Discussion post 2,3,4,5,6,7
ALSO SV GOllDON S. WOOD
Tht Crttltitm ofIM Amerita Repub/ic, 1776-1]8]
GORDONS.WOOD
The Radicalism of THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
VINTAGE BOOKS• A DIVISION OF RANDOM HOUSE, INC.
NEWYORK
Contents
PrtjtJ&e IX Introduttion 3
I MONARCHY
1. Hierarchy II 2. Patricians and Plebeians 24 3. Patriarchal Dependence 43 4. Patronage 57 5. Political Authority 77
11 REPUBLICANISM
6. The Republicanization of Monarchy 95 7. A Truncated Society 1°9 8. Loosening the Bands of Society 124 9. Enlightened Patemalism 145
10. Revolution 169 11. Enlightenment 189 12. Benevolence 21 3
111 DEMOCRACY
13. Equality 229 14. Interests 243 15. The Assault on Aristocracy 27 1 16. Democratic Officeholding 28 7 17. A World Within Themselves 3°5
vii i Contmts
18. The Ce1ebration of Commerce 3 25 19. Middle-Class Order 347
Notes 37 1 IN1ex 43 1 Prf/ace
This book is part of a continuing inquiry into the democratization of early America that I have been engaged in during the past several dec ades. Few subjects are -more important to Arnericans, and perhaps to the rest of the world as weil. Americans were not bom free and demo cratic in any modem sense; they became so-and largely as a conse quence of the American Revolution. After eighteenth-century Americans threw off their monarchical allegiance in 1TJ6, they struggled to find new attachments befitting a republican people, Living in a society that was already diverse and pluralistic, Americans realized that these attach ments could not be the traditional ethnic, religious, and triballoyalties of the Old World. Instead, they sought new enlightened connections to hold their new popular societies together. But when these proved too idealistic and visionary, they eventually found new democratic adhesives in the actuaJ behavior of plain ordinary people-in the everyday desire for the freedom to malte money and pursue happiness in the here and now. To base a society on the commonplace behavior of ordinary people may be obvious and understandable to us today, but it was rnomen tously radical in the long sweep of world hi.tory up to that time. This book attempts to explain this momentous radicalism of the American Revolution.
An early version of the book was presented in February 1986 as the AnIOn G. Phelps Lectures at New York University. I am very grateful to New York University and its History Department for the honor of inviting me to give the Phelps Lectures, which are the most prestigious in the field of early American history . I especially want to thank Carl Prince and Patricia U. Bonomi for their kindness and hospitality during my visit to New York University.
A fellowship at the Center for the Advanced Study of the Behavioral Seiences provided the opportunity to enlarge the lectures and write the bulk of the book. I am very grateful to the Center and its staR' for their
x Preface
help. I particularly wish to thank Margaret Amara, Leslie Lindzey, Kathleen Much, and Rosanne Torre, who met every request with care and good cheer. My thanks also to Jonathan Clark of All Souls College for his knowledgeable reading of thc first part of the manuscript. I am especially indebted to my friends and colleagues in early American his tory, Patricia U. Bonomi, Richard Buel, Jr., and Jack Rakove, who read the entire manuscript and offered perceptive and helpful criticism.
As always, I owe the most of all to my wife, Louise, not only for her editorial expertise but for everything else. To her this book is lov ingly dedicated.
GORDON s. WOOD
THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Introduction
We Americans like to think of our revolution as not being radical; in deed, most of the time we consider it downright conservative. It cer tainly does not appear to resemble the revolutions of other nations in which people were killed, property was destroyed, and everything was tumed upside down. The American revolutionary leaden da not fit our conventional image of revolutionaries-angry, passionate, reckless, maybe even bloodthinty for the sake of a cause. We can think of Robes pierre,Lenin, and Mao Zedong as revolutionaries, but not George Washington, ThomasJefl'erson, andJohn Adams. They seem too stufl'y, too solemn, too cautious, too much the gentlernen. We cannot quite conceive of revolutionaries in powdered hair and knee breeches, The American revolutionaries seem to belong in drawing rooms or legislative halls, not in cellan or in the streets. They made speeches, not bombs; they wrote learned pamphlets, not manifestos. They were not abstract theorists and they were not social levelers, They did not kill one an other; they did not devour themselves. There was no reign of terror in the American Revolution and no resultant dictator-no Cromwell, no Bonaparte. The American Revolution does not seem to have the same kinds of causes-the social wrongs, the class conßict, the impoverish ment, the grossly inequitable distributions of wealth-that presumably lie behind other revolutions. There were no peasant uprisings, no jac queries, no buming of chiteaux, no stonning of prisons. .
Of course, there have been many historians-Progressive or neo Progressive historians, as they have been called-who have sought, as Hannah Arendt put it, "to interpret the American Revolution in the light of theFrench Revolution," and to look for the same kinds of intemal violence, dass conftict, and social deprivation that presumably lay behind the French Revolution and other modem revolutions.' Since the beginning of the twentieth century these Progressive historians have fonnulated various social interpretations of the American Revolution essentially designed to show that the Revolution, in Carl Becker's fa mous words, was not only about "home rule" but also about "who was
4 5 Introdw:tion
to rule at home. t t~ They have tried to describe the Revolution essentially as a social struggle by deprived and underprivileged groups against en trenched elites. But, it has been correctly pointed out, despite an ex traordinary amount of research and writing during a good part of this century, the purposes of these Progressive and neo-Progressive histori ans-"to portray the origins and goals of the Revolution as in some significant measure expressions of a peculiar economic malaise or of the social protests and aspirations of an impoverished or threatened mass population-have not been fulfilled."3 They have not been fulfilled be cause the social conditions that generically are supposed to lie behind all revolutions-poverty and economic deprivation-were not present in colonial America. There should no longer be any doubt about it: the white American colonists were not an oppressed people; they had no crushing imperial chains to throw off.4 In fact, the colonists knew they were freer, more equal, more prosperous, and less burdened with cum benome feudal and monarchical restraints than any other part of man kind in the eighteenth century. Such a situation, however, does not me an that colonial society was not susceptible to revolution.
Precisely because the impulses to revolution in eighteenth-century America bear little or no resemblance to the impulses that presumably account for modern social protests and revolutions, we have tended to think of the American Revolution as having no social character, as hav ing virtually nothing to do with the society, as having no social causes and no social consequences. It has therefore often been considered to be essentially an intellectual event, a constitutional defense of American rights against British encroachments ("no taxation without representa tion"}, undertaken not to change the existing structure of society but to preserve it. For some historians the Revolution seems to be little more than a colonial rebellion or a war for independence. Even when we have recognized the radicalism of the Revolution, we admit only a political, not a social radicalism. The revolutionary leaders, it is said, were pe culiar "eighteenth-century radicals concerned, like the eighteenth century British radicals, not with the need to recast the social order nor with the problems of the economic inequality and the injustices of strat ified societies but with the need to purify a corrupt constitution and fight off the apparent growth of prerogative power. "5 Consequently, we have generally described the Revolution as an unusually conservative affair, concerned almost exdusively with politics and constitutional rights, and, in comparison with the social radicalism of the other great revolutions of history • hardly a revolution at alt.
Introdw:tion
If we measure the radicalism of revolutions by the degree of social misery or economic deprivation suffered, or by the number of people killed or manor houses burned, then this conventional emphasis on the conservatism of the American Revolution becomes true enough. But if we measure the radicalism by the amount of social change that actually took place-by transformations in the relationships that bound people to each other-then the American Revolution was not conservative at all; on the contrary: it was as radical and as revolutionary as any in history. Of course, the American Revolution was very different from other revolutions. But it was no less radical and no less social for being different. In fact, it was one of the greatest revolutions the world has known, a momentous upheaval that not only fundamentally altered the character of American society but decisively affected the course of sub sequent history .
It was as radical and social as any revolution in history , but it was radical and social in a very special eighteenth-century sense. No doubt many of the concerns and much of the language of that premodern, pre Marxian eighteenth century were almost entirely political. That was because most people in that very different distant world could not as yet conceive of society apart from government. The social distinctions and economic deprivations that we today think of as the consequence of dass divisions, business exploitation, or various isms-capitalism, racism, etc. -were in the eighteenth century usually thought to be caused by the abuses of government. Social honors, social distinctions, perquisites of office, business contracts, privileges and monopolies, even excessive property and wealth of various sorts-all social evils and sociaJ depri vations-in fact seemed to ftow from connections to government, in the end from connections to monarchical authority. So that when Anglo American radicals talked in what seems to be only political terms purifying a corrupt constitution, eliminating courtiers, fighting off crown power, and, most important, becoming republicans-they nevertheless had a decidedly social message. In our eyes the American revolution aries appear to be absorbed in changing only their governments, not their society. But in destroying monarchy and establishing republies they were changing their society as weil as their governments, and they knew it. Only they did not know-they could scarcely have imagined how much of their society they would change. J. Franklin Jameson, who more than two generations agodescribed the Revolution as a social movement only to be roundly criticized by a succeeding generation of historians, was at least right about one thing: "the stream of revolution,
6 7 Introduction
once started, could not be confined within narrow banks, but spread abroad upon the land. ' ,6
By the time the Revolution had run its course in the early nineteenth century, American society had been radically and thoroughly trans formed. One dass did not overthrow another; the poor did not supplant the rich.? But social relationships-the way people were connected one to another-were changed, and decisively so. By the early years of the nineteenth century the Revolution had created a society fundamentally different from the colonial society of the eighteenth century. It was in fact a new society unlike any that had ever existed anywhere in the world.
Of course, there were complexities and variations in early American society and culture-Iocal, regional, sectional, ethnic, and dass differ ences that historians are uncovering every day-that make difficult any generalizations about Americans as a whole. This study is written in spite of these complexities and variations, not in ignorance of them. There .is a time for understanding the particular, and there is a time for understanding the whole. Not only is it important that we periodically attempt to bring the many monographic studies of eighteenth-century America together to see the patterns they compose, but it is essential that we do so-if we are to extend our still meager understanding of an event as significant as the American Revolution.
That revolution did more than legally create the United States; it transformed American society. Because the story of America has turned out the way it has, because the United States in the twentieth century has become the great power that it is, it is difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate and recover fully the insignificant and puny origins of the country. In 1']60 America was only a collection of disparate colonies huddled along a narrow strip of the Atlantic coast-economically un derdeveloped outposts existing on the very edges of the civilized world. The less than two million monarchical subjects who lived in these col onies still took for granted that society was and ought to be a hierarchy of ranks and degrees of dependency and that most people were bound together by personal. ties of one sort or another. Yet scarcely fifty years later these insignificant borderland provinces had become a giant, al most continent-wide republic of nearly ten million egalitarian-minded bustling citizens who not only had thrust themselves into the vanguard of history but had fundamentally altered their society and their social relationships. Far from remaining monarchical, hierarchy-ridden sub jects on the margin of civilization, Americans had become, almost over-
Introduction
night, the most liberal, the most democratic, the most commercially minded, and the most modern people in the world.
And this astonishing transformation took place without industrializa tion, without urbanization, without railroads, without the aid of any of the great forces we usually invoke to explain "modernization." It was the Revolution that was crucial to this transformation. It was the Rev olution, more than any other single event, that made America into the most liberal, democratic, and modern nation in the world.
Of course, some nations of Western Europe likewise experienced great social transformations and "democratic revolutions" in these same years. The American Revolution was not unique; it was only different. Because of this shared Western-wide experience in democratization, it has been argued by more than one historian that the broader social transformation that carried Americans from one century and one kind of society to another was 'I inevitable" and "would have been completed with or without the American Revolution." Therefore, this broader so cial revolution should not be confused with the American Revolution. America, it is said, would have emerged into the modern world as a liberal, democratic, and capitalistic society even without the Revolu tion." One could, of course, say the same thing about the relationship between the French Revolution and the emergence of France in the nineteenth century as a liberal, democratic, and capitalistic sodety; and indeed, much of the current revisionist historical writing on the French Revolution is based on just such a distinction. But in America, no more than in France, that was not the way it happened: the American Rev olution and the social transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened "in any case," but we will never know. It was in fact Iinked to the Revolution; they occurred together. The American Revolution was integral to the changes occurring in American society, politics, and culture at the end of the eighteenth century.
These changes were radical, and they were extensive. To focus, as we are today apt to do, on what the Revolution did not accomplish highlighting and lamenting its failure to abolish slavery and change fun damentally the lot of women-is to miss the great significance of what it did accomplish; indeed, the Revolution made possible the anti-slavery and women's rights movements of the nineteenth century and in fact all our current egalitarian thinking. The Revolution not only radically changed the personal and social relationships of people, induding the
8 Introduction
position of women, but also destroyed aristocracy as it had been under stood in the W~stern world for at least two millennia. The Revolution brought respectability and even dominance to ordinary people long held in contempt and gave dignity to their menial labor in a manner un precedented in history and to a degree not equaled elsewhere in the world. The Revolution did not just eliminate monarchyand create re publies; . it actually reconstituted what Americans meant by public or state power and brought about an entirely new kind of popular politics and a new kind of democratic officeholder. The Revolution not only changed the culture of Americans-making over their art, architecture, and iconography-but even altered their understanding of history , knowledge, and truth. Most important, it made the interests and pros perity of ordinary people-their pursuits of happiness-the goal of so ciety and government. The Revolution did not merely create a political and legal environment conducive to economic expansion; it also released powerful popular entrepreneurial and commercial energies that few re alized existed and transfonned the economic landscape of the country. In short, the Revolution was the most radical and most far-reaching event in American history .
Z .
MONARCHY
I. Hierarchy
To appreciate the extent of change that took place in the Revolution, we have to re-create something of the old colonial society that was sub sequently transformed. Despite all the momentous transformations that had taken place since the seventeenth-century settlements, mid-eighteenth-century colonial society was in many ways still tradi tional-traditional in its basic social relationships and in its cultural consciousness. All aspects of life were intertwined. The household, the society, and the state-private and public spheres-scarcely seemed sep arable. Authority and liberty ftowed not as today from the political or ganization of the society but from the structure of its personal relationships. In important respects this premodem or early modern society still bore traces of the medieval world of personal fealties and loyalties out of which it arose.
To be sure, already by the middle ofthe century a thousand different aberrations and peculiarities, a thousand different anomalies and incon sistencies, cried out for resolution and explanation. Powerful social and economic developments were stretching, fraying, and forcing apart older personal bonds holding people together, and people everywhere were hard pressed to explain what was happening. New ideas, new values, were ernerging in the English-speaking world, but the past was tena cious. Like all Englishmen, the colonists continued to embrace deeply rooted assumptions about the orderand stability needed in a monar chical society.
Living in a monarchical society meant, first of all, being subjects of the king. This was no simple political status, but had allsorts of social, cultural, and even psychological implications. As clarified by Sir Edward Coke and other jurists in the seventeenth centu ry , the allegiance the English subject owed his monarch was a personal and individual matter. Diverse persons related to each other only through their common tie to the king, much as children became brothers and sisters only through their common parentage. Since the king, said William Blackstone, was the "po.ter fll11lilÜls of the nation," to be a subject was to be a kind
19 MONARCHY
of child, to be personally subordinated to a paternal dominion. In its starkest theoretical form, therefore, monarchy, as Americans later carne to describe it, implied a society of dependent beings, weak and inferior, without autonomy or independence, easily cowed by the pageantry and trappings of a patriarchal king. The whole cornmunity, said Benjamin Franklin in 1763, is regulated by the example of the king.'
Because monarchy had these implications of humiliation and depen dency, the Anglo-American colonists could never be good monarchical subjects. But of course neither could their fellow Englishmen "at home' three thousand miles across the Atlantic. All Englishmen in the eigh teenth century were known throughout the Western world for their in subordination, their insolence, their stubborn unwillingness to be governed. Any reputation the North American colonists had for their unruliness and contempt for authority came principally from their Englishness.
In our enthusiasm to contrast the "traditional" society of the mother country with the "modernity" of the colonies, we have often overlooked how dominantly British and traditional the colonists' culture still was; indeed, in some respects colonial society was more traditional than that of the mother country. Most colonial leaders in the mid-eighteenth cen tury thought of themselves not as Americans but as Britons. They read much the same Iiterature, the sarne law books, the same history , as their brethren at horne read, and they drew most of their conceptions of society and their values from their reading. Whatever sense of unity the disparate colonies of North America had carne from their common tie to the British crown and from their membership in the British empire. Most colonists knew more about events in London than they did about occurrences in neighboring colonies. They were provincials living on the edges of a pan-British world, and all the more British for that. Their little colonial capitals resembled, as one touring British officer remarked of Williamsburg, nothing so much as "a good Country Town in Eng land. " Philadelphia seemed only a smaller version of Bristol. Most English visitors in fact tended to describe the colonists simply as country cousins-more boorish, more populist, more egalitarian perhaps, with too much Presbyterianism and religious nonconformity-but still Eng Iishmen, not essentially different from the inhabitants of Yorkshire or Norwich or the rest of rural and small-town provincial England . Ob server after observer thought that "the manners, morals and amuse ments" of America in the mid-eighteenth century were "in a humbler degree . . . much the same . . . as in the mother country. ' '2
Hitrarchy '3
In fact, it is very difficult to find contemporary descriptions of the colonists that were not applicable as weil to the English at horne. True, the colonists were thought to be a particularly unruly lot, crude if not barbarous, and especially defiant of social and political authority. But this reputation did not make them any less subjects of the English king; it only made them more English. Had not Montesquieu written that the English were too busy with their interests to have politeness and refine ment?3 Englishmen everywhere simply made poor subjects for monar chy, and they were proud of it. The king had his birthright to the crown, but the people had theirs too: they were "free-born Englishmen;" and they had rights and liberties that no other people in the world enjoyed. They had in fact more rights and liberties than any traditional heredi tary monarchy could accommodate; and consequently the British mon archy was very different not only from any other but also from what it had been in the days of J am es I.
Since the early seventeenth century the English had radically trans fonned their monarchy: they had executed one king and deposed an other, written charters and bills of rights, regularized the meetings of their parliaments, and even created a new line of hereditary succession. In the years following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 they had become increasingly aware of the marvelous peculiarity of their limited mon ar chy. "The constitution of our English government (the best in the World) , " they told thernselves, "is no arbitrary tyranny, like the Turk ish Grand Seignior's, or the French King's, whose wills (or rather lusts) dispose of the lives and fortunes of their unhappy subjects. ,'. Represen tat ion in the House of Commons even allowed for the participation of His Majesty's subjects in the affairs of government. It was a constitution specially dedicated to liberty.
Liberty: Englishmen everywhere of every social rank and of every political persuasion could not celebrate it enough. Every cause, even repression itself, was wrapped in the language of English liberty. No people in the history of the world had ever made so much of it. Unlike the poor enslaved French, the English had no standing army, no lettres de cachet; they had their habeas corpus, their trials by jury, their free dom of speech and conscience, and their right to trade and travel; they were free from arbitrary arrest and punishment; their hornes were their castles. Although few Englishmen and no Englishwomen could vote for representatives, they always had the sense of participating in political affairs, even if this meant only parading and huzzahing during the pe riodie elections of the House of Commons. It would be impossible to
14 MONARCHY
overemphasize the degree to which eighteenth-century Englishmen rev eled in their worldwide reputation for freedom. Even the young Prince of Wales, soon to be George 111, shared in this unmonarchical celebra tionof liberty. "The pride, the glory of Britain, and the direct end of its constitution;" he said, "is political liberty;"> No unruly American provincial could have put it better.
Many of the characteristics for which the eighteenth-century colo nists were noted were in truth English characteristics or exaggerations of English characteristics. Contineutal critics accused the English of be ing crude and unpolished. But like the colonists, the English tumed this lack of cultivation into an advantage: Frenchmen, they said over and over, were overrefined, foppish, and efferninate, sunk in luxury and misery, and overawed by superstitious priests in wooden shoes-no match for their own sturdy, brawling, beef-eating John Bull character. Just as the English commented on the uniformity of speech among the different social ranks of the colonists, so too did Europeans comment on the same characteristic among the English themselves. Americans may have had a multiplicity of religious groups and a consequent reputation for religious toleration. But so too did the mother country, "If there were only one religion in England, " wrote Voltaire in his Phi/osophiuJ Letters, "we should have to fear despotism; ifthere were two, they would cut each other' s throats; but there are thirty, and they live in peaee and happiness. "6
Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic bragged of their indepen dence. To be sure, most colonial farmers owned their own land and were thus different from the mass of tenant fanners who characterized English agriculturallife. Yet too much can be made of this contrast, for dependent as English tenant farmers may have been, they were not seen to be dependent either by themselves or by foreigners. Although the farmers of New York held their lands "in Fee simple," said Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden in 1']65, "they are as to condition of Iife in no manner superior to the. eommon Farmers in England. " English tenant-farmers were in fact eelebrated for their independence, partieu larJy in comparison with the cringing peasants of France, where, as Dr. Johnson's friend Mrs. Thrale observed, "everyone seems to belong to some other man and no man to himself.' Independenee and depen dence were relative and not absolute statuses, and most colonists, like most Englishmen at horne, were never as free as they made themselves out to be.?
Ameriea had a reputation for egalitarianism, but so too did England.
Hierarchy 15
Unlike the Continent, England had no legal or customary barriers to set off its landed aristocracy from the rest of society, and the consequent uninterrupted circulation arnong the various ranks impressed European observers. When even a Manchester cobbler in 1756 could dream and cel ebrate the mobility of English society-"leaving the Coast open for new adventurers" -it is not surprising that foreigners thought the English were mad for equality. European visitors from aeross the Channel thought that ordinary Englishmen had no respect for authority; common people hooted at their social superiors in the streets and jeered at social pretensions everywhere, Foreigners were stunned to discover common workingpeople of England, even apprentices and streetwalkers, min gling with and emulating their betters on Sunday strolls in Greenwich Park. In France the peasants dressed like peasants, noted the Swedish visitor Peter Kalm, but in England laboring men and women wore knee breeches and perukes, bonnets and panniered dresses. In the eyes of Europeans everywhere, Englishmen appeared much too liberty-loving and egalitarian and indeed seemed infected with a "republican spirit."!
To be the subject of an English king who celebrated liberty as proudly as the humblest plebeian was to be a member ofa very unusual state indeed. By continental standards the English monarchy was scarcely a real monarchy. Yet, however superficial and hollow, it was still a monarchical society the colonists lived in, and it was still a king to whom they paid allegiance. In fact, because the growth of royal authority and inftuence in America was such a recent and novel development, the colonists in the mid-eighteenth century could at times be more enthu siastic monarchists than the English themselves. South Carolinians, said Dr. David Rarnsay, "were fond of British manners even to excess, " and similar comments were made of other colonists up and down the seaboard. No metropolitan Englishman could have rnatched the awe feit by the Pennsylvanian Benjamin Rush when in 1']68 he first saw the king's throne in London. It was as if he were "on sacred ground," and he "gazed for some time at the throne with emotions that I cannot describe." Rush importuned his reluctant guide to let hirn sit upon it "for a eonsiderable time," even though the guide said that visitors rarely did so. The experience was unsettling, to say the least: "I was seized with a kind of horror," said Rush, and "a crowd of ideas poured in upon my mind." This was all a man could want in this world; "his passions conceive, his hopes aspire after nothing beyond this throne." No wonder Rush, eventually came to rue the degree to which people's "affections" had been "absorbed by kings and nobles": too many col
16 MONARCHY
oniltl, including himself, had once spoken "only of George the 3rd" and ignored their fellow countrymen.f
Perhaps, as David Hume slyly noted, the colonists revered the king 10 much more than metropolitan Englishmen precisely because they were so far away and thus never knew what a king was really like. Certainly the colonists' excitement over the accession of George III in 1760 equaled that of Englishmen at home. William Henry Drayton of South Carolina thought that no people were ever "rnore wrapped up in a king" than were Americans in 1763. 10
Of course, most colonists knew little about monarchy finthand. Un like Rush, they never saw the throne, never witnessed royal progresses, and never saw much royal pomp and ceremony. But colonial newspa pers reported royal occasions in detail, and colonial authorities did what they could to maintain respect for the crown. They displayed royal arms and emblems in public buildings and celebrated royal occasions like the king's birthday by firing cannons, setring off fireworks, and dispensing drinks. The royal governors were increasingly anxious to establish styles of living that would befit their rank as the crown' s viceregents and do honor to the king-by building distinguished govemment houses, by dressing lavishly, by entertaining generously." They had the power to pardon condemned criminals, and sometimes they used it, like a new king succeeding to the throne, when they took up their gubematorial offices. The governors' ability to set aside the law in this way was de signed to induce awe among the people and to enhance royal authority: the condemned persons usually pleaded for their lives on their knees in open court. Royal authority being as thin as it was in the colonies, the governors resorted to this pardoning power quite freely, in some colo nies sparing as many as one-quarter to one-half of those condemned to death. 'v
In the mid-eighteenth century Englishmen on both sides of the At lantic made new etrorts to embellish royal authority. Since the colonial courts were hardly awesome by English standards, every little effort was made to dignify the king's dispensing of justice, even if this only in volved raising the justices' bench in a Virginia courtroom a foot or so above the ftoor. In 1764 the New York Supreme Court, in emulation of the mother country and several other colonies, ordered the judges and the counsel appearing before them to don robes or gowns and bands in order to advance the "Dignity Authority Solemnity and Decorum of the Court," and to promote "many useful consequences." John Adams recalled that in the early I']60S the Massachusetts authorities had likewise
Hierarchy 17
introduced a new "scenery" in the supreme court-e-v'of scarlet and sa ble robes, of broad bands, and enormous tie wigs"-in order to create a more "theatrical" and "ecclesiastical" setting for the doing of justice. Full-length, gold-framed portraits of Charles 11 and James 11, said Adams, were "hung up on the most conspicuous sides" of the court room "for the admiration and imitation of all men." "The colors of the royal ermines and long flowing robes were the most glowing, the figures the most noble and graceful, the features the most distinct and characteristic"-these portraits of these particular Stuart kings were de signed to overawe. All this, thought Adams, made the council chamber in Boston'sold town hall "as respectable an apartment as the House of Commons or the House of Lords in Great Britain, in proportion. "'3
However recently contrived or artificially imposed, royal authority in the colonies was more deep-rooted and more effective by mid-century than ever before. Despite widespread smuggling of goods, especially in New England, most American trade was being carried on within the confines of the British navigation laws: British or colonial ships carried the goods, colonial staples such as sugar, tobacco, and rice were sent to Britain, the colonists imported increasing amounts of British manufac tures, and most European imports came to America through England. Although the colonists grumbled about and evaded some of these im perial regulations, their compliance was remarkably high; legal com merce soared and all participants prospered as never before. With the resumption of Anglo-French warfare in the 175Os, British funds poured into the colonies, and the colonists responded to the empire's war needs in unprecedented fashion; by the end of the decade many of the colonies had mobilized huge proportions of their manpower and resources to fight on behalf of the British crown. At the same time there were more successful strong royal govemors in the colonies than ever before-from William Gooch and Francis Fauquier in Virginia to Williarn Shirley and Thomas Pownall in Massachusetts....
Religion tended to bolster monarchical authority and order, espe cially among ordinary people for whom Christian revelation (and magie) remained the major means ror understanding and manipulating the world. The European tradition of centralized state-supported churches that had heen only fitfully applied in the colonies during the seventeenth century was dramatically expanded in the first third of the eighteenth century. Although religious groups in most of the colonies lacked the kind of legally established dominance that the Church of England achieved in the mother country, all of their chu rehes , including the
18 MONARCHY
dissenting ones, extended their institutional and disciplinary hold over colonial society. Everywhere in the decades following 1690 governments helped the churches assert coercive Christian authority over increasing numbers of people who had hitherto been neglected or ignored. In all the colonies clerical power was reinvigorated, new parishes were laid out, larger and more elegant churches were built, new and more elab orate ceremonies were established, and more and more unchurched were brought under the control of formal religion; in these different ways monarchical authority and obedience were subtly fortified. Even the Puritan churches of New England reversed their original exclusivity and localism by attempting to strengthen the central authority of the clergy and by reaching out to embrace larger and larger proportions of the society. By offering religious rituals and services to everyone, however, the revived Anglican church during the first half of the century did the most to extend the crown 's Christian authority into the remotest areas and the lowliest ranks of American society. Although the leaders of all religious groups tended to support hierarchical authority to one degree or another-for example, by preaching from Romans 13 that all were "subject unto the higher powers ... for conscience sake" and by ex alting personal and emotional loyalties over calculating and conditional ones-none of them supported and spread the ethic of monarchy more forcefully than did the Anglicans. By the time of the Revolution there were some four hundred Anglican congregations in the North American colonies. Even moderate Anglican preachers continually stressed the sa credness of authority and the need for subjects to honor and revere those set over them and thereby lent a more monarchical tone to the culture than it otherwise would have had. Although the Anglican church often appealed to the poorest and the most powerless of the colonists, as the king's church it was also especially attractive to the top of the social scale-to royal officials and other elites. Indeed, by mid-century Angli cans held public office in numbers out of proportion to their numbers in the society, which further contributed to a strengthening of monarchy in the colonies."
Royal authority never seemed more impressive and aceeptable to the colonists than at mid-century, not simply because wars naturally favored a growth in the inftuence of the crown and the Anglican church was growing in strength, but also because the theoretical underpinnings of their social thought still remained largely monarchical. They may not have known much of real kings and courts, but they knew very weil the social hierarchy that the subjection and subordination of monarchy nec-
Hierarchy '9
essarily implied. Monarchy presumed what Hume called "a long train of dependence," a gradation of degrees of freedom and servility that linked everyone from the king at the top down to the bonded laborers and black slaves at the bottom. The inequalities of such a hierarchy were acceptable to people because they were offset by the great emo tional satisfactions of living in a society in which everyone, even the lowliest servant, counted for something. In this traditional world "every . Person has his proper Sphere and is of Importance to the whole."r6 Ide ally, in such a hierarchy no one was really independent, no one was ever alone and unattached. Hence followed the fascination of the eigh teenth century with the fate of isolated individuals, like Robinson Cru soe, strangers without relatives or connections cast alone in the world. '7
In the eighteenth century, as in the time of John Winthrop, it was nearly impossible to imagine a civilized society being anything but a hierarchy of some kind, in which, in the words of the famous Calvinist preacher Jonathan Edwards, all have "their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and everyone keeps his place, and continues in his proper business. " In such a society it was inconceivable, unnatural, for inequality not to exist.
Order is Heav'n's first law; and this confest, Some are, and must be, greater than the rest, More rieb. more wise . . .
The hierarchy of a monarchical society was part of the natural order of things, part of that great chainof existence that ordered the entire uni verse, part of what John Adams called that "regular and uniform Sub ordination of one Tribe to another down to the apparently insignificant animalcules in pepper Water. ' 118
A proper society was like the plenitude of nature: nothing was ever lost, nothing was ever wasted. This traditional society contained a lim ited number of pIaces and goods, with the implication that no one could really advance and prosper except at someone else's expense. Movement from one rank to another was not only possible, of course , but necessary if people were to find their allotted positions; but such mobile persons had to possess and demonstrate the qualifications of the rank or position into which they moved. It was unnatural to pretend to be something that one was not equipped to be. "A man of low stature may add something to his height, but nothing to his comeliness by strutting upon stilts." Ideally, people were expected to find and artend to "the proper
MONAICHV'0
BUline.." of their particular place within the social order and to "con .ider their mutual Relations and Dependeneies, and duly perform the Dutiel of their respective Stations" and thus promote the moral consen lU. and harmony essential for a healthy society. "God hath in great wildom, " said the Reverend Thomas Cradock of Maryland at rnid century, ugiven variety of abilities to men, suitable to the several sta tions in life, for which he hath design'd them, that everyone keeping his station, and employing his respective abilities in doing his own work, all might receive advantage. "19
Both the New England towns with their ancient "warning out" reg ulations and the southern colonies with their vagabond legislation ex pected everyone to belong somewhere, and they used the force of law to maintain their inherited sense of community. Under the warning-out laws, for example, towns could legally eject "strangers" and have con stables convey them from town to town until they were returned to the town where they legally belonged." Society had to be an organic whole. The colonists repeatedly invoked those powerful lines from Corinthi ans-"that there should be no Schism in the Body but the Members should have the Same Care for one another" -and widely condemned all selfish persons and parties, indeed "anything that dissolved in a moment the solidest friendship.' '21
The colonies were simple, underdeveloped provincial societies, and they lacked the great inequalities and the intricate calibrations of the more complicated society of the mother country. Yet they had their own degrees and subordinations. Although eighteenth-century Americans were "without nobility, or orders of gentry," recalled Arthur Browne, an Anglican clergyman who Iived in several New England cities, there was evidence everywhere in the colonies of "how necessarily some dif ferences of rank, some inequality must and ought to grow up in every society. ' ''12
The colonists' sense of hierarchy was reinforced in a multitude of ways. The military seemed to reproduce the soeiety, and thus it was natural for land grants to veterans of the French and Indian wars to be made according to rank, with field-grade officers receiving 5,000 acres each, captains 3,000 acres, and so on, down to privates, who received 50 acres each. College students learned, sometimes through harsh pun ishments, the importance of hierarchy. They were required, in the words of Yale president Thomas Clap, to "show due Respeer and Distance to those who are in Senior and Superior Classes" and were taught through a variety of means the intricacies of rank and precedence within the
Hierarchy 21
college. Students, for example, had to remove their hats at varying dis tances from the person they approached, depending on the status of that person: ten rods for the president, eight rods for a professor, and five rods for a tutor. All had some sense of where they stood and how they ought to behave toward others in this social hierarchy. And if they did not, there were guidebooks, like that copied by a young George Wash ington, telling them when to pull off their hats "to Persons of Distinc tion," how to bow "according to the Custom of the Better Bred and Quality of the Person"-what to do, in short, in order to "give to every Person his due tide According to his Degree.' ':13
Social ranks carried designations, and such designations, whether "Mr.," "Esq.," "Yeoman," or whatever, were virtually part of a per son's name. Pleadings in courts of law often depended on plaintiffs or defendants getting their social rank correct. "If it is of any Consequence to society that Ranks and subordination should be established in it," argued the young attorney John Adams in 1']61, "it is of Consequence that the Titles denoting those Ranks should not be confounded." Every title from the local militia was carried over into private life; there was hardly a justice of the peace who was not a colonel. When William Brattle went on a mission to New Hampshire on behalf of the Massa chusetts governor, he took care to let all "rhe Country People" know that "he was General Brattle, that he might make them Stare," and that his words "might have more weight." New England farmers prized the subtle shade of difference between husbandman and yeoman. Church pews were assigned on the basis of family heads' age and social position; and entering students at Harvard and Yale were ranked according to the social respectability of their families, On the eve of the Revolution the colonists squabbled over the proper seating order at the governors' tables to the point where Joseph Edmundson, the Mowbray herald ex traordinary of the English College of Arms, had to be called in to pre pare "Rules of Precedency" to lay down the preeise social position of the various colonial officials.24
These differences of title and quality did not resemble our modern conception of "elass. " Although the colonists talked of "gentlemen of the first rank," people of "middling circumstances," and the "meaner sort,' they did not as yet think c1early in terms of those large-scale horizontal solidarities of occupation and wealth with which we are fa miliar today. Distinctions in colonial society were measured by far more subtle, rar more emotionally powerful criteria. Money and property were of course critically important, but by themse1ves they could not create
~~ MONARCHY
and sustain the inequalities of this social hierarchy. Indeed, the distri bution of wealth in eighteenth-century colonial society was far more equal than it would become in the nineteenth century. ~s But a more equitable distribution of wealth did not make this traditional society more equal than the one that would emerge in the decades following the Revolution. It was just differently organized.
There were, of course, a number of occupational categories. Men were in fact considered to be brtd to their occupations and were usually labeled by occupation as coopers, tradesmen, laborers, and so on.,lf) Usu ally occupational designations were for common people only-for all those who were defined by what they did rather than by who they were. The learned professions-medicine, law, and divinity-were not yet re garded as occupations in any modern sense of the term. Indeed, "pro fession" still bore traces of its ancient meaning as something publicly and voluntarily professed, like a religious avowal; and therefore mern bers of the learned professions were generally not defined by how they occupied themselves but by who they were-by their "quality" or gen demanly status. Although designations of quality were becoming harder to make in the increasingly complex eighteenth-century pan- British so ciety, nonetheless efforts were continually made." Some positions government officeholders and the liberal professions-usually carried with them a presumption of high social status and the title of "Mr." or "Esq." lt was thought, for example, that c1ergymen were "often by birth, and always by education and profession gentlernen.Y'"
Most people in the society were planters or farmers; a few of them possessed a high degree of quality, most did not. Calling oneself a planter or farmer could be confusing, however, for gentlernen who applied such tides to themseJves never meant to say that they were cuJtivators by trade. Those involved in overseas commerce, and hence creating wealth for the country, were designated as merchants-a very respectable but not genteel title. There were, moreover, many different sorts of mer chants. In large port cities there were great ones, Jike Able James of Philadelphia, deeply involved in the lucrative and prestigious dry-goods trade with Great Britain. But for every such great merchant in Phila delphia, New York, or Boston, there were scores of smaller traders and shopkeepers, not only in the large ports but in lesser pIaces such as Hanford or Norfolk, sornetimes deaIing in coastwise or West Indian routes but often just scrambling every which way in an endless search for goods and places with which to trade. Various sorts of artisans and mechanics existed everywhere-on southern plantations, in small towns,
Hitrarchy ~3
and in the port cities. Indeed, one-third to one-half of the male popu lation of the large cities was eomposed of artisans or meehanics, and they ran the gamut from very rieh to very poor. Some were beginning teenaged apprentices, others were journeymen working for wages, and many were masters, ranging from those who hired themselves out to those few who ran huge manufaeturing establishments employing doz ens of workers. No matter how wealthy an artisan became, however, his social status or quality remained at best only middling-along with most other laboring people in this society. Below these were the "meaner sort," distinguished from everyone above them by their lack of prop erty-their lack, that is, of either land, goods for trading, or a skill of some sort.29
Out of these occupational categories and differing levels of wealth a c1ass consciousness of a sort would begin to rise by the early nineteenth century.r' But in the mid-eighteenth eentury most Americans still con ceived of their society in a traditional manner, eomposed not of broad and politically hostile layers or c1asses but of "various individuals, con nected together and related and subservient to each other. "3' They thought of themselves as connected vertically rather than horizontally, and were more apt to be conscious of those immediately above and below them than they were of those alongside them. Probably nothing captures more succinctly the peculiar vertical nature of this social hier arehy than a passage from Henry Fielding's great comic novel ]oseph Andrtws (1742). Fielding saw the degrees of dependenee in the society as "a kind of ladder' , :
as, for instance: early in the morning arises the postilion, or some other boy, which great families, no more than great ships, are without, and falls to brushing the clothes and c1eaning the shoes of John thc footman; who, being drest hirnself, applies his hands to the same Ia bours for Mr. Second-hand, the squire's gentleman; the gentleman in the Iike manner, a little later in the day, attends the squire; the squire is no sooner equipped than he attends the levee of my lord; which is no sooner over than my lord hirnself is seen at the levee of the fa vourite, who, after the hour of homage is at an end, appears hirnself to pay homage to the levee of his sovereign. Nor is there, perhaps, in this whole ladder of dependence, any one step at a greater distance from the other than the first from the second; so that to a philosophcr the question might only seern, whether you would choose to be a great man at six in the morning, or at two in the afternoon. And yet thcre are scarce two of these who do not think the least familiarity with the
25 24 MONARCHY
persons below them a condescension, and, if they were to go one step farther, a degradation. 3~
Although individuals in this graded society might on occasion erupt in passion against the rich and the moneyed, few groups or occupations could as yet sustain any strong corporate or dass consciousness, any sense of existing as a particular social stratum with long-term common interests that were antagonistic to the interests of another stratum. In fact, most people could locate themselves only in superiority or in sub ordination to someone else. Their behavior and courtesies were always relative, for it was "absurd to act the same with a Clown and a Prince.'· Thus the colonists' literature on how to behave in society always had to advise for both directions at once, above and below: "with Superiors, courteous and fair-spöken; not over familiar nor surly, with inferiors.' I Individuals were simultaneously free and subservient, independent and dependent, superiorand inferior-depending on the person with whom they were dealing. Thus they did not have dass positions or occupations as much as they had relationships; and the degrees of these relationships could sometimes be calculated with startling precision. When a new tutor to a household of children was even advised to "let the same distance be observed in every article of behaviour between you and the eldest Son, as there ought to be, by the latest and most approved pre cepts of Moral-Philosophy, between the eldest Son, and his next young est Brother," then we know we are dealing with a society that took its degrees of subordination seriously. 33
2. Patricians and Piebeians
Despite the fact that most of coJonial society was verticalJy organized, there was one great horizontal division that cut through it with a sig nificance we can today scarceJy comprehend-that between extraordi nary and ordinary people, gentlernen and commoners. Although the eighteenth century was becoming increasingJy confused over who pre cisely ought ro make up each of these basic groups, there was little question that in alJ societies some were patricians and most were ple beians, that some were officers and most were common soldiers, that some were polished and literate and most were rude and unlettered, that some were gentlemen and most were not. There were the few who were sometimes caUed "the reverend" or "right reverend," "the hon-
Patncians anti Pleheians
ourable," or "excellentI" or "noble," or "puissantI" or "royal," and there were the many who were often called "the Mob," "the Vulgar," or "the Herd." This social cleavage, this "most ancient and universal of alJ Divisions of People;" overwhelmed all others in the culture, even the one between free and enslaved that we find so horribly conspicuous. The awareness of the "difference between gmtle and simple, " recalled the Anglican minister Devereaux J arrett of his humble youth in colonial Virginia, was "universal among all of my rank and age." Since this distinction has lost almost all of its older meaning (Jarrett hirnself lived to see "a vast alteration, in this respecr"), it takes an act of imagination to recapture its immense importance in the eighteenth century. Southern squires entered their churches as a body and took their pews only after their families and the ordinary people had been seated. Massachusetts courts debated endlessly over whether or not particular plaintiffs and defendants were properly identified as gentlemen. More than any other distinction, this difference between aristocrats and commoners, between gentlemen and ordinary people, made manifest the unequal and hier archical nature of the society. 1
In the English-speaking world the aristocracy composed a small but immensely powerful proportion of the society, constituting perhaps only 4 or 5 percent of the population, though in the northern colonies of North America that proportion approached 10 percent. Originally the term "aristocracy" referred to a form of government, government by the most distinguished in birth and fortune; but by the eighteenth cen tury "aristocracy" had been popularly extended to embrace the entire patrician order to which such a governing body belonged. Although this aristocracy was a group distinct from the main body of the social hier archy, it was itself marked by severe degrees of rank. At its top was the king. Below hirn were the peers of the realm, rarely numbering more than two hundred at any one moment in the eighteenth century. These dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts, and barons had huge estates and hereditary titles and, in the case of the English peers at least, automat ically sat in the House of Lords (Scottish peers elected a proportion of their number to the House of Lords). Baronetcies, too, were inheritable but gave the holder no right to a seat inthe House of Lords. Below these were several titled ranks of knights and esquires. The entire aristocracy was bottomed on the large body of gentry, the lowest social rank entitled to bear a coat of arms. ~
"Gentleman" originally meant noble by birth and applied to all of the aristocracy, including even the king. But from the sixteenth century
26 27 MONARCHY
on, with the enlargement of the aristocracy from below by the entry of numerous lesser gentry, the hereditary peerage sought to confine the term "gentleman" to all those who stood as "a middle rank betwixt the nobles and common people." But although this distinction between the nobility and the gentry developed to the point where Dr. Johnson defined a gentleman as "not noble," most eighteenth-century English men still considered gentlemen to be part of the aristocracy.!
When the gentry are inc1uded in the eighteenth-century English ar istocracy, the numbers were in proportion to the population not all that different from the numbers of the eighteenth-century French nobility. Indeed, the English aristocracy and the French nobility may have been much more alike than we used to think. Certainly entry into the upper ranks of the English aristocracy and the French nobility was equally difficult. During most of the eighteenth century the English peerage was scarcely accessible to anyone who was not already weIl established and weil connected. In fact, the English kings gave many of the new titles only to those who already had one. What did distinguish the aristocra cies of the two countries was the extent to which the status of nobility was hereditary. In France, the aristocracy was defined legally, and all children of a French nobleman inherited noble status (though it could be forfeited by marriage outside the nobility or by the pursuit of ignoble employment). In England, only the topmost ranks of the aristocracy were hereditary, and even then the titles descended only in the eldest male line. The rest of the children of the titled nobility were thrown off into the lower gentry ranks of the aristocracy. By the eighteenth century the gentry was defined largely in social, not legal, terms. It was the legally uncontrolled access to this category of gentleman at the bottom that gave the English aristocracy its reputation for openness.
By modern standards, perhaps even by eighteenth-century French standards, that reputation was greatly exaggerated. However amor phous and accessible the bottommost level of the eighteenth-century En glish aristocracy may have been, gentlernen in the English-speaking world constituted a distinct group separated from ordinary people to a degree that can only astonish late-twentieth-century Americans. "The title of a gentleman," wrote one early-eighteenth-century observer, "is commonly given in England to all that distinguish themselves from the common sort of people, by a good garb, genteel air, or good education, wealth or learning." Yet becoming a gentleman was no easy matter. "A finished Gentleman," conc1uded Richard Steele, His perhaps the most uncommon of all the great Characters in Life."4
Pamaans anti Pleheians
So distinotive and so separated was the aristocracy from ordinary folk that many still thought the two groups represented two orders of being. Indeed, we will never appreciate the radicalism of the eighteenth century revolutionary idea that all men were created equal unless we see it within this age-old tradition of difference. Gentlemen and com moners had different psyches, different emotional makeups, different natures. Ordinary people were made only "to be bom and eat and sleep and die, and be forgotten." Like Mozart's Papageno, they knew "Iittle of the motives which stimulate the higher ranks to action, pride, honour, and ambition. In general it is only hunger which can spur and goad them on to labour. " Ordinary people were thought to be different phys ically, and because of varying diets and living conditions, no doubt in many cases they were different. People often assumed that a handsome child, though apparently a comrnoner, had to be some gentleman's bas tard offspring. At times the aristocracy thought that common people resembled Jonathan Swift's Yahoos, having only appetites and being little more than "cattJe." George Washington called ordinary farmers "the grazing multitude." Colonel Landon Carter, aleader of one of Virginia's most distinguished families, saw little to respect among or dinary people and thought that some of them were "but Idiots." Even John Adams early in his career referred to them as the "common Herd of Mankind. " "Common Persons," he said, "have no Idea [of] Leam ing, Eloquence, and Genius," and their "vulgar, rustic Imaginations" were easily excited. To Nathanael Greene "the great body of the Peo pIe" were always "contracted, selfish, and illiberal," and not to be confused with the "noble" natures of gentlemen. As the ambitious son of a Rhode Island ironmonger desperate for distinction and feeling sur rounded by a "mist [of] ignorance," Greene was bound to exaggerate the inferiority of the vulgar. But often other, more established gentry also regarded the common people as narrow-minded and bigoted with little awareness of the world. Despite the best efforts of enlightened elites to spread orthodox Christianity and reason, many ordinary people still believed in an occult world of spirits and demons and still relied on a wide variety of magical practices. They were presumably unimaginative and unreflective and rarely saw beyond their own backyards and their own beUies. They had, said Gouvemeur Morris, "no morals but their interests.' '5
No wonder some aristocrats believed that such ignorant, supersti tious, small-souled ordinary folk were made for monarchy. The "un thinking rnob," the "ignorant vulgar," were easily taken in by their
28 29 MONARCHY
senses, especially by their sight, and were often overawed byelaborate displays of color and ermine. Even at the end of his long life and a decade's experience with republican government, Benjamin Franklin could still conclude that "there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government.' '6
Compared with what young Alexander Hamilton caUed "the un thinking populace," the members of the aristocracy were very different. They were those "whose Minds seem to be of a greater Make than the Minds of others and who are replenished with Heroie Virtues and a Majesty of Soul above the ordinary Part of our Species." These great souled men were driven by passions that ordinary peopJe could never comprehend, by ambition, by pride, by honor, and by " a Prospect of an Immortality in the Memories of all the Worthy, to the End ofTime." In war, the arts, or government, they were the source of achievement and works of genius. The aristocracy were those from whom rulers were drawn; it was from their ranks that the Caesars and Catos, the Crorn wells and Marlboroughs, emerged, which is why such men were to be feared as much as admired. Men of soaring ambition were those in the society who made things happen; they were the men of "extraordinary Character" who were destined to distinguish their "Path thro' the World by any Great Effects." A fifteenth-century nobJeman had thought that in a description of political events it was "sufficient to speak of the high ranking people, for it is through them that God's power and justice are made known." And so it had always been through the ages and was still for many in the eighteenth century: only the ambitions and actions of the great, of the high-ranking, of kings and generals, of aristocrats and gentlemen, counted in the direction and movement of events. John Locke thought that in educating a society the ,. most to be taken Care of is the Gentlemen's Calling. For if those of that rank are by their Education once set right, they wiU quiekly bring the rest into Order." Most gentlemen in that age, like some people even in our own time, believed that the intentions and concerns of ordinary men and women did not matter much in history. Even Thomas Jefferson thought that the ordinary people most often seen by travelers-"tavern keepers, Va lets de place, and postiJions"-were "the hackneyed raseals of every country" who "must never be considered when we calculate the na tional character. "7
Before the mid-eighteenth century few patricians paid much arten tion to what Thomas Gray, in his "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, " called the "homeJy joys and destiny obscure" of ordinary
Patndans anti Pleheians
lowly people. In their "noiseless tenor," "the short and simple annals of the poor" were scarcely worth recording (wh ich was what gave Gray's great poem its ironie significance). Certainly no writer or artist thought the vulgar capable of noble and glorious actions. Yet writers of course could use common people for satiric or comic effect, largely by playing upon the natural repulsion eighteenth-century audiences would feel in seeing plebeian characters doing what they were not meant to do. Both English and provincial playwrights, from Oliver Goldsmith to Robert Munford, sought to make their audiences laugh by setting forth the ingenious ways inferiors might pretend to be something they were not. Nothing more amused eighteenth-century theatergoers than to watch servants and other lowly sorts attempting to strike the heroic poses of their betters.f
Although the formal status of most members of the English aristoc racy was not defined legally, the law did recognize their distinctiveness from commoners. Only gentlemen could display coats of arms and pre sumably be officers in the army or navy. Their treatment in law was different. Common soldiers captured in war were imprisoned; captured officers, however, could be released "on parole," after giving their word to their fellow gentlemen officers that they would not ftee the area or return to their troops. Although English law was presumably equal for all, the criminal punishments were not: gentlemen, unlike commoners, did not have their ears cropped or their bodies ftogged.
In just such ways were common people made to recognize and feel their inferiority and subordination to gentlemen. People in lowly sta tions, Jarrett remembered, were apt to be filled with consternation and awe when confronted with "what were called gmtle10th . . . beings of a superior order." They often stood red-faced and fumbling, caps in hand, when talking with gentlemen. No wonder many of the most humble developed what was called a "down look.' Old George Hewes of Mas sachusetts, seventy years after the event, still had seared into his mind the memory of being scared "almost to death" during a visit he made as a twenty-year-old apprentice cobbler to the horne of Squire John Hancock. Common people, noted the Maryland physieian Alexander Hamilton, knew "how to fawn and cringe" before "a person of more than ordinary rank." They stared "like sheep" at a gentleman's "Iaced hat and sword." The sight of a periwig was apt to send them running. They often shook their heads in bewilderment at an elaborately printed page or gaped in awe at a gentleman's spouting of Latin or Greek. But since their ignorance, inferiority, and subordination seemed part of the
3 1 MONARCHY3°
natural order of things, many common folk feit little shame in their differentness. They dutifully made their bows and doffed their caps be fore ladies and gentlemen; they knew their place and willingly walked while gentlefolk rode; and as yet they seldom expressed any burning desire to change places with their betters.?
"My parents," Jarrett recalled, "neither sought nor expected any titles, honors, or great things, either for themselves or children .... They wished us all to be brought up in some honest calling, that we might earn our bread, by the sweat of our brow, as they did." The naturalist John Bartram feIt the same way about his son William. "I don't want him to be what is commonly called agentIeman," he said in 1755· "I want to put hirn to some business by which he may, with care and industry, get a temperate reasonable living. "10 We will never comprehend the distinctiveness of that premodern world until we ap preciate the extent to which many ordinary people still accepted their own lowliness. Only then can we begin to understand the radical changes in this consciousness of humility, among other things, that the American Revolution brought about.
Of course, in the outlying colonies of the greater British world the aristocracy was bound to be different from what it was in the metropol itan homeland. In the colonies there were few peers or titled gentry, a deficiency that bothered a good many imperial officials. Since the colo nists only occasionally saw someone with a title-a visiting landlord , a royal governor, a British general-their sense of aristocracy was largely confined to the category of gentry. But this limitation did not make their aristocracy any less distinctive in their minds. In Virginia, for example, the distinction was there practically from birth: ,. Before a boy knows his right hand frorn his left, can discern black from white, good from evil, or knows who made hirn, or how he exists, he is a Gentleman." And as agentIeman, "it would derogate greatly from his character, to learn a trade; or to put his hand to any servile employment." Because of the lack of a titled aristocracy in the colonies, being a gentleman became all that more irnportant."
In the southern colonies perhaps as few as one in twenty-five adult white males was readily acknowledged as a gentleman, while in the northern colonies maybe one in ten was accorded that status; but all the North American colonies recognized this distinction between the great and the humble, gentlemen and commoners. Even among the New Jer sey farmers, who were remarkably "Level" in wealth and esrate, there were some "Gentlemen in the first rank of Dignity and Quality" with
patricio,ns anti Plebtians
"high-born, long-recorded Families. " Limited as these New Jersey gen try may have been in their property, they were still quite distinguishable from "the laborious part of Men, who are commonly ranked in the middling or lower Class." In the Chesapeake region these differences were of course far greater. In Virginia in 1171 the top 7.9 percent of the planten controlled one-third of the land in the colony. Same of these aristocratic planters had truly grand pretensions, as Philip Fithian, the College of New Jersey (later Princeton) graduate who became tutor to the family of the great Virginia planter Robert Carter, was at pains to point out. The great planters' "amazing property" in land and slaves, no matter how burdened with debts, had created in all the owners' minds, said Fithian, a belief "that they areexalted as much above other Men in worth and precedency, as blind stupid fortune has made a dif ference in their property." The South Carolina aristocracy, with its "state and magnificence, the natural attendants on great riches," was even more overwhelming, especially to someone like Josiah Quincy, who knew only plain Puritan Boston. Charleston with its "grandeur and splendor ... ," Quincy wrote in 1773, "far surpasses all lever saw, or ever expect to see, in America. " All the colonial cities, in fact, were breeding grounds for aristocrats. There in the urban centers select in dividuals, "by more information, better polish and greater intercourse with strangers, insensibly acquired an ascendency over the farmer of the country; the richer merchants of these towns, together with the clergy, lawyen, physicians and officers of the English navy who had occasion ally settled there, were considered as gentry. " It was in the great towns, all travelers agreed, where one found the "more civilized" inhabitants, those who were distinguished from the common herd by their refine ment and learning."
Although the precise nature of the "men of quality," the "better sort," was more in doubt in the eighteenth century than ever before in Western history , the colonists still had some lingering inherited ideas of who a gentleman was. John Adams in 1']61 at least thought he knew when someone was not agentIeman, "neither by Birth, Education, Office, Reputation, or Employment," nor by "Thought, Word, or Deed." A person who springs "from ordinary Parents," who "can scarcely write his Name," whose "Business is Boating," who "never had any Commissions"-to call such aperson a gentleman was "an arrant Prostitution of the Title." The colonists had a number of ways of distinguishing this genteel status. 13
The most important measure was still "Birth and Parentage," as
3 2 33 MONARCHY
befitting a monarchical society with an inherited crown. All men were created unequal. God, it was said, had been "pleas'd to constitute a Difference in Families. " Although most children were of "Iow Degree or of Common Derivation, Some are Sons and Daughters of the Mighty: they are more honorably descended, and have greater Relations than others." The word "gentry" was, after all, associated with birth, de rived from "gens" or stock. English and colonial writers like Henry Fielding and Robert Munford, even when poking fun at the false pre tensions of the aristocracy, had to have-for the harmony of their sto ries-their apparently plebeian heroes or heroines turn out to be secretly the offspring of a gentleman. A monarchical society necessarily had a deep cultural prejudice against what the Maryland- physician Alexander Hamilton called people of "low extraction. "14
Wealth, too, was important in distinguishing a gentleman, for "in vulgar reckoning a mean condition bespeaks a mean man." One sar donic observer of the gentry of King William County, Virginia, in the I']60S said that any male who had "Money, Negroes and Land enough" was automatically considered a "compleat gentleman"; even a man "looked upon . . . as unworthy of a Gentleman' s notice because he had no Land and Negroes" could, if he, "by some means or other, acquired both," become "a Gentleman all of a sudden. " But for many, property and riches alone were never enough to make someone a gentleman. Not only did some impoverished persons claim gentry status, but some com mon laboring people had more property than some gentlemen. Increas ingly in this early modern society, wealth and even birth-the traditional sources of aristocratic or gentry status-were surrounded and squeezed by other measures of distinction, by cultivated, man-made criteria hav ing to do with manners, taste, and character. ,. No man," it was more and mo.e said, "deserves the appellation a Gentleman until he has done something to merit it.' '15
Gentlemen walked and talked in certain ways and held in contempt those who did not. They ate with silver knives and forks while many common people still ate with their hands. They took up dancing and fencing, for both "contribute greatly to a graceful Carriage." They were urged by their parents to study poetry and to learn to play musical instruments and to "become perfectly easy and natural" intheir man ners, particularly in "real humility, condescension, courteousness, af fability." "A Gentleman," they were told, "should know how to appear in an Assembly [in] Public to Advantage, and to defend hirnself if at tacked. " Philip Fithian said that any young gentleman traveling through
Patricians anti Pleheians
Virginia was presumed to be acquainted with dancing, boxing, card and fiddle-playing, and the use of a small sword. Gentlemen prided themselves on their c1assical learning, and in both their privately cir culated verse and their public polemies they took great pains to display their knowledge. Unlike common people, gentlemen wore wigs or pow dered their hair, believing that "nothing [was] a finer ornament to a young gentleman than a good head of hair weil order'd and set forth," especially when appearing "before persons of rank and distinction." They dressed distinctively and fashionably. In contrast to the plain shirts, leather aprons, and buckskin breeches of ordinary men, they wore lace rufRes, silk stockings, and other finery. They sought to build elaborate houses and to have their portraits painted. Little gratified their hearts more than to have a "coach and six," or at least a "chariot and four," to have servants decked out in "fine liveries, " to have a reputation for entertaining liberally, to be noticed. Some colonial gentry or would-be gentry, like Jonathan Trumbull, an obscure trader from Lebanon, Con necticut, even refined the spelling of their names and acquired coats of arms from the Herald's office in London."
Ultimately, beneath all these strenuous efforts to define gentility lay the fundamental classical characteristic of being free and independent. The liberality for which gentlemen were known connoted freedom freedom from material want, freedom from the caprice of others, free dom from ignorance, and freedom from having to work with one's hands. The gentry's distinctiveness came from being independent m a world of dependencies, learned in a world only partially literate. and leisured in a world of laborers.
We today have so many diverse forms of work and recreation and so much of our society shares in them that we can scarcely appreciate the significance of the earlier stark separation between a leisured few and a laboring many. In the eighteenth century, labor, as it had been for ages, was still associated with toil and trouble, with pain, arid man ual productivity did not yet have the superior moral value that it would soon acquire. To be sure, industriousness and hard work were every where extolled, and the Puritan ethic was widely preached-but only for ordinary people, not for gentlemen, and not for the sake of increas ing the society's productivity. Hard, steady work was good for the char acter of common people: it kept them out of trouble; it lifted them out of idleness and barbarism; and it instilled in them the proper moral values; but it was not thought to expand the prosperity of the society. Although Locke had argued that labor was the source of property, most
34 35 MONARCHY
conventional thinking did not yet regard labor as a source of wealth. People labored out of necessity, out of poverty, and that necessity and poverty bred the contempt in which laboring people had been held for centuries. Freedom was always valued because it was freedom from this necessity to labor. Most people, it was widely assumed, would not work if they did not have to . "Everyone but an idiot," said the English ag ricultural writer Arthur Young in a startling summary of this traditional view, "knows that the lower dass rnust be kept poor or they will never be industrious." It was "poverty," wrote Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts in 1']61, that " will produce industry and frugality . " To many ordinary people in this premodern age (as indeed to many even today in the Third World) leisure seemed more attractive than work . for as yet they could see no reason why they should work harder. Which is why gentlemen spent so much time and energy urging the common people to be industrious."
In time the consumption by ordinary people of goods beyond neces sities-everything from china dishes to lace curtains-would provide a sufficient incentive for working harder, but this possibility was only be ginning to be notieed in the middle of the eighteenth century. Tradi tionally consumption was regarded as both the privilege of the gentry and as an obligation of their rank . Gentlemen responded to unernploy ment among the laboring ranks by ordering another pair of boots or a new hat. In the seventeenth century Thomas Mun had argued that "the purse ofthe rich" maintained the poor . In the eighteenth century Mon tesquieu still agreed: "If the rieh do not spend so lavishly," he wrote , "the poor would die." When unemployed silk workers rioted in London in 1765, the king's natural reaction was to ensure that the ladies of his court ordered expensive silk gowns for the next ball. "To be born for no other Purpose than to consume the Fruits of the Earth, " wrote Henry Fielding in 1751, " is the Privilege (if it may be really called a Privilege) of a very few. The greater Part of Mankind must sweat hard to produce them, or Society will no longer answer the Purposes for which it was ordained . " Sir joseph Banks, the famous botanist, agreed : he even wor ried that farmers were growing rich enough to send their sons to college to become " Lawyers, Parsons, Doctors, etc.," and thus turning them "into Gentleman Consumers and not Providers of Food. , ..8
"An Aged Farmer" of New Jersey in 1770 urged his fellow farmers to stop complaining about the gentry's fox-hunting on their land. "Be grudging the young Men of [Philadelphia) the Use of this Diversion in our Woods" was shortsighted, he said. These gentlemen more than
Patricians anti Pkbeians
made up for "all the tittle injuries that they may do by Accident, in Pursuit of those noxiow Anima/s, " by consuming our produce. Who eise, he asked, would purehase our watermelons if not these gentry? Fox hunting may have been a "Luxury" as charged, but so were water melons . "They are of no Kind of Use as Food," and yet the gentry "pay us some Thowand Pounds a Yea," for them. The Jersey farmers were indebted to the gentry's luxuries, Being able to dispose of his "Truck" in "the Philadelphia Market .. . for Cash, without paying . .. Toll for having the Liberty of selling it," was for this old Jersey farmer an "Indulgence" that had brought hirn "mueh good living in my Time," for which he acknowledged his gratitude, "as should also my Country men, who are mostly under the same Obligations. "'9 Consumption was a gentry prerogative that could be used quite purposefully. The psy chology of the Americans' resistance movement in the I']60S and 1770s its resort to various nonimportation agreements and boycotts of British goods-rested on this traditional assumption about the nature of genteel consumption: that it was a kind of indulgence or favor done for those producers dependent on it and the refusal to consume was a form of coercive punishment. In the Association of October In4: members of the Continental Congress further revealed their genteel biases by agreeing to "discountenance and discourage every species of extravagance and dissipation ," including the fashionable resort to elaborate mouming dress and the giving of gloves and scarves at funerals. 00
The debate over luxury that emerged in the pan-British world in the eighteenth century was directly related to the increased consumption of genteei goods by ordinary people. Luxury, which Benjamin Franklin's friend Richard Jackson defined as "a greater expense of subsistence than in prudence a man ought to consume," was relative to social rank: much of what a gentleman needed a commoner did not, and thus many of the necessities of a gentleman were a common man's luxuries. Lux ury therefore was a serious social vice, a symptom of social disarray. Although all social ranks were presumably capable of luxurious living of consuming beyond their needs-the spending habits of ordinary people were what most concemed and alarmed their betters. The aris tocracy needed to display its status by spending, but the responsibility of common people was to produce, not to consume. Thus followed the many traditional attempts to impose sumptuary laws on ordinary people and the continual calls for rnore frugality among the commonality . The evil of luxury was the evil of ordinary people violating the social hier arehy and Iiving beyond their allotted social rank . Luxurious spending
3 6 37 MONARCHY
by the aristocracy provided useful work for common people ; it was, as Gibbon said, a voluntary tax paid by the rich for the sake of the poor. But if this luxurious spending extended throughout all social ranks, then, according to the received wisdom, common people would reduce their exertions, become idle, begin to act like aristocrats, and thus confound all social distinctions."
Idleness, leisure, or what was best described as nol exerting oneself for profit, was supposed to be a prerogative of gentlemen only . Gentle men, James Harrington had written, were those who "live upon their own revenue in plenty, without engagement either to the tilling of their lands or other work for their livelihood . " In the early eighteenth century Daniel Defoe defined "the gentry" as " such who live on estates, and without the mechan ism of employment, including the men of letters, such as clergy, lawyers and physicians." A half century later Richard Jackson similarly characterized the gentry as those who "live on their fortunes. " Aristocrats lived upon what we today might call " unea rn ed income"; they did not work for a living. Although sorne northern col onists might suggest that gentlemen farmers ought to set "a laborious example to their Domesticks. " perhaps by taking an occasional turn in the fields, a gentleman's activity was supposed to be with the m ind. Managing their landed estates meant exercising authority-the only ac tivity befitting a truly free man. Of course, like the ancient Roman landed aristocrats whom many eighteenth-century gentlernen sought to emulate, landed gentry such as Thomas Nelson of Virginia were deeply involved in all sorts of commercial and entrepreneurial activities breeding their cattle, upgrading their soil, improving their fruit trees, speculating in land, or even trafficking and trading .·· Bur they engaged in these commercial activities in something other than a pure money making spirit, and that presumably made all the difference.
If they had sufficient aristocratic status, they could scorn commercial profiteering as greedy and ungenteel and yet at the same time exploit every possible means to increase their wealth without any sense of con tradiction . But ideally, of course, they were not to work for a Iiving ; their income was supposed to come to them indirectly frorn their wealth-from rents and from interest on bonds or money out on loan and much of it often did. Immense cultural pressure often made them pretend that their economic affairs were for pleasure or for the good of the community, and not for their subsistence. 2) They saw themselves and , more important , were seen by others as gentlemen who happened to engage in some commercial enterprises. Unlike ordinary people , gen-
Pamaans anti Piebeians
tlemen traditionally were not defined or identified by wh at they did, but by who they were . They had avocations, not vocations. The great French naturalist the Comte de Buffon did not like to think of hirnself as anyone other than "a gentleman amusing myselfwith natural history." He did not want to be called a "naturalist," or even a "great naturalist." "Naturalists, linkboys, dentlsts, etc ."-these, said Buffon , were "peo pie who live by their work; a thing iII suited to a gentleman." Clergy men, doctors, lawyers, were not yet modern professionals, working long hours for a living like a common artisan . Their gentry status depended less on their professional skills than on other sources-on family, wealth, or a college education in the liberal arts; and doctors, lawyers, and clergymen who had none of these were therefore something less than gentlemen-peuifoggers, charlatans, or quacka."
One thing seemed clear: as John Locke had said, "Trade is wholly inconsistent with a gentleman's calling." Prominent merchants dealing in international trade brought wealth into the society and were thus valuable members of the community , but their status as independent gentlemen was always tainted by their concern to "serve their own pri vate separate interest, " Retail trading was even worse. The Charleston rnerchant-planter Henry Laurens was keenly aware of the bad image buying and selling had among southern planters . In 1764 he advised two impoverished but aspiring gentry immigrants heading for the backcoun try to establish thernselves as planters before attempting to open a store . For them to enter immediately into "any retail trade in those parts," he warned, "would be mean, would lessen them in the esteem of people whose respect they must endeavour to attract." Only after they were "set down in a creditable manner as planters" might they "carry on the sale of many specie of European and West Indian goods to some advantage and with a good grace." Even that might not work, as former staymaker and wealthy merchant Charles Wallace of Annapolis discov ered after he purchased a plantation and sought to become a Maryland aristocrat . Although Wallace eventually did get appointed to the gov ernor's council and did associate with the prominent gentry of Mary land, he was never really accepted; as his nephew pointed out, "he was not quite a patrician , "'5
From the beginning of the eighteenth century a number of think ers-Daniel Defoe, Bernard Mimdeville, Richard Steele, and joseph Addison among them-had attempted to reconcile the astonishing growth of English commerce with traditional notions of gentility. Some even went so far as to extol the exertion for profit as superior to aristo·
3 8 39
MONARCHY
cratic leisure, but the classicaJ aversion to moneymaking remained streng. Although Addison in The SpeeltztOT tried to make his merchant character Sir Andrew Freeport respectable, in the end he had to have Sir Andrew retire from business and buy a landed estate in order to become a full-ftedged gentleman. Thus it was natural for many English men on both sides of the Atlantic to conclude that having a landed estate worked by others was "the only Gentlemanlike Way of growing rich . . . ; all other Professions have something in them of the mean and suhstTVimt; this alone is free and noble. "26
Labor or working in order to live was thus traditionally considered to be servile, associated with dependency and a lowly status. Even Ben jamin Franklin, for all his praise of the work ethic, never valued toil for its own sake, and certainly not for agentIeman. "Who is there;" he once wrore, "rhat can be handsome1y Supported in Affluence, Ease and Pleasure by another, that will chuse rather to earn his Bread by the Sweat of his own Brows?" Men worked from necessity, he said, not from choice. As soon as Franklin acquired enough wealth not to have to work, he retired from business at the age of forty-two and became a gentleman of leisure. Nobody who continued to work for a living, es pecially with his hands-no plowman, no printer, no artisan-no matter how wealthy he became, no matter how many employees he managed, could ever legitimately claim the status of gentleman. Only when the small-time Charleston trader John Marley and the prosperous printer Benjamin Franklin actually gave up their businesses and freed them selves from mandatory labor could they enter the ranks of gentlemen. Anyone who worked with his hands, even a great painter with noble aspirations like John Singleton Copley, was socially stigmatized. Copley painted the portraits of dozens of distinguished colonial gentlemen, and he knew what his patrons thought of his art. For thern, Copley said bitterly in 1767, painting was "no more than any other useful trade, as they sornetimes term it, like that of a Carpenter tailor or shoemaker.' '27
But it was not enough for a man to avoid trade or manual labor and to think hirnself agentIeman. Ultimately the rank of the "better sort," especially in colonial America, which lacked any legal titles for its aris tocracy, had to rest on reputation, on opinion, on having one's claim to gentility accepted by the world. Once this reputation was gained, it was worth a great deal, both materiaHy and psychologically. Gentry status brought respectability and credit, and for that very personal eighteenth-century world thar lacked most of our impersonal modern
Patricians anti Pltheians
devices for money transactions, respectability and credit were very nearly everything. Among the Virginia planters, noted Fithian, just the fact of a Princeton education meant that "you would be rated, without any more questions asked, either about your family, your Estate, your business, or your intention, at IO,OOO! and you might come, & go, & converse, & keep company, according to this value; & you would be dispised & slighted if you rated yourself a farthing cheaper." It is thus understand able why, when given the choice, New York traders preferred to list themselves as "gentleman" rather than as "merchant. " One tutor re fused to continue teaching in a Chesapeake household unless the family began treating hirn as the "gentleman" he feIt hirnself to be. If only he could be regarded as a gentleman, then the poverty that was being thrown up to hirn would soon be remedied.f
No wonder, then, that eighteenth-century gentlemen so jealously guarded their reputations. "Scarcely anything is so important to an individual as a good Name" was a maxim every gentleman valued. The poet John Trumbull thought that, in Connecticut at least, "three or four weil invented lies, properly circulated and coming from the right Persons, will ruin any but the most Respectable Character." This is why the polemies of the period could be so personally vicious and vi tuperative. No accusation was too coarse or outrageous to be made by one gentleman against another-from drunkenness and gambling to im potence and adultery-for the purpose of such accusations was to de stroy the gentlemanly reputation of one's opponents and thereby bring into question both their social authority and the legitimacy of their arguments.~
This reputation was another name for honor-a traditional quality still much invoked by the eighteenth century. Honor was the value gen teel society placed on agentIeman and the value that agentIeman placed on himself. Honor suggested a public drama in which men played roles for which they were praised or blamed. It subsumed self-esteem, pride, and dignity, and was akin to glory and farne. Gentlemen acted or avoided acting for the sake of their honor. Honor was, in fact, as one American said, "as strong an incentive to Action as self-Preservation and perhaps more so." Honor was a stimulus for ambition, which was thought to be an exclusively aristocratic passion. Everyone had appetites and interests, but only the restless-minded, the great-souled, the extraor dinary few, had arnbition-that overftowing desire to excel, to have precedence, and to achieve farne. It was the kind of passion that in 1769
I
1
I
41 4° MONARCHY
led Alexander Hamilton, a fourteen-year-old merchant's clerk on the obscure island of St. Croix, to wish for a war so he could risk his life and gain honor.s?
War was so exciting and inspiring to eighteenth-century gentlemen precise1y because it offered so many more opponunities for achieving honor and farne than did other endeavors. "The rnore danger the greater glory," declared a young and ambitious John Adams. Yet Adams al ways knew instinctiveJy, and to his great frustranen, that he was not cut out "to make a Figure in Arms," which is why he never could quite forgive George Washington his eventual success."
There was, of course, something old-fashioned, even feudal, about this gentlemanly concern with reputation and honor-as the new dem ocratic world of' the nineteenth century would increasingly discover. Since it was "the nature of honor to aspire to preferments and titles," honor, Montesquieu had written, was ideally suited to a monarchical society. In fact, he said, honor was the very life and soul of monarchy. It set all parts of a monarchical society in motion and by its very action connected them together. Honor was the means by which kings gained the allegiance and support of the ambitious heroes and gentlemen of the society. Honor made sense only in an unequal society, observed the English philosopher David Hartley. "Men that are much commended, presently think themselves above the Level of the rest of the World .... It is evident from the very Nature of Praise, which supposes something extraordinary in the Thing praised, that it cannot be the Lot of many. " Honor was exclusive, heroic, and elitist, and it presumed a world very different from the worJd that was emerging and from our own, a hier archical world in which a few could unabashedly claim a rnoral superi ority over the rest.J2
This gentlemanly superiority was so great and so distinctive that it had its own mies of respectability. This superiority or honor was gen erally recognized by demonstrations of respect for the head, either by the gentry's wearing of wigs or by the doffing of caps by ordinary folks in the presence of gentlefolk. Any affront to the head, ranging from a slap in the face to scalping, was an act of dishonor. Such a concept of honor lay behind the practice of dueling. Dueling was the means by which gentlemen proteered their reputations or their honor among other gentlemen. Indeed, for some, dueling was the ultirnate recognition of the distinctiveness of being agentIeman. The law's remedy for insults may have been good enough for ordinary people, but "there are those
Patricio.ns and Pltheians
of a dijfermt character who know how to resent and to punish men for ill usage, without troubling a magistrate or a court of justice. "33 Gentle men were answerable for their honor to their equals alone. They could be insulted only by other gentlemen. A superior could ignore the affront of an inferior, since his honor or his reputation among other gentlemen was not thereby challenged.
Gentlemanly honor was bound up with the moral commitment to tell the truth or to keep one's word. Young William Paterson of New Jersey let his enthusiasm over becoming agentIeman carry hirn to the point of saying that legal devices such as "Contracts and evidence, and seals and Oaths were devised to tie fools, and knaves, and cowards: Honor and Conscience are the more firm and sacred ties of gentlemen." Few went that far, but most gentlemen thought that a gentleman's word was due only to those who socially deserved it-that is, to other gentle men. This is why captured military officers (that is, gentlemen, not common soldiers) could be released "on parole." To call into quest ion a gentleman's word or to give hirn the lie publicly was thus the most serious kind of affront, demanding satisfaction. The entire elaborate code worked out over centuries presumed a distinctive category of gen tlemen that transcended ordinary social and even national lines. Even in wartime, gentlemen officers in opposing armies recognized that they often had more in common with one another than they did with the common soldiers in their own armies.t'
The very clarity of gentlemen's social superiority over the rest of society could at times permit what later generations would regard as an unbecoming familiarity between different social ranks. Gentlemen rnin gled affably with their inferiors at sporting events and other popular entertainments and rubbed shoulders in taverns and streets more easily than would be the case a half century later. Only a hierarchical society that knew its distinctions weil could have placed so much valu- on a gentleman's capacity for condescension-that voluntary humiliation, that willing descent from superiority to equal terms with inferiors. Rufus 'I Putnam, a young Massachusetts enlisted man serving with the provin cial forces attached to the British army in northern New York du ring the Seven Years' War, thought that Brigadier General George Augus tus, Viscount Howe, possessed such a perfect ability to condescend that "every soldier in the army had a personal attachment to hirn." Howe, who was second-in-comrnand in the 1758 expedition against Fort Ticon deroga, frequently came among the men, said Putnam, "and his man
43 4 2 MONARCHY
ner was so easy and fermiller, that you loost an that constraint or diffi dence we feele when addressed by our Superiours, whose manners are forbiding. "3;
Gentlemen drank with their inferiors, joked with them, and some times teased them, as with children. Southern gentry planters called their neighboring freeholders by their first names, but expected to be called "Mr." or "Your Honor" in return, Gentlemen often took the vulgarities of their inferiors for gran ted and feIt little threatened by them, Sometimes they scarcely thought about those far beneath them. Wh at is extraordinary about the Itinerarium of Dr. Alexander Hamilton that remarkably detailed report of a four-month trip northward in 1744 by a learned and observant Maryland physician-was Hamilton's ig noring of the presence or activities of his Negro servant, who accom panied hirn throughout. The more confident gentlernen were of their superiority, the more familiar they might be. Thus William Byrd could blithely eat the corn pone served to slaves while a boatwright looked on in disgust. 36
By the early nineteenth century men looked back puzzled by the "unsophisticated" and "illiberal" "semi-barbarism" of their eighteenth-century childhood. It was a more boisterous, rnore violent, and more freewheeling world then, Samuel Breck recalled, and people behaved in strange ways. Wild revels and bloody street fights were con doned by people of quality. Pope's Day, the anniversary of Guy Fawkes's atternpt to blow up the Houses of Parliament on November 5, 1605, was celebrated in eighteenth-century Boston by parades, with ef figies of the pope, the devil, and the "guy" carried about the streets and later hanged and burned. During the day the north and south ends of Boston had rival parades and stoned and fought each other viciously. In the evening, companies of the vulgar, remembered Breck, actually used to enter the hornes of the gentry, put on mummeries, and then insolently demand money. What was most astonishing to Breck in rec ollecting these memo ries of his youth was that the colonial gentry of his parents' generation put up with such behavior and paid the money demanded; the new enlightened and refined nineteenth-century society, he declared, "would not brook such usage a moment." He could not comprehend that his genteel nineteenth-century world might have lost much more than it had gained.?
Patriarcluzl DeptruJmce
3. Patriarchat Dependence
The gentlemanly elites of the eighteenth century could condescend and be affable with their subordinates and inferiors because they often thought of themselves as parents dealing with children. Since most re lationships in this hierarchical society were still very personal, they were also necessarily paternalistic. It was only natural for the family-that oldest and most intimate of institutions-to be the model for describing most political and social relationships, not only those between king and subjects but also those between all superiors and subordinates. Some traditionalists still believed, as Montesquieu complained, "that nature having established paternal authority, the most natural government was that of a single person." Even a good whig like Daniel Defoe could argue that there was "a sort of Patriarchal Affection, as weIl as obliga tion, between a King on the Throne and the People he Governs." "The Obedience of Children to Parents is the Basis of all Government," wrote Addison in "The SpecltlJor. In fact, the family was "the measure of that Obedience which we owe to those whom Providence hath placed over us.' The language of paternalism and filial obligation still provided the common metaphors eighteenth-century Englishmen on both sides of the Adantic used to describe their hierarchical experiences.'
