuals would respond in the same way to a threatening dog; the influence of personality is illustrated when more idiosyncratic responses emerge. For example, your response to a particular type of human face that you find attractive, but that is not considered classically “handsome” or “beautiful,” reflects your particular taste.

Pattern Recognition One cognitive model suggests that infor- mation processing involves recognizing patterns. This model maintains that we identify stimuli by matching them to a model, pattern, or prototype that cor- responds to the stimuli. For example, Anderson (1990) hypothesizes that the brain stores patterns, called tem- plates, and that the perceptual system compares these stored templates with incoming information to find a corre- spondence. Recall Ekman’s research on emotions, where he found that certain facial expressions seem to reflect feelings that are universally recognized. Ander- son’s template hypothesis explains this by suggesting that our neural networks

iStock/Thinkstock

If a house is filled with pictures in which everyone in the family looks happy, can that lead to a more positive recollection and outlook on your family life? In this respect, mental representations can overshadow reality.

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CHAPTER 66.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive Psychology and Their Relation to Personality

store various patterns of facial configurations, each of which has a specific emotion attached to it. An angry face will match our stored representations of other angry faces. And other representa- tions will tell us whether to smile, run for our lives, stay and fight, or ignore.

In the cognitive perspective, representation involves the use of symbols to depict or signify objects, events, or occurrences. Cognitive psychologists describe how external events are encoded (transformed) and represented in the mind; they investigate how these are recorded in our neural networks so that they can be recalled as language, visual images, feelings, symbols, and thoughts (Hunt, 2007).

Research suggests that personality patterns can likewise influence this specific cognitive process. For example, borderline personality disorder (BPD) is characterized by profound difficulties with emotion regulation, the consequence of which is affective instability. Because such difficulties are most pronounced in social contexts, it has been hypothesized and supported in the literature that individuals with BPD have impaired facial emotion recognition (typically with a negativity or anger bias), which then undermines the interpersonal interaction (Domes, Schulze, & Herpertz, 2009).

Despite establishing the problems that individuals with BPD have with facial emotion recogni- tion, what is unclear is whether these deficits affect all basic emotions, are valence-specific, or if individual emotions are implicated. Using a sample of 33 inpatients with BPD and 32 matched healthy controls, patients with BPD were less accurate than control participants in emotion recog- nition, and this was especially true for negative emotions (there was little to no impairment with favorable faces; Unoka, Fogd, Füzy, & Csukly, 2011). Individuals with BPD also had difficulties with basic attributions, such that they over-attributed disgust/surprise to facial expressions, but under- attributed fear to the facial expressions relative to controls.

Schema Memory is in large part about the self. That is, much of our memory is autobiographical; it con- sists of our constantly evolving narrative about ourselves (Singer, 1995). In one study, Bartlett told non-Western folktales to Westerners and found that the subjects inadvertently filled in the blanks according to their cultural expectations, omitting details that did not make sense to the Western mind. Bartlett termed this organized mass of experience-based memory schemata or schema.

Schema have since become fundamental to cognitive psychology. The term is used extensively in Jean Piaget’s (1926) developmental theory. Schema refer to mental structures that are organized patterns of thought (see also earlier discussion of templates). In terms of personality theory, we can have self-schema (concept we have about ourselves; discussed in Chapter 9) and person- schema (notions we have about other people). Notions of self- and person-schema were later adopted by cognitive personality theorists who used them to explain and treat depression and personality disorders. Schema became the cornerstone of cognitive models designed to explain how thoughts and beliefs (schemata) influence personality and are involved in the development of mental disorders such as depression.

Research indicates that personality impacts person-schemas (e.g., Srivastava, 2010; Wood, Harms, & Vazire, 2010), and this not only influences how we cognitively perceive ourselves, but also how we perceive others (Kammrath, 2011). For example, individuals high in trait narcissism (which is, in fact, an indicator of low self-esteem) are more likely to perceive others as uninteresting (Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004). Individuals characterized as highly agreeable are likely to perceive oth- ers as more agreeable, while those scoring low on agreeableness are more likely to see others as hostile (Dodge & Crick, 1990; Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). The assumption is that

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CHAPTER 6

the schemas that are easily accessible because they are applied to one’s own behavior are the same schemas that are readily available to characterize the behavior of others (Higgins, 1996). Moreover, with these schemas being activated, it primes individuals to be attentive to situational/ environmental cues that are relevant to the activated schemas (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 2008). As an example, if an individual manifests the trait of dominance, they are likely to notice when others are making a grab for power in an interpersonal interaction, or when power is given up.

6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

As we noted earlier, the development of systems of psychotherapy, psychopathology, and personality theory often occurred simultaneously. These theories emerged from two prin-cipal sources. Some theories grew out of clinical practice; most of these are based on new treatment models that led to advances in personality theory. A second source of personality theo- ries is more academic: It consists of theories that grew out of research, rather than clinical prac- tice. Theories from both of these sources, academic research and clinical science, often show a great deal of cross-fertilization—that is, they build on each other’s ideas.

In the next section we review the founding theorists in the cognitive perspective, including the work of George Kelly, Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, and Walter Mischel. We will also present the work of Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck, who in a parallel fashion founded cognitive therapy. Each presents a somewhat different perspective on how cognition organizes the way we think, act, and feel.

George Kelly and Personal Construct Theory Perhaps as a function of his upbringing on a farm in Kansas, George Kelly adopted the perspective that everyone, even those with less formal education, acts as scientists do. Specifically, they try to explain the present and predict the future, and like scientists, Kelly (1955) argued that every- one develops and modifies theories to accomplish the goals of explanation and prediction. Kelly referred to these theories as personal constructs. Kelly believed that people’s lives represented their “experiments,” and the utility of their personal constructs (theories) was determined by how well they accomplished the goals of explaining the present and predicting the future. As a simple illustration, if your life experiences (experiments) have resulted in the belief that people will take advantage of you if you give them the opportunity, this represents a personal construct. This might also lead to other constructs such as don’t trust anyone, or don’t let anyone get too close to hurt you. Presumably, these personal constructs have been used to explain what has happened to you, they provide a framework for interpreting the world around you, and they allow you to antici- pate what might happen next (predict the future). New information, by way of new experiences, may strengthen these constructs or it may weaken them (as might be the case if you happen upon some relationships that are especially warm and supportive).

In his landmark book, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, Kelly (1955) put forth a fundamental principle and 11 corollaries. The fundamental principle essentially states that how a person per- ceives the world is affected by how he or she expects (anticipates) things will occur. In other words, our expectations are the basis for our psychological reality; it’s not just what’s out there in the world, but rather what we think is out there and what we expect to be out there. The 11 corol- laries that can be derived from the fundamental postulate are identified and briefly described in Table 6.1 (see Kelly, 1955).