"Approach the Almighty with Reverence, thy Prince with Submis sion, thy Parents with Obedience, and thy Master with Respect" was the conventional advice given to al1. The king, said Governor James GIen of South Carolina, had "Paternal care of his People;" even in these C6 the most distant parts of his Dominions." If the people were good subjects, Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie told the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1752, they "will deserve the patemal Affection of his Majesty. tt Could there ever be a more powerful image of authority? Even "Almighty God ... ," said Dinwiddie, "has not disdained to be called the Father of us al1." All superiors, all magistrates, all masters, were "fathers" or "tender parents." Thus the kind of paternalistic or dering of social relations expressed in the early eighteenth century in the prescriptions of the Puritan divine Samuel Willard retained much of its vitality at mid-century: "The Fifth Commandment hath a proper respect to the Order which God hath placed among Mankind; and the Relative Duties which do ftow from the Nature of that Order. "~
Paternalism was meaningful to the colonists because much of their
45 44 MONARCHY
society was organized in famiJies or in those stark dependencies that resembJed the relationship between parents and chiJdren. For the colo nists, the famiJy, or what modern scholars call the household, was still the basic institution in the society and the center of a11 rights and obli gations. A "Iittle commonwealth," the original Puritan settlers had called it, and it remained for eighteenth-century Americans the funda mental source of community and continuity. Almost everyone spent some time in his or her life living in an extended household. And every one in the household was dependent on the will of the father or master (the terms were indistinguishable). The family was, in fact, not simply those living under one roof but a11 those dependent on the single head. And this head, the patriarch, was the only one who dealt with the larger world. Thus it was easy to conclude, as one New England clergyman did in 1754, that
as the Cil/i/ Statt, as weil as the Cnurches of Christ, is furnish'd with Members from private Families: if the Governors of these little Communities, were faithful to the great Trust reposed in them, and Family-Religion & Discipline were thoroughly, prudently & strictly, maintained & exercised ... ,the Civil State, would prosper and flour ish from Generation to Generation.3
The household and hence patriarchy may even have been stronger in America than in England precisely because of the weakness in the colonies of other institutions, such as guiJds. The famiJy household was still the pJace where most of the work in the society was done and where
, most of the education and training took place . In the absence of all the elaborate institurions of modern society-from hospitals and nursing hornes to prisons and asylums-the family remained the primary insti tution for teaching the young, disciplining the wayward, and caring for the poor and insane. No wonder that the colonists believed that society was little more than a collection of family households, to which all iso lated and he1pless individuals necessarily had to be attached. Every where families reached out and blended almost imperceptibly into the larger community.
Sometimes colonial communities seemed to be only enlarged fami lies. Inbreeding and intermarrying, particularly through the rernar riages of widowed spouses, often created incredibly tangled webs of kinship. Some of these kinship networks grew in time to permeate or encompass entire villages, counties, or even colonies. One-third of the
PatnarcluJ/ Deperu1ence
135 taxpayers in the early-eighteenth-century town of East Guilford, Connecticut, came from only five families; indeed, nearly 40 percent of all the families of the village were related to one another. joseph Ern erson of Pepperell, Massachusetts, said he "sometirnes regretted that he did not marry a Shattuck, for he should then have been related to the whole town." All the landed gentry of western Massachusetts were bound together by blood or marriage. The members of six families of Hampshire County held two-thirds of all county offices-creating what has been called ~'a county-wide famiJy magistracy. " The half dozen fam ilies that dominated theeighteenth-century South Carolina council were linked in a similar way. Governor William Bull, for example, had three daughters and two nieces, who married two Draytons, two Middletons, and an Izard. In Virginia seats on the grand juries as weil as on the vestries and the county courts fell to the same families year after year. At the funeral of Abraham De Peyster of New York in 1767, more than a hundred relatives attended, bearing twenty-five different famiJy names. Every colony had its few dominant aristocratic families, and some of these, like the Shippens of Pennsylvania and the Lees of Virginia, were linked through marriage across colonial boundaries.t
Gentry families in many of the colonies, in emulation of the English nobility, created the legal devices of primogeniture and entail, built "seats" for themselves in the country, and strenuously sought to amass estates they could pass on to their heirs. Parents at all social levels almost always named children after themselves and their relatives and created numerous 2nds, 3rds, and 4ths, and in the case of the intermarrying first families of Virginia a veritable polyphony of names: Nelson Page, Page Nelson, Carter Page, Page Carter, Mann Page, William Byrd Page, Carter Harrison, Harrison Carter, Shirley Harrison, Byrd Har rison, Shirley Carter, Carter Braxton, and so on and on.
During the second third of the eighteenth century 43 percent of all marriages among the planters of one Maryland county were between blood kin or persons previously related by marriage. New England was no different. The Minutemen of the towns were held together less by chains of command than by familialloyalties. The 3,047 Massachusetts soldiers who served in the Seven Years' War had only 1,443 family names. Over one-quarter of the Lexington militiamen mustered by Captain John Parker on April 19, Ins, were related to hirn by blood or marriage.>
Family relationships determined the nature of most people's lives, Land was the basis of life in most American communities, and most
4 6 47 MONARCHY
rights in land depended on ties of kinship. Before mid-century there was apparently much more continuity and stability in many colonial rural areas, at least in New England, than historians long imagined. In fact, the colonists were far more likely to have kin alive and to live dose to them than were the English in the mother country. 6 Many farmers were enmeshed in narrowly circumscribed worlds whose roots reached back to the seventeenth century. Sometimes as many as half of the younger sons without land might leave their communities, but most people did not: they lived out their entire lives in the locality in which they were born. Most New England farmers, and perhaps most others too, thought mainly of providing for their families and rarely justified their acquisi tiveness in any other terms than the needs of their families. What they principally wanted out of life was sons to whom they could pass on their land and who would continue the family name. For Virginians as weil as New Englanders, "a man's patrimony ... is a sacred depositum." Probably few ordinary farmers ever owned much more than what was handed down to them by their families. When they did accumulate wealth, they generally used it to buy more land in order to provide for their heirs.?
The land belonged to the male line. English laws of inheritance provided for primogeniture (all lands passing to the eldest son) when there was no will, and for entail (allowing a testator to keep the landed estate intact through the stem line of the family). Entail was used in nearly all the colonies, but most commonly in Virginia. Primogeniture was often used too, but not in the New England colonies, which in cases of intestacy provided for partible inheritance among all children of the decedent, usually reserving a double portion for the eldest son. But the New Engländers' practice, even when they wrote wills, of dividing up their estates among all the childreri, or at least the males, instead of leaving them entirely to the eldest sons, does not mean they were mod ern in their outlook. Far from it: New England families scarcely con ceived of themselves simply as conjugal units with the children sharing and sharing alike in the estates. They were traditional in their outlook, and not all that different from contemporary Europeans. Most prernod ern European families likewise preferred to partition their land among all their sons and to burden the land with various provisions for their daughters, if their tenure rights were secure and there was no danger of the land fragmenting into pieces too small to support a family. It was not unusual, there fore, for premodern parents to seek to secure the
PatnarchtJl Dependtnce
independence of as many of their children as possible without morseling the estate and impairing the social standing of the family. 8
In most of the colonies, at least before mid-century, land was suffi ciendy plentiful for fathers to be able to take care of more than the eldest son in passing on their estates. Indeed, given the abundance of land in America compared with England, what is remarkable is not that the colonists resorted to partible inheritance but that they tried to institute primogeniture and entail at all. The sole existing study we have of pri mogeniture and entail in Virginia is more ambiguous than we have been led to believe. Virginians held much land in fee simple and docked many of their entailed estates; yet even as they were struggling to free some of their entailed land for disposal, they were entailing other por tions. in their continuing efforts to establish their family estates, Even in New England, especially after 1750 when land became less available, most farmers favored one of the sons over the others in the distribution of the land. Nearly half of the inheritances in the little town of Che bacco, Massachusetts, left one or more surviving sons landless. Where there were no male heirs, the fathers often gave the estate to a married daughter and her husband to hold in trust for one of their sons; or sometimes they created male heirs by selecting a brother's son, partie ularly if the nephew bore the testator's own Christian name. At age eight John Hancock became a full member of the childless household of his unde Thomas Hancock and thereby became the heir to one of the largest fortunes in New England.?
In their inheritance practiees New Englanders followed what has been called the premodern European tradition of "favored heir plus burdens." And these burdens could be heavy. Although New England farmers apparently never sought to entail estates, their heirs usually found themselves enmeshed in networks of obligations to their mothers and less favored siblings, induding caring for aged kin, granting use rights to the estate, and paying legacies out of future revenues. The task of defining these rights and obligations could be an intricate business, and it was ofien done in a very pecuniary and unsentimental manner. Calculating the price of past services of a son to his deceased father, or detailing the different heirs' proportional rights to the use of haylofts, bamyards, and wells, or specifying the cords of wood to be delivered to a widow, resembled nothing so much as contractual business arrange ments between masters and apprentices or between neighbors. They were one more indieation that the colonial family was still largely indis
48 49 MONARCHY
tinguishable from the surrounding community; it was not yet a modern private institution bound together only by ties of affection."
In all the colonies, business and politics usually began with the fam ily. As a matter of course brothers took in each other' s sons in order to teach them trades or simply to apply discipline. Merchants often formed partnerships with their relatives and counted on members of their ex tended families to act as the trusted agents they needed in distant ports. Most craftsmen organized their trade around their families, either in their own horne or in an attached shop. An ironmaster, John Lesher, called the employees in his forges his "family," even though the group consisted of nearly thirty persons, not counting the colliers, woodcutters, and other day laborers."
Families everywhere built up local networks of kin and used them in politics. The dominant force in the North Carolina provincial assern bly in the early eighteenth century was a group of Cape Fear promoters, led by Maurice Moore, Roger Moore, and Edward Moselly, who were so closely tied together by kinship that their enemies called them the "Family." By 1731 at least half of the twenty-eight patentees of the rieh Cape Fear area were related to the Moores, who themselves held 83,000 out of the 105,000 acres patented. In many of the colonies people used family names-the De Lanceys in New York, the Ogdens in New Jer sey, the Wentworths in New Hampshire-to designate political groups. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, between 1700 and 1780 three successive Andrew Boardmans not only served almost continuously as town clerk and town treasurer but also were elected for ninety-three terms as se lectman, representative, and moderator. During the half century before the Revolution, more than 70 percent of the representatives elected to the New Jersey assembly were related to previously elected legislators, The situation in South Carolina was similar. Dominant families every where monopolized political offices and passed them among themselves even through successive generations. Whether it was the town clerkship in Norwich, Connecticut, or the clerk of the court in Lancaster County, Virginia, in each case a single family held the office for forty or so years before the Revolution. John Adams knew ofwhat he was speaking when he later stressed the importance of family dynasties in New England politics. "Go into every village in New England. " he said, "and you will find that the office of justice of the peace, and even the place of representative, which has ever depended only on the freest election of the people, have generally descended from generation to generation, in three or four families at rnost. "12
Patriarclud Depmdmce
Living within a family meant astate of dependence for everyone but the patriarch. Women rarely had an independent existence, at least in law. In public records women were usually referred to simply as the "wife of," or the "daughter of," or the "sister of" some male. Before marriage they legally belonged to their fathers and after marriage to their husbands. Most husbands in their wills refused to give their wives outright ownenhip of their landed estates; at best the wife got a life-use of the estate, which the widow usually lost upon her remarriage. With their husbands alive women were considered legally to be like children: they could not sue or be sued, draft wills, make contracts, or deal in property. Even the bodiees and ankle-length petticoats commonly worn by women, girls, and young boys in portraits suggest the similarity of their subordinate and dependent status. Women were in fact often treated as children by their husbands. Husbands might address their wives as "dear child" or by their Christian names but be addressed in return as "Mr." "I never know when to leave off," said one woman of her rambling letters to her husband, "but I depend on your sense to make allowances for the imperfections of a poor foolish Girl, whose Study & greatest pleasure always has & shall be to please you." "Sir," declared Elizabeth Byrd to her husband, William Byrd IH, "your Or den must be obeyed whatever reluctance I find thereby.' No wonder women who did not like to act the part of submissive children declared their "dependence" to be "a wrached state. "13
The traditional patriarchal view held that children and other family memben were absolutely dependent on the head of the household. In the seventeenth century Sir Robert Filmer had declared that "the Father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will," and some of that attitude lingered on. The head of the household remained a kind of miniature king, a governor or protector to whom respect and subjection were due. In the eighteenth century English law in the colo nies still distinguished ordinary murder from the murder of masters by servants or husbands by wives by providing for harsher punishments for these petit treasons, similar to those for high treason. Parents were told that they "should carefully subdue the wills of their children and accustom them to obedience and submission.' ''4
Nearly all of the traditional child-rearing manuals advocated the physical punishment of children. Heads of household expected their au thority to be instantly acknowledged, and they beat their children and other dependents with a readiness and fierceness that today leaves us wincing. Such discipline and punishment could emotionally distance
MONARCHY5°
children from their fathers, and children often Iived in fear and awe of their fathers. Nothing is more reveaJing than the note written by the twenty-seven-year-old Robert Bladen Carter to his father, Robert Carter, describing his attempt that morning to wait "on you in your Library with an intention of asking you for some employment." Noth ing came of the effort: "It has and ever will be the case I am afraid, when before you, " said young Carter; "in my serious reflections, I have observed a stoppage in my throat and intellect vastly confused: what it proceeds from God only knows. ''15
Children sometimes feit this dependence on their parents weil into adulthood. One of the most widely read advice manuals in the colonies stressed that "children are so much the goods, the possessions of their Parents, that they cannot without a kind of theft, give away themselves without the a1lowance of those that have the right in thern.' William Byrd forbade his daughter "never more to greet, speak, or write" to a suitor he disapproved of, simply on the grounds of "rhe sacred duty you owe a parent, & upon the blessing you ought to expect upon the performance of it"'; more to the point: if she disobeyed, she was "not to look for one brass farthing.' '16
In the face of a growing scarcity of land in older communities, many young men were waiting for their inheritance weil into middle age. At mid-century close to half of the sons in Chebacco, Massachusetts, were over forty when they inherited their land. In many northern commu nities at least half the adult males were without land. Young men were growing up, marrying, and yet remaining dependent on their fathers, even to the extent of continuing to live in their fathers' households. In some towns in New England one-third or more of married couples shared a house with parents. Temporary as this filial dependence might be, many sons feit its burden, knew what it meant. One Rhode lsland son experienced it in his father's angry will that left him only a pittance "by reason he has disobeid my comands and left me in a strait of time before he was of full age." Often fathers used the threat of disinheritance to control their children; even John Locke in his educational writings had recognized the use of such a threat when all other methods failed. Wil liarn Shippen urged his daughter, whose marriage was broken, to allow her child to be brought up by her rnother-in-law because, as Shippen warned her, the child's "fortune depends on the old Lady's pleasure. "17
These paternalistic dependencies involved not only those linked by blood or marriage. Paternal authority reached beyond the household to bind large numbers of Americans in various degrees of legal depen-
Pabiarchal Dtpmdence 5'
dency. Indeed, at any one moment as much as one-half of colonial lociety was legally unfree .18
Most conspicuously unfree, of course, were the half million Afro Americans reduced to the utterly debased position of Iifetirne hereditary servirude. Henry Laurens, the South Carolina merchant and planter, had several hundred black slaves on the eve of the Revolution. Like many other large slaveholders, Laurens regarded his slaves as "poor Creatures who look up to their Master as their Father, their Guardian, and Protector, and to whom there is a reciprocal obligation upon the Master." Most black slaves were held in the South, but slavery was not inconsequential in the northern colonies. By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, one out of every five families in Boston owned at least one slave. At mid-century black s1aves made up nearly 12 percent of the population of Rhode bland. By 1746 more than a quarter of New York City's working-age males were black slaves; perhaps one-half the households in the city held at least one slave. '9
It is evident that many Northerners as weil as Southerners experi enced the master-slave relationship and exercised or witnessed this most severe sort of patriarchal authority at some point in their lives, The consequences were damaging for both masters and slaves: the preva lence of slavery in the South, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, meant that children, both black and white, enslaved and free, were "nursed, educated, and daily exercised in ... the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submission on the other." Slavery etched deeply into people's consciousness what outright dependence could mean."
Legal unfreedom, however, was not confined to blacks. Tens of thousands of whites, usually young men and women, were indentured as servants or apprentices and bound to masters for periods ranging from a few years to decades. As late as 1759 Benjamin FrankIin thought that most of the labor of the middle colonies was being performed by indentured servants brought from Britain, Ireland, and Germany. It has been estimated that one-half to two-thirds of a11 immigrants to the colonies came as indentured servants. Among these immigrants there were an estimated 50,000 British and Irish convicts and vagabonds shipped to America between 1718 and 1775 and bound over as servants for periods of seven or fourteen years, or even in some cases for life. Yet being bound out in service or apprenticeship for a number of years was not a1ways an unrespectable status, and it was by no means confined to the lowest ranks of the society. Many of the mid-eighteenth-century
53 52 MONARCHY
immigrants-redemptioners who redeemed the cost of their passage ac ross the Atlantic by contracting their labor-were skilled craftsmen; even schoolmasters offered to sell themselves, usually with few buyers."
Indentured apprenticeship was different from servitude; it existed at all social Ievels and still provided the primary means by which young men, even from well-to-do families, learned a skill and entered the world . Parents were often eager to place their adolescent children in another household; such placement, as one father put it, was better for disci pline , "submission to astranger [being] more eligible and easy." jer emiah Wadsworth, who eventually became one of the leading merchants of the Connecticut Valley and commissary general during the Revolu tion, got his start at age fourteen by being bound out to the New York mercantile firm ofPhilip Livingston . In Charleston, Henry Laurens said in 1']68, most of the merchant houses were overloaded with "engage rnents to take the sons, nephews, or relatives of sorne of their Principal Customers. " Yet Laurens found room to take on the son of the royal govemor of Georgia. :n
Apprenticeship among the upper ranks or among urban artisans in the colonies resembled that in England. In both societies formal appren ticeship bound rnaster and apprentice by written contract for a term of years . Although it is true that English masters more often had to be paid to take an apprentice than rnasters did in America, the practice of apprenticeship was similar . But the practice of servitude was no1."3
Servitude was common on both sides of the Atlantic; indeed, noth ing sets off that distant eighteenth-century world from our own more than the ubiquitous presence of servants, It has been estimated that servants in England made up over 13 percent of the population, and that 60 percent of young people between fifteen and twenty-four were ser vants, British colonial America was no different, at least in the North. Even middling households often contained one or two servants, and any family of the highest rank was apt to have a half dozen or more, ranging from butler to scullery maid. But servitude in this premodem society was not confined to the domestic or house servants that we are familiar with today. Indeed, most servants in the eighteenth-century pan-British world were engaged in agriculture. In England, however, the status of rural servants was very different from that of rural servants in the colonies."4
By colonial standards rural servitude was remarkably mild and loose in England. Although English servants were still members of their mas ten ' households, these households were usually in localities dose to their
Pamarchal Dependena
homes, and the servants saw themse1ves essentially as hired labor . Their contracts with their masters were usually oral and bound them for only • year at a time . Servants moved easily and often from master to master , end many of them received wages and acquired property. This was not the servitude that most colonists either experienced or witnessed ."
In the colonies servitude was a much harsher, rnore brutal, and more humiliating status than it was in England, and this difference had important irnplications for the colonists' consciousness of dependency . Colonial bonded servants in fact ahared some of the chattel nature of black slaves. Although they were members of their master's household and enjoyed sorne legal rights, they were a kind of property as well, valuable property. Colonial servants were not simply young people drawn from the lowest social ranks but, more commonly, indentured immigrants who had sold their labor in order to get to the New World. Precisely because these imported servants were expensive, their inden tures or contracts were wriuen and their terrns of service were Ionger than those of English servants-five to seven years rat her than the year long agreernents usual in England .06
Because labor was so valuable in America, the colonists enacted numerous laws designed to control the movernent of servants and to prevent runaways. There was nothing in England resembling the passes required in all the colonies for traveling servants. And as expensive property, most colonial servants could be bought and sold, rented out, seized for the debts of their masters, and conveyed in wills to heirs. Colonial servants often belonged to their masters in ways that English servants did not. They could not marry, buy or sell property, or leave their households without their master's permission ."1
No wonder newly arriving Britons were astonished to see how ruth lessly Americans treated their white servants. "Generally speaking," said William Eddis upon his introduction to Maryland society in 1769 , "they groan beneath a worse than Egyptian bondage . " Eddis even thought that black slaves were heuer treated. As late as the 1750S im migrant redernptioners , as one observer noted, were being bought in parcels at Philadelphia and driven in tens and twenties "like cattle to a Smithfield market and exposed to sale in public fairs as so many brute beasts ." Like black slaves, white servants, too, could be advertised for sale as "choice" and "well-disposed." Young Mauhew Lyon, who came to the colonies in 1]64 at the age of fifteen, was later sold by his master for a "yoke of bulls" valued at f12. Actually, all colonial servants, even those American-born, were treated harshly . "As is too commonly the
.5.5 .54 MONARCHY
case,' one such Connecticut servant complained after having been bound out at the age of four by his father, "I was rather considered as a slave than a member of the family, and . . . was treated by my master as his property and not as his fellow mortal ." It is not surprising, then, that a colonial father might discipline his errant child by threatening, "1'11 bind you out. "oll
The subjugation of colonial servitude was thus much more cruel and conspicuous than it was in England, where the degrees of dependence were more calibrated and more gradual. Consequendy, the colonists were much more acutely conscious of legal dependence-and perhaps of the value of independence-than Englishmen across the Atlantic. Un der such circumstances it was often difficult for the colonists to perceive the distinctive peculiarity of black sIavery. Slavery often seemed to be just another degree of servitude, another degree of labor, more severe and more abject, to be sure, but not in the eyes of most colonists all that different from white servitude and white labor. Both kinds of ser vants shared the necessity of laboring and the contempt in which manual labor was traditionally held, and both were plainly dependent in a world that valued only independence. Slaves, like servants, were often de scribed simply as another kind of dependent in the patriarchal family. "Next to our children and brethren by blood," said the Reverend Thomas Bacon of Maryland in 1743, "our servants, and especially our slaves, are certainly in the nearest relation to us . They are an immediate and necessary part of our household ." As late as 1720 some southern planters still lumped black slaves and white servants together as de pendents. William Byrd in his Swtt Diary mentioned about fifty servants by name, but he rarely differentiated between black and white servants ; when he did so, it was only to distinguish between (WO servants bearing the same name.'?
By the middle of the eighteenth century black slavery had existed in the colonies for several generations or more without substantial ques tioning or criticism. The few conscience-stricken Quakers who issued isolated outcries against the institution hardly represented general co lonial opinion. Southern planters showed no feelings of guiIt or defen siveness over slavery, and even the ·most liberal of masters coolly and callously recorded in their diaries the savage punishments they inflicted on their slaves-"I tumbled hirn into the Sellar and there had hirn tied Neck and heels all night and this morning had hirn stripped and tied up to a limb .' White servants could be ferociously punished too , One drunken and abusive servant being transported by ship to Virginia in
Patriarchal Dependmce
the Inos was horsewhipped, put in irons and thumbscrewed, and then handcuffed and gagged for a night; he remained handcuffed for at least nine days.'o
By modem standards it was a cruel and brutal age, and the life of the lowly seemed cheap. Slavery could be regarded, therefore, as merely the most base and degraded status in a society of several degrees of unfreedom, and most colonists feit little need as yet either to attack or to defend slavery any more than other forms of dependency and debasement.
In addition to these stark forms of unfreedom, many people in this monarchical society experienced other kinds of inferiority and depen dency. Closest to the legally unfree in dependence were those who did not own their own land. Although most colonial farmers, unlike most English tenant farmers, were freeholders, in some areas of America in the middle of the eighteenth century tenantry was rapidly growing. Sometimes it was used as a device by speculators to develop otherwise uncultivated land, but increasingly it was becoming a much more settled and broadly based form of dependence. Not only were the great pro prietors like the Baltimore and Penn families reviving, reordering, and exploiting old feudal landlord claims, but many lesser landowners were increasingly relying on rents as the major source of their income. By the l']60s Lord Baltimore had twenty-three tenanted manors encompass ing 190,000 acres of Maryland. In New York six to seven thousand tenants were living on about fourteen baronial estates, Some of these manors-Philipsborough, Livingston, and Rensselaerswyck-were re tuming annual incomes for their landlords equal to those enjoyed by middling gentry in England. By the time of the Revolution the bulk of the income of the great Virginia planter Robert Carter came from the rents of tenants. George Washington had tenants working portions of his lands in four different counties of Virginia. On the eve of the Rev olution as many as one-third to one-half of the households of some es tablished Chesapeake counties were tenants. Nor was tenantry confined to the countryside. In a fast-growing town like Lancaster, Pennsyl vania, more than a quarter of its heads of families were classified as "tenants. ",.
Although the loose and scattered nature of many of the leaseholds tended to reduce the landlord-tenant relationship to a predominandy monetary one, this was not always so. Tenants often appealed to the landlords' sense of moral responsibility, and aristocratic patemalism sometimes made the landlords remarkably indulgent and lenient. The
57 56 MONARCHY
great New York landlord Frederick Philipse lent money to half his ten ants and then was very slow to collect any interest or to call in the debts . Henry Beekman and other New York landlords were remarkably casual and lax in collecting rents from their tenants. Beekman was never sure what was owed hirn and tended to take his tenants' word as to what they had paid, Some of the tenants of Robert Carter of Virginia were as much as ten years behind in their ren t. Nor did tenants believe they owed their landlords only rents in money or produce; the dependent relationship often demanded more than that. During the rnid-century disturbances in New York, manor lords were easily able to raise com panies of forty to fifty loyal tenants to put down some New England inspired insurrections in their neighborhoods. Although, as we shaillater see, most of these American tenants leased their land or houses under more favorable conditions than did English tenants, they were none theless tenants, and thus technically at least still dependents of their landlords.r'
Many colonists, therefore, not only black slaves but white servants and young men and a variety of tenants and of course a11 women, knew firsthand what dependence meant. Dependence, said James Wilson in 1774, was "very Iittle else, but an obligation to conform to the will ... of that superior person . . . upon which the inferior depends." People who were dependent could not be free ; in fact, "freedom and depen dency" were "opposite and irreconcilable terms." Dependents were a11 those who had no wills of their own; thus like children they could have no political personalities and could rightfully be excluded from partici pation in public life. It was this reasoning that underlay the denial of the vote to warnen , servants, apprentices , short-terrn tenants , minors, and sons over rwenty-one still living at horne with their parents.P
As common and as manifest as these legal forms of dependency were, however; they were not experienced by large portions of white male society, or if they were , not for full Jives. Most farmers were not short-term tenants , and white servitude and apprenticeship were usually temporary statuses , largely confined to the young. But a11 dependency in this still very traditional and hierarchical society was not so limited and so obvious . These conspicuous examples of legal and contractual dependence did not begin , in fact, to comprehend the thousand and one other, less palpable ways in which paternalism and dependence made themselves feit. This monarchical society had many other, more elusive devices for extracting obedience and deference.
Patronage
4. Patronage
Many colonists who were quick to scorn a11 forms of legal or contractual dependence, many who owned their own land and prided themselves on their independence, were nevertheless enmeshed in the diffuse and sometimes delicate webs of paternalistic obligation inherent in a hier archical society . There was no doubt, wrote British polemicists John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, that between men there should be "no such Relation as Lord and Slave, lawless Will and blind Submission ." But these most radical whigs, with whom the colonists shared many ideas, did not expect equality between men; indeed for Trenchard and Gordon the only proper relationship was still "that of Father and Chil dren, Patron and Client, Protection and Allegiance, Benefaction and Gratitude, mutual Affection and mutual Assistance." The ties that bound people together in this society were still explained and given meaning by terms that looked to the past more than the future, to the personal world of the family as much as the impersonal world of com merce. It was taken for granted that "Dependence and social Obligation take place at the first Dawn of Life, and as its Thread lengthens," they would "continually multiply and invigorate." The world still seemed small and intimate enough that the mutual relationships that began with the family could be extended outward into the society to describe nearly a11 other relationships as weil.'
Despite the traditional English celebration of independence and lib erty, no one in this hierarchical society could be truly independent, truly free. No relationship could be exclusive or absolute; -each was relative, reciprocal, and complementary. "Every service or help which one man affords another, requires its corresponding return." These "returns .. . due from one person to another, according to the several circumstances or relations in which they stand, with respect to each other," were in fact "the bands of society, by which families, neighborhoods, and nations are knit together.'" Society was held together by intricate networks of personal loyaIties, obligations, and quasi-dependencies. These personal loyalties were not the same as the legal bondage of the unfree; they were not Iike the explicit subjection of the landless; and they were not even precise reproductions of the many subserviencies of patronage-ridden England. Still, these personal reJationships were forms of paternalism,
- - - - - - - ------- --- -- -
58
-- -- ._"._--
MONARCHY
dependence, and subordination-vague and subtle as they often may have been .
Some referred openly to these social relationships as "paternalistic'"; others called them "connections" or "Interests." Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century so repugnant was the idea of dependency among free men in the English-speaking world, and so e1usive and presumably mutual were these innumerable personal attachments, that only the term " friendship " seemed universal and affective enough to describe them. !
Indeed, every variety of personal attachment and connection , no matter how unequal, could be described as friendship . " Friendship, I take it," said John Adams, "is one of the distinguishing Glorys of man. And the Creature that is insensible of its Charms, tho he may wear the shape of Man, is unworthy of the Character." Kin relations could be "friends" ; so too could patrons or customers. Charles Willson Peale advertised the opening of his upholstery and harness shop in 1761 by expressing his " hopes to have the Employ of his friends, who may de pend upon being well and faithfully served." The chief justice of South Carolina promised the itinerant Anglican minister Charles Woodmason, as Woodmason put it, "to be my Friend and to take me under his protection ." "Friendships" were what a person's age and rank would lead him to form-they were euphemisms for all sorts of dependencies, Sons were the friends of their fathers, wives were the friends of their husbands , and sons and daughters called their mother their "best friend ." Even a common soldier might talk about "the Friendship of my officers" or a servant refer to his master as his "principal friend. "4
The American colonies, even more than the mother country, nec essarily had to be organized in these personal terms . In the strung-out colonies there were no institut ions, no arenas, in which impersonal re lationships might dominate . Of course , in America there was nothing rernotely resembling the teeming rnetropolis of Lenden-e-at three quarters of a million the largest city in the Western world. But in Amer ica there were not even any cities that could rival the secondary urban areas of Great Britain. By 1']60 England had a half dozen cities with populations over 30,000; America had none of that size, By 1']60 England had over twenty cities with populations over 10,000; America had three . Indeed , the colonies had only a half dozen or so urban centers larger than 5,000 people, and even its largest-Philadelphia with a population of about 20,000 in 1']60-could seem to be Iittle more than an overgrown village .~ Looking back from the urban sprawl of the early nineteenth century, one Philadelphian believed that in the colonial period he had
_ ._
PaJrontJgt 59
known "every person, white and black, rnen, women, and children in the city of Philadelphia by name . ,,6 Nothing comparable in scale or Importance to England's economic growth and industrialization was oc· curring in America: there were no burgeoning manufacturing centers, no Leeds, no Manchester, no Birmingham; indeed, by contemporary English standards there was in America not much manufacturing at all. In England less than half the labor force was employed in agriculture, whereas nineteen out of twenty colonists still were farmers; and the bulk of them lived in tiny rural communities in which most people knew one another. In comparison with much of England the colonies were still a very primitive and undeveloped soclety.
In such a small-scale society, privacy as we know it did not exist, and our sharp modern distinction between private and public was as yet scarcely visible. Living quarters were crowded, and people who were not formally related-e-servants, hired laborers , nurses, and other lodg en-were often jammed together with family members in the same room or even in the same bed, Members of New England communities thought nothing of spying on and interfering with their neighbors' most intimate affairs, in order, as one Massachusetts man put it in 1']60, "not to Suffer Sin in My Fellow Creature or Neighbour." People took the injunction to be their brother's keeper very seriously and turned one another in for adultery , wife-beating, or any other violation of corn munity norms.?
Since people in this society noticed everything, personal reputations counted a great deal: a man could go a long way just on what others thought of him. Benjamin Franklin, as he tells us in his Autobiography, was able "to secure my Credit and Character as a Tradesman" in Philadelphia not only by being "in Rtality Industrious and frugal" but , more important in such a face-to-face society, by avoiding "all Apptar tl1I&ts of the Contrary." He dressed plainly and never let people see him idle, and "to show that I was not above my Business I sometirnes brought home the Paper I purchas'd at the Stores thro' the Streets on a Wheelbarrow." That these circumscribed worlds resembled theaters attended by everyone was no trivial rnetaphor in this culture."
John Adams, too, knew what sort of society he was living in . He repeatedly advised his young protege William Tudor " to mix yourself with the World and through yourself in their sight." He told TudoT a homily about Cicero, who had admirably administered an office in Si cily, but who to his mortification had received no commendation from the Romans; apparently Cicero was so far from their eyes that he was
60 MONARCHY
out of their thoughts as weil. From then on, said Adams , " it was his Policy to keep hirnself always in their Sight; nor to be so solicitous how to make them hear of him , as to make them see hirn ." Adams advised Tudor even to change his church in Boston , so " you will be seen by more People, and those of more Weight and Consequence. " 9
In these little worlds one's good name seerned as precious as life itself, and whenever it was defamed, people were quick to seek legal redress . The court records are thus full of actions for slander and defa mation. To call someone " a Devillish Lyar," to accuse a rninister of being "as drunk as the Devil last night," to say of a boat manufacturer that he made boats "only fit to drown people"-all thes e offenses were open to either criminal or civil prosecution, We today may be astonished by the "triviality" of these defamation cases, but slander was anything but a frivolous matter for the people of that very different society ."
People were expected to know those with whom they were dealing which was why letters of introduction were so common and so essential. People were immediate1y conscious of strangers and unattached persons and subjected them either to intense questioning or to openmouthed staring. Runaway servants, as one British visitor noted , could not hope to lose themselves in such small-scale societies, so detailed were the de scriptions of the runaways in the newspapers and so vigilant were the communities "in detecting persons under suspicious circumstances." For a newspaper to describe an escaped shipwright wearing "a great Coat of an ordinary dark brown Ratteen, with the Cuff of the right sleeve off, a green Grogram Vest, patch 'd under one Arm, and bound down the Buttonholes with green Bays, with two rows of buttonholes, black Mohair Buttons and no lining , a new ozenbrigs Shirt, red Plush Breeches, the Breeches good but the Plush ordinary, a new silk hand kerchief, an old Beaver hat , light grey yarn stockings, new shoes"-to set forth a description in this extraordinary detail was to presurne a society in which all strangers were closely scrutinized. "
In this face-to-face society , part icular individuals-spec ific gentle men or great men-loomed large, and people naturally explained hu man events as caused by the motives and wills of those who seerned to be in charge, headed the chains of interest, and made decisions , No one as yet could conceive of the massive and impersonal social processes industrialization , urbanization, modernization-that we invoke so blithely to describe large-scale social developments. Such complicated processes were simply not part of people's consciousness .
In this cuhure the quest ion asked of events was not " how did they
Patronage 61
happen?" but "who did them?" Specific identifiable individuals did things and were personally accountable for what happened. Ir the price of bread rose suddenly, then a particular baker or merchant could be blamed . If a merchant's cargo was seized for violating the navigation acts, then a particular and well-known official could be singled out. The political and social world still seemed small and intimate enough to hold particular men morally responsible for all that occurred within it. Which ia why the colonists especially were quick to explain a concatenation of events as caused by a conspiracy."
The provincial governments were lilliputian by modern standards. They were not impersonal bureaucracies , but particular familiar persons whose numbers could usually be counted on one's hands . Prominent colonists knew personally the governors , justices, customs collectors, na val officers , and other leading magistrares with whom they dealt. They drank and dined with them, played cards or the violin with them, and sometimes went to church with thern. Even the provincial assernblies were minuscule. New Hampshire's assernbly had thirty-five members; New York's, twenty-eight; New Jersey 's, twenty ; Maryland's, sixty . Massachusetts's house of representatives was extraordinarily large at 117 · The combined membership of the New York colonial assembly and council was even smaller than a committee in today's House of Repre sentatives . Gentlemen in such tiny political worlds were necessarily fa miliar with one another. The vitriolic burlesques of public officials, like the satiric eloset dramas of Mercy Otis Warren, derived much of their force from the intimate knowledge the audience or readers had of the persons being ridiculed or satirized. Without such familiarity and inside knowledge, much of the fun of the pieces-the disguised characteriza tions, obscure references, private jokes, and numerous innuendos would have been lost. I)
Government authority in the colonies was intirnate, and none 01' its activities was too insignificant to be dealt with by a leading official. A royal governor might respond personally to the public grievance of an obscure shipmaster and call hirn to his home to work out a solution, When William Eddis arrived in Maryland in 1769 , he was astonished to discover that the meanest person in the colony seemed to have "an easy and immediate access to the person" of the governor. 11 has been said that the speaker of the South Carolina house was not exaggerating when he deelared that he was' 'well acquainted with the circumstances of most of our Inhabitants," so sm all was the society . In '756 Governor Robert M':>rris of Pennsylvania took to roaming the waterfront of Philadelphia
62
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MONARCHY
at night in search of smugglers, even using his bare hands to force his way into warehouses suspected of being storage places for contraband. Local government could be even more personal and familiar . In [']63 the town council of Bristol, Rhode Island, lent Joseph Maxfield the money to buy a cord of wood, which, the council declared, he was to pay back " when he gets his money from Mr. Bosworth. "'4
J ust as colonial public buildings were no more than elaborate private residences , so too was much public business only an extension into gov ernment of private social relationships. Consequently, private feelings often blended imperceptibly into public ones, James Otis's attack on Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts in the early [']6os so intermingled personal and political motives that no one was (or has been since) able to separate them. Not only was Otis angry ar Hutehinson for taking the chief-justiceship that Otis thought had been promised his father, but he bitterly resented the social superiority he felt Hutchinson and his clan pretended to . Otis's fury ran deep, and follow ing a private confrontation it exploded in [']6[-62 in a series of blister ingly sarcastic public denunciations of Hutchinson that left the lieutenant governor bewildered . There Otis was, he wrote of his confrontation with Hutchinson in the Boston Gazette, "entering the Lists with aGentIeman so much one's Superior"; it was, he said, like some insignificant army subaltern dueling with a general, "His Honour" was "very conde scending" to .debate such an inferior as Otis. Was not Hutchinson risk ing a loss of his reputation by stooping so low? But then again, said Otis, "from those who have, and desire but little, but little can possibly be taken away." Otis had reputedly sworn " revenge" against Hutch inson for his father' s loss of the office, and he searched for a public issue that might embarrass the lieutenant governor. First he tried the money. standard, and when that proved too complicated to arouse the public, he turned to the rnore inflammatory issue of plural officeholding. To be sure, there was political significance in a1l this maneuvering, but no one could be certain where that began and Otis's private animosity left Off.'5
Henry Laurens of Charleston, South Carolina, was another who had trouble separating his private emotions from his political attitudes in this small intimate society. In 1765 Laurens was no patriot. No one more vigorously denounced the Stamp Act riots than he. But by the late 1760s he had become much more radical, largely as the result of aseries of personal confrontations, first with Daniel Moore, customs collector of Charleston, and later with Egerton Leigh, judge of the vice-admiralty court and Laurens's friend and kinsman . When Moore tried to use his
.N - _. . - _ •.-......- - -
PatroNJge 63
position to create dependents among the Charleston merchants and in particular sought to exploit his initial "intimacy" with Laurens for "mean" purposes, Laurens became angry: Moore's behavior, he said, "made me sit loose & speak my mind plainly to him." One thing led to another, and Laurens became the "object" of the collector's "re sentment." Following Moore's arbitrary seizure of several of Laurens's ships, Laurens confronted Moore in public and wrung his nose, This resulted in achallenge to a duel that was never fought . When Leigh, in the vice-admiralty court, tried in the meantime to mediate between the two men, he only managed to embroil himself in a heated quarreI with Laurens. Laurens and Leigh then attacked each other viciously in the press, and this resulted in another aborted challenge to a duel. The whole affair ended with Leigh's colonial career in ruins . Laurens natu rally and defensively denied that his new stand on behalf of American rights was the consequence of these private quarrels; but there is no doubt that his dislike of Moore and his anger with Leigh did more to make hirn a patriot by the late [760s than all the whig pamphlets he might have read. Obnoxious officials like Moore and Leigh, Laurens said in [']67, were "the most likely instruments to effect a disunion be tween the Mother Country & her American offspring. " They are "the Men who shake the affections of the Americans & drive thern to a greater distance from the powers in the Mother Country. "16
And so it was everywhere in this small face-to-face society: personal and official affairs could scarcely be separated. Merchants used public money for private purposes, and vice versa. Soldiers sued their captains for their back pay. Magistrates lived off the fees and fines they levied. And governors sometimes drew on their personal accounts to raise money to supply troops . That the North Carolina governor even offered in [765 to pay that portion of the stamp tax pertaining to official docu ments out of his own pocket tells us just how lost to us that eighteenth century world really is.?
Personal relationships of dependence, usually taking the form of those between patrons and clients, constituted the ligaments that held this society together and made it work. The popular "deference" that historians have made so much of was not a mere habit of mind; it had real economic and social force behind it. Artisans in America, Iike their counterparts in Britain, still had patrons more than they had customers. Tradesmen and shopkeepers were told that ••the Seller is Servant to the Buyer." At the end of the Seven Years' War wealthy Maryland planters ßocked to Annapolis and began building town houses and consuming
64 MONARCHY
luxuries at unprecedented rates. By the early '770S all the hundreds of newly arrived craftsmen and shopkeepers in the town had become de pendent on the spending habits of the rieh. Elsewhere it was the same . Although a few artisans in some places were already running large man ufacturing establishments and turning out goods for distant markets, most colonial craftsmen still made wigs or boots or built hornes or ships on demand for famiIiar gentlemen ("bespoke work") and felt obliged to them. And that sense of obligation and dependency could have emo tional and economic satisfactions that often more than compensated for any loss of freedom and independence, as Philadelphia carpenter Wil liam Falk discovered. In the '750S Falk decided to cut loose from his paternalistic relationship with the wealthy merchant Isaac Norris in or der to try selling his labor by the day to the highest bidder. But the experience of too many days without work soon drove hirn back to the security of Norris's patronage."
Everywhere, it seemed to John Adams, "all the rich men have many of the poor, in the various trades, manufacturing and other occupations in life, dependent upon them for their daily bread; many of smaller fortunes will be in their debt, and in many ways under obligations to ihem ." Such relationships between patrons and clients were pervasive, and men could be both at the same time. John Goodrich was a pros perous and influential Virginia merchant who owned and operated a dozen vessels and a large number of warehouses and stores in Ports mouth . Ahhough his business gave Goodrich many clients of his own, he was hirnself dependent on the patronage of the great planter Robert Carter, a patronage that could be quickly withdrawn. When the rner chant failed to perform satisfactorily , Carter ordered his agent in the port "not in the future to employ any of Capt. Goodrich's Craft to do . service for me." In just such ways was inßuence exerted. '?
Much of the economy was organized into webs of private relation ships. Indeed, the economy in this premodern world was still often thought of in traditional terms as the management of a household . Econ omy was defined as the art of providing for all the wants of the family, or in the case of the royal household of the king, the nation, whieh was his extended family. In such an antique conception the distribution of persons and goods in accordance with the organic social hierarchy-everything in its proper and needed place-became the key to proper politica1 manage ment, Although in England modem commercial developments were fast eroding such medievaI and mercantilist notions-viewing the economy as an enlarged household administered by patriarchal authorities from
PatrontJge ·65
the top down-they stilllingered on in people's minds, especially in the colonies, which were commercially backward compared with the mother country .?"
The financial and commercial revolutions that were transforming English society were slow to take hold in America. Before '750 the col onies still had undeveloped economies engaged essentially in small-scale fanning or in producing provisions and agricultural staples for the greater Atlantic world. The colonies had no Bank of England, no stock exchange, no Iarge trading companies, no great centers of capital, and no readily available circulating medium of exchange. Although by '750 most of the colonies had experimented with several forms of paper cur rency, there was Iittle in America resembling the complicated array of monetary notes of England or the dozens upon dozens of private and country banks that had sprung up all over Great Britain in the decades after 1690 to facilitate inland trade. By '774- there were fifty-two private banks in London alone."
To this extent the colonies were not yet commercial societies like Britain, where the importance of inland or internal trade matched that of overseas or external trade. Instead, the colonies were what were called trading societies, dominated by their external commerce. This emphasis on overseas trade confirmed the traditional mercantilist assumption which held that each colony could increase its aggregate wealth only by selling more beyond its borders than it bought . The economic goal of a cclony therefore was to have more exports than imports-that is, a fa vorable balance of trade, which would result in gold and silver specie (the only real money most people recognized) remaining within the col ony . But since the colonists tended to import far more than they ex ported, they ,always had an acute shortage of gold and silver specie; sometimes fanners had to pay even their taxes in bits and pieces of produce.
In the absence of other forms of currency, this shortage of specie limited the colonists' ability to make exchanges with one another within their borders; it limited, that is, what was commonly called their "in land trade." Before mid-century the colonists' inland trade remained remarkably primitive, especially by English standards. But it was not only primitive, it was unappreciated as weil. The colonists believed that their internal trade-say, between Lancaster and Philadelphia-had no real value unless goods were further shipped outside of the colony. In land trade by itself could never increase a colony's aggregate wealth; it could only redistribute it, move it about, The "meer handling of Goods
......... ~ ....... _"--- _ _ , , ,, __ .~,~ .• " •• •• " __ ._ , ~_ , • • • ~ . ri~• • " _ ,,
66 MONARCHY
one 10 another, no more increases any wealth in the Province, than Persons at a Fire, increase the Water in a Pail, by passing it thro' Twenty or Forty hands ." Such passing of wealth around the community from hand to hand, said William Smith of New York in 1750, "tho it may enrich an Individual," meant that "others must be poorer, in an exact proportion to his Gains ; but the Collective Body of the People not at all." With such zero-surn mercantilist assumptions domestic trade was not much valued, and internal traders and retail shopkeepers did not have much respectability , They certainly did not yet have the status, or the right to claim the title, of ,. merchants, " those who by exporting and importing goods from abroad brought real wealth into the society.··
To carry on what internal trade they desired the colonists experi mented with several crude forms of paper currency-Iand-bank certifi cates and government bills of credit. The certificates of land banks, which by 1750 were in use in every colony but Virginia, were loans to individual colonists, often only middling farmers , at 5 percent interest and repayable over a long period of time. These circulating certificates were secured by mortgages on land, but the bills of credit, issued mainly during wartime by desperate colonial governments that were spending far more than they were receiving in taxes, were backed by nothing more than the governments' promises to accept them as taxes at some future date .
By the middle of the eighteenth century England's century-Iong ex perience with its highly developed inland trade had made Englishmen at horne familiar with a variety of sophisticated paper notes and checks. But not the colonists; before 1750 many of them regarded paper money as only a wartime expedient, as peculiar and special, and not as some thing essential to their economies. Since many colonists did not yet believe that their inland trade was very important, they d'id not believe that paper money (wh ich made such inland trade possible) was very irnportant. And because the paper currency the colonists issued usually could be exchanged at the rate of 133 to 100 pounds sterling (but some times through overprinting of the paper the rate could skyrocket to 160 or 180 to 100 pounds sterl ing), established merchants who imported from abroad and had to pay their bills in sterling were generally anxious to limit the amounts of paper currency in circulation . Since paper money was therefore not readily available , colonists who needed money for their businesses usually had to rely on loans from local moneyed men, thus increasing their sense of personal cJientage and dependency .
Thus colonial economic life remained remarkably simple and per-
Patronagt 67
sonal, and few colonists other than overseas merchants knew anything of the large impersonal institutions and public worlds that were trans forming the consciousness of Englishmen at horne. This backwardness, this primitiveness, of colonial society put a premium on patronage and individual relationships and to this extent at least riddJed colonial society with more personal monarchical-like dependencies than England itself had.
Without banks, without many impersonal sources of credit, without even in some cases a circulating medium, most economic exchanges in the colonies had to be personal, between people who knew one another. Economic relations in this society could never be strictly pecuniary; people rarely dealt directly in "ready pay" or cash-in a paid-and-be done-with-it manner. Although a cash nexus was emerging here and there, most economic exchanges were by credit and were still clothed in moral and social terms. "Trade ought to be managed with truth, justice and charity: for without these," it was said, "it is only a more cleanly art of cheating or oppression." Abusinessman had to act mo rally even if it meant "the diminution of his trade." Merchants, shopkeepers, and craftsmen all tended to regard their businesses as aseries of personal transactions with familiar persons. Their records exhibit these personal relationships-a single page of their ledgers for each person they dealt with. Often they treated their economic activities simply as extensions of their personaliife: they mingled their domestic and business accounts to the point where they had little or no awareness at any one moment of the profitability of their enterprises.'3
Many northern farmers-how many is a matter of controversy were not as yet deeply involved in the larger market economy of the Atlantic world. Many, as the common appellation "husbandman" sug gests, did not yet think of themselves as agricultural entrepreneurs out to maximize profits. They were acquisitive, to be sure, and few were truly self-sufficient; and thus they produced "surpluses" when they could and swapped goods and services with each other and with local shop keepers and merchants. Some of the exchanges were simple and direct barters: a farmer might lend his oxen to a neighbor in ' return for help in harvesting his crop, A midwife might trade her services for wool or tobacco .··
But more often the exchanges took the form of credits and debits and were recorded in monetary terms. A farmer hired out his children or ren ted his boat to a neighbor for a fee of, say , 21. 6d.; at the same time he used another neighbor's mill or bought a pair of shoes at the
68 MONARCHY
local store at a cost of, say, 3S. 4". In the absence of much specie, these fees and costs were usually not paid in cash but were instead entered in each person 's account book. Through these numerous exchanges farm ers built up in their localities incredibly cornplicated webs of credits and debts, "book accounts" among neighbors that ran for years at a time ."
Although litigation could and did result from these obligations, such credits and debts more often worked to tie local people together and to define and stabilize communal relationships.· Because such debts were individually small, were locally owed, and often lacked any explicitly stated promise to pay, they implied a measure of mutual trust between people. Such debts could even be regarded as social bonds Iinking people togetber.r"
. For the very wealthy, moneylending became a common and stable source of income and influence-more stable in America certainly than that resulting from land speculation or tenantry . Indeed, money lent out on interest was a principal means by which many colonial gentlemen maintained their superiority and their leisure. As a source of income for those whom George Washington called "the monied Gentry," it was akin to rent from tenants ." lt was, in fact, just a form of what one historian, in reference to the eighteenth-century French aristocracy , has called "proprietary wealth "-meaning rents, bonds, and interest from loans." Such proprietary wealth was generally static and stable and was based on noncapitalist forms of property. lt produced income that carne without work or without participation in trade and was thus genteel and free from the taint of self-interested profiteering. This proprietary wealth was what the English on both sides of the Atlantic meant when they talked about property as the source of that "independence" sought by all would-be ladies and gentlernen. So many hundreds of pounds a year from one's estate was the only kind of property someone like Jane Aus ten really thought about or valued . Independence, as Josiah Quincy pointed out in 1768, really meant independence from "rhe fickleness and inconstancy" of the markerplace .'?
For gentry like Quincy, modern commercial venture capital was scarcely property at a11: it could never be a source of independence , and there was too much risk and exertion involved in earning it . Such capital was not aristocratic property, cerrainly not rhe kind of proprietary wealth that sustained the English gentry . The dominant aristocratic position of the landed gentry, said Adam Smith , came from their unique source of " reven ue." Their incorne from the rents of tenants on their landed estates "costs them neither labour nor care , but comes to thern, as it
Pat.ronage 69
were, of its own accord, and independent of any plan or project of their own . " But in America, as J ohn Witherspoon pointed out, such tenantry and rent-producing land could never be as secure a source of income as in England. In the New World, said Witherspoon, where land was more plentiful and eheaper than it was in the Old World, gentlemen seeking a steady income "would prefer lending money at interest to purchasing and holding real estate, "30
The little evidence we have suggests that Witherspoon was correct. The probate records of wealthy colonists show large proportions of their estates out on loan, All sorts of persons lent money, said John Adams: merchants, professionals, widows, but especially "Men of fortune, who live upon their income." In 17'16 Cadwallader Colden was the creditor of seventy-three different people. Even many of the great planters of the South eamed rnore from such presumably ancillary activities as lending money than they did from selling their staple crops . Charles Carroll of Annapolis had f:24,ooo on loan to his neighbors. A large landowner in the Shenandoah Valley, J ames Patron, had 90 percent of his total estate in the form of bonds , bills, and promissory notes due hirn. When mer chants and wealthy artisans wanted to establish their status unequivo cally as leisured gentlemen, they withdrew from their businesses and, apart from investing in land, lent out their wealth at interest . Benjamin Franklin did it ; so did Roger Sherman, John Hancock, and Henry Lau rens . As soon as the trader J osiah Dwight of Springfield, Massachusetts, had any profits, he began removing them from his business and lending them out at interest. By the time of his death more than 60 percent of his assets were out on loan. This was how men became gentlemen and exerted inftuence in their cornmunities . In fact, it was often through loans to friends and neighbors that great men were able to build up networks of clients and dependents. The Virginia planters, who were debtors to British investors abroad but creditors within their own corn munities, knew only too weil that "every debtor does in some measure feel the imperiousness of his creditor. " 3'
In the absence of banks and other impersonal institutions, such per sonal credit was usually the only source of capital for local communities, and gentry creditors could rightly regard their patrimonial property as indispensable to the trade and prosperity of the society. Although other, more dynamic and more volatile kinds of property were already emerg ing, often in the hands of those protocapitalist debtor developers who were demanding paper money, the gentry creditors could scarcely con ceive of any property other than their established proprietary wealth ,
MONARCHY7°
and considered those who wanted inßationary paper moner to be "gen erally of low condition among the plebeians and of small estate, and many of them perhaps insolvent." They "consisted," wrote Thomas Hutehinson, one of the most established of the established gentry of Massachusetts, "of persons in difficult or involved circumstances in trade , or such as was possessed of real estates, but had Iittle or no ready money at command , or men of no substance at all. "3'
I( we take this language literally, as many historians have , we will be hopelessly confused, for many of the debtors and paper-money ad vocates were not poor uncommercial people but in fact prosperous farm ers and substantial entrepreneurs and artisans who were eager to advance their wealth at the expense of those proprietary gentry standing in their way ; they were poor or without substance only to the extent that their wealth was not as stable or as patrimonial as the wealth of those that opposed thern. Unable to appreciate the growing entrepreneurial need for more money, or unwilling to share their dominance with newcomers, the established gentry considered attacks on their patrimonial wealth by debtors promoting paper money and other forms of debt relief to be dishonest and unjust public evils that threatened not merely their per sonal well-being but the bonds that held the traditional society together. Since their credit was' often liberally extended and sometimes only slowly paid back, such patrimonial gentry saw themselves not as profiteers but as social benefactors fulfilling their patemalist obligations to the com munity. Of course, lending money in this liberal manner reinforced their political dominance. Although powerful creditor families Iike the Stoddards, WiJliamses, and Worthingtons of western Massachusetts took seriously their prescribed charitable responsibilities toward their debtors , they also expected gratitude and respect in return.P
Even the most impersonal and modern of marketing arrangements in colonial America-that involv ing the production and sale of southern staples-remained deeply grounded in personal and patronage connec tions. The southem economy was geared to the production of staple crops for distant markets, but weil into the eighteenth century only the largest planters had direct access to the great merchant houses of Brit ain . Small and middling farmers of the Chesapeake, with their planta tions of one or two hundred acres , lived in a world of dependency that was as much social as it was economic. The pr imary market for their tobacco was through the great planters.v Only these great planters perhaps only one in fifty or rnore of all families-experienced firsthand the impersonalities of the larger Atlantic economy through the consign-
Patronage 7'
ment system of tobacco marketing. They were in fact middlemen in the economy and the society of the Chesapeake. They collected together the small tobacco crops of their neighbors for consignment abroad and sold in their country stores goods imported from England or manufactured on their own plantations . They bought and sold land, extended credit, and resolved dispures among their numerous dependents and clients. They were land speculaton, merchants , srorekeepers, and banken as weil as farmers. In fact, most of the large fortunes these great planten amassed resulted from activities other than growing tobacco . And the patronage that carne from such activities was what distinguished them from the mass of ordinary farmers in the Ohesapeake.P
No wonder, then, that the great planters of Virginia and Maryland could speak so readily of mobilizing their "interest" arnong their neigh boring freeholders . Their sense of patemalism-being addressed as "your honor" by friends and dients-had substance behind it. There was more truth in the maxim set forth in Robert Munford's play Thr
CaNiidates than perhaps Munford intended:
'T is said self-interest is the secret aim, Of those uniting under Friendship's name.
The great planten were the protectors, creditors, and counselors "friends"-of the lesser farmers. They lent them money , found jobs or minor posts for their sons, stood as godfathers for their children, handed down clothing to their families, doctored them, and generally feit re sponsible for the welfare of "our neighbors who depended upon us ." During a particularly bad "ague and fever Season" in 1711, "the whole neighbourhood," Landon Carter proudly noted in his diary, "are al most every day sending to rne . I serve them all." They boasred of their paternalism, dedaring, as the wealthy Charles Carroll of Annapolis did in 1759, "how commendable it is for a gentleman of independent means . . . to be able to advise his friends, relations, and neighbors of all sorts ." These great Chesapeake planten had the wealth and, more im portant, the influence to make themselves the strongest aristocracy
America has ever had. 36 Perhaps 00 activity in colonial society revealed its patemalistic na
ture more than the way people govemed their localities and handled their dispures. Much of the local administration and law enforcement for communities in both the northem and southern colonies rested with the local justice of the peace and the county courts. These courts were
72 73
"'I
MONARCHY
remarkably autonomous local bodies, composed of neighborhood gentry .whose amateur knowledge of the law was more than offset by the social respect they commanded in the loeal community . That local social su periority, and not any professional legal expertise, was what gave the justices the extraordinary discretionary authority they exercised . Law at times seemed to be pretty much what they said it was. For their judg ments they scarceIy worried about English practices or collections of ancient cases; they instead relied on their collective memory and on their own untrained but ritualized sense of justice. Sometimes they even re interpreted provincial statutes to fit their local needs.
The county courts were the piaces where the local communities re affinned their hierarchical relationships and reconciled their various obligations. The courts acted as c1earinghouses for the many credits and debts crisscrossing though the local community. Since the justices were a1ways more interested in people's reIationships than in the letter of the law, they made great elforts to resolve disputes over debts informally or out of court . With a11 social relationships dependent on mutual trust, it is not surprising that the courts treated instances of cheating and decep tion far more severely than they did overt acts of violence. The courts tended to treat a11 culprits as fathers might treat wayward children : they lectured and reprimanded those brought before them and disciplined them in a highly discretionary and patriarchal manner. A person who olfended the court by forgetting to take his hat off, "by readily acknowl edging his fault & begging pardon for the same" might satisfy the mag istrate's paternaI sense of justice. Occasionally olfenders even acted the part of children. In this familial world it was not startIing for a man presented for profanity to send word to the justice that he "confessed hirnself to be guilty and was ashamed ro appear before the Court, but would Willingly Submitt to the Courts Judgment. "37
Only a society that intuitively conceived of individuals as enmeshed in social relationships-bound tightly to the community in a variety of personal ways-e-could make sense of such public confessions and of the traditional public punishments still common inthe eighteenth century . Subjecting criminals to public censure at the pillory or whipping and mutiJating their bodies in front of neighbors and friends was designed both to involve the community in the punishment and to make the criminals feel shame for their actions. Men and wornen in eighteenth century Boston were taken from the huge cage that had brought them from the prison , tied barebacked to a post on State Street, and lashed thirty or forty times "amid the screams of the culprits and the uproar
Patronage
of the mob." In New York, criminals with labels on their breasts were brought to the whipping post on a wooden horse set upon a "triumphal ur." Everywhere criminals had their heads and hands pilloried and were exposed for hours on end to insults and pelting by onlookers. The Itocks were even moved about, often to the particular neighborhood of the criminals so they could feel their ~ortification more keenly. Exe cutions were likewise conducted in public (New York's gallows stood on the Common), and they drew thousands of spectators. In every punish ment the authorities were detennined to expose the offender to public scorn, and with the lowliest of criminals to do so pennanently through mutilation. Persons with a brand on their forehead or a piece of ear missing were forever condemned to the conternpt of the intimate worlds in which they lived .,s
A society organized like this accentuated the difference between the few and the many, gentlefolk and commoners, and gave meaning to the age-old distinction between rulers and ruled . "In aIl Societies whatso ever ," it was said, "there are, and must be, people that lead, and people that are led." Everywhere men ofwealth and property, those with easier access to markets and political and legal inftuence, played crucial me diating roles as patrons for numerous dients and dependents. Someone like William Allen of Pennsylvania cultivated both those above and those beJow hirn on bis chain of interest . He sent gifts of wine to Colonel Barre and Lord Shelbume and pi ne bud tea to William Pitt , and he married one of his daughters to the govemor of PennsyJvania and another to the son of the govemor of New York. At the same time he consolidated his interest among those beneath hirn by the selective use of his power and patronage. In 1764, for example, he secured positions as justices of the peace for some fellow Presbyterians, got the price of land on the frontier lowered, and reduced corruption in the land office. Even in his absence his friends and dients-his "interest"-rewarded hirn with e1ection to the assembly from Cumberland County. His control of governrnental patronage in the colony was awesome . When a young governor ignored Allen', recommendation for an office, Allen quickly got the proprietor, Thomas Penn, to set the govemor straight and to instruct hirn "to advise with Mr. Allen upon every occasion ." As areward for Samuel Purviance having spent !3°O in creating a network of Presbyterian corn mittees to support Allen, Allen asked the proprietor to give Purviance oe5 or 6,000 acres of land. " Not surprisingly, such inftuence enabled the Allen family and its connections to dominate much of the executive activity in Pennsylvania on the eve of the Revolution .P
74 MONARCHY
Paternalism, patronage, and friendship of one sort or another nec essarily determined mueh of what went on in this society . Like the eIder James Otis of Barnstable, Massaehusetts, dominant individuals at both the loeal and provincial levels were repeatedly asked by supplieants to "use your Interest " in their behalf, and when they did so, they ereated "obligations" among those they helped. The provincial armies of the eighteenth-century eolonies were still little more than quasi-feudal bands of patrons and clients . The system of reeruitment for the Massaehusetts forces in the Seven Years' War of the 1750S depended largely on the personalloyalties that local men had for the officers who enlisted them, Governor William Shirley, commander in chief of the provincial forces, expected ascending ranks of officers, who were appointed in accord with their corresponding social influence , to be able to reeruit inereasing numbers of men : each ensign, fifteen; each Iieutenant, twenty-five; each eaptain, fifty. Of course, this system of personal influence also worked in reverse: gentlemen who could raise a eompany might be entitled by that very demonstration of patronage to a captaincy .•o
In the absence of the elaborate and impersonal selection procedures and institutions that we today take for granted, personal influence had to be the prineipal souree of reeruitment and mobility in all areas. To get ahead in the law , young John Adams told a friend in 1756, one needed not only knowledge, time, and a large collection of books, but most irnporta nt , "the Friendship and Patronage of the great Masters in the Profession ." George Washington got his start as a surveyor and militia officer through the influence of Lord Fairfax and his family in the Northern Neck of Virginia. The eider James Otis's rapid four-year rise in Massaehusetts polities was due mainly to the sponsorship of per sonal and kinship connections . Even sorneone IikeJasper Yeates of Phil adelph ia, with a distinguished grandfather and a college degree , ultimately came to depend " intirely" on his marriage into the grear Shippen family "for his promotion. " 4'
This system of personal inßuence did not necessarily scorn merit or discourage social mobility . It did require , however, that a talented per son attract the attention of some patron in a position to help hirn. When that happened, a persorr 's rise from obscurity could be spectacular, as the case of Benjamin Waller of Virginia suggests. One evening in q20 , John Carter, the provincial secretary and "a man of immense wealth, " was accidenrally detained by a swollen river at the horne of a "plain planter, .. John Waller. Carter 's eye caught the "quickness " and the "uncommon parts" of Waller's ten-vear-old son, Benjamin , and he
Palronagt 75
talked the father into allowing him to take the boy and make something of him, Carter virtually adopted young Waller as part of his family, sent hirn to the College of William and Mary, appointed hirn his secretary, .nd trained hirn in the law. Carter's "liberality" as a patron eventually made Waller at age twenty-five clerk of the General Court, which in turn 100 to the "friendship" of Govemor William Gooeh. Before Wal ler'·s eareer was over he had beeome a member of the House of Bur gelses, holder of several erown offices, and a great man in his own right."
Influential patrons everywhere were on the lookout to sponsor the mobility ofyoung talent , Benjamin Robinson, clerk ofCaroline County, Virginia, rescued fourteen-year-old Edmund Pendleton from poverty .nd set hirn on his way to becoming one of Virginia's distinguished leaders . So, too, was the penniless immigrant indentured servant Daniel Dulany, Sr., patronized by a wealthy Marylander. In a like way friends recognized the precocity of the teenaged Alexander Hamilton and plucked him from the "grov'ling" eondition of a merchant's clerk in St. Croix "to whieh," as Hamilton lamented, "my Fortune, etc ., eondemns me ." Wealthy apotheeary Dr. Daniel Lathrop of Norwieh, Connecticut , saw great promise in his young apprentice, Benedict Arnold, whose aleoholic father died just as he eame of age and his apprenticeship ended . Lath rop 's patronage was generous: he not only gave the twenty-one-year old orphan the enormous sum of !soo but also deeded hirn the Arnold family home, whose !3°O mortgage he had held, and wrote letters of introduetion for him .·
' Reseuing genius in this way was thought to redound to the credit of
sponsors and patrons, Different groups of eolonial gentlemen in Penn sylvania and Maryland organized subscriptions to send two struggling young painters, Benjamin West and Charles Willson Peale , to -Eu ro pe to study art . That was what real aristocrats presumably did . Of course, some talented individuals of humble origins in this greater British world did make it on their own. John Paul Jones, son of a Scottish gardener, was apprenticed to sea at thirteen; through drive and luck he became at age twenty-one a master of a merchant vessel in the West Indies trade. But for most men seeking to move up through this personally organized hierarchy, ambition and ability were usually not enough. They also needed the patronage or "friendship" of someone who had power and inßuenee-whether it was a governor awarding a printing contract, a merchant taking on an apprentice, or a minister helping a cornmuni cant's son get to Yale.
76 MONARCHY Political Authority 77 We are too apt to think of social mobility in eighteenth-century
America in terms of the career of Benjamin Franklin, printer. But Franklin's career was extraordinary, to say the least; and in his lifetime in America he was rarely celebrated as the common man who had made good. In fact, at every crucial point in Franklin's meteoric rise it was not simply his hard work, brilliance, and character that moved hirn upward; most important was his ability to attract the attention of an influential patron. As a bright teenager who could read and write, Franklin immediately caught the eyes of two colonial governors. Gov emor William Keith of Pennsylvania, "surpris'd" that a seventeen year-old boy could have written a letter he saw, concluded that Franklin "appear'd a young Man of promising Parts, and therefore should be encouraged." A year later Governor William Burnet of New York, told that a ship passen ger "had a great many Books," and that being suffi ciently rare, had young Franklin brought to his horne, where the two "had a good deal of Conversation about Books and Authors." For 'Ca poor Boy" like Franklin all this gubernatorial attention was "very pleas ing" indeed. But it was just the beginning of decades of encouragement and sponsorship that Franklin received from "Ieading Men" such as James Logan, William Allen, and Andrew Hamilton. Hamilton espe dally, said Franklin, "interested hirnself for me strongly ... continuing his Patronage till his death. "44
Franklin understood better than most the kind of dependent society in wh ich he lived. He learned early the pose of "the humble Enquirer," and constantly preached the virtues of calculation and civility.
Wouldst thou extract the purest Sweet of Life, Be nor Ally nor Principal in Strife.... On Haie let Kindness her warm Embers throw And mould into a Friend the melting Foe.
Such caressing and cultivating of feelings was good not only for society but for oneself; for
The weakest Foe boasts sorne revenging Pow'r; The weakest Friend some serviceable Hour.•s
Franklin spent much of his long lifetime seeking patronage and place within English society and politics-not surprisingly, since, in 1749 at least, he believed that social mobility was actually easier in England
than in the colonies ("Something seems wanting in America to incite and stimulate Youth to Study").46 He became deputy post master gen eral of North America in 1753, and by the I']60S he was angling for something bigger in the imperial hierarchy. But ultimately he was to find, as his old enemy Thomas Penn had predicted, that the topmost sphere of English politics remained closed to him. However brightly his scientific achievements may have shone in the eyes of British and Eu ropean philosophes, they counted for very little in the eyes of the "great People" at the center of British imperial power. Thus, as Franklin told David Hume in 1']62, he was perhaps better off carrying his talent away from this English land of plenty back to "where from its Scarcity it may probably come to a better Market." Yet it was not until the late l']60s, when all his hopes for English preferment seemed squashed, that Frank lin began to think of himself as an American. The first part of his Au tobiography was written at the moment in 177! when his grandiose English political and social ambitions seemed most lost, and it became a kind of justification of his failure, a salve for his disillusionment, and ultimately to readers of the nineteenth century-who actually established Frank lin's modern reputation as Poor Richard, the self-made man-a vindi cation of the American Revolution and the changes it had made in the old patronage society. 47 .
5. Political Authority
Patronage was most evident in politics, and there its use was instinctive. When Benjamin Franklin was made deputy postmaster general of North America in 1753, he was ted no time in appointing all his friends and relatives to positions under his control. His son became postmaster in Philadelphia. One brother was made postmaster in Boston; when the brother died, Franklin gave the office to his brother's stepson, He made his nephew postmaster in New Haven, appointed the son of a friend postmaster in Charleston, and made another friend in New York con troller. A year or so later he promoted his son to be controller and moved the husband of his wife's niece into the vacated Philadelphia position. When this office again became open, he brought another brother down from Newport to fill it.'
Such patronage politics was simply an extension into govemmental affairs of the pervasive personal and kin influence that held the colonial social hierarchies together. The appointing to govemmental offices, the
--
78 79 MONARCHY
awarding of military commissions or judgeships, the granting of land or contracts for provisions-all these were only the visible political expres sions of the underlying system of personal obligations and reciprocity that ran through the whole society ." The key to Sir Lewis Namier's great success as a historian in iIIuminating the nature of eighteenth-eentury English politics was his perception of the special personal character of the vertical bonds that tied people together and his understanding of the peculiar behavior of the leading politicians in whom the chains of infiu ence and patronage converged . Namier taught us what many in the eighteenth century, from the Duke of Newcastle to David Hume, al ready knew : that patronage was what made the English monarchy work.
In a monarchical society the king was "the Head & Fountain" of a11 offices and honors. Subjects were expected to look upward for favors and rewards, if not to the king hirnself, then at least to those who were dependent on him, The experience ofliving in a monarchy, said Hume, tended "to beget in everyone an inelination to please his superiors." Lines of influence radiated outward from the crown through the colonial governors into even the remotest localities of American society. Through such influence , wrote the English whig John Brown contemptuously, a "great Chain of political Self-Interest was at length formed; and ex tended from the lowest Cobler in a Borough , to the King's first Min ister . " "We may .. . give to this influence what name we please, " said Hume ; " we may call it by the invidious appellations of cOTTUption and dtpendenu; but some degree and some kind of it" were absolutely necessary for all royal government. Patronage was the lifeblood of monarchy.3
If this was so, how monarchical was government in the colonies? Historians have commonly stressed the weakness of royal influence in the colonies . Following the Revolution, observers ranging from loyalist supporters to radical whigs concluded that "the King and government of Great Britain had no patronage in the country, which could create attachrnent and infiuence sufficient to counteract that restless, arrogating spirit .. . in popular assemblies. "4 It is certainly true that royal influ ence in the colonies was meager compared with what it was in the mether country . There were no elaborate civil bureaucracies, no bishoprics , no deaneries, no prebends, few regular army or navy posts, and not much ro speak of in the way of crown livings. During the first half of the eighteenth century much of the crown's appointing power had been progressively stripped away from below-by the provincial assemblie.il and by local authorities . And the political effectiveness of royal officials
Politieal Authority
was continually weakened by divisions within the imperial hierarchy and by the governors' need to share influence with the British court and bureaucracy above them. Yet for many Americans the crown's manip ulation of offices and patronage remained pervasive and powerful enough to arouse their continual exasperation and anxiety.
Weak in fact as royal authority may have been in America, the crown was responsible for the empire, and as such it ultimately bore the burden of nearly a11 personal political influence exercised in the colonies. Even when local notables encroached on the crown's authority and built up their own countervailing connections with which to combat royal officials, the notables still seemed somehow to be only links in that long chain of dependency whose end disappeared into the distant and murky corridors of Whitehall. The rich merchant William PeppereIl had the most powerful "interest" in a11 of Maine, and naturally the governor of Massachusetts appointed hirn commander of the military expedition to take Louisburg in 1745 because he was "most likely to raise Soldiers soonest ." Yet Pepperell's subsequent appointrnent to a regular com mand in the British army and the award of a baronetcy made it impos sible for hirn to separate his "interest" from that of the crown, and thus inevitably, he was regarded as a royal dependent.>
Any Briton whose sources of political strength lay in the rnetropoli tan center was bound to be associated with crown authority. Henry McCulloh was never a royal governor of North Carolina, but he exer cised more political power than most royal governors ever did. For four decades this British merchant and land speculator, whose "political Connections" in England, as his son delicately put it, "are far from contemptible," almost single-handedly kept North Carolina's politics in turmoil. McCulloh never lost any opportunity to pursue his interest . He defied and replaced royal governors and acquired for hirnself hundreds of thousands of acres of Carolina land, which he also managed to ex em pt from the normal payment of quitrents. Although he spent only a half dozen years in America , he had friends and agents in North Car olina for whom he secured offices and privileges . The royal governors by themselves may have lacked sufficient patronage power to govern, but in the face of the activities of men like McCulloh, the colonists had a hard time perceiving the weakness of crown authority in America."
Few royal governors could match the power of Lord Baltimore's secretary, Cecilius Calvert, who conceived of the Maryland proprietary as a "Political Warehouse " of positions and favon similar "in Minia ture' , to the patronage of the Duke of Newcastle in Great Britain . But
80 81 MONARCHY
they did what they could with what they had, and with the underdevel oped nature of American society less could often go a long way . Al though "we have few places in the governor's gift," noted the Boston physician William Douglass, "a great many small farms weU leased out may be equivalent to a few great farms . " In fact, in all the royal colonies except Virginia, loca1 officials-sheriffs, judges, justices of the peace , militia officers, clerks, and so on-remained more ~.::;>endent on royal favor than their counterparts in the mether country. In New Jersey , for example, one -quarter of the gentry could be affected by such crown appointments to loca1 offices. The situation was no different in Massa chusetts, where in the course of the eighteenth century the proportion of members of the assembly who were simultaneously justices of the peace rose steadily, reaching a peak of 71 percent in 1']63 . All in an, concluded Douglass, this power to appoint local officials "gives the Gov ernors vast Influence. " 7
The more equal the society, the more ferocious the scrambling " for any little distinction in tide or name ." Even Englishmen thought that the colonists solicited for offices "more eagerly than in any Country upon Earth," and "it rnatters not how menial those offices may seern." For those struggling up from near the bottom of this provincial hierar chy three thousand miles from the metropolis, it took little enough to create an "interest." The Commission of a Subaltern, in the Militia," noted John Adams, "will ternpt these little Minds, as much as C rowns, and Stars and Garten will great ones." Sometimes the crown's influ ence took the form of a carpetbagging official's elevation to the chief justiceship of a colony through the connections of some English lord 's mistress; at other times it was simply a New England town deputy's "taking a favour from the Governor" and being made a justice of the peace . But however petty this royal patronage may have been, it exerted an influence in local colonial affairs that we have only begun to measure. Certainly it provided much of the colonists' antagonism to the imperial system; indeed, the power of appointment became the great political evil against which they struck out most vigorously in their new revolu tionary state constitutions of 1776 .8
It is almost impossible today to comprehend the ancient monarchy in its own terrns or to understand the role that patronage played in sustaining its authority. We apply modern republican standards that were alrea cly ernerging in the eighteenth century. "Corruption" is nearly all we see. Indeed, we find it very difficult to understand why members of that society put up to the extent they did with the flagrant efforts of
Political Authority
political officials to exploit their positions for their personal gain. Charges of "covetousness" and "corruption" were repeatedly made, to be sure, but before mid-century these accusations were much less effective than they would be on the eve of the Revolution. In fact, before 1745 in Musachusetts opponents of royal authority remained preoccupied with technical constitutional issues-the right of the assembly to elect its own speaker, adjourn itself, and so on-and rarely attacked the government in the radical whig language of "corruption .' '9 For that monarchical lOCiety there was something traditional and justifiable in the crown's patronage authority that ultimately allowed it to persist as long as it did in the face of the notorious abuse of it and the continual criticism of it .
Eighteenth-century monarchical government still rested largely on inherited medieval notions that are lost to us today. The modern dis tinctions between state and society , public and private, were just emerg ing and were as yet only dimly appreciated . The king's inherited rights to govern the realm-his prerogatives-were as much private as they were public, just as the people's ancient rights or Iiberties were as much public as they were private . Public institutions had private rights and private persons had public obligations. The king 's prerogatives or his prernier rights to govern the realm grew out of his private position as the wealthiest of the wealthy and the largest landowner in the society; his govemment had really begun as an extension of his royal household. But in a like manner all private households or families-"those small subdivisions of Government, " one colon ist called them-had public re sponsibilities to help the king govern."
Govemments in this premodern society were not supposed to have much to do beyond carrying out the king's duty to preserve the peace and to adjudicate disputes among his subjects. "The Business of Gov ernment," declared the radical whig "Cato," was to do justice-"to secure to every Man his own, and to prevent the Crafty , Strong, and Rapacious, from pressing upon or circumventing the Weak, Industri ous, and Unwary." Royal governors did not have legislative policies, and assemblies did not enact legislative programs. Many of the colonial govemments ' activities were private, local, and adjudicatory . Even the assemblies spent a good deal of time hearing private petitions, which often were only the complaints of one individual or group against another."
The modem distinctions between legislation and adjudication were far from clear. Many of the county courts not' only settled disputes but exercised a general paternalistic authority over the localities and handled
82 83
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MONAllCHY
a wide variety of what we today would call "administrative" tasks, drawing on the community for help. The county courts were as much instruments of government as they were judicial bodies. They assessed taxes, granted licenses, oversaw poor relief, supervised road repair, set prices, upheld moral standards, and all in all monitored the localities over which they presided ."
These colonial governments carried out their responsibilities without the aid of elaborate bureaucracies. On the eve of the Revolution a1l the expenses of the govemment of South Carolina came to less than rB,ooo a year. Colonial Massachusetts had a society of 300,000 people, yet it spent less than f25,ooo a year on its govemment, which employed only six "full-time officials" and fewer than a thousand "part-time officials." Even this notion of "full-time " and "part-time" officials is anachronis tic and misleading, for no one yet conceived of politics as a paid profes sion or of a permanent civil service in the local colonial governments. It is true that members of the Massachusetts assembly were paid for their services , but this practice was unusual, and it horrified many ob servers. "The Honour, and Pleasure of doing Good," it was said, should be "Recompence sufficient to a Patriot." Most officeholding was still regarded, with varying degrees of plausibility, as a public obligation that private persons "snving gratis or gerurously" owed to the community.'3
lndeed, all govemment was regarded essentially as the enlisting and mobilizing of the power of private persons to carry out public ends. "Govemments," it has been said, "did not act so much as they ensured and sanctioned the actions of others. ,. lf the eighteenth-century city of New York wanted its streets cleaned or paved, for example, it did not hire contractors or create a "public works" department; instead it is sued ordinances obliging each person in the city to clean or repair the street abutting his house or shop. In the same way, if the colony of Connecticut wanted a college, it did not build and run the college itself, but instead gave legal rights to private persons to build and run it . Most public action-from the building of wharfs and ferries to the maintain ing of roads and inns-depended upon private energy and private funds . For the most part governments had only legal authority at their disposal . They issued sanctions against private persons for failure to perform their public dunes, and they enticed private persons into fulfilling public goals by offering charters, Iicenses, and various other legal immunities to gether with fee-collecting offices. Given the difficuhy in that premodern world of raising tax revenues, it was understandable that governrnents insisted on shifting the costs of most public action to private sources .
Political Authority
This practice has been called "govemment by delegation, govemment eommitted to a policy of extemalizing the costs of action." Even crirn Inal defendants who were acquitted were required to pay the costs of their trials!"
Only in the context of these traditional assumptions about the nature and limitations of premodem govemment can we appreciate the role of royal patronage and the apparent "private" exploitation of " pu blic" offices in the colonies; in fact, it was to be the other way 'round: the "public" exploitation of "private" power. Since everyone in the society had an obligation to help govem the realm commensurate with his social rank-the king's being the greatest because he stood at the top of the social hierarchy-important offices were supposed to be held only by those who were already worthy and had already achieved economic and social superiority . Just as gentlemen were expected to staft' the officer corps of the army, so were independent gentlemen of leisure and edu cation expected to supply leadership for govemment . Since such well to-do gentry were "exempted from the lower and less honourable ern ployments, " wrote the philosopher Francis Hutcheson , they were "rather more than others obliged to an active life in some service to mankind. The publick has this claim upon them ." All the founding fathers feh the weight of this claim and often agonized and complained about it. At a moment of bittemess Jeft'erson actually debated with hirn self the question "whether the state may command the political services of all its members to an indefinite extenr." He had little doubt, he said, that "public service and private misery (were) inseparately linked to
gether. ' " 5 Govemmental service , in other words, was gene rally thought to be
a personal sacrifice required of certain gentlemen because of their tal ents, independence, and social preeminence. Officeholding was sup posed to be a burden, " attended , " said George Washington in 1758, "with a certain Expense and trouble without the least prospect of gain"; and plural officeholding was just that much more of a burden. Thomas Hutchinson ne ver regarded his many offices as anything but public ob ligations placed upon hirn by virtue of his distinguished and wealthy position in Massachusetts society. "l never sought or solidted any posts," he said in 1']65; and he insisted that he would willingly give up all claim to honors and emoluments if it would serve the peace of his country. Presumably Hutehinsen never lost money from his officehold ing-his confiscated estate as a loyalist was worth fga,ooo-but many local officeholders, from grand jurors to justices of the peace, did serve
85 84 MONARCHY
without salary; and in some piaces communities had trouble getting " people to take on certain offices, Of course, many offices offered the holders incentives in the form of fees, rewards, or benefits, sornetimes quite lucrative ones. But a1ways it was assumed that granting such of fices together with their perquisites was the best way for these premod ern governments to get things done without incurring any direct public " costs.16
Since the society and the state were assumed to be identical , social honors and titles were necessarily related to the offices of government. J ustices of the peace were invariably "Esq."; assemblymen and many :' selectmen were "Mr." In fact, wrote the great English jurist William Blackstone, "honours and offices are in their nature convertible and synonymous." Social distinctions, including titles, were the prerequisite " of high govemment office: "that the people may know and distinguish such as are set over thern, in order to yield thern their due respect and obedience." In this sense government office seemed to belong to men t of property and high social rank in the same way that the throne be longed to the king . Officeholding at times even seerned patrimonial . Some men tended to regard their offices as a virtual species of private property that they could pass on to members of their farmlies. Seats on Virginia grand juries were perpetuated within families almost as fre quently as seats on the vestries and county courts. Everywhere in the colonies men resigned offices in favor of their sons and then exulted, as Joseph Read of Pennsylvania did to Edward Shippen III in m'F "Is it not agreeable to find our Descendants thus honoured?" The practice of ., a father resigning his place to his son' was common enough that even Thomas Hutchinson complained that it was " tend ing to make a11 offices hereditary. ''''
Because office was an extension into government of the private per son, the greater the private person, the greater the office. Access to government therefore often came quickly and easily to those who had the necessary social credentiaJs . Thus wealthy John Dickinson could be elected to the Delaware assembly in [760 at the age of twenty-eight and promptly be made its speaker. When James Allen at the age of twenty seven retumed from his education at the Middle Temple in London, he immediately was elected alderman of the city of Philadelphia, a lifetime position that was as distinguished as nearly any in the colony; six years later he succeeded his father as a member of the Pennsylvania assembly from Cumberland County. So also in [753 Daniel Dulany of Maryland, predsely because he inherited great wealth and social position. could at
Political Authority
once take over those political offices that his father had spent decades in achieving. So, too, could Jonathan Trumbull, a poor, obscure country merchant, be catapulted into the speakership of the Connecticut assern bly at twenty-eight and into the council at the age of twenty-nine simply by the fact that his marriage into the ancient and prestigious Robinson ramily had given him, as Samuel Peters put it, "the prospect of prefer ment in civillife. "18
Since these colonial govemments lacked most of the coercive powers of a modem state-a few constables and sheriffs scarcely constituted a police force-officeholders relied on their own social respectability and private inftuence to compel the obedience of ordinary people. Common people could become hog reeves or occupy other lowly offices, but they had no business exercising high politica1 office, since, in addition to being caught up in their petty workaday interests, they had no power, no connections, no social capacity for commanding public aUegiance and deference. Thus, when, in [759. the governor of Massachusetts ap pointed as a justice of the peace in Hampshire County someone whose company the other locaJ justices declared they were "never inclined to keep," eleven of the justices resigned in protest, saying that such an appointment would make the office contemptible in the eyes of the peo ple and diminish their ability to enforce the law. For mechanics and other manuallaborers, holding high office was virtually impossible while they remained in their inferior status and were involved in market in terests. '9
Although many artisans and petty traders who had wealth and po Iitical ambitions, such as Roger Sherman of Connecticut, found that retirement from business was a prerequisite for high public office, none was as scrupulous on this point as Benjamin Franklin-perhaps because his sights were higher and his enemies more numerous. Franklin shrewdly perceived that the secret to his rising in America was not to presume too much and get ahead of hirnself. As a printer and business man, no matter how rich, Franklin knew he was not really agentIeman, and, unlike some of his fellow' artis;ms in Pennsylvania, he made no effort to appear to be one. When, in 1747, the officers of the Philadelphia militia elected hirn colonel of their regiment , he "declin'd that Station, . .. conceiving myself unfit. " Colonels were supposed to be gentlernen. A year later, however, at the age of forty-two, Franklin thought he had acquired "sufficient tho' moderate Fortune" to retire finally from busi ness and become agentIeman. Only then did he believe he had "secur'd Leisure during the rest of my L.ife" to do what enlightened and virtuous
86 87 MONARCHY
gentlemen were supposed to do-engage in "Philosophical Studies and Amusernents," serve in important political offices (for which "the Pub lic now considering me as a Man of Leisure, laid hold of me for their Purposes"), and, finally assurne the colonelcy of the Philadelphia regi ment that he had earlier declined and for which he was now fit. At the time this coming into gentility was a significant, even a cerernonial, event for Franklin: he commissioned Robert Feke to paint a mannered and foppish portrait to honor the occasion. Later in his life, however, after he had become a wigless republican hero, he conveniently forgot about this monarchical portrait. 20
The stability of the politieal system thus depended on the social au thority of the politicalleaders being visible and incontestable. No won der, then, that officials were so sensitive to public criticism of their private character. They knew only too weH-"these are dry common place observations, known to everyone" -that their ability to govern rested on their personal reputations. In fact, as future loyalist Jonathan SeweH put it in 1766, "the person and the office are so connected in the minds of the greatest part of mankind, that a contempt of the forrnn', and a veneration for the latler are totally incompatible. "21
This patrimonial conception of officeholding, this identification be tween social and political authority, private and public leadership, ran deep in this traditional monarchical world. No presumption about pol itics was in' fact more basic to this society and separated it more from the emerging democratic world of the nineteenth century. It lay behind much of the political squabbling of eighteenth-century America-from the continual resort to the law of seditious libel to the repeated com plaints that the wrong sorts of persons were gaining office, either through arbitrary crown manipulations or through a demagogie courring of the populace. Rulers needed to be socially and morally respectable. "What ever tends to create in the minds of the people, a contempt of the persons who hold the highest offices in the stare;" whatever convinced people that "subordination is not necessary, and is no essential part of govern ment, tends directly to destroy it."22
Thus royal officials and other public magistrates tried to wrap them selves in the sacred mantIe of God and religion and to establish their personal dignity in every way possible. They invoked the common law of seditious lihel agairrst scurrilous attacks on their personal character on the understandable grounds that such "speaking evil of dignities and reviJing the rulers of the people" undermined their capacity to govern. Critics of government had to be careful to state that they were denounc-
Political Authon'ty
ang "measures, not men" and to avoid the full spelling out of the name of a public official in the press for fear of conveying conternpt. But ensuring the people's respect for the personal dignity of public office holders was difficult, if not impossible, if those holding office had no sociel respectability in the first place. And so both crown officials and colonial gentry complained constantly of the prevalence in government of men in "necessitous circurnstances," or "plain illiterate husband men," or "men without education, and of dissolute rnanners," or "ob scure and inferior persons," or "those who have neither natural nor acquired parts to recommend thern.' Crown and colonists blamed each other for placing the wrong sorts of people-men without real wealth, esteern, and virtue-into offices of public trust. In an important sense the Revolution was fought over just this issue-over differing interpre tations of who in America were the proper social leaders who ought naturally to accede to positions of public authority. 23
The personal structure of eighteenth-century politics, the prevalence of numerous vertieal lines of inftuence converging on particular people of wealth and power, was what made colonial politics essentially a con test among prominent families for the control of state authority. This personal structure of politics, and not simply the age's abhorrence of division, explains the absence of organized politieal parties in the eigh teenth century. Political factions existed, but these were little more than congeries of the leading gentry's personal and family "Interests." And it was this personal' structure of politics-not any elaborate legal restric tions on the suffrage-that kept most common people from participating in politics. Although the contending gentry increasingly appealed to the "people" in electoral contests-so much so, as Governor William Shir ley of Massachusetts observed in 1742, that the aroused people had "it in their power upon an extraordinary Emergency to double and almost treble their numbers" in elections-much of the time most ordinary folk were not deeply involved in provincial or imperial politics. Sometimes as many as one-third of the towns of Massachusetts failed to send rep resentatives to the provincial legislature."
Few if any of the common people regarded government as a means by which economic and social power might be redistributed or the prob lems of their lives resolved. Usually they confined themselves to local issues and to wrangling over such questions as whether or not to allow their hogs to run free in their communities. And whenever they did discover the inclination to place demands on governrnent, they lacked the power to challenge the personal influence of the dominant elites. In
88 89 MONARCHY
a 1758 election in Newport, Rhode Island, noted Ezra Stiles, two hun dred out of six hundred eligible freemen did not vote; "one third He still," he said, "silenced by Connexions." In 1773 in the Mohawk dis trict of Tryon County, New York, at least four hundred men had the franchise. Yet in an election for five constables only fourteen electors turned out to vote; all fourteen were closely tied by interest or patronage to Sir William Johnson, the local grandee of the area, and all fourteen naturally voted for the same five candidates. 2~
Whatever acquiescence people gave to those who by virtue of their wealth, influence, and independence were considered best qualified to rule was based not simply on traditional habits of deference but on the dependency that patronage created. When in 1757 Jeremiah Gridley of Brookline, Massachusetts, thought his hopes of being elected to the House of Representatives were endangered, he asked the Earl of Lou doun, commander in chief of His Majesty's army in North America, to use his inftuence with Governor Thomas Pownall to secure his appoint me nt as militia colonel for the regiment of his locality. Because the regimental commander had the power to impress men for provincial military service, Gridley told Loudoun, the colonelcy "will place my Townsmen in a Dependency upon me. "26
Probably no one in late-eighteenth-century America used his prop erty and patronage to create political dependencies more shamelessly than John Hancock. Hancock patronized everyone. He made work for people. He erected hornes that he did not need. He built ships that he sold at a loss. He sponsored any and every young man who importuned him. He opened trade shops and staffed them. He purchased a concert hall for public use. He entertained lavishly and habitually treated the Boston populace to wine. John Adams recalled that "not less than a thousand families were, every day in the year, dependent on Mr. Han cock for their daily bread. " He went through the mercantile fortune he had inherited from his uncle, but he formed one of the most elaborate networks of political dependency in eighteenth-century America and be came the single rnost popular and powerful figure in Massachusetts pol itics during the last quarter of the century. 27
Translating the personal, social, and economic power of the gentry into political authority was essentially what eighteenth-century politics was about. The process was self-intensifying: social power created po litical authority, which in turn created more social influence. Some members of the gentry, such as the Tidewater planters of Virginia or the wealthy landholders of the Connecticut River valley, had enough
Political Authority
influence to overawe entire communities. Connecticut River valley gen try like Israel Williams and John Worthington, so imposing as to be called "river gods," used their power to become at one time or another selectmen of their towns, representatives to the Massachusetts General Court, members of the council, provincial court judges, justices of the peace, and colonels of their county regiments. It became impossible to tell where the circle of their authority began: the political authority to grant licenses for taverns or mills, to determine the location of roads and bridges, or to enlist men for military service was of a piece with their wealth and social influence."
It was likewise substantial paternalistic and patronage power, and not merely the treating of the freeholders with toddy at election time, that enabled the great Virginia planters to mobilize their "interests" and to maintain law and order over their local communities without the aid of police forces. The leading Virginia gentry were the vestrymen of their parishes and the lay leaders of the Anglican church, so that the sacredness of religion and the patronage of poor relief furt her enhanced the hierarchy of authority. All this was the stuff of which aristocracies were made. 29
Everywhere it was the same: those who had the property and power to exert influence in any way-whether by lending money, doing favors, or supplying employment-created obligations and dependencies that could be turned into political authority. When in 1743 Henry Beekman, a large New York landowner, interceded on behalf of several small free holders of his county who were faced with an ejectment suit, he was exercising the power of patronage his position gave hirn. Although Beek man told the beneficiaries of his aid that he would "expect no other reward for this than your friendship," he clearly expected such "friend ship" to manifest itself in political allegiance at e1ection time.t"
Even the recurrent mobbing and rioting of Anglo-American society, which seem to be challenges to the structure of authority, were in fact ultimately testimonies to the paternalism and personal organization of that society. The crowd riots were disorderly protests by common peo pIe, to be sure, and gentlemanly authorities were not at all happy with them. But the riots took place within the existing structure of authority and tended to reinforce that structure even as they defied it; often they grew out of folk festivals and traditional popular rites and had much in common with them. In fact, it was the awesomeness of personal and social authority in this premodern age that compelled common people to resort to mock ceremonies and rituals as a means of dealing with their
91 MONARCHY9°
humiliations and resentrnents, Such rituals momentarily allowed hum ble people to overcome their feelings of inferiority and subordination and to control the release of their pent-up anger and hostility. Conse quently, role reversals, in which boys, apprentices, and servants became kings for a day, worked not to undermine but to reaffirm that existing hierarchy . Brief saturnalian transgressions of the society's rules by the populace tended to underscore the power of those rules. And the use of effigies and the heavily ritualized behavior of the mobs, such as those in Boston's Pope 's Day celebrations of November 5, served to keep these challenges to authority at a distance."
Often these popular mobs or riots were simply products of local frustration with the way the ordinary processes of society were operat ing; they indicated, said Samuel Adams, that the "wheels of govern ment" were "somewhere dogged . "3' Whether destroying bawdy houses that magistrates had been unable to close, or proteering communities against the threat of smallpox, or preventing the king 's ships from im pressing local sailors, crowds of people per iodically took to the streets to set things right in a direct and im mediate fashion. Often the crowds acted to support traditional customs and moral relationships against changes brought on by new impersonal market conditions, maintaining by force, for example, customary prices and the traditional ways of distributing goods against the perceived forestalling and gouging prac ticed by unscrupulous shopkeepers and middlemen.
Such mobbing was a means by which ordinary people, usually those most dependent-women, servants, free blacks, sailors , and young men-made their power feit temporarily in a political system that was otherwise largely immune to their influence. Although the crowds usu aUy acted outside the bounds of law and of existing institutions , they were not necessarily anti-authoritarian. The mobs' actions often enjoyed widespread support in the local community, and in fact were condoned or at least tolerated by many gentlemen who remained confident of their paternal hegemony and who often wanted to separate themselves from crass and greedy tradesmen and moneymakers. Sometimes members of the gentry even participated in the rioting and guided it. The mobs often showed remarkable rest raint, pinpointing their objectives with ex traordinary care, and limiting themselves to the intimidation of partic ular persons and to the selective destruction of property . These common crowd actions, at least before the imperial crisis deepened in the l]60s, were generally thought to pose no great threat to the hierarchy of the society. Popular uprisings were commonly viewed as momentary re-
Political Authorily
leases within the political system, temporary "Thunder Gusts" that "do more Good than Harm" in clearing the political atmosphere . Far from being symptoms of the breakdown of traditional authority, the behavior of the mobs indicated that the customary mechanisms of social control in the society were still working. 33
Even the riots against royal officials and stamp agents in the I']60S were not always as deeply threatening to authority as they sometimes seemed. The mobs dared to whip, hang, and bum effigies but usually not real persons, and their mock ceremonies-the crowning of petty merchants and craftsmen as captains-general or kings, for example were, like alt parodies, backhanded tributes to what was being ridiculed . The severely ritualized nature of much of the crowds' behavior often kept the mobs from running amok. The destruction of Lieutenant Gov emor Thomas Hutchinson's horne by a Boston mob on August 26,1']65, aroused so much more shock and fear in the community, even among whigs, than a riot against the Stamp Act twelve days earlier precisely because it ignored the prescribed rituals and effigy-parading that the previous riot had carefully followed. It seemed much : more a private than a public mob .3+
Perhaps nothing is more revealing of the paternal and face-to-face nature of this society than the way the prominent Charleston merchant planter Henry Laurens dispersed a Stamp Act mob in 1']65. Perceiving that the mob, disguised in blackened faces, sailors ' clothes, and slouch hats, was about to force an entrance to his house in search of stamped paper, Laurens let the rioters in . Although held with a brace of cutlasses against his ehest, Laurens called out the names of members of the mob "to their great surprize"-and forced them by sheer familiarity to back down in their threats . The crowd eventually ended up praising Laurens: they said they "loved" him, gave hirn "three cheers," wished his "Lady" weil and retired with "God bless your honour, Good night, Colonel."~
This sort of popular rioting was ultimately evidence that politics remained essentially a preserve of the dominant gentlemanly elite. The processes of government still depended on the face-to-face relations of gentlemen or on the widespread use of personal correspondence among gentlernen. Even much of the writing of pamphlets or newspaper essays was an extended form of personal correspondence among gentlemen who knew one another intimately. By filling their writings with personal references, Latin quotations, and esoteric allusions to the heritage of Western culture, gentlemen showed that they still thought of the audi
9 2 MONARCHY
ence for their political polemies as roughly commensurate with the social world comprised of other educated gentlemen.f
Such familiar elitist politics in adependent hierarchical world nec essarily involved a great deal of personal maneuvering and manipula tion. Success of any sort in eighteenth-century Anglo-American society put a premium on certain traits of character-on circumspection, cau tion, and calculation ; on the control and suppression of one's real feel ings for the sake of cultivat ing the patronage of those superiors who could help or hurt one's rise. Throughout the pre-revolutionary crisis in Maryland the eider Charles Carroll, raised in this old society, contin uallyexhorted his impetuous son of the same name, who was leading a newspaper assault on the government, to move carefully and to hide his bitter antagonism to the Maryland governor. For, as the father warned, "prudence directs you not to show that the governor's folly and want of spirit is mortifying to you . You may resolve to live in a desert if you will not generally associate with foolish, fickle, mean-spirited men." Such advice bred the civic-minded prudence and role-playing, the Rat tery and fawning, that made the eighteenth-century so distinctive and so repulsive to those who value sincerity and authenticity . Already by the time of the Revolution, however, a younger generation of American politicians, men.Iike Carroll's son, were no longer willing to abide the insincere dissembling of that oider monarchical courtier world."
u REPUBLICANISM
6. The Republicanization of Monarch) In the end the disintegration of the traditional eighteenth-century mo narchica1 society of paternal and dependent relationships prepared the way for the emergence of the liberal, democratic, capitalistic world of the early nineteenth century. This reordering of the society of the ancim rigime was not confined to America, or even to the English-speaking world. It occurred throughout Western society, sometimes but not al ways accompanied by violence and revolution . Indeed, the late eigh teenth century in the Adantic world has been called "the age of the democratic revolution." It might heuer be ca1led "the age of the repub lican revolution." For it was republicanism and republican principles that ultimately destroyed this monarchical society.I
But not at any one moment-neither in 1716 with the Declaration of Independence, nor in 1789 with the ca1ling of the French Estates Gen eral, nor even in 1793 with the execution of Louis XVI. Republicanism did not replace monarchy a11 at once; it ate away at it, corroded it, slowly, gradually, steadily, for much of the eighteenth century. Repub licanism seeped everywhere in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world, eroding monarchica1 society from within, wearing away a11 the tradi tional supports of kingship, ultimately desacralizing monarchy to the point where, as David Hume observed, "the mere name of king com mands little respect; and to talk of a /cing as God's vice-regent on earth, or to give hirn any of these magnificent titles which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in everyone . ,'.
So confused and blended did monarchy and republicanism become in the eighteenth century that people, especially in the English-speaking world, had trouble precisely defining them. Republicanism, in partieu lar, assumed a wide range of meanings and, as Alexander Hamilton said, was "used in various senses. " By the early nineteenth century John Adams professed to believe that he had "never understood" what republicanism was and thought that "no other man ever did or ever will." He concluded in frustration that republicanism "may signify any thing, every thing, or nothing. " And so it did, becomingat times vir
9 6 97 REPUBLICANISM
tually indistinguishable from monarchy. Certainly it stood for some thing other than a set of political institut ions based on popular e1ection. In fact, republicanism was not to be reduced to a mere form of govern ment at all; instead it was what Franeo Venturi has called " a form of life;' ideals and values entirely compatible with monarchical institu tions . Republicanism " was separated from the historical forms it had taken in the past, and became increasingly an ideal which could exist in a monarchy. "3
Promoting republicanisrn as an actual form of government was of course forbidden in that monarchical world. No one in his right mind dared suggest deposing kings and replacing them with republican gov ernments. That was dangerous, seditious, and treasonous, ~ Besides, few who believed in republicanism actually intended to foment revolution and overthrow monarchy . The self-proclaimed republics in Europe the Swiss cantons, the Italian city-stätes, and the Dutch provinces-were scarcely fit models for the sprawling monarchies of the continent. And no one wanted to try the disastrous seventeenth-century English exper iment in republican government again.
True, the intellectuals and critics who invoked republican principles and sentiments were opposed to the practices and values of the dominant monarchical world . But they sought to reforrn and revitalize their soci ety; they wanted to enlighten and improve monarchy , not cut off the heads of kings . These critics and many others-including good loyal colonial subjects of His Britannic Majesty-used republicanism merely as a counterculture to monarchy. Though rarely cited specifically by name, republicanism represented all those beliefs and values that con fron ted and criticized the abuses of the eighteenth-century monarchical world.
But republicanism was no less revolutionary for all that , In fact, it was in every way a radical ideology-as radical for the eighteenth cen tury as Marxism was to be for the nineteenth century , It challenged the primary assumptions and practices of monarchy-its hierarchy, its in equality, its devotion to kinship, its patriarchy, its patronage, and its dependency. It offered new conceptions of the individual, the family , the state, and the individual's relationship to the family, the state , and other individuals. Indeed, republicanisrn offered nothing less than new ways of organizing society . It defied and dissolved the older monarchical connections and presented people with alternative kinds of attachrnents, new sorts of social relationships . It transformed monarchical culture and
TM Repuh/icanization of Monarchy
prepared the way for the revolutionary upheavals at the end of the eigh teenth century .
M'any like Adam Smith believed that all govemments in the world could be reduced to just two-monarchies and republics-and that these were rooted in two basic types of personalities: monarchists, who loved peace and order, and republicans, who loved liberty and lndependence . Late in his life Jefferson likewise thought that all people by nature could be divided into just two parties. They existed in all countries, he said, whether called tories and whigs, aristocrats and democrats, right and left, ultras and radicals , or serviles and liberals. Jefferson left no doubt where his own sympathies lay: "the sickly, weakly, timid man, fears the people, and is a Tory by nature. The healthy, strong and bold, cherishes thern, is formed a Whig by nature ;">
But most intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century never tried to distinguish between monarchy and republicanism as sharply asJefferson did. Instead, they usually discussed monarchy and republies as govem ments that mingled with and reinforced one another. David Hume thought that as perfect as the monarchical form may have appeared to sorne political leaders, "it owes all its perfection to the republican ." It was not possible for a pure despotism established among a barbarous people to refine and polish itself. "It must borrow its laws and methods, and institutions, and consequently its stability and order, from free gov emments. These advantages," said Hume, "are the sole growth of re publics." Such statements by a variety of intellectual figures helped to make republicanism a common and integral part of the dominant rno narchical culture.
It was Montesquieu, however ("the most comprehensive and pierc ing genius of his age, " the Reverend Thomas Robbins of Massachusetts cal1ed hirn), who most systematically and comparatively set forth the principles of monarchy and republicanism for that enlightened age . Al though Montesquieu's ideal models of govemment were sometimes overly rigid and his moral and social prescriptions for each type of gov emment often aphoristically concise ("as honor is the principle of a monarchical govemment, the laws ougb . to be in relation to this prin ciple" ; "the less luxury there is in a republic, the more it is perfect"), his inftuential treatise The Spirit of the Laus (1748) comprehensively weighed the advantages and disadvantages of monarchies and republics, described the cohesive forces of each, and suggested that most modem govemments were mixtures of both to one degree or another."
98 99 REPUBLICANISM
Most European readers of The SpiriJ of tht Laws, even those who lived in the France of Louis XV and Louis XVI, could readily conclude that their societies shared in the spirit of both monarchy and republicanism. Had not Montesquieu hirnself previously written (in his PmitJ" Leuer: of 1']21) that there were no pure monarchies left in Europe? Surely mon archies Iike that of France could benefit from some further infusion of republican principles. Montesquieu and others even implied that France might borrow something from the balanced constitution of the English monarchy-that is, it might become more republican.
Among the monarchies of Europe, the English possessed by far the most republican constitution. England, Montesquieu said, "may be justly called a republic disguised under the form of monarchy. " Already by the beginning of the century the English monarchy had lost much of its sacred aura. The man -rnade dynastie alterations of 1688 and 17I4 and the rationalizing of religion inevitably weakened the sense of hereditary mystique, and the restrietions Parliament placed on the crown's prerog atives and finances diminished the king's ability to act independently. None of the Hanoverian monarchs before the American Revolution ever achieved more than a fteeting popularity . Neither George I nor George II seemed to care about the monarchy's public image, and both kings tended to avoid displaying the trappings of royalty. It was not easy for the English populace to get very excited about them, and more often than not London crowds accorded the monarchy in public less respect than they would pay to it in the nineteenth century. It was as if George I, by abolishing the royal touch, had begun a steady process of desac ralizing the English crown . It reached the point where radieal whigs like "Cato" could describe the king as being no different from the mayor of a town: "they are both civil officers."7
The English thought they lived in a republicanized monarchy, and they were right. Their famous "Iimited" or "mixed" monarchy was in fact a republicanized one. The English kings, it was said, were not typical kings, Far from being the traditional sort of power-hungry mon archs, the English kings were "the Scourges of Tyrants, and the Asser tors of Liberty ." They were "beloved by a nation of Freemen and Heroes," and they, like their peopIe, aspired after "those brighter Tro phies that are earn'd in the Paths of Virtue and heroic Deeds .' The British king was the ultimate disinterested republican leader, the "sov ereign umpire" of the realm. H
NearIy everyone agreed that the substantial element of republican ism in the English constitution was a crucial source of its strength , Some
Tht RepublicanizlJlion of MonaTChy
Englishmen were even willing to admit openly that the English consti tution was republican. Thomas Wentworth in 1710 said that the arrange ment of "king, lords, and commons, each acheck upon the other," was "calculated for the good of the whole," which meant "that it may more properly be called a commonwealth than a monarchy." The English constitution was judged by republican standards. Each part of the triad of king, lords, and commons was praised for its independence, and any loss of that independence was widely condemned as corruption, partic ularly when the crown gained power at the expense of the commons. Radical whigs were full of praise of republicanism. Trenchard and Gor don were certain "that our Govemment is a Thousand Degrees nearer akin to a Commonwealth (any sort of Commonwealth now subsisting or that ever did subsist in the WorId) than it is to absolute Monarchy." James Burgh went further in his celebration of republicanism and even suggested that the English people had a sovereign right to establish a republic if they wished. Many Britons agreed with Adam Smith's re puted view that for the English constitution "a commonwealth" was "the platform for the monarchy . "9
Republicanism did not belong only to the margins, to the extreme right or left, of English political life. Monarchical and republican values existed side by side in the culture, and many good monarchists and many good English tories adopted republican ideals and principles with out realizing the long-run political implications ofwhat they were doing. Although they seldom mentioned the term, educated people of varying political persuasions celebrated republicanism for its spirit, its morality, its freedom, its sense of friendship and duty, and its vision of society . Republicanism as a set of values and a form of life was much too per vasive, comprehensive, and involved with being liberal and enlightened to be seen as subversive or as anti-monarchical,
Instead of constituting some thin eddy ftowing only on the edges of British or even European culture, this republican tradition thus became an important current in its own right that blended and mingled with the monarchical mainstream and inftuenced its color, tone, and direc tion. Eighteenth-century republicanism did not so much displace rnon archy as transform it. Republicanism was never a besieged underground ideology, confined to cellar meetings and marginal intellectuals. On the contrary: there were no more enthusiastic promoters of republicanism than many members of the English and French nobility, who were pre sumably closest to monarchy and who depended for their status upon it. All those French nobles who in 1785 ftocked to the Paris salon to ooh
101 IOD REPUBLICANISM
and aah over Jacques-Louis David's severe classical painting The Oath oj IM Horatii had no idea they were contributing to the weakening of monarchy and their own demise, Nor did all those aristocrats who in 1786 applauded Mozart's Marriagt oj Figaro, with its ce1ebration of hu manistic and egalitarian values, believe that they were espousing repub licanism and undermining monarchy. Likewise, all those aristocratic sponsors of the 1730 edition of James Thompson's whiggish poem The Stasons-including the queen, ten dukes, thirty-one earls and countesses, and a larger number of the lesser peerage and their sons and daugh ters-little sensed that they were contributing to the erosion of the values that made their dominance possible. When even hereditary aristocrats, "disclaiming as it were (their) birthright, and putting [themselves] upon the foot of a Roman, " could subscribe enthusiastically to the view voiced by Conyers Middleton in his Lift ojCiuro (1741) that "no man, how nobly seever born, could arrive at any dignity, who did not win it by his personal merit," then we know something of the power of these repub lican sentiments in the culture. "Radical chic" was not an invention of the twentieth century."
In essence republicanism was the ideology of the Enlightenment. If the Enlightenment was. as Peter Gay has called it, " the rise of modem paganism, " then c1assical republicanism was its creed .U In the eigh teenth century to be enlightened was to be interested in antiquity, and to be interested in antiquity was to be interested in republicanism. Cer tainly classical antiquity could offer meaningful messages for monarchy too, but there is no doubt that the thrust of what the ancientworld had to say to the eighteenth century was latently and at tirnes manifestly republican .
All the ancient republics-Athens , Sparta, Thebes-were familiar to educated people in the eighteenth century (their names had "grown trite by repetition," said one American) but none was more familiar than Rome . People could not hear enough about it. "It is impossible," said Montesquieu, " to be weary of so agreeable a subject as ancient Rome ." The eighteenth century was particularly fascinated by the writ ings ofthe golden age ofRoman literature-"the First Enlightenment, " as Peter Gay has called it-the two centuries from the breakdown of the republic in the middle of the first century B.C. to the reign of Marcus Aurelius in the middle of the secend century A.O.'"
These Roman writers-Cicero, Virgil, Sallust, Tacitus, among oth ers-set forth republican ideals and political and social values that have had a powerful and lasting effect on Western culture . These classical
The Rtpublicanization of Mor.archy
ideals and values were revived and refurbished by the Italian Renais sance-becoming what has been variously called "civic humanism" or "classical republicanism" -and were carried into early modem Europe and made available to wider and deeper strata of the population. By the eighteenth century monarchical culture in Europe and particularly in Great Britain was thoroughly infused with these classical values and to that extent at least was republicanieed .?
Of course, Englishmen subscribed to these c1assical republican val ues with varying degrees of intensity, and the term "republican" re mained pejorative, something to hang on the head of an opponent in order to damage his credibility, if not his loyalty to the crown, Never theless , what is remarkable is the extent to wh ich the thinking of eighteenth-century educated Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic was republicanized in substance, if not in name . Many Englishmen were quick to respond as the editor of the Sowh Caroli1Ul Gazette, Peter Timothy, did in 1749 when he was denounced as a republican for pub lishing Cato 's Letters: he was not a "Republican . .. ," Timothy said, "unless Virtue and Truth be Republican. "'4 Invoking these c1assical ideals became the major means by which dissatisfied Britons on both sides of the Atlantic voiced their objections to the luxury , selfishness, and corruption of the monarchical world in which they lived ,
The literature of the first half of the eighteenth century in Great Britain-both beiles lettres and political polemics-was a literature of social criticism, and this social criticism was steeped in classical repub lican values. Most English writers of the period-whether tory satirists like Pope and Swift or radical whig publ icists like Trenchard and Gordon-expressed a deep and bitter hostility to the great social, economic, and political changes taking place in England during the decades following the Glorious Revolution of .688. The rise of banks, trading companies, and stock markets , plus the emergence of the new moneyed men, the increasing public debt, and the corruption of poli ties all threatened traditional values and led opposition poets and po lemicists alike to set c1assical models and morality against the spreading comrnercialization ."
Classical republican Rome, like some South Sea tribes for twentieth century anthropologists, became the means by which enlightened eighteenth-century Englishmen could distance themselves from their own society and achieve the perspective from which to criticize it. Gibbon admired Juvenal for that Roman satirist's refusal to surrender his re publican ideals in the face of monarchical realities. He had, said Gib
102 REPUBLICANISM
bon, "the soul of a republican" and was " the sworn enemy oftyranny." Thus Dr. Johnson found that the best way to condemn the corruption of eighteenth-century London was to imitate ]uvenal 's third satire on , Nero's Rome ."
So pervasive, so dominant, was this literature of social criticism that it is difficult to find anything substantial that stood against it, All the great eighteenth-century British writers spoke in republican tones. The long administration of Sir Robert Walpoie (1721-42) eventually united in intellectual opposition all of what WiJliam Pulteney called "the gay, the polite and witty Part of the World" ; and that opposition, whether the tory John Gay in The Btggar 's Opera or the whig James Thompson in his poem Lihmy, inevitably drew on classical republican values to voice its love of freedom and its antagonism to corruption . Hume in 1742 thought f that more than half of what had been written during the previous twenty years had been devoted to satirizing the rnachinations of Walpoie, the ~ figure who seemed most responsible for what ailed Britain. One admin istration defender in 1731 concluded that, simply for the sake of getting at Walpole, "the whole nation hath been abused, Corruption and De ,I generacy universally charged." All the country-opposition citations to Roman writers were moral strictures against apolluted court, and as such they were often unwitting celebrations of republican values .
In fact, rnost of the eighteenth century's invocations of classical an tiquity became covert and often unwitting championings of republican- , ism . Although some Englishmen in the late seventeenth century had found in the age of Augustus a model of restored stability in which the arts were allowed to flourish, after 1688 most Englishrnen, even aristo crats close to the court, criticized Augustus and looked to the Roman Republic for values and inspiration . Cicero and Cato, not Augustus, were the Romans to be admired. To Voltaire, Augustus was "ce po/tron qui osa exiler Ovide. " Augustus, Montesquieu said, had led the Romans "gently into slavery," and most Englishmen agreed. "Augustus" be- : came a code word for " tyran t, " and as such he was attacked by nearly everyone except royal absolutists. The tories, thinking of George I , called Augustus a despot , but the court whigs and all defenders of the Hano verian settlement, thinking of the Stuarts, did likewise. From 1688 on, the need for the government to defend the whig settlement and attack Stuart pretensions meant that a quasi-republican, anti-royalist bias was necessarily built into the official center of English culture. During Wal pole's era both court and country writers alike condemned Augustus as an imperial dictator, the murderer of Cicero, and the destroyer of the
The Republicanization of Monarchy 1°3
republic. From Addison to Dr. Johnson, English intellectuals expressed their admiration for Tacitus's anti-Augustan republican view of Roman history . Thomas Gordon originally dedicated bis edition of Tacitus to Walpoie, his patron, but the work so fully expressed a republican an tagonism toward Augustus ("the best of his Government was but the sunshine of Tyranny") that it was celebrated by English common wealthmen as wen. David Hume thought that even the tories had been so long obliged to talk "in the republican stile" that they had at length "embraced the sentiments, as wen as the language of their adversaries. "1'/
These appeals to antiquity made anything other than a classical con ception of leadership difficult to justify. It was almost always classical standards-Catonic and Ciceronian standards-that British opposition writers invoked to judge the ragged world of eighteenth-century politics. They placed the character of republicanism-integrity, virtue, and dis interestedness-at the center of public life. Whatever the partisan origins of a work like Richard Glover's Leonidas (1737), which contrasted the bravery and patriotism of the Spartan commander and his soldiers with the selfishness and corruption of Walpoie and his followers, the repeated use of such antique models only led to the further spreading of classical ideals. 18
Although set within a monarchical framework, these classical repub lican ideals established the foundations both for a liberal arts education and for political debate in the English-speaking world. The writings of classical antiquity provided more than window dressing for educated Englishmen on both sides of the Adantic; they were, in fact, the prin cipal source of their public morality and values. Political leaders were held to ancient republican standards:
You then whoseJudgment the right Course wou'd steer, Know weil each ANCIENT'S proper Clulrtuler, His Fable, Suhjtet, &ope in ev'ry Page, Religion, ColUlby, Genius, of his Age.'9
So Alexander Pope told his countrymen, and nearly every gentle man agreed. Public morality was classical morality; people could not read enough about Cato and Cicero. ,Although Hume attempted to ex plain the need for corruption in the working of the British constitution, it was virtually impossible, espedally in the North American colonies, for anyone to justify holding office simply as a means of selfish aggran
REPUBLICANISM1°4
dizernent . Classical republican values forbade it. Good monarchists in evitably accepted, at least rhetorically, the civic humanist ideals of disinterested public leadership . Even royal governors at times denied "all pretension to Eminence or Distinction" in favor of what was more valuable-the cultivation of ' 'those Virtues of a social Nature. "20
According to the c1assical republican tradition, man was by nature a political being, a citizen who achieved his greatest moral fulfillment by participating in a se1f-governing republic, Public or politicalliberty or what we now call positive liberty-meant participation in govern rnent . And this political liberty in turn provided the rneans by which the personal liberty and private rights of the individual-what we today call negative liberty-were proteered. In this c1assical republican tradi tion our modern distinct ion between positive and negative liberties was not yet clearly perceived, and the two forms of liberty were still often seen as one." Liberty was realized when the citizens were virtuous that is, willing to sacrifice their private interests for the sake of the community, including serving in public office without pecuniary re wards. This virtue could be found only in a republic of equal, active, and independent citizens. To be complete1y virtuous citizens, men never women, because it was assumed they were never independent had to be free from dependence and from the petty interests of the marketplace. Any loss of independence and virtue was corruption.
The virtue that cIassical republicanism encouraged was public vir tue . Private virtues such as prudence, frugality, and industry were im portant but, said Hume , they only made men "serviceable to thernselves , and enable them to promote their own interests "; they were not "such as make them perform their part in society." Public virtue was the sacrifice of private desires and interests for the public interest. .It was devotion to the commonweal . All men of genius and leisure , all gentlemen, had an obligation to serve the state . " Let not your love of philosophical amusements have more than its due weight with you," Benjamin Franklin admonished New York royal official Cadwallader Colden in 1750. Public service was far more important than science . In fact, said Franklin , even "the finest" of Newton's "Discoveries" could not have excused his neglect of serving the commonwealth if the public had needed hirn. 2.
Republicanism thus put an enormous burden on individuals . They were expected to suppress their private wants and interests and develop disinterestedness-the terrn the eighteenth century most often used as a synonym for civic virtue: it better conveyed the increasing threats from
TM Republicanizatwn of Monarch) 1°5 interests that virtue now faced . Dr. Johnson defined disinterest as being "superior to regard of private advantage; not inftuenced by private profit." We today have lost most of this older meaning. Even some educated people now use "disinterested" as a synonym for "uninter ested, " meaning indifferent or unconcerned. Perhaps we cannot quite conceive of the characteristic that disinterestedness describes : we cannot quite imagine someone who is capable of rising above private profit and private advantage and being unse1fish and unbiased where a personal interest might be present. 23
Precisely because republics requ ired civic virtue and disinterested ness among their citizens, they were very fragile polities, extremeJy li able to corruption. Republics demanded far more morally from their citizens than monarchies did oftheir subjects. In monarchies each man's desire to do what was right in his own eyes could be restrained by fear or force, by patronage or honor. In republics, however, each man must somehow be persuaded to sacrifice his personal desires, his luxuries , for the sake of the public good . Monarchies could tolerate great degrees of self-interestedness, private gratification, and corruption among their subjects . After all, they were based on dependence and subservience and had all sorts of adhesives and connections besides virtue to hold their societies together. Monarchies relied on blood, family, kinship, patronage, and ultimately fear, as one loyalist c1ergyman in western Massachusetts tried to make clear to several of his neighbors who were thinking of taking up arms against their king in Ins. Da not do it, the cleric warned. "The king can send a company of hone through the country and take off every head; and in less than six weeks you will be glad to labor a week for sheep's head and pluck."24 But republics could never resort to such force. In their pu rest form they had no adhesives, no bonds holding themselves together, except their citizens ' voluntary patriotism and wi1lingness to obey public authority. Without virtue and self-sacrifice republics would fall apart .
One did not have to be a professed republican or a radical whig, however, to believe in virtue and the other cIassicai values that accom panied it, Virtue, along with the concept of honor, lay at the heart of aU prescriptions for politicalleadership in the eighteenth-century English speaking world . Throughout the century Englishmen of all political per suasions-whigs and tories a1ike-struggled to find the ideal virtuous leader amid the rising and swirling currents of financial and commercial interests that threatened to engulf their society. Nothing more enhanced William Pitt's reputation as the great patriot than his pointed refusal in
106 REPUBLICANISM
1746 to profit from the perquisites of the traditionally lucrative office of paymaster of the forces. Pitt was living proof of the possibility of disin terestedness-that a man could be a governmental leader and yet re main free of corruption."
Ir virtue was based on liberty and independence, then it followed ' that only autonomous individuals free from any ties of interest and paid by no master were qualified to be citizens . Jefferson and many other republican idealists hoped that all ordinary yeoman farmers who owned their own land and who depended for their subsistence only "on their own soil and industry" and not "on the casualties and caprice of cus tomers" would be independent and free enough of pecuniary tempta tions and marketplace interests to be virtuous.f
Others, however, questioned the capacity of most ordinary people to rise above self-interest, particularly those who were dependent on "the casualties and caprice of customers." Common people and others involved in the marketplace were usually overwhelmed by their interests and were incapable of disinterestedness. Yet of course they were not to be the leaders of the society . Although republicanism compared to mon archy rested on a magnanimous view of common people, it retained a traditional patrician bias in regard to officeholding. Many good whigs and republicans believed that important public offices, even including \ membership of grand juries, ought to be filled only with ••the better sort because they are less liable to temptations, less fearful of the frowns of power, may reasonably be supposed of more improved capacities than those of an inferior station." People who had occupations, who needed to engage in the market, who worked with their hands, who were with out a liberal education-such ungenteel or ordinary people could scarcely possess the enlightenment and disinterestedness to resist the temptations of power and stand above the haggling of the marketplace and act as impartial umpires .?
For many this disinterested leadership could only be located arnong the landed gentry whose income from the rents of tenants came to them, as Adam Smith said, without their exertion or direct involvement in the interests of the marketplace . Merchants, unlike the landed gentry , gained their profits in the workaday world of interests and were considered to be necessarily motivated by avarice rather than by virtue . "Tt seems as difficult to restrain a Merchant from striking at Gain, as to prevent the keen span iel from springing at Game. that he has been bred to pursue. " Even Smith believed that the interest of merchants and all who thought more "about the interest of their own particular branch of business,
Tht Republicaniudion of Monarchy 10 7 than about that of the society" was "always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. "311
Perhaps only a classical education that made "ancient manners fa miliar," as Richard Jackson once told Benjamin Franklin, could "pro duce a reconciliation between disinterestedness and commerce; a thing we often see, but almost always in men of a liberal education." Yet no matter how educated merchants might become, while they remained actively engaged in commerce, they could never quite acquire the char acter of genteel disinterestedness essential for full acceptance as political leaders. Lord George Germain expressed conventional wisdom in de claring that he "would not have men in a mercantile cast every day collecting themselves together and debating on political matters." Con sequendy, in most places those merchants active in their businesses who wanted to participate in politics had great difficulty justifying their am bitions. Ir they did hold office, they usually had to have wealth and leisure sufficient to avoid any day-to-day involvement in their busi nesses. Otherwise, they were apt to be criticized, as Sir Henry Moore, govemor of New York, said of some merchants nominated to the coun eil, for possessing "no other merit than having dealt weil by their cor respondents in trade and [being] utterly unfit for the great ends of govemment. "29
Mechanics and others who worked with their hands were thought servile and totally absorbed in their narrow occupations and thus un qualified for disinterested public office. Indeed, the very term "occu pation," by which everyone except gendemen was designated, meant being occupied and having no leisure for public service . Even members of the liberal professions, if they were too dependent on their work as a source of income, were regarded as ill equipped for virtuous leadership. On the eve of the Revolution, Virginians debated in the newspapers as to whether or not lawyers practiced "a grovelling, mercenary trade." Although one critic conceded that lawyers constituted one of the "three genteel Professions," he argued that they were surely guilty of more "petit Larceny" than doctors and c1ergymen. James Madison's college friend William Bradford was defensive about his decision to become a lawyer. He knew that the behavior of rnost lawyers was ., reproachable, ' , but he argued that they were at least different from merchants. The sole pursuit of merchants was gain, and thus they were "much more likely to contract an inordinate desire of wealth than the lawyers, whose pur lUit is as much after fame as Wealth ." Madison, reluctant himself to choose a profession, was not convinced by his friend; but he did concede
R E PUB LI C A N I SM108 A Trunaued Socidy 1°9 that the profession of law would at least allow Bradford to use the knowl edge both of them had acquired at Princeton. A liberal education, he said, "is a sort of General Lover that wooes all the Muses and Graces. "30
Eighteenth-century Englishmen were preoccupied with the moral character of their leaders precisely because leaders were the source of despotism. The very abilities that made patricians and gentry likely leaders also made them potential tyrants . "Men of great talents by na ture and polisht by Art" were no doubt necessary for al1 government . But, said Nathanael Greene in a common reckoning, such accomplished men, especially if they had "a general Acquaintance with mankind, " were as weil "tbe most dangerous persons to be connected with un less" -and this qualification identified the crux of the whole republican tradition-"unless they steadily persevere in the practice of Virtue." Such men knew "the secret avenues to the human Heart and, having the power to make the worse appear the better," they had the capacity for ensnaring ordinary people in chains . "Ninety-nine parts out of one hundred of mankind , are ever indined to live at peace, and cultivate a good understanding with each other. " Only members of "the remaining small part"-those whose "considerable abilities" were "joined to an intriguing disposition"-were "the real authors, advisers, and perpet uators of wars, treasons, and those other violences, which have , in all ages, more or less disgraced the annals of man. ' '3'
Controlling and channeling the overweening passions of these ex traordinary men-the aristocratic passions of avarice and ambition: "the Love of Power and the Love of Money," as Benjamin Franklin called them-seemed to many to be the central political problem of the age. Same thought that "ambition and avarice are springs of action so utterly opposite, that they never did or ever will unite in the sarne person." Others, however, were convinced not only that these two great passions "may subsist together in the same breast," but that when "united in View of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent Effects. Place before the Eyes of such Men a Post of Honour , that at the same time be a Place of Profit, and they will move Heaven and Earth to obtain it. "32
For all those who clairned to speak for the interests and the good of the people, the crown and all other rulers with soaring passions were dangerous, and the people were always justified in their suspicion and jealousy of power. Precisely because rulers in government were thought to be rnen of extraordinary and frightening capacities-"like elephants in war," said one colonial minister-they had to be watched constantly,
Radical whigs turned "political jealousy" into a "necessary and laud able Passion. " The people had to be suspicious of their rulers, for, as Henry Laurens said in 1'765, a "malicious Villain acting behind the Cur tain . .. could be reached only by suspicion ." Assuming as they did that patterns of events were always the intended consequence of partic ular human designs, the enlightened men of the age were ready to see plots and conspiracies everywhere.ü
But suspicion and jealousy, essential as they might be in proteering liberty in a monarchy, were not noble or praiseworthy emotions in themselves, They were in fact necessary evils to offset the soaring pas sions of ambition and desires for power expressed by rulers or great men. And therefore to the degree that the rulers became virtuous and republicanized, the people could relax their jealousy and suspicion and become open and trustful. Barriers could be erected, bills of rights es tablished, contracts negotiated, charters written, institutions arranged and balanced, and the people allowed a share of participation in gov ernment; but ultimately the most enlightened of that enlightened age believed that the secret of good government and the protection of pop ular liberty lay in ensuring that good men-men of character and dis interestedness-wielded power. In the end there was no substitute for classical republican virtue in the society's rulers; and everyone on the political spectrum paid at least lip service to the need for it. But no one paid more attention to this need for virtue than did members of that generation of North American colonial leaders who came of age in the middle decades of the eighteenth century.
J. A Truncated Society
Classical republican values existed everywhere among educated people in the English-speaking world, but nowhere did they have deeper reso nance than in the North American colonies. Nowhere had the republi canizing of monarchy gone further. The Americans did not have to invent republicanism in In6; they only had to bring it to the surface . It was there all along. The revolutionaries shed monarchy and took up republicanism, as Jefferson put it, "with as much ease as would have attended their throwing off an old and putting on a new suit of clothes. '"
Because English culture was so republicanized, it was often difficult for the colonists to appreciate how radical their thinking was. When the colonists in the l700s and 1770S were accused of fomenting rebellion and
" ' ';'
REPUBLICANISMUD
promoting republican principles, they were surprised and indignant. The spirit of republicanism, they said, the spirit of Milton, Needham, and Sidney, was "so far from being uncompatible with the English constitution , that it is the greatest glory of it." In resisting tyranny the colonists saw themselves acting only as good Englishmen should. "We boast of our freedom,' Samuel Adams told his fellow Englishmen across the Adantic in '767, "and we have your example for it. We talk the language we have always heard you speak." It was true . Americans read the same literature, the same law books, the same histories as those read by the English in the mother country. Even tories admitted that whig and republican principles of government were so ingrained in Brit ish culture, "so often transcribed by one from another," that there was no longer any need of having those principles "retailed in this enlight
ened age ." Despite the colonists' sense that they were only thinking as any good
Englishmen would, they did draw from that British culture its most republican and whiggish strains. For they were in fact the most repub lican of people in the 'English-speaking world. Every visitor to the New World sensed it. All the republican peculiarities for which Englishmen were noted were magnified in the colonies and carried to excess. If Englishmen were known to be liberty-Ioving and unruly, then the col onists seemed absolutely licentious. The colonists lived in a monarchy and were monarchical subjects, but, ~s General Guy Carleton noted in 1768, the conditions of their society gave them "a strong bias 10 Republi
can Principles ."" First, many colonists had little reason to feel part of His Majesty's
realm or to respect royalty. Many white foreign immigrants had no natural allegiance to a British king, and they often settled far from es· tablished authority in the colonies. Even many of the eighteenth-century migrants from the British Isles-Scotch-lrish and lrish-came with bit ter grievances against the English government . They had been pushed about and persecuted by the English government and Anglo-Irish land lords for so long that they could not feel much loyalty to the English
crown . But even those English colonists who were proud of being English
men were not very good monarchists. Many New Englanders ritualis tically recalled their seventeenth-century Puritan heritage of defiance to king and church; and many of them remained astern, sober people, not much given to the hierarchies and displays of monarchy . Massachu setts was accused in '740 of being still "a kind of commonwealth where
A Trunaued Society UI
the king is hardly a stadtholder. " Everywhere in America, even in the southem colonies where attempts to emulate English ways were streng est, most colonists had little sense of royal majesty: the crown was too far away to make its presence feit. The colonists were apt to think of King George, as one wealthy colonial merchant reputedly did, as simply a good honest fellow with whom they might like to smoke a pipe. The crown's viceregents in the colonies-the royal govemors-did little to enhance royal dignity. They were often without titles, wealth, or the accouterments of power, and they complained constantly that their mea ger incomes allowed them to live no better than "a private gentlernan." In the 1750s the North Carolina governor did not even have a permanent residence: he was reduced, as he grumbled, to renring "a small House" in New Bem "without either garden or field to keep either hone or cow."4
Royal authority operated much of the time on the surface of Amer ican life, masking the confused reality of decentralized institutions and localized authorities that made up the central govemance of the colonies . The harmonious compromise between central and local authorities that had developed in Britain since ,688 was not duplicated in America. The crown always seemed to the colonists to be an extraneous overlaid power antagonistic to their local institutions, especially the provincial assem blies. In England. Parliament provided an arena for reconciling crown and local in te rests , but in the colonies it had no such function . In this respect colonial society resembled more the hodgepodge of local privi leges and liberties that confronted the French monarchy in the eigh teenth century than it did the relatively agreeable and integrated relationship between the crown and local authorities worked out in Great . Britain, Consequently, the colonists had little understanding of state authority, of a united autonomous political entity that was completely sovereign and reached deep into the localities. And thus they were not prepared to accept that authority when after 1763 it tried to intrude into their lives.
Not only did royal authority have trouble making itself felt in the colonies, but it lacked the religious backbone that an established church oft'ered royalty at horne. In England the Anglican church was firmly in the hands of the crown and operated essentially as a bureaucratic arm ofthe crown. But not in America. "No Bishop, no King," James I had once warned-a "stupid saying," declared radical English whigs, that had "formerly filled our Prisons with Dissenters, and chased many of them to Ammea." The colonies had many dissenters and no bishop
~~.
REPUBLICANISMIl2
and had never had one-and consequently the presence of the Church of England was fundamentally ftawed; and royal officials saw a latent (and sometimes not so latent) rebellious presbyterianism everywhere.~
Ir England had thirty different religions, then America had hun dreds, and none of them was rraditionally organized. "There was no hierarchy or degrees of Eminence arnong the Clergy," complained Wil liarn Knox, an imperial bureauerat with a half dozen years of firsthand experience in the colonies, "no distinctions of Bishops, Priests or Dea cons, no Rule or Order, no Deans Chapters or Archdeacons . All were Priests and nothing more ." Control of religious life never ftowed from the top down, and personal patronage within any of the numerous re ligious groups was never strong. Even where the Church of England was most solidly established-in Virginia-it was dominated by the local vestries . Regardless of the circumstances of their ordination, c1ergymen everywhere tended to be appointed by their congregations and thus de pendent on thern. The disorders and confusions of American religious life by themselves made difficult the maintenance of a traditional mo
narchieal society in the colonies ." But the meager royal authority and the disordered religious life only
expressed a deeper social confusion-the weakness and incompleteness of America' s social hierarchy. Despite increased social strarification dur ing the eighteenth century, American society remained remarkably shal low and stunted by contemporary English standards . All the topmost tiers of English society were missing in America. There were no dukes, no marquesses, no court, and nothing like the fabulous wealth of the English nobility . The scale of everything was different in the colonies. While Charles Carroll of Maryland, one of the wealthiest planters in the South, was earning what the colonists regarded as the huge sum of !I,800 a year, the Earl of Derby's vast estates were bringing in an an nual income of over !40,ooo . George Washington's estate was thought to be earning in the l770S only "!3OO per an. Virginia currency," which put Washington, according to a visiting Englishman, " in point of rank only equal ro the better sort of yeoman in England. " Major merchants in American cities were worth between !25,OOO and .(50 , 0 0 0 ; in contrast, their counterparts in England were worth between !200,OOO and !8oo,ooo. Thomas Hancock of Boston, one of the richest merchants in . America, left an estate of nearly !100,OOO; yet this enormous colonial fortune was scarcely a third of the sum bequeathed in 1753 by a London merchant, Henry Lascalles. Hancock's house in Boston and Williarn Byrd's Virginia mansion of Westover rnay have been expensive and
A Truru;aUti Socitty Il3
elaborate structures for the colonies, but they were dwarfed by the mag nificent palaces the English nobility built for themselves. Hancock's two storied house, like most gentry hornes in America, had only eight rooms; the Sackville family's palace, Knole in Kent, had 365. Very few of the colonists ' great houses even had secondary staircases for the servants. Byrd's Westover was sixty-five feet in length, but this was scarcely a tenth of the size of the Marquess of Rockingharn's house, Wentworth Woodhouse, which was longer than two footbell fields.'
Everywhere even the wealthiest of colonial gentry strained to Imitate the best of English taste . The practice of plastering and painting the wood, brick, and fieldstones of their hornes in order to resemble c1assi caIJy precise-cut masonry was symptomatic of their plight . By English standards the colonial aristocracy was a minor thing-at best composed
I of middling and lesser gentry only. Charles Chauncy of Massachusetts was not exaggerating by much when he said in 1766 that "there is scarce a man in any of the colonies, certainly there is not in the New England ones, that would be deemed worthy of the name of a rich man in Great Britain .' ,8
AJthough real and substantial distinctions existed in colonial Amer ica, the colonial aristocracy was never as weil established, never as wealthy, never as dominant as it would have liked. As strong as the colonial gentry may have been in some places and at some times, they never were able to duplicate the mutual protection and allegiance be tween superiors and inferiors that made the eighteenth-century English squirearehy relatively so secure. As pervasive as personal and kinship inftuence was in the colonies, gentry use of this inftuence in the econ omy, in religion, or in politics was never as powerful as it was in En gland. Militia officers were often selected by their companies, ministers were hired by their parishioners, and a remarkably large proportion of political leaders were popularly elected, sometimes by an extremely broad electorate .
The American aristocracy, such as it was , was not only weaker than its English counterpart; it also had a great deal of trouble maintaining both the desired c1assieal independence and its freedom from the rnar ketplace . Few members of the American gentry were able to live idly off the rents of tenants as the English landed aristocracy did . Some landowners in New York and in the South leased out their lands to tenants, but their position was never quite comparable to the English landed gentry. Landlords were not able to preernpt the produce of their tenants, and their rental income was often unreliable. Usually they acted
,I
Ili II~ (
l
REPUBLICANJSMII4
more as land speculators than as landlords, offering tenants very advan tageous terms simply to open up and clear land that otherwise would remain as useless wilderness. New royal governors, thinking of the En glish experience, tried to build up large rent rolls, but none of them
realized his expectations.? America could not sustain the stable pattern of tenantry that lay at
the heart of a traditionallanded society, and thus that dependency that lay at the heart of monarchical society was undermined. The tenants often lived on land far removed from their landlords and were very poorly supervised. Many landlords had trouble not only in collecting rents but in preventing their tenants from selling their leases and moving on without paying their debts. Since tenantry was often regarded as simply a first step toward an independent freehold, mobility was high. The New York manor leases , which were usually for life, turned over on the average every ninth year. In a society where land was so widely available, most men preferred to secure their own land. In fact, said Cadwallader Colden, "the hopes of having land of their own & becom ing independent of Landlords is what chiefiy induces people into Arner ica .' In 1747 a North Carolinian advised agendeman who was about to purchase from afar a plantation in the Cape Fear region to come and see it before he bought it; "for if you should not like to live their, you cannot Rentit," even at the low rate of r percent interest . "The poorest people here if they have been any time in the country, makes shift to get Land of their own either by taking up or Buying." The truth was, as the English bureauerat Knox put it, that "the relation between Land lord and Tenant could have no existence where every Man held by the same tenure." Even though some gentlernen had vasdy greater wealth and land than others, they could not be aristocrats in the English man ner: "their riches brought them little infiuence for if they parcelled out their Lands it was upon the same tenure as they held it. '''0
Consequently, it is not surprising, particularly in the years after mid-century, that New York landlords expected less and less filial affec tion from their tenants and more and more monetary payments. Fewer of the landlords were able or willing to ignore or bum their tenants" overdue debts, as Colonel Frederick Philipse and Sir WiJliam Johnson '
'
'I continued to do, More and more landlords wanted their rents, and those ,! like Beverly Robinson who raised them at every opportunity were will ing to evict tenants who could not pay . Yet every act of exploitation, every suggestion that only profit mattered. eroded further the patemal istic bonds tying superiors and inferiors together. U
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A Trunaued Society 11,5
Most colonial aristocrats were never able to dominate their localities to the extent that English aristocrats did. In England local aristocrats were the primary patrons and consumers of local merchandise and skills. Their country houses were the centers of consumption and employment in their communities. They spent fortunes on building and maintaining their estates, and their patronage kept dozens and sometimes hundreds of artisans, shopkeepers, and laborers in work. Walpoie employed twenty-nine men and fifty women just to layout and plant his gardens at Houghton in 1721. Landowners with mines on their estates could em ploy entire communities. In the colonies a few aristocrats did spend huge amounts of money in their localities and developed dependencies among the local artisans and laborers. John Hancock went through a fortune in his aristocratic atternpts to patronize local labor. But Hancock's ex ample was conspicuously unusual in a way it would not have been in England; most American gentry had neither the funds nor the ability to do what he did . The southern planters built and maintained country houses, but they relied on their slaves to supply them with most of their needs, from making hogsheads to caring for their gardens. Thus not only did the great planters' reliance on the labor of their own slaves prevent the growth of large middling groups of white artisans in the South, but their patronage and hence dominance of the communities beyond their planrations was correspondingly reduced . Everywhere in America aristocrats tended toimport from abroad many of their accou terments-from carriages to fumiture; and to the extent that they did, they weakened their influence among art isans and workmen where they lived."
Of course, the great planters of the South did enjoy a considerable arnount of leisure based on the labor of their slaves; and consequently they came closest in America to fitting the c1assical ideal of the free and independent gentleman. By the middle of the eighteenth century the ruling southern planters in the Chesapeake and in South Carolina had thoroughly absorbed the c1assical republican ideology of leadership and saw themselves fulfilling it, and to a remarkable extent they did. In Virginia about forty or so interrelated wealthy families dominated the society and practiced a republican stewardship that rivaled that of the English squirearchy-Iaboring tirelessly in the county courts, the parish vestries, the House of Burgesses, and other offices out of a deep sense of public responsibility. In South Carolina planters and planter merchants likewise saw thernselves as independent English country gentlemen. They built country houses in the swamps, traced their ge
116 • REPUBLICANISM nealogies, attempted to found farnilies, and worked hard to make their General Assembly live up to the republican image of being a repository of virtue. Perhaps nowhere eise on the continent did so many wealthy individual leaders take so much pride in their scorn of party and con nections and their prornotion of dassical republican values. ?
Yet despite the impressive ways these southern planters controlled and stabilized their societies and lived up to the dassical republican irnage they had of thernselves, they were not as free and independent as they would have liked . Some planters kept taverns on the side, and many others were intimately concerned in the day-to-day managernent of their estates . Even with overseers and agents and dozens of slaves, few of the great planters could treat their estates as self-perpetuating patrimonies, Their overseers were not comparable to the stewards and estate managers of the English gentry; thus the planters, despite their aristocratic poses, were often very busy, commercially involved men. Their livelihoods were tied directly to the vicissitudes of international trade, and they had always had an uneasy sense of being dependent on the market to an extent that the English landed aristocracy, despite its comrnitrnent to enterprising projects and improvements, never really feit. Even the wealthiest and most established of planters were incapable of being absentee owners; and those like William Byrd and the younger Charles Carroll, who might have liked to spend their days in Europe, had to return horne or lose the source of their wealth . "Our affairs, " Carroll told his father in 1764. " absolutely require my residen ce in , 1 Maryland . •,,.
The legal devices of entail and primogeniture that in England worked to perpetuate family estates intact through a prescribed line of heirs had a contrary effect in America: by limiting a father's discretion in dispos-.' ing of the estate, such devices tended to risk the family property on the : particular talents-or shortcomings-of an eldest son . By the eve of the l
Revolution the great planters of the Chesapeake realized with growing .' concern that their painstakingly built fortunes could be suddenly wiped out by the mistakes of their heirs . Robert Carter gave his son Robert, Bladen the management and profits of his Billingsgate plantation-I,200 acres and forty slaves-and then in dismay watched hirn squander it all away in only three years. The Nelsons were not the only great family in Virginia to disappear through the indebtedness and waywardness of , a single generation. William Byrd III had no head for business: he mortgaged his silver plate and 159 slaves and went through a fortune ; before committing suicide on New Year's Day 1777 . Some ofthe planten '
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117A Trunaued Society
saw with mounting fear the accumulated gains of their lives being dis sipated by the reckless gambling and drinking of their heirs, who, as Landon Carter moaned , "play away and play it all away." "In a com mercial nation , " noted the sober young Carroll , "the glory of illustrious progenitors will not screen their needy posterity from obscurity and want." The aristocrats of America had a much keener consciousness of mobility, both up and down, than the ir English counterparts . The huge debts of the Virginia planters, warned Thomas Nelson on the eve of the Revolution, were "but Preludes to Vast Changes of property among us, that must soon take place. "'5
In the years after mid-century the Virginia planters became more and more concerned about the state of their society . Pressure from their British creditors forced them to hound each other for repayment of debts. Circumstances were compelling them to cut through the appearance of independent country gentry they had sought to maintain and to expose the raw commercial character of their lives. They discovered, as James Mercer did, that they were not as free from the day-to-day business world as they made out. When Mercer gave up his law practice in 1765, he found that his plantation could not support him, Many of the planters were living on the edge of bankruptcy, seriously overextended and spending beyond their means in an almost frantic effort to live up to the aristocratic image they had created of themselves . Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier thought that the rising indebtedness of the planters was due to their unwillingness to "quit any one Article of Luxury ." By the eve of the Revolution many planters were voicing a growing sense of impending ruin . Nonimportation of British luxuries was welcomed in the l']60s and l770S precisely because, as Washington pointed out , it gave the planters apretext to cut back on their ostentation and display with out injuring either their aristocratic honor or their credit. By 1776 many Chesapeake planters were ready to believe that republicanism and re ·Ii publican values would save their society. Still, despite all their difficuhies the great southern planters at least approached the dassical image of disinterested gentlemanly leadership; they knew it and made the most of it throughout their history .'6
Elsewhere, even in other parts of the South, elites never even came dose to the English model. Perhaps no ruling group in the eighteenth century colonies was weaker and more vulnerable to challenge than that of North Carolina. The majority of the colonial assembly in 1730 who were distinguished enough to leave any personal records were only mid dling planters even by Virginia standards-owning less than ten slaves
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119 • REPUBLICANISM118 and five hundred acres each. Even the council was composed of men whose claim to gentility was very doubtful. Of the twenty members of the council in 1730 only two are known to have been university-educated . One Virginian called them a "company of pirates, vagabonds and foot men . " Put together, their estates, it was said, "won't amount to 1:1500." The royal govemors continually complained that North Carolina lacked men of wealth and standing. The "characters" of the high officials, said Governor Gabriel Johnston, " alone were sufficient to bring all Magis tracy and Government into conternpt and ridicule." Of course, many of the governors were no better . Johnston hirnself was criticized for being "a Schoolmaster and of mean and low descent . "'7
No place was as confused as North Carolina; but in the northern colonies gentry elites also had trouble Iiving up to the c1assical republi can model of leadership, and challenges to their authority were corn mon . Although eighteenth-century society was much tighter and less porous than American mythology would have it, the topmost ranks of the social hierarchy certainly remained more permeable and open to entry from below than in the mother country. Claiming the rank of gentleman in America was easier. Men who prescribed a few potions or displayed a knowledge of law might pretend to be doctors or lawyers and thus assert their membership in one of the gentlemanly liberal professions . Even in a settled area of Pennsylvania, noted the Maryland doctor Alexander Hamilton, a "very rough spun, forward clownish blade, much addicted to swearing," could attempt "to pass for a gen t1eman ." In New England, to the chagrin of young John Adams, farrn ers called themselves both yeomen and gentlemen at the same time. More than half of the company officers of the Massachusetts militia mobilized for the Seven Years' War identified thernselves with manual occupations ."
Because, as Benjamin Franklin said, " com mon Tradesmen and Farmers" in America were "as intelligent as most Gentlemen from other Oountries, " these common men often expected to pass as gentlernen more easily than elsewhere . David Harry, who had once been a fellow apprentice with Franklin, set hirnself up as a rnaster printer in Phila delphia. But, said Franklin, " he was very proud, dress 'd like a Gentle man, liv'd expensively, . .. ran in debt, and neglected his Business , upon which all Business left hirn" ; eventually Harry fted the country . Franklin hirnself discovered early in his life how easy it was for a corn moner with the right sponsorship to mingle comfortably with gentlernen. When he and James Ralph boarded the ship to sail to England in 1724,
A Trunaued Sociny
they "were forc'd to take up with a Berth in the Steerage," since, "none on board knowing us, (we) were considered as ordinary Persons." But when Colonel John French, justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, carne on board, recognized the nineteen-year-old Franklin, and paid hirn "great Respect," he and Ralph were immediately invited "by the other Gentlemen to come into the Cabin." Franklin, however, did not let the incident go to his head; he realized, as we have seen, that it was wiser to keep to his allotted rank and wait until he had acquired suffi cient wealth to retire pennanently from business before formally becom ing a gentlernan. '9
Other colonists were not so punctilious as Franklin . Everywhere wealthy commoners, even those who still worked with their hands, sought to buy their way into gentlemanly status, Building a second horne in the country, for example, was very much a sign ofbeing a gentlernan . By the l770s ~ighty.two Philadelphians owned pi aces c1early defined as "country seats" in Philadelphia County alone. Yet these "seats" were by no means comparable to the great country seats of the English aris tocracy . They were not even suburban villas: they had assessed values ranging from 4- to 1:200, and only ten of them were worth more than 1:50. And this distinction of having a "seat" was spread very widely: the list of eighty-two owners included thirteen esquires, nine gentlemen, live doctors, twenty-two merchants, four widows, three shop keepers , two innkeepers, and twenty-six artisans of one sort or another."
In the northem port cities there were only a few "merchant princes"-such as the Drinkers and Whartons of Philadelphiaor the Amorys and Boylstons of Boston-whose wealth and standing were suf ficient to allow them to imitate comfortably the lesser gentry of England. But even these few merchant princes, rich and genteel as they might be, knew that they were not real aristocrats exempt from the interests and worries of trade. Certainly they were not as patrician in manner or as free from failure as their counterparts in the mother country, Even the wealthiest American merchants realized that they could not ignore their businesses and take grand tours and live as nobly as rich English rner chants did. Most ordinary colonial merchants-perhaps 85 percent or more of the two or three hundred merchants in Philadelphia-were en snared in such "a hardharted Iron-Fisted & inhospitable world," unable "to lay up such a Stock, as would maintain me without dayly labour," and thus could not even pretend to gentility. Most were in fact very new to wholesale trade, often having begun their careers as artisans, shopkeepers, or smugglers . As Lieutenant Governor Colden of New
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York pointed out, most of them "suddenly rose from the lowest rank of the People to considerable fortunes ." Whereas in England it took 13,000 ro becorne a merchant , in colonial Philadelphia it took only 400; which is why many young Englishmen who lacked the resources to become wholesalers at horne migrated to the colonies. But business in America was always chancy, and being a colonial merchant was always precari ous; and one could as readily slide into bankruptcy as rise into merchant status . Perhaps as many as one in three colon ial merchants failed. Be coming a merchant in the colonies was far easier but also far riskier than it was in the more developed ports of Great Brirain ."
The relative primitiveness of colonial economic conditions aggra vated the uncertainty of many of the merchants and reduced their influ ence , Whatever authority they claimed in their horne port, it rarely extended very far into the countryside . Rather than dictating to the farmers of the region, merchants often found themselves 'dependent on them , They needed supplies ro trade, and farmers, many ofwhom were not regularly producing for the market , often lacked "surpluses" to seIl. Not only were the merchants' sources of supply insecure ; their markets were too . Consequently , even the rnost wealthy merchants usually ended ' up being only middlemen in extraordinarily complicated networks of exchanges. As such , they rarely could specialize ; most merchants were forced to engage in a wide variety of tasks, being exporters, importers, wholesalers, retailers , manufacturers, insurance underwriters , ship builders, or privateersmen at one time or another . Such different roles blurred their special reputation as "merchants"-a term supposedly confined to those involved in overseas wholesale trade-and further weakened their status and thus their authority in their communities. Being rnerchanrs under such adverse circumstances no doubt bred pe culiarly flexible and risk-taking personalities, but such aggressive and hustiing arrivistes rarely possessed a patrician interest in public service . Many were apt to share Charles Pettir's view that politics was not worth the time and trouble it demanded, " unless it should eventually throw business in my hands by which I may obtain a profit." Consequently, most active merchants did not serve in government. 22
Of course , in the northern colonies there were nurnbers of educated well-connected professional men or gentlernen of independent fortune who were capable of living up to the classical ideals ofpoliticalleadership that dominared eighteenth-century culture . But there were, it seemed, never enough of these to go around. As a result, more than one estab lished gentleman complained of the extent to which the colonial assem -
A Truncaud Socitty
blies contained too many members who were not gentlemen in any sense, much less gentlemen educated in a liberal elassical mode . The legislatures contained too many retailers of "'Rum and Small Beer" from "poor obscure" country towns "remote from all Business"; or too many "plain, illiterate husbandmen, whose views seldom extended far ther than to the regulation of highways, the destruction of wolves, wild cats and foxes, and the advancement of the other little interests of the particular counties they were chosen to represent." Even members of the councils-the colonial counterparts to the English House of Lords were sometimes criticized by the governors for being men in "necessi tous circumstances" or of "no estate in the country and much in debt." Or when they did have sufficient wealth, too often the councillors ab senred themselves from attendance because , as one New Jersey council lor put it, "it would too much interfere with my Interests & Business ." The long and short of it was, as Governor Lewis Morris of New Jersey complained to the Board of Trade in 1745, that many wealthy individuals regarded service on the council as "a sort of tax on them to serve the publick at their owne Expense besides neglcct of their business. "2)
More than anything else, it was this weakness of the colonial aris tocracy-its relative lack of gentility, its openness to entry, its inability to live up to the classical image of political leadership, and its suscepti bility to challenge-that accounts for the instability and competitive fac tiousness of colonial politics. Wherever the ruling families of a colony were entrenched-readily identifiable and beyond the resentment and rivalry of others-as in eighteenth-century Virginia and New Hamp shire, then the politics were stable and factionalism was at aminimum . The strength or weakness of royal authority in any particular colony had almost nothing to do with determining this stability . In New Hamp shire royal authority was extraordinarily strong, stronger than in any other colony . But this authority was only a consequence of the power exercised by a small and well-defined elite dominated by the royal gov emor, Benning Wentworth . By controlling the timber and naval stores trade, which was practically the sole source of great wealth in the colony, Wentworth was able for twenty-five years to manipulate the rnercan tile leaders of Portsmouth, virtually the only aristocracy the colony possessed, and to maintain peace within the colony. Yet in Virginia, whose politics were likewise remarkably stable , royal authority was very weak-so weak, in fact, that the royal governors virtually abandoned responsibility for ruling the colony to the forty or so aristocratic families that kept Virginia politics relatively calm for nearly a half century.
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123 REPUBLICANlSM122
They were able to do SO because they were a remarkably homogeneous and uncontested ruling group-perhaps the only colonial aristocracy whose wealth and inftuence approached that of the eighteenth-century
English aristocracy." EIsewhere in the colonies-wherever the aristocracies or would-be
aristocracies were weak and divided-politics were contentious and fac tious , filled with bitter clashes among the prominent ind ividuals and families of each colony for the rewards and privileges of government. Although most colonists naturally came to believe that the intrusive presence of British royal authority and the imperial relationship in gen eral were the source of America's political instability and factionalism, they were wrang. The problems of American politics were at bottorn neither imperial nor constitutional but social; the crown was virtually irrelevant to the society's basic contentiousness. In the tiny corporate colony of Rhode Island royal authority was weaker than anywhere else; yet Rhode Island was the most faction-ridden colony of all. Only after the Revolution would some Americans come to appreciate the true na
ture of their social reality . But it was not just the top of the English hierarchy that was missing
or confused in Arnerica: the bottom layer-the great mass of destitute people that still burdened most European societies-was also lacking. Severe fam ine remained a threat to parts of Europe weil into the eigh teenth century, and although England irself had been free of famine since the seventeenth century I it still had plenty of poor. Nowhere in America was there anything comparable to the vile and violent slums of London-that wretched gin-soaked world immortalized by Hogarth . Al though by the mid-eighteenth century the numbers of poor were increas ing in the urban ports of Boston , New York, and Philadelphia, there was not, Americans realized , "the least danger of starving amongst us." Many of the American poor, especially those in an entrepöt like Phila delphia, were transients , people on their way to someplace else. Eco nomic downturns could occasionally allow the proportion of poor in the colonies to range as high as 10 percent; but this still did not begin ro compare with the poor of Hanoverian England, where as much as half the population was regularly or at least occasionally dependent on char ity for subsistence. England, of course, had nothing like the nearly half million blacks held by the colonists in hereditary bondage. But it had huge proportions of marginal tenants and rural wage laborers; indeed, the bulk of its population was landless. The independent English yeo man landowner was a dream of the past in the mether country . By the
A Ttunaued Society
eve of the Revolution three-quarters of English farmland was owned by noble and gentry landlords who leased the ir estates to tenants of one sort or another . Indeed, four hundred great families owned a fifth of all the land in England .~
By contrast, most American farmers owned their own land ("We are Lords of our own little but sufficient Estates"). The radical impor tance -ofthis landownership in an English-speaking world dominated by rent-paying tenants and leaseholders cannot be exaggerated: even before the Revolution it gave Americans a sense of their egalitarian exception alism. The "Level" in New Jersey society that Philip Fithian thought so admirable arose "from the very great division of the lands in that Province, and consequently from the near approach to an equality of Wealth amongst the Inhabitants." Connecticut was no different, as even a spiteful Anglican victim of the Revolution, Samuel Peters, admitted. "In no part of the world," Peters wrote in his Gmeral History of Connect iau, "are /es petiJs and /es grands SO much upon a par as here, where none of the people are destitute of the conveniences of life and the spirit of independence. " Two-thirds of the white colonial population owned land, compared with only one-fifth of the English population. There were propertyless in America (maybe in some places as many as 30 percent of the adult males), but they tended to be either recent immigrants or young men awaiting their inheritance or an opportunity to move and acquire land. In no case was the overall situation of property-owning in America comparable to that of England, where more than 60 percent of the population owned no property of any kind. Freehold tenure in America was especially widespread, and freehold tenure, saidWilliam Knox bluntly, "exduded all ideas of subordination and dependence. ,,26
This description of the truncated nature of American society is fa miliar. Both eighteenth-century observers and historians ever since have repeatedly commented on the egalitarian character of colonial society. America, it seemed, was primed for republicanism. It had no oppressive established church, no titled nobility, no great distinctions of wealth, and no generality of people sunk in indolence and poverty. A society that boasted that "almost every man is a freeholder" was presumably a society ideally suited for republicanism ."
Yet paradoxically this latently republican society was at the same time manifestly monarchical. American society was riddled with contra dictions . It was still remarkably underdeveloped commercially compared with the mether country, it was still largely agricultural and rural, and it possessed as yet few modern alternatives to traditional personal and
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kinship relations to tie itself together-fewer certainly than the econom ically advanced society of England. Not only were the legal dependen eies of white servitude and black slavery harsher and more conspicuous in the colonies than in England, but the relative backwardness of the colonists' society and economy meant that Americans had fewer oppor tunities than Englishmen to subst itute impersonal market exchanges and a cash nexus for older personal and patriarchal connections; and thus they were more apt than Englishmen to continue to think of social re lationships in familial and personal terms-as expressions of the house hold rather than of a market society. Colonial society was therefore a society in tension, torn between contradictory monarchical and repub Iican tendencies. lt had many exaggerated expectations of subjection and dependency but at the same time lacked sufficient personal influence and patronage power to fulfill these expectations. Consequently, the connectedness of colonial society-its capacity to bind one person to another-was exceedingly fragile and vulnerable to challenge.
8. Loosening the Bands of Society
Pcrhaps in time this truncated republicanized monarchical society might have matured and become more hierarchical. Already by mid-century colonial society in some areas was more stratified than it had been, and social distinctions seemed to be hardening . The rich were getting richer and the poor were growing in number. Despite pockets of instability in some areas and the spread of republican values, the ruling gentry in most colonies were more visible, interconnected , and conscious of their identity than ever before .'
Yet any resemblance between colonial soeiety and that of the mother country remained superficial and partial; the hierarchies and patronage connections of American society were brittle; and little in the society had much chance to solidify. For just at the moment when some parts of American society seemed to be becoming more Iike England's, pow erful forces were accelerating and changing everything.
These basic forces were the most important sources of the late eighteenth-century democratic revolution. Of course, they were not unique to America; they were Western-wide. But because society in the New World was already more republican, more shallow, and more fra gile, there the effects of these forces seemed magnified and overdrawn. All Europe experienced a democratic revolution in the late eighteenth
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Loosming IM Bands oJ Society
century, but in America this democratic revolution was carried further than elsewhere. Extraordinary demographic and economic develop ments, moving as never before, reshaped the contours of the society challenging and further eroding the older monarchical world of depen dent patemal and personal relations.