6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

Table 6.1: Kelly’s personal construct corollaries

Construction corollary

People anticipate events by construing similarities to past events. That is, we expect things to happen as they did before (based on past experience).

Experience corollary

Personal construct systems will vary as a function of construing new events. This means that as we experience the world, how we perceive that world necessarily changes and adapts to maximize predictability.

Dichotomy corollary

Construct systems are composed of dichotomous constructs, and there are a finite number of said constructs. Constructs have two poles that define each other (e.g., nice-mean, threatening-safe, outgoing-inwardly focused, etc.) and there is a limited number of ways we can interpret the world (i.e., constructs are not infinite in their number).

Organization corollary

A construct system orders its specific constructs in a hierarchy. More simply stated, some constructs are more important and central than others.

Range corollary Any construct has a limited range of events to which it can be applied. As an illustration, a construct such as “good-bad” would likely have a very wide range of use.

Modulation corollary

Variability in the construct system is a direct function of the permeability (changeability) of the constructs, and some constructs are more changeable than others. Kelly was specifically referring to changes in the construct’s range of use, rather than the actual content of the construct.

Choice corollary Individuals are free to choose any constructs for their construct system, but once chosen, those constructs limit how the individual perceives and interprets the world.

Individuality corollary

Because we all differ in our experiences, our constructs and construct systems will necessarily be unique to us.

Commonality corollary

Whenever two people interpret experiences in the same way, their construct systems should be similar.

Fragmentation corollary

Due to the considerable variability within each person’s construct system, it is possible and, in fact, quite likely that different constructs within one system are incompatible with each other.

Sociality corollary

A person can better get along with someone else by adopting that person’s construct system, even if the constructs are quite different.

Kelly hypothesized that individuals will experience anxiety when their construct system fails to explain or predict events. He argues that the natural response for the individual is to modify their construct system until events can be explained, and at that point, anxiety should be reduced. Kelly also defined a number of other emotional responses in terms of personal constructs. For example, Kelly suggested that guilt is experienced when one is engaging in behavior or experienc- ing thoughts that are incongruent with one’s superordinate (core or central) constructs.

Perhaps one of the more interesting concepts introduced by Kelly was that of cognitive com- plexity. Kelly argued that individuals are healthiest when they have numerous superordinate con- structs that can be used to interpret the world around them. In contrast, he considered those with very few superordinate constructs as highly vulnerable; the rationale being that if events ever undermined those few (or one) superordinate constructs, the individual would have no other theories to adopt, and this would significantly undermine personality functioning. In fact, Kelly characterized psychological disorders as any time an individual uses a personal construct that has been repeatedly invalidated by life’s experiments. Presumably this would be more likely to occur

Based on Kelly, G. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton.

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for those having fewer superordinate constructs to turn to, even in the face of a failure to predict and explain. In a study examining cognitive complexity and traits, researchers demonstrated that cognitive complexity (flexibility) is, predictably, most related to the trait of openness to new expe- rience (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993).

Julian Rotter’s Model of Behavioral Expectancy and Reward Value Julian Rotter was one of the earlier contributors to the cognitive movement as he elaborated on the basic behavioral paradigm, and he was among the first to introduce social learning theory. Like behaviorists, Rotter still focused on predicting behavioral outcomes. However, his theory empha- sized two decidedly cognitive events as the most important predictors of behavior. In the book Social Learning and Clinical Psychology (1954), Rotter suggests that behavior could be predicted by knowing behavioral expectancy and reward value.

He defined behavioral expectancy as the individual’s expectation that the contingencies—the outcomes—for behavior are in place. That is, rather than focusing on whether or not one is rein- forced or punished for a behavior, Rotter shifted the focus to whether the individual expects to be reinforced or punished (i.e., the subjective assessment). The second factor, reward (or reinforce- ment) value, emphasizes the fact that we all subjectively value rewards in different ways, and this variability is critical to predicting behavior. Thus, if you highly value earning an “A” in personality psychology and expect to receive the “A” if you study, then Rotter’s theory predicts that you will study. However, if you either don’t value a high grade or don’t believe that your efforts will be rewarded, then the theory predicts that you will be less likely to study.

It is also important to note that Rotter didn’t actually use the term behavior, but instead empha- sized behavior potential. Behavior potential was defined as the probability of engaging in a spe- cific behavior in a given situation. Obviously, in a given situation, there are many behaviors that one can engage in, and for each of these, there is a behavior potential. Rotter hypothesized that people will manifest the behavior with the highest potential. Based on these concepts, Rotter developed a simple formula to predict behavior. Specifically, he stated that Behavior Potential (BP) is a function of both Expectancy (E) and Reinforcement Value (RV).

BP 5 f(E & RV)

Of course, because the factors of expectancy and reinforcement value are derived in part from the situation, in addition to the individual’s subjective appraisal of each factor, social learning theory is thus an interaction model, considering both the individual and the situation. Several researchers would expand on this model, but this was an important first step.

One additional significant con- tribution from Rotter was his differentiation of internal versus external locus of control. Rotter (1966) stated that those with an internal locus of control believe that they have control over most aspects of their life (e.g., ability and effort), whereas those with an external locus of control are influenced by factors outside

one’s personal control (e.g., chance/luck, task difficulty). The internal-external locus of control distinction will be discussed extensively in Chapter 8.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

In an award-winning 1990 address, Rotter reviews the his- tory of the concept of locus of control.

Reference: Rotter, J. B. (1990). Internal versus external con- trol of reinforcement: A case history of a variable. American Psychologist, 45(4), 489–493.

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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

Bandura’s Social Learning Theory One of the more influential theorists who integrated theoretical contributions from the cognitive perspective to the field of personality is Albert Bandura. Bandura (1986; see also Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961) developed a hybrid social-cognitive theory that combines aspects of the behavioral and cognitive approaches. The cognitive influence is seen in Bandura’s emphasis on emotions in determining behavior, as well as in the importance he places on our ability to symbolize and anticipate the consequences of our actions; both of these represent decidedly cognitive events. The behaviorist influence is also apparent in his discussion of the consequences of our actions.

Modeling

Drawing on the work of Miller and Dollard (1941), Bandura hypothesized that individuals learn in a variety of ways, and of those, modeling is fundamentally important. Modeling is learning that occurs as a function of observing behaviors performed by others. Through imitation, we learn all sorts of important behaviors. For example, Bandura explains that we learn new behaviors when we see them performed by someone else; we learn to inhibit deviant behaviors when we see others punished for similar behaviors (or perhaps we learn to engage in deviant behaviors when we see others rewarded for them). We also learn what classes of behaviors and beliefs are likely to be rewarded in our culture.