Most Americans, Iike most Europeans, scarcely grasped the immen sity of the fundamental forces at work in the Western world . They were , of course, conscious of changes and disruptions in the customs of their Iives. Yet, habituated as they were to monarchical hierarchy and desir ous of stability and continuity, most were not disposed to perceive, much less to understand, the structural shifts taking place in their society. In the subsequent decades, they, Iike the Europeans, struggled to cornpre hend what was happening to them, and they sought through a variety of ways to resolve the problems and anxieties created by their newly detached and independent situations. The history of America in the decades between the 1740S and the 1820S is the story of these various resolutions . The imperial crisis with Great Britain and the American Revolution itself were simply c1arifying ineidents in this larger story of America's democratic revolution.
The basic fact of early American history was the growth and rnove ment of people. From the beginning of the eighteenth centurv, if not earlier, the colonial population had been virtually exploding; in fact, through their high birthrates and low mortality rates the North Ameri can colonists were multiplying more rapidly than any other people in the Western world. Between 1750 and 1770 they grew from one million to over two million and between 1770 and 1790 from two to four million, doubling every twenty years as they had for several generations ,
Moreover, this growth was not entirely natural. During these same middle decades of the eighteenth century immigrants poured into the New World by the tens of thousands-Englishmen, Seots, and Protes tant Irish from the British Isles and Germans from the Rhine Valley. Between 1764 and 1776 alone, 125,000 entered the American colonies from the home islands. From the colonial ports, particularly Philadelphia, these new migrants from the British Isles and Europe now combined with the swelling numbers of uprooted colonists to spread themselves in all directions over the eastern half of the continent."
For nearly a century and a half the colonists had been confined to a several-hundred-mile-wide strip along the Atlantic coast. Now in the middle decades of the eighteenth century they began to feel pressed by the growing numbers of people. Overcultivated soil in the East was
126 REPUBLICANISM
becoming depleted . Older towns, especially in New England, now seerned crowded, and greater numbers of young ,men were coming of age without their fathers' having land to give them. The political system was unable to absorb the increasing numbers of ambitious men. Edu cated, aspiring young men like WiJliam Hooper of Boston and Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Philadelphia set out for distant frontiers in North Carolina and western Pennsylvania because there was "no room" for them in their native cities. Expansionist urges among the colonists were suddenly intensified. Men dreamed of landed empires in the West, founded land companies, requested and often received grandiose grants of land from colonial and imperial authorities, and threatened the French in the Ohio Valley and Indians up and down the continent.!
People moved as never before-from village to village, from colony to colony, over distances of ten, a hundred, even a thousand miles. The movement was neither smooth nor orderly, nor was it directed simply into empty or sparsely settled spaces. New people poured into settled areas as others moved out, and some towns and counties long estab Iished received as many people as they sent away , Thousands upon thousands of settIers swept into western Pennsylvania and, "Iike the goths and Vandals of old, " said William Byrd, swarmed south into the Carolinas along routes on both sides of Virginia's Blue Ridge. Along these roads strings of small towns-from York , Pennsylvania, to Carn den , South Carolina-quickly developed to service the migrants and to distribute their produce to distant markets. Others, particularly dispos sessed Scottish Highlanders, came to the Carolinas direcdy by sea.!
The growth of settlement was phenomenal. In Pennsylvania, twenty nine new localities were created between 1756 and 1765-more in a single decade than in the entire previous three-quarters of a century of settle rnent . Between 1750 and 1775 North Carolina increased its population sixfold to emerge from insignificance and become the fourth-largest col ony . "There is," wrote one commentator without exaggeration in 1767, "scarce any history , either ancient or modern, which affords an account of such a rapid and sudden increase of inhabitants in a back country, as that of North Carolina." Even tiny Georgia grew from 2.300 in 17:J.
to 33,000 by 1773 ' ~ With the British conquest of the French in 1759 and the coming of
peace in 1763 the colonists at last seemed poised to take advantage of the half billion acres of newly acquired territory in the interior between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. Immediately after General jamel Wolfe's victory at Quebec in 1759, speculators and settIers moved into
Loosming IM Bands of Socitty 12 7 the area around Lake Champlain and westward along the Mohawk into central New York. In the ten years between 1761 and t771 New York's population more than doubled, from 80,000 to over 168,000. By the early 1']601 hunters and explorers like Daniel Boone were beginning to open up paths westward through the Appalachians. Settlers, mosdy small farmers, soon followed. Some moved southward to the valley of the Holston and the headwaters of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and others spread northward into the Ohio Valley and the Kentucky basin, Some drifted down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to join over land migrants from the southern colonies in the new British province of West Florida, and thus completed a huge encirclement of the new west ern territory.6
By the middle decades of the eighteenth century even staid New England stirred with movernent. Sorne people circulated only from town to town, going from inland communities to the seaports or from the seaports to the interior-always in search of new opportunities and se curity. Boston did not grow in population but many of its faces changed yearly. Beyond the eastern localities growing numbers of new towns sprang up, Between 1741 and 1780 90 percent of all new settlements in Massachusetts were founded in the counties west of Worcester. Many New England farmers gave up looking for opportunities within the es tablished colonies of the region and set out for new and distant places, even to the very edges of the recently expanded British empire. Mas sachusetts and Connecticut colonists not only trekked to northern New England and Nova Scotia but began moving to areas as far away as the Susquehanna in Pennsylvania and the lower Mississippi. Indeed, the largest single addition to the population of West Florida came from the settlement of four hundred families from Connecticut in 1773-74. So massive was the the migration of Connecticut farmers to the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania that Connecticut attempted in 1']6g to extend its jurisdiction over these Pennsylvanian settlements and in 1774 to annex them as part of one of its counties; the inevitable consequence was a nasty war between the two colonies. Between 1']60 and 1776 some twenty thousand people from southern New England moved up the Connecticut River into New Hampshire and what would soon become Verrnont . In that same period migrants from Massachusetts streamed into Maine and founded ninety-four towns. In all , du ring the years between 1']60 and 1776, 264 new towns were established in northern New EnglandJ
More colonists needed land and suddenly in 1763 more land was available. On the frontier-in northern New England and New York,
t Loosming the Bands of Socitty 12 9REPUBLICANISM128
representation was common enough to Britain (the House of Commonsin western Pennsylvania and Virginia, and in rhe backcountry of the was a hodgepodge of inequalities and anomalies), the colonists wereCarolinas-Iand remained generally cheap and accessible . But of course historically used to more direct and equal representation; and their small the more people wanted it, the more prices rose . In some desirable spots clublike assernblies became more and more of a grievance ." land prices skyrocketed: in the bustling, growing entrepöt of Staunten,
The growth and movement of people strained and broke apartVirginia, four town lots purchased for 1:10 in 1775 sold for 1:100 five years households, churches, and neighborhoods . Young men particularly belater. Within a decade or so these same town lots were selling for thou came more autonomous and more independent of patemal and patronsands of pounds. Land in the upper Shenandoah Valley in the period age relationships . Families necessarily became less involved with the 1745-54 was bought andresold at anywhere from three to ten times its larger society, and extended lines of kinship frayed and snapped. Chiloriginal price . Americans had often bought and sold land before but dren left their aged parents in increasing numbers to "go off among
never on this scale." strangers," as one mother lamented. "Oh how are my children disperst Speculative land fever seemed to infect all levels of the society. While over the face of the earth" became the refrain of countless American someone like Ezra Stiles, minister at Newport, Rhode Island, and later parents in the coming years. Continual migration broke apart and scatpresident of Yale, speculated in small shares of land in piaces all over tered families. Although the Preston, Campbell, and Breckenridge famNew England, Pennsylvania, and New York , more influential figures ilies had settled on Beverley Manor in the upper Shenandoah Valley like Benjamin Franklin concocted gargantuan schemes involving mil only in the 1740s, within a few decades their members were spread all lions of acres in the vast unsettled terrain of the West. Even small farm over southwestern Virginia and as far south as the Holston River. Each ers bought and sold their land at handsome profits and, to the surprise , move made the next one easier; even someone as established as William of European visitors , prided themselves on how many plantations they Preston, who rose to become a justice of the peace, county officeholder , had successively owned . Family farms were now thought of less as pat and member of the House of Burgesses, uprooted and replanted hirnself rimonies and more as commodities. With such movement of people and and his family three times in his lifetime, excited by the desire to seil such buying and selling of land, any traditional sense of community high in one place and buy cheap in another." became increasingly difficult to rnaintain . Each move made family and
The increased availability of land opened up opportunities for debtsocial ties more renuous, the roots more shallow. The colonists, declared ors, insolvents, and others to escape their dependencies. Delinquent andone astonished British official, were moving "as their avidity and rest- I insolvent tax reports of Augusta County, Virginia, showemigrantslessness incite them. They acquire no attachment to Place: but wander heading for various destinations, many further west into Kentucky, sorne ing about Seems engrafted in their Nature; and it is weakness incident to other parts of Virginia, and still others into Pennsylvania, Georgia, to it that they Should forever imagine the Lands further off, are Still and Tennessee. The numbers of transients drifting from village to vilbetter than those upon which they are already Settled ."9 lage, from job to job, increased dramatically .Many of these people The effects of this increase and movement of people were rnornen- ',;
tous . The population outran the society's political institutions, and most made their way into the tiny colonial cities that were iIl equipped to of the small and exclusive colonial governments remained unresponsive handle them. By 1772 in Philadelphia the percentage of poor had in
to the powerful forces at work . In many of the colonies, in the rniddle creased to eight times what it had been twenty years earlier, and alms
colonies especially, representation in the legislatures did not come dose houses were being constructed and filled in astonishing numbers .
to keeping up with the expansion of population . In 1730, for example, Everywhere older hierarchies were broken apart and traditional pater
the New York assembly had one representative for 320 adult white males; nalistic ties were severed. '2
by 1770 this ratio had jumped to one for 1,065. The Pennsylvania assern In New England the rnultiplication of "idie and indigent" persons
bly was even worse : one representative to 336 white adult males in 173° required towns to build workhouses for the poor, and in 1750 Massachu
became one representative 10 1,301 white adult males by 1770 . On the eve setts for the first time began regulating these "houses of industry. " By
of the Revolution, Pennsylvania, with a population of 25°,000, had an " 1']60 the numbers of transients and wandering poor in some counties of
assembly of only thirty-six members . Although such disproportionate New England had doubled or even tripled over what they had been a j
13 1 REPUBLICANISM13°
decade earlier. Never before had there been so many men and women living in places where they had not been born. By the end of the century even Providence, Rhode Island, with a population of only five thousand, was thought to have "a great many strangers always here. " ']
All of this movement in New England put unbearable pressure on the region's old warning-out laws. These laws had been part of the older culture of paternal dependency in which everyone was supposed to be long somewhere. Ir vagrants stayed in a town for a given period-three months in Connecticut and New Hampshire, one year in Massachu setts-they were then considered members of the community, which became responsible for their welfare . Warning-oul was designed to ab solve the community of this responsibility: men and women wamed out could not claim legal inhabitancy . From rnid-century the numbers of persons formally warned out in this way by various towns increased remarkably, so much so that town clerks began making lists of those warned out instead of writing separate warrants for each one. By the late l760s Massachusetts and Connecticut began shifting responsibility for identifying transients from the comrnunities to the individual tran sients themselves. In Inl the movement of people became so much greater that Connecticut and New Hampshire could no Ionger maintain their short three-rnonth period for legal residency ; they extended it to one year and brought their laws into line with Massachusetts. Increasing numbers of migrants put pressure on the whole archaic system . By the 1790s New Englanders were at last willing to acknowledge the fact of population movement , and they finally abandoned the old warning-out laws . Thereafter, citizens were free to migrate from town to town, at least within their respective states, without being subjected to warnings
or exclusions ." In some places people moved so rapidly and in such numbers that
society as people had known it was not easily re-created . Hierarchies that gradually emerged out of raw frontier areas were necessarily jerry built and precarious . Although in 1733 William Byrd had thought that Southside Virginia was "quite out of Christendom . " by 1746 the region was sufficiently filled with swarming migrants that a new counry , Lu nenburg , had to be carved out of it. Most of the early settlers, cornpris ing 650 households scattered over the live thousand square mHes of the county I were subsistence farmers with small landholdings; 80 percent of the households had no slaves. In such a raw society distinctions were hard to come by , and those who sought to rule had difficulty sustaining their authority . Most of the county's original twelve justices were little
Loosming tiJe Bands of Socitly
wealthier than the people they ruled; five of them did not own any slaves . During the first decades of the county's existence the turnover of the justices was very high: thirty-nine different men moved in and out of the twelve seats of the court. The church was no more stable. In the more settled counties of Tidewater Virginia, the justices of the court and vestrymen of the parish tended to be the same men, but in Lunen burg in the early years this was not the case: no gentlemen were dis tinctive enough to monopolize these positions of authority . It was not until 1759 that the county had a reputable minister who stayed for a reasonable length of time. Over a dozen years after the county's for mation this minister still found large numbers of people who "had never, or seldom been at Church since they were Baptized. "'~
Although in subsequent decades Lunenburg would develop some thing of a social hierarchy and become reasonably civilized-by 1760, for example, claims for wolf bounties had become rare-continued im migration into the area kept this backcountry society from matehing the stability of the older Tidewater counties. Thus its social distinctions remained tenuous, its politics turbulent, and its structures of authority continually susceptible to challenge. Its gentry erected no elegant brick mansions like those in the Tidewater; sm all frame houses painted white were the best they could do. Its leaders were quick to swear, drink, and fight and were scarcely gentlemen at all. Robert Munford, who knew the area well, drew the outrageous characters of his play TM CandidJJIts from personal experience. In Southside Virginia there actually existed parvenu gentlernen who promised the voters anything, magistrates who were habitually drunk, and candidates who stripped off their shirts and prepared to wrestle their way into the House of Burgesses. 16
In some areas, even the barest elements of civilized society were hard to acquire . Orange County, North Carolina, was one of the fastest growing areas in the colonies ; yet by 1758, six years after its organiza tion, William Few found "no schools, no churches or parson, or doctors or lawyers: no stores, grocers or taverns, nor . . . during the first two years any officer, ecclesiastical , civil or military, except a justice of the peace, a constable, and two or three itinerant preachers.' "7 Conditions in the South Carolina backcountry were even worse . Thousands of the new immigrants in the l760s, most of whom were Scotch-Irish, seemed to have no semblance of a society at all, and settlas lived in virtual isolation from one another.
They lived like "Savages," moaned Charles Woodmason, that har 1 'J ried and headstrong itinerant Anglican minister-a character out of a 1
' .• >5 '~- ". __. '*
133 132 REPUBLICANISM
Fielding novel if ever there was one-who has left us with an unforget table picture of these early Carolina settlers , Every day of his "travels" during the late l760s "in the Wild Woods of America" astonished Woodmason and left hirn feeling harassed and victimized. There he was: "Destitute often of the Necessaries of Life-Sometimes starved Often famished-Exposed to the burning Sun and scorehing Sands Obliged to fight his Way thro' Banditti, proßigates, Reprobates, and the vilest Scum of Mankind on the one hand, and of the numerous Sectaries pregnant in these Countries, on the other-With few Friends, and few Assistants-and surmounting Difficulties, and braving Dan gers, that ev'ry Clergyman that ever entered this Province shrunked even at the thoughts of. ,..8
He was bringing the Anglican religion to "this Wild Country," when it really needed all the other basic elements of civilization as weIl. He had never seen people with such "abandon'd Morals and profligate Principles-Rude- Ignorant- Void of Manners , Education or Good Breeding." There were no institutions at all-no courts, no schools, no churches, and very few gentlemen or even literate persons. The people lived "like Hogs " in open cabins with "Iittle or no Bedding, or anything to cover them. " They had multitudes of children : "There's not a Cab bin but has 10 or 12 Young Children in it-When the Boys are 18 and the Girls 14 they marry-so that in many Cabbins You will see 10 or 15 Children . Children and Grand Children of one size-and the mother looking as Young as the Daughter. " But because of the lack of ministers many did not marry and thus lived ,. in Concubinage-swopping their Wives as Cattel, and Jiving in a state of Nature, more irregularly and unchastely than the Indians ." The people seerned lazy; many lived "by Hunting and the killing of Deer." Most of the time they lolled around, often drunk, with no shoes or stockings and half clothed, with the women wearing only a short shift and petticoat. ("The Indians are better Cloathed and Lodged. ") They had no shame, "for Nakedness is counted as Nothing-as they sleep altogether in Common in one Room, and shift and dress openly without ceremony ." Woodmason could not stom ach their food, "all the Cookery ofthese People being exceedingly filthy, and most execrable." So in his travels, he carried everything with him, "heavy loaded like a trooper. If I did not, I should starve . . .. In many places they have nought but a Gourd to drink out of Not a Plate Knive or Spoon, or Glass, Cup or any thing.' They lacked, in other words, the barest accouterments of civilized living. But mainly the people lacked religion, at least Woodmason's religion . He had trouble raising corn-
Loosming the Bands 0]Society
municants for his services . When he did get a crowd, "out of Curiosity not Devotion," the people insulted and scoffed at him, telling him one time that "they wanted no D--d Black Gown Sons of Bitches among them ." At other times they set their dogs barking during his service, or got drunk "according to Custom," or went to "firing, hooping, and hallowing like Indians. " "Who but an Heart of Oak," Woodmason told himself, "could bear up Firm against such Torrents of Malice, Bigotry, and Impudence!" He bore it all, with Christian compassion and with "the Contempt and Derision befitting aGentIeman. "'9
It was mainJy as a gentleman that Woodmason framed the scenes of human degradation he was witnessing. Several times he wondered what cultivated Englishmen would think of these backcountry Caro linians. "How would the Polite People of London stare." Yet this country, said Woodmason, was not a "place I would wish any Gentle man to travel, or settle." There was "no genteel or Polire Person" in the area, not even "one literate, or travel'd Person-No ingenious Mind-None of any Capacity." "How hard the Lot of any Gentleman in this Part of the World." Here was human existence in the raw without culture."
Woodmason referred time and again to a state of nature and to a comparison with the Indians. This Carolina backcountry, he could see, was a formJess world starring anew. "All this must be born with at the beginning of Things" and until the country could be "reduc'd to some Form ." It was not thar people were too scattered for socialliving. Quite the contrary: although many parts of the country were "newly settled . .. the People are already together as thick as in England. " These fron tier people simply seemed to lack normal social relationships and the ordinary attributes of civilization. They had no benevolence, no feeling for one another. "Tis the fashion of these People to abandon all Persona when siek, instead of visiting them-So that aStranger who bad no Relatives or Connexions, is in a most Terrible Situation." So ciety had come apart, and nothing could bring it together, For the sociable eighteenth century, this was the ultirnate horror."
The South Carolina backcountry was the extreme ; perhaps Wood mason exaggerated, for it did not happen like this everywhere. But everywhere in the colonies the sudden increase and movement of people in the middJe decades of the eighteenth century shattered traditional monarchical relationships that were often not strong to begin with . Peo pie were freed from customary connections and made independent in new, unexpected ways . This demographic explosion, this gigantic move
135 REPUBLICANISMI:U
ment of people, was the most basie and the most liberating force work ing on American society during the lauer half of the eighteenth century, and it would remain so for at least another century after that . But it was not the only dynamic at work.
Coupled with this demographie expansion-and nearly equal a force in unsettling the society-were the spectacular changes taking place in the American economy. Exports and imports began rapidly rising in the 1740s and 175Os. Higher prices and increased demand for foodstuffs to feed the expanding populations of the Atlantic world began enticing more and more American farmers into producing for distant markets . Even Chesapeake planters, both large and srnall, began shifting from tobacco to grain production. Between 1760 and InO Virginia 's exports of corn to the West Indies increased ninefold, its exports of wheat to Southern Europe, sevenfold. Its exports of flour to all destinations boomed from 15 tons to 2,59' tons. By the eve of the Revolution old Charles Carroll had seen America nearly become "the granary of Eu rope ." No wonder Thomas Paine in 17'76 was so confident of the future of American commerce : America "will always have a market," he wryly noted , "while eating is the custom of Europe. " ..
Yet while these export and import statistics provide the best mea sures we have of economic growth in the period, even they can scarcely convey the magnitude of what was happening. Colonial America was so economically backward. so primitive compared with Great Britain, that the effects of this sudden commercialization were exaggerated. They became both more exhilarating and more alarming. The rising demand in the Atlantic world for wheat and other foodstuffs set off chain reac tions throughout the colonies. Networks of towns abruptly emerged to move the produce to the market, and hosts of new people, from wagon ers to innkeepers, appeared to serve the towns . The nature of tobacco culture and its marketing had long inhibited the development of towns and marketing centers in the southern colonies; but with the shift in the upper South to grain production , strings of communities reaching deep into the hinterland now arose. Almost overn ight the ports of Baltimore, Norfolk, and Alexandria grew up to distribute this swelling commerce within the Atlantic world . In the decade or so before the Revolution, Norfolk more than doubled in size to become the fifth-Iargest city in British North Arnerica."
Almost everywhere in the colonies, but particularly in the northern and middle colonies, growing numbers of small farmers, many for the first time in their lives, were drawn into producing "surpluses" for the
'
'\ i
..
. "I
Loosening the Bands of Socitty
market. Supplying the armies that fought the French at mid-century had already helped to incite many fanners into expanded sales of pro visions. But an even more important stimulus for increasing the pro ductivity of fanners than new markets was the growing opportunities they had for eonsumption. The prospeet of raising their standard of living and enlarging their purchase of "luxury" goods spurred farmers to work harder and produce more and more "surpluses." Higher in comes and rising expectations of ordinary people represented the begin nings of a revolution in traditional habits of consumption. Common people now had the financial ability to purchase "luxury" goods that previously had been the preserve of the gentry-from tea and tea sets to silk handkerchiefs and feather mattresses."
But it was not just increased purchasing power among ordinary peo ple that eaused this consurner revolution; it was the weakness of the social hierarchy and the social emulation this eneouraged. In England it was already elear that efforts by inferiors to imitate the dress and other accouterments of their superiors was a driving foree behind "the birth of a consumer society." A society like England's that had, as one En glishman put it, a "gradual and easy transition from rank to rank" was bound to encourage emulative spending. If the purchase of a earriage or a Staffordshire tea set was an it took to move up a notch in the social hierarehy, then working harder in order to acquire such an item became worthwhile.'5
How much more worthwhile was such emulative consumption in colonial Ameriea, where the distinetions of rank were even more blurred than they were in England. Already it seemed evident to observers that Americans were even more exeited about emulative consumption than people in the mother country. All the "common people" in the colonies seemed "eager to make a show much above what they do in England. " After an, when the ranks were squeezed together it did not take much for aperson to pass upward from one to another. "In a eountry like this, where property is so equably divided, every one will be disposed to rival his neighbour in goodness of dress, sumptiousnes of furniture, etc." The result was to put people in "one continued Race; in which everyone is endeavoring to distance all behind hirn, and to overtake or pass by, an before him ; every one ftying from his Inferiors in Pursuit of his Superiors , who fly from hirn with equal Alacrity." Thus in America
every tradesman is a Merchant , every Merchant is a Gentleman, and every Gentleman one of the Noblesse . We are a Country of Gentry ,
~A±F'5L. ~~::"~=~~" :.: 't7:'~7;':';" : '~~-0i · -" , ,·
137 - 13 6 REPUBLICANISM Popu/ous gtnmJsorum : We have no such thing as a common People among us: Between Vanity and Fashion, the Species is uuerly destroyed .26
. These were the cornplaints of social conservatives alarmed by this conspicuous consumption and the social disorder it engendered. Cler gymen and gentry spoke out against the evils of "luxury" and invoked conventional republican messages along with traditional Puritan jere miads to extol probity and simplicity and warn of the dan gers of too much wealth and riches. They knew that philosophers like Francis Hutcheson had urged high duties to be placed on imported luxuries just "so that they rnay never be used by the lower and more numerous orders of people, whose consumption would be far greater than those of the few who are wealthy .' I Common people who were tempted by re finement and extravagance, who spent too much on luxuries, were sup posed to lose their incentive to work and become idle and dissolute . On the eve of the Revolution some colonists even proposed surnptuary laws in order to coerce people into living within their rank."
Others, however, found in these changes in consumption and pro ductivity the source of new ideas . Both Bernard Mandeville and later David Hume argued that , far from being an unrelieved vice, as the severe republican moralists would have it, luxury and the desires of ordinary people to acquire the goods and trappings of fashion actually stimulated manufacturing and industriousness, and he1ped to develop a middling group in the society standing between the aristocracy and the poor. It was precise1y these developments that eventually allowed theo rists like Adam Smith to perceive that, contrary to centuries of thought, labor was not based on necessity and poverty after all but was instead the principal creator of productivity and prosperity in the society; it might in fact be the sole source of wealth in the society . But these new thoughts were slow in developing, especially in the colonies. Many Americans had .argued in traditional terms that poverty and the threat of starvation were the only incitements for common people to work harder. Hence the less income people had, the more frugal and more industrious they would become ...e
Suddenly, this rnid-century experience brought this tradition al view into question . "Poverty," saidJames Otis in 1']61, "is so far from being '. the basis of industry and frugality, that it is too often the occasion of vices directly opposite." Otis was particularly eager to distinguish him self from those rich aristocrats like Thomas Hutchinson who believed that the problems of Boston and Massachusetts were due to the fact that
Loosening the Bands of Society
"the common people in this town and country live too weU ." As for luxury, said Otis, speaking for a newrising generation, Americans could not have too much of it. They could never be too prosperous or import too many consumer goods : "the more we have the better, if we can export enough to pay for them. ""9
Most Americans agreed that they could not have too many im ports-even if they could not export enough to pay for them . In the years before the Revolution, colonial imports from Britain skyrocketed, going from less than a million pounds in value in '747 to nearly four and a half million by '772. All sorts of shopkeepers and petty mushroom traders now became involved in the importat ion and sale of British dry goods-that is, in the kind of trade that the richest and most prestigious of colonial merchants had long controlled. In reaction, these established merchants tried to form rudimentary chambers of commerce in order to keep such upstarts out of their ranks, but the availability of British credit and the willingness of British exporters to deal with anyone in the colonies undermined their efforts. By the l']60s a prominent London merchant house might be dealing with as many as '50 different traders in a single northern port. All this meant that traditionallines of patron age in the port cities were further weakened and the tide of "merchant ," theoretically still confined only to those involved in wholesale trade abroad, had lost its exclusivity.3°
But just as important for American society as the sudden increase in exports and imports in the years after 1745 was the expansion of America's domestic or inland trade. Better roads , more reliable infor mation about markets, and the greater number and variety of new towns all encouraged domestic manufacturing for local, regional, and inter colonial markets. By '']68 colonial manufacturers were supplying Penn sylvania with eight thousand pairs of shoes a year. In many towns 20 to 30 and even 40 percent of the male population followed a trade or craft of some sort . In ,']67 the town of Haverhill, Massachusetts, with fewer than three hundred residents, had forty-four workshops and nineteen rnills. By the I']60S immigrants and ex-soldiers were becoming mechanics and craftsmen in Philadelphia in such numbers as to alarm British au thorities worried about American manufacturing competition with the mother country. But it was not just a case of more artisans producing for domestic and inland markets; much of the farming population itself was manufacturing and trading.r
We are just beginning to appreciate the degree to which Americans participated in what historians sometimes call •' proto-ind ustrializa tion , , ,
139 138 REPUBLICANISM
where rural manufacturing developed alongside commercial agricultural production . Unlike in Britain and Europe, however, American rural manufacturing was not generally the result of mercantile capitalists mo bilizing impoverished cottagers and landless laborers in putt ing-out sys tems; it was more often the consequence of ongoing farm families becoming part-time manufacturers and entrepreneurs in order to better themselves. No doubt many farm families in settled areas, faced with growing population pressures on diminishing amounts of available ar able land, were forced either to migrate to new western areas, as many increasingly did, or to supplement their incomes with manufacturing and trading. But many other farmers engaged in domestic industry and marketing not simply to make ends meet but also to bolster their income and raise their living standards . Even farmers who were not growing crops for export abroad were nonetheless scrambling to create goods to exchange in local markets-putting their wives and children to work spinning cloth or weaving hats, dressing deer skins and beaver pelts, making hoops and barrels, distilling rum or eider, and fabricating whatever they might seil to local stores . On the eve of the Revolu tion, more than one-third of the families of even the simple western Massachusetts town of Northampton had some nonfarm income . In some northern agricultural towns, people seemed to be doing everything but farming.
Although direct statistical evidence of local industry seems virtually impossible to recover, literary sources and indirect evidence suggest a significant expansion of domestic manufacturing in the countryside, par ticularly in homespun cloth. Royal governors in both the North and the South were surprised at the extent of household spinning and weaving in the colonies. "The planters' wives spin the cotton of this country," Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier reported from Virginia, not only for their own consumption but for sale in local markets . Cloth manu facturing was even more common in the middle and New England col onies . Govemor Wentworth of New Hampshire estimated an annual sale of 25 ,000 yards of high-priced linen in his colony. During the im: perial crisis and nonimportation agreements of the 1']60S and 17705 some northern towns c1aimed yearly outputs of 20,000 or 30,000 yards of cloth; Elizabeth, New Jersey, boasted that it produced nearly 100,000 yards of ' linen and woolen cloth in a single year. In Philadelphia in 1775 small traders and artisans formed the "United Company for Promoting American Manufactures," employing three hund red wornen and chil dren in their hornes. Everywhere people sought to spin or to make some-
Loosming tht Bands of Society
thing in order to increase their incomes and their capacity to buy goods. Inland commercial centers like Lancaster, Pennsylvania, sprang up to meet their expanding commercial needs and desires. In 1759 Lancaster had many retail traders, but only one person officially designated as a "merchant"; by 1770 twenty-two claimed that designation, all of them shopkeepers who had usurped the title. This was but a simple prefig uring of what in time would become the momentous shift of the basis of American prosperity from external to internal commerce.P
Before mid-century, inland trade in the colonies had remained lim ited and rudimentary compared with the century-Iong experience of the mother country with horne markets. Now, in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, Americans suddenly began experieneing on an ex panded scale what Englishmen had known for generations, A new kind of business world rapidly emerged, involving the extensive exchange of goods and services not simply with the mother country or foreign ter ritories but within and between the colonies themselves , and no one was culturally equipped to understand or justify it. Internal trade within and between the individual colonies had, of course, gone on before, but not on this scale. This abrupt expansion of inland trade combined with the inherent weakness of America's social hierarchy to create social concerns that most Englishmen had long since learned to live with and control.
"Traffick" of one sort or another was now what every American seemed to be doing, and "subtilty and craft" in people's "dealing," it was said, had become "an accomplishment peculiar to our American colonys." It was not the traditional external commerce by those desig nated as "merchants" that was worrisome, but rather the extent of domestic trading among more ordinary people . Everyone seemed to have "an itch after living by their Heads rather than their Hands"; everyone wanted to be a trader buying and selling goods. Visitors and travelers were stunned by the numbers of Americans whose "whoie thoughts" were "turned upon profit and gain." Sometimes it seemed "as if almost allliv'd one upon another, and that but a small Proportion was employ'd in producing any Thing from the Earth or Sea . "33
Under these commereial circumstances borrowing among the colo nists increased dramatically, as farmers and traders incurred debts in order to buy more land and livestock or to finance projects that they expected would increase their profits. This borrowing against future earnings was not the same as the informal "book debts" of the small rural communities where people knew one another, were implicated in one another's lives, and did not demand interest on their debts . Much
REPUBLICANISM14°
of the new commercial borrowing involved formal, signed interest bearing instruments of credit often between people who did not know each other well. In several Connecticut counties court actions involving such signed obligations increased from about 20 percent of all debt Iiti gation in 1700 to 80 percent by the middle decades of the century. Be cause this borrowing and lending often crossed the boundaries of the local community, creditors were no Ionger willing to rely simply on a system of mutual notations of debts among neighbors . They now de manded that debtors, often located at some distance from them, for mally write out promissory notes or take out bonds with prescribed deadlines for repayment and provisions of interest. These written con tracts represented very different obligations from those of the older book accounts: they suggested a degree of mistrust and were particularly and orten exdusively economic rather than being part of some ongoing social relationship based on personal familiarity . For many rural colonists these written credit obligations constituted a major intrusion of impersonal market relations into lives that hitherto had been governed by custom and communal norms.I'
By borrowing in this way on this expanded scale, the colonists began contributing their part to the long, slow process of transforming the traditional meaning of credit and debt. Credit was often still considered less a business investment than a form of charity, a mutual aid for those temporarily distressed by the risks of life. Hence debtors who seemed to be prospering and yet refused to honor their obligations were moral delinquents who could justly be imprisoned ; creditors who had been deceived had every right to squeeze out ' any of the debtors' concealed assets and to expect family, friends, or patrons of the debtors to bail them out. 33
It is not surprising that the most liberal, the most entrepreneurial, and the most " modem " of the eighteenth-century colonies-Rhode Is land, where nearly everyone seemed to be participating in trade-was also the colony that developed the most far-reaching terms for the relief of insolvent debtors . Rhode Island 's provisions for bankruptcy were thoroughly modern and went well beyond contemporary English prac tice: they protected the future earnings of bankrupt debtors from being attached by creditors-in effect recognizing the new risk-taking, entre preneurial character of debt. Yet such innovations were a long way from general acceptance.P"
As the colonists expanded their inland trade , they necessarily in creased their use of paper money, which, as one historian has noted,
Loosming lhe Bands oj Society 14 1
was "a public variant of private credit instruments.' '37 By the middle decades of the century many colonists were coming to realize that paper money was not just a wartime expedient that enabled governments to pay for goods and services without suddenly raising taxes . Traders, shopkeepers, market farmers-all those involved in internal and retail trade-had discovered the value of paper currency. Without specie or paper money, as Governor William BuH of South Carolina noted in InO, trade had to be carried on "by credit or barter," wh ich in turn required the close and more personal patron-dient relationships of a small-scale society . But in a society where increasingly "the Inhabitants [were I Strangen to each other," reliance on such personal relationships would mean that the society "could carry on no Trade ." The "barter of Commodities" was "extremely troublesome and unpleasant" for people who did not know one another intimately; they were forced into "consuming near half their Time, in Bargains of the most trivial as well as material Consequence." Thus paper money opened up possibilities for increasing numbers of people to participate more independently and more impersonally in the economy. For farmers to borrow from aland bank meant that they were no longer dependent on city merchants or great moneyed men of the community for their credit. Paper money thus had a corrosive effect on traditional patronage dependencies.f
Paper money was attractive to entrepreneurs and retailers eager to trade and unwilling to accept the short-term credits or the deferential dientage that went with personal borrowing from established patrons and lenders. It is no wonder , therefore, that Rhode Island, where the social hierarchy was weakest and the prevalence of trading greatest, became the notorious hotbed of paper-money issues , with nine banks emitting hundreds of pounds of paper currency between 17" and 1750. In the ti ny town of Glocester , with only about 120 freemen , over one third of them on average borrowed paper currency at each of the emis sions.39 Inland trading interests also lay behind the short-lived private Massachusetts land-bank scheme of 1740; its failure, however, suggested the still dominant position of gentry creditors and established overseas merchants, who regarded domestic trade as unproductive for the colony and too much paper currency as inftationary and destructive of their credit.
Despite parliamentary acts in 1751 and 1764 restricting the use of paper money as legal tender, the colonies continued to issue paper cur rency . But du ring the remainder of the colonial period no American atternpted to argue that the demands of the intern al market alone were
143 142 REPUBLICANlSM
capable of upholding the value of paper money .t" lt would take the Revolutionary War and further experience with the issuing of paper money before Americans would begin to see the significance of their domestic market and its dependence on paper currency.
Still, the development of inland trade and the resort to paper currency emissions do suggest the various ways in which ordinary peo pIe of middling rank were becoming more independent and more free of traditional patron-cIient relationships. But perhaps the most vivid example of this Iinkage between commercial change and the loosening of paternalistic social ties can be seen in what happened to the oldest and most deeply entrenched system of small-fanner dependency in the colonial economy-that involving the international marketing of tobacco
in the Chesapeake. By the middle decades of the eighteenth century the older consign
ment system of marketing tobacco in the Chesapeake was being rapidly displaced by a new system that had mornentous consequences for the structure of Virginia and Maryland society. From about the 1730S Scot tish merchant houses, operating largely out of Glasgow, set up stores or factories all over the Chesapeake area but particularly in the developing interior . UnJike the consignment system, which had tied small planters with their small crops to the large planters with access to English mer chant houses, the new Scottish marketing system was ideally suited to enhance the independence of small planters. The Scottish factors or storekeepers bought the farmers' crops outright, sold them imported goods, and extended thern liberal amounts of credit. In effect they sup plan ted the great aristocratic planters as middlemen in the economy and society of the Chesapeake . Yet because the Scottish factors were gener ally only employees of their merchant firms, they had Iittle independent standing in Chesapeake society and thus, unlike the great planters who consigned their neighbors' tobacco, never translated their economic power into political or social patronage. This change in the marketing of tobacco, together with the accompanying development of new and diverse crops, allowed small farmers, espedally in the backcountry, to become more independent of personal and paternalistic ties than before. By the eve of the Revolution direct trading stores run by Scottish factors controlled probably two-thirds of the yearly tobacco crop of the region and effectively opened up participation in the market economy to many ' new small planters ."
The growing independence of small and middling Chesapeake fann-
Loosming the Bands of Society
ers from traditional patronage connections manifested itself in a variety of ways. During the middle decades of the eighteenth century, the num ber of contested elections for the Virginia House of Burgesses grew markedly. This increased participation of ordinary people in electoral politics made the leading planters more anxious about their role as rep reseätatives, and in the 1750s the planters even began debating the am biguities in the relationship between the members of the House of Burgesses and their constituents. The gentry voiced more and more concern over the mounting costs of e1ections and growing corruption in the soliciting ofvotes, especially by "those who have neither natural nor acquired parts to recommend thern." There were complaints every where of "craft and extortion " and of social disarray. Every tobacco inspector (whose income was related to the price of tobacco) was being "made rich and above his calling" by the rising price of tobacco . Clerks of the courts were using their offices and emoluments to become "great Men." Storekeepers were able to make an estate in only seven years . And "the Smith, the Tailor, the Canoe Man, etc." were all demanding "unreasonable Prices for their Labour." By the late I']60S and early Inos the Virginia newspapers were filled with warnings against electoral treating, bribery, and vote-seeking. The freeholders were stridently urged to "strike at the Root of this growing Evil; be influenced by Merit alone," and to avoid electing "obscure and inferior persons" to the House of Burgesses. Too many "worthy gentlemen" were being pressed by "abject competitors;" and gentlemen Iike Robert Carter were retir ing from public Iife rather than adjust to what Carter called the "new system of politicks" that had hegun "to prevail generally. " The gentry were quick to invoke those famous Iines from Addison's Cato:
When vice prevails and impious men bear sway. The post of honour is a private station.•"
In this context Robert Munford's plays The Candid4tes and The PaIri ots, written on the eve of the Revolution, less confirm the gentry plant ers' confidence in their superiority than betray their uneasiness with e1ectoral developments in the colony, "when coxcombs and jockies can impose themselves upon it for men oflearning." Although Munford has disinterested virtue eventually win out, his satiric comedies reveal the fears the established planters had of "men who aim at power without merir .' Virginia society was by no means coming apart; but social re
~,
REPUBLICAN IBM '44
lationships were changing, and these changes were sudden enough and on such a scale as to make many gentlemen think that the colony was
on the verge of ruin. 43 Religious developments in the Chesapeake reinforced the impression
of impending ruin . The surging population and changing economic re lationships unsettled traditional hierarchies and the authority of the gentry-dominated Church of England. Hundreds and thousands of Vir ginians, separated from customary patemal and patronage connections, found the established Anglican church unable to satisfy their emotional and moral needs and began forming new ordered evangelical commu nities that rejected outright the high style, the luxurious living, and the preoccupations with rank and precedence of the dominant Anglican gen try. Throughout the 1750S and I']60S the Chesapeake gentry complained in newspapers and letters of mounting defections from the Church of England , particularly among the common farmers . In these mid-century decades succeeding waves of enthusiastic New Light Presbyterians, Sep arate Baptists, and finally Methodists swept up new converts, mostly from among the ordinary people of the Chesapeake. Between t769 and 1774 the number of Baptist churches in Virginia alone increased from seven to fifty-four. The gentry blamed this successful proselytizing by dissenters on the laxity and ignorance of the Anglican clergy, and the c1ergy in turn accused the lay vestries of Anglican gentry of not sup- , porting them against the evangelical threat. In this atmosphere of mu tual recrimination the authority of both the gentry and the established
Anglican clergy was weakened.t' What was taking place in Virginia at mid-century was just one man
ifestation of aseries of religious upheavals throughout all the colonies, later called the Great Awakening. Up and down the continent there i were momenfous religious stirrings and convulsions that ran through " the middle decades of the century. They were often diverse , cornpli cated , and local in their origins, but in general they grew out of people'i ;: attempts to adjust to the disturbing changes in their social relationships; caused by demographic and commercial developments. It is not sur- .~~ prising, for example, that New Light religious awakenings in Connect- :!' icut centered precisely in those eastern counties most unsettled by" population growth , trade, and paper-money emissions. Although the .,: Great Awakening commonly represented an effort by people to bring, some order to their disrupted lives, its implications were radical , espe-r : cially since supernatural religion remained for most ordinary people, if
Enlightmul Patemalism '4S
not for eniightened gentry, the major means of explaining the world. By challenging clerical unity, shattering the communal churches, and cutring people loose from ancient religious bonds, the religious revivals became in one way or another a massive defiance of traditional author ity. The individualistic logic of Protestantism was drawn out further than ever before . Revivalist c1ergymen urged the people to trust only in "self-examination" and their own private judgments, even though "your Neighbours growl against you, and reproach you." Some New Lights went so far as to assert the "absolute Necessity for every Person to act singly .. . as if there was not another human Creature upon Earth." The burden of people's new religious attachments now rested clearly on themselves and their individual dedsions. 45 Such conditional loyalties could contribute little to the deferential faith and obedience on which monarchy ultimately rested .
9. Enlightened Patemalism
Throughout the eighteenth-century Anglo-American world, traditional authority was brought into question. Personal and social relations were not working properly . The social hierarchy seemed less natural, less ordained by God, and more rnan -rnade, more arbitrary. By the early l770s, the practice of ranking entering students at Harvard and Yale by their social status had come to seem archaic and unfair and was abol ished . Leaders lost some of their aura of mystery and sacredness. Sub ordinates and inferiors feit more independent, more free, than they had in the past. People were less willing to fulfill customary obligations. Superiors seemed more selfish and more unresponsive to those below them, and subordinates seemed more sullen and suspicious. In all the colonies, as Charles Carroll said in 1765, there seemed to be " a mean, low, dirty envy which creeps through all ranks and cannot suffer a man of superiority, of fortune, of rnerit, or of understanding" to go uncon tested. Any mark of superiority, any pretension to aristocracy, was "sure to entail a general ill will and dislike upon the owner." Threats and anger were becoming more common than mutual respect and deference. Servants became more difficult to maintain, and masters complained of shortages of servants. Everywhere ordinary people were no longer will ing to play their accustomed roles in the hierarchy, no longer willing to follow their callings, no Ionger wi1ling to restriet their consumption of
147 REPUBLICANISM14 6
goods. They were less dependent, less willing to walk while gentlemen rode, less willing to dolf their caps, less deferential, less passive, less respectful of those above them. ii
But this heightened questioning of authority was not simply a matter 0} of ordinary people throwing olf customary restraints and asserting thern- .. selves in new ways. It was more complicated than that. The problem " really lay with authority itself; :with masters and patriarchs and all those ." traditionally designated to govern this monarchical society. Byadopting new enlightened standards of paternalism, rulers of all sorts in the Anglo American world coilaborated in weakening their own authority.
No English ruler, no English master, and certainly no superior among the American colonists-who were more English than the En glish themselves-ever had it easy. Liberty, insubordination, and un willingness to truckle to any authority were wh at distinguished Englishmen from Frenchmen and all the other enslaved and deprived peoples of the world. The English everywhere were habitually defiant of authority, and no one at the top of any of the English-speaking world's many hierarchies ever feit as secure as he would have liked. In the colonies especially, superiors of all sorts-fathers, masters, and magis trates-were increasingly uneasy and self-conscious about the legitimacy of their position, their right to dominate.
Even in the terms of a more traditional patriarchal society, the re lation between fathers and children, masters and servants, rulers and ruled , had always been described as mutual. Inferiors obviously had .: obligations to their superiors, but so too did superiors have a responsi bility to respect the rights of their subordinates, "for," as Samuel Willard had written, "they are no more left by the Word of God to be despotü;al than the others to be disobliged. " English rulers could not rely on standing armies or companies of guards to frighten and compel people into obedience . " O bedience by compulsion," wrote William Livingston in 1752, "is the Obedience of Vassals, who without corn pulsion would disobey. The Alfection of the People is the only Source of a Cheerful and rational Obedience."· Unlike rulers elsewhere, English superiors had to gain the natural alfection and respect of their inferiors and dependents. They had to be enlightened and liberal, be- , fitting Englishmen. Yet in the colonies, particularly by mid-century, the more those in authority sought to earn the esteem of those below thern, the more fearful and resentful their subordinates became, Somehow duties and obligations hitherto taken for granted by masters and subordinates were now open to doubt. Traditional social bonds "
Enlightened PaJemalism
were coming apart,and authority lost confidence in its ability to hold them together.
The problem began naturally enough with the family-that model of all superior-subordinate relationships in a traditional society . Decades later, after the entire ancient structure of society in Europe and America had been transformed , John Adams knew only too weil where "the source of revolution" lay : in "a systematical dissolution of the true family authority. There can never be any regular government of a na tion," he told one of his sons in 1799, "without a marked subordination of mother and children to the father ." But th is was hindsight. In the middle of the eighteenth century few saw any political dan gers in alter ing the nature of familial authority; indeed, many who had no desire to bring about a social upheaval were nonetheless eager to transform tra ditional relationships within the family. In short, they wished to repub licanize the family as they were republicanizing monarchy .!
Certainly by 1750 ancient patriarchal absolutism no Ionger had the same ideological significance it had once possessed . Whatever the prac tice at some times and in some places might have been, few fathers, or at least few gentry fathers, now dared to justify controlling their house hold dependents in the arbitrary manner advocated a century earlier by Sir Robert Filmer. Married women in the colonies continued in general to have greater legal rights than their counterparts in England (though after mid-century elforts to bring colonial law more into line with En glish common law did at times legally restriet the rights of wives). Di vorces initiated by women were a measure ofwomen's autonomy, and they were always rnore common in parts of America than elsewhere in the British empire. In fact, on the eve of the Revolution the crown instructed its governors to veto all colonial elforts to liberalize the di vorce laws.!
Patriarchy was being challenged in other ways too . Not only were sons and daughters leaving horne in greater numbers, but they also c1aimed a greater say over their choice of marriage partners. Young people were now more apt to marry someone outside of their immediate locality, or even their religion, than they had been earlier. They may even have used premarital pregnancy as a means of compelling parental acceptance of their choices: in the last part of the eighteenth century one-quarter to one-third of all brides in some areas of America (and of England too) were pregnant before their marriage. Fathers found themselves on the defensive with their children, unable to act as arbitrarily as they had in the past . The patrimony they had to pass on
149 148
REPUBLICANISM
had become diminished. In sorne parts of America, fathers could not provide land for all their sons as they had earlier, and their sons were growing up with a keener sense of both old limitations and new pos-
I
sibilities.> Personal relationships and values within the family were trans
formed . Families cut some of their ties to the outside world and became much more private and insular. Servants were more difficult to acquire, and their relationship to the other members of the household became less intimate. The family core of father, rnother, and children became more distinct frorn the household, and affection became more important than dependency in holding the family together. Lower infant-and childhood mortality enabled parents to make a greater emotional invest ment in their offspring. Parents paid more attention to the individuality of each child and sentimentalized the family's inner relationships . The practice now developed of giving children affectionate nicknames, and composite family portraits including father, mother, and children be came much more cornmon . Although the family remained hierarchical, the mutual relationships of its nuclear members became more compli cated. Sons were no longer seen simply as the representative of the stern line of the family, and after mid-century fathers were less apt to name a son after themselves. The individual desires of children now seemed
to outweigh traditional concerns with family üneage." Parents familiar with the larger eosmopolitan and genteel culture
could scarcely have avoided becoming preoccupied with the question of how best to bring up their children and with redefining their parental authority. From every quarter of the cultivated world they were besieged with advice on what it meant to be a parent. No theme was more central
i
, ~
' ,~
' "
to the popular writing of the eighteenth century. Nearly every work of the age-whether of history, fiction, or pedagogy, from Marmontel's ;1 Memoirs to Goldsmith's Vicar of WaA:efieltl to Chesterfield's Letters-dwelt J on issues of familial responsibility and wamed against the evils of pa- :, rental tyranny and the harsh and arbitrary modes of child-rearing of an older, more savage age. Charles Rollin's Ancient History attacked pri-I: mogeniture and other legal devices that supported an artificial patriar- ' chal authority. Samuel Richardson's CltJrissa criticized parents who . placed family pride and wealth ahead of the desires and integrity of their , children. Even Hogarth's popular series of prints Marriage ti la MlNM ,'\ pointed out the dangers of parents arranging their children's marriages. : Being a parent was no longer simply a biological fact; it was also a
Enlightend Patemalism
cultural responsibility. As Fenelon's Teltma&hus attested, a child's true parents were not his blood relatives but those moral preceptors like Mentor who shaped his mind and raised hirn to become a reasoning moral adult in a corrupt and complex world. Children were no longer merely dependents but moral beings to be cared for and educated .?
These changing ideas about parent-child relationships constituted what has been called a "revolution against patriarchy." The sources of this immense eighteenth-century cultural transformation necessarily ran deep-ran, indeed, all the way back to the turbulence and innovative thinking of the previous century. Although this cultural revolution was so extensive and diverse, so much apart of the general republicanization of monarchy, that the inftuence of no single thinker can account for it, there is no doubt that the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke was important. More significant even than his Two Treauses oJ Govemmmt (1689-90) for the eighteenth century's assault on absolutist monarchy was his Some Thoughts on Education (1693)' It became an authoritative start ing point for the following century's ideas about education."
Locke's interest in pedagogy and child-rearing ftowed from his as sumption, set forth in his Essay Conctming Human Understanding, that all knowledge was ultimately based on information received from the senses. Ir the mind of a child was indeed a tabukz rasa upon which experience made impressions, then the responsibility of controlling and guiding this impressionistic experience was awesome. "Those who have Children, or the charge of their Education" during that "time most susceptible of lasting Impressions," Locke wrote, had an obligation "diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of ldeas in the Minds of young People." In fact, parents were largely responsible for the formation of their children' s character and understanding; they, more than anything else, determined their children's fate, With the spread of such ideas-and by the mid-eighteenth century they wcre taken for granted by the most liberal, enlightened people-being a parent could never again be the same.t
Despite their power, however, the new ideas about parent-child re lationships developed slowly, erratically, and confusedly, and they were largely confined to the literate and educated elements of society. This revolution against patriarchal authority was a century-long affair at least (indeed, it is still going on), and even so the new enlightened thinking about parent-ebild relations was never complete, never undisputed, never final . The age-old claims of blood and breeding remained persls
REPUBLICANISM15°
tently powerful, even among the enlightened. Indeed, throughout the century opposing monarchical and republican strains of thinking existed simultaneously in the culture, and often within the minds of individuals.
Evidence for the coexistence and struggle of the opposing strains may be found in hundreds of different places, sometimes in the most unlike1y ones. Robert Munford intended his play TIu Patriots, written on the eve of the Revolution, as a satire on political behavior in Vir ginia, but despite his focus on politics Munford could not avoid talking about familial re1ationships. At the end of the play the character Me linda learns that she is the offspring of a deceased gentleman and not in fact, as she had thought, the daughter of John and Margaret Heartfree, the simple farming couple who were entrusted with her as a baby . The Heartfrees have raised Melinda as their own, and she is naturally stunned by the sudden revelation of the truth , But despite the lack of a blood relation Melinda refuses to "forget my poor old good father and mother, who have fed rne, raised me, cherished and loved me so long." By the new enlightened standards of the eighteenth century the Heart frees have the superior moral claim to parenthood, and Melinda's newly discovered gentry-uncle (her mother's brother) admits as much : the Heartfrees' "kindness .. . , " he says, "weil deserves a filial attach ment. " Yet at the same time this Virginia aristocrat cannot but feel the overpowering connect ion of blood. This girl is clearly his sister's child : "These eyes tempered with sweetness, these looks of mildness declare the fountain from whence they take their origin.' Munford, the South side Virginia planter with aspirations to Tidewater gentility, could not shake off the traditional aristocratic concern with genealogy and social rank. Since Melinda was to be married to agentIeman of rank, it was important for the harmonious ending of Munford's play that she, how ever naturally good and kindly reared , be of gentry stock herself. Tra ditional opinion died hard."
Indeed, it was precisely the continuing power of ancient patriarchal thought that made the revolution against it so intense and widespread. Nothing like it on such a scale had happened before in Western history . Never had so many people become so self-conscious about the problems of child-rearing and parental authority.
In his work on education, which went through numerous editions in the eighteenth century, Locke advised parents not to base their au thority on fear. The ferocious brutality infticted on children and other household dependents in the past could not produce benevolent adults. lnstead, parents were now advised to work hard to cultivate the reason
Enlightentd Paumalism 15 1
and affection of their children . Corporal punishment might on occasion be necessary for very young children who could not be reasoned with, but coercion could never make for effective Iong-lasring parental au thority. "For, as Years increase," Locke told parents, "Liberty must come with them ." The child gradually had to be "trusted to his own Conduct; since there cannot always be a Guard upon him, except what you have put into his own Mind by good Principles, and established Habits, which is the best and surest, and therefore most to be taken Care of. " Eventually, parents had to win the respect and esteem of their children, and their other dependents, through reason, benevolence, and understanding. Parental imperiousness and severity only bred resent ment and servility among the children and made them unfit for the life of independent thinking adults. The ultimate goal, as Lord Chesterfield put it, was to make one's children "equals" and "friends." Affection rather than force was to bind parents and children together. "I never saw a froward child mended by whipping," said Chesterfield ."
But, of course, avoiding the whip had its own dangers. Parents, said John Witherspoon, president of the College of New Jersey (later Prince ton), in a typical work of the newage, Ltturs on Educaium (1765), were certainly not to use "a savage and barbarous method" of training their children such as had been common "in the former age." Yet, he warned, too much "persuasion and every soft and gentle method" of education could "lead to a relaxation" of authority. "There are some families, " said Witherspoon, "not contemptible either in station or character, in which the parents are literally ... obedient to their chil dren, " All of the literature prescribed a very thin line between arbitrar iness and permissiveness for parents and masters to walk in order to find "the best means of preserving authority and the way in which it ought to be daily exercised." "A middle is best," said Witherspoon.'·
Parents had "to establish as soon as possible, an entire and absolute authority" over their children. Yet at the same time they had to take "the utrnost care" so as "not to render authority cheap, by too often interposing it." They must maintain discipline, but not by fear or force. They ought to reason with their children and all their dependents; "it is not below any man to reason in some cases with his servants." But at the same time they were never "to depart" from their "right and title to command." They were to be "always cool," but not too cool: they were not to keep their children "at too great a distance by an uniform sternness and severity of carriage .' Children had to be made to obey, but that obedience was not unlimited or unequivocal; children
153 REPUBLICANISM15 2
had rights and individualities that had to be respected . Parents thus had to be caring and affectionate, but not too much so: they were not to indulge their children . "Nothing can be more weak and foolish, or more destructive of authority, than when children are noisy and in an i11 humor, to give them or promise them something to appease them ." lt was, said Witherspoon, simply a matter of "keeping to the just middle, without verging to one or another of the extremes. " '3
When even the advisers sometimes realized that their readers might think that "all this is excessive refinement , chimerical or impossible," it is not surprising that parents became unsure of thernselves." The ambivalent messages of the advice manuals and the pedagogica1 litera ture confused parents in the eighteenth century just as much as they do parents today . Anxiety was the burden of being an enlightened parent.
Perhaps no household more vividly iIluminates the problems of pa ternal authority in this enlightened age than that of the wealthy eighteenth-century Virginia planter Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall. Carter was a well-educated leader of one of Virginia's largest and most distinguished families, an important county magistrate , and a sometime member of the House of Burgesses. Although Carter's per sonality was anything but typical, the anxiety he experienced in rnain taining his authority within his household and plantation, however uniquely depicted in his remarkable diary, only epitomized the confu sions of authority elsewhere in the culture .
Carter shared the assumptions and values of many other eighteenth century gentlemen in the Anglo-American world, and he was very self-conscious about the liberal dictates of the culture . Like so many others in that enlightened age , he wanted to do the right thing both for hirnself and for those dependent on him . Self-improvement was in fact "the whole plan of my life. " In 1775, looking back at his sixty-five years, he characterized himself as a "sensible Gentleman , who has lived 10 an extreme age , preserving an unexceptionable character, as weil in his publick capacity as in his private life." Yet somehow his "unexception able character" was not enough to command the esteem of those be neath him-inc1uding not only several generations of his family living within his household but also the slaves and other dependents on his plantation .'5
His own kin were impossible . His elder son , the forty-year -old Rob ert Worme1ey Carter, was strangely disrespectful, impudent , and sulky, even though he knew "every moment that his all must corne from me ." H is other son, John, was little better, and his grandson, Robert Worme-
Enlightened Patemalism
ley's son, Landon, was "insufferable," "the most outrageous scoundrel that ever appeared in human shape." God knows he tried to be a good parent, but repeatedly his requests went unheeded, his orders unobeyed . The attitude of his children was: "can't you let us do as we will?" and this attitude was infectious, spreading to bis sons' friends and all "those entertained by me." lt was a good thing that "our laws prevent Parri eide," or his eIder son might "put his father out of the way ." Through out his life Carter had the unsettling feeling that he was not master in his own house."
For his grandson's shocking "filial behavior," Carter blamed the permissiveness of the boy's "temporizing" father . It was the temper of the age : "Nothing [isJ so common as to hear Parents say, 'to curb their children is to spoil their genius.' Everyone called Solomon 'barbarous' and 'a damned fool when he said spare the rod and spoil the child.' " But Carter himself was no different, toward either his own sons or his grandson. He tried reasoning with them; he threatened them with dis inheritance (had not Chesterfield used his will to control his heir' s be havior?); and at one point he even lashed his grandson with a whip in front of the boy's parents. But he never stood by his threats, and he repeatedly offset his displays of anger and violence by indulgence. In 1766, realizing that his grandson was "encouraged" by his parents "to insult me," he vowed to his diary to discontinue supporting the boy . "And I shall give notice.' ' But years later he was still making the sarne sorts of vows and threats to his sons and grandson and never carrying them out. After he had suffered from his son "really as much abuse as could be submitred to," the "monster" had the nerve to ask hirn "for a pair of Pumps to go to Colo. Taylor's in and like an old fool I gave him a pair of my own ." One time Carter "absolutely refused" to keep his grandson's horse, but on the very next day rescinded the refusal and "gave hirn to boot 2 dollars for his Pocket ." Another time he even forbade the boy to come into his home "any more whilst I lived." But the next day with "tears and contrition" and "a resolution to mend," the unruly youth was welcomed back."
And so it went with all Carter's dependents. He could not take the relationships with any of his subordinates for granted. He thought about them constantly, worrying about their respect or lack of respect for hirn and pondering ways to exact their deference and obedience. He fre quently got into unbecoming wrangles with his dependents, inc1uding his slaves, and then became angry when they spoke impudently or sar castically to hirn. "I will repay this treatment," he told his diary after I
I !l~ ,
IS4 REPUBLICANISM
one such incident with a slave; he called another slave "a most cursed Villain . " His slaves were never beneath his conternpt ; he had too many doubts about his authority for that. In fact, the real quest ion was whether he could in any degree rise above their contempt . He was continually anxious about their apparent lack of submissiveness . He tried persuad ing and pleading with them, and he threatened them. And sometimes in frustration he stripped and whipped them and tied them neck to heel all night. He sensed disrespect and disdain among all his dependents. After one young overseer disobeyed one of his orders , Carter actually got into a debate with hirn over the proper obligations a subordinate owed his superior. He even tried toimagine hirnself in the position of adependent and convinced hirnself that he would obey even if the rnas ter were wrang. "Oh the impudence of youth!" he said of his young overseer. "A gawky boy brought up and bound to me. 1 rear hirn to life and to business . In short, 1 make hirn a useful man to society and the first instance he walks alone , he is to teU me how to step." But so it went everywhere "through this part of the world . .. . Even children just cloathing are instructing their Parents. ",li
Even as a justice of the county court, Carter sensed a lack of def erence among those who should have respected hirn. Ouring an ex change of insults with an attorney in court, Carter in' frustration "intended to make use of my own Authority and order hirn to the stocks," but the rest of the court took "no notice of the behav iour ." Only after he had "immediately removed horne and resolved never more to go out the bench till I had satisfaction Publickly" was he able to extract a sufficient apology from the lawyer for his "ilI-behaviour." "I have been a slave to everybody in the County," Carter wrote of the bitter experience, " and yet without either Severity or arbitrariness in my behaviour, nor anything but aresolution to do my duty , 1 am the rnost insulted of any man in it. "'9
He tried to act with his inferiors in what he thought was an author itative and aristocratic manner-calm, distant, and superior-but this only made hirn seem ridiculous. When his children's sullen tutor acted mysteriously, Carter decided to disdain asking hirn about it. " I will forbear talking to hirn to let hirn see 1 despise hirn." When his son abused hirn in front of company for being a tyrant, " calling me Bassha for not letting everybody do as they pleased," Carter "avoided alter cation" by going off to his room and pouting. The next day his son goaded hirn before the guests by accusing hirn of running off the night before with the key to the wine cellar and preventing the party from
EnJigluenbf Paiemalism ISS
drinking. This "falsehood" was too much for Carter's pretended aloof ness; "it broke through my resolution of not speaking." The whole incident ended with everyone laughing at hirn. Was there not some duty a son owed a parent, he asked plaintively, some deference, "of which I never receive the least shew in any one instance. "20
The diary is 6lled with such pathetic complaints. Carter thought he was a good father, a kind master, a conscientious official. He was not brutal or arbitrary; he was everything the enlightened eighteenth cen tury said a good gentJeman should be-liberal and compassionate, full of "the Social Virtue of forgetting injuries . " Yet somehow his enlight ened compassion did not win him the honor and respect he yearned for. There must be something other "than internal goodness that goes into the Composition of esteem , " he wrote with poignant bewilderment in Ins, three years before his death. "It must be a Species of love not really merited but a passion that enslaves the mind without ... convic tion; because I am sensible that in my old Age no endeavour of mine has or does Attract it.' ' ..
Landon Carter was no ordinary person, and his is no ordinary di ary. Undoubtedly few parents and masters feIt as abused and unre spected as he, But Carter's experience was not unique: it exaggerated but did not misrepresent the confusions of the society." Other fathers fought with their sons, other masters quarreled with their servants, and other superiors worried about their relations with their subordinates. Already American youngsters had a reputation for being more unruly than children e1sewhere. Colonial children , British observers noted, were not "overawed by their parents. There is very little subordination ob served in their youth. Implicit obedience to old age is not among their qualifications , " In households up and down the North American con tinent, family relationships were changing, and in confused, unintended ways these changes were affecting the relationships of all superiors and subordinates."3
All political authority in the eighteenth century was still described in patemalistic terms. These terrns, however, were not those of the
' divine-right patriarchism made notorious by James I and Sir Robert Filmer a century earlier, To be sure, weIl into the eighteenth century,
' especially on the annual commemoration (january 30) of the execution of Charles "the Martyr" in 1649, tory high-church Anglicans and Jac obite orators and writers in England kept alive the idea that unlimited submission and nonresistance were the duty of all subjects to their rul ers , But since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the installation of the
REPUBLICANISM'56
Hanoverian monarchy in 1714 the doctrines of indefeasible hereditary succession and absolute patriarchism steadily lost their appeal in Eng land; in colonial America, where there were no tories to speak of (at least before the imperial crisis), such absolutist ideas scarcely existed
at all. The colonists might argue over the degrees of obedience owed by
subordinates to their superiors, but that such obedience was absolute and unconditional was hardly defensible in a liberty-Ioving whig dominated world . How would any supporters of the Hanoverian mon archy question the people's ultimate right of resistance and revolution? . Who, shrewdly asked the Boston rninister Jonathan Mayhew in 1750, could now dare to speak against the Revolution of 1688, "upon the justice of which depends (in part) his present MAJESTV'S right to the throne' '? For all his ßirting with Jacobitism and nostalgic toryism, even Lord Bolingbroke could dismiss ••the royal fatherhood of that ridiculous writer Filmer" as "a silly and slavish notion" and "one of the greatest absurdities that was ever committed to paper. ".+
Yet, absurd as Filmer's patriarchal absolutism had become, order, rank, and hierarchy were still as essential as ever, even to good whigs, and patemalism of one sort or another provided the principal image with which Englishmen described the nature of obedience to authority. Bolingbroke might ridicule Filmer, but he still believed that "the true image of a free people" remained "that of a patriarchical family, where the head and all the other members are united by one common interest, and animated by one common spirit ." The idea that fathers, kings, and all other superiors in the society could be arbitrary and absolute was all but dead, "constitutionally erased out of the political creed of every English subject, not in or fit for Bedlam, " said Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina in 1769; but the new, more enlightened, liberal pater nalism of the age-the kind of paternalisrn that had been set forth by Locke and other pedagogues-was still very much alive ."
Locke, of course, had not meant to identify patemal with political authority. In fact, in his Two Treaises of Gouemment he had sought to destroy Filmer's patriarchism by denying that any analogy between family and govemment was possible. Parental authority and political authority, said Locke, were distinct and separate and had different sources: one rested on nature, the other on trust or consent. The Fifth Commandment had no political significance. It was, wrote Locke, "an Etemal Law annex'd purely to the relations of Parents and Children, and so contains nothing of the Magistrates Power in it, nor is subjected
EnlighJened Paiemalism '57
to it." Despite extensive criticism of this sort by Locke and other whig publicists, however, the familial metaphor in govemment persisted. It was too much in accord with the realities of a monarchical and hierar chical society to be easily displaced. English society was still a gradation of degrees and ranks held together by ties that seemed to resemble those of the family or household more than those of any other institution. The very persistence with which whig intellectuals were compelled to attack the identity between familial and political authority testified to its stay ing power. Indeed, Filmer was invoked most often by whig critics pre cisely because he had been the most absolutist and most extreme of patriarchists and hence the easiest to discredit. Whig firebrands, like Bishop Benjamin Hoadly, continued to deny, as Locke had, that the king's office was "founded upon PalmltJl Authori~ properly so-called." Still, even Hoadly had to admit that it had undoubtedly become "a common thing ... to reduce, as we say, the Drdy of Sul!iectJ to the Injunctions laid upon Children.v'"
In the end patemalism could remain such a compelling way of ex plaining authority for eighteenth-century Englishmen only because of the momentous changes taking place in family relationships and in peo ple's attitudes toward parental authority. Once parents themselves be came limited monarchs, then even good whigs had no trouble in equating familial and political authority. Locke eventually did destroy Filmer's patriarchal absolutism-not, as he had intended, with the Ttoo Treaiises of Govtmmmt, but with Some Thoughts on Education and the new liberal ideas about the proper relation between parents and children it pro moted. Parental power was not absolute after all, and children had rights as weIl as obligations. Parents, it seemed, had to earn the respect and trust of their children, and in sorne sense the children as they grew actually came to consent to their parents' rule . In just this way did the Lockean image of a trusting relationship between caring parents and respectful children come to explain the new consensual relationship be tween rulers and subjects in the English-speaking world. Indeed, this new enlightened paternalisrn became what Jonathan Mayhew in rnid century called "an easy and familiar similitude" to describe the mutual duties and rights of all superiors and inferiors in the society."
This "easy and familiar similitude" meant, however, that all the ambiguity and anxiety infecting the new enlightened paternalism of the family could likewise be found in govemment and in all superior subordinate relationships. Just as parents were bewildered by the mass of literature that advised them to be enlightened and liberal in the rear
159 REPUBLICANlSM15 8
ing of their children and blamed them for any mistakes, so too were all rulers confused by a culture that stressed the rights and liberties of sub jects even more than their obligation to obey . In the English-speaking world of the eighteenth century, patemal authority at all levels could no
longer take itself for granted . Even the authority of the supreme father of all, GOO himself, was
not immune to challenge . In an enlightened age GOO could no longer be absolute and arbitrary. Religion, some now said, had to rest not only on faith and revelation but also on nature and reason. "He who would persuade a man or prevail with hirn to do anything," wrote Archbishop Tillotson, the most widely read sermon izer in America in the first half of the eighteenth century, ••must do it one of three ~ays, either by entreaty or authority or argument." And for a new liberal age reasoned argument was clearly the most preferable. It was " preposterous, " said Tillotson, "to entreat men to believe anything or to charge them to do so" before they were " convinced . . . by sufficient arguments that it is reasonable to do so." GOO , like any parent, had to earn the respect of his children , and he had to earn it through love and affection, not fear . GOO, declared Mayhew in 1']65, is "a compassionate Parent." As He is "father to all, so His government is parental, free from all unnecessary rigor.".a
In the thinking of many American Protestants, particularly among those gentry most susceptible to the new ideas of parenthood, Christ ;; and New Testament love replaced the earlier Puritan emphasis on the absolutism of the Old Testarnenr's Jehovah . Deists like Jefferson and Franklin went so far as to believe that the only thing worth keeping of the Christian faith was the Sermon on the Mount. Many of the theo- \ logical struggles of late-eighteenth-century America were cast in the same terms as the debates over parental child-raising. Did people need coer cion and the terror of eternal damnation by an absolute God to make them righteous? Was it only fear for their future existence that could " make people bow to a sovereign GOO? Or could people better be brought to humility and salvation through Christ's love and compassionj"?
Ir even God was losing his absolute right to rule, the position of all earthly rulers necessarily became less secure . In some measure all su- i periors in the Anglo-American world-whether parents, masters, or magistrates-came to share the confusion and uneasiness feit by Landon Carter in the exercise of authority. No one could be sure any Ionger when discipline ran into tyranny or liberty slid into licentiousness .
Enlighlmed PatmuJism
Because authority was not just limited but also responsible for the behavior of those it ruled, the burden of the relationship between su periors .and subordinates had shifted. Ir children were unruly and dis obedient , if the people balked at govemmental measures and rioted or rebelled, the fault more often than not now seemed to be with those in authority; for, as Witherspoon said of parents and their children, "that which begets esteern, will not fail to produce subjection." Badly behav ing children-"ill words and altercations . . . between parents and chil dren before company"-were "a sure sign that there is a defect of govemment at horne" and that the parents were not fulfilling their re sponsibilities . They were not lovingand caring enough. "People," said one Virginian minister, "are very apt to judge of the principles of the master, by the general behaviour of the servants." Just as children never repeatedly defied kind and reasonable parents, subjects would never rebel for light and transient causes .•• All History ShOWS,'1 said the influ ential Boston preacher Samuel Cooper, "that it is no easy Matter to excite a large People into any vigorous and continued opposition to the Government they have been long habituated to respect and obey. Noth ing can bring them to this, but a clear Conviction and strong Feeling of some real and important Injury... . This is so true, that I am per suaded it will not be easy to produce an Instance of any State agitated with long and great Commotions, without some violent and continued Pressure from the Side of Government. The Waves do not rise till the Wind blows. "30
Against these kinds of enlightened currents traditional patriarchal authority could scarce1y malte any headway . By the time of the imperial crisis those who remained loyal to the patemal role of the British crown over the colonies found themselves in an impossible situation. Once Thomas Bradbury Chandler, high Anglican churchman of New Jersey, raised the question "whether Greal Britain bears not a relation to these colonies, similar to that of parent tochildren," he conjured up an image that ultimately could only work against hirn and the cause of monar chical authority . After all, in that enlightened age parents were far more responsible than children for the harmony of the familial relationship and even the most extreme whigs were quite willing as late as In3 to invoke the parental analogy in defense of colonial rights. Talk as they might of the colonists' childlike "ingratitude" to the mother country and the fatherly king, the tories in the liberal atmosphere of pre revolutionary America could not turn paternalism to their advantage.
161 REPUBLICANISM160
In the end Chandler was reduced to asking "whether some degree of respect is not always due from inferiors to superiors"-a pitiful question a traditional society should never have had to ask."
Perhaps the most revealing and poignant example of paternalism being turned inside out during the years leading up to the Revolution was the bewildering experience of Thomas Hutchinson, a prominent colonial magistrate and royal governor of Massachusetts Bay during the crisis over the Tea Party. Although Hutchinson was learned and refined and one of the most distinguished men in all of eighteenth-century North America, by the early 1770S he had become one of its most hated. He was denounced and his effigy was burned up and down the continent. He was saddened and stunned . He feit it "grievous to be vilified & reproached by so great a party of the people," particularly to be vi ciously accused for failing to be what he had always prided hirnself on being: "father of his people ." He had devoted his life to public service; even John Eliot, who did not like hirn, once conceded that Hutchinson "upon all occasions seemed to be influenced by public spirit more than selfish considerations. " He was the most caring and affectionate of par ents; indeed, "love of family and horne," claims one of his biographers, was his "most notable personal characteristic." Just as he was the most loving of parents, so too did he see hirnself as the most benevolent of magistrates, governing not by force but by the respect and esteem of those he governed. He believed in benevolent paternalism . He especially valued his position as judge of the probate court, for it gave hirn "so much Pleasure to relieve the Widow & fatherless" that he said he would "rather resign my other Offices and discharge this alone without Fees or Reward ." He regarded hirnself as a "patron" of the poor; he cared for the exiled Acadians in the 1750S as few other Massachusetts officials did; and, unlike other senior judicial officials in the colony, he never browbeat young attorneys.3'
Hutchinson seemed to ep itomize eighteenth-century enlightened val ues. He read Locke ontoleration, supported the Baptists in Congrega tional Massachusetts, and struck out at "blind bigotry" of all sorts . He always tried to be fair and moderate in his opinions and courteous ro opponents. He was all that an up-to-date liberal and genteeI parent and ruler ought to be. " T he more favor you shew the colonists in freeing them from taxes of every sort , and indulging them in such forms of constitution civil and ecclesiastical as they have been used to," he told the colony's agent in Great Britain in 1769, "the more agreeable it will be to me." He was never happy exercising authority and he was never
Enlightened Patemalism
a tory at heart, Even Jonathan Mayhew adrnitted that Hutchinson ex pressed hirnself just as strongly in favor of civil and religious liberty as Mayhew himself did. Hutchinson repeatedly urged the British govern ment to treat the colonists with moderation, and he protested that Brit ain's closing of the port of Boston in 1774 was excessively severe. He promised "never [to] make any Encroachment upon the Rights of the People." Although he could be a spiteful paternalist, as his behavior in the tea dispure suggests, he always prided hirnself on his reasonableness. He feit that any resort to force created more problems than it solved, lf anyone had attempted to find a "just middle," he had . He constantly sought to walk thin lines, to make delicate distinctions between power and liberty. He knew he had tried to be a good and enlightened father tohis people . "I am charged with arbitrary principles," he said in 1775, "but I am 1IO far from them as any man in the world and never wished for a greater restraint of natural liberty than is necessary to answer the end of government. "33
But in the face of an angry whig world, which men like Hutchinson never understood, these reasoned and refined niceties conceded the case for liberty at the outset and could do nothing to bolster authority . Evi dence of the arbitrariness of royal officials like Hutchinson lay in the people's very anger and turbulence: royal magistrates had simply lost the people's confidence; for when the people "see their rulers actuated by principles of benevolence and a love of justice they need little eise, than this confidence, to secure their obedience." The entire obligation for obedience now seemed to rest on authority , on those who were to be obeyed. Indeed, so inherently weak, so intrinsically liberal, had tra ditional paternal authority become in American culture that by 1775 the Maryland preacher Jonathan Boucher came to believe that if order in America were to be defended at all, there was no alternative except to return to something resembling the archaic doctrines of Filmer's divine right patriarchy . "The first father," said Boucher, "was the first king : and ... it was thus that all government originated; and monarchy is its most ancient form." Since kings, magistrates, masters, and all su periors received their authority not from below but from God, the duty of all subjects and subordinates was simple: "to be quiä and to sit still. " That Boucher found it necessary to bypass not only Locke's Two Treatises but even his Thoughts on Education and to go all the way back to patriar chical absolutism was the ultimate symptom of the loyalists' plight. 34
This liberalization of paternal authority spilled out to affect all eco nomic and social relations. And precisely because American society was
'0' o._._.__~""""=~........"..,.. "'-~ .... =
163 REPUBLICAN1SM162
so economically primitive and so personally organized compared with England, the effects of this liberalization on relationships were greater in the colonies than in the mother country. The colonists had continued to think of their social and economic relations primarily in terms of the household rather than a market society and to treat them as sets of mutual rights and obligations between superiors and subordinates who were members of the same patriarchal household. Thus the colonists tried to grapple with the changes taking place in their lives almost solely in terms of their traditional personal relationships-perhaps most c1early revealed in the way in which they blended their enlightened paternalism into the new meaning they gave to contracts .
Traditionally contracts did not mean what they were coming 10 mean in the commercialized eighteenth century . In the past contracts had often been used in patriarchal relationships-between husbands and wives, masters and apprentices, or rnasters and servants-and they were not thought to be incompatible with hierarchy and inequality. These contracts were regarded as evidence that the parties to the relationship. however unequal, had mutual rights and obligations established in cus tom , Such patriarchal contracts did not create these rights and obliga tions; they merely recognized their existence . Often the contracts were informal and not written out, as befitting their entanglement in the meshwork of society, The rights and obligations of the contracts were not necessarily the result of deliberate acts of will, nor did the parties even have to consent mutually to the contracts for them to be binding. Such contacts defined relationships between people rather than specific
promises of action.P But increasingly in the commercialized eighteenth century contracts
became much more voluntary, explicit , and consensual, much less de claratory of previously existing rights and duties and much more the consequence of conscious acts of will. lnstead of defining social relation ships, they now focused on individual transactions . Contracts for ap prenticeship, for example, became more formal and more explicit , with obligations specified in greater detail and rranslated into monetary value . Contracts carne 10 be thought of as positive bargains deliberately and freely entered into between two parties who were presumed to be equal and not entirely trustful of one another. Such formal written conrracrs made sense in the emerging commercial world .36
The new conception of contract as a consensual bargain between two equal parties was a consequence of changes in a11 traditional rela tionships between superiors and inferiors, even those between parents
En/ighlmed Patmudism
and children, Not only was it now thought that children tacitly assented to their parents' authority, but as children grew into adulthood they were considered to be independent equals of their parents. By the mid eighteenth century the parent-ebild relationship seemed to be so condi tional, so much a matter of mutual consent, as to become something akin to a voluntary contract. Had not Chesterfield in fact described the parent-child relationship evolving into "contracts" of friendship that were based on a recognition of the "reciprocaJ merit" of the two parties?37
By mid-century, positive written contracts and other impersonal le gal instruments were more and more replacing the informal, customary, and personal ways people had arranged their affairs with one another. New Englanders in particular were used to thinking of patriarchal re lationships in contractual terms. They had, after all, a long Puritan tradition of covenants-between the people and God, between members of congregations and their rninisters, and between members of the same community. To the Puritans even marriage was more of a contractual relationship than it was to other religious groups. New England Puritans of all sorts valued "the liberty" they had "of choosing, or consenting, to their own pastor, to whom they commit care of their souls." And if their pastor did not care for their souls, they had "a natural right" to dissolve the relationship. That these New Englanders therefore would come to think of the most severe superior-subordinate relationships as only deJiberate and positive bargains between two parties is perhaps not surprising. But it certainly was to the British army when thousands of New England's young men joined its war against the French in America.38
During the Seven Years ' War in the 1750s Lord Loudoun, com mander in chief of the British forces in America, was confronted with what seemed to him astonishing disobedience by the New England mi litia under his authority. When Loudoun attempted to get the various New England militia to serve with regular royal troops, the New En gland soldiers simply refused to obey. They refused on the grounds that joint service with royal troops had not been part of the contractual agreements they had made when they enlisted in the militia expeditions. And their militia officers and even their colonial civilian superiors agreed with them! In 1756 Governor Thomas Fitch of Connecticut tried to ex plain the situation to a bewildered and angry Loudoun. The troops, Fitch said, had to be "continued under the same Command and Ern ployed agreeable to the Design of their Enlistments, otherwise the Con
165 REPUBLICANISM16 4
tract between them and their constituents made for promoting his Majesty's service in this particular may be broken and their Rights violated. "
To Loudoun this sort of explanation was as bad as the troops' dis obedience. Reared in the hierarchical military tradition of a1legiance, duty, and subordination, Loudoun simply could not comprehend what the New Englanders were talking about . Bargains and contracts be longed in a counting room, not on a battlefield , But for New England ers, contracts were part of their ordinary everyday lives. They were used to making bargains, and they treated their enlistment in the militia expeditions as just another bargain. That Britain was fighting a great war, a world war, for empire-was fighting even for the colonists ' own security-was somehow lost on them . They had made agreements with their enlisting officers in which they were promised bounties and pro visions in return for their services. And when their contracts were vio lated-as they were when they did not receive what they thought was coming to them or when Loudoun tried to merge the militia with royal regulars-they considered their agreements void, and they mutinied or deserted, sometimes heading for horne in groups of dozens or even hundreds.J9
The remarkable behavior of these militiamen reveals the peculiar nature of American social relat ions on the eve of the Revolution , at least in New England. The common New England soldiers lived in linle awe of their officers. Indeed, the contractual relationship now often pre sumed an equality and a degree of suspicion between the parties . The soldiers certainly had little sense that obedience and loyalty to their superiors flowed from anything other than their voluntary contracts, Authority, even the patemal authority and majesty of the crown , com manded little natural respect . Allegiance was becoming a mere business arrangement , a coincidence of interests.