Note how Bandura’s explanations for the effects of imitation are drawn from behaviorist notions of reinforcement. It is the consequences—and more impor- tantly, the anticipated consequences— of a model’s behavior that determines whether or not the model will be cop- ied. But note, too, that concepts such as anticipation describe a fundamentally cognitive activity: To anticipate is to sym- bolize and to think. And symbols are a central aspect of Bandura’s theory. In fact, Bandura’s theory also asserts that a model need not be a real-life person performing some act, but is perhaps even more likely to be symbolic in our advanced technological societies. Symbolic models include written or verbal instructions, abstract graphical representations, film and book characters, and any other set of stimuli that can be represented and emulated (note the overlap here with our earlier discus- sion of representations).

Bandura proposed that the modeling process involves several steps. The first two steps implicate memory functioning, whereas the latter two steps involve planned behaviors.

• Attention: In order for learning to occur, the individual or animal must first notice and attend to the defining features of the behavior that is to be modeled.

• Retention: In order for the behavior to be reproduced, the defining features of modeled behavior have to be encoded, retained, and recalled.

Monkey Business Images/Thinkstock

How much do we learn from watching others get in trouble (or be rewarded)?

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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

• Reproduction: To reproduce a behavior, responses must be organized to match the model. The process of organizing typically improves with practice and can move from an intentional act, to one requiring minimal attention (i.e., a more automated behavioral sequence).

• Motivation: Incentive(s) or motive(s) are typically needed to reproduce the behavior.

Some of the strongest experimental data on the effects of modeling that is more readily appli- cable to our daily life can be seen in the literature examining the impact of exposure to violent media (primarily television) images (for a review, see Friedrich-Cofer & Huston, 1986). Most note- worthy, a study by Huesmann and colleagues (1984) found that earlier viewing of aggression on television predicted later aggression, even after initial levels of aggression and age were statisti- cally controlled. Moreover, the effects were strongest when the participants (boys) reported that they could identify with the violent television characters (note the consistency with the earlier research, cited in this chapter, regarding self-schemas). In addition, research has shown that the effect of violent media images affects both immediate and long-term aggressive behavior (Bush- man & Huesmann, 2006). As a result, even the most recent reviews of the literature have con- cluded that television violence does result in increased aggressive behavior, and the magnitude of this effect appears to have increased since 1975 (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). Of course, as technology has changed, so too have the media channels through which we can be exposed to violent images, and researchers have shifted their focus to such areas as violent video games (van Schie & Wiegman, 1997).

Importantly, not all of the published studies have concluded that violent video game exposure necessarily results in more aggression or violent outcomes (e.g., Williams & Skoric, 2005); in fact, there is considerable division in the empirical literature on what we really know about this phe- nomenon (Kutner & Olson, 2008). As noted in the opening of the chapter, considerable debate erupted over the causal antecedents of the Newtown shooting, with the violence portrayed in the media being one of the alleged contributing factors. The uncertainty over the role of media violence was perhaps highlighted most clearly when the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that video games have First Amendment protection and that minors’ use of violent video games could not be regulated by the government (Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 2011). The Supreme Court’s decision was based at least in part on the high court’s conclusion that the scientific evidence was “unpersuasive,” as it was lacking in scientific scrutiny, and this paralleled recent similar conclusions by government reviews in both Australia and Sweden (Swedish Media Council, 2011). However, a recent publication does provide an effective summary on the points of agreement in the empirical literature, and they are: (1) Video game violence is an important area for ongoing research; (2) violence is determined by multiple factors, (3) results tend to be stronger when the outcome measures are aggression and measured in the lab, and minimal when the outcome behavior is violence and measured outside the lab; and (4) in order to fully under- stand whether, and to what extent, media violence impacts aggressive behavior, there is a need to consider evidence from multiple sources, including survey research, experimental studies, and longitudinal/prospective research (Ferguson, 2013).

Self-Efficacy

Another important construct developed by Bandura (1997) is the construct of self-efficacy (or mastery/competency), defined simply as the belief that you have the ability to succeed—or, more literally, the opinion you have of your personal effectiveness in a given situation. For example, those with high levels of self-efficacy are more likely to stop smoking because they believe that they can. In a sense, self-efficacy is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: People with high self- efficacy expect to be successful, they tend to engage in activities where they are successful, and,

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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

as a result, their activities bolster their notions of self-efficacy. High self-efficacy provides a sharp contrast to the concept of learned helplessness (as discussed in Chapter 5). Individuals character- ized by learned helplessness believe that they have no control over outcomes; hence, they have very low notions of self-efficacy. It should also be noted that self-efficacy beliefs can be domain specific. That is, one might have highly elevated self-efficacy beliefs with respect to their work, but very low self-efficacy beliefs with respect to relationships. Not surprisingly, some research sug- gests that domain-specific, self-efficacy beliefs, such as those in the social domain, are related to specific personality traits, such as agreeableness (Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012).

The context specificity of self-efficacy beliefs is not only important to predicting behavioral out- comes in different contexts, but it also highlights the fact that we can cognitively create and dif- ferentiate contexts simply by how we perceive them. Social cognitive theory is focused on our expectations about the future, and Bandura believed that our self-efficacy perceptions are central to our expectations. Although there are many ways in which self-efficacy beliefs can influence our behavior, one of the most profound is in its relation to effort and persistence, which in turn also influences performance (e.g., Sitzmann & Ely, 2011). That is, if we believe we are competent enough to succeed, this predicts sustained effortful behavior, whereas if we doubt our abilities, then we are less likely to try (e.g., Bandura, 1997).

Reciprocal Determinism

Bandura’s (1986) theory suggests that in order to predict behavior it is important to understand the person (i.e., their internal cognitive processes), his or her behavior, and the environmental context or setting in which the behavior occurs. Bandura also suggested that each of these three factors is both caused by and causes the others—hence, the concept of reciprocal determinism (or reciprocal causality). In this respect, by accounting for both internal processes of the individual and environmental context, social cognitive theory demonstrated a considerable advance over the psychodynamic and behavioral perspectives that predated the cognitive movement.

XiXinXing/Thinkstock Eyecandy Images/Thinkstock

How do our beliefs about domain-specific self-efficacy affect our success in certain domains?

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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

Walter Mischel’s Self-Regulatory Theory Walter Mischel’s training within a cognitive framework was established early on, as he studied under both George Kelly and Julian Rotter. Mischel made a number of important contributions to the field of personality psychology, and among them were his ideas on self-regulation. Self- regulation is the process of identifying a goal or set of goals and, in pursuing these goals, using both internal (e.g., thoughts and affect) and external (e.g., responses of anything or anyone in the environment) feedback to maximize goal attainment. In an early classic experiment with implica- tions for self-regulation, Mischel tested school children in the late 1960s who were asked to regu- late their impulses for an immediate desired reward (e.g., a single marshmallow) in order to gain a greater reward (e.g., two marshmallows) at a later point in time. Although this research can be considered within the framework of delayed gratification or even the trait of impulsiveness, it can likewise be conceived of as an early experiment in the ability to self-regulate to a specific goal. In this current example, the goal might be to maximize the number of marshmallows they could eat (although for some children, the goal may have been to minimize the time they would have to wait for the marshmallows!). The children who were most effective at self-regulation (also referred to as self-control) were also found to be more successful later in life, resulting in higher scores on standardized tests, higher educational attainment, lower incidence of drug use, and more stable marriages (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).