This contractual imagery mingled with and colored all paternal and all superior-subordinate relationships , including those between the crown and the colonies . lndeed, contractual imagery that emphasized the per sonal character of the subject's relation to state power was much more a1ive in America than it was in the mother country, where parliamentary sovereignty was swallowing up the ancient notions of contract and nat ural rights. Since the colonists were just beginning to feel the commer cial revolution that was transforming English society, they were more apt to see their relationship to the state as being similar to their rela tionships with each other. Thus it was natural for Americans to turn
Enlightened Patemalism
their familial relationship to the crown into a contractual one, for this merely substituted one personal relationship for another; 'but this sub stitution also made it easier for them to take the awful step of rebelling against their own parents.
In the decades leading up to the Revolution scarcely a piece of American writing, whig or tory, did not invoke the parent-ebild image to describe the imperial relationship. The king was the "father" and Great Britain was the "mother country" and the colonists were their "children." Because the image was so powerful, so suggestive of the personal traditional world in which most colonists still lived, almost the entire imperial debate was inevitably carried on within its confines . At times the polemies between whigs and tories appeared to be little more than a quarrel over the proper method of child-rearing, Whigs argued that Britain was an unnatural parent, cruel and unfeeling in her harsh treatrnent of her children. "Where is maternal affection?" asked John Dickinson. In reply the tories accused the colonists of being insolent and ungrateful brats and demanded to know "whether any parent can put up with such disrespectful and abusive treatment from children, as Great Britain has lately received from her colonies. " The whole imperial strug gle collapsed into a family squabble.t"
The whigs, of course, invoked the latest, most enlightened thinking about the parent-ebild relationship: that parents with unruly children had only themselves to bIarne . But for children and subordinates to disobey their fathers and masters in this still traditional world was so terrifying and unnatural that whigs inevitably resorted to the image of a contract in order to explain the imperial relationship and to justify their sense of equality and their rebeIIiousness. The crown had its an cient rights, its prerogatives-those vague and discretionary rights of authority that the king possessed in order to carry out his responsibility for governing the realm; but the people had their rights and liberties too, and they were just as old and just as important as the rights of the crown . Indeed, Englishmen described their history essentially as a centuries-long struggle between these conflicting rights, with the nego tiating and bargaining between them resulting in the original contracts of government.
Thus the colonists, the whig polemicists said in the InOS, were not just children whose affection for the parent state was being worn away by brutal treatment; they were also parties to contracts, deliberative agreements, legal or mercantile in character, between people and rulers in which a11egiance and protection were the considerations . "Alle
167 • 166 REPUBLICANISM giance," wroteJames Wilson in 1774, " is the faith and obedience, which every subject owes to his prince . This obedience is founded on the pro tection derived from government: for proteenon and allegiance are the reciprocal bonds, which connect the prince and his subjects." Not only did this contractual imagery explain the people 's obedience to the pre rogative powers of the king (which their consent expressed in their rep resentative legislatures could never do), but eventually the notion of an original contract between crown and people also rnade sense of the col onists' developing view in 1774 that they were connected to Great Britain exclusively through the king, "Parliament " being "no party to the transaction ." Their several charters (or where these were lacking "their commissions to their governors have ever been considered as equivalent securities") were now seen as "evidence of a private bargain made and executed between the King of England and our predecessors, to which the [Brirish] nation were total strangers, and are so still, however they have in some instances strangely intermeddled." Such charters, like all contracts, were designed "to reduce to a certainty the rights and privi leges we were entitled to" and "ro point out and circumscribe the pre rogatives of the crown ." How would the sprawling British empire be held together? The king, said Alexander Hamilton in a common con clusion, would be "the great connecting principle, ,,+,
As feelings between the antagonists hardened, the modern contrac tual image tended to swallow up the traditional patriarchal idea of authority. It was as if paternalism became so liberal, so republicanized, as to surrender itself willingly tu modern legal contractualism. If the empire and the colonial governments were still thought of as enlarged families, they had becorne remarkably artificialand voluntary ones . In the subtle, often unintended ways that the colonists prepared themselves for republicanism, some whigs now even c1aimed that there was no essential difference between hereditary and elective rnagistrates: both could be "fathers " to their people and still have their patriarchal au thority rest on the consent of the people . Allegiance, which had once denoted the loyalty of an inferior to a superior, now became virtually indistinguishable from consent. Most colonists dung confusedly to the traditional patriarchal images of the king as "father" and Great Britain as the "mother country" while asserting with great vehemence that their relationship to the British crown was solely contractual, liable to be broken if the considerations were not fulfiJledY
All this legal talk of businesslike contracts and conditional promises left little room for natural patemal or filial feelings. Some who saw this
:,
'
. ';
"
Enlighlentd PatmuJism
were quick to draw out the anti-familial implications of a contractual relationship. When the arch-tory Martin Howard, Jr., of Rhode Island noted in despair that the colonies' relation to Great Britain was not really that of children to parent, as the whig Stephen Hopkins had sug gested, Hopkins was quick to agree; for paternalism, even enlightened paternalism, smacked too much of hereditary dependence for good whigs to be ultimately comfortable with it as a description of the imperial relationship . "There may be a natural relation between two subjects that exists by nature," said Hopkins, "but the mother country and colony exist only by policy, and may no doubt have a political relation to each other; but can have no natural one. "43
Others, too, in these years broke through the familial imagery and even contractual imagery to confront the ultimate logic of modern whig thinking. Govemment, wrote Benjamin Franklin, resembled a business company, and rulers were just "Directors" hired by the owners to carry out their wishes. "They are paid a Reasonable Consideration for their trouble." In such a relationship there "is nothing of weak and streng, Proteetion on the one hand, and Service on the other." These "Direc tors are the Servants, not the Masters" and "the Power they have is from the members & returns to them." Franklin was going further than most whigs dared go in public (even his thoughts were just marginal comments on a British pamphlet). But when even some tories Iike Jon athan Sewell conceded that govemment was "an amJicial state of pre mainmee and subordination" that .. in faet, and in the nature of things must be, volwttary, " it is not surprising that whig principles dominated the pre revolutionary debates. Government was now being widely pictured as merely a legal man-rnade contrivance having little if any natural rela tionship to the family or to society. 44
The conclusions were momentous and forbidding, and most colo nists were reluctant to reach them. They repeatedly touched on the awesome questions their arguments were raising but never faced them directly. What would this separation of govemment from nature and from the natural inequalities of society ultimately mean? Would people respect rulers who were not God or their fathers or their masters, who had no visible sacredness or awesomeness, who had no inherent patri archal authority? Was submission to be without emotion, merely a mat ter of utiJity? Were people to yield to rolers "not on account of their persons considered exclusively on the authority they are c10thed with, but [onlyon account] ofthose laws which in the exercise ofthis authority are made by them conformably to the laws of nature and equity"? Did
168 REPUBLICANISM
the injunction to obey laws and not men really mean that the dignity and natural social standing of men no longer mattered in government? Were kings really " the servants and not the proprietors of the people ," asJefferson asserted in 1774? It was true that rulers were " exalted above their brethren not for their own sakes but for the benefit of the people. " But did this mean that rulers were not to be "great men," perhaps not even to be gentlemen? Were rulers really " of the same species . . . and by nature equal" with those they ruled? And do they "greatly tarnish their dignity when they atternpt to treat their subjects otherwise than as their fellow-men ' ?45
These were questions implied but not followed up, suggestions thrown out in the heat of polemics, momentary and sometimes desperate efforts to bridge some of the awful chasm that had traditionally existed between superiors and subordinates, rulers and ruled. But few as yet were willing to draw out fully the significance of the incongruous belief that rulers and masters were servants and that children controlled their parents,
Even the most revolutionary could not shake off the familial imagery of the past . In 1776 in Common Senst Thomas Paine tried to clear the air of the " ancient prejudices " that supported hereditary monarchy and all that it implied in patriarchy and family government. Paine rejected out right the whole idea of dynastic monarchy ; the king of England was a "royal brute," a "wretch . . . with the pretended title of Father of His People ." " T he phrase parmt or mother country hath been jesuitically adopted by the king and his parasites, with a low papistical design of gaining an unfair bias on the credulous weakness of our minds." Yet only a year later Paine could find no better means to explain and justify the Revolution than to dredge up once again the familiar parent-ebild metaphor that he had presumably laid to rest . The colonists had simply grown up and come of age. "To know whether it be the interest of the continent to be independent ," he wrote, "we need only ask this easy, simple question: Is it the interest of a man to be a boy all his life?" It was testimony to the lingering power of the old monarchica1 assumptions that Paine in 1777 should have still feit compelled to put the issue in these familial terms.t''
• Revolution 169 10. Revolution
The Revolution brought to the surface the republican tendencies of American life. The "Suddenness" of the change from monarchy to re publicanism was "astonishing." "Idolatry to Monarchs, and servility to Aristocratica1 Pride," said John Adams in the summer of 1776, "was never so totally eradicated from so many Minds in so short a Time." Probably Adams should not have been astonished, for the truncated nature of American society with its high proportion of freeholders seemed naturally made for republicanism. Yet adopting repuölicanism was not simply a matter of bringing American culture more into line with the society. It meant as weil an opportunity to abolish what remained of monarchy and to create once and for all new, enlightened republican relationships among people.'
Such a change marked a real and radica1 revolution, a change of society , not just of government. People were to be "changed," said the South Carolina physician and historian David Ramsay, "from subjects to citizens," and "the difference is immense. Subject is derived from the latin words, sub and jado, and means one who is under the power of another; but a citizen is an unit of a mass of free people , who, collec tively, possess sovereignty. Subjects look up to a master, but citizens are so far equal, that none have hereditary rights superior to others, Each citizen of a free state contains, within hirnself, by nature and the constitution, as much of the common sovereignty as another.' " Such a republican society assumed very different sorts of human relationships from that of a monarchy .
By the late 1']605 and early 17705 a potentially revolutionary situation existed in many of the colonies. There was little evidence of those social conditions we often associate with revolution (and some historians have desperately sought to find): no mass poverty, no seething social discon tent, no grinding oppression. For most white Americans there was greater prosperity than anywhere else in the world ; in fact, the experi ence of that growing prosperity contributed to the unprecedented eighteenth-century sense that people here and now were capable of or dering their own reality. Consequently, there was a great deal of jeal ousy and touchiness everywhere, for what could be made could be unmade; the people were acutely nervous about their prosperity and the liberty that seemed to make it possible. With the erosion of much of
• REPUBLICANISM17° what remained of traditional social relationships, more and more indi viduals had broken away from their families, communities, and patrons and were experiencing the anxiety of freedom and independence. Social changes , particularly since the 1740s, multiplied rapidly, and many Americans struggled to make sense of what was happening. These social changes were complicated, and they are easily misinterpreted. Luxury and conspicuous consumption by very ordinary people were increasing. So, too, was religious dissent of a1l sorts. The rich became richer, and aristocratic gentry everywhere became more conspicuous and self conscious; and the numbers of poor in some cities and the numbers of landles~ in some areas increased. But social classes based on occupation or wealth did not set themselves against one another, for no classes in this modem sense yet existed . The society was becoming more unequal, but its inequalities were not the source of the instability and anxiety. Indeed, it was the pervasive equality of American society that was caus ing the problems-even in aristocratic South Carolina.
Perhaps the society of no colony was more unequal, more riven by discrepancies of rich and poor, more dominated by an ostentatious ar istocracy than that of South Carolina. "Stare and magnificence, the natural attendants on great riches, are conspicuous among this people, " declared a wide-eyed New England visitor in 1773. "In grandeur, splen dour of buildings, decorations, equipage, numbers, commerce, ship ping, and indeed in almost everything, it far surpasses all lever saw, or ever expect to see in America." Yet, surprisingly, in the opinion of Carolinian Christopher Gadsden, society in his colony was most re markable, not for its inequality, but for its equality, for the prevalence in it of substantial hardworking farmers and artisans-that is, of a11 those who "depend, alrnost , altogether upon their own daily labour and industry, for the maintenance ofthemselves and families,"These honest industrious white folk were extraordinarily prosperous. Even "the poor est of them (unless some very uncommon instances indeed) but must find hirnself, in a very comfortable situation, especially when he corn pares his condition, with that of the poor of other nations, " or, Gadsden might have added, with that of the black slaves in their own midst, The result, said Gadsden, was that white society in South Carolina was com paratively equal , "the distinctions . .. between the farmer and rich planter, the mechanic and the rich merchant, being abundantly more here, in imagination, than reality ."
Yet because such equality and prosperity were so unusual in the Western world, they could not be taken for granred . The idea of labor,
Revolutwn 171
of hard work, leading to increased productivity was so novel, so radical, in the overall span of Western history that most ordinary people, most of those who labored, could scarcely believe what was happening to them. Labor had been so long thought to be the natural and inevitable consequence of necessity and poverty that most people still associated it with slavery and servitude, Therefore any possibility of oppression, any threat to the colonists' hard-eamed prosperity, any hint of reducing them to the poverty of other nations, was especially frightening; for it seemed likely to slide them back into the traditional status of servants or slaves, into the older world where labor was merely a painful neces sity and not a source of prosperity. "The very apprehension thereof, eannot but cause extreme uneasiness." "No wonder," said Gadsden, "that throughout Ameriul, we find these men extremely anxious and attentive, to the cause of liberty." These hardworking fanners and me chanics were extraordinarily free and weH off and had much to lose, and "this, therefore, naturally accounts for these people, in particular, being so united and steady, everywhere," in support of their liberties against British oppression.!
In al1 the colonies in the l700s and '77os the circumstances were similar. The absence of a traditional European nobility and a sprawling mass of the destitute made everyone seem much more alike. At present , wroteJohn Adams, in '']61, "al1 Persons under the Degree ofGentlemen are styled Yeoman, " including even laborers and those "who never owned an Inch of ground in their Lives." The lack of the customary degrees of distinction and deference was what British visitors to the colonies meant when they said that .. an idea of equality . . . seems general1y to prevail, and the inferior order of people pay but little ex ternal respect to those who occupy superior stations.' Equality did not mean that everyone was in fact the same, but only that ordinary people were closer in wealth and property to those above them and feIt freer from aristocratic patronage and control than did common people else where in the Western world. And they were ready, as Edmund Burke said, to "snufftyranny in every tainted breeze" ; and as Orange County, North Carolina, stated in InO in a common phrase that captured the colonists' sense of the high stakes involved in their politics, they were willing "to risque our All to save our Country from Rapine and Slavery ." • .
This extraordinary touchiness, this tendency of the colonists in their politica1 disputes to argue "with such vehemence as if a11 had been at Stake," ftowed from the precariousness of American society, from its
173 REPUBLICANISM172
incomplete and relatively ftattened character, and from the often "rapid ascendency" of its aristocracy, particularly in the Deep South, where families "in less than ten years have risen from the lowest rank, have acquired upward of noo,ooo and have, moreover, gained this wealth in a simple and easy manner. " Men who had quickly risen to the top were confident and aggressive but also vulnerable to challenge, espe cially sensitive over their liberty and independence, and unwilling to brook any interference with their status or their prospecrs.t
For other, more ordinary colonists the promises and uncertainties of American life were equally strong. Take, for example, the lifelong strug gle of fanner and sawmill owner Moses Cooper of Glocester, Rhode Island, to rise from virtual insignificance to become the richest man in the town. In 1']67-68, at the age of sixty, Cooper was finally able to hire sufficient slaves and workers to do all his manual labor; he became a gentleman and justice of the peace and appended "Esq." to his narne. Certainly by this date he could respond to the rhetoric of his fellow Rhode Islanders talking about their colony as •'the promised land ... aland of milk and honey and wherein we eat bread to the full . . . a land whose stones are iron . . . and . . . other choice mines and min erals; and aland whose rivers and adjacent seas are stored with the best of fish." And Cooper might weil have added, "whose forests were rich with timber," for he had made his money from lumber. Yet at the same time Cooper knew only too weH the precariousness of his wealth and position and naturally feared what Britain's rnercantile restrictions might mean for his lumber sales to the West Indies. Wh at had risen so high could as readily fall: not surprisingly, he became an enthusiastic patriot leader of his tiny town of Glocester. Muhiply Cooper's experience of uneasy prosperity many thousandfold and we have the stuff of a popular revolutionary movernent. 6
America was no doubt " the best poor Man's Country in the World. "7 But the general well-being and equality of the society set against the gross inequality and flagrant harshness of both white servi tude and especially black slavery made many people unusually sensitive to all the various dependencies and subordinations that still lurked ev erywhere in their lives. Thus in 1']65 at the outset of the imperial crisis John Adams's fearful and seemingly anachronistic invocation of an older feudal world of "servants and vassals" holding "rheir lands, by a va riety of duties and services . . . in a state of servile dependence on their lords," could at once arouse the colonists' anxieties over the potential ities, however inchoate and rernote, of adependent world in their own
• RevoiuJion rnidst. They repeatedly put into words their widespread sense that very little stood between their prosperous freedom and out-and-our oppres sion. Indeed, they told themselves over and over that if ever they should agree to a parliamentary tax or allow their colonial assemblies to be silenced, "nothing will remain to us but a dredful expectation of certain slavery." The tenants of one of the New York landlords may have seemed to the landlord's agent to be "silly people" by their resisting a simple extension of the services required of thern out of "fear [of] draw ing their Posterity into Bondage," but they knew the reality of the eighteenth-century world. They knew the lot of ordinary people else where, and they knew especially the lot of white and black dependents in their own society, and thus they could readily respond to images of being driven "like draft oxen ," of being "made to serve as bond ser vants," or of foolishly sitting "quietly in expectation of a m[aste]r's promise for the recovery of [their]liberty." The immense changes oc curring everywhere in their Personal and social relationships-the loos- , ening and severing of the hierarchical ties of kinship and patronage that were carrying thern into modernity-only increased their suspicions and apprehensions. For they could not know then what direction the future was taking.8
By the middle of the century these social changes were being ex pressed in politics. Americans everywhere complained of "a Scramble for Wealth and Power" by men of "worldly Spirits." Indeed, there were by the early I']60S "so many jarring and opposite Interests and Systems" that no one in authority could relax, no magistrate, no ruler, could long remain unchallenged. More and more ordinary people were participating in electoral politics, and in many of the colonies the nurn ber of contesred elections for assembly seats markedly increased. This expansion of popular politics originated not because the mass of people pressed upward from below with new demands but because competing gentry, for their own parochial and tactical purposes , courred the people and bid for their support by invoking popular whig rhetoric. Opposition factions in the colonial assemblies made repeated appeals to the people as counterweights to the use of royal authority by the governors, espe cially as the older personal avenues of appeal over the heads of the governors to interests in England became clogged and unusable. But popular principles and popular participation in politics, once aroused, could not be easily put down; and by the eve of the Revolution, without anyone's intending or even being clearly aware of what was happening, traditional monarchical ways of goveming through kin and patronage
REPUBLICANlSM174
were transformed under the impact of the imperial crisis.? "Family Interests, " like the Livingstons and Oe Lanceys in New York, or the Pinckneys and Leighs of South Carolina, observed one prescient British official in In6, "have been long in a gradual Decay; and perhaps a new arrangement of political affairs may leave them wholly extinct." Those who were used to seeing politics as essentially a squabble among gentle men were bewildered by the "strange metamorphosis or other" that was taking place."
With the weakening of family connections and the further fragrnen tat ion of colonial interests, crown offleials and other conservatives made strenuous efforts to lessen popular participation in politics and to control the "democratic" part of the colonists' rnixed constitutions. Some royal govemors atternpted to restriet the expansion of popular representation in the assemblies, to limit the meetings of the assemblies, and to veto the laws passed by the assemblies. Other officials toyed with plans for remodeling the colonial governments, for making the salaries of royal officials independent of the colonial legislatures, and for strengthening the royal councils or upper houses in the legislatures . Some even sug gested introducing a titled nobility into Amer ica in order to stabilize colonial society. But most royal officials relied on whatever traditional monarchical instruments of pclitical patronage and inftuence they had available to them to curb popular disorder and popular pressure-using intricate maneuvering and personal manipulation of irnportant men in place of whig and republican appeals to the people.
After 1']63 all these efforts became hopelessly entangled in the British government's attempts to reform its awkwardly structured empire and to extract revenue from the colonists. All parts of British policy came together to threaten each colonist's expanding republican expectations of iiberty and independence. In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 1760s and 177os, all the imperial efforts at reform seemed to be an evil extension of what was destroying liberty in England itself. Through the manipulation of puppets or placemen in the House of Commons, the crown-since 1']60 in the hands of a new young king, George 111 was sapping the strength of popular representation in Parliament and unbalancing the English constitution . Events seemed to show that the crown, with the aid of a pliant Parliament , was trying to reach across the Atlantic to corrupt Americans in the same way."
Arnericans steeped in the radical whig and republican ideology of opposition to the court regarded these monarchical techniques of per sonal inftuence and patronage as "corruption," as attempts by great
Rtvolution 175
men and their power-hungry minions to promote their private interests at the expense of the public good and to destroy the colonists' balanced constitutions and their popular liberty. This corruption had created pockets of royal inftuence throughout America and had made the crown itself, said John Adams, nothing but a "private interest, " Such corrup tion had tumed the colonies into a dumping ground for worthless place seekers from Britain, "strangers ignoranJ of the interests and laws of the Colonies . . . sent over," complained William Henry Drayton of South Carolina, "to 611 offices of 200{ or 300{ per annum, as their only sub sistence in life." Americans were wamed that they could no Ionger trust those "who either hold or expect to hold certain advantages by setting examples of servility to their countrymen." Men who themselves were tied to patrons simply "serve as decoys, for drawing the innocent and unwary into snares.' '12 Such corruption had allowed even distinguished Americans like Thomas Hutchinson and his clan in Massachusetts to pile up offices to the exclusion of those who John Adams and James Otis felt were better men. The hatred of Hutehinsen was so great that sometimes it could scarcely be contained. "Good God!" declaredJosiah Quincy in 1770. "What must be the distress, the sentiments, and feelings of a people, legislated, condemned and govemed, by a creature so mer cenary, so dependent, and so-but I forbear: my anguish is too exqui site-my heart is too fuH!" The term "pensioner," Hutchinson ruefully noted, was one "which among Americans conveys a very odious Idea. "'3
By adopting the language of the radical whig opposition and by attacking the monarchical abuse of family inftuence and patronage, however, the American revolutionaries were not simply expressing their resentment of corrupt political practices that had denied some of them the highest offices of colonial govemment. They actually were tearing ar the bonds holding the traditional monarchical society together. Their assault necessarily was as much social as it was political.
But this social assault was not the sort we are used to today in describing revolutions. The great social antagonists of the American Revolution were not poor vs. rich, workers vs. employers, or even dem ocrats vs, aristocrats, They were patriots vs. courtiers-categories ap propriate to the monarchical world in which the colonists had been reared. Courtiers were persons whose position or rank came artificially from above-from hereditary or personal connections that ultimately ftowed from the crown or court. Courtiers, saidJohn Adams, were those who applied themselves "to the Passions and Prejudices, the Follies and Vices of Great Men in order to obtain their Smiles, Esteern, and Pa
p 17 6 REPUBLICANISM
tronage and consequently their favors and Preferments." Patriots, on the other hand, were those who not only loved their country but were free of dependent connections and inßuence; their posit ion or rank came naturally from their talent and from below, from recognition by the people . "A real patriot," dedared one American in 1716, was "the most ilIustrious character in human life. Is not the interest and happiness of his fellow creatures his care?"'4
Only by understanding the hierarchical structure of monarchical so ciety and taking the patriots' assault on courtiers seriously can we begin to appreciate the significance of the displacement of the loyalists-that is, of those who maintained their allegiance to the British crown . The loyalists may have numbered close to half a million, or 20 percent of white Americans. As many as 80,000 of them are estimated to have left the thirteen colonies during the American Revolution , over six times as many emigres per 1,000 of population as ßed France during the French Revolurion.s Although many of these American emigres, unlike the French emigres, did not have to abandon their nation and could remain as much British subjects in Canada or the West Indies or Britain itself as they had been in one of the thirteen colonies , nevertheless, the erni gration of the loyalists had significant effects on American society .
It was not how many loyalists who were displaced that was impor ranr; it was who they were. A disproportionate number of them were well-tö-de gentry operaring at the pinnacles of power and patronage royal or proprietary officeholders , big overseas dry-goods merchants , and rich landowners. Because they cornmanded important chains of in fluence, their removal disrupted colonial society to a degree far in excess of their numbers . The emigration of members of the De Lancey, Oe Peyster, Walton , and Cruger families of New York, who, one historian has said, were related "by blood and marriage to more than half the aristocracy of the Hudson Valley," collapsed the connections and inter ests holding together large dusters of New York society.16 Similar ram ifying disruptions were feit in Pennsylvania from the departure of members of the Penns, Allens , Chews, Hamiltons, and Shippens, who formed particularly prominent , cohesive, and inßuential groups . Young James Allen realized only too weil what the Revolution was doing. " P ri vate friendships are broken off," he wrote in his diary, and his distin guished family and its important connections were "totally unhinged. "'7
It was the same everywhere . The removal of the loyalist heads of these chains of interest had destructive effects on the society out of all proportion to the actual numbers involved . Gnly forty-six Boston mer-
Revolution 177
chants were named in Massachusetts's banishment act of1n8, yet among these were some of the wealthiest families-the Ervings, Winslows, Clarks, and Uoyds-whose connections of kin, friends, and dients ram ified throughout the soeiety. True, the vacancies in Boston created by their removal were quickly filled by ambitious north shore rnerchants, including the Cabots, Lees, Jacksons, Lowells, Grays, Higginsons , and Gerrys. But the bases of the newcomers' positions were necessarily dif ferent, and the very recency of their arrival opened them to resentrnent and further challenge. As early as In9 James Warren was complaining that in Boston ••fellows who would have cleaned my shoes five years ago, have amassed fortunes, and are riding in chariots.' ,,8
Many of the loyalists' networks of kin and patronage were, of course, extensive enough to proteer some of thern from patriot persecution and confiscation of their property and to allow others to return quietly ro the United States at the end of the war. Same departing loyalists even left members of their families in America to look after their interests. Yet neither the returning loyalists nor the patriots who took many of their places were able to re-create precisely the old prewar chains of family and patronage. Post -revolutionary society was inevitably put together on new republican terms. Social and business links formed during the war and after were thinner and more precarious, less emotional and more calculating than they had been. The lines of interest and inßuence created by the Revolution were looser and less personal, based less on kin and more on devotion, to the patriot cause or on wealth alone . The Revolution effectively weakened or severed those loyalities of the anden regime that had enabled men like William Allen or James Oe Lancey to form their extensive webs of personal and familial influence.
To eliminate those clusters of personal and familial influence and transform the society became the idealistic goal of the revolutionaries. Any position that came from any source but talent and the will of the people now seemed undeserved and dependent. Patrimonialism, plural officeholding, and patronage of all sorts-p'ractices that had usually been taken for granted in a monarchical society-came under attack. It might have been possibleearlier for a royal governor like Jonathan Belcher of Massachusetts to brag that "1 never lost any thing 1 could get in an honest way." But after mid-century the piling up of offices and fees and the open exploitation of them ceased to be tolerable. "A multiplicity of public trosts" in a few persons, wrote Oxenbridge Thacher of Massa chusetts in 1']63, was indeed the practice ~ ' in the inJaTI&J of the country." It was necessary then when "gentlemen of education and ability could
II~
REPUBLICANISM178" not be found . . . to fill up every place in govemment." But now "tbc! case is very much alter'd. "'9 "
The prevailing revulsion against corruption and the use of patronage spilled over to affect even those who were unconnected with royal aU- 'j thority. Despite their stands against royal government, the self,, :~\ perpetuating oligarchies of the Virginia county courts were not free from .] criticism. Spread of republican sentiments explains some of the anger ofVirginians such asJefferson, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee against the older clique of Tidewater planters who tended to look after one another and to restrain the entry of others into their inner circle, The scandal in t?66 involving John Robinson, speaker of the House of Burgesses and colony treasurer, who had lent to his friends paper money he was supposed to destroy, together with the easygoing way the Vir ginia General Court in the same year treated the murder charge against Colonel John Chiswell, smacked of corruption. Such events, one gentle man told Richard Henry Lee, fully justified Lee's "opposition to the confederacy of the great in places, family connections, and that more to be dreaded foe to public virtue, warm and private friendship. "'0
It is in this context that we can best understand the revolutionaries' appeal to independence, not just the independence of the country from Great Britain, but, more important, the independence of individual. from personal inftuence and "warm and private friendship." The pur pose of the Virginia constitution of In6, one Virginian recalled, was" to prevent the undue and overwhelming influence of great landholders in elections." This was to be done by disfranchising the landless "tenants and retainers" who depended "on the breath and varying will" of these great men and by ensuring that only rnen who owned their own land could vote."
A republic presumed, as the Virginia declaration of rights put it, that men in the new republic would be "equally free and independent," and property would make them so. Property in a republic was still con ceived of traditionally-in proprietary terms-not as a means of per sonal profit or aggrandizement but rather as a source of personal authority or independence. It was regarded not merely as a material possession but also as an attribute of a man's personality that defined hirn and proteered hirn from outside pressure. A carpenter's skill, for example, was his property. Jefferson feared the rabble of the cities pre cisely because they were without property and were thus dependent.
All dependents without property, such as women and young men, could be denied the vote because, as a convention of Essex County,
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Massachusetts, dedared in I"n8, they were "so situated as to have no wills of their own." Jefferson was so keen on this equation of property with citizenship that he proposed in 1.,-,6 that the new state of Virginia grant fifty acres of land to every man that did not have that many. Without having property and a will of his own-without having inde pendence-a man could have no public spirit; and there could be no republic. For, as Jefferson put it, "dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.""
In a monarchical world of numerous patron-dient relations and mul tiple degrees of dependency, nothing could be more radical than this atternpt to make every man independent. What was an ideal in the English-speaking world now became for Americans an ideological im perative. Suddenly, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, all the fine cali brations of rank and degrees of unfreedom of the traditional monarchical society became absurd and degrading. The Revolution became a full scale assault on dependency.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century the English radical whig and deist John Toland had divided all society into those who were free and those who were dependent. "By FrtmlJJn," wrote Toland, "I un derstand men ofproperty, or persons that are able to live ofthemselves; and those who cannot subsist in this independence, I call ServanJs. ""3 In such a simple division everyone who was not free was presumed to be a servant. Anyone tied to someone else, who was someone's dient or de pendent, was servile. The American revolutionary movement now brought to the surface this latent logic in eighteenth-century radical whig thinking.
Dependency was now equated with slavery, and slavery in the American world had a conspicuous significance. "What is a slave," asked a New Jersey writer in 1765, "but one who depends upon the will of another for the enjoyment of his life and property?" "Liberty," said Stephen Hopkins of Rhode bland, quoting Algernon Sidney, "solely consists in an independency upon the will of another; and by the name of slave we understand a man who can neither dispose of his person or goods, but enjoys all at the will of his master." It was left to John Adams in Ins to draw the ultirnate conclusion and to destroy in a single sen tence the entire conception of society as a hierarchy of graded ranks and degrees, "There are ," said Adams simply, "but two sons of men in the world, freemen and slaves." Such a stark dichotomy collapsed all the delicate distinctions and dependencies of a monarchical society and cre ated radical and mornentous implications for Americans."4
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Independence, declared David Ramsay in a memorable Fourth of July oration in In8, would free Americans from that monarchical world where "favor is the source of preferrnent," and where "he that can best please his superiors, by the low arts of fawning and adulation, is most likely to obtain favor." The revolutionaries wanted to create a new republican world in which ., all offices He open to men of merit , of what ever rank or condition." They believed that "even the reins of state may be held by the son of the poorest men, if possessed of abilities equal to the important station." They were "no more to look up for the blessings of govemment to hungry courtiers, or the needy dependents of British nobility"; but they had now to educate their " own children for these exalted purposes.' Like Stephen Burroughs, the author of an extraordinary memoir of these years, the revolutionaries believed they were "so far . . . republican" that they considered "a rnan's merit to rest entirely with hirnself, withoutany regard to family , blood, or con nection. "'3 We can never fully appreciate the emotional meaning these commonplace statements had for the revolutionaries until we take seri ously their passionate antagonism to the prevalence of patronage and family inftuence in the anaen rigime.
Of course, the revolutionary leaders did not expect poor , humble men-farmers, artisans, or tradesmen-themselves to gain high political office. Rather, they expected that the sons of such humble or ungenteel men, if they had abilities, would, as they had, acquire liberal and gen teel republican attributes, perhaps by attending Harvard or the College of New Jersey at Princeton, and would thereby rise into the ranks of gentlernen and become eligible for high political office. The sparks of genius that they hoped republicanism would fan and kindie into flame belonged to rnen like themselves-men "drawn from obscurity" by the new opportunnies of republican competition and emulation into becom ing "i1lustrious characters, which will dazzle the world with the splendor of their names." Honor, interest, and patriotism together called thern to qualify themselves and posterity "for the bench, the army, the navy, the leamed professions, and all the departments of civil governrnenr .' They would become what Jefferson called the "natural aristocracy" liberally educated, enlightened gentlemen of character, For many of the revolutionary leaders this was the emotional significance of republican ism-a vindication offrustrated talent at the expense ofbirth and blood, For too long, they feit, merit had been denied, In a monarchical world only the arts and sciences had recognized talent as the sole criterion of leadership. Wh ich is why even the eighteenth-century anaen rigime
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called the world of the arts and sciences "the republic ofletters." Who, it was asked, remembered the fathers or sons of Homer and Euc1id? Such a question was a republican dagger driven into the heart of the old hereditary order. "Virtue, .. said Thomas Paine simply, "is not he reditary . ' '26
Because the revolutionaries are so different from us, so seemingly aristocratic thernselves, it is hard for us today to appreciate the anger and resentrnent they feit toward hereditary aristocracy. We tend to ig nore or forget the degree to which family and monarchical values dom inated colonial America. But the revolutionaries knew only too weil what kin and patrimonial officeholding had meant in their lives, Up and down the continent colonial gentry like Charles Carroll of Maryland had voiced their fears that "all power might center in Orte family" and that offices of govemment •'like a precious jewel will be handed down fromfather to son." Everywhere men expressed their anger over the ex clusive and unresponsive governments that had distributed offices, land, and privileges to favorites. Real emotion lay behind their constitutional staternents, like that of the New Hampshire constitution, which declared that "no office or piace whatsoever in government, shall be hereditary the abilities and integrity requisite in all, not being transmissible to posterity or relations"; or that of the 1776 Virginia declaration of rights drawn up by George Mason, which stated that
no Man , or Set of Men are entitled to exclusive or separate Emolu ments or Privileges from the Community, but in Conside.ation of public Services; which not being descendible, or hereditary, the Ideal of Man born a Magistrate, a Legislator, or a Judge is unnatural and absurd.27
More perhaps than any other revolutionary leader Mason rernained preoccupied by the social implications of this republican assault on pa trimonialism . A decade later in the Philadelphia Convention he warned his colleagues that they must not forget the meaning of republicanism. The new federal Constitution of 1787 seemed to suggest that the "su perior dasses of society" were becoming indifferent to the rights of the "lowest dasses. " This was foolish, he said, because "our own children will in a short time be among the general mass." Such downward rno bility was inevitable in the present circumstances of America, said the younger Charles Carroll. "In a commercial nation," he said, "the glory of illustrious progenitors will not screen their needy posterity from ob
, 182 REPUBLICANISM
scurity and want." Despite these occasional premonitions, however, few of the revolutionaries realized just how devastating republicanisrn would be to their children and grandchildren."
All of the founding fathers remained fascinated with the power of lineage and what William Livingston called "the Vanity of Birth and Titles. "29 To his dying day John Adams was haunted by the veneration for family that existed in New England. Jefferson, too , always feit the power of genealogy. He, unlike Adams, was not one to let his feelings show, but even today we can sense the emotion lying beneath the placid surface of his autobiography written in 1821 at the age of seventy-seven. There he described his efforts in ITJ6 in Virginia to bring down that "distinct set of families" who had used the legal devices of primogeni ture and entail to form themselves "into a Patrician order, distinguished by the splendor and luxury of their establishments." The privileges of this "aristocracy of wealth," wrote Jefferson, needed to be destroyed in . order "to make an opening for the aristocracy of virtue and talent," of which he considered himself a prime example.
Jefferson has often been thought to have exaggerated the power of primogeniture and entail and this "Patrician order." Not only was the docking of entails very common in Virginia, but the "Patrician order' does not appear to us all that different from its challengers. But Jefferson obviously saw a difference, and it rankled hirn. In the opening pages of his autobiography Jefferson teils us that the lineage of his Welsh father was lost in obscurity: he was able to find in Wales only two references to his father's family. His mother, on the other hand, was a Randolph, one of the distinguished families of the "Patrician order." The Ran dolphs, he said with about as much derision as he ever allowed hirnself, "trace their pedigree far back in England & Scotland, to which let every one ascribe the faith & merit he chooses.' '3 0
Benjamin Franklin likewise began his autobiography with a survey of his ancestors, concluding ruefully that he was "the youngest Son of the youngest Son for 5 Generations back" -a powerful indictment of the way primogeniture had worked to deny him through live genera tions. In the last year of his life, the bittemess was still there. In a codicil to his will written in June 1789 Franklin observed that most people, having received an estate from their ancestors, assumed they were obliged to pass on something to their posterity. "This obligation,' he declared with ernotion, "does not lie on me, who never inherited a shilling from any ancestor or relation. "31
In their revolutionary state constitutions and laws the revolutionaries
Revolution 183
struck out at the power of family and hereditary privilege. In the dec ades following the Revolution all the new states abolished the legal de vices of primogeniture and entail where they existed, either by statute or by writing the abolition into their constitutions. These legal devices, as the North Carolina statute of 1784 stated, had tended "only to raise the wealth and importance of particular families and individuals, giving them an unequal and undue inftuence in a republic, and prove in man ifold instances the source of great contention and injustice." Their ab olition would therefore "tend to promote that equality of property which is of the spirit and principle of a genuine republic. "32
We have been told that such legal and constitutional changes in inheritance at the Revolution were "largely formal and symbolic," merely attempts to bring the laws of intestacy into line with what men were already doing by wills)3 It is true that in many colonies fathers in the eighteenth century had tended to divide up their lands fairly equally among their male heirs. But, as we have seen, this partitioning of estates among more than the eldest son did not represent any modern commit ment to all children sharing and sharing alike in the property, Eldest sons still had been given preference, and when land became less avail able fathers had resorted to more traditional patterns of inheritance in order to protect the unity of the estate.t' The Revolution made a major change in these older patterns of inheritance, particularly in recognizing the equal rights of daughters and widows in the inheriting and posses sion of property.
Although some states continued the traditional practices, most new post-revolutionary inheritance laws tended to break with a patrilineal definition of kinship and to establish greater recognition of kinship ties through marriage. These new inheritance laws recognized greater equal ity among sons and daughters and gave greater autonomy to widows by granting them outright ownership of one-third of the estate rather than just the lifetime use that had been usual in the past. Such widows now had the right to alienate the land or to pass it on to their children of a second marriage. Most of the states also strengthened the ability of women to own and control property. In a variety of ways the new state laws not only abolished the remaining feudal forms of land tenure and enhanced the commercial nature of real estate; they also confirmed the new enlightened republican attitudes toward the family,3~
The Revolution's assault on patriarchy inevitably affected relation ships within the family, as decisions concerning women's and daughters' rights were made that conservatives later regarded as "tending to loosen
•
, REPUBLICANISM184
the bands of society." Changes in the family begun earlier found new republican justifications and were accelerated-showing up even in paintings. In earlier-eighteenth-century family portraits fathers had stood dominantly above their wives and children; now they were portrayed on the same plane with them-a symbolic leveling. With the Revolution men lost some of their earlier patriarchal control over their wives and property. Although wives continued to remain dependent on their hus bands, they did gain greater autonomy and some legal recognition of their rights to hold property separately, to divorce, and to make con tracts and do business in the absence of their husbands. In the colonial period only New Englanders had recognized the absolute right to di vorce, but after the Revolution all the states except South Carolina de
veloped new liberallaws on divorce.P Women and children no doubt remained largely dependent on their
husbands and fathers, but the revolutionary attack on patriarchal mon archy made allother dependeneies in the society suspect. Indeed, once the revolutionaries collapsed all the different distinctions and depend encies of a monarchical society into either freemen or slaves, white males found it increasingly impossible to accept any dependent status what soever. Servitude of any sort suddenly became anomalous and an ach ronistic. In 1784 in New York, a group believing that indentured servitude was "contrary to ... the idea of liberty this country has so happily established" released a shipload of immigrant servants and ar ranged for public subscriptions to pay for their passage. As early as 1775 in Philadelphia the proportion of the work force that was unfree composed of servants and slaves-had already declined to 13 percent from the 40 to 50 percent that it had been at mid-century. By 1800 less than 2 percent of the city's labor force remained unfree. Before long indentured servitude virtually disappeared."
With the post-revolutionary republican culture talking of nothing but liberty, equality, and independence, .even hired servants eventually became hard to come by or to control. White servants refused to call their employers "master" or "mistress"; for many the terrn "boss," derived from the Dutch word for master, became a euphemistic substi tute. The servants themselves would not be called anything but "help," or "waiter," which was the term the character Jonathan, in Royali Tyler's 1787 play The Contrast, preferred in place of "servant. "3
8 "The
white servants generaIly stipulate that they shall sit at table with their masters and mistresses," declared astonished foreigners. When ques tioned, the servants explained that this was "a free country," that they
Revolution 185
were as good as anyone, and "that it was a sin and a shame for a free bom American to be treated like a servant. " Samuel Breck, a sometime senator from Pennsylvania, thought his life would be "perfectly happy" if only he had good servants. "But so easy is a livelihood obtained that fickleness, drunkenness, and not infrequently insolence, mark the char acter of our domestics." In one year alone Breck hired seven different cooks and five different waiters.P
When one English immigrant in the 1790s reported that "the worst circumstance of living" in Newark, New Jersey, was "the difficulty of getting domestic servants," then we know things were bad. Desperate would-be masters in several cities were eventually compelled to form organizations for the encouragement of faithful domestic servants. Some Northemers even concluded that the practice of keeping servants was "highly anti-republican." Consequently, in time Americans built hotels as public residences that were unlike anything existing in Europe. These hotels, combining both eating and lodging, prohibited tipping and were often occupied by permanent boarders. Many found living in these ho tels eheaper than setting up a household with servants who were so hard to find. Foreigners found such hotels and boardinghouses to be pecu liarly American institutions. 40
By the early nineteenth century what remained of patriarchy was in disarray. No Ionger were apprentices dependents within a family; they became trainees within a business that was more and more conducted outside the household. Artisans did less "bespoke" or "order" work for patrons; instead they increasingly produced for impersonal markets. This in turn meant that the master craftsmen had to hire labor and organize the sale of the products of their shops. Masters became less patriarchs and more employers, retail merchants, or businessmen. Cash payments of wages increasingly replaced the older patemalistic relationship be tween masters and joumeymen. These free wage eamers now came and went with astonishing frequency, moving not only from job to job but from city to city. This "ftuctuating" mobility of workers bewildered some employers: "while you were taking an inventory of their prop erty, " sighed one Rhode Islander, "they would sling their packs and be off. "41
Although both masters and joumeymen often tried to maintain the traditional fiction that they were bound together for the "good of the trade," increasingly they saw themselves as employers and employees with different interests. Although observers applauded the fact that ap prentices, journeymen, and masters of each craft marched together in
186 REPUBLICANISM
the federal procession in Philadelphia on July .j., 1788, the tensions and divergence of interests were already visible. Before long journeymen in various crafts organized themselves against their masters' organizations, banned their employers from their meetings, and declared that "the interests of the joumeymen are separate and in some respects opposite of those of their employers. " Between 1786 and 1816 at least twelve major strikes by various journeymen craftsmen occurred-the first major strikes by employees against employers in American history .4 2
One obvious dependency the revolutionaries did not completely abolish was that of nearly a half million Afro-American slaves, and their failure to do so, amidst all their high-blown talk of liberty, makes them seem inconsistent and hypocritical in our eyes. Yet it is important to realize that the Revolution suddenly and effectively ended the cultural climate that had allowed black slavery, as well as other forms of bondage and unfreedom, to exist throughout the colonial period without serious challenge. With the revolutionary movement, black slavery became ex cruciatingly conspicuous in a way that it had not been in the older monarchical society with its many calibrations and degrees of unfree dom; and Americans in 1775-76 began attacking it with a vehemence that was inconceivable earlier.
For a century or more the colonists had taken slavery more or less for gran ted as the most base and dependent status in a hierarchy of dependencies and a world of laborers,' Rarely had they feit the need either to criticize black slavery or to defend it. Now, however, the re publican attack on dependency compelled Americans to see the deviant character of slavery and to confront the institution as they never had to before. It was no accident that Americans in Philadelphia in 1775 formed the first anti-slavery society in the world. As long as most people had to work merely out of poverty and the need to provide for a living, slavery and other forms of enforced labor did not seemall that different from free labor. But the growing recognition that labor was not simply a common necessity of the poor but was in fact a source of increased wealth and prosperity for ordinary workers made slavery seem more and more anomalous. Americans now recognized that slavery in a re public of workers was an aberration, "a peculiar institution," and that if any Americans were to retain it, as southern Americans eventually did, they would have to explain and justify it in new racial and anthro pological ways that their former monarchical society had never needed. The Revolution in effect set in motion ideological and social forces that
, Revolution 187
doomed the institution of slavery in the North and led inexorably to the Civil War. 43
With all men now considered to be equally free citizens, the way was prepared as well for a radical change in the conception of state power. Almost at a· stroke the Revolution destroyed all the earlier talk of patemal or maternal government, filial allegiance, and mutual con tractual obligations between rulers and ruled. The familial image of govemment now lost all its previous relevance, and the state in America emerged as something very different from what it had been.
Ovemight modern conceptions of public power replaced older ar chaic ideas of personal monarchical government. No longer could gov ernment be seen as the king' s private authority or as a bundle of prerogative rights. Rulers suddenly lost their traditional personal rights to rule, and personal allegiance as a civic bond became meaningless. The revolutionary state constitutions eliminated the crown's preroga tives outright or regranted them to the state legislatures. Popular con sent now became the exclusive justification for the exercise of authority by a1l parts of the .government-not just the houses of representatives but senates, governors, and even judges. As sovereign expressions of the popular will, these new republican governments acquired an auton omous public power that their monarchical predecessors had never pos sessed or even claimed. In republican America government would no longer be merely private property and private interests writ large as it bad been in the colonial period. Public and private spheres that earlier had been mingled were now to be separated. Although the state legis latures, to the chagrin of many leaders, often continued to act in a traditional courtlike manner-interfering with and reversing judicial de cisions, probating wills rejected by th~ courts, and passing private leg islation affecting individuals-they now became as weH sovereign embodiments of the people with a responsibility to promote a unitary public interest that was to be clearly distinguishable from the many private interests of the society.
From the outset the new republican states thus tended to view with suspicion the traditional monarchical practice of enlisting private wealth and energy for public purposes by issuing corporate privileges and li censes to private persons. In a republic no person should be allowed to exploit the public's authority for private gain. Indeed, several of the states wrote into their revolutionary constitutions declarations against any man or group of men receiving special privileges from the com
188 REPUBLICANISM
munity . "Government," said the New Hampshire constitution, was "instituted for the common benefits, protection , and security of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, orclass of men." The North Carolina constitution stated that "perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a State, and ought not to be allowed ."
Consequently, the repu blican state governments sought to assert their newly enhanced public power in direct and unprecedented ways doing for thernselves what they had earlier commissioned private per sons to do. They carved out exclusively public spheres of action and responsibility where none had existed before. They now drew up plans for improving everything from trade and comrnerce to roads and wa terworks and helped to create a science of political economy for Arner icans. And they formed their own public organizations with paid professional staffs supported by tax money, not private labor. For many Americans the Revolution had made the "self-management of self concerns . .. the vital part of government."44 The city of New York, for example, working under the authority of the state legislature, set up its own public work force to clean its streets and wharves instead of re1ying, as in the past, on the private residents to do these tasks , By the early ninereenth century the city of New York had become a public institution financed primarily by public taxation and concerned with particularly public concerns , It acquired what it had not had before the power of eminent domain-and the authority to make decisions without worrying about "whose property is benefited .. . or is not ben efited ." The power of the state to take private property was now viewed as virtually unlimited-as long as the property was taken for exclusive1y public purposes .•~
Many concluded that the state legislatures could now do for the public whatever the people entrusted them to do, "A community must always remain competent to the superintendence of its concems," wrote James Cheetham in 1802 . "These general powers of superintendence must be entrusted somewhere. They can be no where more safely de posited than with the legislature. Subject to the constitution, all the rights and privileges of the citizen are entrusted with them. ".6 The peo pie under monarchy, of course, had possessed long-standing rights and privileges immune from tampering by the prerogative powers and priv Heges of the king. But under republicanism could such popular rights continue to be set against the government? In the new republics. where there were no more crown powers and no more prerogative rights, it
, Enlightmmtnt 189
was questionable whether the people's personal rights could meaning fully exist apart from the people's sovereign power-the general will expressed in their assemblies. In other words, did it any Ionger make sense to speak of negative Iiberty where the people's positive liberty was complete and supreme? To be sure, as the Pennsylvania constitution together with other revolutionary constitutions declared, "no part of man's property can be justly taken from hirn, or applied to public uses, without his own consent," but this consent, in 1776 at least, meant "that of his legal representatives.' '47
Such assertions that all power to superirrtend and improve the soci ety belonged to the people and was embodied in the popular state leg islatures ftowed naturally from republican doctrinc. But weil before 1800 many Americans had come to challenge thebelief that such a monopoly of public power ought to be entrusted to any governmental institution whatsoever, however representative and popularly elected, Indeed, lim iting popular government and proteering private property and minority rights without at the same time denying the sovereign public power of the people became the great dilemma of political leaders in the new republic; indeed, it remains the great dilemma of America's constitu tional democracy .
H. Enlightenment
Destroying the ligaments of patronage and kinship that had held the old monarchical society together was only half the radicalism of the repub lican revolution. Semething eise would have to be put in place of these ancient social ties, or American society would simply fall apart. The first steps in constructing a new republican society were to enlighten the people and to change the nature of authority. Not only would rhe culture have to be republicanized, but all superior-subordinate relationships would necessarily change. Ir parents and masters were kind and caring, children and servants would naturally obey. Ir the political rulers were men of merit and talent and governed only in the public interest, they would naturally command the affection and respect of the ~ople, and the crises of authority bedeviling American society would end. Love and gratitude would replace fear and favor as social adhesives.
The vision of the revolutionary leaders is breathtaking. As hard headed and practical as they were, they knew that by becoming repub lican they were expressing nothing less than a utopian hope ' ror a new
19° REPUBLICANISM
moral and social order led by enlightened and virtuous men. Their soaring dreams and eventual disappointments make them the most ex traordinary generation of political leaders in American history .
In many respects this revolutionary generation was very modern. They were optimistic, forward-looking, and utterly convinced that they had the future in their own hands. They told themselves that they had the ability, like no people before in modern times, to shape their politics and society as they saw fit. Can America be happy becoming indepen dent? asked Thomas Paine. "As happy as she pleases," he answered for a1l American leaders; "she hath a blank sheet to write upon. '" The American revolutionary leaders had a very modem understanding of culture. For the first time in American history they saw that their culture was exclusively man-made. They alone were responsible for what they thought and believed and for what would be thought and believed in the future by those they often called the "millions unborn."
It was an awesome responsibility, and they assumed it with a sense of excitement and anxious expectancy. They knew-it was the basic premise of a1l their thinking-that people were not born to be what they might become. Lockean sensationalism told the revolutionaries that hu man personalities were unformed, impressionable things that could be molded and manipulated by controlling people's sensations. The mind, said John Adams, could be cultivated like a garden, with barbarous weeds eliminated and enlightened fruits raised, "the savages destroyed, . . . the civil People increased. " The revolutionaries believed with Sam uel Stanhope Smith, soon to be president of Princeton, that new habit ual principles, "the constant authoritative guardians of virtue," could be created and nurtured by republican laws, and that these principles, together with the power of the mind, could give man's "ideas and mo tives a new direction." By the repeated exertion of reason, by "recaJling the lost images of virtue: contemplating them, and using them as mo tives of action, till they overcome those of vice again and again until after repeated struggles, and many foils they at length acquire the ha bitual superiority" -by such exertions it seemed possible for man to recover his lost innocence and form a society of "habitual virtue." Vir tue, said Ezra Stiles, was an art to be learned as other arts were learned."
From these premises fiowed the revolutionaries' preoccupation with education-not just their interest in formal schooling but their concern with a variety of means to create new attitudes and to remake their culture. These comprised everything from the histories they wrote and
, Enlightenmmt 19 1
the advice manuals they read to the icons they created-including jef fersan's Virginia capitol, lohn Trumbull's paintings, and the design of the Great Seal. With the Lockean premises they had about how knowl edge was acquired, everything suddenly seemed possible. The revolu tionary leaders were faced with the awesome task of creating their own world.
Changing the culture meant pushing back the boundaries of dark ness and barbarism and spreading light and knowledge. For the revo lutionary generation America became the Enlightenment fuUilled. The settlement of America, said lohn Adams in 1765, was "the opening of a grand scene and design in Providence for the illumination of the igno rant, and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth. "3 The Revolution was simply the climax of this grand historie drama. Enlightenment was spreading everywhere in the Western world, but nowhere more promisingly than in America. It was an astonishing claim: that these obscure provinces only recently rescued from wilder ness, surrounded by "savages," and perched precariously on the very edges of Christendom, should presume to be in the vanguard of the Enlightenment was enough to boggle the mind. Americans, Thomas Paine told them in 1782, had thrown off the "prejudices" of the Old World ("prejudice, that poisonous bane and pernicious pest of society," representing everything the Enlightenment hated) and had adopted new liberal, enlightened, and rational ideas. "We see with other eyes; we hear with other ears; and think with other thoughts, than those we formerly used." Ignorance was being expelled and could not return. "The mind once enlightened cannot again become dark."!
This pushing back of darkness and what was called Gothic barba rism occurred on many fronts. Some saw the central struggle taking place in natural science and in the increasing understanding of nature. Even the invention of a water pump for ships sent Benjamin Rush into raptures over the hope it promised "that the time will come when, comparatively speaking, 'evil there shall be none' upon the surface of the globe. ,,~ Others saw it occurring mostly in religion with the tem pering of enthusiasm and the elimination of superstition. Still others saw it taking place mainly in politics-in driving back the forces of tyranny and in the creating of new free governments. For many Americans this political struggle became the focus of their revolution, the republican prerequisite for all other kinds of enlightenment. But for many other enlightened Americans of the eighteenth century these were just aspects
REPUBLICANlSM192
of a larger struggle. For the Enlightenment represented not just the spread of science, or liberty, or republican government-important as these were-but also the spread of what came to be called civilization.
Everywhere in the Western world people were making tiny, piece meal assaults on the ignorance and barbarism of the past. Everywhere in small, seemingly insignificant ways life was being made easier, more comfortable, more enjoyable. Decrease the pain and increase the plea sure of people: that was the Enlightenment. It seemed at times to be a mere matter of counting, of adding pleasures and subtracting pains. So William Wollaston in his Religion 0/Nature Dtlineated set out with rnath ematical exactness the way to calculate human happiness: •'the man who enjoys three degrees of such pleasure as will bring upon him nine de grees of pain, when three degrees of pain are set off to balance and sink the three of pleasure, can have remaining to hirn only six degrees of pain; and with these therefore is his pleasure finally resolved. And so the three degrees of pain, which anyone endures to obtain nine of plea sure end in six of the latter.' ,6
Such mathematical exercises were possible because the increments of happiness, the quantities of pleasure and pain, seemed small and measurable. Sometimes they were quite palpable and material "conveniences" or "decencies" or "comforts" as they were called. Did people eat with knives and forks instead of with their hands? Did they sleep on feather mattresses instead of straw? Did they drink out of china cups instead of wooden vessels? These were signs of prosperity, of hap piness, of civilization. Jefferson said that to know the real state of a society's enlightenment one "must ferret the people out of their hovels, . . . look into their kettle, eat their bread, 1011 on their beds under pre tence of resting yourself, but in fact to find out if they are soft.' '7
But enlightenment was not simply a matter of material prosperity, of having Wedgwood dishes and finely pruned gardens. It was above all a matter of personal and social morality, of the ways in which men and women treated each other, their children, their dependents, even their animals. Such enlightened morality lay at the he art of republicanism. Americans thought themselves more civilized and humane than the Brit ish precisely because they had adopted republican governments, which, as Benjamin Rush said, were "peacefuJ and benevolent forms of gov ernment" requiring "mild and benevolent principles." With the Rev olution they sought to express these mild and benevolent principles in a variety of reforms-most notabJy perhaps in their new systems of crim inal punishment.
, Enlightmmmt 193
Many of the revolutionary state constitutions had promised in Bec carian fashion to end punishments that were "cruel and unusual" and to make them "less sanguinary, and in general more proportionate to the crimes." Jeffenon and other leaders drew up plans for liberalizing the harsh penal codes of the colonial period, which had relied on bodüy punishments of whipping, mutilation, and especially execution. AI though most states did something, Pennsylvania led the way in the 1780s and 1790s in the enlightened effort, as its legislation put it, "to reclaim rather than destroy," "to correct and reform the offenders' rather than simply to mark or eliminate them. Pennsylvania abolished all bodily punishments such as "burning in the hand" and "cutting off the ears" and ended the death penalty for all crimes except murder. In their piaces the state proposed a scale of punishments based on fines and years of imprisonment. In the larger and less intimate worlds in which people now lived, public punishments based on shame seemed less meaningful. Instead, the criminals should be made to feel their individual guilt, by being confined in prisons apart from the excited environment of the outside world, in solitude where the "calm contemplation of mind wh ich brings on penitence" could take place. Out of such assumptions was created the penitentiary, which turned the prison into what Philadelphia officials called "a school of reformation." By 1805 New York, New Jer sey, Connecticut, Virginia, and Massachusetts had followed Pennsyl vania in constructing penitentiaries based on the principle of solitary confinement. Nowhere else in the Western world, as enlightened phi losophes recognized, had such reforms been carried as far as they had in America."
But these penal reforms were only one manifestation of what Rush called the "gentle and forgiving spirir" that lay at the heart of the En lightenment. The eighteenth century seemed to many to be civilized and enlightened not simply because reformers were seeking to end the barbarity of criminal punishments, but, more important, because people in general were more benevolent, conversations were more polite, man nen were more gracious than they had been in the past. Everywhere there were more courtesies, arnenities, civilities-all designed to add to the sum of human happiness. Not talking loudly in company, not in terrupting others' conversation, not cleaning one's teeth at the table, were sm all rnatters perhaps, but in the aggregate they seemed to be what made human sociability possible. We are apt to regard the eigh teenth century's preoccupation with proper social behavior-its concern for manners and decorum-as superficial and frivolous. But the enlight
" REPUBLICANISM'94 ened of the eighteenth century knew better. "Human Felicity," wrote Franklin in his Autohiography, "is produc'd not so much by great Pieces of good Fortune that seldom happen, as by little Advantages that occur every Day. " They realized that all those seemingly trivial improvements in social behavior were contributions to civilization and hence to en lightenment.?
"Civilization" was not yet a widely accepted term, but "civility" was. "Civility" was originally a legal term derived from "civil." In the first edition of his Dictionary in 1755, Dr. Johnson defined "civility" as "a law, aet of justice, or judgment which renders a criminal process civil." But by the latter half of the eighteenth century the modern mean ing of "civility, " arising first in France and spreading to Great Britain, had come into use in order to express the advanced stage of enlighten ment that Europe had attained. It encompassed "politeness" and "re finement' and all those new manners and decencies between people that eharacterized the age. Many, however-though not Dr. Johnson him self-agreed with James Boswell that another word besides "civility" was needed to designate and celebrate the kind of society the eighteenth century Enlightenment was creating, and that word was "civilization." & 'Civilization," Boswell told Johnson, was better able to contrast with "barbarity" than the word "civility." Yet the origins of civilization in civility were not lost to the late eighteenth century, and politeness, good manners, and elegance remained the defining characteristics of the new society set in opposition to the rudeness and barbarism of the Gothie past."
All this stress on manners, decorum, and civilization brought to a head developments that had proceeded at least since the Renaissance. For generations the enlightened people of Western society had steadiJy enlarged the pale of civilization and rolled back the boundaries of su perstition and barbarism. Always at the center of this advance was the changing idea of a gentleman. A gentleman, Lord Chesterfield said, was "a man of good behavior, weIl bred, amiable, high-minded, who knows how to act in any society, in the company of any man." No word in the English language carne to denote better the finest qualities of the ideal man than ., gentleman," and it was the eighteenth century above all that gave it that significance. Defining a proper gentleman was a subject that fascinated the educated public, and writers from Richard Steele to Jane Austen spent their lives struggling with it."
To be a gentleman now took on a moral as weIl as a social meaning,
Enlightenment '95
and in this sense gentility became republicanized. Pure monarchists might still define aristocracies exclusively by the pride of their families, the size of their estates, the lavishness of their ostentation, and the haughtiness of their bearing, but others increasingly downplayed or ridiculed these characteristics. The enlightened age emphasized new, man-made criteria of gentility-politeness, grace, taste, leaming, and character. To be a gentleman was to think and act like a gentleman, nothing more. It implied being reasonable, tolerant, honest, virtuous, and candid, which meant just and unbiased as weIl as frank and sincere. It signified being cosmopolitan, standing on elevated ground in order to have a large view of human aJfairs, and being free of the prej udices, parochialism, and religious enthusiasm of the vulgar and bar baric. It meant, in short, having all those characteristics that we today sum up in the idea of a liberal arts education. Indeed, the eighteenth century created the modem idea of a liberal arts education in the English-speaking world."
When John Adams asked himself what a gentleman was, he an swered in just these terms of a liberal arts education: "by gentlemen," he said, "are not meant the rich or the poor, the high-born or the low born,the industrious or the idle: but all those who have received a liberal education, an ordinary degree of erudition in liberal arts and sciences. Whether by birth they be descended from magistrates and officers of government, or from husbandmen, merchants, mechanics, or laborers; or whether they be rich or poor. "13
America, "just emerging," as William Livingston said, "from the rude unpolished Condition of an Infant country, " was primed to receive these new republican standards of gentility. The colonists were eager to create a new kind of aristocracy, based on principles that could be leamed and were superior to those of birth and family, and even great wealth. They were weil aware that 'la thorough acquaintance with polite literature softens our manners, banishes clownish rusticity, and renders us courteous to all. , '14 Such sentiments had a special appeal for the outlying provinces of the greater British world, Scotland as weil as North America. Not only did both provinces exist on the edges of civilization, keenly conscious of the nearby barbarism of the Highland clans or In dian tribes, but also both societies Jacked the presence of the great he reditary noble families that were at the controlling center of English life. In both North America and Scotland, unlike metropolitan England, the uppermost levels of the aristocracy tended to be dominated by minor
'l~ill~1 1
1
, REPUBLICANISM196
gentry-professional men and relatively small landowners-who were anxious to have their status determined less by their ancestry or the size of their estates and rnore by their behavior or their learning,'!
Historians and literary scholars have commonly characterized this cultivation of politeness, leaming, and virtue the ideology of a "middle dass," but this label is misleading, to say the least. To be sure, the lower gentry in the English-speaking world were becoming sufficiently separated from the great wealthy aristocratic families to permit Dr. Johnson to define a gentleman as sorneone "not noble," but gentle men were not as yet equated with commoners, middling or not. The eighteenth-century North American gentry did not see themselves in quite the same way nineteenth-century gentlemen did. Thomas Jelfer son and John Adams were not members of a "rniddle dass." The eighteenth-century gentry did not describe themselves as landowners or professionals who happened to be genteel; instead they were still gentle men ' who happened to be professionals or landowners. They were, in short , still aristocrats, natural aristocrats, aristocrats of virtue and talent no doubt, but aristocrats nonetheless. They were still men of leisure, graceful without foppishness, polite without arrogance, tasteful without pretension, virtuous without affectation, independently wealthy without ostentation, and natural without vulgarity . They hoped to be , in short, the kind of enlightened aristocratic gentlernen that both Edmund Burke and Jane Austen adrnired .
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of these new en lightened republican ideals of gentility for the American revolutionary leaders. They were men of high ambitions yet of relatively modest origins, and this combination made achieved rather than ascribed stan dards of aristocracy very appealing to them , Family and kinship had nothing to offer them, and they not only directed their anger at all hereditary and monarchical values but also were determined to establish new measures of gentility. All of them would have heartily supported William Livingston 's injunctions for becoming true patriotic gentlemen:
Let us abhor Superstition and Bigotry , which are the Parents of Sioth and Slavery. Let us make War upon Ignorance and Barbarity ofMan ners. Let us invite the Ans and Sciences to reside amongst us o Let us encourage every thing which tends to exalt and embel1ish our Char acters. And in fine, let the Love of our Country be manifested by that which is the only tme Manifestation of it , a patriotic Soul and a public Spirit.'6
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It is extraordinary, to say the least, to realize what a high proportion of the revolutionary leaders were first-generation gentlernen. That is to say, many were the first in their families to attend college, to acquire a liberal arts education, and to display the marks of an enlightened eighteenth-century gentlernen. Samuel Adams, John Adams, Themas Jelferson, James Otis, John Jay, James Madison, David Ramsay, Ben jamin Rush, James Wilson, John Marshall-the list goes on and on, down even to the secend and third ranks of revolutionary leadership men such as William Paterson, Elbridge Gerry, Thomas McKean, Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Nathan Chipman. Those revolutionary leaders such as Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and Nathanael Greene who did not artend college usually made up for this lack by intensive self-cultivation in liberal enlightened values ." The revolutionaries knew something their fathers had not known, and they were anxious to dis tance thernselves from them sodally and culturally. Sometimes, as in the case of Thomas McKean, the father's status was too lowly for the ambitious son even to acknowledge. After having been taught gentility at Francis Allison's Pennsylvania academy, McKean turned his back on his father, a failed tavernkeeper, and sought to hide his back ground-so clumsily, in fact, that his later political enemies quickly perceived his sensitivity over his origins and used it against him . But even when father and son shared the same social and educational ad vantages, as in the case of the Charles Carrolls, the son often perceived the world differently from the father. Garroll the younger, to his father's chagrin, took the wealth of the family for granted, and proclaimed grandly that great wealth did not guarantee virtue, "I am resolved to live as becomes a gentleman," said young Carroll, and that meant avoiding "every appearance of meanness" and "every appearance of prodigality and ostentation . " 1t rneant as well dedicating himself to the public good. 18
We shall never understand the unique character of the revolutionary leaders until we appreciate the seriousness with which they took these new republican ideas of what it was to be a gentleman. No generation in American history has ever been so self-conscious about the moral and social values necessary for public leadership.
Washington's behavior, for example, is incomprehensible except in terms of these new, enlightened standards of gentility . Few were more eager to participate in the rolling back of parochialism, fanaticism, and barbarism . Washington loved Joseph Addison's play CaJo and saw it over and over and incorporated its lines into his correspondence. The
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play, very much an Enlightenment tract, helped to teach hirn what it meant to be liberal and virtuous, what it meant to be a stoical classical hero.'? But Washington's Enlightenment was never precisely that of, say, Jefferson or Franklin. To be sure, he was conventionally liberal on matters of religion ("being no bigot myself to any mode of worship"), and though he went to church regularly to keep up decorum, he was not an emotionally religious person. Washington never mentioned Christ in his writings, and he usually referred to God as "the great disposer of human events." On the other hand, he had no passionate dislike of the clergy or of traditionally organized Christianity as Jefferson did." And although he admired learning, he was not himself a man of science as was FrankJin; in fact, like many eighteenth-century gentlemen, he did not believe that "becoming a mere scholar was a desirable education for a gentleman."'" Washington's Enlightenrnent was a more down-to earth affair, concerned with social behavior and living in the everyday world of people. His Enlightenment involved civility.
One of the key documents of Washington's life is his "Rules of CiviJity and Decent Behaviour in Company and Conversation," a col lection of 110 maxims that Washington wrote down sometime before his sixteenth birthday. The maxims were originalJy drawn from a seventeenth-century etiquette book and were copied out by the young autodidacr. Thcy dealt with everything from how to treat one's betters ("In speaking to men of Quality do not lean nor Look thern fuU in the Face") to how to present one's countenance ("00 not Puffup the Cheeks, LoU not out the tongue, rub the Hands, or beard, thrust out the lips, or bite them or keep the Lips too open or too Close ")."
All the founding fathers were aware of these conventions of civiJity, and alJ in varying degrees tried to live up to them. But no one was more serious in following them than Washington. He wanted desperately to know the proper rules of behavior for a liberal gentleman, and when he discovered those rules he stuck by them with an earnestness that awed his contemporaries. It is this purposefulness that gave his behavior such a copybook character. He was obsessed with having things in fashion and was fastidious about his appearance to the world. Ir was as if he were always onstage, acting a part. He was very desirous not to offend, and he exquisitely shaped his remarks to fit the person to whom he was writing-so much so that some historians have accused hirn of deceit." , 'So anxious was he to appear neat and correct in his letters," recalled Benjamin Rush, that he was known to "copy a letter of 2 or l3?] sheets of paper because there were a few erasures on it. "24 His remarkable
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formality and stiffness in company came from his very self-conscious cuItivation of what was considered proper gentee1 classical behavior.
Precisely because Washington had not attended college and thus had not received a liberal arts education, he became punctilious and literal minded about observing wh at he had formally missed. He repeatedly expressed his "consciousness of a defective education," and he re mained quiet in the presence of sharp and sparkling minds.~ He was forever embarrassed that he had never learned any foreign languages. In the 1780s he refused invitations to visit France in part because he feIt it would be humiliating for someone of his standing to have to converse through an interpreter. He said that it was his lack of a formal education that kept hirn from setting down on paper his recollections of the Rev olution. It was widely rumored that his aides composed his best letters as commander in chief. Ir so, it is not surprising that he was diffident in company. Same even called it "shyness," but whatever the source, this reticence was certainly not the usual characteristic of a great man. "His modesty is astonishing, particularly to a Frenchman," noted Bris sot de Warville. "He speaks of the American War as if he had not been its leader. " This modesty only added to his gravity and severity. "Most people say and do too much," one friend recalled. "Washington ... never fell into this common error.' ,26
Franklin, like Washington, never attended college, but he certainly made up for this deficiency by becoming as much of a member of the cosmopolitan literati as he could, After his retirement from business in 1747, Franklin shed all traces of the leather-aproned mechanic he had once been, and became a gentleman philosopher and public official. He certainly feit the lack of proper social and genealogical credentials in both Philadelphia and London and did all he could to establish hirnself by those alternative enlightened credentials he could control. He spent his life making hirnself equal to "most Gentlemen from other Coun tries, " His experiments in science, his Augustan wit, his bit of Latin, and his untiring service to the public were all part and parcel of his enJightened gentility. His mean origins made hirn doubly eager to stress his aristocratic values. To critics who charged hirn with being a rabble rouser, he replied indignandy that he remained an independent gentle man whose offices were always obligations thrust upon hirn. In not one of fourteen elections, he said in .'764, "did lever appear as a candidate. I never did, directly or indirectly, solicit any man's vote."27 He never bragged about making money and was in fact apologetic about it. He always urged that public officials serve without salary, and he had
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no greater censure than to say of someone that he thought like a shopkeeper.
lt is obvious that Franklin moved way beyond his father, but others sought to do the same even when their fathers were not obscure . James Otis, J r .'s father was an important Massachusetts politician and speaker of the house of representatives. But as a self-made, uneducated Barn stable businessman the elder Otis was never able to crack the topmost levels of Massachusetts society or to get elected to the council, the bas tion of such aristocracy as Massachusetts possessed. He was defeated for election to the council, it was believed, because Thomas Hutchinson thought hirn contemptible . The elder Otis, Hutchinson reportedJy said, had wielded power in the Massachusetts legislature not by "any merit But only by Doing Little Dirty Things for Governor Shirley such as Persons of worth Refused to meddJe with." Ir slights like these rankled the elder Otis, theyenraged the son. James Gtis,Jr., spent his life trying to prove that he was every bit the equal of Hutehinson, if not his su perior, And he aimed to do this in the only way he could, by becoming more learned and virtuous. As a Harvard graduate, class of 1743, Otis became a member of the literary and intellectual cirele of Boston. "He was," recalledJohn Adams, "weIl versed in Greek and Roman history, philosophy , oratory, poetry , and mythology. His elassical studies had been unusually ardent , and his acquisitions uncommonly great." He read Pufendorf, Grotius, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Heineccius, and in civillaw Domat and Justinian. No one, said Adams , was Otis 's intelleemal superior. His first published book was on Latin prosody and he wrote another in manuscript on Greek prosody . And he opened his library of rare books for all to consult . Otis prided hirnself on his en lightenment and on his sacrifices for the people. To argue the cause of the people, he would never, he said, accept a fee. It was almost as if he wanted to show Hutehinson and the world that he was not grasping and uniertered like his father."
John Adams, son of a substantial but still ungenteel Braintree farmer and cordwainer, was not all that different. When Adams left Harvard and moved to Boston, he was still the wide-eyed country boy in the big city. No revolutionary leader revealed his ambitions so openly ; none expressed his resentments so fully. Moving on the edges of genteel Bos ton society, he was awed by the wealth, sophistication , and elegance he saw. "The very rich feel their fortunes . .. their imaginations are in Rated by wealth. " He envied this world yet despised it at the same time . "Pomp, formalities " were abominations to hirn. He hated "all the great
" .,
Enlightenmmt 201
Notionsof high Family that you find in Winslows, Hutchinsons, Quin cys, Salstonstals, Chandlers, Leonards, Otis's," for "tis vain and mean to esteem oneself for his Ancestors Merit.' '29
Rising from obscure country origins into the genteel world of the colonial big city was a common experience for many revolutionary lead ers . Jonathan Mayhew was a member of a family that had devoted itself for several generations to missionary work among the Indians on the island of Martha's Vineyard. He was the first surviving son to attend college, and the excitement of Harvard and Cambridge convinced hirn that he could never again go back to Martha's Vineyard and the Indi ans. He decided to enter the Congregational ministry, and tried for an opening in Worcester but failed to get it. Discouraged, he was about to accept an offer from tiny Cohasset on the south shore of Massachusetts when the ministry at West Church in Boston became vacant, its occu pant having upped and converted to Anglicanism. Mayhew accepted the appointment happily, for West Church was the highest-salaried Congregational post in the colony. His congregation was made up of well-to-do arriviere merchants who were as socially ambitious and anx ious as their minister. Mayhew loved the life he led as pastor of West Church-the tea parties, the soirees, the high-toned conversation-and he bragged to his English correspondents of the wealth of his acquain tances and the delicacy of the tea cakes they served. He was quick to attack other Congregational ministers as " raw an d unstudied in divin ity, " and he opposed creating another college in western Massachusetts because it would result in too many "unlettered persons" getting into the ministry. Yet at the same time Mayhew was resentful of the Boston Anglican world that scorned his origins and tempted his congregation. His liberal Congregationalism and his fiery denunciations of Anglican ism-so passionate as to bewilder even his supporters-were designed to keep his ambitious parishioners from following their previous minister into the Church of England by offering them as much respectability and fonnality as was possible within Congregationalism. He allowed his pa rishioners prosperity but at the same time condemned the luxury of the attractive Anglican world, even saying at one point that he preferred to be the poor son of a good man than the rich son of a sycophant and Ratterer . Injust such ways were republican values used to soothe uneasy souls.'"
William Paterson's origins were even more obscure. He was born in Ireland of a tin-plate worker who emigrated to America when WH· liarn was two years old . His father became a storekeeper in Princeton,
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New Jersey, and managed to send his bright son to the college there. As with so many of the revolutionary leaders, the experience changed young Paterson's life, for at college he leamed how to be a gentleman. "The true gentleman," he wrote in one of his college cornpositions, "is easy without affectation, grand without haughtiness, cheerful without levity, and humble without meanness." Paterson filled his notebooks with what it took to become a gentleman. He carefully catalogued the proper styles to follow in musie , dance, and dress, and was quick to note the absence of graee and manners in others. A liberal arts education was more than Latin and mathematics. " Hardly anything," he wrote, "is more diffieult to attain than a graceful and easy deportment ." He dreamed of sometime going to London and joining in the beau TTWn& of playhouses, operas, and balls. lf he went, he said in 1772, he would collect anecdotes of persons eminent for station, learning, and genius . .. Hardly anything is sought after more here or renders a person more agreeable in conversation.' ')1
Yet all the while Paterson made fun of such pretensions. Classical values told him that too much gentility and politeness unmanned a gen tleman, and while at Princeton he carried on a personal crusade against what he called "the effeminacy and dissoluteness of modem manners," including even the wearing of nightgowns by Princeton students. Like other proto-republieans, he tended to scorn what he eould not fully share in. He resented the fact that college friends with better backgrounds tended to ignore his letters . He tried claiming a more significant lineage than he bad, but eventually he realized that in America he did not have to be "true blue" and could actually glory in "being a Scotchman. " Small wonder, then, that aspiring gentlemen could yearn for a new world where eonfusing fashion-mongering would disappear and only talent, liberallearning, and virtue would matter.J"
]efferson was probably the revolutionary leader most taken with the new enlightened and liberal prescriptions for gentility. He was the son of a wealthy but uneducated and ungenteel planter from western Vir ginia and the first of his father's family to go to college. From the outset he was the sensitive provincial quick to condemn the backwardness of his fellow colonials. In 1766, as a twenty-three-year-old making agrand tour up the Atlantic seaboard, he was contemptuous of the erude and barbaric behavior of the Maryland assembly he witnessed in what he sarcastically referred to as "this Metropolis" of Annapolis . The old eourthouse the colonial assembly met in, "judging from it's fonn and appearance, was built in the year one;" and its members made "as
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great a noise and hubbub as you will usually observe at a publick rneet ing of the planters in Virginia." "The mob (for such was their appear ance) ... were divided into little clubs amusing themselves in the common chit chat way." They addressed the speaker without rising, shouted out their votes chaotieally, and, in short, seemed unaware of the proper or usual forms of conducting a legisiature.JJ
Doing things properly and in the right manner was important to Jefferson . At the College ofWilliam and Mary and later in studying law at Williamsburg he played the violin, learned French, and acquired the tastes and refinements of the larger world. At frequent dinners with Govemor Francis Fauquier and his teaehers, William Small and George Wythe, Jetl'erson said he "heard more good sense, more rational and philosophical conversations than in all my life besides." Looking back, he ealled Williamsburg "the finest school of manners and morals that ever existed in America." By 1782, "without having left his own coun try," Jetl'erson had become, as Chevalier de Chastellux noted, "an American who ... is at once a musician, a draftsman, an astronomer, a geometer, a physicist, a jurist and astatesman." He was everything an eighteenth-century republican gentleman ought to be. 34
In time Jetl'erson became quite proud of his taste and his peculiar liberal brand of manners. He read widely and sought to acquire the best that was thought and said (and sipped) in the world. His excitement over the sixteenth-century Italian Andrea Palladio, whose Fou, Books of Arcllileeturt was virtually unknown in America, was the excitement of the provincial discovering the cosmopolitan and enlightened taste of the larger world. He became contemptuous and even ashamed of the "Gothic" Georgian architecture of his native Virginia; and he sought in Monticello to build a house that would do justice to those models that harked back to Roman antiquity. In everything-from gardening and wine to painting and poetry-Jetl'erson wanted the latest in English or European fashion. JJ
Nathanael Greene, son of a Quaker ironmonger of Rhode Island, probably summed up as weil as anyone the emotions and passions of many of the revolutionary leaders, He was as ambitious as any of them, and he worked harder than most at becoming a gentleman. He espe cially lamented his "want of a liberal Education"-due, he said, to the "Supersticious" opposition of his Quaker family and his father's prej udice against books. So whatever he leamed, he had to teach himself. But perhaps that was an advantage. It was all very weil for his friend Samuel Ward, Jr., son of a distinguished Rhode Island family, "to be
1'1
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able to Enumerate a long train of Noble Ancestors." But that only meant that it was harder for Ward to excel his progenitors. 'I He that enters into Life with all the advantages of a Noble Birth, Adomed with a Liberal Education and improved by the most Pious Example, cannot be excus'd short of an improvement proportionable to the opportunity given. " Ir one pursued virtue under such circumstances "where there is no opposition," it would be meritorious, but it would only be "the Merit of a common Man." But to pursue and practice virtue "in spite of all Opposition," that, Greene told his friend Ward, would be "the carrector of a truly great and Noble Soul.' '3 6
Voicing these enlightened and republican ideals was, however, one thing; implementing them was another. At the very outset of the im perial crisis in 1']61, James Otis, Jr., had electrified his audience with his call for virtue. "The only principles of public conduct that are worthy of a gentleman or a man," he said, "are to sacrifice estate, ease, health, and applause, and even life, to the sacred calls of his country. These manly sentiments, in private life, make the good citizen; in public life, the patriot and the hero. "37 The Revolution became a test of the Amer icans' capacity for virtue.