Mischel and colleagues also demonstrated that some intervention strategies (e.g., blocking the desired stimulus from sight or imagining the reward to be something less desirable) could be used to help the children self-regulate more effectively, thereby indicating that these were: (1) mutable processes and (2) a direct function of the individual and the situation. That is, some individuals could regulate their behavior more easily than others, and some could modify their behavior more easily than others. More recently, Mischel and colleagues demonstrated that individuals who can more effectively self-regulate may be better at taking a broader (“big picture”) perspective on matters and finding meaning in their experiences (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). Thus, Mischel saw humans as actively involved in the construction of their own psychological world, rather than being passive and instinct-driven in responding to their environments (Mischel, 1976).

Like Bandura and other social learning theorists, Mischel emphasized goal setting, and self- regulation to one’s goals, as central to predicting human behavior. Within the context of goal setting, a number of factors are implicated, including perceived competencies (as per Ban- dura), subjective appraisals of reward value and expected reinforcement (as per Rotter), and even basic cognitive abilities, such as encoding strategies. The goal-driven behavior is likewise affected by feedback or corrective information. For example, if a student is not progressing to a desired or expected level toward a goal, such as doing better in a history class, the student’s behavior can be adjusted. This can be done in one of two ways. The student could increase effort or efficiency by studying more, going to speak with the professor regularly, or taking more notes in class. Adjustments can also be made via the student’s goals. For example, the student can maintain the same effort and efficiency but lower expectations for the outcome (i.e., accept a lesser grade as a measure of success).

Building on the self-regulatory framework here described, researchers have studied how a desire for a particular outcome can impact the cognitive processes and goal pursuit. For example, Kunda (1990) suggests that when we make inferences and reason regarding our environment, this does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, we reason within the context of specific desired outcomes (such as getting a higher grade), and as a result we may be motivated to perceive events in specific ways, referred to as motivated reasoning.

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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality

In a comprehensive review of the literature, Kunda (1990) highlighted the concept of motivated reasoning as showing that (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1987; Pyszczynski & Green- berg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986) people utilize cognitive processes and mental representa- tions to reach desired conclusions and that their motivation plays a critical role in determining the specific cognitive processes they employ (Kunda, 1990). Thus, in essence, we are biased in how we utilize cognitive processes when navigating toward desired outcomes (Kunda, 1990). As an illustration, consider how you might evaluate an interaction with an acquaintance whom you want to date. As you use cognitive processes to evaluate your social interactions with this person, you are motivated to notice and favorably interpret some cues (e.g., smiles, eye contact, responding to your text), as well as being motivated to possibly ignore or minimize other cues (e.g., lack of eye contact with you or failure to return your text).

At an even more basic level, recent research has shown that our internal motivations can impact our visual perception—that is, our motivations can affect what we see and how we see it. Con- sider the research by Balcetis and Dunning (2006) in which they examined visual perception and how it is influenced by motivated states. The researchers informed participants that they would be assigned to one of two experimental conditions based on randomly generated information on a computer. For example, in study 1, participants were engaged in what was ostensibly a taste- testing task, and they would either have to consume and evaluate a glass of freshly squeezed orange juice (desirable) or a chunky, gelatinous substance referred to as an “organic veggie smoothie” (undesirable); both beverages were placed in front of participants and they were encouraged to smell them. They were then instructed to look at the computer screen and told that they would see either a “13,” which was assigned to the OJ, or the letter “B,” which was assigned to the veggie smoothie, and that whatever symbol they saw would determine the beverage they would drink.

An ambiguous figure (see Figure 6.2) was then presented for 400 ms and then the computer “crashed.” Participants were then asked by the experimenter if they happened to notice anything on the screen prior to the “crash.” Participants overwhelmingly (i.e., 82%) reported seeing the symbol that was randomly assigned to the desirable outcome (i.e., 13, rather than B). Similar findings were reported in four additional experiments, leading the researchers to conclude that motivation clearly affects visual information processing.

Figure 6.2: The ambiguous “B–13” figure

Research suggests that whether you see a “B” or a “13” depends on if a desirable outcome is associated with seeing one of the two figures.

Source: From Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2006). See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(4), 612–625. doi:10.1037/0022- 3514.91.4.612. Copyright . 2006 by the American Psychological Association.

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

Researchers have also linked personality to other aspects of reasoning. For example, trait extra- version is associated with the increased incidence of reasoning errors on valid syllogisms, despite expressing greater confidence in their erroneous decisions (Papageorgiou et al., 2012). However, other research suggests that this same trait can result in more effective reasoning, provided the reasoning task is related to the trait of extraversion (Fumero, Santamaría, & Johnson-Laird, 2011). Finally, research has also been able to link several personality traits, such as extraversion and neu- roticism, to moral reasoning (Athota, O’Connor, & Jackson, 2010).

Person-by-Situation Debate

Although this will be elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 8, which focuses on personality traits, it is here noted that Mischel was squarely at the center of one of the biggest controversies in psy- chology. Researchers such as Mischel critiqued personality researchers (specifically those studying traits) for over-emphasizing the person when trying to predict behavior. Mischel believed situ- ational factors to be at least as important in determining behavior as trait factors.

To support his point, Mischel had collected considerable data on the behavior of schoolchildren in different situations and concluded that there was minimal cross-situational consistency, thereby speaking to the explanatory power of situations rather than traits. In 1968, Mischel published his classic book Personality and Assessment, which critiqued traits on two major grounds. First, Mischel argued that traits only accounted for approximately 9% of human behavior (i.e., aver- age correlations of approximately .30), with these figures being derived in part on his studies of schoolchildren in different contexts. His second critique suggested that traits were mere labels, and therefore limited in their utility. Although the field of personality did respond to these chal- lenges, Mischel was instrumental in moving the field to a more interaction-based approach to understanding and predicting behavior.

6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

There is considerable overlap in current cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models of per-sonality (see Figure 6.3). Still, one way to differentiate between the two approaches is to look at the way they were influenced by various other disciplines. Whereas cognitive theory was highly influenced by computer models, as well as by linguistics and anthropology, cognitive- behavioral models emerged out of the behavioral tradition. As a result, cognitive-behavioral theo- rists have a somewhat different orientation, which is evident in their use of behavioral concepts and therapies. It is interesting to note that there are elements of a cognitive approach in the much earlier work of some psychoanalytic theorists, such as Karen Horney, Otto Rank, and Alfred Adler, all of whom influenced Aaron Beck, whose work is discussed in this section (Sperry, 1999). Some of the theoretical work that underlies personality theory, which emerged from the cognitive- behavioral tradition within clinical psychology, is here reviewed.

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

Ellis’s Rational-Emotive Therapy Albert Ellis is generally recognized as having launched the cognitive revolution in psychother- apy. His Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) [(later changed to Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT)] was one of the earliest applications of the cognitive model to psychotherapy. It emerged in the mid-1950s (Ellis & Harper, 1961) and was at the forefront of the cognitive revolution. Ellis claims that REBT “had an implicit theory of personality” (Ellis, 1974, p. 309). A later text, published shortly after his death in 2007, at age 90, presented a more formal theory of personality (Ellis, Abrams, & Abrams, 2009).

Ellis’s basic tenet is that irrational thinking (a decidedly cognitive event) is the central cause of human suffering. His theory is partly derived from the work of Alfred Adler (1923), who believed that humans constantly evaluate and give meaning to events in their lives. Ellis acknowledges the influence of Karen Horney (1950), who talked about the “tyranny of shoulds” (as in “I should have done that,” “I should act like this,” etc.). He also was influenced by the work of Julian Rotter (1954), who emphasized the cognitive aspects of learning and personality theory (Arnkoff & Glass, 1992). More specifically, Ellis believed that it is not the actions of others, the defeats we experience, the problems of the external world, or other events that cause suffering, but the way we think about or interpret these events.

The fundamental component of personality disorders, explained Ellis, is “irrationality.” Irra- tional beliefs are what lead to emotional, cognitive, and behavioral disturbances (Ellis et al., 2009). Ellis (1974) developed the ABC theory to explain how beliefs (either rational or irratio- nal) lead to emotional and behavioral outcomes. In this theory, A 5 Activating Experience;

Figure 6.3: The influence of different disciplines on the cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models

Anthropology

Cognitive-Behavioral

Linguistics

Computer Science

Cognitive

Behavioral

This figure illustrates the somewhat distinct fields influencing the emergence of the cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models.

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

B 5 Belief System; and C5Consequence (i.e., emotional consequence). Whereas many people might directly attribute an event or experience to a particular outcome or consequence—that is, A S C—according to Ellis’s ABC theory, point B, our belief system, determines our emotional outcome (C) to our experiences (A)—that is, A S B S C. How we think about an experience determines our emotional reaction to it. For example, if your car is stolen in a big city you’ve never been to before (A), then the way you think about it (B) will determine your emotional state (C). You can, for example, believe that cities are dangerous places and that perhaps there are criminals who have targeted you for a crime. This would obviously lead to a more anxious and paranoid emotional state. You can believe that car theft happens everywhere, in towns big and small, and that you simply were unlucky in this instance. Such thinking about the event will likely lead to far less anxiety, and perhaps none at all.

If we apply the ABCs of REBT to personality development, we can arrive at a basic understanding of how personality patterns develop. Based on variations in biologically based emotional response tendencies, individuals are going to be shaped by the conditioning patterns present in their social- cultural environment. Those who are sensitive to rejection might begin to interpret minor rejec- tions as too awful to bear and develop a conditioned response pattern of avoiding situations in which they might be rejected. This behavior pattern will continue to be shaped by the individual’s beliefs and may become firmly entrenched. As a result, the individual might later be described as having a shy, withdrawn, avoidant personality.

Beck’s Cognitive Theory and Therapy Aaron Beck, though psychoanalytically trained, was interested in developing a treatment approach that would be brief, in contrast with the traditional psychoanalytic approaches that were sometimes astonishingly lengthy, often lasting many years (Beck, 1967). Like Ellis, Beck became disenchanted with the analytic model and began to use aspects of cognitive science’s information-processing model. One construct that proved especially useful in the development of his theory was that of the schema—the individual’s internal representations (private thoughts, beliefs, and emotions).

Beck was intrigued by evidence suggesting that depressed patients’ views of the world are dis- torted by negative thinking and misattributions about themselves and the world. Accordingly, Beck began to use the rules of evidence and logical argument to change the depressed patient’s cognitive distortions (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). He too believed that the way we perceive and how we interpret situations shape our emotions and behaviors. If the therapist can change these perceptions and make the patient think more rationally, personality disorders might well be resolved. The therapeutic approach Beck developed describes specific cognitive distortions that characterize various neurotic conditions, and it outlines how the general principles of cog- nitive therapy can be used to treat these conditions, as well as to treat depression (Beck et al., 1979). Importantly, just as the social learning theorists tried to explain and predict the behavior of most individuals, practitioners like Ellis and Beck were using similar cognitive frameworks to effect changes in those with problematic thinking.

A Cognitive Model of Depression

Beck’s interest in the clinical phenomenon of depression culminated in the publication of the book Cognitive Therapy of Depression (Beck et al., 1979), which many consider a major development in the treatment of depression, and he later addressed personality disorders, developing his cogni- tive theory of personality (Beck & Freeman, 1990; Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004).

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

There is evidence that personality factors play a role in the development of depression (Klein, Kupfer, & Shea, 1993). The cognitive model of depression suggests that there may be important links among overlapping cognitive schema (thoughts and beliefs), and as maladaptive thoughts become well rehearsed and automated, the problems are more likely to manifest in the form of personality. Moreover, the relationship between personality and depression may be reciprocal. Thus, just as irrational beliefs (schema) are at the root of personality disorders, so too can certain personality features, such as high emotionality (neuroticism), make one more vulnerable to the effects of loss or personal failure, either of which can precipitate depression (see Figure 6.4). Similarly, a highly confrontational and demanding individual may have trouble maintaining attach- ments and may have to deal with the emotional consequences of poor relationships.

Figure 6.4: The highly interdependent nature of mood and personality

Neuroticism can result in one overreacting to aversive outcomes, which can lead to a negative mood state. If this occurs with sufficient frequency, then more durable aversive mood states (e.g., depression) may occur.

Interdependence of personality

and mood

High neuroticism

Sad mood state

Overreact to most outcomes (catastrophes)

Durable and more intense

sad mood (depression)

Beck et al. (1979) present a compelling information-processing model that identifies predisposing factors for depression. The theory proposes that negative concepts about the self, the external world, and the future result from our early experiences. These negative concepts are encoded in schema that we may be unaware of but can be activated by situations similar to the experiences that first led to the negative schema. For example, if you had a parent who left the home while you were young, you might be more likely to detect abandonment cues, such as someone show- ing decreased interest, and this leads you to interpret even benign information consistent with a schema based on abandonment. Thus, the theory describes cognitive distortions associated with depression as primitive rather than mature ways of thinking (see Table 6.2).

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

Table 6.2: Application of the information-processing model to the thinking of the depressed individual

Arbitrary inference (a response set) the process of drawing a specific conclusion in the absence of evidence to support that conclusion, or when the evidence is contrary to the conclusion.