The revolutionaries went to extraordinary lengths to fulfill dassical values and to create suitable dassical personae. J ames Warren actually wore a toga while delivering the Boston Massacre oration in 1775. And Joseph Hawley, in a supreme act of republican denial, resolved never to accept any promotion, office, or emolument under any government. John Adams yeamed to have his own Ciceronian moment. Just as "Ci cero's Name has been handed down thro' many Ages with Admiration and Applause," Jonathan Sewell told young Adams in 1760, "so may yours. " It was true that Adams was as yet an obscure person from a little-known part of the globe, to whom the "unthinking Mob ... daz zled with the Parade and Pomp of Nobility" as yet paid no attention. But, said Sewell, "it is not the Place where a Man lives, nor his titles of Honour in that place, which will proeure hirn Esteem with succeeding Generations." There was a new day coming, and New England was rising. And since "a Man's Worth riseth in proportion to the Greatness of his Country, who knows but in future ages . . . , it shall be as care fully recorded among the Registers of the Leterati, that Adams flourished in the second Century after the Exode of its first Settlers from Great Britain, as it is now that Cicero was born in the Six-Hundred-Se-Forty Seventh Year after the Building of Rome?" 38
But none of these revolutionaries' efforts to fulfill classical republican
Enlightenrnent 2°5
values came close to matehing that of Samuel Adams. Adams was a Harvard-educated gentleman who literally devoted hirnself to the public. He was without interests or even private passions, "It would be the glory of this Age," he said, "to find Men having no ruling Passion but the Love of their Country. " He had neither personal ambition nor the desire for wealth. In fact, he prided hirnself on being a "poor Man," and he lived in conspicuous poverty. So unconcerned was he with his personal appearance that his colleagues had to outfit hirn properly for his mission in 1774 to the Continental Congress. He did not even care about fame. He thought his letters were triftes and refused to keep copies of them. He despised everything that had to do with genealogy and refused to have anything to do with patronage in any form, even among his own family. He left his son to make his own way in the world, saying that no one could expect any "advantage in point of Promotion from his Connections with rnen.' No one took republican values as seriously as Adams did. No wonder they said that "modern times have produced no character like his." He was truly "one of Plutarch's men. "39
Although Adams's stern display of virtue was unique, the power of dassical republican imperatives among all the revolutionary leaders was impressive. Like David Humphreys, they believed the Revolution rep resented a recovery of antique virtue.
What Rome, once virtuous, saw, this gives us now-
Heroes and statesmen, awful from the plough.
In ancient Rome, said J ames Wilson, magistrates and army officers were always gentlernen farrners, always willing to step down "from the elevation of office" and reassume "with contentment and with pleasure, the peacefullabours of a rural and independent life. "40
George Washington, of course, was the perfect Cincinnatus, the Ro man patriot who returned to his farm after his victories in war. Wash ington knew very weil these classical republican values and tried to live his life by them, The greatest act of his life, the one that gave hirn his greatest farne, was his .resignation as commander in chief of the Amer ican forces. Following the signing of the peace treaty and British rec ognition of American independence, Washington stunned the world when he surrendered his sword to the Congress on December 23, 1783, and retired to his farm at Mount Vernon. In order to enhance the
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disinterestedness of the political advice he offered in his circular letter to the states written six months earlier, he promised not to take "any share in public business hereafter." He even resigned from his local vestry in order to make his separation from the public world complete. This self-conscious and unconditional withdrawal from power and pol itics was a great moral action, full of significance for an enlightened and republicanized world, and the results were monumental."
His retirement had a profound effect everywhere in the Western world . It was extraordinary, it was unprecedented in modern times-a victorious general surrendering his arms and returning to his farm , Cromwell, William of Orange, Marlborough-all had sought political rewards commensurate with their military achievements. Though it was widely thought that Washington could have become king or dictator, he wanted nothing of the kind. He was sincere in his desire for all the soldiers "to return to our Private Stations in the bosom of a free, peace ful and happy Country;" and everyone recognized his sincerity. It filled them with awe. Washington's retirement, said the painter lohn Trumbull writing from London in 1784, "excites the astonishment and admiration of this part of the world. Tis a Conduct so novel, so unconceivable to People, who, far from giving up powers they possess, are willing to convulse the empire to acquire more." King George III supposedly predicted that if Washington retired from public life and returned to his farm, " he will be the greatest man in the world. "4'
Washington was not naive. He was weil aware of the effect his res ignation would have . He was trying to live up to the age's image of a classical disinterested patriot who devotes his life to his country, and he knew at once that he had acquired instant fame as a modern Cincin natus. His reputation in the 1780s as a great classical hero was interna tional, and it was virtually unrivaled. Franklin was his only competitor, but Franklin's greatness still resred far more on his reputation as a scientist than on his long service in public affairs, Washington was a living ernbodirnent of all that classical republican virtue the age was eagerly striving to recover.
Despite his outward modesty Washington realized he was an ex traordinary man, and he was not asharned of it . He took for granted the differences between hirnself and more ordinary men .+3 He had earned ,i his reputation, his "character," as a moral hero, and he spent the rest ,~ of his life guarding and protecting it. He believed Franklin had erred by going back into public life in Pennsylvania in the 1780s. Such involve-
Enlightmment 20 7
ment in politics, he thought, could only endanger the international standing Franklin had achieved. In modern eyes Washington's concern for his- reputation is embarrassing; it seems obsessive and egotistical. But his contemporaries understood. All gentlemen tried scrupulously to guard their reputations , which is what they meant by their honor. To have honor across space and time was to have farne, and fame , "the ruling passion of the noblest minds," was what most of the founding fathers were after, Washington above al1. And he got it, sooner and in greater degree than any of his contemporaries, And naturally , having achieved what all his fellow revolutionaries still anxiously sought, he was reluctant to risk it. 44
Many of his actions after 1783 can be understood only in terms of this deep concern for his reputation as a virtuous leader. He was con stantly on guard and very sensitive to any criticism-e-more so than any one else, said jefferson. He judged all his actions by what people might think of them , He was obsessed with a concern that he not seem base, mean, avaricious, or unduly arnbitious. No one, said jefferson, worked harder than Wasbington in keeping "motives of interest or consanguin ity, of friendship or hatred" from inftuencing him , He had a lifelong preoccupation with his reputation for "disinterestedness. "+5
This preoccupation explains the seemingly odd fastidiousness and caution of his behavior in the 1780s. In 1783 he welcomed the formation of the Order of the Cincinnati and agreed to be its first president. Noth ing was dearer to him than this fraternity of retired revolutionary army officers, until a great popular outcry was raised against it. Washington was bewildered and shaken, and he appealed to his friends for advice. To persuade Washington to put pressure on the Order to reform itself and eliminate its hereditary character, jefferson appealed to the one argument that Washington could not resist-that Washington's leader ship of this aristocratic society would tarnish his reputation for classical virtue.+6
In the winter of 1784--85 Washington was led into temptation once again, and it was agony. The Virginia assembly presented him with 150 shares in the Jarnes River and Potomac canal companies in recognition of his services to the state and the cause of canal-building. What should he do? He did not feel he could accept the shares. Acceptance might be "considered in the same light as a pension" and might compromise his reputation for virtue. Yet he believed passionately in what the canal companies were doing, he had long drearned of making a fortune from
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such canals, and he needed the money. At the same time, he did not want to show "disrespect" to the assembly or to appear "ostentatiously disinterested" by refusing this gift. 47
Few decisions in Washington's career caused hirn more distress than this one. He wrote to everyone he knew-to Jefferson, to Govemor Patrick Henry, to William Grayson, to Benjamin Harrison, to George William Fairfax, to Nathanael Greene, even to Lafayette-seeking "the best information and advice" on the disposition of the shares. "How would this matter be viewed then by the eyes of the world?' he asked, Would not his reputation for virtue be harmed? Would not accepting the shares "deprive me of the principal thing which is laudable in my conduct? ' '+8
Thesituation seems comic today, but it was not to Washington. He suffered real anguish. Once again Jefferson found the key to Washing ton ' s anxieties and told hirn that dedining to accept the shares would: only add to his reputation for disinterestedness. So Washington gave them away to the college that eventually became Washington and Lee.
Washington suffered even more anguish over the decision to attend the Philadelphia Convention in 1787. Many believed that his presence was absolutely necessary for the effectiveness of the convention, but the situation was tricky. He wrote to friends imploring them to tell hirn "confidentially what the public expectation is on this head, that is, whether I will or ought to be there." How would his presence be seen, how would his motives be viewed? Ir he attended, would he be faulted for violating his pledge to withdraw from public life? But if he did not attend, would his staying away be thought to be a "dereliction to Re publicanism"? Should he squander his reputation on something that might not work?49
And what if the convention itself should fail? The delegates would have to return horne "chagrined at their ill success and disappointment. This would be a disagreeable circumstance for any one of them to be in; but more particularly so for a person of my situation." Even Mad ison had second thoughts about the possibility of misusing so precious
. an asset as Washington's reputation. What finally convinced Washing ton to attend the convention was the fear that people might think he wanted the federal government to fail so that he could then manage a military takeover. So in the end he decided, as Madison put it, "to forsake the honorable retreat to which he had retired and risk the rep utation he had so deservedly acquired." No action could be more vir tuous. "Secure as he was in his farne," wrote Henry Knox with some
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1
,1,
I
"
. '\
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awe, "he has again committed it to the mercy of events, Nothing but the critical situation of his country would have induced hirn to so haz ardous a conduct.' 'Yl
When the convention met, Washington was at once elected its pres ident, His presence and leadership undoubtedly gave the convention and the proposed Constitution a prestige that they otherwise could not have had. His backing of the Constitution was essential to its eventual ratification. ce Be assured, " J ames Monroe told J efferson, "his inftuence carried this government.t'P Once committed to the Constitution, he worked hard for its acceptance. He wrote letters to friends and let his enthusiasm for the new federal govemment be known. Once he had identified hirnself publicly with the new Constitution he became very anxious to have it accepted. Its ratification was a kind of ratification of hirnself.
After the Constitution was established, Washington still believed he could retire to the domestic tranquillity of Mount Vernon. But everyone else expected that he would become President of the new national gov ernment. Indeed, many Americans were willing to accept the strong kinglike chief executive created by the Constitution precisely because they expected Washington to be the first President. People even talked about the fact that he lacked an heir and therefore could not establish a dynasty. S2 This widespread expectation that he would be President aroused all his old anxieties about his reputation, He had promised the country that he would permanently retire from public life. How could he now assurne the presidency without being "chargeable with levity and inconsistency; if not with rashness and ambition?" His protests were sincere. He had so much to lose and so little to gain. But he did not want to appear "too solicitous for reputation." He was certain, he told his friend Henry Lee, "whensoever I shall be convinced the good of my country requires my reputation to be put at risque; regard for my own fame will not come in competition with an object of so much magnitude. "53
The rnore Washington weighed his decision, the more he recognized that accepting the presidency might be the only way of preserving his reputation, especially after Hamilton suggested to him that there niight be "greater hazard to that fame, which must be and ought to be dear to you, in refusing your future aid to the system than in affording it." It was not easy to make decisions when a concern for one's virtue was viewed as unvirtuous. Nothing could make hirn abandon his retirement, Washington told Benjamin Lincoln, "unless it be a convict;on that the
210 REPUBLICANISM
partiality of my Countrymen had made my services absolutely neces sary, joined to a ftor that my refusal might induce a belief that I pre ferred the conservation of my own reputation and private ease, to the good of my Country."~
Washington' s excessive coyness, his extreme reluctance after 1783 to get involved in public affairs, and his anxiety over his reputation for virtue were all part of his strenuous effort to live up to the classical ideal of a republican leader. It shows, as nothing else so etfectively can, the extent to which these enlightened values atfected the actions of the rev olutionary leaders.
Everywhere in America these republican values helped to shape the revolutionaries' behavior. John Dickinson's pose in 1767 as a "Pennsyl vania Farmer" is incomprehensible except within this classical tradition. Dickinson, the wealthy Philadelphia lawyer, wanted to assure his read ers of his gentlemanly disinterestedness by informing them at the outset that he was a farmer "contented" and "undisturbed by worldly hopes or fears.' Busy city lawyers were perhaps too much involved in the marketplace to make ideal republican leaders. Their constant "Wran gling" and their "supporting any cause that offers" had "obliterated all regard to right and wrong . . . even with them Who are above pe cuniary infiuence." "Candor and integrity," it was said, were found "seldom in professional Men." Lawyers thus were always hard pressed to justify their virtue and disinterestedness. But landed gentlemen, like the ••Pennsylvania Farmer, " living off ••a little money at interest" were not.~
Since merchants were worse off than lawyers in this respect, those with political ambitions always feit pressed to shed their mercantile ac tivities and to ennoble themselves. John Hancock has been criticized by historians for dissipating his uncle's fortune and destroying his merchant business. But such criticism misses the point of Hancock's ambitions. Hancock wanted a public career, and the only way he feit he could have it was to become a republican aristocrat who could say "I despise the sharne of wealth." Henry Laurens had the same ambition, and in 1']64 he began curtailing his mercantile operations. In case he himself did not make it as an aristocrat, he went to great lengths to educate his son, John, to become one. So successful was he that John Laurens, before his untimely death in 1782, emerged as everyone's ideal young republi can gentleman who loved military glory and who was about as far re moved from the sordid business of trade as one could get. During the Revolution, Henry Laurens, the father, became president of the Con
, Enlightenmmt 2II
tinental Congress and enough of an aristocrat hirnself to be able to sneer at all those merchants who were still busy making money. "How hard it is,' he had the gaU to say in 1779, "for a rich, or covetous man to enter heartily into the kingdom of patriotism. "YJ
There was nothing unusual about these mercantile efforts at enno blement. As Adam Smith said, "merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming country gentlemen. "57 Many American merchants in the years preceding and following the Revolution-George Clymer, William Bingham, Elbridge Gerry, George Cabot, and others-retired from business, put most of their mercantile capital into proprietary wealth, and sought to set themselves up as landed squires, often in order to pursue political office within the classical republican atmosphere.P But the most important merchant in the American Revolution and perhaps the richest in all North America, Robert Morris of Philadelphia, was very slow to adapt to these republican imperatives.
Morris engaged in public affairs during the Revolutionary War and became superintendent of finance in 1781 while at the same time remain ing a private merchant deeply involved in the profit-rnaking of his busi ness. Perhaps he could never have succeeded as financier of the United States if he had not used his private trading and personal resources to aid the revolutionary cause, but he paid heavily for his mingling of private and public activities. No revolutionary leader was more severely criticized for being self-interested as Morris was. No matter that his "Exertions" in supplying and financing the Revolution were, as he said, "as disinterested and pure as ever were made 'by Mortal Man," the charges that he used public office for private gain kept arising to torment him, Laurens hirnself becoming one of his principal critics.v
By 1781 Morris realized that his sons ought to be better prepared for public service than he was. Like Laurens, he sent his sons abroad for the liberal education that he never had. He wanted them to read many books and to become ••weil grounded in the leamed Languages.' He hoped that when his sons returned to the "republican Governments" of America "they may probably be of some Political Consequence." Although Morris was inclined to place his older boy in "a Mercantile Character, " he believed that ••a liberal and weil grounded Education is as necessary to this as to any other Profession, and particularly in a Country where that very Character has a tendency to lead Men into the Senate &c.' ,60
Morris hirnself was certainly attracted by high public office, but, lacking a liberal education, he eventually became convinced that, in his
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own ease at least, "a Mereantile Charaeter" was not going to be ac ceptable for participation in an Ameriean senate, Years of harsh criti cism of his self-interestedness finally drove Morris into his own attempts at ennoblement. At one moment in 1786 the vituperation was so severe that he thought he would give up his public ambitions and become exdusively a private citizen, "which suits both my indination and af fairs mueh better than to be in public life for whieh I do not find myself ' very weH qualified. "6, But the lure of the public arena and what it rep resented in the aristocratic terms of civic honor were too great for him. Instead, like other merchants with politica1 ambitions, he gradually dis engaged from his mercantile business.
In the late 1780s and early 1790s he shifted all his entrepreneurial energy and much of his capital into the acquisition of speculative land something that seemed more respectable than trade-and tried to set himself up as an aristocrat. He acquired a coat of arms, patronized artists, and hired L'Enfant to build him a huge marble palace in Phil adelphia. He surrounded hirnself with the finest furniture, tapestry, sil ver, and wines and made his home the center of America's high social life. Like a good aristocrat, he maintained, recalled Samuel Breck, "a profuse, ineessant and elegant hospitality" and displayed "a luxury . . . that was to be found nowhere else in America. " When he became a United States senator in 178g, he was edgy and anxious to prove hirnself a disinterested aristocrat . When informed that the public were alarmed at the extent of " com mercial infiuence" in the Congress, he supposed "they blame me." He seemed almost desperate to win the approval of the South Carolina nabobs Pierce Butler and Ralph Izard, who seemed to have "a particular antipathy" to him . When the Carolina senators haughtily expressed their contempt for vulgar moneymaking, Morris to the astonishment of listeners-did " likewise" ; he gave himself "Compliments on his manner & Conduct in life, . . . and the little respect he paid to the common Opinions of People ." Like the classical republiean aristocrat he aspired to be, he was proud of "his disregard of money . " 60
But for Morris to disregard money was not only astonishing, it was fatal . We know whal happened, and it is a poignant , even tragic story . All his aristocratic dreams came to nothing; the marble palace on Chest nut Street went unfinished; his dinner parties ceased; his carriages were seizedj and he ended in debtors' prison . That Morris should have be haved as he did says something about the power of the classical aristo cratic ideal of disinterestedness in post-revolutionary America.
I
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I
s
BtMvo/ena 213
12. Benevolence
At the height of the patriot frenzy in 1774-76 many of the revolutionaries wanted nothing less than a reconstruetion of American society. But they had no desire to overtum one dass and replace it with another, They could as yet scarcely coneeive of society in these modern terms. What the whig radicals desired was to destroy all the remaining traditional ties of a monarehica1 society-those "seeret bonds of society," as Jer emy Belknap ca1led them: bonds of blood, family, and personal inftu enee-and replace them with new republican adhesives.' Somehow American society would have to be tied together in new ways.
As royal authority eollapsed in the eolonies in In4-7S, new loca1 authorities-eommittees and eongl'esses-began putting together new popular struetures of authority from the bottom up. Americans, as one Maryland oßicial complained, were eoming to believe that "they ought not to submit to any appointments but those made by themselves." Tranaforming the direetion in whieh authority ftowed, however, would not be easy. Whig patriots were keenly aware of the nature of the old monarchica1 society they were attaeking. As the South Carolina General Committee told a hesitant New York Committee in March Ins, "we are not ignorant of that erowd of placemen, of eontraetors, of oflieers, and needy dependents upon the Crown, who are eonstantly employed to frustrate your measures."? Mueh of the activity of the revolutionary committees in 1774-76 was devoted to breaking these older personal ties of dependency on royal authority and to establishing new attaehments to "the body of the people."
These whig committees and mobs took their actions very seriously. They worked out elaborate procedures and rituals for dealing with in dividuals who held royal commisaions or whose allegianee to the revo lutionary cause was in doubt. Since prominent and wealthy individuals in a monarehieal society had a ramifying importanee among their de pendente, the patriots were a1ways fearful, as the erowd confronting the Connecticut "River God," Israel Williams, declared, of "a man ofyour place and of your ability and inftuence." James Allen, the scion of the great Allen family of Pennsylvania, was similarly feared. In December 1716 patriot IOldien with fixed bayonets seized him and brought him before memben of the couneil of safety, because, as Allen reeounted in his diary, "Mr. Owen Biddle ... said, that they had received aceounts
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of the unwillingness of the Militia of Northampton County to march, that they knew my inftuence and property there, & were afraid of my being the cause of it . "3 But actually no person Iiving off royal patronage was too insignificant to be challenged. In April tn5 a local committee of inspection seized a Maine lumberman under contract to provide masts to the royal navy yard in Halifax, Nova Scotia, for his "dose connec tions with and dependence on persona employed by the Crown," an activity "contrary to the known sentiments of the people." Rarely, how ever, did these whig mobs hang or kill or even bring before kangaroo courts these suspected individuals . Such crown loyalists were intimi dated and coerced, often by tarring and feathering and sometimes by being stuck in a smokehouse with the chimney blocked. But always the aim was to get the suspected persons to recant their former ties to the crown and to reintegrate them back into the community. 4
Since the bond to the king was a personal and moral one, the disa vowals had to be personal and moral as weU . The mobs singled out suspected loyalists, subjected them to elaborate interrogations, and urged them to sign confessions of guilt and repentance. In Philadelphia, for example, thiny militiamen escorted Isaac Hunt around the city in a cart while he publicly recanted his questioning of a revolutionary commit tee' s authority. Once the degrees of disaffection were defined and estab lished, whether it was having drunk British tea or having denouneed the Continental Congress, the mobs went to great lengths to get these individuals to swear new oaths of fidelity as "marks of friendship" to
the people .5 The breaking of old oaths and the taking of new ones were signs of
how much this new enlightened age still owed to the older medieval world of personal fealty and homage. Without such individual and per sonal ties, it seemed that society would necessarily faU apart. In fact, one of the principal accusations that tories made against thc: patriots was that their vitriolic attacks on royal officials and others, their "el«titmetr ;~ as it is called," wc:re "so ruinous to private attachments and good feUowship." They "set a community at variance, father against son, son against father ; they dissolve in a moment the solidest friendship." Ev erywhere the loyalists saw what the revolutionary attack on family, he redity, and patronage, or "friendship," really meant: the patriots, tories charged, seemed to regard as imponant "no law, no friendship, no alliance, no ties of blood," and to be bent on dissolving all society "under the specious show of an exaltc:d kind of virtue. ,,6
These tory accusations were neither inaccurate nor misplaced. The
&nevolmce !ll5
patriots were indeed trying to destroy the ligaments of the older society and to reknit people together in new ways. All revolutionaries in the eighteenth eentury were fascinated with oath-taking and the need to find some republican substitute for the personal fealty and loyalty that sub ordinates feit toward their superiors in a monarchical society. Whig committees sought , as a character in Robert Munford's T1Ie PaJriotr de clared, to make the oaths "a touchstöne of public virtue, and as a trial of faith, and woe unto those who Are found faithless." Late-eighteenth century artists eould not paint enough oath-taking scenes, and the American revolutionaries, like the French a few years later, could not administer enough oaths . This oath-taking was so solemn and ceremo nious because the revolutionaries knew that something important was happening. They were ereating new social bonds by making individuals swear a new "attaehment to the body of the people" (the terms most commonly used in these mob rituals).7
How to attach people to one another and to the state? That was one of the central obsessions of the age. Laeking our modern appreeiation of the force of nationalism, eighteenth-century thinkers had diffieulty eonceiving of what Bishop Butler caUed "the distinet cements of soci ety" in anything other than personal terms, in terms of the individual's relationship to some other individual . Monarchy had been so powerful because its social adhesives-force, kinship, patronage, and dependen eies of various sorts-had seemed so substantial. But sinee at least the beginning of the eighteenth century reformers had sought to republieize monarchy by replacing its social eements with other, more affeetive, more emotional, more natural ties. Tbe Enlightenment came to believe that there was "a natural principle of attraetion in man towards man," and that these natural affinities were by themselves capable of holding the society together.s
These natural affinities, the love and benevolence that men feit to ward each other, were akin to traditional classical republican virtue but not identical to it. By mid-century classical vinue seemed too demand ing and too severe for the eivilized societies of Europe. Ancient Sparta and Rome, said Hume, were free republican states no doubt, and their citizens were virtUOUB ~d self-sacrificing. But they were also small states that were almost continually in arms. Therefore it was not surprising that their citizens were soldiers as weil as farmers. "Could we convert a eity into a kind of fortified camp, and infuse into each breast so martial a genius, and such a passion for public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the greatest hardships for the sake of the public; these
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affections might now, as in ancient times, prove alone a suffident spur to industry, and support the community. It would then be advanta geous, as in camps, to banish all arts and luxury ." But Hume and many others concluded that such martial and moral spirit was " too disinter ested and too difficult to support" in this modern age of sprawling com
mercial societies.? The revolutionaries wanted a virtue that was natural . The kind of
c1assical virtue that Montesquieu had described was unnatural; it was too forbidding, harsh, and austere. It was a "visionary principle," "the offspring of a rugged impracticability of character," and "enthusiasm" not based on reason. The antique conception of virtue was too tran scending of the demands of a corrupt human nature and thus resembled the Christian conquest of self, ultimately achieved only by divine grace . It was like Chinese foot-binding; it ran against human nature . All that was needed was to a1low human nature"fair play," and it would take care of itself. Man "cannot alter his nature; he can only cultivate it." Even kings were "unnatural, " said Benjamin Rush , since their author ity had to be "imposed by oaths, garters, guards , picture on coin &c." Without kings and other unnatural interferences, republican society could develop a new kind of virtue, could express the natural adhesives, what Rush called the natural "affections" appropriate to a modern en
lightened society." Such a new, modern virtue was associated with affability and socia
bility, with love and benevolence, indeed with the new emphasis on politeness, which James Wilson and his friend William White defined in 1']68 as "the natural and gracejul expression of the socuu virtUß. " Politeness tamed and domesticated the older civic humanist conception of virtue . Virtue became less the harsh self-sacrifice of antiquity and rnore the willingness to get along with others for the sake of peace and prosperity. Virtue became identified with decency. Where the ancient classical vir tue was martial and masculine, as revealed, for example, in David's painting 'IM 0aJh of the Horaui, the new virtue was soft and feminized, and capable of being expressed by women as weil as men ; some, in fact, thought it was even better expressed by women ."
The new social virtue was much more Addisonian than it was Spar tan . Indeed. the powerful appeal of Addison's play CaJo could scarcely have rested on the austere and self-denying character of Cato hirnself. The hero's forbidding sternness and his inexorable suicide on behalf of libeny represented behavior not easily emulated by the prosperous and civilized audiences of the eighteenth century. More attractive was young
Bmevolence 21 7
Juba, the Prince of Numidia and Cato's prospective son-in-law, His message was the Enlightenment's message:
A R077UJn soul is bent on higher views: To civilize the rode unpoIished world, and lay it under the restraint of laws; To make Man mild, and sociable to Man; To cultivate the wild licentious Savage with wisdom, discipline, and liberal arts Tb' embellishments of life: Virtues like these, Make human nature shine, reform the soul And break our fierce barbarians into men."
Promoting social affeerlen was in fact the object of the civilizing process, "What does the idea of politeness and refinement of a people suppose? Is it not this, that they cultivate intimate friendships; that they mutually sympathize with the misfortunes of each other, and that a passionate show of affections is promoted . "'3
Although some like William Livingston stressed that "Benevolence is the Parent of Patriotism," clearly something essential in the republi can tradition had changed. Classical virtue had ftowed from the citizen's participation in politics; government had been the source of his civic consciousness and public-spiritedness, But modern virtue ftowed from the citizen's participation in society, not in government, which the Iiberal-minded increasingJy saw as the principal source of the evils of the world. "Society," said Thomas Paine in a brilliant summary of this common enlightened separation, "is produced by our wants and gav ernment by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positiwly by uniting our affections, the latter negativtly by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions ." Even someone as different from Paine as James Wilson made a similar point in suggesting that government was "highly necessary" only because of man' s "fallen state ;" Society, "particularly domestick society," said Wilson, was "better" than public Iife, People were wrong to consider society as merely the scaffolding of government; "in the just order of things, government is the scaffolding of society ; and if society could be built and kept entire without government, the scaffolding might be ' thrown down, without the least inconvenience or cause of regret." It was society-the affairs of private social life-that bred politeness, sym pathy, and the new domesticated vinue. Mingling in drawing rooms,
., 218 REPUBLICANISM
clubs, and coffeehouses-partaking of the innumerable interchanges of the daily comings and goings of modern life-created affection and fel low feeling. Some now argued that even commerce, that traditional enemy of classical virtue, was in fact a source of modern virtue. "Its effects," said Benjamin Rush, were "next to religion in humanizing mankind. " It formed, said James Sullivan, "a chain of confidence and friendship throughout the world. "14
The importance of this domestication of virtue for American culture can scarcely be exaggerated. It was not nostalgic or backward-looking, but progressive. It not only helped reconcile classical republicanism with modernity and commerce; it laid the basis for all reform movements of the nineteenth century, and indeed for all subsequent modern liberal thinking. We still yearn for a world in which everyone will love one another.
No doubt this belief in the capacity of love and benevolence to hold republican societies together became for many as much of a "visionary principle" as the belief in ascetic classical virtue had been, and hard nosed skeptics came to doubt its efficacy. But for a moment in the glow of the Revolution, Americans as cool and collected as young John Quincy Adams could imagine a new and better world emerging. In such a "vision of bliss" all violent passions will "give place to the soft control of mild and amiable sentiments, which shall unite in social harmony the innumerable varieties of the human race.' Superstition would disap pear, barbarism recede, and all parts of the globe be gently bound to gether through commerce. And then "the long expected era of human felicity which has been announced by prophetic inspiration and de scribed in the most enraptured language of the muses, shall commence its splendid progress. "15 Men like Adams were optirnistic and confident of social harmony and progress because the new modern virtue was no utopian fantasy but an enlightened conclusion of the modern science of society. Most clergymen, of course, remained satisfied with urging Christian love and charity upon their ordinary parishioners. But edu cated and enlightened people wanted something more: to secularize Christian love and find,in human nature itself a scientific imperative for loving one's neighbor as oneself. Ultimately the Enlightenment aimed at nothing less than discovering the hidden forces in the moral world that moved and held people together, forces that could match the great eighteenth-century scientific discoveries of the hidden forces-gravity, magnetism, electricity, and energy-that operated in the physical world.
Bmevo/ence 21 9 Philosophes such asJohn Witherspoon, president of Princeton, dreamed of a time "when men, treating moral philosophy as Newton and his successors have done natural, may arrive at greater precision. "16
This stientific investigation of the moral and social order was not simply the work of such great minds as Shaftesbury, Bishop Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith. There was hardly an educated person in all of America who did not at one time or another try to describe the natural forces holding society together. By the middle of the century writers of every description-novelists, essayists, clergy men-were excitedly exploring and promoting the natural ways people related to one another. By 1754 Esther Burr, the daughter of Jonathan Edwards and the new bride of Aaron Burr, Sr., president of the College of New Jersey, had come to realize that because of "so many just thoughts" on benevolence and compassion expressed by recent writers, "the World is agoing to have better notions about friendship than they used to." Mn. Burr did not anticipate the half of it. "Were we not formed for Society? . . . And can that Society be carried on without a chearful and benevolent Disposition?" were questions central to the En lightenment .17
"Man," it was said over and over, "is formed for social life." He had an instinct, "an irresistible urge to associate with his fellow-beings." Which 'is why solitary confinement as a criminal punishment was re garded by some in the eighteenth century as a terror worse than death." Americans like young Nathanael Greene marveled at the way the "Spir its and minds of men" were "drawn together into communities, friend ships and the various species of Society" by some "principle of attraction." This harmony "in the moral and intellectual world" was no different from the rest of the universe. "In the whole scope of Cre ation" there was "a certain correspondence of parts, a similitude of operations and unity of design." Liberal clergy were especially ecstatic to learn that Christian love was natural to man and in accord with the teachings of science. "Just as the regular motions and harmony of the heavenly bodies depend upon their mutual gravitation towards each other," saidJonathan Mayhew, so too did love and benevolence among people preserve "order and harmony" in the society. Love between humans was akin to gravity of the moral world, and it could be studied and perhaps even manipulated more easily than the gravity of the phys ical world. "Benevolence," said Samuel Cooper of Boston in 1753, "is the Cement and Support-of FamiJies-of Churches-of States and
, R E PUB L r.c A N ( S M 220
Kingdoms-and of the great Community of Mankind . lt is the single Principle that constitutes and preserves all the Peace and Harmony, all the Beauty and Advantage of Society. '''9
Such love, many thought, was so natural and so powerful because it rested ultimately on self-love, "There is, in the human Breast, a social Affection which extends to our whole Species ," John Adams told his wife in 1775 in a conventional description of the moral seience at work . This affection centering on the self, said Adams, reaches outward 10 embrace in widening concentric circles ever larger numbers of people, to the family, the neighborhood, the town , the country, the province, the nation, eventually reaching across nations and taking in all man kind . Francis Hutehesen even thought that such love might extend into outer space. Although this love got steadily weaker as it moved outward from the self, many thought it was always tied to the self and received its strength from the self. In fact, said Samuel Cooper, self-love was "at least as necessary to the Support and Happiness of the World as social [love]." Benevolence was not some " m ad " emotion by which a person "becomes wholly devoted to the Gratification of others, without any Concern or Relish for his own private Happiness." Without self-love there could be no benevolence and without benevolence there could be no private happiness. Since it seemed scientifically evident that the greatest happiness for people came from their love and friendship with others, then "the more we cultivate benevolence the more we shall pro mote our own happiness." Thus if only the natural tendencies of man were allowed to flow freely, "unclogged by civil impediments," society would prosper. There would be no need any longer for compacts and charters, no need for "municipal monitors." The natural feelings of love and benevolence between people could become republican substi tutes for the artificial monarchical connectives of family, patronage, and dependency and the arrogance, mortification and fear that they had bred ....
America seemed made for such republican affection, "In most Eu ropean countries, " Americans told themselves, ., the dependence of peasants on the rich, produces on the one side, callousness and pride , and on the other, depressing and humiliating debasement." But in America, where "the feudal distinctions of tenant and lord are ... unknown . . . the dependence of our citizens is only on each other for the supply of mutual wants," and this "produces mutual confidence and good-will" between people. ""
One's liberalism in this enlightened world was determined by the
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distance one was able to extend one's love outward. "Our Charity should be confined to no partialities, but should extend to our enemies as well as our friends, to the most remote, as weU as to such as are in the vicinity." Only men who had "a benevolent temper" and reached beyond themselves and their neighborhoods were true patriots. But, of course, there were selfish persons "who live but for themselves ." These tended to be those "eircumscribed to the more humble walks of life," but even others more informed could act selfishly. Sometimes our self love was "so powerful as to become partial, to blind our Eyes, and to darken our Understanding and pervert our Wills.' "12 Such parochialism, bigotry, and narrowness of outlook were precisely what liberal education and refinement were designed to eliminate. Thus republicanism and cosmopolitanism were joined.
Cosmopolitanism was one of the great ideals of the EnJightenment. American military officers like Light-Horse Harry Lee were anxious to avoid being "accused of local partiality," which they conceived "im proper in any officer." To be enlightened was to be , as Washington said, "a citizen of the great republic of humanity at large ." English radicals believed that "every Man whatever, without any partial dis tinction of Nation, Distance or Complexion, must necessarily be es teemed our Neighbour and our Brother. " Too intense a local attachment was a symptom of narrow-mindedness, and indeed of .usease. Eighteenth-century thinkers thought there was something wrong with the Swiss, who when away from horne had the reputation of breaking into tears when they heard one of their local songs. Such local feelings were common to peasants and backward peoples, but educated gentle men were supposed to be at horne anywhere in the world. The many state histories written in the aftermath of the Revolution wen: anything but celebrations of localism. Indeed, they wen: testimonies to American cosmopolitanism; they were designed to "wear away prejudices-e-rub off asperities and mould us into an homogeneous people."23
It was particularly important that artists and scientists be considered members of the "fellowship of intellect" or what was commonly called the "republic of letters." The American Revolution may have divided the British empire, said Benjamin Rush, but it "made no breach in the . republic of letters. " Americans showed no anger at artists and scientists, such as Benjamin West, J. S. Copley, and Count Rumford, who had left America and gone abroad. They were eager to instali British sei entists in the American Philosophical Society despite the war. "Science and literature are of no party nor nation," said John Adams. When
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Franklin was rninister to France during the Revolutionary War, he is sued a document to the English explorer Captain Cook protecting him from American depredations at sea du ring his voyage of In9. Franklin told all American ship commanders that they must regard all English scientists not as enemies but "as common friends of Mankind. " When an American captain seized a British ship with some thirty volumes of medical lecture notes, Washingron sent them back to England, saying that the United Stares did not make war on science. General William Howe, commander in chief of the British forces in America, in effect said the same thing when he proteered David Rittenhouse's orrery in Philadelphia from damage . To be liberal-minded was to transcend such
local and national boundaries." The revolutionary generation was the most cosmopolitan of any in
American history . The revolutionary leaders never intended to make a national revolution in any modern sense. They were patriots, ro be sure, but they were not obsessed, as were later generations. with the unique character of America or with separating America from the course of Western civilization . As yet there was no sense that loyalty to one's state or country was incompatible with such cosmopolitanism. David Ramsay claimed he was "a citizen of the world and therefore despise[d] national refiections." Yet he did not believe he was being "inconsistent" in hoping that the professions would be "administered to my country by its own sons." Jod Barlow did not think he was any less American just because he ran for election ro the French National Convention in 1792 - . 93. Tne truth was, said Thomas Paine in Common Sense, that Americans were the rnost cosmopolitan people in the world. They surmounted all local prejudices. They regarded everyone from different nations as their countryman and ignored neighborhoods, towns, and countries as "dis tinctions too limited for continental minds ."'5
To be free of local prejudices and parochial ties defined a liberally educated gentleman. One's humanity was measured by one's ability to relate to strangers, to enter into the hearts of even those who were different . And Americans prided themselves on their hospitality and their treatrnent of strangers . Such cosmopolitanism was a consequence of civilization ... As a man advances into the refined and complicated circumstances of civilization," said WiUiam Smith, "his mind expands and reaches out to embrace larger and larger entities, from self, family, neighborhood, to country ." But even love of country was too contracted for a truly cosmopolitan person . America, by uniring the different kin
&nevolen&e IZIZ3
dred of the earth, had a duty to eradicate national prejudices and to make all humanity members of one extensive family. 06
The institution that best embodied these ideals of sociability and cosmopolitanism was Freemasonry, It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Masonry for the American Revolution. It not only created national icons thar are still with us; it brought people regether in new ways and helped fulfill the republican dream of reorganizing social relationships. For thousands of Americans, it was a major means by which they participated directly in the Enlightenment.
Freemasonry took on its modem role in Great Britain at the begin ning of the eighteenth century. The first Grand Lodge was formed in London in 1117. By mid-century, English Masonry was strong enough to provide inspiration and example to a worldwide movement, Although Masonry first appeared in the North American colonies in the 173os, it grew slowly until mid-century, when membership suddenly picked up. By the eve of the Revolution there were dozens of lodges up and down the continent. Many of the revolutionary leaders, including Washing ton, Franklin, Samuel Adams, Otis, Richard Henry Lee, Madison, and Hamilton, were members of the fratemity . The Revolution disrupted the organization but revitalized the movement; in the following decades Masonry exploded in nurnbers, fed by hosts of new recruits from deeper levels of the society. There were twenty-one lodges in Massachusetts by 1779; in the next twenty years fifty new ones were created, reaching out to embrace even small isolated communities on the frontiers of the state. Everywhere the same expansion took place. Masonry transformed the sociallandscape of the early Republic."
Freemasonry was a surrogate religion for an Enlightenment suspi cious of traditional Christianity. It offered ritual, mystery, and congre gativeness without the enthusiasm and sectarian bigotry of organized religion. But Masonry was not only an enlightened institution; it was a republican one as weil. It repudiated the monarchical hierarchy of fam ily and favoritism and created a new hierarchical order that rested on "real Worth and personal Merit" and "brotherly affection and sincer ity. " Masonry was an organization designed to maintain the familiarity of personal relationships in a society that was coming apart. It created an "artifidal consanguinity," declared Oe Wiu Clinton, that operated "with as much force and effect, as the natural relationship of blood." It was intended to bring people together who did not know each other as weil as they had in the past . The Masonic lodges, declared Charles
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Brockwell in 1750, were a means by which men who differed in everyday affairs, even in occupation, social rank, and religion, could "all meet amicably, and converse sodably together." There in the lodges "we discover no estrangement of behavior, nor alienation of affection." Ma sonry was looking for the lowest common denominator of unity and harmony in a society increasingly diverse and fragmented . It became "the Center of Union and the means of conciliating friendship among men that might otherwise have remained at perpetual distance, " That strangers, removed from their families and neighbors, could come to gerher in such brotherly love seemed a vindication of the enlightened hope that the force of love might indeed be made to flow outward from the self, A Mason found hirnself "belonging, not to one particular place only, but to places without number, and in almost every quarter of the globe; to whom, by a kind of universal language, he can make hirnself known-and from whom we can, if in distress, be sure to receive relief and protection, " This was the enlightened cosmopolitan drearn .oll
A gentlernan's cosmopolitanism rested on his ability to relate to strangers, to share in the feelings of others, including social inferiors and even animals. "He weeps with thern that weep and rejoyces with them that rejoyce": that was sympathy, thar was compassion . Elites earlier had scarcely ever thought about the existence of their inferiors. Now they not only thought about their inferiors, including their servants and slaves, but, like Landon Carter, they wondered and worried what their inferiors might be thinking about them! This willingness to believe that "the other" had a reality equaJ to one's own was a powerful force in the sentimental revolution that swept through Western culture in the latter half of the eighteenth century .29 Gentlemen increasingly congrat ulated themselves on their ability to condescend, to enter imaginatively into the mind of an inferior with whom they were speaking and to assurne a pose of equality. In this new republicanized world all superior inferior relationships tended to get sentimentalized, when they were not denied altogether. Consequently it is not surprising that "friendship" becarne the term, the euphemism, most used to describe every conceiv able personal relationship in the social hierarchy, induding sorne of the most unequal and dependent. Even the subrnissiveness of the servant toward his rnaster was occasionally sugarcoated with the terrn "friend ship . ,. It was as if every patron-dient and dependent relationship had to be smothered in benevolence,
Many now argued that "gratitude" was "a kind of counterpart of benevolence," an enlightened republican substitute for monarchical
BennJolmce !l!lS
subjection and deference. Indeed, republican theorists from Plutarch to Montesquieu had argued that gratitude was the prindpaJ source of obedience in republics and that the great vice of republics was aJways in gratitude. Yet there was something about the obligations of gratitude defined as the "offspring of that gladness of heart which we feel on the reception of"a favor" -that implied inequaJity and dependence-« "dependence for friendship," John Jay derisively called it; and con sequently Americans in the years following the Revolution remained uneasy over their attempts to make their republican ideas of equaJity compatible with gratitude and the inequality it suggested.J0
Yet these efforts to assert the obligations of gratitude and to reconcile republicanism with hierarchy were doomed almest from the outset . For the Revolution had set loose forces in American society that few realized existed, and before long republicanism itself was struggling to survive.
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13. Equality
The republican revolution was the greatest utopian movement in Amer ican history . The revolutionaries aimed at nothing less than a reconsti tution of American society. They hoped to destroy the bonds holding together the older monarchical society-kinship, patriarchy, and pa tronage-and to put in their pIace new social bonds of love, respect, and consent. They sought to construct a society and governments based on virtue and disinterested public leadership and to set in motion a moral movement that would eventually be feIt around the globe. People "begin to know one another, and that knowledge begets a love for each other, and adesire to proeure happiness for themselves, and the great family of mankind. "I
But the ink on the Declaration of Independence was scarcely dry before many of the revolutionary leaders began expressing doubts about the possibility of realizing these high hopes. The American people seemed incapable of the degree of virtue needed for republicanism. Too many were unwiUing to respect the authority of their new elected leaders and were too deeply involved in trade and moneymaking to think be yond their narrow interests or their neighborhoods and to concern them selves with the welfare of their states or their country. In many of the greatly enlarged and annually elected state legislatures a new breed of popular leader was emerging who was far less educated, less liberal, and less cosmopolitan than the revolutionary gentry had expected. These new popular leaders were exploiting the revolutionary rhetoric of liberty and equality to vault into political power and to promote the partial and local interests of their constituents at the expense of what the revolu tionary gentry saw as the public good. Growing opportunities for wealth tumed social mobility into a scramble. Everywhere there were laments that the "tender connection among men" that the Revolution was sup posed to foster was being "reduced to nothing" by "the infinite diver sities of family, tribe, and nation."2 Expectations of raising one's standard of living-if only to buy new consumer goods-seeped deeper and deeper into the society and had profound effects on the conscious
'JO 'D E M O C R A C Y
".... ur urdinary people. Iriltead of creating a new order of benevolence .ncl -elftellness, enJightcned republicanism was breeding social compet- " Itlveness and individualiun: and there seemed no easy way of stopping :iJ ir. Since at the outRt mo.t revolutionary leaders had conceded primacy to society over government, to modern social virtue over classical pubJic virtue, they found it difficuh to resist people's absorption in their pri vate lives and lnterests. The Revolution Was the source of its own contradiction•.
The federaJ Constitution of 1787 was in part a response to these popular lOCiaJ developments, an attempt to mitigate their effects by new ,) in.titutional arrangements. The Constitution, the new federal govern ment, and the development of independent judiciaries and judicial re view were certainly meant to ternper popular majoritarianism, but no constitution, no institutional arrangements, no judicial prohibitions could have restrained the popular social forces unleashed by the Revo lution. They swept over even the extended and elevated structure of the new federal government and transformed the society and culture in ways that no one in 1716 could have predicted. By the early nineteenth cen tury, America had already emerged as the most egalitarian, most ma terialistic, rnost individualistic-and most evangelical Christian-society in Western history. In many respects this new democratic society was the very opposite of the one the revolutionary leaders had envisaged.
Same now looked back nostalgically to the era of the Revolution when everything was "in the plain repubJican style." "Those were the patriarchal times of our country, the days of innocent pleasure, which are never to return. " Othen were more bitter, castigating the "democ racy! savage and wild. Thou who wouldst bring down the virtuous and wise to thy level of folly and guilt! Thou child of squinting envy and self-tormenting spleen! Thou penecutor of the great and good!" But most were bewildered by what had happened.3
All Americans believed in the Revolution and its goals. Conserva tives Jike James Kent had wanted as much as any radical "to dissolve the long intricate and oppressive chain of subordination " of the old monarchical society. Fisher Ames may have lost confidence in the peo_ pie, but he never lost confidence in the Revolution . He remained a good republican, despite the fact that the Revolution and republicanism were the sources of all he despised . Ames had never wanted, he said, "to strip the people of all power-for then slavery would ensue." But how to prevent Americans from "sliding down into the mire of a democracy, which pollutes the morals of citizens before it swallows up their liber
Equa/ity 231
ties"? Ames, like many American conservatives ever since, tried to draw a sharp distinction between a republic and a democracy-a republic differing "more widely from a democracy than a democracy from a despotism. ,'. But since democracy was an extension of republicanism, the distinction was difficult to rnaintain without repudiating the Revo lution itself.
Same conservatives in the 1790s and after evaded the problern by blaming the French Revolution for all that had gone wrong with Amer ica. It was not the American Revolution that had caused the popular disorder and degeneration of standards infecting America; it was the French one, The French Revolution had "done the cause of liberty an irreparable injury," said the Federalists; it was "hostile to all govern ment, even ours, which is certainly the besr." Better that the United Stares be "erased from existence than infected with French principles," declared a rather hysterical 'you ng Oliver Wokon, Jr. Yet by the early nineteenth century, that seerned to many to be precisely what had hap pened, French Jacobinical principles, spouted by "Voltaire, Priestley and Condorcet and that bloody banditti of atheists," had poisoned the American mind and perverted the rational principles of the American Revolution. So convinced was John Quincy Adams on this point that in 1800 he translated and pubJished in Philadelphia an essay by the German scholar Friedrich von Gentz contrasting the American and French Revolutions-promoting the pamphlet on the grounds that it rescued the American Revolution "from the disgraceful imputation of having proceeded from the same principles as the French.' "
Thus was begun the myth that has continued into our own time the myth that the American Revolution was sober and conservative while the French Revolution was chaotic and radical. But only if we measure radicalism -by violence and bloodshed can the myth be sustained; by any other measure the American Revolution was radical-and most of the Federalists knew it. Federalists like Fisher Ames and George Cabot knew that the elfort in 1804 to separate the northeastem states from the Fran cophiles in the rest of the country was doomed, because, as Cabot put it, the source of the evils aftlicting America ultimately lay not in the southem states or in France but "in the politiml theories of Dur country tuUi in DUrstlves. "6
Weil before 1810 many of the founding fathers and others, including most of the older leaders of the Federalist party, were wringing their hands over what the Revolution had created and most American citizens were celebrating: American democracy . "The govemment adopted here
DEMOCRACY232 , is a DEMOCRACY," declared the renegade Baptist Elias Smith in ISog.
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j "It is weil for us to understand this word, so much ridiculed by the j international enernies of our beloved country. The word DEMOCRACY i. ;\" formed of two Greek words , one signifies the ptop/e, and the other the" govnnmml which is in the people... . My Friends, let us never be j ashamed of DEMOCRACy!"7
Democracy became for Americans more than the broader suffrage i and the competitive politics of their political systern. "A most surprising ..;: revolution has taken place in the whole structure of society." declared Hugh Swinton Legare in a Fourth of july address in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1823 .8 Democracy actually represented a new social order with new kinds of linkages holding people together. Not that in the new democratic society the monarchical influence of patronage and kinship was ever entirely lost or that the .republican ernphasis on affection and benevolence was ignored : no society or culture, however dynamic, could ever slough off the past that completely. Older social relationships of a monarchical and republican cast, of course, persisted into the nineteenth century and persist even today. Yet there is no doubt that the new Republic saw the development and celebration of democratic social bonds and attachments different from those of either monarchy or re publicanism and the emergence of democratic political leaders different from any that had ever existed anywhere in the history of the world.
In the decades following the Revolution, American society was transformed. By every rneasure there was a sudden bursting forth, an explosion-not only of geographical movement but of entrepreneurial energy, of religious passion , and of pecuniary desires . Perhaps no coun try in the Western world has ever undergone such massive changes in such a short period of time . The Revolution resernbled the breaking of a dam , releasing thousands upon thousands of pent-up pressures . There had been seepage and fiows 'before the Revolution , but suddenly it was as if the whole traditional structure, enfeebled and brittle to begin with, broke apart, and people and their energies were set loose in an unprec' eden ted outburst.
Nothing contributed more to this explosion of energy than did the idea of equality. Equality was in fact the most radical and most powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution. Its appeal was far more potent than any of the revolutionaries realized. Once invoked, the idea of equality could not be stopped, and it tore through American society and culture with awesome power . It became what Herman Melville called "the . great God absolute! The centre and circumference of all
Equality 233
democracy!" The "Spirit ofEquality" did not merely cull the "selectest champions from the kingly commons," but it spread "one royal mantle of humanity" over all Americans and brought "democratic dignity" to even "the arm that wields a pick or drives aspike."9 Within decades following the Declaration of Independence, the United Stares became the most egalitarian nation in the history of the world, and it remains so today, regardless of its great disparities of wealth.
Equality lay at the heart of republicanism; it was, said David Ram say, " the life and soul of Commonwealth." Republican citizenship im plied equality. "Citizen" (or sometimes "cit") was a term that had been commooly used by the premodern monarchical society. It gener ally had meant the inhabitant of a city or town, who had been thus distinguished from a rnember of the landed nobility or gentry. Dr. john son, in fact, had defined a citizen as "a man oftrade, not a gentleman. " In 1,& an English comedy by Edward Ravenscroft was entitled The Cilizm Tunt 'd GenlJeman. 'O
By adopting the title of citizens for members of their new republics, the revolutionaries thereby threatened the distinctive status of "gentle man" and put more egalitarian pressure on their society than they meant to . After Im in Boston the designations of "yeoman" and "husband man" dropped out of use, and occupational titles even among artisans were now recorded ooly occasionally. "Mr." increasingly came into general use among adult white males, By the 1790s the Charleston, South Carolina, city council was pressured into doing away with the titles of "Esq." and "His Honor." Already by 1793 the young conservative joseph Dennie. who would eventually make a name for himself as founder and editor of The Port Folio, the best-known Federalist periodi cal, was chastising the revolutionaries for their encouragement of equal ity. "I always had a high admiration of your ' old whigs of vm: " he told his parents with supercilious sarcasrn, "but the measure of their folly was never completely filled till they gave tarts and tailors a civic feast and taught the rabble that they were all viceroys. ""
In embracing the idea of civic equality, however, the revolutionaries had not intended to level their society. They knew that any society, however republican and however devoted to the principles of equality, would still have to have "some Distinctions and Gradations of Rank arising from education and other accidental Circumstances," though none of these distinctions and gradations would be as great as those of a monarchical society"" By equality they meant most obviously equality of opportunity, inciting genius to action and opening up careers to men
234 DEMOCRACY
of talent and virtue while at the same time destroying kinship and pat ronage as sources of leadership . With social movement both up and down founded on individual ability and character, however, it was as surned that no distinctions would have time ro harden or ro be perpet uated across generations . Thus equality of opportunity would help to encourage a rough equality of condition .
Such a rough equality of condition was in fact essential for republi canism . Since ant iquity theorists had assumed that a republican state required a general equality of property-holding among its citizens. Al though rnost Americans in In6 did not believe that everyone in a re public had to have the same amount of property, a few radicals did call for agrarian laws with "the power of lessening property when it became excessive in individuals. " And all took for granted that a society could not long remain republican if only a tiny minority controlled most of the wealth and the bulk of the population rernained dependent servants or landless laborers. Equality was related ro independence ; indeed, Jef ferson's original draft for the Declaration of Independence stated that "all men are created free & independent . " Men were equal in that no one of them should be dependent on the will of another, and property made this independence possible . Americans in In6 therefore conc1uded that they were naturally fit for republicanism precisely because they were "a people of property; almost every man is a freeholder . " ')
Yet in the end equality meant more than even this to the revolu tionaries . Indeed, if equality had meant only equality of opportunity or a rough equality of property-holding, it could never have become, as it has, the single most powerful and radical ideological force in all of American history . Equality became so potent for Americans because it came to mean that everyone was really the same as everyone eise, not just at birth, not in talent or property or wealth , and not just in some transeendental religious sense of the equality of all souls. Ordinary Americans carne to believe that no one in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out manner was really better than anyone else. That was equality as no other nation has ever quite had it.
Such a view of equality was perhaps latent in republican thought . The revolutionaries ' stress on the circulation of talent and on the ability of common people to elect those who had integrity and merit presumed a certain moral capacity in the populace as a whole . In the 1780s James Madison had his doubts about this moral capacity of the people stretched to the limit, but even he admitted that ordinary people had to have sufficient "virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom "
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Equality 235
or "no theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us se eure ." Good republicans had to believe in the common sense of the common people. Only in monarchy were "the common people" re garded as "but little superior to the untutored herd." Ordinary people, "Cato" had wriuen , were "the best Judges, whether things go ill or weIl with the Publick," for they were "the Publick." "Every plough man knows a good govemment from a bad one." Ordinary people were in fact more to be trusted on some things than the aristocratic few. "Honesty and plainness go always together." Ordinary people were not deceptive or deceitful ; they wore their hearts on their sleeves and were usually sincere, sincerity being defined by Archbishop John Tillotson as making "our outward actions exactly agreeable to our inward purposes and Intentions." Republicanism presumed this sincerity among com mon people. "In republics, " said David Ramsay, "mankind appear as they really are without any false colouring." Republican America would end the deceit and dissembling so characteristic of courtiers and mon arehies. "Let those ftauer who fear," said Jefferson in 1774; "it is not an American art. "14
But republicanism went further. The republicanizing tendencies of eighteenth-century thinking actually challenged the age-old distinction between the aristocratic few and the common many. In our egalitarian minded age it is diffieult for us to appreciate the degree of contempt with which the aristocracy and gentry of the traditional monarchical society had regarded the lower orders: those "common wretches that crawl upon the earth," when they were noticed at all, were often re garded as little better than animals. But in the course of the eighteenth century, as we have seen, enlightened and republicanized gentry un dermined this aristocratic contempt in a variety of ways. By assuming their inferiors had realities equal to their own, they in effect seeularized the Christian belief in the equality of all souls before God, and in the process gave birth to what perhaps is best described as humanitarian sen sibility-a powerful force that we of the twentieth century have inherited and further expanded. Often this sensibility was expressed indirectly or obliquely, but increasingly many were coming to conclude thar
Divisions into mean and great are bane to ev'ry virtuous state.'5
When someone as aristocratic as William Byrd could write of the natural equality of all men, even those of different nations and races,
, Equali~ 237DEMOCRACY23 6 government, or accidental causes ." Such beliefs were essential to the
another proceeds only from the differing opportunities of irnprove and conclude that "the principal difference between one people and
growing sense of sympathy for other human creatures feit by enlight ment," then we know the force of this enlightened republicanism. So ened people in the eighteenth century . Once men came to believe that powerful were the republican tendencies in eighteenth-century Anglo they could control their environment and educate the vulgar and lowly American culture that even Lord Chesterfield could say in one breath to become something other than what the traditional monarchical soci that "the herd of mankind can hardly be said to think" and yet declare ety had presumed they were destined to be, then they began to expand in the next that "shepherds and ministers are both men; their nature their sense of moral responsibility for the vice and ignorance they saw and passions the same, " only their "modes" of expression were "dif in others and to experience feelings of common humanity with them . ferent." Chesterfield, after aIl, was enlightened. He counted hirnself The eighteenth century's feelings of equality and humanitarian concern among the new liberal breed of aristocrats who thought it was undig ßowed from these premises." nified to be proud of one 's birth; he considered his servants "myequals ' Perhaps no one better revealed the ambivalent yet ultimately radical by Nature and my inferiors only by the differences of our fortunes." feelings the revolutionary leaders had about equality than did John Ad Some now saw more clearly than ever before the fabricated nature of ( ams. Adams had no doubt there were great men and extraordinary
culture, and all distinctions came to seem artificial . Montesquieu said characters in the world, and he hoped to be one of them. He was not he was " hu man of necessity" but "French by accident. ,,,6 ashamed to have Cicero held up as a model for him, "not ashamed to
Not all Americans, of course, shared fuHy in these enlightened as own that a Prospeer of an Immortality in the Memories of all the Wor
sumptions about the natural equality of mankind . Some like genteel thy, to [the] End of time would be a high Gratification to my Wishes."
Benjamin Prat of Boston thought that the common people were beastly, I
Yet at the same time he had so personally feit the arrogance and pre
superstitious, and ignorant, and ought to remain so; education would tensions of the so-called great of Massachusetts-their ., Fleers and flouts,
do nothing for them except make them " conceited . '''1 Others balked at and sneers and snubbs"-that he could not help identifying emotionally
including Indians or blacks within the sphere of men; and when many with common ordinary people-"the multitude, the million, the popu
men thought about women in these terms, it was only to emphasize lace, the vulgar, the mob, the herd and the rabble, as the great always
women's difference from men, not their equality . Others continued to delight to call them." These "meanest and lowest of the people" were
believe that God had ordained permanent distinctions between the saved far from being mere animals; they were in fact "by the unalterable laws
and the damned. Still others, while admitting that all men had the same of God and nature, as well intitled to the benefit of the air to breathe,
senses of sight, hearing , smell , taste, and touch, argued that men of light to see, food to eat, and clothes to wear, as the nobles or the king ."
genius, the elite , might have special senses-an aesthetic sense, for ex Adams believed devoutly-he had to believe-as he wrote in 1']66, a ample-that separated them from common people and made them more decade before Jelferson's Declaration of Independence, that "all men
sensitive. Such a dist inction justified the continued separation of gentle are born equal ." No revolutionary expressed more passion than Adams men from commoners and explained the different standards of honor in denouncing aristocracy-its "certain Airs of Wisdom and Superior
and shame that each group had. ity.... its "Scom and Contempt and tuming up of the Nose." And no Still , in the end what remains extraordinary about the views of late revolutionary defended with more vehemence common ordinary peo
eighteenth-century Americans is the extent to which rnost educated men I ple against that aristocracy-"against being ridden like horses, ßeeced shared the liberal prernises of Lockean sensationalism : that all men were like sheep , worked like cattle, and fed and cloathed like swine and born equal and that only the environment working on their senses made hounds. "'9 them different. " H uman nature is the same in all ages and countries, .. Adams was ever ready to adopt his hick-farmer persona "Humphrey said Benjamin Rush , who as much as Jefferson came to personify the Ploughjogger" in order to da battle in the press on behalf of these hum American Enlightenment, "and all the differences we perceive in its . •! ble people who were "made of as good Clay" as the so-called "great characters in respect to virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, may ones of the World." He was not "book lamt myself, to rite so polydy, be accounted for from c1imate, country, degrees of civilization, forms of as the great gendefolk that rite in the News-Papers, about Pollyticks,"
, DEMOCRACY23 8 but he knew that he made better sense than they did . "The disceming few, the Choice Spirits, the better sort ," as "our great knowing rich men" liked to call themselves, thought that " the talents to excel as extreamly scarce, indulged by Nature to very few, and unattainable by all the Rest." Such a view was based on "the same vanity which gave rise to that strange religious Dogma, that God elected a precious few (of which few, however, every Man who believes the doctrine is always One) to Life etemal without regard to any forseen Virtue, and repro bated all the Rest, without regard to any forseen Vice." The truth was, Adams said in J']6J, the differences between men were not sharp and absolute; abilities existed on a spectrum. "We define Genius to be the innate Capacity , and then vouchsafe this flattering Tide only to those few, who have been directed, by their birth, education and lucky acci dents to distinguish themselves in arts and sciences or in the execution of what the WorId calls great Affairs." But if we apply the title of genius to all those above the median , then, said Adams, we will find that "the worId swarms with them." "Planting corn, freighting Oysters, and kill ing Deer"-these were among "the worthy employments in which most great Geniuses are engaged." The lives of these ordinary people had "as many instances of Invention (Mr. Pope's Criterion of genius) as you will find in the works of the most celebrated Poets" or "as you will read in the lives of Caesar, or Charles or Frederick." Moreover, said Adams, this genius that the so-called great were so proud of was not innate but actually a product of circumstances. "If you pick out your great Men, from Greek or Roman, and from English history and sup pose them bom and bred in Eskimeaux or Caffraria, Patagonia or Lap land, no Man would Imagine that any great effects from their genius would have appeared. " In the end , agreed David Ramsay, the talents for "great stations" were really the same as those for "the proper dis charge of ordinary business.' '00
In egalitarian late-twentieth-century America, where nearly every one is presumed to have a job and to make a living, we can scarcely get very excited over these eighteenth-century suggestions that ordinary people have occupations and talents that are fundamentally similar to those of the few great men of the society. But in the overall span of Western history such suggestions were novel, indeed radical , and were very much a part of the world-shaking character of the American Revolution.
Thus despite all their acceptance of differences among people differences created through the environment operating on people's
EqUlliity 239
senses-most revolutionaries concluded that all men were basically alike, that they were ., all partakers of the same common nature." It was this commonality that linked people together in natural affection and made it possible for them to share each other's feelings. There was something in each human being-some sort of moral sense or sympathetic in stinct-that made possible natural compassion and affection and that bound everyone together in a common humanity . Even the lowliest of persons, it was assumed, had this sense of sympathy or moral feeling for others. Young divinity student and schoolmaster of Sheffield, Mas sachusetts, Thomas Robbins recounted in his diary the incident of a black boy of about four who asked Robbins about a cut on his thumb. The boy told hirn, "If I had some piaster I would give you some to put on it." Robbins was overwhelmed by the boy's sympathy. "He appears to act from the pure dictates of nature without the least cul tivation . If in anyone, I think we can see nature in him." The conclu sion was obvious: "Is there not then in human nature a principle of benevolence?' '0'
The revolutionaries believed in Lockean sensationalism. But they were not such out-and-out sensationalists that they counted on men and women being able by reason alone to control the environment 's chaotic bombardment of their senses. Something else was needed to structure their experiences. Otherwise, human personalities, said James Wilson, quoting Hume, would become "a bundle or collection of different per ceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity . . . in a perpetual flux and movernent." A society composed only of fluc tuating sensations was impossible; something had to bind people to gether intuitively and naturally. As Jefferson said, "the Creator would indeed have been a bungling artist, had he intended man for a social animal, without planting in hirn social dispositions." Americans, like others in these years, modified their stark Lockean environmentalism by positing this natural social disposition, a moral instinct, a sense of sympathy, in each human being. Such a moral gyroscope-identified with Scottish moral or commonsense thinking and resembling Kant's categories-was needed to counteract the worst and most frightening implications of Lockean sensationalism and to keep individuals level and sociable in a confused and chaotic world. Ifman's character were simply the consequence ofthe "impressions" made upon hirn "from an infinite variety of objects external and internaI .. . ," wrote Nathaniel Chip man, "he would be the sport of blind impulses ." There was a "neces sity," therefore, "for a balance, as weil as some arbiter of moral action. "
, DEMOCRACY24°
And this balancer or arbiter was not reason, which was too unequally distributed in people, but a common moral sense-a moral Intuition existing in every person's he art or conscience, however humble and however lacking in education that person may have been . This common sense , said James Wilson, "is purely the gift of heaven"; it "makes a man capable of managing his own affairs, and answerable for his con duct toward others." It made benevolence and indeed moral society
possible ." It was thus "natural to infer, that a disposition to do good, must,
in some degree, be common to all men." From this assurnption ftowed not only the confidence of the revolutionaries in the natural affability of people, but the view of many that educated gentlemen had no greater sense of right and wrong than plain unlettered people. "State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor," said Jefferson, echoing Tren chard and Gordon's "Cato"; "the former will decide it as weil, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by arti
licial rules . "23 Here was the real source of democratic equality, an equality that
was far more potent than the mere Lockean belief that everyone started at birth with the same blank sheet . Jefferson and others who invoked this egalitarian moral sense, of course, had little inkling of the demo cratic lengths ro which it would be carried . But already , even before the Revolution, there were premonitions. A gentleman's faney education in the liberal arts did not make men free, it was suggested in 1771. "The plain, the simple and honestly well-meaning are . . . infinitely more free, than those whose self-affections are exa1ted by a mere formal ed ucation . Practical knowledge only is valuable. "24
The republican revolution aggravated suchanti-intellectual senti rnents and rendered suspect all kinds of distinctions, whether naturally derived or not . By increasing the social scrambling and conspicuous consumption that had been obvious even before the Revolution, repub lican equality threatened even to destroy the notion of a social hierarchy of ranks and degrees. In a free and independent republic "the idea of equality breathes through the whole and every individual feels ambi tious, to be in a situation not inferior to his neighbour." Among Amer icans , "the idea of inferiority, as of pursuing a mean employment or occupation . .. mortifies the feelings, and sours the minds of those who feel themse1ves inferior." Consequently, everyone strives to be equal with those above hirn, "in dress , if in nothing else." A society that had no place for these sorts of inferiorities-of occupation or of dress-was
EqUßiity 24 1
an unusual society indeed, This was drawing out republican equality faster and further than anyone had expected.v
For many who were captivated by such egalitarian thoughts the Rev olution had only substituted one obnoxious elite for another. "There are some among W' who call themselves persons of quality," declared a typical tirade from Massachusetts in the mid-rrßos . But in fact such persons ofquality were no different from that "set ofmushroom gentry" of the colonial era who, adorned with imperial offices and connected with those "whom they condescended to admit into .their circle, ". had attempted to assurne the character of ., the betJer sort ofpeople." So absurd was this designation "the better sort" in a republic "that the very terms become thoroughly contemptible and odious in the estimation of the people.":z6
The warning was now out against all displays of superiority, whether it was attending exclusive balls and tea parties or ftaunting a college degree. The formation of the Order of the Cincinnati in 1783 by retired revolutionary army officers aroused bitter opposition . Many Americans, including Samuel Adams, thought the organization represented " as rapid a Stride towards an hereditary Military Nobility as was ever rnade in so short a time." This sort of ferocious criticism forced the army officers to pull back and becorne less public in their pretensions. Indeed, by the mid -rjßos aristocrats of all sorts , natural as weil as artificial, were becoming increasingly cautious about claiming any superiority at al1. 27
Equality becarne the rallying cry for those seeking to challenge every form of authority and superiority, including the rank of gentlemen. We have usually dismissed these challenges of aristocracy as rhetorical ex aggerations-hearing little relation to the presumed egalitarian reality of American society. After all, compared with Europe, America seemed to have no aristocracy to overturn. But as Louis Otto, the French min ister to America, pointed out in 1786, our dismissals ignore not only the rank of gentlemen but the sense of deprivation that ordinary people now feit in relation to those gentlemen . "Although there are no nobles in America," said Otto, "there is a dass of men denominared 'gentlemen,' who by reason of their wealth, their talents, their education, their fam ilies, or the offices they hold , aspire to a preerninence which the people refuse to grant thern . "oll
As early as the 1780s the principal antagonists in the society were no longer patriots vs. courtiers but had become democrats vs . aristo crats. The legislative halls and the press were filled with diatribes against aristocracy , and gentlemen whose fathers were ordinary farm
243 ,. 242 DEMOCRACY ers suddenly found their new claims to gentility-often only a degree from Harvard, Yale, or Princeton-had become objects of bitter denun ciation.
Nathaniel Chipman, son of a Connecticut blacksmith and farmer, had graduated from Yale in 1777. Like many other college graduates in + these years, Chipman was intensely ambitious and full of enlightened opinions. After resigning his commission in the revolutionary army in 1778 because he lacked the income "to support the character of a gentle man" and "an officer," Chipman followed many other Connecticut migrants up the Connecticut River to Vermont, where, he feit, his col lege degree and his legal education might go further . "I shall indeed be rara aois in tems," he wrote to a friend in 1779. "for there is not an attorney in the state. Think . . . think what a figure I shall make, when I become the oracle of law to the state of Vermonr." Although there was a good deal of self-protective humor in these revelations of ambition to a close friend, there is no doubt Chipman was serious about rising rapidly in government, eventually even into the Confederation Con gress, then the highest national office in the land. All his joshing about the "many steps" he had to mount to attain "that pinnacle of happi ness"-"Let's see. First, an attomey; then a selectman; a huffing jus tice; a deputy; an assistant; a member of Congress"-only points up his arrogant expectation that such offices naturally belonged to the likes of him."9
No wonder, then, that someone like Matthew Lyon regarded Chipman as a haughty "aristocrat." Lyon, like so many others in the pre revolutionary years, arrived in America from Ireland in 1']64 as a fifteen year-old indentured servant. After serving his indenture in Connectieut, Lyon married and then in 1773 migrated to Vermont. Lyon was an ambitious scrambler who seized every opportunity for personal advance ment offered by the Revolution, the confiscation of loyalist lands, and the crearion of an independent Vermont. Before he was done he had become a leader in the Vermont assembly and one of the riehest entre preneurs and manufacturers in Vermont, if not in all New England .
But for all his wealth, Lyon was always just an "ignorant Irish puppy" in the eyes of the educated gentry like Chipman . And naturally Lyon in turn regarded Chipman and his fellow lawyers as " professional gendemen" and "aristocrats" who used their knowledge of the rigma role of the common law on behalf of former loyalists, New York land lords, and other "over-grown land jobbers in preference to the poorer sort of people." However big a manufacturer and however rich he was,
lntmsts
Lyon was not wrong in claiming to represent the poorer sort of people, for emotionally and traditionally he remained one of them: he had not gone to Yale and he was not a gentleman. From his perspective the emerging struggie between Federalists like Chipman and Republicans like hirnself was indeed •'a struggle .. . between the aristocrats and the democrats. "3"
The ironies of being called an "aristocrat" were not lost on Chip man and his family. "Nathaniel Chipman an aristocrat!" said his brother in amazed disbelief. •'This must sound very oddly . . . to all those who have witnessed his plain, republican manners, habits, and sentiments." Yet in the levels below levels of post-revolutionary Amer ican egalitarianism, Chipman was in fact as much of an aristocrat as Vermont was to know, and Lyon, because he was wealthier than Chip· man, deeply resented being made to feel his inferior)'
By 1791 the geographer ]edidiah Morse was already describing New England as a place "where every man thinks hirnself at least as good as his neighbors, and believes that all mankind have, or ought to possess equal rights." But what Morse had seen in New England was only the beginning. Others would soon discover that equality in America meant not just that a man Was as good as his neighbor and possessed equal rights, but that he was "weighed by his purse, not by his mind, and according to the preponderance of that, he rises or sinks in the scale of individual opinion." That was a kind of equality no revolutionary had anticipated.f
14. Interests
In the eighteenth century democracy was not yet the article of faith that it would soon become for Americans. It was still essentially a technical term of political theory-referring to govemment literally by the people, which was an impossibility for any large community . But from the be ginning of the revolutionary movement Americans sought to overcome this impossibility in every conceivable way; and in the process they became the first society in the modem world to bring ordinary people into the affairs of govemment-not just as voters but as actual rulers. This participation of common people in govemment became the essence of American democracy, and the Revolution made it so. Although pre monitions ofthis democratic future appeared early in America's colonial history , only with the imperial crisis in the l']60s and 1770S did a full
, DEMOCRACY244
scale ideological defense of the participation in government by ordinary
people actually emerge. Popular participation in politics meant something other than the
mobs and rioting of the I.,ooS and l77os. Mob actions by cross sections of ordinary people, artisans and laborers, were nothing new in colonial America. In all the colonies mobs had erupted almost continually in the eighteenth century, aiming at particular targets in protest against prob lems that the regular processes of government seemed unable to solve. Far from being symptoms of democracy, these mob protests simply demonstrated the extent to which the society was still hierarchically and paternalistically organized. Although these eighteenth-century mobs were undoubtedly anti-authoritarian and could on occasion temporarily turn "the world upside down," by their actions they always recognized "the world right side up" and usually seemed to pose no lasring threat to the political and social order; which is why they were so often toler
ated by the gentry. What alarmed the gentry of the I.,ooS and l77os, however, were the
growing ideologically backed claims by ordinary people to a share in the actual conduct of government. It was one thing for ordinary people to take part in a mob or to vote; for them to participate in the deliberations and decisions of government was quite another. By c1assical republican standards such participation would imply the participation of private "interests" in government, with the participants becoming judges of their own interests. Yet that was precisely what democracy in America
came to mean. Beginning with the Stamp Act disturbances and the formation of the
Sons of Liberty in the several colonial ports in 1765, ordinary people chiefly mechanics or artisans from many different crafts-came together to call for the boycotting of British goods. In 1772 the mechanics of Philadelphia, who comprised half the male residents of the city whose occupations are known, formed the Patriotic Society, the first organized nonreligious public pressure group in Pennsylvania's history. In New York the mechanics began convening in tavems but soon bought a meeting place for themselves and named it Mechanics Hall. Everywhere in the colonial ports artisans developed a new sense of collective identity and began speaking openly of a distinct "mechanical interest" in the society. But the artisans were not content simply to be apressure group. They wanted to make governmental decisions for thernselves, and they now called for explicit representation of their interests in government. By the 1770S artisans in the various port cities were forming slates of
J
Interests 245
candidates and were being elected as artisans to various committees and congresses and other prominent offices. The traditional gentry no longer seemed capable of speaking for the interests of artisans or of any other groups of ordinary people. "If ever therefore your rights are pre served," the mechanics told each other, "it must be through the virtue and integrity of the middling sort, as farmers, tradesmen, etc. who de spise venality, and best know the sweets of liberty." Artisans, they said, could trust in govemment only spokesmen of their own kind, only those "from whose Principles," as South Carolina craftsmen dec1ared, they had reason "to expect the greatest assistances. ".
In 1770 artisans in Philadelphia won four of the ten elected city of fices. In the wake of their success, other particular interests-religious and ethnic groups-clamored for equal recognition through represen tation in govemment. By 1774: the Philadelphia Committee of Nineteen, the principal organization of the resistance movement, invited six per sons from each religious association in the city to take part in its delib erations. When in J une 1774: the Philadelphia radicals proposed to add seven mechanics and six Germans to the list of nominees to the com mittee that would succeed the Nineteen, a significant moment in the history of American politics occurred, This marked the beginning of what would eventually become the very staple and stuff of American politics-a consciously pluralistic, ethnic, interest-group politics. By 1775 the royal govemor of Georgia could only shake his head in astonishment that the revolutionary committee in control of Savannah consisted of 11 a Parcel ofthe Lowest People, chiefly carpenters, shoemakers, blacksmiths etc. with a Jew at their head.!"
Such popular and pluralist representation was only the fulfillment of the localist tendencies of public life that went back to the seventeenth century beginnings of American history . The development of what came to be called 11 actual representation' in government, with its corollaries of residency requirements for representatives and binding instructions from constituents, grew out of this widely held belief that in all affairs of govemment members of the society 11 should be consulted in the most particular manner that can be imagined." People increasingly feit so disconnected from one another and so self-conscious of their distinct interests that they could not trust anyone different or far removed from themselves to speak for them in government, American localist democ racy grew out of this pervasive mistrust.!
Such popular pluralistic representation was momentous enough by itself. What made it doubly so was that these demands for interest-group
DEMOCRACY24- 6~ representation were accompanied by a full-scale ideological defense of self-interest . As early as the I?60S groups of New York artisans were willing to say bluntly and publicly in justification of their desire for explicit representation in government that "St/j-InJertst is the grand Prin ciple of all Human Actions" and that "it is unreasonable and vain to expect Service from a Man who must act contrary to his own Interests to perform it." Every man in the society had interests, not just noble men and gentlemen , and therefore every man in the society had the right to hold office in government . "Every Man who honestly supports a Family by useful Employment," the New York radicals argued, "is honourable enough for any office in the State, that his abilities are equal to . And in the great essential Interests of a Nation, which are so plain that every one may understand them,-as every individual is interested , all have an equal Right to declare their Interests, and to have them
regarded."· The rationale for interest-group politics has never been put rnore
explicitly than that. Nevertheless, these were as yet just marginal ex pressions thrown up in the confusions of the resistance movernent , pre monitions and anticipations of what would be more fully developed over the following decades.
Such premature demands by artisans and other plain people for participation in government were sufficiently novel and threatening, however, to provoke some responses from the gentry. However whiggish and revolutionary sorne gentlemen might be, they were not prepared to accept the participation in government of carpenters, butchers, and shoemakers. It was inconceivable to someone like WiUiam Henry Dray ton of South Carolina that gentlemen with a liberal education who had read a little should have to consult on the difficulties of government "with men who never were in a way to study, or to advise upon any points, but rules how to cut up a beast in the market to the best advan tage , to cobble an old shoe in the neatest manner, or to build a necessary house ." Drayton was willing to admit that " the profanum lJulgus" was "a species of mankind ," even that mechanics were "a useful and nec essary part of society," but, he said , with rnore courage than discretion, such men were not meant to govern. "Nature never intended that such men should be profound politicians or able statesmen... . Will a man in his right senses," he asked, "be directed by an illiterate person in thc prosecution of a law-suit? Or, when a ship is in a storm, and near thc rocks who , but a fool, would put the helm into the hand of a landsman? " ~
Inttrests 247
It was not just their lack of ability that disqualified artisans from important governmental office. It was their deep involvement, their oc cupations, in work, trade, and business-their very interestedness-that made such ignoble rnen unsuitable for high office. They lacked the req uisite liberal, disinterested, cosmopolitan outlook that presumably wu
. possessed only by enlightened and educated persons-only by gentle men . When artisans and other "interests" in the l760s and Inos de fended their self-interestedness and c1aimed that they and their marketplace interests had a right to be personally involved in govern ment, they were in effect demanding to be judges in their own cause; they were insisting that party or faction be made a legitirnate participant in government. This was tantamount to saying that the object of gov ernment was the pursuit of private interests instead of the public good . Such ideas ran too strongly against the grain of enlightened republican thinking to be acceptable as yet . Thus in the I?60S and Inos it was relatively easy for Drayton and other gentry to dismiss contemptuously these early defenses by artisans of interest-group politics. But such ar guments did not go away.
The Revolutionary War and the reliance on American manufactur ers and craftsmen that it entailed meant that artisan interests became increasingly important. But not just artisan interests: all sorts of acquis itive and commercial interests were unleashed by the Revolution, rnore interests than anyone had realized existed . By the 1780s a variety of self conscious interests, many of them created by the war itself, had emerged and were c1amoring for help and protection from the state governments and the weak Confederation Congress. Of course, the existence of in terests in America was not new. Many of the revolutionary leaders had experienced them in their colonial assemblies. But the interests of the post-revolutionary years were different. They were more numerous, less personal and less farnily-oriented, and more popularly expressive of new widespread economic elements of the society than the interests of the colonial period had been. Americans virtually ceased talking about the people 's "interest" in the singular; the people's "interests" agricultural, comrnercial , manufacturing-were all plural now .6
The Revolutionary War, like the Civil War and the two world wars, had a profound effect on America's society and economy. The war eWort and mobilization were enonnous. The war went on for eight years (the longest war in American history until that of Vietnam); it eventually put one hundred thousand men or more under anns (perhaps as many as one in ten of the available population served); and it touched the
I~l
249 ,.
DEMOCRACY24 8
whole of American society to a degree no previous event in American history ever had. Thomas Paine did not realize the half of it when he wrote in 1776 that "the necessities of an army create a new trade." The inexhaustible needs of three armies-the British and French as well as the American-for everything from blankets and wagons to rneat and rum brought into being hosts of new manufacturing and entrepreneurial interests and made market farmers out of husbandmen who before had scarce1y ever traded out of their neighborhoods.7
To pay for all these new war goods, at least for the American armies, the revolut ionary governments issued huge sums-four hundred million to five hundred million dollars-in paper money that made its way into the hands of many people who had hitherto dealt only in a personal and bookkeeping barter economy . Under the stimulus of this wartime pur chasing, speculative farmers, inland traders , and profiteers of all sorts sprang up by the thousands to circulate these goods and paper money throughout the interior areas of America. By 1778, wrote Henry Lau rens, "the demand for money" was no longer "confined to the capital towns and cities within a small cirele of trading rnerchants, but spread over a surface of 1,600 miles in length , and 300 broad." The war and rapirlly rising prices were creating a society in which, as one bitter com missary agent complained, "Every Man buys in order to seil again ." No event in the eighteenth century accelerated the capitalistic develop me nt of America more than did the Revolutionary War. It brought new producers and consumers into the market economy, it aroused latent acquisitive instincts everywhere, and it stimulated inland trade as never before.f
The paper money and the enormous amounts of debts that all these inland entrepreneurs, trad ers, shopkeepers, and rnarket farmers thrived on were the consequences neither of poverty nor of anti-cornmercial behavior. Debt, as we of all generations in American history ought to know, was already emerging as a symptom of expansion and enterprise. Farmers, traders, and others in these revolutionary years borrowed rnoney, just as they married earlier and had more children than ever before , because they thought the future was going to be even better than the present. Common people were eager as never before to purchase luxury goods. "15 not the Hope of one day being able to purchase and enjoy Luxuries a great Spur to Labour and Industry?" asked Benjamin Franklin in 1784-a question that fiew in the face of conventional wis dom. Farmers worked harder and produced "surpluses" during the war, not, as traditional thinking would have it, out of poverty and ne -
Inurests
cessity, but in order to raise their standard of living and increase, in Nathanael Greene's words, their "pleasures and diversions." And, much to the chagrin and anger of American army officen, when these consumer goods, many of them prewar imports, became less available, the farmers stopped working hard and their "surpluses" deelined. Ex hortations to virtue and patriotism were ignored. The farmers were not about to sell wheat or beef to the army in return for inftated paper promises to pay if they could not use that paper money immediate1y to · buy those "pleasures and diversions" they were becoming used to. 9
The economic troubles of the 1780s came in part from the ending of the war and the curtailing of govemment and military purchasing. Too many people had too many heightened expectations and were too deeply involved in the market and the consumption of luxuries to make any easy adjustments to peace. The collapse of internal markets and the drying up of paper money meant diminished incomes, overextended businesses, swollen inventories of recendy imported manufactures, and debt-laden farmers and traders , The responses of people hurt by these developments were very comprehensible: they simply wanted to con tinue what they had done during the war . The people had enjoyed buying, selling, and consuming and desired to do more of it. And to do that they needed money, lots of it. Farmers "in a new and unimproved country," it was said, "have continual uses for money, to stock and improve their farms" or, as Madison noted, to "extend their consump tion as far as credit can be obtained." And they now wanted more money than could be had by the old-fashioned means of applying "to a monied man for a loan from his private fortune." Consequendy, many of these farmers pressured their govemments not only to protect them from their private creditors but to print paper money or to set up loan offices that would issue paper money .10
These calls for paper money in the 1780s were the calls of American business. The future of America's entrepreneurial activity and prosper ity lay not with the hundreds of well-to-do creditor merchants who dom inated the overseas trade of the several ports along the Atlantic seaboard . Rather, it lay with the thousands upon thousands of ordinary traders, petty businessmen, and market farmers who were deep in debt and were buying and selling with each other all over America, For these people, unlike the overseas merchants who had their private bills of exchange, publiely created paper money was the only means "capable of answer ing all the domestic and intern4l purposes of a circult:uing medium in a nation" that lacked specie. The prosperity of a country, it was now argued,
r DEMOCRACY25° involved more than external commerce, more than having a surplus of exports over imports. •"T he jntenuzi commerce of the country must be promoted, by increasing its real riches, " which were now rightly equated with the acquisitions, improvements, and entrepreneurial activity of or dinary people . And such internal commerce , unlike foreign commerce, did not need specie; it could exist on paper money alone."
The emergence of all these business interests and their participation in the popularly elected state legislatures made the 1780s truly a critical period-perhaps, as John Fiske once said, even in the aftermath of the Civil War, the most critical moment in all the history of Arnerica .' For there in those few years was first clearly revealed all the latent interest filled and enterprising power of American democracy . In the 1780s the revolutionary leaders had a glimpse of what America was soon to be come-a scrambling business society dominated by the pecuniary inter ests of ordinary working people-and they did not like what they saw. What were release and liberation and the pursuit of happiness for the mass of ordinary Americans were for many revolut ionary gentry signs of licentiousness and self-interestedness that portended the failure of the grand experiment in republicanism.
The state legislatures were greatly democratized by the Revolu tion-by both the increase in the number of rnembers in each assembly and the broadening of their electorates . Men of even more humble and rural origins and less education than had sat in the colonial assemblies were now elected as representatives. In New Hampshire, for example, the colonial house of representatives in 1-,65 had contained only thirty four members, almost all well-to-do gentlemen from the coastal region around Portsmouth . By 1786 the state's house of representatives nurn bered eighty-eight mernbers, of whom most were ordinary farmers or men of moderate wealth and many were from the western areas of the state , Such representatives not only had a hard time passing as gentle men but by the nature of their occupations and their lack of enlightened gentility had interests to promote.I]
In all the states electioneering and open competition for office in creased dramatically . The high levels of incumbency and stability at tained by the colonial assemblies on the eve of the Revolution were now suddenly reversed , and the annual elections (an innovation for most of the state legislatures) often saw half or more of the representatives in the states turned over in any one year.'4 Under these turbulent circum stances the state legislatures could scarcely fulfill what many revolution aries in 1776 had assumed was theirrepublican responsibility to promote
Interests 251
a unitary public interest distinguishable from the private and parochial interests of people. By the 1780s it was obvious to many that "a spirit of l«aJity" was destroying "the aggregate interests of the corn munity." Everywhere the gentry complained of popular legislative practices that we today have come to take for granted-e-parochialism, horse-trading, and pork-barreling that benefited special interest groups. Each representative, grumbled Ezra Stiles, president of Yale College, was concerned only with the particular interests of his electors, Whenever a bill is read in the legislature, "every one instantly thinks how it will affect his constituents." Instead of electing rnen to office "for their abilities, integrity and patriotism ;" the people were much more likely to vote for someone "from some mean, interested, or capricious motive." They "choose a man, because he will vote for a new town , or a new county, or in favor of a memorial; because he is noisy in blaming those who are in office, has confidence enough to suppose that he could do better, and independence enough to tell the people so, or because he possesses in a supereminent degree, the all-prevailing popular talent of coaxing and ftauering. "I~
To the gentry the most alarming special-interest legislation of the 1780s was that on behalf of debtors-the printing of paper money and the enacting of stay laws and other debtor-relief rneasures . We have always known that the skyrocketing inflation fueled by numerous paper money issues and the many laws passed protecting debtors were dev astaring to creditors, but we have not always appreciated precise1y what this meant to the gentry socially and morally. Debts that were cheap ened, obstructed, or not paid back not only violated the personal faith and trust that presumably lay behind the relation between creditor and debtor, but, more important , all debt-reducing devices struck direcdy at the kind of stable and static proprietary wealth that wasthe principal source of the gentry's authority and independence .f
We shall never understand why the inflation created by the printing of paper money aroused such extreme anxiety and such deep moral Indignation among those whom George Clymer called the "honest gen try of intrinsic worth" until we appreciate heuer the nature of their proprietary wealth and the social identity and influence that stemmed from that wealth. Monetary inflation, they believed , threatened nothing leu than "the first principles of society." Paper money, Madison told his fellow Virginian legislators, was unjust, pernicious, and unconsti tutional. It was bad for commerce, it was bad for morality, and it was bad for society : it destroyed "confidence between man and man."
253 DEMOCRACY252
Therefore most gentry who stood up for credit and the honest payment of debts did not see themselves as just another interest in a pluralistic society. They were defending the onIy social order they could conceive of. "On one side," said Theodore Sedgwick, "are men of talents, and integrity, firmly determined to support public justice and private faith, and on rhe other there exists as firm adetermination to institute tender laws, paper money, . . . and in short to establish iniquity by law." These rentier or proprietary gentry could not fu11y understand the new kind of property that was emerging-venture capital; money borrowed, not lent; properry that was dynamic, ftuid, and risky. As far as they were concemed, alt the paper money and debtor-relief legislation of the states were simply the consequence of men using government to pro mote their private interests at the expense of the public good. Thus the revolutionary gentry began (0 appreciate for the first time what dernoc racy in America might mean-the prevalence of private interests in gov ernrnent."
Monarchies, of course, mingled public and private interests; indeed, they scarcely drew any distinction between public and private spheres of activity. But republics supposedly were different; they ideally embod ied a distinct public interest to which people would willingly surrender some of their private pecuniary interests. Now all that seemed in doubt. Although some of the revolutionary gentrylike Jefferson had hoped that ordinary farmers might be free of the interests and capri ces of the mar ketplace, others soon came to realize that the American people were not going to be virtuous and selftess and were not going to keep their private interests out of the public arena after a11. Washington, for one, quickly realized that to expect ordinary people, such "as compose the bulk of an Army," to be "inftuenced by any other principles than those of Inrerest, is to look for what never did, and I fear never will happen." Even most officers could not be expected to sacrifice their private inter ests and their families for the sake of their country. "The few, therefore, who act upon Principles of disinterestedness," Washington concluded, "are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the Ocean. "18
Everywhere in the war years and after, the revolutionary leaders were reluctantly forced to retreat from the republican idealism of Ins 76. Looking around at price-gouging farmers, engrossing merchants, and factious legislators, many could only conclude that private interest ruled most social relationships, It was "the only binding cement" be tween people. It was "the greatest tie one man can have on another." To expect most people (0 sacrifice their private interests for the sake of
lnterests
the public good was utopian. Republican citizens were apparently not aß that different from the subjects of monarchies. "We may preach till we are tired of the theme, the necessity of disinterestedness in republies, without making a single proselyte," wrote an unsentimental Alexander Hamilton in 1782. All Americans, it now seemed evident, could not be like Samuel Adams. It was too bad, but that was the way it was. Human beings were like that: their "engrossing motive was self-interest. "19
By the late 1780s many of the younger revolutionary leaders like James Madison were willing to confront thereality of interests in Amer ica with a very cold eye. Madison's Federalist No. 10 was only the most farnous and frank acknowledgment of the degree to which private inter ests of various sorts had come to dominate American politics. Madison and others were now willing to allow these diverse competing interests free play in the continent-sized national republic created by the new Constitution of 1787. But Madison and the Federalists,as the supporters of the Constitution of 1787 were called, were not modern-day pluralists. They still dung to the republican ideal of an autonomous public au thority that was different from the many private interests of the society. They did not expect this public authority of the new federal government to be neutralized into inactivity by the competition of these numerous diverse interests. Nor did they see public policy or the common interest of the national govemment emerging naturally from the give-and-take of these clashing private interests. They now knew that "the regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern Legislation," but they also hoped that by sliifting this regulation to the national level these private local interests would not be able to dominate legislation as they had in the states and become judges in their own causes. Far, then, from the new national govemment being a mere integrator and harmonizer of the different special interests in the society, it would become a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions and interests in the Stare.' And it would do so because the men holding office in the new central government would by their fewness of numbers be more apt to be disinterested gentry who were supported by proprietary wealth and not involved in the interest mongering of the marketplace.f"
Most of the revolutionary leaders, in other words, continued to hold out the possibility of virtuous politics. They retained the republican hope that at least a few, perhaps only those who were Washington's "drop in the Ocean, " still had sufficient virtue to become disinterested umpires and promote an exclusively public sphere of activity in government.
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Amid all the scrambling of private interests, perhaps only a few were capable of becoming founders and legislators who from their "com manding eminence . . . look down with contempt upon every mean or interested pursuit"; only a few were liberally educated and cosmopolitan]
I: \.
I
,
. I'
'
enough to have the breadth of perspective to comprehend all the diffe~' ent interests of the society; and only a few were independent and un biased enough to adjudicate among these different interests and advance the public rather than a private good."
Determining who these few were was one of the crucial issues in the debate over the formation of the Constitution. Many gentry shared the certainty of Charles Nisbet, president of Dickinson College, "that men of learning, leisure and easy circumstances . . . if they are endowed with' wisdom, virtue & humanity, are much fitter for every part of the busi ness of government, than the ordinary dass of people." But who were these extraordinary men? Hamilton was sure that he was one of thi. wise and virtuous elite, but nevertheless he lacked sufficient "easy cir cumstances" to remain leisured and entirely free of interested market place activities. As more than one friend pointed out to him, he, like many other hard-pressed gentlemen, had to live off "the hard earned profits of the law. " But, explained Hamilton, this necessity did not turn lawyers into tradesmen or artisans; being a lawyer was not an occupa tion and was different from other profit-making activities, It may have been true, he wrote in The Federalist No. 35, that mechanics, merchants, and farmers were deeply involved in the marketplace and therefore had interests to promote. This was not the case, however, with members of the learned professions. "They truly form no distinct interest in society" and thus were best suited to be politicalleaders. They "will feel a neu trality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry" and will be most likely to be "an impartial arbiter" among the diverse in terests and occupations of the society. Thus was reinforced a notion that has carried into our own time-that lawyers and other professionals are somehow free of the marketplace, are less selfish and interested and therefore better equipped for political leadership and disinterested decision-making than merchants and businessmen."
The new federal Constitution was designed to ensure that govem· . " mental leadership would be entrusted as much as possible to just those kinds of disinterested gentlemen who had neither occupations nor nar row mercantile interests to promote, "men who," in Madison's words, "possess most wisdom to discern and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society.' In an interest-ridden society the secret of good
Interests 255
govemment was to enlarge and elevate the national government, in the manner projected by the new federal Constitution of 1787, and thus screen out the kind of interested men who had dominated the state legisJatures in the 1780s-"men offactious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs" -and replace them with classically educated gen tlemen "whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice.' '23
With "the purest and noblest characters" of the society in power, Madison expected the new national government to play the same su prapolitical neutral role that the British king had been supposed to play in the empire. In fact, Madison hoped that the new federal govemment might restore some aspect of monarchy that had been lost in the Rev olution. In monarchies, he said, the king was sufficiently neutral toward his subjects, but often he sacrificed their happiness for his avarice or ambition. In small republics the government had no selfish will of its own, but it was never sufficiently neutral toward the various interests of the society. The new extended republic, said Madison, was designed to combine the good qualities of each. The new government would be "sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to con trol one part of the society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time suffieiently controlled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole society." That someone as moderate and as committed to republicanism as Madison should speak even privately of the benefits of monarchy adhering in the Constitution of 1787 is a measure of how disillusioned many of the revolutionary gentry had be come with the democratic consequencesof the Revolution."
Given this Federalist reasoning and these Federalist aims, it is not surprising that the opponents of the Constitution in 1787-88, or the Anti Federalists, as they were called, charged that the new federal system was aristocratically designed to "raise the fortunes and respectability of the well-bom few, and oppress the plebeians. "25 Because the Constitution seemed to be perpetuating the c1assical tradition of virtuous patrician leadership in government, the Anti-Federalists feit compelled to chal lenge that tradition. There was, the Anti-Federalists said repeatedly, no disinterested gentlemanly elite that could feel "sympathetically the wants of the people" and speak for their "feelings, circumstances, and inter ests. " That elite had its own particular interests to promote. However educated and elevated such gentry might be, they were no more free of the lures and interests of the marketplace than anyone else.!26
The consequences of such thinking were immense and indeed dev
257 256 DEMOCRACY
astaring for republican government. If gentlemen were involved in the I marketplace and had interests just like everyone else, they were really no different from all those common people-artisans, shopkeepers, trad ers, and others-who had traditionally been denied a role in political leadership because of their overriding absorption in their private occu pational interests. In short, the Anti-Federalists were saying that liber ally educated gentlemen were no more capable than ordinary people of classical republican disinterestedness and virtue and that consequently there was no one in the society equipped to promote an exclusive public interest that was distinguishable from the private interests of people.
One of the crucial moments in the history of American politics maybe the crucial moment-occurred in 1786 during several days of debate in the Pennsylvania assembly over the rechartering of the Bank of North America. The debate-the only important one we have re corded of state legislative proceedings in the I780s-centered on the role of interest in public affairs.
The principals in this debate were William Findley, a Scotch-Irish ex-weaver from western Pennsylvania and adefender of the debtor-relief and paper-money interests in the state, and Robert Morris, the wealth iest merchant in the state, ',Vith aristocratic aspirations and a major sup porter of the rechartering of the bank. Findley was precisely the sort of backcountry legislator whom gentry like Madison in the 1780s were ac cusing of being narrow, illiberal, and interested in the promotion of paper money and debtor-relief legislation. Now ~ with the issue of the rechartering of the bank, Findley had an opportunity to get back at his aristocratic accusers and he made the most of it. Morris and his genteel Philadelphia ilk had continually tried to pose as disinterested gentlemen in the classical mold, who were above crass marketplace interests and concemed only with the public good. Bur Findley and his western col leagues refused to let Morris and the aristocratic supporters of the bank get away with this pose. These supporters of the bank's rechartering, Findley charged, were themselves interested men; they were directors or stockholders of the bank and thus had no right to claim that they were neutral disinterested umpires only deciding what was good for the state. The advocates of the bank "feel interested in it personally, and therefore by promoting it they were acting as judges in their own cause. ' , Their defense of the bank, said Findley, revealed "the manner in which disappointed avarice chagrins an interested mind."
There was nothing new in these charges. To accuse one's opponent of being self-interested was conventional rhetorical strategy in eighteenth-
Interests
century debates. But Findley went on to pursue another line of argu ment that was new-startlingly new. He accepted Morris's and the other bank supporters' interestedness in the bank and found, he said, nothing unusual or im proper in their efforts to obtain its rechartering; as its directors and stockholders, after all, they could hardly be expected to do otherwise, and "Any others in their situation ... would do as they did." In sum, Morris and the other investors in the bank had every "right to advocate their own cause, on the floor of this house." But, Findley then continued, they had no right to protest when others realize "that it is their own cause they are advocating; and to give credit to their opinions, and to think of their votes accordingly." They had no right, in other words, to try to .pass off their support of their personal cause as an act of disinterested virtue. The promotion of interests in politics, suggested Findley, was quite legitimate, as long as it was open and aboveboard and not disguised by specious claims of genteel disin terestedness. The promotion of private interests was in fact what Amer ican politics ought to be about.
Findley was not content merely to expose and justify the reality of interest-group politics in representative legislatures. He glimpsed some of the important implications of such interest-group politics, and in just a few remarks he challenged the entire classical tradition of disinterested public leadership and set forth a rationale for competitive democratic politics that has never been bettered. If representatives were elected to promote the particular interests and private causes of their constituents, then the idea that such representatives were simply disinterested gentle men, squire worthies called by duty to shoulder the burdens of public service, became archaic. It may have been meaningful in the past, when such virtuous men did exist, for such a disinterested representative to make no effort on his own behalf and simply stand for election. But now, said Findley, in the democratic America of many interests where the candidate for the legislature "has a cause of his own to advocate, interest will dictate the propriety of canvassing for aseat. " Such interest group politics meant that politically ambitious men, even those with interests and causes to advocate, now could legitimately run and com pete for electoral office and thus become what Madison in Federalist No. 10 most feared-parties who were at the same time judges in their own causes."
Despite all the sarcasm and mingled emotion with wh ich Findley in 1786 put forward this radical suggestion, he was anticipating in this one statement all of the modern democratic political developments of the
25 8 DEMOCRACY
succeeding generation: the increased electioneering and competitive pol itics, the open promotion of private interests in legislation, the erner gence of parties, the extension of the actual and direct representation of particular groups in govemment, and the eventual weakening, if not the repudiation, of the classical republican ideal that legislators were supposed to be disinterested umpires stand ing above the play of private interests .
But it was not just the classical tradition of virtuous gentry leader ship that Findley and other backcountry and middling Anti-Federalists contested. Without realizing the full implications of what they were do ing, in the ratification debates over the Constitution they also called into question all the time-honored conceptions of society known to the rev olutionary leaders . To be sure , there were a number of Anti-Federalist aristocrats like George Mason and Richard Henry Lee who had a whig gish fear of centralized power but no desire to undermine the traditional order of society, Such Anti-Federalist southem gentry could not emo tionally speak for all the entrepreneurial and debtor forces of ordinary people that were emerging, particularly in the northern parts of Amer ica. But common Anti-Federalists like Melancron Smith and William Petrikin could ; they shared a whiggish fear of power with aristocrats like Lee and Mason, but they also had adesire to challenge both aristocratic leadership and the social order. To these plebeian Anti-Federalists, pull ing together at least two decades of intense polemies and developing reality, American society could no longer be thought of as either a hi erarchy of ranks or a homogeneous republ ican whole. Many of them , in fact, saw a society rnore pluralistic, more diverse, and more frag mented with interests than even someone as hardheaded and realistic as James Madison had. Society, they said, was not a unitary entity with a single common interest but a heterogeneous mixture of "many different dasses or orders of people, Merchants, Farmers, Planters, Mechanics, and Gentry or wealthy Men ," all equal to one another. In such a plu ralistic egalitarian society there was no possibility of a liberal enlightened elite speaking for the whole; men from one dass or interest could never be acquainted with the "Situation and Wants" of those from another. ••Lawyers and planters, " whatever their genteel pretensions, could never be "adequate judges of tradesmeu's concerns." The occupations and interests of the society were so diverse and discrete that only individuals sharing a particular occupation or interest could speak for that occupa tion or interest. It was foolish to tell people that they ought to overlook their loeal interests when loeal interests were all there really were. "No
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man when he enters into society, does it from a view to promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good." Since all .individuals and groups in the society were equally self-interested, the only "fair representation" in govemment, wrote the "Federal Farmer," ought to be one where "every order of men in the community . .. can have a share in it." Consequendy any American govemment ought "to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the Iegis lature, " Only an explicit form of representation that allowed Germans, Baptists, artisans, farmers, and so on each to send delegates of its own kind into the political arena could embody the democratic particularism of the emerging society of the early Republic .:a8
Momentous consequences eventuaJly ftowed from these Anti Federalist arguments. In these populist Anti-Federalist calls for the most explicit form of representation possible, and not in Madison's FtderaJist No . 10, lay the real origins of American pluralism and American interest group politics . The grass-roots Anti-Federalists concluded that, given the variety of competing interests and the fact that all people had inter ests, the only way for a person to be fairly and accurately represented in govemment was to have someone like hirnself with his same interests speak for hirn; no one else could be trusted to do so.
Ultimately, the logic of this conception of actual representation de termined that no 'one could be represented in govemment unless he had the right to vote. The interests of a person were so particular, so per sonal, that only by exercising the ballot could he protect and promote his interests, Election in America became the sole criterion of represen tation. Insofar as American palitics became localist and dominated by interest groups and calls for extending the suffrage. the Anti-Federalists prepared the way.
The Anti-Federalists lost the battle over the Constitution. But they did not lose the war over the kind of national govemment the United States would have for a good part, at least, of the next century. Their papular understanding of American society and politics in the early Re pubJic was too accurate and too powerful to be put down-as the Fed eralists themselves soon came to appreciate. Even the elections for the First Congress in 1788 revealed the practical realities of American dem ocratic life that contradicted the Federalists' classical republican dreams of establishing a government led by disinterested educated gentlemen .
Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania, astout Federalist, knew that the new congressmen from the state should be "rnen of knowledge and
DEMOCRACY260
information, well attached to the new plan and should have characters unexceptionable as to their integrity." If we had such men, he told a Federalist friend in 1788, it would not matter to "what profession or interest they belong." Unfortunately, however, outside of the city of Philadelphia' 'there are but few men who have abilities and leisure and are fit objects for choice." There were simply not enough educated and disinterested gentlemen spread about the state; which is why Federalists in Pennsylvania, like those in several other states, urged that congress men be elected at large instead of by districts: "you have a better chance of obtaining good men than obliging the electors to vote for separate Representanves in districts.' '29 Because the Federalists in Pennsylvania soon realized that cosmopolitan and disinterested college-educated gen tlemen for representatives "cannot easily be found," they began advo cating representation that was as interest-ridden as that promoted by the Anti-Federalists. Northumberland County Federalists, for example, urged in October 1788 "that different men adapted to the different in terests" of the state be chosen for Congress: four involved in agriculture, two in commerce, "one person remarkably attached to the principles of rnanufactures, and an eminent law character. "3°
But none of this interest-group participation in Pennsylvania politics had the political explosiveness of the issue of German representation. The Germans constituted about one-third of the population of Penn sylvania, hut had never had numbers in govemment commensurate with their size in the state. Suddenly in the election of 1788 for the new federal Congress and the presidential electors, agitators raised the issue of proportional German representation in the new government and touched off a furor in Pennsylvania's politics. Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists scrambled to place a couple of German names on their tickets for Congress and for the presidential electors. But once aroused, German dissatisfaction "at having so small a representa tion' could not be appeased. Some tried to resist this ethnic pressure by pointing to its apparent logical absurdity and asked why the Ger mans should be singled out for attention. "If any national distinctions can possibly be made in the future laws of the empire, why are not these anxious writers equally concemed for the Scotch and the Irish? Why are they not desirous that they also should have their due pro portion of federal representation?" Such "invidious distinctions" among the citizenry were ridiculous. But it soon became clear that these distinctions of ethnicity, as well as those of occupation and religion, were here to stay. The Germans, voting very much as a bloc, went
Inttrests 261
on in 1788 to elect three German congressmen from Pennsylvania every German candidate they could find on the Federalist and Anti Federalist tickets."
The situation in Pennsylvania was exaggerated-because of the particular heterogeneity of the state; but it was only an exaggeration of what was present elsewhere in America, particularly in the North. 32
America's democratic future of local politics, special interests, ethnic voting, and popular electioneering was already hurdling the great heights of the extended republic of 1788-Sg. Even Anti-Federalist and later Re publican William Findley made it into the Second Congress. From the outset Madison' s republican remedy for republican ills did not work as weIl as he and other Federalists had hoped.
For that reason Madison' s remedy of an elevated and extended re public in 1787 seemed much too mild and insufficient for many Feder alists in the 1790s worried about the spread of what Alexander Hamilton called "the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit, "33 So deeply pessimistic over the interest-ridden and unvirtuous reality of American society were many of the Federalists of the 179Os-who clung to the name used by the supporters of the Constitution in 1787-88-that in filling out the new national govemment they went way beyond Mad ison's "strictly republican" remedy and sought to bring back some of the basic characteristics and adhesives of monarchical society that many revolutionaries had thought they had gotten rid of in 1,-,6 once and for all.
Despite their fears of democracy, however, the Federalists and even their leader Hamilton were not monarchists. Although in the Philadel phia Convention Hamilton had "acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Govemment," he had no stake in claims of blood and had no intention of retuming to the monarchical and patri archal politics of the ancien regime in which govemment was treated as a source of personal and family aggrandizement. Still, he and the other Federalists did believe that some monarchical surrogates had to be found to strengthen govemment in order to keep the unvirtuous American people from ftying apart in licentious pursuits of happiness. "The mass of men," observed John Jay, "are neither wise nor good, and virtue, like the other resources of a country, can only be drawn to a point and exerted by strong circumstances ably managed, or a strong govemment ably administered. "3+
By the 1790S the Federalists had no confidence left in the radical enlightened hope that governmental power was, in Hamilton' s derisive
262 DEMOCRACY
words, a mere "consequence of the bad habits which have been pro duced by the errors of ancient systems" and therefore not ultimately necessary for holding society together. Although many of the artisan and plebeian followers of the Republicans were quite willing, like the Federalists, to recognize the prevalence of interests, most of their lead ers, and Jefferson especially, still held out hopes that virtue and the natural sociability of people were the best social adhesives. In Hamil ton's view, however, these hopes were nothing but delusions. The idea that, "as human nature shall refine and ameliorate by the operation of a more enlightened plan" based on a common moral sense and the spread of affection and benevolence, government eventually "will be come useless, and Society will subsist and ftourish free from its shack les," was a "wild and fatal ... scheme," even if its Republican "votaries" like Jefferson did not push such a scheme to its fullest.35
The Federalists thus repudiated the emerging jeffersonian Repub lican view that the best government was the least govemment. Hamilton believed deeply in the "need" for "a eommon directing power" in government, and had only contempt for those who thought trade and other private interests could regulate themselves. "This is one of those wild speculative paradoxes," he said, "which have grown into credit among us, eontrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most en lightened nations. . . . It must be rejected by every man aequainted with commercial history . "36
In plaee of the impotent confederation of separate states that had existed in the 1780s, the Federalists aimed to build a strong, consoli dated, and prosperous "fiscal-military" state in emulation of eighteenth century England, united "for the aecomplishment of great purposes" by an energetic government eomposed of the best men in the society. Like Madison, Hamilton reeognized and aceepted the prevalence of eco nomic and commercial interests in the society, but he sought to use the national government to harness these interests for the ereation of a European-like great power of a sort that Madison had never antici pated.F As Secretary of the Treasury, he was undoubtedly concemed with the eommercial prosperity of the country-with promoting "the great interests of a great people"-but we make amistake to see him as a capitalist promoter of America's emerging business culture.f He had as mueh contempt for the vulgarity and selfishness of that popular business eulture as did Madison. Hamilton was very much the aristo cratie eighteenth-century statesman-willing to allow ordinary people
lntetests 26 3
their profits and property, their interests and their pursuits of happiness, but wanting honor and glory for himself and for the United Stares.
To achieve that honor and glory Hamilton deliberately set out to "corrupr" American society, to use monarch-like governmental influ ence to tie existing commercial interesrs to the govemment and to create new hierarchies of interest and dependency that would subseitute for the absence of virtue and the apparently weak republican adhesives existing in America. "What other chain," asked Federalist congressman Chris topher Gore, would be •'so binding as that involving the interests of rhe men of property in the prosperity of the Govemment"?39 In local areas Hamilton andthe Federalist leaders built up followings among Revo Jutionary War veterans and members of the Society of the Cincinnati. They appointed imponant and respectable Jocal figures to the federal judiciary and other federal offices. They exploited the patronage of the Treasury Department .and its 800 or more customs officials, revenue agents, and postmasters with particular effectiveness. The Federalists carefully managed the Bank of the United Stares and the national debt to connect interested individuals to the government. By 1793 or so the Federalists had fonned groups of "friends of government" in most of the states. Their hierarchies of patronage and dependency ran from the federal executive through Congress down to the various localities. In the eyes oftheir jeffersonian Republican opponents the Federalists seemed to be taking Americans back to the monarchy that had been repudiated in 1776.
Although Hamilton later denied, rather defensively, that he had ever made interest the weightiest motive behind his financial program, there is no doubt that he thought the debt and other financial measures would strengthen the national government "by increasing the number of lig aments between the Government and rhe interests 01' Individuals. "tO He agreed with the Scottish political economist Sir james Steuart that "sclf interesr . . . is the main spring and the only rnotive which astatesman should make use of, to engage a free people to concur in the plans which he lays down for their government." Unfortunately for the Federalists, however, Hamilton auempted to tie the government largely ro the hold ers of traditional aristocratic proprietary wealth-"who are in every society the only firm supporters of government"-and ultimately ig nored the new multiplying dynamic commercial interesrs of those who worked for a living-commercial farmers, artisans, manufacturers, ernerging entrepreneurs, and risk-taking businessmen, panicularly of
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the mid-Atlantic states, who consequently ended up in the Republican opposition."
Hamilton' s dream of making the United States a great fiscal-military state dissipated in the face of America's emerging democratic society. It 'I failed not simply because it was overwhelmed by the Jeffersonian Re 'j publicans and their waves of new entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, but, more irnportant, because it was ultimately undone by the Feder alists themselves.
Hamilton and other Federalist leaders hoped to promote anational " public interest that transcended all the petty local concerns of the soci ety. Yet by resting their government so completely on the assumption that most people were self-interested and absorbed in their private af fairs, the Federalists laid virtually no civic foundations for their scheme and weakened their ability to justify their peculiar disinterested leader ship against the repeated charges of their Anti-.Federalist and later Re publican opponents that they were as interested as everyone else in the society. The Federalists' claims of being truly disinterested and the only rigtitful rulers in the society thus came to depend on their remaining scrupulously uncorrupted, free of even the taint of using government to further their own private interests.
Yet many of the Federalist leaders themselves, including subcabinet officials and congressmen, were deeply involved in speculative schemes and were busy making money out of their public connections and of fices. In the 1790S many congressmen, especially Federalists from the North, found, as had many army officers and other officeholders du ring the Revolutionary War, that their proprietary wealth did not provide sufficient earnings for them safely to ignore or neglect their private af fairs; and consequently they either had to exploit their offices for profit or had to absent themselves from their responsibilities. Senator William Maclay saw at the outset what was happening in the new Congress. I' I came here expecting every man to act the part of a God," he confided to his diary in August 1789. "That the most delicate Honor, the most exalted Wisdom, the refined Generosity was to govern every Act and be seen in every deed." Instead, he found only too often "rough and rode manners Glaring folly, and the basest selfishness, apparent in al most every public Transaction ." At a crucial moment during the debate over the assumption of state debts, Federalist congressman Theodore Sedgwick complained that Thomas Fitzsimmons and George Clymer were absorbed in their private affairs in Philadelphia, while Jeremiah
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Wadsworth of Connecticut "has thought it more for his interests to speculate than to attend his duty in Congress, and is gone horne. "42
Hamilton knew that many public officials were using their connec tions to get rich, but he did not want to be one of them. In 1795, at a time when he was very much in need of money and out of public office, his elose friend Robert Troup pleaded with hirn to get involved in busi ness, especially in speculative land schemes, Everyone else was doing it, said Troup. "Why should you object to making a little money in a way that cannot be reproachful? Is it not time for you to think of putting younelf in astate of independence? " Troup even joked to Hamilton that such moneymaking schemes might be "instrumental in making a man offortune-I may say-a gentleman ofyou. For such is the present insolence of the World that hardly a man is treated like a gentleman unless his fortune enables hirn to live at his ease."
But Hamilton refused. "Saints," he said, might get away with such profit-making, but he knew he would be denounced by his Republican opponents as just another one of those "speculators" and "peculators.' He had to refuse "because, " as he sardonically put it, "there must be some public fools who s~crifice private to public interest at the certainty of ingratitude and obloquy-because my vanity whispers I ought to be one of those fools and ought to keep myself in a situation the best cal culated to render service.' '43 Hamilton elung as long and as hard to the elassical conception of leadership as anyone in post-revolutionary Amer ica. Unfortunately for the Federalists, however, Hamilton's elassical vi sion of aristocratic leadership required more than just himse1f and Washington, more than just a handful of farsighted, cosmopolitan, and great-souled gentlemen who remained virtuous and above the concerns of crass moneymaking.
To be sure, other members of the Federalist aristocracy often tried their best to live up to the elassical image of being disinterested leaders standing above the marketplace of interests. Many sought to become landed gentry in the English or Virgilian manner; indeed, in the early decades of the Republic' s history establishing a seat in the country be came something of a mania, especially among the New England gentry. In the mid-1790s congressman and lawyer Joshua Coit of Connecticut sold his two-acre homestead in New Londo~ and purchased a nine hundred-acre livestock farm in Montville in order to try out his "uto pian ... schemes of a Country Life." Only then, he said, could he realize his dream of "Independence, I' and thus real gentility, and enjoy
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nature and experiment, georgic style, with Lombardy poplars and new grasses suggesred by the Connecticut Agricultural Society. But the live stock farm proved too expensive, and he had to seil it and eventually settle for something much smaJler than even his original homestead. Similar financial pressures constrained even wealthy Chrisropher Gore of Massachuseus from realizing his genteel dreams. Fisher Ames thought that Gore would have to forgo retiring to his Waltham estate for a while and take up his law praetiee onee again if he were to keep up the style of life appropriate to agentieman of his rank. Being a gentleman, par tieularly a landed gentleman, demanded money. "A man may not in cline to take a certain degree on the seale of genteel living." Ames told Gore, "but having once taken it he rnust mainrain it. "+4
Other Federalists in the 1790S likewise sought to seeure themselves by acquiring various SOTtS of proprietary wealth. Some moved into the new territory of the West with dreams of establishing landed ernpires for themselves on the banks of the Ohio, and others remained in the cities of the East and simply speculated in land; but all desperately sought to do what Adam Smith suggested disinterested gentry leaders must do-get money as landlords without direct exertion in the rnar ketplace. But land in the New World was a far riskier investment than it was in Europe, and important Federalists in the 17905, including Rob en Morris, senator from Pennsylvania, Henry Knox, Seeretary of War under Washington. and James Wilson, justiee of the Supreme Court, ended their ventures in land speculation in bankruptcy and disgraee, and in some eases debtors' prison .•5
These numerous bankruptcies and financial collapses in the 17905 contributed greatly to the democrarization of Ameriean society. All the many failures of "those who eall thernselves Gentlemen," noted con ternporaries, destroyed that paternalistic "eonfidence in men of reputed fortunes and prudence as used to exist," and opened up opportunnies in business and government for new men, usually RepubJicans, less weil educated, less liberal, less cosmopolitan, and less well-bred, men who by the traditional standards of rank were very ordinary indeed, "men, who," in the opinion of Oliver Wolcotr, Secretary of the Treasury under John Adams. "possessed neither capital nor experience " and not even the inclination to be disinterested. The problem of the Federalist gentry in the 17905 was the perennial problern of American society: America's aristocraey simply did not have suffieient private means to act the publie part of a classical aristocracy. Those skeptical of the appointment of James Wilson to the Supreme Court could indeed make mueh of "the
Itueresu 267
deranged state ofhis Affairs," admitted Benjamin Rush in 1789. "But," he asked, "where will you find an American landholder free from em barrassments?" The financial chaos of the 1780s and the states' and the Confederation' s inability to pay their debts in full had "reduced all our wealthy men to the utmost distress" and had "thrown a great part of their property into the hands of quartermasters-Amsterdam jews, & London brokers. "46 lronically, only the South, which provided much of the Republican leadership opposed to the Federalists, was able to mains tain a semblance of a traditional leisured patriciate.
So much did private interests come to pervade the halls of Congress and the corridors of the various statehouses that many Americans found it harder and harder to conceive of disinterested leadership anywhere in the society. John Adams, for example, came to accept the inevitable presence of diverse interests in the society, though he believed they all could be reduced to two-"persons and property" or "democracy and aristocracy. " These competing private interests might then be embodied in the two separate houses of the legislature, with the governor or ex ecutive, the only truly disinterested figure left in the state, holding the balance between the two. No wonder people accused Adams of being a crypto-monarchist: his conception of an independent disinterested ex ecutive standing above and balancing all the interests of the society was as dose to a monarchy as a republic could get.
All the talk of affection and benevolence between people and nations many Federalists now dismissed as sentimental claptrap. Calls in the Senate for expressions of gratitude for France's contribution to Ameri ca's independence were shouted down. "Nothing but interest," it was said, "governed all nations." Hamilton acknowledged that gratitude might exist between individuals, as the emotional response of aperson to a benevolent and disinterested service; but nations acted only out of self-interest, The "best lesson in moral philosophy," wrote Hugh Henry Brackenridge sarcastically in his comic novel Modern Chivtdry, was "to expect no gratitude." Even gratitude itself, that sublime ancient repub lican sentiment, actually seemed to be more and more a "selfish rule of action" that commands us to prefer and honor men "not for their worth, but that they did us service." Interest, however disguised, now seemed to dominate all social relations.v
The revolutionaries' aim had been to keep private interests out of govemment; by the 179Os, however, many had come to accept the prev alence of in terests everywhere. Even some spokesmen for the aristocratic planters of the South lost the capacity to imagine a govemment that did
268 DEMOCRACY
not embody private interests of one sort or another. The polemical writ ings of Timothy Ford of South Carolina in 1794 reveal the remarkable extent to which special interests were overwhelming the republican as sumptions of 1776.
Ford spoke for the Tidewater slaveholding planters who were wor ried about the massive migration of small Scotch- Irish farmers into the backcountry of Carolina. After several decades of migration, these small backcountry farmers, most of whom as yet did not own slaves, were damoring for representation in the state legislature proportionate to their numbers. The minority of eastern slaveholding planters feared they would be swamped by any such reapportionment. Ford aimed to pre vent this.
Ford's argument is interesting in more ways than one. In the colo nial period a conservative like Ford would have justified the unequal representation in the Carolina legislature by referring to the concept of virtual representation: that the backcountry settlers did not need addi tional representatives because the educated and cosmopolitan planting elite of Charleston spoke for the whole Carolina community and virtu ally, if not explicitly, represented everyone. But by 1794 with the weak ening of patronage connections and the diversification of interests such an argument was becoming harder to make.
Instead, Ford argued that the society of South Carolina was made up of different private interests-merchants, farmers, planters, manu facturers-but that the Tidewater slaveholding planters constituted a particularly important interest. Indeed, Ford thought their interests were so "great and peculiar" that they could never be put under the legis lative control of a mere numerical majority composed of people sepa rated from the eastern planters geographically and 'I strangers to our interests. " Interest as a motive for human behavior was in fact so streng that for the planters to place their concerns under the majoritarian power of contrary interests "would probably be fatal unto us at some time or another. " Therefore out of "mere self-preservation' the planters had to stand againstthe simple notion of one man, one vote.t"
Ford's argurnent not only anticipatedJohn C. Calhoun's later efforts to describe concurrent majorities, but it resembled the arguments that other conservatives, frightened by the democratic power of numbers, attempted over the next two or three decades. Perhaps the best known of these are the argurnents of Chancellor James Kent and his Federalist colleagues in the New York convention of 1820-21 called to revise the state constitution.
Imerests 269
In the face of widespread enthusiasm for universal manhood suf frage, Kent and the other Federalists desperately sought to maintain a special freehold qualification for the electors of the state senate. Ten years ago, said Kent, such universal suffrage would never have been proposed, but "so rapid has been the career of our vibration" that few now could resist bowing "before the idol of universal suffrage. " In their tortured polemies the Federalists tried to explain why special property qualifications for the senate's electorate were needed: that the senate had to be differently composed, that the property qualification was "a sort of moral and independent test of character, in the electorate, which we could get at in no other practicable mode," that it was the only way to protect the state against the onrushing rabble. But when confronted with Republican arguments that such a distinction in the electorate was , 'an odious remnant of aristocracy" perpetuating a privileged order in a republic where "there is but one estate-the people," the Federalists backed away and soon settled on the one point they thought their J ef fersonian opponents would accept-the wholesomeness of yeomen farm ers and the need to protect their landed property and the "farming interest' , from other opposing interests.w
Arguing that a specially elected senate was necessary to protect landed property or the "farming interest" was symptomatic of how rnuch Americans were not only abandoning the eighteenth-century das sical tradition of disinterested representation but also changing the meaning of property. Indeed, the entire Revolution could be summed up by the radical transformation Americans made in their understand ing of property. In dassical republican thought, property, landed prop erty in particular, was not some special interest needing representation or protection. Rather , property had been considered in proprietary terms as part of a person's identity and the source of his authority. Such proprietary property was regarded not as the product of one's labor or as a material asset to be bought and sold in the market but as a means of maintaining one's gentility and independence from the caprices of the market. Landed property was the most important such guarantee of autonomy because it was the least transitory, the most permanent form, of property. Such proprietary property was designed to protect its hold ers from external influence or corruption, to free them from the scram ble of buying and selling, and to allow them to make impartial political judgments. But by making landed property merely another "interest" among all the other market interests to be promoted or protected, Kent and the other Federalists unwittingly stripped property of its older sanc
DEMOCRACY27°
tified, static meaning and turned it into a mere material possession or capital commodity. They thereby conceded the northern Republicans' more modern understanding of property at the outset-that property " was changeable, based on people's labor, and "essential to our temporal I happiness. "50
If property had become just an "interest,1t a mere material posses sion, just venture .capital, then, the Republicans said, everyone had an equal right to acquire it, for "the desire of acquiring property is a uni versal passion." Such property could no longer be an integral part of a person's identity; instead it was "only one of the incidental rights of the person who possesses it," important no doubt, but scarcely requiring specific representation in a branch of the legislature. In fact, "compared with our other essential rights," property was "insignificant and tri fting." The Declaration of Independence, said the New York Republi cans, had mentioned the rights of " 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' -not of property. " In these enterprising times there could be no distinction between real and personal property. Modern property, including land, was exelusively the product of a person's labor and en trepreneurial skills; it was commercial, dynamic, and unpredictable and could have little to do with his independence. "Independence consists more in the structure of the mind and in the qualities of the heart.' , Besides, the Republicans asked, how could a moral position be "guar anteed by dollars and cents?"sJ
In the end, the New York Republicans of 1820 could only gaze in amazement ar the Federalists' inability to comprehend the new society they lived in. Did they not know that "the course of things in this ' country is for the extension and not the restriction of popular rights"? And did they not know that "our community is an association of per sons-of human beings-not a partnership founded on property' '? The Republicans had "supposed that the great fundamental principle that all men were equal in their rights was settled, forever settled, in this country. " Hence why would the Federalists try to stand against those who advanced "with the fearless confidence of an advocate of the real and substantial rights of the people"? By 1820, if not before, there was little place left in America for old-fashioned aristocrats who talked against what Kent still had the temerity to call "the evil genius of democracy.Y"
The Assault on Aristoaa&y 27'
15. The Assault on Anstocracy
Ultimately the weakness of the American aristocracy, ar least in the North, was the source of its down fall. Sy the first decade of the nine teenth century attempts by aristocrats and would-be-aristocrats, espe cially those north of the Mason-Dixon line, to justify their political leadership had become increasingly desperate. With the weakening and disappearance of older forms of patronage, with the expansion of corn merce and the ftuctuating redistributions of wealth, with the spread of paper money and the widening commercial opportunities for plain and "rniddling" men everywhere, the gentry's position in northern society became more and more anachronistic. By the end of the eighteenth century the Federalist leaders, relatively speaking, had already lost most of the substantial economic and social power thar had made aristocracies traditionally viable. By 1800 the Federalists existed essentiallyon bor rowed time and what Abraham Bishop of Connecticut called the peo ple's "habit of following these great men faithfully as hounds do the horn.'
Bishop did his best to break this habit of "dormant acquiescence " in the people.' In fact, in the years surrounding the election of Jefferson to the presidency, Bishop launched aseries of attacks on the Federalist gentry that were the most vicious and devastating of any made in the entire period of the early Republic.
Bishop, whom the Federalists called "a monstrous oddity in the world, " was an unlikely critic of aristocracy. 1 He was the son of are spected citizen and sometime mayor of New Haven, a 1778 graduate of Yale, and a lawyer who had c1erked in Philadelphia-e-in short, a liberally educated gentleman who had even gone on a grand tour of Europe in the 1780s. He returned to oppose the federal Consrirution, hold a few petty offices in New Haven, teach school, lecture, and marry, before ernerging as one of the greatest popular dernagogues in American his tory, Whatever private demons he had within hirn were unleashed on the bewildered and frightened Federalist gentry of Connecticut.
In aseries of speeches and parnphlets designed for audiences of or dinary people, Bishop, like other Republican polemicists in the 179os, accused the Federalists of aiming at monarchy. They were rhe sort "who wish for a season when congress shall be opened with a speech from the throne to my Lords and Gentlemen ... or they wish to hear of brilliant
273 272 DEMOCRACY
lives, and splendid drawing rooms. " They were those who "trade under the firm of Great men and company.' They yearned for a hierarchy and a distinction of ranks, which were among the "first objects" of monarchy. They had persuaded people in government to support mea sures, "if not by offices and bribes, yet by hopes of office, of emolu ments, of honors and inftuence. n The Federalists had used patronage and placemen in elections to engage "a host of expectants' and "sy cophants and dependents,' and they had built a financial structure that was "a British funding system, Americanized. "3
AU this was standard Republican rhetoric, and it was hardly what made Bishop's speeches and pamphlets remarkable. What did set them off from other Republican polemies was his acutely modern understand ing of culture. Bishop realized, far more clearly than most of his con temporaries, that all that people thought and believed was a "mere human invention." No doubt, he said, Americans could look to the Far East and pity the ignorance of millions bowing to sticks and stones and adoring idols that they themselves had created; yet at the same time these Americans "seldom reftect that all our rights of conscience and opinion, that all our powers and faculties are in astate of most absolute subordination to mere human inventions."! Bishop thus set out, as we might say today, to "deconstruct" his culture, to bring to the surface and challenge those unspoken premises of the society that supported all those feelings of inferiority and inequality still existing everywhere de spite the republican revolution. Ir the culture were truly man-made, as the revolutionaries had suggested, then Bishop meant to have ordinary people make it over in their own interest.
Many Americans, particularly Southerners, said Bishop, might wonder about the existence of aristocracy in Connecticut "where the distinction of rank is hardly known." But they did not know the reality of the thing. There were great men in Connecticut as elsewhere, 'Omen whose elevated birth or talents have raised them to elevated stations and given them an immense influence over the people."
Every country is divided into two classes of men-one which lives by the labor of the head, and the other by the labor of hands; each claims, that Üs services are the hardest and most important; the first professes great zeal for public good, and means nothing by it; the last does his days work, makes 00 professions, but brings his produce to the best markets. The first always governs the last either by deceit or force.
The Assault on Aristocracy
Deceit is the mildest way, but it requires great labor and management; force is surest.5
Bishop aimed to expose these great men for what they were deluders and deceivers who were busy leading people down the garden path to monarchy. It would not be easy, he knew, to "break through the thick folds of error and imposture with which the friends of order keep the great part of mankind encompassed." The great were masters ar creating feelings of inferiority and inequality among the common people. "You have been taught," he told the people, "to reverence your 'friends of order.' " That "humiliation" that ordinary people feIt in the face of "wealth and power ... has been," said Bishop, "a leading cause of all the slavery on earth. "6
Bishop wanted the people to understand that all their feelings of inferiority and humiliation, that all that made them bow their heads and doff their caps in front of gentlemen, that indeed the whole cuIture that sustained rule by the gentry elite, were "delusions," "delusions" fab ricated by all "the great, the wise, rich, and mighty men of the world" "delusions" invented and maintained by all those "weil fed, weil dressed, chariot rolling, caucus keeping, levee revelling federalists." These were the agents of delusion, these so-called gentlemen, that "one tenth of the society" who claimed superiority over the rest. Over and over again Bishop asked his audiences: Why should the nine-tenths of ordinary people look up "with fear and awe" to these "deceiving few"?7
What is most extraordinary about Bishop's attack on the Federalist aristocracy is his concession, made at the outset, that this aristocracy was indeed superior to common, ordinary people in every way-in wealth, in birth, in private character, in intellect, in education. These gentry are, he said, "the best informed men in the society." They were well versed in history , in foreign languages, in political science. They were outwardly polite, liberally educated, and cosmopolitan-everything eighteenth-century gentlemen were supposed to be. But for these very reasons, Bishop charged, these gentry were not equipped to rule the society. Precisely because they were extraordinary rnen, they were hoth dangerous and unessential for repuhlican government. Ordinary people ought not to be ruled by men greater, wiser, and richer than they. "Through excessive indulgence we have already a number of men too great for a republic. How happens it," Bishop asked his audiences, "that these great men are so very fit to govern? Internal government is
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designed to control inordinate passions : great rnen are most proud, av aricious and tyrannical: will you then select these to curb pride , avarice and tyranny?" What! the great cry ou t: "Will you leave out men of abilities and put in the base-born to govern us?" Why not? said Bishop. Why shouldn 't the people mistrust the great? "The liberties of mankind were never destroyed by any other dass of men ." Do not the "base born " financially support th,e governrnem, and do they not thereby have a right ar least 10 " peep through the treasury docr "?"
The main point, said Bishop, was that these great rnen, these gen tlemen. these "self-stiled friends of order have. in all nations, been the cause of aIl the convulsions and distresses , which have agitated the world ." They fooled people with their "charming outs ides, engaging manners , powcrful address , and inexhausrible argument ." They de ceived them with their eloquence and skill in manipulating language. •'They know weIl the force and power of every word; the east , west, north and south of every serni-colon ; and can extract power from every dash ." They can prove conclusively that anational debt is a blessing or a curse. They "are able to say more and argue better on the wrong side of the question than the people are on either side of it. "9
The subjects of the gentry's guile were "the labering and subordi nate people throughout the world . Their toil goes to support the splen dor, luxury and vices of the deluders, or their blood flows to satiate lawless ambition." But Bishop was not content merely to list the con ventional vices of great men-their lust for power and wealth. He de tailed genteel tasres and behavior in a way designed to rankle -, Imagine, he said, "the luxurious courtier who must have his pease and salmon before the frost has left the earth, or the ice the river, and who loathes the sight of vegetable or animal food in the season of it; who rides in a gig with half a dozen lacqueys behind hirn ; who eurses every taverner, excommuriicates every cook, and hecks over the table because his eggs were not brought to hirn in apre-existent stale ." Such a man "can never have any opinion of the plebnans who are toiling to furnish the means of his splendor."
These gentry like to say that they are of you , Bishop told his audi- . :1 ences of common people, that their interests are the same as yours . Yes, "they art intktd cifJau, IJ he said, invoking an image that Edmund Burke had onee used to praise the aristocracy, in the same way that "the oak, which shades all the small trees and draws its nourishment from the roots, fis) apart of the grove." "Bur by cireumstances of fortune , birth or superior bestowments of mind, or better education they have ceased
i
,
,
The Assault on AristocTaty
to be as you; their political condition is immensely variant from yours, they are to govern, you are to be governed. They are weil-born, you are base-bom!" 10
These superior sorts speak of honor and glory, but they look only to "what they can turn to their personal advantage." These Federalists talk of energetic govemment and national greatness, but this was only to milk the people at every turn. They take the people's money in taxes to pay for this government at a cbst of $42,000 a day. They have made the national debt "a standing dish." Washington, D .C ., "begun on a system rivalling in expense and magnificence ancient Babyion, has been a sink for your money." Beware of this de1uding aristocratie rhetoric about genius and glory, wamed Bishop. "A nation whieh makes great ness its polestar can never be free." The wars that the heroic gentry exult in are paid for by the blood and treasure of ordinary people . ••In war the great do not fight: they are either in the cabinet or on sorne distant hill, directing the carnage." Only "plain men like yourselves, " on both sides, do the fighting. We are told of naval glory, but know
that privates must bleed by the thousands for the glory of admirals, comrnodores, and port captains; that the only glory to which the sailor or marine can arrive, is to have his name printed in the papers and against it, "lIIigh badly jra&tuml, si'nt:t ampulaUd, and liktly to r«over, IJ and in a few months after, "braVtly fighting in tht main-top, eut in two by a ehain sMt, " and just under it, "we are happy to announce that though not quite successful this time, yet tht admiral andojjicers Mt in high spirits and having put into Jamaica to refit, intend to look at them again. "
"Delusion!" said Bishop, "these are thy trophies." Strong stuff, by a man way ahead of his time. Bishop even called the naming of warships "hair-strokes of delusion. ""
This was the most outlandish assault made on aristocracy in these years, but it was scarce1y the only one. Indeed, it could have had little effect if it had not been backed up by many others. Everywhere in the early Republic northern aristocrats were besieged relemlessly, merci lessly, in print and in speeches, not only by alienated gentlemen Hke Bishop who had gone to Yale but, more important, by countless numbers of common ordinary people who had never been to college artisans, traden, and businessmen-and who themselves had feit the deprivations and humiliations of being common and ordinary and were bent on revenge. Such men were sick and tired of being dismissed as
•
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factious, narrow, parochial, and illiberal and were unwilling to defer any longer to anyone's politicalleadership but their own.
In 1797 George Warner, a sailmaker in New York, spoke for all the "tradesmen, mechanics, and the industrious classes of society" who for too long had considered "themselves of TOO LlTrLE CONSEQUENCE to the body politic. ,. In the early 1790S they organized themselves in mechan ics' associations and Democratic-Republican societies, and eventually they came to make up the body and sou1of the northern part of the Republican party. Everywhere in their extraordinary speeches and writ ings of these years, artisans, laborers, and proto-businessmen of all sorts vented their pent-up egalitarian anger at all those aristocrats who had scorned and despised them as swine and rabble-and allbecause they had "not snored through four years at Princeton." They urged each other to "keep up the cry against J udges, Lawyers, Generals, Colonels, and all other designing rnen, and the day will be our own." They de manded that people do their "utmost at election to prevent all men of talents, lawyers, rich men from being elected. "12 For a half century following the Revolution these common ordinary men stripped the northern gentry of their pretensions, charged them at every turn with being fakes and shams, and relentlessly undermined their capacity to rule. In the end they transformed what it meant to be a gentleman and a political leader in America. Here in this destruction of aristocracy, includingJefferson's "natural aristocracy," was the real American Rev olution-a radical alteration in the nature of American society whose effects are still being feh today.
Most of the critics of aristocracy in these years were different from Abraham Bishop-not estranged college-educated gentry, but artisans, businessmen, and common people-and they took a different tack from that of Bishop. Most were intent on showing not the differentness of the aristocracy, not their separateness from ordinary people, as Bishop had, but rather the opposite: most sought to close the traditional and some times terrifying gap that had existed between common people and gen tlemen; they aimed to emphasize the similarity of the two groups and thus undermine the gentry's distinctiveness and privileges. To do so they attacked the most important aspect of what it was to be a gentleman in the classical tradition: the gentry's leisure, wh ich gave it both the time and the responsibility for public service.
Leisure, meaning not having to exert oneself for profit, had been for ages a principal source of gentry distinctiveness. It was this leisure that enabled the gentry aristocracy to stand above the competing interests of
The Assault on Aristocrtzty
the marketplace and at the same time obliged gentlemen to serve in govemment, ideally without pay. Now in the decades following the Rev olution this leisure was labeled idleness and was subjected to scathing criticism-criticism that went weil beyond anything experienced in En gland or Europe in these years. At the same time this assault on gentry idleness was coupled with a heightened appreciation of the significance and dignity of labor, which aristocrats traditionally had held in con tempt, Changes in the value of labor in turn affected the traditional aristocratic meaning of property. Property became associated less with proprietary wealth and the authority of its possessor and more with the labor that produced or improved it. The claims of speculators and ab sentee landlords to landed property, for example, came to have little legitimacy compared with the claims of those who actually worked and improved the land; the new moral value given to labor tended to over ride all mere legal titles to the land. '3
Before these developments ran their course in the second and third decades ofthe nineteenth century, there was nobody left, in the northern states at least, who dared publicly and proudly to claim that he did not work for a living. Not only did this celebration of work and disparage ment of idleness make the South with its leisured aristocracy supported by slavery seem even more anomalous than it had been at the time of the Revolution, thus aggravating the growing sectional split in the coun try; but these developments had as weil profound implications for the conception most Americans had of themselves as a working people.
The attacks on aristocratic idleness began early in the pre revolutionary debates. In the late I,ooS the Charleston mechanics were quick to respond to William Henry Drayton's incredulous dismissal of their right to participate in the decisions of government on the grounds that, as workers, they lacked a liberal arts education. The mechanics began, as all defenders of equality did in the late eighteenth century, with an appeal to that "common sense" of which nearly everyone in the society had aportion. But Mr. Drayton, they said, seemed to lack his portion, perhaps due to "his upper works being damaged by some rough treatment of the person who conducted his birth," and of course such a deficiency of common sense "cannot be compensated by all the learning of the schools." Mr. Drayton, "in his great condescention, " said the artisans in biting sarcasm, "has been pleased to allow us a piace arnongst human beings." But they were more than just members of the human species; they were in fact, they said, "the most useful people in a community." Which was more than they could say for "the polite
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Mr. Drayton. All he ever did was inherit a fortune. Can he really tt "claim any merit from his possessing an estate not obtained, or obtain able, by his own industry?" Ir Mr. Drayton had to earn his own bread "by the labour of either his head or his hands," could he do it? Was he in fact "qualified for any one sort of business that requires knowledge or skill to conduct it?" Maybe he could earn "a scanty pittance" as a packhorseman in the Indian trade, or as a common laborer to some mechanic, or "if he behaved weil," as a cartman in the city. But he could never be a carpenter, shoemaker, or butcher, though the mechan ics could "not deny, that he might contrive to help hirnself to a slice of a dead ox, when sharp set. "14
These were just the opening shots on behalf of common working people of what would become major barrages against aristocratic leisure in the coming years. Because we are the heirs of their democratic rise, it is difficult for us to appreciate the immense struggle these mechanics and artisans endured in establishing their self-esteem and worth in the face of the age-old scorn in which their me an occupations were held. Everywhere their claims of equality were rnet with genteel disbelief and "consummate and unbearing haughtiness. "15 Yet, in one of the great expressions of the democratic revolution of these years, they persevered and eventually transfonned American culture. They brought aristocratic leisure into contempt and turned labor into a universal badge of honor.
It became increasingly difficult for the gentry, even those in the South, to continue ro maintain the classical republican pose of being above commercial exertions and interests by their not having to work the way ordinary people did. Everyone in the society was now urged to work, and if he did not, then there was something wrong with hirn. Indeed, productive labor now came to be identified with republicanism and idleness with monarchy. "Monarchy delights in taking from the great body of labouring people their rank in being, by making the idle few so wealthy and powerful, as .to sink mediocrity unto contempt. tt Monarchy had "courtiers" and "sinecures" and men receiving "princely estates" for "trifling services." Republican governments, however, had no more officers than were necessary and "gives no rnore than enough to secure their services. '116
During the 1790s jeffersonian Republicans like Matthew Lyon la beled the Federalist gentry as men brought up "in idleness, dissipation and extravagance," and associated themselves with "the industrious part of the community." They saw American society divided between those who work and those who "live on the stock of the community,
The Assault on Aristoe,acy
already produced, not by Ihnr labor, but obtained by their an and cunning, or that of their ancestors. "17 The struggle, said William Manning, an uneducared New England farmer writing under the narne of "a La bourer, " was between the many and the few, based on "a Conceived Difference of Interest Between those that Labour for a Living and those that git a Living without Bodily Labour.' Those who did not have to do bodily work were "the merchant, phisition, lawyer & divine, the philosipher and school master, the Juditial & Executive Officers, & many others." These "orders of men," once they had attained their life of "ease & resr" that "at once creates a sense of superiority," wrote Man ning in phonetic prose that was real and not some gentleman' 5 satiric ploy, tended to "asotiate together and look down with two much con tempt on those that labour. " Although "the hole of them do not arnount to one eighth part of the people;" these gentry had the "spare time" and the "arts & skeems" to combine and consult with one another. They had the power to control the electorate and government "in a veriaty of ways." Some voters they Hatrered "hy promises of favours, such as being customers to thern, or helping them out of debt, or other difficultyes; or help them to a good bargain, or treet them, or trust them, or lend them money, or even give them a little money" -anything or everything if only "they will vote for such & such a man." Other voters they threatened: " 'if you don ' t vote for such & such a man,' or 'if you do' & cc, 'you shall pay me what you owe me,' or 'I will sew you'-'I will turne you out of my house' or 'off of my fann'-'I wont be your customer any longer' ... All these things have hin practised & may be again. " This was how the "few" exerted influence over the many.
Those who "live without Labour" (the phrase that Manning used over and over to identify the gentry) managed rhe governrnent and laws, making thern as "numerous, intricate and as inexplicit as possible," controlIed the newspapers, making them as "costly as possible;' and manipulated the banks and credit, so as to make "money scarse." es pecially since "the interests and incomes ofthe few lays chiefty in money at interest, rents, salaryes, and fees that are fixed on the nominal value ofmoney"; that is, they lived upon proprierary wealth. In addition these "few" were "always crying up the advantages of cosdy collages, na tional academyes & grammer schools, in order to make places for men to live without work, & so strengrhen their party. ,. In fact, wrote Man ning in 1798, ., alt the orders of men who live withoul Labour havc got so monstrously crouded with numbers & made it fashanable to live & dress so high, that Labour & produce is scarse." lVlanning ended his
..
281 280 DEMOCRACY
lengthy diatribe against all gentlemen of leisure by proposing, appro priately enough, to form "a Society of Labourers to be formed as near after the order of Cincinati as the largeness of their numbers will admit of. "18
All who lived by their labor, whatever their dissimilarities in our modern eyes, did feel as one. After all, gentlemen traditionally tended to lump together as commoners all those who worked for a living, even those who differed from each other as greatly as did Walter Brewster, a young struggling shoemaker of Canterbury, Connecticut, and Christo pher Leffingwell, a well-to-do manufacturer of NOIWich, Connecticut, who owned several mills and shops and was the town' s largest employer. Given their common meanness as workers who had to exert themselves for a living, men like Brewster and Leffingwell naturally allied in polit ical movements on behalf of artisans and understandably identified their "Iaboring interest" with "the general or common interest" of the whole state. Modern historians are often puzzled by such seemingly incongru ous alliances and feelings of identity among manufacturers who differed dramatically in their wealth and scale of activity: but this puzzlement results from anticipating the future too quickly. As great as the dis tinction between rich capitalist employers and poor workers would eventually become, in the early decades of the Republic large-scale manufacturers like Leffingwell and small craftsmen like Brewster still shared common resentments of a genteel world that had humiliated them and held them in contempt from the beginning of time. Nor should it be surprising that Joseph Williams, a mule trader, would take up the political cause of artisans and manufacturers such as Brewster and Lef fingwell. Although Williams was the richest man in Norwich (who had extorted from the town a seat in the Connecticut assembly by threat ening to move his business out of the community) and as a merchant had interests that were different from those of artisans and manufactur ers, he nevertheless identified with their loathing of the Federalist aris tocracy of Connecticut." Despite all the apparent differences between wealthy mule merchants, small shoemakers, and big manufacturers, so cially and psychologically they were still the same-which has caused no end of trouble for those modern historians looking to celebrate a heroie working dass but despising businessmen. Now in the aftermath of the Revolution all these workers and businessmen saw that their day was coming and joined the Jeffersonian Republicans in a democratic attack on all those gentlemen "who do not labor.' '20
So prevalent did this kind of rhetoric against gentlemen of Jeisure
The Assault on Aristocrag
become that now even southem slaveholding aristocrats feit compelled to identify themselves with hard work and productive labor. One of the most curious anomalies in American history was the way southern aris tocrats led by JefFerson and Madison assumed leadership of a Republi can party that in the North was composed mostly of unaristocratic sorts-common farmers, artisans, manufacturers, and hustling entre preneurs. The southern planters were able to link themselves with these ordinary working people in the North by stressing their common in volvement in productive labor in contrast to all those northern Federalist professionals, bankers, speculators, and moneyed men who never grew or made a single thing and lived off their proprietary wealth and other men' s labor.
Of course, once invoked, this celebration of productive labor could be used by others against the gentry slaveholders themselves. So profes sionallawyers in Virginia, struggling to gain control of the county courts from gentlemen amateurs, accused the planter aristocrats of being men raised to no "pursuit of honest industry." All this idle gentry had ever done was "Iearned to dress, to dance, to drink, to smoke, to swear, to game; contracted a violent passion for the very rational, elegant and humane pleasures of the turf and the cock-pit, and was long distin guished for the best horses and game-cocks in the country." Then again, lawyers found themselves open to a similar accusation: that they were unproductive parasites who lived off the cares and anxieties of others."
It is not surprising, therefore, that John Adams should have con cluded as early as 1790 that "the great question will forever remain, who sJuzlI work?" Adams hirnself continued to hold to the traditional distinc tion between the few gentry and the many commoners. Not everyone could be idle, he said; not everyone could be a gentleman. "Leisure for study must ever be the portion of a few. The number employed in govemment, must forever be very small." Adams was so keen on this point ofgentlemen and high public officials not working that on the voyage to Europe to become minister to Great Britain he, much to the surprise of foreign observers, "scorned working at the pump, to which a11 the other passen gers submitted in order to obviate the imminent danger of sinking, arguing that it was not befitting a person who had public status." To risk drowning rather than to lose one's honor as a gentle man speaks volumes about the power of these cultural imperatives. 22
Others answered Adams's question "who shall work?" by con cluding that, in America at least, all shall work. Gentlemen found themselves in an increasingly embarrassing position. As early as 1792,
28 3 DEMOCRACY282
Benjamin Rush confided to his commonplace book some of his subver sive and sarcastic thoughts on the problem of gentlemanly leisure suggesting just how constraining the traditional character of a gentleman was becoming even for members of the gentry themselves. Rush noted that John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, had forbiddcn "his preachers to affect to be, or even appear like gentlemen." "No wonder he gave such advice ,' said Rush, ••when we consider how that word is
abused in the world."
A man who has been bred a gentleman cannot work, . , , and there fort' he lives by borrowing without intending tO pavI or upon rhe pub lic or his Iriends. A gentleman cannot wait upon himsc1f, and therefore his hands and his legs are often as useless to hirn as if they were paralytic. Ir a mercham be agentieman he would sooner lose: 50 cus torners than be seen to carry a piece of goods across the street. Ir a Doctor should chance to be a gentleman he would rather let a patient die than assist in giving hirn a glyster or in bleeding hirn. lf a parson he loses his zeal erc. Ir a tradesman should happen to be a gentleman hc is undone for ever, by entertaining company, by a country seat, or by wishing to secure the society and good will of gentlemen by trusting them. In a word, to be a gentleman subjects one to the necessity of resenting injuries, fighting duels and the like, and takes away all dis grace in swearing, getting drunk, running in debt, getting bastards, etc, It makes nothing infamous but giving or taking the lye, for how ever much gendemen prctend to be men of their word, thev are the grealest lyers in the world. They lie to their creditors, 10 their mis tresses, to their fathers or wives, or 10 the public.
Rush concluded his diatribe by observing that everyone, men and women,
in every society ought to work.? Gentlemen had traditionally assumed that leisure, not having to work
for profit, was aprerequisite of their genteel status. Now, however, such gentlemen who were ••not . . . under the necessity of getting their bread by industry" were accused of living off "the labour of the honest farmers and mechanics." Their "idleness" resred on "other men' s toil." Gen tlemen who "do not labor, but who enjoy in luxury. the froits oflabor." had no right to "finally decide all acts and laws" as they had in the past because their "interest is at such a remove from the common interest. " Even in aristocratic South Carolina the classical republican demand that government should be run by rich, leisured gentlemen who served "without fee or reward" was met with growing scorn: "enormous
The Assault on Aristocracy
wealth," it was said, "is seldom the associate of pure and disinterested virtue. ' '24
By the early decades of the nineteenth century working in sorne useful occupation was widely regarded as the new source of farne. In fact, to the chagrin of traditionalists, talented workmen and inventors of carding machines were now receiving the public applause and civic wreaths that rightly and classically belonged to government leaders.P The popular biographer Parson Weems helped to make the philosopher and diplomat Benjamin Franklin into a nineteenth-century hero for ar tisans and other laboring people. Although in the traditional sense he had not worked a day in his life since the age of forty-two and had thoroughly adopted eighteenth-century gentry values, Franklin, as a onetime printer, was no doubt the founding father most easily trans formed into a workingman' s symbol. But even the aristocratic George Washington was not immune to the new cultural pressures. Weems celebrated Washington, too, as someone who worked as diligently as an ordinary mechanic, and in the process Weems helped to broaden and change the older meaning of work. In a classical sense Washington had been a farmer who had exercised authority over his farm but had not actually labored on it. But for Weems exercising authority now became identified with labor and was praised as labor. Indeed, he wrote, "of all the virtues that adomed the life of this great man, there is none more worthy of our imitation than his admirable INDUSTRY." Washington "displayed the power of industry more signally" than any man in his tory. Rising early and working hard alt day were the sources of his wealth and success. He was "on horseback by the time the sun was up," and he never let up; "of all that ever lived, Washington was the most rigidly observant of those hours of business which were necessary to the successful management of his vast concerns." "Neither hirnself nor any about him were allowed to eat the bread of idleness, " idleness being for Weems "the worst of crimes." Weems, speaking to the rising new generation of entrepreneurs, businessmen, and others eager to get ahead, was anxious to destroy the "notion, from the land of lies," which had "taken too deep root among some, that 'labour is a low-lived thing, fit for none but paor people and slaves! and that dress and pleasure are the only accomplishments for a gentleman!' " He urged all the young men who might be reading his book, "though humble thy birth, low thy fortune, and few thy friends, still think of Washington, and HOPE. "26
Distinctions were now so regularly drawn between "worthless idle" gentlemen and "the productive classes," between "the learned and the
285 28 4 DEMOCRACY
wealthy" and "the free laboring people . . . struggling to get a little forward in the world, and educate their children," that gentlernen who wanted a political career found it next to impossible to justify leisure in traditional genteel terms." No wonder would-be aristocrats like Edward Everett pleaded with so-called workingmen' s parties to believe that for mer gentlemen of leisure really were workingmen too . Even Dernosthe nes, Caesar, Bacon, Newton, Franklin, Wash ington, and Napoleon were all "hard workers." All value was in labor, said Everett in speech after speech and writing after writing. Man was a working being. "It is his destiny, the law of his nature to labor." "The Art of Being Happy, " wrote Everett, was not leisure, as the English character "Droz" had said, On the contrary, the secret to happiness was industriousness, im mersing oneself in business, even if that business involved the making ofmoney. Consequently, the new workingmen's parties that were being formed in the 1820S, said Everett, were no artificial, temporary contri vances Iike other parties; they were bound to last "to the end of time," for their "first principles are laid in our nature." In America at least, these workingmen's parties necessarily had to include everyone in the society who did an honest day's work, And everyone meant gentlernen and professionals as weil as artisans and common laborers . "Take the case of an eminent lawyer in fuH practice;" said Everett . "He passes his days in his office, giving advice to clients, often about the most uninteresting and paltry details of private business, or in arguing over the same kind of business in court . " He had no more leisure than a rnechanic . In fact, " lawyers, doctors, and ministers, men in public sta tion, rich capitalists, merchants, " were all "very much occupied with the duties of life." There was actually no difference in this regard be tween "the humblest laborer, who works with his hands," and gifted geniuses like Franklin , Newton, or Shakespeare, All workers, manual laborers and gentlernen, "however various their occupations," ern ployed both their minds and their bodies in their labor, and this united them "into one imerest."
It is remarkable, to say the least, to see the audacious ease with which Everett in these speeches and writings dissolved age-old distinc tions. Intellectual and bodily work, the liberal and mechanical ans , the leisured few and the laboring many, working for the public and working for profit-all these dassical divisions were now casually collapsed into a single category. Consequently , argued Everett , every honest worker in the society, induding a celebrated gentleman Iike Everett, was "en titled to the good fellowship of each and every other member of the
Ths Assault on Aristocracy
community; ... aJI are the parts of one whole, and ... between those parts, as there is but one interest, so there should be but one feeling. "211
Despite the heightened value placed on labor everywhere in the Western world in these years, this blurring of the ancient differences between leisured gentry and common workingmen was carried much further in America than elsewhere. And foreign visitors Jike Tocque ville, Michael Chevalier, and Francis Grund were surprised at what they found in the United States, at least outside of the South . The secret of America's prosperity, said Grund , was its celebration of work . Only in America had labor entirely lost its traditional association with mean ness and become fuUy respectable, Only in America was "industry ... an honor, and idleness a disgrace." In places such as Cincinnati, said Chevalier, it was hard to find members of "a leisure dass, living without any regular profession on their inheritance or on the wealth acquired by their own enterprise in early life." Of course, there were "many persons of wealth having one hundred thousand dollars or more," but these rich, even if they had been so inclined, were prevented Irom living a life of leisure by a culture that prized work and attacked idleness. Ev erywhere in northern America, said Chevalier, there was "a constant and unrelaxing devotion to labor." In England, businessmen worked only in the morning and played at being a traditional gentleman the rest of the day. But "the American of the North and the Northwest whose character sets the tone in the United Stares is perrnanently a man of business, he is always the Englishman of the morning. "29
Tocqueville reached the same startling conclusion. In America, he said, "everyman works for his living" and assumes "that to work is the necessary, natural, and honest condition of all men." What most aston ished Tocqueville was that Americans thought not only thar work itself was "honorable" but that "work specificaJly to gain money" was "hon orable." In Europe, gentlemen had only seorn for working for profit . There the classical republican tradition of political leadership by a dis interested leisured aristocracy was still very much alive . In Europe, there were "hardly any pubJic officials who do not claim to serve the state without interested motives. Their salary is a detail to which sometimes they give a little thought and to which they always pretend to give none. " But in America, public service and profit were "visibly united. " In fact, observed Chevalier, "the idea of service and salary are so in separably connected" in Americans' thinking that in their "almanacs it is common to see the rate of pay annexed to the lists of public offices." All this had immense consequences in making people feel equaI; and it
.,
~
DEMOCRACY286
was this equality, as Tocqueville pointed out, that gave Americans what ever satisfaction they had in their busy lives: it "every day confers a number ofsmall enjoyments on every man. " With everyone being alike in working for profit, no one , induding servants, said Tocqueville, had to "feel degraded because they work ." Who could be humiliated by working for pay when even the president of the country •' works for a
salary ' '?'O We have usually not given these comments on Arnerican work by
foreign visitors the attention they deserve because we have not appre ciated the degree to which early-nineteenth-century Arnericans were overturning the ancient tradition of aristocratic leisure and leadership and celebrating in its place what Emerson called ,. the dignity and ne cessity of labor to every citizen . "3'
Perhaps nothing separated ear1y-nineteenth-century Amcricans more from Europeans than their attitude toward labor and their egalitarian sense that everyone must participate in it . In America, wrote Theodore Sedgwick, son of the prominent Federalist of the sarne name, "to live without sorne regular employment or industry is not reputable ." Al though there were individuals here and there who were idle, "there is no dass that is not compelled to work." "It is true , then , in the best and strictest sense," Sedgwick concluded, "that the great body of the people of the United States are working people ." With everyone claim ing to work and no exclusive working dass , it is not surprising that the development of a socialist movement in the United Stares was inhibited. In America it seerned everyone had to have an occupation, and begin ning with the 1820 census every adult male was asked his occupation. All people became laborers and all activities, induding public office holding, were reduced to the making of a living-a severe leveling un precedented in history that no other society in the modern world quite duplicated. No wonder, then, that an American, inquiring about a Eu ropean visitor and being told he was a duke, could reply: "A Duke! I
wonder what he does for a living? "" In time new distinctions would be drawn, between "manual" and
"nonmanual" labor, between "hand work" and "head work ," and between "blue-collar" and "white-collar" workers. But all who made a useful contribution to society were defincd similarly as workingmen. Because every free American was presumed to work at something and for pay, every free American was to that extent equal.33
pnnocratü Ofttlwlding 28 7
16. Democratic O.fficeholding
From the outset of the Revolution the American gentry had been vul nerable to attacks on their leisured disinterestedness because for most of them, at least in the North, their leieure was something of a fraud : they really never had enough independent wealth and income to support their classical image of living without working . In eighteenth-century America it had never been easy for gentlernen to make these personal sacrifices for the public, and it became especially difficult du ring the Revolution. Gentlemen were expected to staff the officer corps of the army and to provide for their own rations, clothing, and equiprnent on salaries less than half those of British officers. Members of Congress were no beuer off. Many of them, especially those of "smali fortunes," continua1ly cornplained of the burdens of office and repeatedly begged to be relieved of these burdens in order to pursue their private interests . Gentlemen were nof used to offices that absorbed all their time and energy and quickly concluded that the "Trade of Patriotism but ill agrees with the profession of a practising Lawyer. " Thomas Stone of Maryland resigned from Congress in InS because he became "convinced that I cannot artend Congress so constantly, as every Delegare ought to do, without giving up the Practice of the Law." James lredell 01' North Carolina worried about how he could resign from unremunerative of fices without hurting his reputation, and in 1716 he had to turn down an appointment to the Congress because 01' his ., cursed poverty . " Periodic retirement from the cares and commotions of the public arena for refuge and rest at one's country seat was acceprable c1assical behavior, But too often America's political leaders, especially in the North, had ro retire not to relaxation in the leisure and solitude of a rural retreat but to the making of money in the busyness and bustle of a city law practice .'