Selective abstraction (a stimulus set) focusing on a detail (fragment) taken out of context, ignoring other, more salient, features of the situation, and conceptualizing the whole experience on the basis of the fragment.

Overgeneralization (a response set) the pattern of drawing a general rule or conclusion on the basis of one or more isolated incidents and applying the concept across the board to related and unrelated situations.

Magnification and minimization (a response set) errors made in evaluating the significance or magnitude of an event. These errors are seen as being so gross as to constitute a distortion.

Personalization (a response set) the tendency to relate external events to oneself when there is no basis for drawing such a conclusion.

Absolutistic, dichotomous thinking (a response set) the tendency to place all experiences in one or two opposite categories; for example, flawless or defective, immaculate or filthy, saint or sinner. In describing himself, the patient selects the extreme negative categorization.

Source: From Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. New York: Guilford Press, p. 14. Reprinted by permission of Guilford Publications.

Beck’s success in therapy, even relative to pharmacologic interventions (e.g., Hollon et al., 2005), and the popularity of his approach led to the expansion of descriptions of clinical syndromes and a widening of the populations to whom it could be applied—among others, individuals suffering from anxiety, pain, substance abuse, and eventually even those with personality disorders. The latter is an especially compelling area because of the prevalence of personality disorders and the difficulty of effectively treating them. Cognitive therapy not only suggests how disorders might be treated, but also emphasizes the importance of empirical support for the approach.

Applying Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT) to Personality Theory

Beck described how an information-processing model can use personality schema to character- ize how those with different personalities organize their belief systems (Beck & Freeman, 1990; Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004). Personality schemas are anchored in the individual’s behaviors, thoughts, and affect. As with the previously mentioned social learning model, Beck believed that education, training, modeling, reinforcement contingencies, and cultural influences also influence personality development. Beck’s theory also takes into consideration how evolutionary history has influenced how we think, perceive the world, and behave (Beck & Freeman, 1990). Beck assumes that both animal and human behaviors are programmed in the sense that they are based on an interaction of genetically determined structures and experiences. Thus, individuals may have various personality types that are genetically determined: Some people are predisposed to attack when threatened, others might freeze, and yet others go out of their way to avoid danger. Each of these patterns may have a certain adaptive survival value (Beck & Emery, 1985).

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

Confirmation Bias

Early experiences, especially those of a traumatic nature, also have an important influence on the development of our schema. Later, these schemata may be reinforced by confirmatory bias, meaning that information that matches the schema strengthens it and that which fails to match it is ignored or rejected. For example, those whose cognitive schema is “I am bad” may well view anger directed at them as confirmation of their badness. But someone whose schema is “I am good” may view other people’s anger as evidence of that person’s irrationality.

In an interesting series of studies that demonstrate this confirmation bias in people’s self-schemas, Swann and colleagues demonstrated that depressed individuals seek out feedback that confirms their unfavorable self-assessments (see Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). In addition, the depressed participants also were the least likely to seek out favorable feedback. These find- ings are in keeping with a wide range of studies showing that those with positive self-schemas choose partners who appraised them favorably and validate their self-views, whereas those with negative self-views tend to choose partner interactions that conform to self-verification (i.e., those who view them unfavorably) rather than self-enhancement (see Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992). In fact, with respect to relationships, individuals with negative self-schemas tend to feel more committed to those who likewise thought negatively of them (De La Ronde & Swann, 1998; for a review, see Swann et al., 2007).

Strategies

Strategies may be likened to personality traits or patterns of behavior, in that they “may be regarded as forms of programmed behavior that are designed to serve biological goals” (Beck & Freeman, 1990, p. 25). Strategies are not necessarily conscious, nor are all of them adaptive. In fact, some can be highly maladaptive, depending on the circumstances in which they are expressed. For example, Beck notes that strategies such as competitiveness and avoidance of unpleasant outcomes are often adaptive. However, if you always avoid minor unpleasantness, such as might be associated with a visit to your doctor or dentist, your strategy may, in the end, be fatally maladaptive.

Various personality disorders are associated with primitive strategies that characterize how individuals adapt. For example, those with antisocial personality disorder use a predatory strat- egy; those with a dependent personality adopt a help-eliciting strategy; and those with a com- pulsive personality use a ritualistic (i.e., relying on behavioral habits to reduce anxiety) style (Pretzer & Beck, 1996). As we shall see in Chapter 10, the disorders of personality explicitly involve perceptions and interpretations of the self and others as relevant to all diagnostic cri- teria for personality disorders.

Beck’s Use of Schema

Beck’s theory of personality is based on an information-processing model (Pretzer & Beck, 1996). Individuals process data about themselves based on their beliefs and other elements of their cognitive organization (memory, perception, and the like). The manner in which information is interpreted shapes an individual’s response pattern. Therefore, cognitive structures determine how information affects behavior.

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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality

One of the most important elements of Beck’s theoretical model is his emphasis on schema (inter- nal representations in the form of thoughts, feelings, and beliefs). Schema may include infor- mation about relationships, such as attitudes toward self and others, as well as more objective concrete or abstract categories. They can be narrow or wide in scope, flexible or rigid, overtly emotionally charged, or less obvious in their emotional content.

Research suggests that self-related schemas are automated (as was the case for the above-noted self-verification strivings) and often implicit, rather than explicit (see Greenwald et al., 2002). For example, it appears that cognitive representations of your self-concept can be associated with fac- tors central to defining your personality, such as traits and self-esteem, and the speed with which you make those associations can indicate how central they are to your self-concept. Indeed, one of the more recent directions in the psychological literature is to consider implicit self-esteem (which is based on automatic, self-evaluative processes) to be as, if not more, important than explicit self- esteem (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001); tests like the Implicit Association Test (IAT) are one of the preferred approaches for assessing such implicit schemas (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; also see the discussion on the IAT in the assessment sec- tion of this chapter).

An essential aspect of this theoretical model concerns how impulses are controlled or inhibited. Impulses may be thought of as “wants” that might be encouraged or inhibited by beliefs. Beliefs are the “should” and “should nots” that color our schema. At times, they may exert a counterforce on our impulses and wishes (I wish to punch someone who hurts me, but I do not do so because of my belief that it is wrong to act in violence). At other times, they may encourage our impulses (I feel like having an ice cream cone, and I will have one because I believe I deserve one after all these hours of hard studying).

In a sense, the internal control system represents how individuals communicate with themselves. Our personality functioning is guided by our schema and by how our internal communication system operates to evaluate, assimilate, and encode information. When we function well, we can modify schema to respond flexibly to the demands of our environment, but in cases of personal- ity dysfunction, maladaptive schemata tend to be inflexible and self-perpetuating. Schemata are sometimes maintained through a variety of faulty information-processing mechanisms. Cognitive distortions such as dichotomous thinking (using either-or categories such as “I am good or bad”), selective abstraction (focusing only on one stimulus and ignoring other contradictory informa- tion), and catastrophic thinking (expecting, for example, a future event to be unbearable) are but a few of these (Pretzer, 2004).

An important aspect of Beck’s work has been his efforts to provide an evidence base for cognitive psychotherapy. Other researchers, like Marsha Linehan, also extended Beck’s work.

Linehan’s Cognitive-Behavioral Model Many theoretical developments that have contributed to the development of personality theory have resulted from the need for new therapeutic approaches for severe personality disorders. This was the case with Marsha Linehan, who developed a cognitive-behavioral model of personality, referred to as Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), based on her work with individuals suffering from severe personality disorders. Linehan’s (1993) model of personality is biosocial: It maintains that both genetic predispositions for emotional problems (biology) and the social environment are responsible for the creation of personality disorder. Thus, for Linehan, personality exists in a relational context and is fluid, changing largely as a function of our perspective.

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CHAPTER 6 6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From the Cognitive Perspective

Linehan’s model is primarily a treatment model; unlike Freud’s model, it is not intended as a grand theory of personality. However, by developing a treatment model that has shown robust empirical support, she has demonstrated that DBT methods are also effective as an explanatory framework for personality (i.e., they can help explain why a patient is having problems, as well as providing a direct method to change those problems).

One important distinction between DBT and Beck’s CBT is that Linehan emphasizes mindfulness in order to become aware of automatic thoughts so as to then allow such thoughts to pass. In contrast, Beck makes patients aware of automatic thoughts, but the goal of CBT is to actively inter- rupt those thoughts and replace them with more adaptive thoughts. Another important contribu- tion of this model is that it blends theoretical elements that include biological, relational, cogni- tive, behavioral, and systemic components. Linehan (1993) believes that attempting to categorize behavior into the various modes traditionally used by cognitive-behaviorists—motoric, cognitive- verbal, and physiological—is artificial, such that when both covert and overt behaviors are con- sidered, all of the categories are implicated. For example, she describes how motor behavior, expressed by actions of our skeletal muscular system, can be overt and covert. She also explains how activities such as problem solving, thinking, perceiving, speaking, reading, and writing are cognitive-verbal behaviors that have parallel motoric and physiological events. At a physiological level, there are the many activities related to functioning of the nervous system and of glands and smooth muscles. The results of most of these physiological activities are usually covert (e.g., heartbeat) but can also be overt (e.g., blushing and crying). Thus, Linehan sees each of the tradi- tional behavioral categories as one piece of a larger, unified set of experiences.

6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From the Cognitive Perspective

Cognitive theorists have a strong foundation in empiricism and therefore value objective assessment instruments. Assessment of personality based on a cognitive model relies on the assumption that various personality configurations share identifiable types of schemata (Beck & Freeman, 1990; Young, 1994). Most assessment tools are self-administered scales that are then scored by a clinician. A sampling of the instruments commonly employed will be here reviewed.

Kelly’s Repertory Grid Kelly’s (1955) theoretical work resulted in the development of the Repertory Grid, a method for accessing the personal constructs of individuals. Kelly adopted a very straightforward method for assessing constructs by focusing on how we perceive the important people in our lives. After generating a list of important individuals (e.g., mother and father figures, siblings, current and ex-boyfriends/girlfriends, employer—15 in all), the respondent is asked to compare three indi- viduals at a time and note how two of the three are similar on a construct yet different from the third individual on that same construct. For example, when comparing your father, ex-boyfriend/ girlfriend, and employer, one might conclude that your father and ex-boyfriend both have a good sense of humor, while your employer does not (e.g.. “funny – not funny”). The respondent would then continue to make all possible three-person comparisons, generating new constructs for each. The resulting list of constructs could then be analyzed (Kelly did so mathematically) to identify common/recurrent themes, with those representing core or superordinate constructs.

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CHAPTER 6 6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From the Cognitive Perspective

Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) Beck (Beck et al., 1979) developed one of the most widely used instruments to assess depression: the Beck Depression Inventory, which was revised most recently in 1996 (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,

1996). This 21-item inventory was devel- oped to identify the cognitive features of depression, emphasizing such concepts as self-reported withdrawal, sense of failure, sadness, guilt, self-dislike, indeci- siveness, and the like. The items include four-response choices ordered in terms of severity, and respondents focus on the most recent two weeks of time in order to match the DSM-IV criteria for major depression. The total scale score results in labels of minimal depression to severe depression, with norms collected on 500 outpatients and a college student sam- ple. The BDI-II has strong psychometric properties, thereby making it a popular inventory.

Other Depression Inventories Although the BDI is one of the most commonly used measures, a number of other self-report depression inventories are used widely in research and clinical practice to assess the cognitive manifestations of depression.

The Center for Epidemiological Studies in Depression

When assessing the construct of depression in the general population, the Center for Epide- miological Studies in Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) is one of the better normed and more effective self-report measures when assessing less severe forms of depression. The CES-D is a 20-item inventory with Likert ratings on how frequently a particular experience has occurred within the past week. Although it is primarily intended for use in the general population, there are geriatric norms, and it adopts a clinical cutoff score of 16.

The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression

The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression is like the BDI in that it is used to capture depression scores that fall more within the clinical range. Item endorsements denote symptom severity, with scores of 20 and higher denoting moderate, severe, or very severe depression (Hedlung & Vieweg, 1979). Other versions of the scale have also been developed.

Anxiety Inventories The construct of anxiety is also commonly assessed and is a central component of clinical and personality research. Two of the more commonly used scales are here reviewed.

Aman Khan/iStockphoto/Thinkstock

This person appears depressed behaviorally. The challenge is capturing that affective state in an objective manner and quantifying it.

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CHAPTER 6 6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From the Cognitive Perspective

The Beck Anxiety Inventory

The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) is a 21-item symptom listing that requires respondents to endorse the extent to which they experience each symptom, ranging from “not at all” to “severely,” and it is intended for those aged 17–80 years of age. Items reflect two general factors, one measuring somatic symptoms (e.g., sweating, numbness, tingling, etc.) and one mea- suring cognitive features of anxiety. Scores range from 0 to 63, though scores above 23 typically denote severe anxiety.

The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was first published in 1970 but was then revised in 1983 (Spielberger, Gorssuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The inventory assesses state anxiety as well as trait anxiety in adults. Responses are based on a 4-point Likert scale, and scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. The psy- chometric properties of the STAI have been shown to be adequate (Rule & Traver, 1983).

Implicit Association Test The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is computer-based task that asks respondents to categorize concepts with a particular attribute. For example, one might be asked to categorize the concepts of “white” and “black” with favorable (e.g., “sunshine,” “happy,” etc.) and unfavorable (e.g., “war,” “vomit,” etc.) attributes. The typical design requires respondents to match both concepts to both sets of attributes and records reaction times to assess the extent to which some associations are more natural (i.e., more easily made and therefore more readily associated from a cognitive standpoint) relative to others. Because this assessment is thought to access more automatic associations, it is considered better than self-report measures that can be more affected by demand characteristics (see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Of course, debate continues on the constructs assessed with the IAT, with some research suggesting that it assesses knowledge of associations, rather than whether one actually has a particular association.

You can take the Implicit Association Test at the link below to find out more about any implicit biases you might have: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.

Possible Selves and Self-Schemas The assessment of possible selves is to assess a number of possible (hypothetical) selves that an individual might have at any time in his or her life. These can include multiple manifestations of an “ideal self,” future possible selves (which includes the ideal self), as well as current and past pos- sible selves. Possible selves can also be assessed for their valence (positive or negative).

Two distinct approaches for measuring possible selves have been forwarded in the empirical lit- erature. An open-ended version is primarily intended for use with child and adolescent samples, whereas with adult samples, a closed-ended approach is preferred. In the latter, the focus often involves identifying the number of positive and negative possible selves as well as the affective ratings associated with these possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986).

A second instrument, the Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS), provides a self-reported assessment of schemata concerning self and others but specifically targets those experiencing psychosis. The

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CHAPTER 6Summary

BCSS assesses four dimensions of self and other evaluation: negative-self, positive-self, negative- other, positive-other. In the initial validation of the instrument, individuals experiencing psychosis and in cognitive therapy were compared to students. The BCSS appears to have reasonably good psychometric properties (Fowler et al., 2006).

Cultural Influences and Differences There is little research at this time that looks at the applicability of the cognitive model to other cultures. Even though the cognitive model does not pay much attention to cultural differences, the basic theory takes into consideration environmental factors that influence and shape schema. For example, that some cultures (including our own) encourage extraverted behavior is seen as a reflection of cultural demands encoded into its members’ schemas through information- processing activities.

Since the various cognitive models are based on an information-processing model, most are highly flexible, and the assumption is that they probably have good generalizability to other cultures. An interesting question is whether those raised in other cultures learn to process information differ- ently and how this might affect personality development and expression.

Within the last two decades, researchers have begun to address this question by exploring cultural differences with respect to certain cognitive mechanisms. For example, it appears that East Asians (relative to those in western Europe and America) consider dispositions to be more malleable and more strongly influenced by the situation (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999), and they also perceive environmental events as more holistic (interdependent; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). For a recent discussion on cultural differences in perception, see the following cover story on The Culture-Cognition Connection found in the American Psychological Association’s publication, the Monitor (from February 2006; see link: http://www.apa.org/monitor/feb06/connection.aspx).

In Chapter 9, we will discuss some additional ways in which the self-concept may vary by culture, emphasizing how the self in individualistic cultures is distinct from the self in collec- tivistic cultures.

Summary

Cognitive science represents a revolutionary advance in the field of personality psychology. It emerged from behaviorism, after Tolman introduced the concept of latent learning. How-ever, the cognitive approach went considerably farther, recognizing that it could make infer- ences about the mind and not just about things that are observable. George Miller, who believed the behavioral model lacked sufficient complexity, engendered this cognitive revolution. Miller was interested in memory, a highly relevant topic for psychology and personality, as it undergirds many basic cognitive processes. Another conceptual leap occurred when the computer was used as a metaphor for developing a model of how the mind works, which is an area of great interest to neuroscientists. The computer offered an analogue to how the mind might process information and form connections.

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CHAPTER 6Key Terms

Information-processing models led to the development of valuable constructs, such as schema, which are the cognitive templates we use to process information. Various blends of cognitive models have been developed with slightly different emphases reflected in cognitive, social- cognitive, and cognitive-behavioral approaches. George Kelly was one of the earliest theorists who considered individuals as scientists and their theories as personal constructs, which are used to explain the present and predict the future. Researchers such as Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, and Walter Mischel introduced ideas relating to learning and the self-concept. Rotter empha- sized the influence of reward value and expected contingencies, rather than assuming universally defined rewards value and contingencies. Bandura developed a social cognitive theory emphasiz- ing the role of modeling, the importance of the ability to symbolize and to anticipate, and the cen- trality of notions of self-efficacy. Constructs such as self-efficacy are useful in understanding how our perceptions and self-beliefs affect our behavior. Mischel emphasized the role of self-schema, how such schema are biased for self-verification, and how personal goals play a role in the self- regulation process.

Each of these theorists has contributed to our understanding of personality. Personality is not just a reaction to external events and conditioning: It is strongly affected by our cognitive processing of our world and our relationships, as well as by the inner representations (schema) that result. The cognitive perspective also resulted in the development of a large number of self-report inven- tories used to assess personality, with an emphasis on internal mental representations. These represent some of the most widely used inventories in the field.

Key Terms

behavioral expectancy The individual’s expec- tation of reinforcement or punishment.

behavior potential The probability of engaging in a specific behavior in a given situation.

biosocial The interplay of genetic predisposi- tions and the social environment.

cognitive map A mental representation of a spatial environment.

cognitive revolution The shift in the field of psychology toward cognitive science.

confirmatory bias The tendency to favor infor- mation that matches and strengthens a schema and to ignore or reject information that contra- dicts a schema.

heuristic A type of information-processing technique that can be common or differenti- ated among humans.

information processing When data are manip- ulated and transformed into information.

latent learning Learning that is not immedi- ately evident or behaviorally observable, and that occurs absent of reinforcement of the behavior or any associative learning.

metacognition The act of thinking about one’s thinking. An awareness of one’s own thinking processes.

mirror neuron A brain cell that fires when an animal perceives others performing an action and facilitates unconscious, automatic mimicry.

modeling Learning that occurs as a function of observing behaviors performed by others.

motivated reasoning Motivation to perceive events in specific ways by reasoning within the context of desired outcomes.

personal construct A theory developed and modified by an individual used to explain and predict phenomena.

preparedness Readiness to learn and develop a particular behavior.

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CHAPTER 6Key Terms

Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) A type of psychotherapy that focuses on identify- ing and changing irrational beliefs to resolve emotional and behavioral disturbances.

reciprocal determinism The belief that a per- son’s cognitive processes, behavior, and envi- ronmental context influence each other; also called reciprocal causality.

representation The use of symbols to depict or signify objects, events, or occurrences.

reward (or reinforcement) value The idea that we each subjectively value rewards in different ways, and this variability is critical to predicting behavior.

schema An organized pattern of thought.

self-efficacy A person’s belief that they have the ability to succeed.

self-regulation The process of identifying a goal and using both internal and external feed- back to maximize goal attainment.

self-verification The tendency to seek feedback that maintains or confirms your self-concept.

social-cognitive theory Theory that combines aspects of behavioral and cognitive approaches to explain personality.

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