Hence would-be officeholders from rn6 found themselves in the awk· ward position of having to urge their republican govemments not only to pay saJaries but to keep raising them. In the process they gradually undermined the two-thousand-year-old c1assical tradition of aristocratic public service . In an ideal republican world, government officeholders ought to serve without saJary. Rc:ceiving profits from a public office smacked of interestedness and taintcd the officeholder's virtue . Which is why the radicaJ Pennsylvania constitution of rn6 abolished a11 "offices of profit" in the government; there was no need for them. the consti
DEMOCRACY!l88
tution declared , for they created "dependence and servility unbecoming freemen in the possessors and expectants, faction , contention, corrup tion , and disorder among the people." In place of offices of profit the Pennsylvania constitution provided "reasonable compensation" for all public servants; and if that compensation attracted too many applicants , then it had to be lessened by the legislature . For the same republican reasons Washington was anxious that he not be paid a salary as corn mander in chief. To the end of his life Thomas Jefferson remained com mitted to a classica1 view of officeholding-officeholding in accord with what he called "the Roman principle." "In a virtuous government," he said , ". . . public offices are, what they should be, burthens to those appointed to them , which it would be wrong to decline, though foreseen to bring with them intense labor, and great private loss." Public ern ployment contributes "neither to advantage nor happiness. It is but honorable exile from one's family and affairs."·
Jefferson was never one to put his private happiness above public duty .! But of course he had a large plantation and several hundred slaves to support hirn . Other gentlemen, including most Federalists, were not so weIl situated. Since few would-be officeholders had J efferson' s wealth or Washington's scruples, they constantly had to press their govern ments to pay their officials higher salaries . If the salaries were not raised, said Gouverneur Morris in In8, the alternative was clear : it was to elect men "who possess such Property that they can afford to sacrifice a few Thousand to the general Cause. ""
But should anyone, even the most wealthy, have to make such sac rifices? In an unfinished essay written sometime du ring these years, Morris struggled to reconcile the classical tradition of disinterested pub lic leadership with the private demands of making a living. ,. A Man expends his Fortune in political Pursuits,' wrote Morris, expressing a common gentry complaint . Did he do this out of "personal Considera tion " or out of adesire to promote the public good? If he did it to promote the public good, "was he justifiable in sacrificing to it the Sub sistence of his Family? These are important Questions, but, " said Mor ris, "there remains one more: Would not as much Good have fo11owed from an industrious Attention to his own Affairs?" With this final ques tion Morris went beyond the issue of salaries and cut the foundations out from under the entire classicalrepublican tradition. An aristocracy that could pose such a question was already doomed.>
J ohn Adams, cantankerous and honest as always, was also willing openly to challenge the classical republican tradition that had dictated
DtTTUKTatic OjJiceholding !l89
Washington's refusal of a salary. In several remarkable letters written in the mid -rjßos to the English radical John Jebb, Adams analyzed the issue of salaries for officeholders with a thoroughness and boldness un equaled in the revolutionary era. Jebb, said Adams, seemed to agree with David Hume's view expressed in his essay on a perfect common wealth that no representative, magistrate, or senator ought to be paid, though Hume did grant salaries to executive officials such as secretaries, councillors, and ambassadors. But Adams was not satisfied with any restrictions on salaries, and he denied that public officials' receiving pay was a violation ofrepublican principles. The Pennsylvania constitution's abolition of offices of profit was a rnistake, said Adams. It was not the " legal , honest profit " of office the Pennsylvanians ought to have worried about; it was "the perquisites, patronage, and abuse, which is the evil." If "you make it a law that no man should hold an office who had not a private income sufficient for the subsistence and prospects of hirnself and family," then the consequence would be that "all offices would be monopolized by the rich; the poor and the middling ranks would be excluded and an aristocratic despotism would immediately follow." Ad ams knew "very weil that the word 'disinterested' turns the heads of the people by exciting their enthusiasm. " It was central to the classical republican faith and to the views of enlightened Englishmen and French philosophes. But , said Adams, in one of the most explicit disavowals of revolutionary idealism made in the 178os, this reliance on virtuous lead ers was all wrong. "How few have they been !" Perhaps history saw only one actual disinterested character every five hundred years, but certainly it had shown us "two thousand instances every year of the semblance of disinterestedness, counterfeited for the most selfish pur poses." At any rate, there was "not enough" disinterested men ·"in any age or any country to fi11 all the necessary offices, and therefore the people may depend upon it, that the hypocritical pretence of disinter estedness will be set up to deceive them, much oftener than the virtue will be practised for their good."6
Washington' s refusal of a salary as commander in chief and his awesome and famous retirement in 1783 from public life infuriated Ad ams, which accounts for the passion expressed in his letters to Jebb . What did it mean , Adams asked with undisguised resentment, for an officeholder to offer to serve the people for nothing? Since serving with out pay "never fails to turn the heads of the multitude ," what did Washington think he was doing when he refused a salary? Did he expect the people to feel grateful to hirn? Gratitude, implied Adams, was no
291 DEMOCRACY29°
basis for authentic republican relationships. Although gratitude had al ways been valued by the ancient rcpublicans, it had lost its significance for Adams. "The cry of gratitude, " he said, "has made more rnen mad, and established more despotism in the worJd, than all other causes put together. " The concJusion was obvious. "Every public man should be honestly paid for his services," and then offices would be founded on justice, not gratitude. Adams had no patience even with Washington's retirernent and renunciation of further office in December 1783. Surely , he said, the "revolution was not undertaken to raise one great reputa tion to makc a sublime page in history ." Why were pcople making so much of Washingtorr's retircment? "Why? What is implied in this ne cessity? ... Does not this idea of the necessity of his retiring, imply an opinion of danger to the public, from his continuing in public, a jealousy that he might become ambitious? and does it not imply something still more humiliating, a ... danger of setting hirn up for a king?" An this could have been avoided if Washington had accepted a salary as the other revolutionary generals had. "He should have been paid, as weil as they, and the people should have too high a sense of their own dignity ever to suffer any man to serve them for nothing. " Adams went on to declare that "offices in general ought to yield as honest a subsistence, and as clear an independence as professions, callings, trades, or farms, " without spelling out the full significance of what he was saying-that officeholders had to makc a living just like everyone else.?
There was no doubt that paying salaries fundamentally altered the nature of the officeholdcrs and made them something other than virtu ous leaders. Which is why French philosophes like the Abbe Mably protested so indignantly against the articles in the revolutionary state constitutions providing for salaries for officeholders. In 1781 James Lov ell, a former Boston schoolmaster with no independent wealth, dimly saw the irnplications of what was happening while serving as the Mas sachusetts delegate to the Confederation Congress. Wh)' should serving in public office not be a paid profession like any orher profession such as the ministry or teaching? asked Lovell. "ls it a Crime 10 serve here as a Delegate for a Living more than to do it in the Church or in an Academy? I thought not whcn I undertook it.,,8 Seeing public office as just another occupation from which one earned a living, however, was a long way from cJassicaJ republican thinking; it even suggested the possibility of interests actually participating in government.
One of the rnost illurninating rnoments in the developing contradie tions between the revolutionaries' republican idealism and their social
Democratic Ojficeholding
reality came early in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. On June 2 Benjamin Franklin proposed that members of the executive branch "shall receive no salary, stipend, Fee or reward whatsoever for their services, " This was putting the issue about as starkly as it could be put, and the response of the Convention tells us volumes about what was happening to the c1assieal republican tradition in America.
The eighty-one-year-old Franklin feit strongly about not paying peo pie who served in government and had written out a speech, which J ames Wilson delivered for him. The saving of money from the salaries was not his aim, he said. It was the evils the salaries would cause that he wished to prevent. Ir the government paid salaries to its executive officials, it would attract into office the wrong sorts of men, "rhe bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits." "By making our posts of honor places of profit," said Franklin, we would "sow the seeds of contention, faction & tu mult." The old man realized that some may imagine "that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Ex ecutive department, without paying them well for their services." But, he noted, the country gentry and aristocrats of England and France took up burdensome offices without pay. And had not General Washington led the Continental army "for eight years altogether without the smallest salary." These examples "shew that the pleasure of doing good & serv ing their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfac tion. " Surely America, he said, had sufficient numbers of such disin terested men.
In light of Franklin' s subsequent nineteenth-century reputation as the bourgeois American, it is ironie, to say the least, for Franklin to be the founding father at the Convention most concerned with these clas sieal sentiments of aristocratic leadership. But in fact not only was the eighteenth-century Franklin one of the most aristocratic-minded of the founding fathers, but he was also one of the wealthiest and one of those mostable to serve in public office without pay.
Most of the delegates were not as well off as Franklin, and they were embarrassed by his proposal. They knew in their hearts that the old man was right, that he spoke out of a classical republican heritage of disinterested public service that went back at least to Cicero and that they still tried to pay lip service to. But they also knew that in late eighteenth-century America serving in government without compensa
293 292 DEMOCRACY
tion was no longer possible for most gentlemen. "No debate ensued," Madison dryly noted, and Franklin's motion was postponed. "It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability. "9
After Franklin' s proposal for the executive branch died;: it was a foregone conclusion that the rest of the federal officials would receive some sort of salary. Still, there were those South Carolinian nabobs, Pierce Butler and john Rutledge, who proposed that at least members of the aristocratic Senate "should be entitled to no salary or compen sation for their services." But this proposal lost, seven states to three, with one divided."
In the end the Convention provided for compensation for all na tional officials but left the amounts up to the Congress. This provision itself was radical for the age: members of Parliament, after all, did not receive salaries until 1911. The First Congress, which met in the spring of 1789, easi!y set the compensation for the members of the other branches of the government, but it had trouble setting its own salaries. The issue had been a controversial one in the Convention, Madison having de clared that for Congress to detennine its own salaries was "an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one." Nevertheless, at the outset the House of Representatives agreed upon six dollars a day for both congressmen and senators. But some, including Madison and many senators, thought that senators ought to be paid more than congress rnen. Otherwise, said Madison, older, able men-"thefirst characters" in the country-might prefer private retirement to public service in the Senate and thereby cause the Senate to "degenerate into an inferior and unavailing institution." Accordingly, a proposal was made to lower the salary of representatives to five dollars a day, hut it was defeated hy a Iarge rnajority. Frederick Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, who became Speaker of the House, toId a correspondent at horne that as long as the Congress continued to meet in New York City the representatives could not accept any reduction in their salary: "You have no conception," he wrote, "at what extravagant rates every thing is paid for in this place. "11
At the same time many members of the Senate were arguing that they deserved higher salaries than the members of the lower house. Senator Ralph Izard of South Carolina contended that senators needed sufficient income to maintain their dignity and character; after all, his state's delegates to the old Congress used to have i:600 sterling a year, which had enahled them to "live like Gentlemen." Then Izard's col league, Pierce Butler, who had a claim to an Irish title, rose to express
Democratit Ojfictlwlding
his aristocratic contempt for all this wrangling about money. "A Mernber of the Senate," he said, "should not only have a handsome income but should spend it all. . . . It was scandalous for a member of Congress to take any of his Wages home. " Better that he "give it to the poor. "12
After months of "hard jockeying between the Senate and the House of Representatives" over their respective pay ("it was a tryal who would hold longest out . . . a Tryal of Skill in the way of Starvation' '), the Congress finally provided for six dollars a day for members of both houses. Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania was suspicious of this clamoring for pay and for offices of profit. Indeed, he said in May 1790, "the Spirit of the last Session really was to make offices for Men, to provide for Individuals without regarding the public or Sparing Ex pence. "13 All these salaries for congressmen and for other federal offices, however, were never enough for many would-be gentry. New England Federalists, precarious aristocrats that they were, complained ceaselessly of "the continued disgrace of starving our public officers." Fisher Ames thought that "such a sum should be paid for service as was sufficient to command men of talents to perform it. Anything below this was parsimonious and unwise." Good men, he said, would not take up the public burden; or, as Oliver Wo1cott put it, in words that by them selves repudiated the classical tradition of public service, "good abil ities command high prices at market." Indeed, although the federal administration had more than enough applicants for its lower and rnid dling offices, by the mid-179Os it was having trouble filling its highest offices. In 1795 William Smith charged in the House of Representatives that Jefferson, Hamilton, and Henry Knox had all resigned from the cabinet "chiefty for one reason, the smallness of the salary." Although this was not at all the case with jefferson, both Knox and Hamilton had trouble maintaining a genteel standard of living on their govemment salaries.'!
By the beginning of the nineteenth century the classical republican conception of govemment officeholding was losing much of its meaning. If each person was supposed to pursue his own private interests, and the pursuit of private interests was the real source of the public good, then it was foolish to expect men to devote their time and energy to public responsibilities without compensation. A New York report of 1800 caught the anachronism in the older republican idea of relying on pri vate citizens serving in government without pay. On the face of it, such a reliance was "plausible, as it carries the appearance of economy and
295 294 DEMOCRACY
evidences a disinterested zeal for the public service." But in reality, this mode of governing was not successful, It evaded responsibility. I 'The burthen which no one in particular is bound to sustain, is shifted from shoulder to shoulder, till at last it is left wholly unsupported: and as no compensation is to be received, no one thinks hirnself bound to sacrifice his own private affairs, to an object of general concern.' '15 So far then had Americans abandoned the age-old tradition that public office was the responsibility of a leisured patriciate.
It became increasingly clear that society could no Ionger expect men to sacrifice their time and money-their private interests-for the sake of the public. Public office could no longer be regarded merely as a burden that prominent gentlemen had an obligation to bear. No longer could it be something that gentlemen simply stood by and waited to be called to. And no Ionger. could it be the consequence of a gentleman's previously established social wealth and authority. If anything, office in America had become the source of that wealth and authority."
In the generation following the formation of the Constitution, the Anti-Federalist conception of actual or interest representation in govern ment-the William Findley conception of representation-came to dom inate the realities, if not the rhetoric, of American politicallife. And the intellectual world of the founding fathers, a world that went back two millennia, was rapidly undermined.
Many Americans of the early Republic, with varying degrees of reluctance or enthusiasm, came to believe that what they once thought was true was no longer true. Government officials were no Ionger to play the role of umpire; they were no longer to stand above the com peting interests of the marketplace and make disinterested, impartial judgments about what was good for the whole society. Elected officials were to bring the partial, local interests of the society, and sometimes even their own interests, right into the workings of government. Parti sanship and parties became legitimate activities in politics. And all adult white males, regardless of their property holdings or their indepen dence, were to have the right to vote. By 1825 every state but Rhode Island, Virginia, and Louisiana had achieved universal white manhood suffrage.
With these new ideas and practices came the greater participation of more ordinary people in politics. If men were a11 alike, equal in their rights and in their interestedness, then there were no specially qualified gentlemen who stood apart from the whole society with a superior and
Democratic OjfialwltJing
disinterested perspective. All people were the same: al1 were ordinary and alI were best represented by ordinary people. That was democracy.
Indeed, as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century it seemed to many gentlemen like Benjamin Latrobe, the noted architect and engineer, that was precisely what democracy in America had come to mean. His remarkable letter written in 1806 to the Italian patriot Philip Mazzei teIls us that much of the democratic world that Tocque ville would later describe was already present. "After the adoption of the federal constitution," Latrobe explained, "the extension of the right of Suffrage in alI the states to the majority of al1 the adult male citizens, planted a germ which has gradually evolved, and has spread actual and practical democracy and political equality over the whole union. There is no doubt whatsoever but that this state of things in our country pro duces the greatest sum of happiness that perhaps any nation ever en joyed." But the cost has been high, said Latrobe. Most men have to labor, and consequently "those arts and refinements, and elegancies which require riches and leisure to their production, are not to be found among the majority of our citizens."
The want of learning and of science in the majority is one of those things which strikes foreigners who visit us very forceably. Our rep resentatives to all our Legislative bodies, National, as well as of the States, are elected by the majority sw similis, that is, unleGrnetl. For instance from Philadelphia and its environs we send to congress not one man of letters, One of them indeed is a lawyer but of no eminence, another a good Mathematician, but when elected he was a Clerk in a bank. The others are plain farmers. From the next county is sent a Blacksmith, and from just over the river a Bureher. Our state legis lature does not contain one individual of superior talents. The fact is, that superior talents actually excite distrust, and the experience of the world perhaps does not encourage the people to trust men of ge nius .... This government of what may be called, an unlettered ma jority, has put down even that ideal rank which mannen had established, excepting in our great cities depending on commerce and crouded with foreigners, where the distinction between what is called the Gentlemen, and others still subsists, and produces circles of asso ciation separate from each other.... In Philadelphia even this dis tinction has almost disappeared, those who expect it having early excluded themselves from the present race of well dressed men and women. Of this state of society the solid and general advantages are
297 29 6 DEMOCRACY
undeniable: but to a cultivated mind, to a man of letters, to a lover of the arts it presents a very unpleasant picture. The importance attached to wealth, and the freedom which opens every legal avenue to wealth to every one individually has two effects, which are unfavorable to morals: It weakens the ties that bind individuals to each other, by making a11 citizens rivals in the pursuit of riches; and it renders the means by which they are attained more indifferent.
The problerns of governing this kind of society were overwhelming. If everyone in the society was interested and no one was disinterested, who was to assume the role of neutral umpire? Who was to reconcile and harmonize all these different clashing interests and promote the good of the whole? All the Anti-Federalists and their Republican suc cessors could offer by way of an answer was the view, attributed to Jefferson by Latrobe, "that the public good is best promoted by the exertion of each individual seeking his own good in his own way" with the government apparently having very little to say in the matter. Such a view marked an end to classical republicanism and the begin nings of liberal democracy. 17
Once men decided that the public good was best promoted by allow ing each individual to pursue his own good in his own way, then the relationship between the public and private spheres had to shift, as La trobe very acutely realized. Having only ordinary people and no men of genius in government promoting an autonomous public good had little political or economic effect-e-since the public realm of classical pol itics no Ionger seemed to matter to the growth and prosperity of the country. "The wealth of our country, its improvements in agriculture and in mechanics, and even in some species of manufactories is rapid beyond example." And government, said Latrobe, had no hand in this rapid improvement. "We in fact do not perceive that we have a gov ernment, but on the days of election, and in the bickerings of party, which are kept up by the few who prefer the uncertainty of salaries from the public to the secure income of private industry.' '18
Despite the weakness of government and the uncertainty of public salaries in democratic America, however, competition for political office became very fierce, fiercer than in England, because, as Edward Everett observed, public office in America for some became personally and so cially more irnportant than in England. In England, said Everett, there were all sorts of areas of family and social rank for ambitious men to find scope for their talents. "In place of all these," said Everett, "we
Democraue Ojficeholding
have nothing, to which the ambitious can aspire, but office.... Office here is family, rank, heredity, fortune, in Short, Everything, out of the range of private life. This links its possession with innate principles of our Nature; & truly incredible are the efforts Men are Willing to Make, the humiliations they will endure, to get it. "19
This competition for office led inevitably to the emergence of poli ticians whose social position, private happiness, and even wealth came from holding public office and who identified their private interest with that of the public. Congressman and avid Republican Matthew Lyon, for example, saw nothing wrong with using his office to get govemment contracts for himself. What difference did it make, he asked on the ftoor of the House in 1805, if a congressman served "the public for the same reward the public gives another"? Although a member of the House of Representatives, he was also a businessman looking "for customers with whom I can make advantageous bargains to both parties. It is all the same to me whether I contract with an individual or the public. "20
It was not easy to accept such modern democratic politics. No doubt one had to have faith in the people, said one angry and befuddled Fed eralist in 1816. But why did the people continue to vote for "those who seek to promote their own interest" instead of "those who seek to pro mote the public good"? It was discouraging. "We have advanced in the progress of avarice, and self-interest, from one step to another, till the offices of govemment are considered only as private property, and the election of our rulers, has become with all parties in a greater or less degree, the subject of calculation and compromise." Even former men of principle, it was said, were going over to the popular cause and adopting democratic techniques of electioneering in the scramble for political office. "Public offices are sought as a means of enriching the occupant; and their importance is graduated according to the means of corrupt inftuence which they afford." This classically minded Federalist could not restrain his indignation. For a man "to seek for office as means of accumulating wealth, ... to promote his private interest, it is," he sputtered, "unpardonable. "21
Of course, most politicians, even those openly seeking to promote their constituents' interests, were not ßagrantly self-serving, but their blatant electioneering and their competitive campaigning for office made many people think they were. By 1823 Niles' Wuk{y Register already de fined modem politicians as "persons who have Iittle, if any regard for the welfare of the republic unless immediately connected with . . . their own private pursuits.' '22
299 29 8 DEMOCRACY
These changes prepared the way for the development of modem political parties, which in the end helped to legitimate the changes the Revolution had brought about and to make democracy acceptable to Americans. The Democratic- Republican parties that emerged at the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century in some northern states, especially New York, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky, were the first mod ern parties in American history and perhaps in Western history . These parties were impersonal and permanent organizations of professional salaried politicians that were designed solely to recruit leaders, mobilize voters, win elections, and compete regularly and legitimately with other opposition parties. As such, they were unlike the earlier Federalist and Republican parties and indeed were unlike any party that had ever existed before .
The Federalists and the Republicans of the 1790S were not modern political parties, and their electoral competition scarcely constituted a "party system.' ':l3 Neither the Federalists nor the Republicans accepted the legitimacy of the other, and neither was designed to be permanent. Both of them were formed by notables, who continued to decry the existence of party spirit, and both were organized essentially from the top down. The Federalists actually never thought of themselves as a party; instead they saw themselves as the natural gentry rulers of the society. The Republicans did reluctantly describe themselves as a party, but one, like the whig parties of the 1760s and 1770s, made necessary only by the need to counter monarchical tyranny; as soon as that threat from the Federalist monocrats receded, the older Republican leaders thought their party should fall away. The end of the War of 1812 and the disgrace of the Federalists, exulted Thomas Jefferson, had resulted in the "complete suppression of party. ":l4
Historians have delighted in pointing out that the "Era of Good Feeling" under James Monroe's adrninistration was filled with bitter factional content ion that belied the name people gave to the era. But the title was meaningful to most people because it seemed that the earlier party competition and hateful party spirit had indeed finally disap peared. Monroe summed up traditional thinking when he remarked in 1816 that "the existence of parties is not necessary to free government. ":l5 However often the founding fathers in reluctant concessions to reality admitted that political parties might be necessary evils in a free society, none of them ever thought that permanent party strife was good for the harmony and stability of the Republic. Only a new generation of polit-
Democratic OJficelwlding
icalleaders-younger men born usually in obscurity during the years of the Revolution-would be able to reach that startling conclusion.
Martin Van Buren represented just this sort of new breed of Amer ican, at ease in the chaos of the early Republic and confident of the future. He thrived in a democratic political world that was very different from that of the founding fathers. He believed in political parties and in running for office. He was the first modem professional politician to win the presidency. As the arnbitious son of a tavemkeeper, he prided himself on having risen to office "without the aid of powerful family connexions.' ':16 Before his elevation to the highest office in the land, Van Buren had no farne, no fortune, and no reputation for great achieve ment. He had won no battles, had written no great treatises, had made no memorable speeches, He had no public charisma and was barely known throughout the United Stares. But what this "little magician" did do was build the best and most organized political party the country had ever seen.
The new parties of professional politicians like Van Buren were de signed for the modem democratic society. They brought together large numbers of ordinary people in order to counter the family inftuence and personal connections of Federalist gentry and older aristocratic Repub licans such as Oe Witt Clinton of New York. Parties, like other volun tary associations of these years, combined otherwise isolated individuals into meaningful communities. People have joined the New York Re publican party, declared its leaders in 1820, not for personal benefit or profit, "but have spontaneously and voluntarily identified their political fortunes with ours, and thereby entitIed themselves to full community with us.' ''rJ Parties, in fact, became a modem means by which some thing akin to the self-subsuming virtue of classical politics could be prac ticed. "Individual partialities and local attachments," declared the leaders of the New York Democratic-Republican party in 1823, "are secondary and quite unimportant compared . . . with the INTERESTS AND PERMANENCY OF THE REPUBLJCAN PARTY.' ':lll
Loyalty to the party became the sole criterion of the political worth of aperson. Farnily ties, personal connections, personal wealth, even individual achievement did not matter as much as loyalty to the party and devotion to its cause. In vain did the son ofrevolutionary JohnJay plead for the recognition of other characteristics besides party loyalty in determining officeholders. No one, said PeterJay in the New Vork constitu tional convention of 1820, should want respectable men like hirnself and
I
DEMOCRACY 3 0 0
other Federalists to "feel themselves aliens in their native land." The Republican majority ought to give the Federalists some offices, however humble, "instead of bestowing all upon rnen, recommended principally as ardent political champions, or as the noisy and active agents at our elections.' But the new professional politicians like Van Buren had only contempt for such pathetic complaints from these men who were "Federalists from their birth." "Most of these gentlemen had from early manhood enjoyed high and inftuential position in what was called good society," Van Buren later recalled , "and the supposition that they expected to occupy l on that account, greater consideration in the democratic organization was not acceptable in-that quarter .""'9
Despite the difficulty of defying the traditional aversion to party spirit, Van Buren tried from the outset of his career to carve out a new significance for parties. "Parties would always exist," he dedared in 1820, "and they would always consult their interest in the selection of candidates for public places, Their first and chief object was success." And loyalty and discipline were the keys to success. Decades later men recalled the iron discipline that the Albany Regency faction of the New York Democratic-Republican party exacted from its members . No one "was allowed to occupy a seat on the bench of whose loyalty to party or to the acts of the regency there could be the least question ." In an enlarged, impersonal world of strangers and unknown men, connection to the party was sometimes all that could be relied on; it was a substitute for the friendships and personalietters of introduction of the older, more intimate world . Nomination and appointment to office were to be made only to loyal party members . "Give them to good and true and useful friends who will enjoy the emolument if there is any, and who will use the influence to our benefit, if any inftuence is conferred by the office," advised Albany Regency leader Silas Wright to a party colleague . " T his . is the long and short of rhe rule by which to act."3"
Such a rule created a radically new understanding of political pat ronage and officeholding, one that virtually repudiated all that the rev olutionaries of 1776 had sought. Using offices to bind people to the government was what monarchies did, and the revolutionaries had at tacked it as "corruption. " It was true that disillusionment with the revolutionary republican experiment of having the people elect the best and the brightest had led Hamilton and the Federalists in the 1790s to revive sorne of the patronage practices of monarchy and to use federal offices to tie inftuential men to the government. But Jefferson had come into power in 1801 promising to undo all that Federalist monarchical
Dtmocratic Ojfi&elwlding JOI
corruption and to restore the true republican spirit of 1776. He soon found hirnself, however, torn between his sincere desire to repudiate the Federalists' monarchical use of political patronage and the pressing de mands of many of his fellow Republicans that he oust the Federalists and put good Republicans in their places.
No problem in Jefferson's presidency took more ofhis time or caused hirn more trouble than did that of political patronage. "Solicitations to
111,
office," he said, were the "most painful" part of being an executive magistrare. "The ordinary affairs of a nation offer little difficulty to a :mi person of any experience; but the gift of office is the dreadful burden
I which oppresses him." Once the Republicans had their proportionate
!.lll, ::i.·share of offices, Jefferson promised to "retum with joy to that state of I I n things, when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be, is he ~
Ihonest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?"31 With Fed i eralist officeholders replaced by Republicans, there was no further need iI' ; for compromise on the issue of "corruption," and removals from office I;
for political reasons came to an end. Under Jefferson's Republican suc ' 11, " ' cessors, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, the holders of govemment appointments became a more or less permanent ' . I ~ ~ officialdom of men growing old in their positions.
John Quincy Adams thus inherited in 1825 an administration fiUed with bureaucrats who were opposed to hirn. But, averse as he was to corruption and loyal to republican principles, Adams was unwiUing to use patronage for political purposes. He retained most members of Monroe's cabinet; he even offered to keep his presidential rival, W . H.
;.ICrawford, in his cabinet. In the four years of his administration Adams dismissed only twelve of the over eight hundred civil officeholders in the
I ') ~
l lrll '
'li
~ I !1, 1 '1:111 ;1
federal government. When urged to dismiss more, he declared he would not. Dismissal at the pleasure of the President would be "harsh and llillf odious-inconsistent with the principle upon which I have commenced
1II~ I. r~ the Administration, of removing no person from office but for cause."
..
, 1\'1
Adams remained committed to the ideology of the Revolution . To the l~ ,1111
astonishment of younger politicians, he said he could not remove an 11:;' ~
'1offleer of the govemment "for merely preferring another candidate for [1! 1 iI the Presidency. "3'
I,I " 1Younger democratic politicians revealed a radically new attitude to
ward patronage as early as 1820 in the New York constitutional conven ,]f tion . During the debates the Federalists tried to out-republicanize the Republicans and use the Americans' revolutionary aversion to patron age against the Republican-dominated execut ive and its power to ap ~
l l 1 1~i 111 , "
1I LI
DEMOCRACY3°2
point officers. They argued strongly that justices of the peace, instead of being appointed by the governor, ought to be elected by the people in the localities. Rufus King, in the fashion of a good revolutionary of >, 1776 , said that he wanted "to dissever and disconnect the magistracy from the central power at the seat of government , and to destroy this extensive means of patronage which . . . was not necessary to sustain the government." Election of local offices meant that "this great mass of patronage and power might be broken up into minute fragments , and disposed throughout the land." That the Federalists in 1820 should have been reduced to such populist and localist arguments says a great deal about the reversal of their political position since the 179Os.
The New York Republicans, who usuaIly favored electing everyone and anyone, were obviously embarrassed by the Federalists' tactics; they after all saw themselves as the true guardians of the revolutionary spirit of 1'776. Van Buren, ' very defensively , tried to point out that only a few thousand offices remained appointive; most were elected by the people. Besides, he said in a stunning concession to monarchical principles, retaining some patronage meant not cutting " every cord that binds to gether the people to the government." Republican Nathan Williams car ried this argument even further. Was it not essential, he asked, "that there should be some channel through which the remotest parts of the state would feel the influence of the central administration . . . ? Could it be expected . . . that without a community of feeling, without a single tie of interest, any government would long hang together? What ligament, what cement, would there be to bind the head and the remote parts together?" "Patriotism" could not do it . It "alas! had been found, in some cases, rather weak among us ." Without "influence," said Wil liams , "the government would be like a rape of sand." Hamilton could not have said it better. These New York Republicans were a long way from In6 and strict republican principles, but their arguments, thrown up in the heat of debate, became part of the intelleemal preparation for the Jacksonian revolution.P
Jacksonianism did not create democracy in America. But it legiti mated it; it restrained and controlled it and reconciled Americans to it. It did so by infusing into American democracy more elements of rnon archy than even the Federalists had dared to try. The Jacksonians did this, however, in the midst of the most enthusiastic democratic rhetoric that any modern country had ever experienced. Consequently, the cen tralizing and consolidating aspects of the Jacksonian revolution have been obscured and generally lost to us ,
Democraue O.fJiceholding 3°3
The administration of Andrew Jackson had a very different idea of patronage from that of the revolutionaries, one more in accord with the emerging democratic society of the nineteenth century. The J acksonians inaugurated what came to be caIled the "spoils system," the systematic use of patronage to reward members of the victorious party in an intense and legitimate party competition. By ousting the losing party and ap pointing only party loyalists to post offices and land offices and other government positions, the party created networks of influence through out the country and helped to hold the country together.
No wonder many thought theJacksonians' flagrant use ofpatronage was a throwback to the old monarchical techniques of the eighteenth century ; this is partly why Jackson's opponents called hirn "King Andrew" and formed the Whig party. Although the Jacksonians' jus tifications of patronage were sometimes similar to those of the past, its use was different-different not only from that of monarchy but from that of republicanism as weil. The J acksonian officeholders were not sociaIly visible and respectable men. Historians and sociologists have worked hard to show that the social status of the J acksonian officeholders was not dramatically different from that of earlier administrations .n But not only have these studies focused on the administrative elites of the government, ignoring the federal officeholders in the localities, but they have often applied very crude measures of social status and social back ground. "Occupation" is virtually no measure at all: there were lawyers and there were lawyers ; an enormous social gulf, perceptible to contern poraries if not to us, separated a Harvard-educated attorney from an apprenticed lawyer who had never been to college .
Many of the J acksonian officeholders were new sorts of democratic men. Even Amos Kendall, a member of Jackson 's "kitchen cabinet" and author of Jackson's Bank veto message , was thought by some to lack "the polished conversation the graceful manner & high tone" of a real gentleman; he did "not look like a Gentleman." In fact, Jackson chose what he called "plain businessmen" for his official cabinet. "He has surrounded hirnself with men of narrow minds, some of them hardly gentlemen," complained the governor of Virginia.» Not that all Jack sonians were without' wealth and power. Some were Federalist converts who found solace in the Jacksonian attack on corruption and the Jack sonian desire to restore order and virtue. Others were ambitious entre preneurial go-getters, wealthy hut unestahlished and ungenteel. But many others were like the humble gracer in Frankfort, Kentucky, who became a postmaster-truly ohscure men without social position in their
DEMOCRACY3°4
localities; in fact, their appointment to a post office or a land office was usually the source of any social influence they might have.:J6
Regardless of the officeholders ' wealth or soeial standing, however, what was crucial now was their loyalty to the Jacksonian cause. The sole criterion of appointment was not family, not soeial standing, not wealth, not ability, not character, and not reputation, but connection to the party. Nothing else was needed. "The duties of all public offices," said J ackson in his first annual message, "are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance.... In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another.' '37 Anyone now could serve . in any office.
But not for long. The Jacksonians used the older radical whig con ception of "rotation in office" not only as a means of freeing govern ment as much as possible from any semblance of aristocratic influence \ but also as a cover for the radical changes they were making in the nature of officeholding. Government office was no longer to be "a spe eies of property" belonging to prominent gentlernen simply because of " their social rank or character. Govemment office now belonged to the people, ordinary people, and all equally had the right and the ability to hold such office-at least for a short period of time. The result was not, of course, any sudden invasion of offices by ordinary people; college graduates and would-be gentlemen continued to dominate high public office in America. But now even they behaved as common people-a fact immediately evident to European visitors. American public offieials, observed Tocqueville in June 1831, possessed little of the aristocratic dis tinction that Europeans expected in their government officers. "They are absolutelyon the same footing as the rest of the citizens, They are dressed the same, stay at the same inn when away from horne, are accessible at every moment, and shake everybody by the hand. They exercise a certain power defined by the law; beyond that they are not at all above the rest.' '3 8
In such an egalitarian system of rotating offices, individuals could be appointed and removed at will without damaging the integrity of govemment-because the nature of the offices was now to be different. Offices were to be bureaucratic in a modern sense-rationalized, deper sonalized, organized by function, defined by rules and regulations, and paid set salaries.
Because many of the J acksonian officeholders were to be face1ess
A w-u Within Themselues 3°5 functionaries, presumably lacking the traditional aristocratic concern for personal honor or reputation, the government had to devise new mod em safeguards against corruptioh. More formal structures were erected, new administrative rules were adopted, and more bookkeeping, receipts, and cross-checking were required-all designed to prevent men from exploiting their offices for personal benefit. 39 These added bureaucratic regulations and red tape in the dispensing of funds were not simply the result of theJacksonian government's having gotten larger and assumed new responsibilities; they were the result of democracy. The new imper sonal rules and the self-policing regulations were made for officeholders who were ordinary men with ordinaryinterests. In the Jacksonians' idea ofgovemment, "effieiency," it has been said, "lay primarily in the system (rules and regulations) rather than in men (character)." Office was defined impersonally, bureaucratically. The officeholder's creed was: "I want no discretion. I wish to be able to tum to some law or lawful regulation for every allowance I am called upon to make. "40
The Jacksonians finally accepted the reality that most officeholders in America could no longer be leisured aristocrats serving out of a sense of honor and an obligation of rank. Instead, as experience since the Revolution had shown, officeholders in democratic America were likely to be "interested" men who could not be trusted to behave virtuously without bureaucratic checks and regulations. By today's standards Jack sonian govemment was minuscule, but its character was modern. It established many of die prineiples underlying our present democratic bureaucracy. It helped to make democracy acceptable to Americans.
17. A World Within Themseloes
Beneath all these changes in interests, leisure, and officeholding were seismic shifts taking place in the structure of American soeiety. In the half century following the Revolution what remained of the traditional soeial hierarchy virtually collapsed, and in thousands of different ways connections that had held people together for centuries were further strained and severed. The Revolution, complained the newly arrived Scotsman Charles Nisbet in 1787, had created "a new world . . . unfor tunately composed ... of discordant atoms, jumbled together by chance, and tossed by unconstancy in an immense vacuum." He had bumbled into a society that "greatly wants a principle of attraction and cohe sion." It was not surprising that individuals were ftying about, espe
DEMOCRACY3°6
cially since their leaders were saying that it was "the moral duty of the people, at all times, to pursue their own happiness" and that each in dividual was his own "moral agent" with the right "to dispose of him self, and be his own master in all respects. "I
People in the early nineteenth century sensed that everything had changed and could thus readily respond to Washington Irving's Rip Van Winlde, who woke up after several decades to find the society he had known suddenly gone . "We live in a most extraordinary age, " declared young Daniel Webster in 1825 . "Events so various and so im portant that might crowd and distinguish centuries, are, in our times , compressed within the compass of a single life." Classical Rome was now thought to be too stolid and imitative to express the restlessness and originality of this new democratic society. Ancient Greece, said Edward Everett, was a better model. Ancient Greece was turnultuous, wild, and free, said Everett, " free to licentiousness, free to madness .".
Everything seemed to be coming apart, and murder, suicide, theft , and mobbing became increasingly common responses to the burdens that liberty and the expectation of gain were placing on people. The drinking of hard liquor became an especially common response. By the second or third decade of the nineteenth century American consumption of distilled spirits reached an all-time high, more than five gallons per person per year -an amount nearly triple today's consumption and greater than that of any major European nation at that time. American grain farmers, particularly those in western Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Tennessee. found it easier and more profitable to distill, ship, and seIl whiskey than to try to ship and sell the perishable grain itself. Con sequently, things got to the point where almost everyone or his cousin had a distillery. The number of distilleries increased rapidly after the 178os, reaching a peak of 20,000 by 1830. In 1815 even the little town of Peacham, Vermont, had thirty distilleries. Distilling whiskey was good business because, to the astonishment of foreigners, nearly all Ameri cans drank-men, women, children, and sometimes even babies everywhere and anywhere, all day long. Washington, who himself had a distillery, thought as early as 1789 that distilled spirits were "the ruin of half the workmen in this Country." John Adams was mortified that his countrymen were more intemperate than any other people in the world . "The thing has arrived to such a beigbt," declared tbe Greene and Delaware Moral Society in 1815, "that we are actually threatened with becoming a nation of drunkards.' '3
By 1800 Americans were already known for pushing and shoving one
A w-u Within Thnnselves 3°7 another in public and for their aversion to ceremony. And in the suc ceeding years there were frequent complaints over "the violation of decorum, the want of etiquette, the rusticity of manners in this gener ation." Violence was perhaps no rnore common than it had been earlier, but now it seemed more bizarre. During the forty-five years between 1780 and 1825 there occurred ten of the twelve multiple family murders that were reported or written about in America from the seventeenth century through 1900. It was as if all restraints were falling away. Fistfighting even broke out repeatedly in the Congress and the state legislatures...
Urban rioting became more prevalent and destructive than it had been. Street, tavern, and theater rowdiness, labor strikes , racial and ethnic conflicts-all increased greatly after 1800. These eruptions of mob violence in the early Republic were uncontrolled and ·sometimes mur derous and no Ionger paid tribute to paternalism and hierarchy as the mobs of the eighteenth century had done. The mobs and gangs were now composed of mostly unconnected and anonymous lowly people, full of dass resentment, and thus were all the more frightening. Indeed, Republicans in New York City played upon such resentrnent in lSoI by telling the common people in election handbills that the Federalist mayor "hates you; from his own soul he hates you . . . ; do your duty and . . . you will get rid of a mayor who acts as if he thought a poor man had no more right than a hone.' ' 5
Urban societies now seemed but "a heterogeneous mass" of men with an "insatiable appetite for animal gratification" and " weak and depraved minds"; the population of the eitles was now "so numerous that the citizens are not all known to each other," thus allowing "dep redators [to] merge in the mass, and spoliate in secret and safety ." In New York City the number of watchmen increased from 50 in 1788 to 428 by 1825, nearly double the proportionate growth in population, and still the murderous rioting continued . By the second decade of the nine teenth century some were calling for the creation of professional police forces. Social authority and the patronage power' of the rnagistrates and gentry were no longer able to keep the peace."
A new competiriveness was abroad in the land, and people seerned to be almost at war with one another. Although some were frightened by these developments , others welcomed what was described as "useful and generous strife of competition and emulation." Elkanah Watson prided hirnself on having done someth ing to stimulate this competitive strife , Watson , the son of a Rhode Island artisan and representative of
308 DEMOCRACY A w-u Within Themselves 3°9 '.
the new breed of middling hustlers and inventors springing up every":l where in these early years of the nineteenth century, discovered that the: earlier aristocratic and enlightened techniques of stimulating agricul-,I, tural reform through scientific societies of gentlemen farmers would not~: work in America. Because Americans were too independent for SUCh;ll learned paternalism, Watson in 1810 devised for Berkshire County of:~
l,
western Massachusetts what soon became the familiar American county . fair, with exhibitions, entertainment, and prizes awarded for the best crops and biggest livestock. By such fairs Watson intended, he said, to excite that spirit of "envy" and "competition" and that desire for "per sonal interest" and "personal ambition" characteristic of all Americans, which in Watson's mind were, as ctpractical" sources of agricultural im- ' provement, worth all the "studied, wiredrawn books" ever written. Watson knew, as the enlightened gentry did not, that society had to be dealt with "in its actual state of existence,-not as we could wish it." The only way of achieving public benefits "congenial to American habits, and the state of our society, " Watson concluded, was to incite emulation and individual self-interest and create "a general strife.' '7
The problem with America, complained Samuel MitchiU of New York in 1800, was that everybody wanted independence: first indepen dence from Great Britain, then independence of the states from each other, then independence of the people from govemment, and "lastly, the members of society be equally independent of each other." In the I western fron tier areas society seemed especially weak and thin: there were "no private or publick associations for common good, every Man standing single." Indeed, could the frontier areas even "be called so ciety where every man is for hirnself alone and has no regard for any person farther than he can make hirn subservient to his own views"? How far could American freedom be carried without ending "in the u lawless and capricious liberty prevalent among savages"? Yet authority of every sort seemed unable to resist these endless challenges. By what right did authority claim obedience? was the question being asked of every institution, every organization, every individual. It was as if the Revolution had set in motion a disintegrative force that could not be I stopped."
All these changes and disruptions in American society were driven \' by the same dynamie forces at work since the middle of the eighteenth I. century-population growth and movement and commercial expansion. After 1800 the birthrate began to decline as people became more con- 1i scious of their ability to create prosperity for themselves and their chil
dren by limiting the size of their families. Nevertheless, the population as a whole continued to expand by leaps and bounds. Americans boasted that by 1810 the United Stares, numbering over seven million people, was nearly as populous as England and Wales had been in 1801 and was rapidly gaining on the former mother country. 9 The population was increasing at about 37 percent every decade, more than twiee the rate of growth of any European nation. And it was a remarkably young population: in 1810,36 percent of the white population was under the age of ten and nearly 70 percent was under the age of twenty-five.
This youthful population was moving about the country even more rapidly than it had in the past. Before the Revolution the territory of Kentucky had contained almost no white settlers. By the early 1780s, however, it had more than 20,000; by the end of the century it had grown to over 220,000 people, and people marveled at the fact that not a single adult had been bom and grown up within its borders. Between 1790 and 1820 New York's population more than quadrupled and Ten nessee's multiplied over ten times. In a single decade at the turn of the century Ohio grew from a virtual wilderness to become more populous than most of the colonies had been at the time of the Revolution. By 1820, only thirty-two years after the first permanent white settlers ar rived, Ohio had a population of over a half million people and was already the fifth-largest state in the Union. And Ohioans were complain ing that they had run out of names for their hundreds of new towns. Indeed, gazetteers in Ameriea, it was said, could not keep up with the "very frequent changes" in the dividing of territories and naming of places "which are almost daily taking place": it was a problem "pecu liar to a new, progressive and extensive country." In one generation Americans occupied more territory than they had occupied during the entire 150 years of their colonial existence. "We are a rapidly-I was about to say fearfully-growing country," saidJohn C. Calhoun in 1816. "This is our pride and danger , our weakness and our strength.' '10
It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of this westward move ment of people. It was a "stupendous work of human advancement ... of wh ich the history of mankind certainly affords no other example.' , The movement was far more spectacular than the historie events re vealed by the ancient ruins of the Old World. It was, Americans told thernselves, "a scene, not of decay, but of teeming life, of improvement almost too rapid to seem the result of human means." By 1817 migrants could only shake their heads in amazement: "Old America," they said, "seems to be breaking up and moving westward. " There was more
311 31 0 DEMOCR.ACY
land than people could use, and still they kept moving. The father of joseph Smith, the founder of Monnonism, moved his family seven times in fourteen years. Others moved at least three or four times in a lifetime, selling their land to new settlers at a profit each time; "they are ," it was noted, "very indifferent ploughmen" anyway. Nothing stopped them-Indians, bad weather, or poverty."
By 1820 westward-swarming Americans had created a great trian gular wedge of settlement reaching to the Mississippi River. The north ern side of the triangle ran from New York along the Ohio River, the southern side extended from eastern Georgia through Tennessee, and the two sides met at the tip of the wedge at St. Louis. Within this huge triangle of settlement people were distributed haphazardly and huge pockets remained virtually uninhabited. By 1820 the United States had added the territory of Louisiana and Florida, which doubled the size of the country. And the original thirteen states had become twenty-two, with over nine and a half million people. Foreigners complained that Americans were completely taken with the gigantic extent of their coun try and their "golden dreams of the future" and had come "to measure the importance of foreign nations by this scale. "12
This spectacular growth and movement of people further weakened traditional forms of social organization and intensified people's feelings of equality. Such a mobile population, one Kentuckian told James Mad ison in 1792, "must make a very different mass from one which is com posed of men born and raised on the same spot. . . . They see none about them to whom or to whose families they have been accustomed to think themselves inferior." In these new western territories, where "society is yet unborn," where "your connections and friends are ab sent, and at a distance," and where there was "no distinction assumed on account of rank or property,' it was difficult to put together anything that resembled a traditional social hierarchy, or even a civilized com munity, Kentucky, like all frontier areas, travelers noted, was "dif ferent from a staid and settled society, . . . A certain loss of civility is inevitable. "I]
"The manner in which the population is spreading over this conti nent has no parallel in history, " declared a worried observer in 1818. Americans were reversing the civilizing process, going backwards in time, losing politeness instead of, as the revolutionaries had hoped, gain ing it. Usually the first settlers of any country were barbarians who gradually in time became cultivated and civilized. "The progress has been from ignorance to knowledge, from the rudeness of savage life to
A World Within Themselves
the refinements of polished society. But in the settlement of North America the case is reversed. The tendency is from civilization to bar barism." Under New World conditions "the tendency of the American character is then to degenerate, and to degenerate rapidly; and that not from any peculiar vice in the American people, but from the very nature of a spreading population. The population of the country is outgrowing its institutions. " Ta some it seemed that the mind once enlightened could after all become darker .'4
Frederick Jackson Turner was right to make so much of this western movement of people fomenting American democracy, self-sufficiency, and individualism. "The practical liberty of America is found in its great space and small population," said the Englishman George Flower in 1817. "Good land, dog-cheap everywhere, and for nothing, if you will go for it, gives as much elbow room to every man as he chooses to take. " But Turner and Flower were both wrong to think that it was simply the free land and open space of the frontier that were at work. It was rather what the scale and speed of movement did to the structure of a society already weak to begin with. But equally corrosive were the republican principles the settlers carried with them. Fertile free land could ne ver have been enough: look at the contrast with Canada, Amer icans said. It was "the general operation of the new political order of things on the mind and character of the country" that explaine~ the growth of democracy. 15
But perhaps nothing was more important in affecting the mind and character of Americans in these years than the massive changes taking piace in the economy. Often these changes have not been understood, even by expert economic historians. The changes do not seem as obvi ous or palpable as those that occurred later in American history . In these early decades of the nineteenth century there was linle industri alization or urbanization to speak of, certainly nothing like what was going on in England in the same period. And before the 1820S there were no great teehnological breakthroughs, certainly nothing compara ble to the railroad or the telegraph. Although by the early nineteenth century men increasingly congratulated themselves on the speed with which persons and goods were transported, in 1820 it still took weeks to travel between Boston and Washington, D.C. Consequently, most eco nomic historians and cliometricians have been hard put to discover and agree on just what went on in these years before the Age ofJackson.
In fact, the economic data for the late eighteenth and early nine teenth centuries are so few and fragmentary and so open to misinter
3 1 2 DEMOCRACY
pretation that almost everything about America 's economy in these years has been c1aimed. Some economic historians, often extrapolating from bits and pieces of data, have . said that per capita real income was de clining; others, more recently, that it was rising . So me agree that the society before 1840 got more prosperous and the per capita standard of living went up, but disagree when this happened . Others emphasize the extent to which particular groups in the society, espec ially craft ern ployees, experienced decline . Still others believe that no great gains in productivity were possible before 1840 and the development of mechanization and factory machinery. But others say that factory or ganization and supervised divisions of labor, even without mechaniza tion, were enough to increase productivity substantially . Most, however, seem to have a model of the English experience in the back of their minds and identify sizable economic growth and development with the expansion of manufacturing . By this measure not much economically seems to have happened in America before the 1820S. In numbers of people the United States may have been rapidly ga ining on England, but its economy in the early Republic still seemed very primitive in comparison with that of the former mother country ."
The early Republic remained largely agricultural and rural. In 1800 nearly 75 percent of the labor force was still in farming . In fact, by 1820 the percernage of the labor force in agriculture actually increased to nea;ly 80 percent. In contrast, England in 1801 had only 36 percent of its workers engaged in agriculture. In America even the more urban areas of New England and the mid-Atlantic had 70 percent of their workers still on farms. The American people still lived mostly in the countryside . In 1800 there were only thirty-three towns with a population of 2,500 or rnore , and only six of these urban areas had populations over 10,000. Only 5 percent of Americans actually lived in cities . By 1820 the number of urban places with populations over 2,500 had increased to sixty-one, but only live of these were cities with populations over 25,000; altogether these urban places held only 7 percent of the population. England in 1821 by contrast had weil over a third of its population in cities; more than 20 percent lived in ciries larger than 20,000. There was London with its million and a quarter people, and there were dozens of other urban areas, twenty-eight of which had populations over 20,000." At that same date the early American Republic was a very different country-still a predominantly rural agricultural society , on the surface not all that different from rural agricultural eighteenth-century colonial
America.
A Wotld Within Themseloes 3 13
Yet beneath that seemingly similar surface, everything had changed . America may have been still largely rural, still largely agricultural, but now it was also largely commercial, perhaps the most thoroughly com mercialized nation in the world .
One measure of that commercialization was the level of literacy; for the strongest motive behind people's learning to read and write, even more than the need to understand the Scriptures, was the desire to do business-to buy and seil real estate and other goods and to make deals involving signatures and written agreements. When in the early years of the nineteenth century people in New England, including even areas along the Connecticut River in rural Vermont, attained levels of ele mentary literacy that were higher than any other places in the Western world (with the possible exception of parts of Scandinavia), then we know we are dealing with a population engrossed in comrnerce ."
Even at the outset of the Revolution some Americans glimpsed the significance of buying and selling among themselves, which in turn had contributed to the reform of the Articles of Confederation and the cre ation of a more unified country . If Americans were to be truly a nation, some said in the 1780s, they could no Ionger exist as thirteen separate states, living on the margin of things , sending their agricultural produce to Europe and receiving manufactured goods in return, They told thern selves that they were by nature a unified empire, defined by interest and otfering .. a prospect of wealth and commerce which future ages alone can realize." All the massive movements of people westward , all the growing productive activity, all the endless trading , were creating a continental marketplace and a natural harmony of economic interests. Farmers could sell their produce to Americans and could buy their man ufactured goods from Americans; and if the artificial political obstacles of the states could be eliminated, the whole country could be linked in trade and prosperity . "When we consider the vastness of our country, the variety of her soil and climate, the immense extent of her seacoast , and of inland navigation by the lakes and rivers, " declared a Fourth of july orator in 1785, "we find a world wirhin ourselves, suffident to pro duce whatever can contribute to the necessities and even the superfluities of life. "'9 Sentiments like these both prepared the way for reform of the national government in 1787 and underlay Alexander Hamilton's 1791 Repon on Manufactures; in time they contributed to a radically new conception of America's economy.
Arnerica 's deep involvement in overseas commerce between 1792 and 180s-largely because of the European wars-tended to mask the signif
3 15 3 14 DEMOCRACY
icance of what was happening at home. AIthough the Federalists and the Congress did not follow up Hamilton's Report on Manufactures, domestic manufacturing and commerce steadily grew in the decades following the Revolution. Although most Americans continued to live in the countryside, more and more were involved in proto industrialization or rural manu factu ring. By 1820 weil over a quarter of the labor force in New England and the mid-Atlantic states was working in small factories, making everything from shoes to textiles. But such statistics concerning the number of factory workers are misleading; for not only was at least 30 percent of the manufacturing labor force in 1820 composed ofwomen and children, but this factory work does not include the extraordinary amount of manufacturing taking place in rural family households. Farnily farms were doing more than farming; they were manufacturing as well. In 1810, for example, 90 percent of the $42 mil lion total textile production of the nation came from family households. Only in America, said Congressman Albert Gallatin in 1799, were dif ferent occupations so blended together, "the same man being frequently a farmer and a merchant, and perhaps a manufacturer." As early as the 1790s Henry Wansey, the British visitor, observed that in both Mas sachusetts and New Jersey housewives in every farming household kept their families busy carding and spinning woolen and linen cloth "in the evenings and when they are not in the fields." In 1795 Brissot de War ville found "almost all" the households of Worcester, Massachusetts, "inhabited by men who are both cultivators and artisans; one is a tan ner, another a shoemaker, another sells goods; but all are farmers.' People, observed Tench Coxe, were seIling their tlsurplus of household manufactures out of statt. " Manufactures, it was said, were "rising in all their varied form in every direction, and pursued with an eye to profit in almost every farm house in the United Stares. "20
Everywhere in the northern states farm families were busy buying and selling with each other in ever-increasing amounts, not just "nec essaries," "conveniences," and "luxuries" but capital goocls as weil. The bulk of the ftedgling American iron and steel industry, for example, was devoted to farm implements-everything from scythes and pitch forks to axes and hoes. Horne manufacturers were increasing, it was said, "because all who deal in them find their profit in doing so.... Every day brings to market sorne new commodity. " 21 Gross statistics de piering the growth of this household manufacturing, even when they are available, can never fully reveal the significance of its disruptive effects on the society.
A WarM Within Themsdoes
We get some sense of these effects, however, from the example of the Mann family. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Horace Mann, who would become a great educational reformer, was still a boy on his father's farm in the little town of Franklin in southeastern Mas sachusetts. Like so many other northern families, Mann and his mother and his brothers and sisters spent much of their spare time on handi crafts, at first just spinning and weaving for their own use. Then they began making straw braids used in ladies' hats. At first they took these braids to the local storekeeper in exchange for merchandise. But in 1804 a local hat factory began buying the braids directly from the Manns and other families in the town of Franklin and turning them into straw bon nets for sale in Providence and Boston. By 1812 the little country town of Franklin was producing 6,000 hats a year. Soon the mother and children of the Mann family were making more money from the braids than the father was from his farm. Not only did such extra disposable income in the household affect patriarchal relations between husbands and wives, but it gave these farming households the means to purchase the very sorts of luxury or consumer goods, such as straw hats, that they themselves were producing. 22
Once it was finally realized that the desire of ordinary people to buy such consumer goods, and not their poverty or frugality as used to be thought, was the principal source of their industriousness and their pro ductivity, then the fear of "Iuxury" that had bedeviled the eighteenth century died away. It no Ionger made any sense to say, as J ohn Adams archaically said in 1814, that "human nature, in no form of it, ever could bear Prosperity." Prosperity was now thought to be good for people; it was their "desire of gain, beyond the supply of the mere necessities of life," that stimulated enterprise and created this prosperity. 23
From this rapid development of internal trade arose the heightened demand almost everywhere for internal improvements-new roads, new canals, new ferries, new bridges-anything that would help increase the speed and lower the cost of the movement of goods, and, as John C. Calhoun said in 1817, in a common opinion, help "bind the republic together." All this worked to convince Americans, as the governor of Pennsylvania declared in 18n, that "foreign commerce is a good but of a secondary nature, and that happiness and prosperity must be sought for within the limits of our own country." This growing belief that domestic comrnerce of the United Stares was "incaJculably more valu ahle" than its foreign commerce and that "the horne market for pro ductions of the earth and manufactures is of more importance than all
3 17 3 16 DEMOCRACY
foreign ones" represented a momentous reversal of traditional thinking . "Commerce" in the eighteenth century had usually referred exclusively to international trade. Now it was being equated with all the exchanges taking place within the country, exchanges in wh ich both parties always gained. The Americans, said Fanny Wright in 181g , echoing a phrase heard over and over in these years, were truly forming "a world within themselves. " ••
If Americans were truly a commercial world within themselves, then they demanded as never before not only internal improvements of every sort but paper money with which to trade and deal with one another. Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution had prohibited the states from emitting bills of credit; but such a legal prohibition could scarcely have restrained the powerful entrepreneurial forces at work . People wanted, indeed needed, paper money, and despite the framers' best intentions the people simply pressed their state legislatures to charter banks that in turn issued the paper money that was desired .
Gentlemen trying to live off their proprietary wealth in 1787 had not fuHy comprehended the explosive entrepreneurial forces they were deal ing with, and most of them certainly had not reckoned on what banks could do , Indeed, few revolutionaries understood banking at all. In 1781 the Congress had set up the Bank of North America in Philadelphia, and by 1790 there were three more banks established in New York, Boston, and Baltimore . Yet compared with England. banking in Amer ica was new and undeveloped . There was nothing yet in America that duplicated the array of different monetary notes and the dozens upon dozens of private and county banks scattered all over eighteenth-century GreatBritain . When the Bank of North America was first opened in Philadelphia, it was "a novelty," said Thomas Willing, its president. Banking in America, he said, was "a pathless wilderness , ground but little known to this side of the Atlantic." English rules, arrangements, and bank bills were then unknown . "All was to us a mystery. "'5
Suddenly, as if making up for lost time , America went wild in the creation of new banks, Twenty-five banks were established between 1790 and 1800, including the Bank of the United Stares. Between 1801 and 1811, when the Bank of the United Stares was allowed to die, sixty-two more banks were established by the states. By 1816 the number of state charte red banks had increased to 246, and by 1820 it exceeded 300. These banks, unlike the original Bank of North America or the Bank of the United Stares , were not just sources of credit for government, not just commercial banks, handling short-term credit for merchants, but banks
A WorM Within Themselves
for all the different economic interests of the society that wanted easy, long-term credit-mechanics and farmers as weil as governments and merchants. In 1792 the Massachusetts legislature required the second state bank it created to lend at least 20 percent of its funds to citizens living outside of the city of Boston in order that the bank "shall whoHy and exclusively regard the agricultural interest. "26 The state charter set ting up the Farmers and Mechanics Bank of Philadelphia in lBog stip ulated that a majority of the directors be "farmers, mechanics, and manufacturers actually employed in their respective professions." New charters elsewhere had similar requirements."
And these banks were to be located not merely in the large urban centers such as Philadelphia or Boston but also in such outlying areas as Westerly, Rhode Island , where a new bank established in 1800 justi fied itself by declaring that existing banks in the state in Providence, Newport, and Bristol were "too remote or too confined in their opera tions to diffuse their benefits so generally to the country as could be wished. " By 1818 the state had twenty-seven banks. In 1813 the Pennsyl vania legislature in a single bill authorized incorporation of twenty-five new banks. After the govemor vetoed this bill , the legislature in 1814 passed over the govemor' s veto another bill incorporating forty-one banks. As early as 1793 John Swanwick of Philadelphia had envisioned banks sprouting up in all the provincial towns of the state, "Their num ber will be so far multiplied, " he told the Pennsylvania legislature, "that it will be no Ionger a favor to obtain discounts." By the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century it seemed to one observer that nearly every village in the country had a bank; wherever there was a church, a tavern, and a blacksmith, one could usually find a bank as wen . By 1818 Kentucky had forty-three new banks, two of thern in towns that had fewer than one hundred inhabitants. Rhode bland, befitting its advanced commercial state, seerned to have a bank in nearly every community .•8
These hundreds of banks now issued the paper money that the peo ple had desired , Of course, the bank notes were not real money or specie but only promises to pay gold or silver. Yet in increasing amounts these bank notes passed as money; indeed, some Americans even grasped the fact that these banks were creating money . By 1815 over two hundred banks had deposits and note Iiabilities of about $90,000,000 backed by only $17,000,000 of specie . "The circulation of our country," Senator James Uoyd of Massachusetts declared in 18u, "is at present emphati cally a paper circulation; very Iittle specie passes in exchange between
3 19 318 DEMOCRACY
individuals. " Some of the old revolutionaries never understood the " magic of banking. Jefferson thought that the paper money issued by banks was designed "to enrich swindlers at the expense of the honest and industrious part of the nation." He could not comprehend how "Iegerdemain tricks upon paper can produce as solid wealth or hard labor in the earth . It is vain for common sense to urge that nothing can produce nothing." John Adams agreed: "every dollar of a bank bill that I is issued beyond the quantity of gold and silver in the vaults represents nothing and is therefore a cheat upon somebody," he said in 1809. Yet such bank bills were a new source of entrepreneurial energy that enter prising Americans were eager to exploit. By 1819 Alexander Baring, the head of the great British financial family , could tell a committee of the British House of Commons that •' the system of a paper currency has been carried to a greater extent in America than in any other part of the world. "29
The public chartering of banks was just one example of the states exploiting private wealth for public purposes in an old-fashioned mo narchical manner . In fact, the unwillingness of new democraticaUy elected state legislatures to raise taxes to pay for all that govemmental leaders wanted to do forced nearly all the states to fall back on the traditional mobilization of private power for public ends . As in the case of political patronage, democracy was forcing a curious reversion to older monarchical forms of goveming. Instead of doing the tasks them selves, as many devout republicans had expected, the states ended up doing what the crown and all premodern governments had done granting charters of incorporation to private associations and groups to carry out a wide variety of endeavors presumably beneficial to the pub lic, not just in banking but also in transportation, insurance, and other enterprises . Yet because of a republican aversion to chartered monop olies , the creation of corporations did not take place without strenuous opposition and heated debate . As a consequence, these corporations were radically transformed . Within a few years most of them became very different from their monarchical predecessors: they were no longer ex clusive monopolies and they were no longer public . They became pri- . vate property and what Samuel Blodget in 1806 called "rivals for the common weal." And they were created in astonishing numbers undu plicated anywhere else in the world.t"
Corporate charters had been traditional legal instruments used by governments to harness private enterprise and private wealth to carry out desirable public goals, such as founding a colony, maintaining a
A w-u Within Thmuelves college, building a bridge, or running a bank. Like the appointing of wealthy individuals to be justices of the peace or other public officials, granting corporate charters Wall a means by wh ich legaUy powerful but revenue-starved prernodern govemments shifted the costs of public ac tions to private sources . In retum for the public service, such corporate grants gave to the recipients certain exclusive legal privileges, including the right to govem an area or the right to a monopoly over a particular activity. There was no sharp distinction in such corporate grants be tween public and private. Harvard College with its charter in the sev enteenth century was no less public than one of the incorporated New England towns. These corporate privileges were not frequently granted or widely available; they were made at the initiative of the govemment, not private interests.
Such monopolistic grants were meaningful in a monarchical society where the recipients of these exclusive privileges were clear and visible . In the old society the holders of the corporate chartere and other gav ernmental franchises tended to be those dominant gentry in whom the hierarchical lines of patronage and inftuence converged. Once the Rev olution severed those hierarchicallines of patronage and influence, how ever, these exclusive corporate charters and govemmental grants became increasingly anomalous . Even in the old society of England there had been outcries against monopoly and favoritism and complaints that such corporate grants wen: unfairly dispersed.
These criticisms wen: nothing, however, compared with what hap pened in America. Once the old hierarchies disintegrated and the lines of i~ftuence became blurred, the new states' attempts to grant such corporate privileges to select individuals and groups immediately raised storms of protear." Critics charged that such grants, even when their public purpose seemed obvious, such as those for the College of Phila delphia or the Bank of North America or the city of Philadelphia, were repugnant to the spirit of American republicanism , "which does not admit of granting peculiar privileges to any body of men." Such fran chises and privileged grants may have made sense in monarchies as devices serving " to circumscribe and limit absolute power." Certainly the colonists had seen their various crown and corporate charters in just this defensive way. But now that only the people ruled, these grants of corporate privileges seemed pernicious, for ••as much as the combina tion of citizens enjoying corporation immunities may be calculated, even at this day, to relieve from the weight of monarchical sway , to the same degree an: they contrary to the equal and common liberty which ought
3 2 0 DEMOCRACY
to pervade a republic ." "The unequal or partial distribution of public benefits within astate creates distinctions of interest, inftuence and power, which lead to the establishment of an aristocracy, the very worst species of government." "All incorporations," declared Justice John Hobart of New York , "imply a privilege given to one order of citizens which others do not enjoy, and are so far destructive of that principle of equal liberty which should subsist in every community .' '3' Some like ]efferson remained deeply opposed to these corporate grants for just these reasons . To his dying day Jefferson believed that the state legis latures should grant such legal privileges only sparingly and should be able to interfere with them or take them back anytime they wished.
Given the democratic and interest-ridden nature of American soci ety, however , it was difficult for the state legislatures to resist appeals to bestow these corporate privileges , especially since many of their mern bers were themselves involved in the businesses they were incorporating. Legislators became in fact, as Madison had feared, judges in their own causes. In the New Jersey legislature in 1806, for example , "the pecu lators of both parties" cooperated in chartering dozens of turnpike as sociations for themselves . The •'d iscord ant names of Democrat and Federalist hath become harmoniously attuned to the pursuasive and dul cet sounds of interesr." It was the same in Connecticut . The subscrip tion list of the Hartford Bank , suggested one shrewd subscriber in 1791, had to be left open, or seem to be open-e-that is, if the bank hoped to be incorporated by the Connecticut legislature. There were "a number in the Legislature who would wish to become subscribers, and would , of course, advocate the bill while they supposed they could subscribe, and, on the contrary , if it was known the subscription was full, they would oppose it violently . "33 The exploitation of public office for private ends-that is, corruption-was of course not new to American politics; it had been common in the colon ial governments . But the republican revolution was supposed to have created aseparate public authority free from private interests,
With the representatives in the state legislatures turning over an nually , it was not hard for each interest to secure its own cluster of legal privileges, with the corporate charter becoming, as James Sullivan com plained in 1792, rnerely " a n indulgence to a few men in the state , who happened to ask the legislature to grant it to them. ",. What one com munity or group of entrepreneurs had, another wanted , and so the cor porate charters multiplied in ever-increasing numbers. There had been only about a half dozen business corporations chartered in the entire
A WOTld Within Themselves 3 2 1
colonial period . Now such corporate grants for businesses virtually be came popular entitlernents. The legislatures incorporated not just banks but insurance companies and manufacturing concerns, and they li censed entrepreneurs to operate bridges, roads, and canals . The states issued IJ charters of incorporation between 1781 and 1785, 22 more be tween 1786 and 1790, and "4 between 1791 and 1795. Between 1800 and 1817 they granred nearly 1,800 corporate charters. Massachusetts alone had thirty times more business corporations than the half dozen or so that existed in all of Europe . New York, the fastest-growing state, issued 220 corporate charters between 1800 and 1810 . It seemed clear as early as 1805, as a committee of New York City justifying multiple ferry leases put it, that "the only effectual method of accommodating the public is by the creation of rival establishments." •'Thus, " as one American noted in 1806, " if two baking companies are thereby permitted, where there was but one, bread may be eheaper in consequence; or if there are two banks thus instituted, and neither of them taxed, more of the people will be favoured by loans, than where there is but one bank; and a further increase will reduce even the Talt ofinterest." The thinking be hind the Charles River Bridge decision of the Supreme Court in 1837 was already present a generation earlier.»
Eventually the pressure to dispense these corporate charters among special interests became so great that some states sought to ease the entire process by establishing general incorporation laws. Instead of re quiring special acts of the legislature for each charter specifying the persons, location, and capitalization involved, the legislatures opened up the legal privileges to all who desired them. Beginning first with religious associations in the 1780s, the states, led by New York in 1811, extended the privileges of corporation to manufacturers , and later to banks ' and other entrepreneurial activities. With this multiplication not only was the traditional exclusivity of the corporate charters destroyed, but the public power of the state governments was dispersed. If "gov ernment, unsparingly and with an unguarded hand, shall inultiply cor porations, and grant 'privileges without limitation; " then, declared a concerned Governor Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts, sooner or later "only the very shadow of sovereignty" would remain .r'
Despite this generous bestowal of corporate charters on private in terests, however, the republican belief that the government should have a distinct and autonomous sphere of public activity remained strong, especially among the new states west of the Appalachian Mountains.P Even in the older states many retained a republican faith in the power
3 23 3 2 2 DEMOCRACY
of majorities in the legislatures to do what they wanted with corporate charters on behalf of the public interest. "It seerns difficult to conceive of a corporation established for merely private purposes," declared a North Carolina judge in 1805. "In every institution of that kind the ground of the establishment is some public good or purpose to be pro moted , "38 This increasing stress on the need for a "public purpose" behind the state's activity, however, eventually forced people to distin guish between corporations such as banks and insurance companies that were now considered private because they were privately endowed and those such as towns or counties that remained public because they were tax-based.
But this distinction had its own logical consequences. Ir corporations such as banks and other businesses were indeed private, and not public, then it could be intelligibly argued that their charters , once granted, were actually "vested rights" of private property proteered from sub sequent violation or regulation by state authority.P No one doubted the capacity of the legislature to take private property for public pu rposes , but this power, it was now argued, could not be extended so far as to abridge rights expressly vested prior to the legislature 's assertion of its power-at least not without some sort of compensation for such abridg ments.+0 "In granting charters," declared William Robinson in the Pennsylvania assembly in 1786 in defense of the charter of the Bank of North America, "the legislature acts in aministerial capacity"; that is, it acted as the crown had acted in mobilizing private resources for public purposes. This bestowing of charters, said Robinson, "is totally distinct from the power of making laws, and it is a novel doctrine in Pennsyl vania that they can abrogate those charters so solemnly granted . " There was a difference between laws and charters. Laws were general rules for the whole community; charters "bestow particular privileges upon a certain number of people . . . . Charters are a species of property. When they are obtained, they are of value. Their forfeiture belongs solely to the courts of justice . "4' It was a strained, prernature argument, and it did not im med ia tely take hold; but it pointed the way to the future . After the Constitution was adopted, some even began to argue that the corporations were actually contracts immune from state tampering by the contract clause in Article I, Section 10 ofthe Constitution, a position eventually endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Dartmouth College case in 181g.
Protecting private property and minority rights from the interests of the enhanced public power of the new republican governments eventu-
A WarM Within Themselves
ally became, as Madison had foreseen, the great problem of American democratic politics. As early as the 1780s many were already contending that only the judiciary in America was impartial and free enough of private interests to solve that problem and defend people's rights and property from the tyrannical wills of interested popular majorities. The state legislatures, it was argued, should not "Ieave the great business of the state, and take up private business, or interfere in dispures between contending parties" as the colonial assernblies had habitually done. The evils of such legislative meddling were "heightened when the society is divided among themselves;-one party praying the assembly for one thing, and opposite party for another thing.... In such circumstances, the assembly ought not to interfere by any exertion of legislative power, but leave the contending parties to apply to the proper tribunals [that is, to the judiciary] for a dec ision of their differences , "4" These efforts to carve out an exclusive sphere of activity for the judiciary, a sphere where the adjudicating of private rights was removed from politics and legislative power, contributed to the remarkable process by which the judiciary in America suddenly emerged out of its colonial insignificance to becorne by 1800 the principal means by which popular legislatures were controUed and limited. The most dramatic institutional transfor mation in the early Republic was the rise of what was called an " inde pendent judiciary. "+3
Judges now became the arbiters between the emerging separate spheres of public power and private rights. Law became more and more of a science rernoved from politics and comprehended by only an en lightened few who needed to be educated in special professional law schools, Law, Henry Chipman argued in 1806, was now "too complex to be understood by those who have not the leisure or ability to trace the intricate relations subsisting among the members of a great and busy community , " Populist radicals resisted these arguments, tried to draw distinctions between "lawyers law, and legisllllive law, " and urged that all adjudication be purged of its ' 'professional mystery. " But to little avail: even after the Federalists were virtually eliminated from polirics, every new effort at popular radicalization created its own conservative oppo sition among the Jelfersonian Republicans. The desire for an indepen dent expert judiciary was bred by the continuing and ever renewed fears of democratic politics. ++
Traditionally judges had been appointed to the courts because of their social and political rank, not because of their legal expertise; many were not even legally trained. They had exercised a broad, ill-defined
3 25 3 2 4 DEMOCRACY
magisterial authority befitting their social rank; they were considered members of tM government and remained intimate1y involved in poli tics, Thomas Hutchinson, for example, who was no lawyer, had been ,. chief justice of the superior court , lieutenant governor, a member of the council, and judge of probate of Suffolk County of Massachusetts aU at the same time. During the 1790s both J ohn J ay and Oliver Ellsworth performed diplomatic missions while sitting as justices of the Supreme Court; indeed , while waiting for Jefferson 's return from France in 1789, Jay served simultaneously as Secretary of State and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase saw nothing wrong with his open politieking on behalf of the Federalist cause. Con gress in its Invalid Pension Act of 1792 assigned rhe federal courts ad ministrative and magisterial duties that were not strictJy judicial and that were actually subject to review by the Secretary of War and the Congress. Of the twenty-eight men who sat on the federal district courts in the 1790s only eight had held high judicial office in their states; but nearly all of them had been prominent political figures, having served in notable state offices and in the Continental Congress. They saw their service on the court as simply an extension of their general political activity; some of them even continued to exercise political influence and pass on Federalist patronage in their districts while sitting on the bench . Such judges were political authorities, not professional legal experts.n
By the early nineteenth century, however, judges began withdraw ing from politics, shedding their older, broad magisterial roles, and lim iting their activities to the regular courts, which became increasingly professional and less burdened by popular juries. The courts tended to avoid the most explosive and partisan political issues but at the sarne time atternpted to designate other important issues as issues of law that were within their exclusive jurisdiction. Men began to draw lines around what was political or legislative and what was legal or judicial and to justify the distinctions by the doctrine of separation of powers. 46 As early as 1787 Alexander Hamilton had argued in the New York assembly that the state constitution prevented anyone from being deprived of his rights except "by the law of the land" or, as a recent act of the assembly had put it, 11 by due process of law, " which, said Hamilton in an astonishing and novel twist, had "a precise technical import" : these words were now " only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of legislature. "41 Placing legal boundaries around issues such as property rights and contracts had the effect of isolating these issues from popular tampering, partisan de-
The Cekbration of Commerce
bate, and the clashes of interest-group pohtics . Some things, including the power to define property and interpret constitutions, became matters not of political interest to be determined by legislatures but of the "fixed principles" of law to be determined only by judges. Without the pro tection of the courts and the intricacies of the common law, it was even argued in Pennsylvania in 1805, "rights would remain forever without remedies and wrongs without redress." Americans could no longer count on their popularly elected legislatures to solve many of the problems of their lives. "For the varying exigencies of sociallife, for the complicated interests of an enterprising nation, the positive acts of the legislature can provide little. "48 This was a long way from the 1]76 republican confi dence in popular legislative law-making and represented a severe in dictment of democracy.
The result was paradoxical: as the public power of the state grew in the early Republic, so too did the private rights of individuals-with the courts mediating and balancing the claims of each . Many, including Madison in his later years, concluded that the judiciary was the only governmental institution that came elose to resembling an umpire, standing above the marketplaee of competing interests and rendering impartial and disinterested decisions . It seemed the only public place left in democratie America where a trace of classical aristocracy and virtue could be found. Some even thought that the very "existence" of America's elective governments depended on the judieiary-the insti tution most removed from the people and most immune to the pressures of private interests, "The courts of justiee," coneluded Tocqueville, "are the visible organs by which the legal profession is enabled to con trol the democracy . "49
18. The Celehration of Commerce In the end, no banks, no government, no institutions could have created the American economic miraele of these years. America suddenly emerged a prosperous, scrambling, enterprising society not because the Constitution was created or because a few leaders formed anational bank, but because ordinary people, hundreds of thousands of them, began working harder to make money and "get ahead." Americans seemed to be a people totaUy absorbed in the individual pursuit of money . "Enterprise, " "improvement, " and "energy" were every where extolled in the press. "The voice of the people and their govern
327 3 26 DEMOCRACY
rnent is loud and unanimous for comrnerce, " said the disgruntled and bewildered Columbia professor Samuel MitchilI in ,800 . "Their incli nation and habits are adapted to trade and traffic , From one end of the continent to the other, the universal roar is Commerce! Commerce! at all events, Commerce!"
Mitchill 's sarcastic attitude toward trade was no doubt fitting for a college professor , but not for ordinary Americans. Most of them seerned to be happily involved in buying and selling, more so than in any other country in the world. " T he American," foreigners said, "is always bargaining; he always has one bargain afoot, another just finished, and two or three he's thinking of. All that he has, all that he sees, is mer chandise in his eyes. " English travelers were stunned to see Americans oi selling their landed estates in order to go into trade-the reverse of what Englishmen sought to do. There was more peddling and shopkeeping than existed anywhere else on the globe , In the ,820S Americans first .
. \\!
used the term "businessman " to express rnost concisely what so many of them were doing. Americans everywhere in the country were ob sessed with commerce. "It is a passion as unconquerable as any with which nature has endowed us, " said young Henry Clay to the House of Representatives in ,812. " You may attempt to regulate-you cannot destroy it. " I
It was frightening and bewildering to many-that a whole society should be taken over by moneymaking and the pursuit of individual interest. Hustling entrepreneurs like Oliver Evans protested against the enlightened view of gentlernen philosophers that inventions should not be patented but be made available freeIy to the world of science. It was all weil and good for wealthy aristocrats like Jefferson to refuse to patent and protect their inventions , but "there are few such patriots as Mr. Jefferson. " The common inventor now in America was usually a poor man, and "the discovery he has made at great expense (was) the only thing perhaps which he possesses exclusively, by which he can make a comfortable living. " These new kinds of enterprising inventors certainly could do good for the country , but they said they could not be expected to "do it at our own expense, without a prospect." They needed longer patent protection in order to be allowed "ro enrich ourselves by our own labors, while we shall enrich our neighbors and our country ." Good business sense for a new commercial world, but to enlightened philosophes Iike Benjamin Rush it seemed only that the "love of gold " was displacing the values of the founding fathers . The motto of the new men was:
The Celebration of Commerce
On others inspiration flash, Give them eternal fame But give me cash!"
Gentlemen of varying tastes-ranging from Benjamin Rush to Washington Irving to Philip Freneau-shook their heads in amazement and despair and filled the air with satirical complaints or handwringing analyses of what was happening. Sensitive souls were eager to be patri otic, but many of them feared that a society so absorbed in moneymak· ing not only would contribute not hing to the arts and the finer things of life but would eventually fall apart in an orgy of selfishness.
By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, the appre hensions had increased to the point where many Americans now looked to war as a necessary regenerative act-as a me ans of purging Arneri cans of their greed and their seemingly insatiable love of commerce . The War of 1812 with England became for many a way of refreshing the national character and revitalizing republicanism.t "War," it was said in December 1811, "will purify the political atmosphere . .. . All the pub lic virtues will be refined and hallowed; and we shall again behold at the head of affairs citizens who may rival the immortal men of 1776 ." "There is," said William Crafts of Charleston , South Carolina, "a magnanimity in war, which makes even defeat glorious."!
The War of 1812 did not, of course, end or even lessen the Americans' involvement in commerce and their pursuit of individual self-interest. If anything, it aggravated thern, by increasing horne manufacturing and people 's commitment to domestic markets. But the war did have the effect of clearing the air of much traditional thinking and of helping Americans come to a new and more honest appreciation of their society and its commercialism . By the end of the second decade of the nine teenth century there were far fewer despairing lamentations over the chaotic and commercial state of American society and many more re alistic attempts to find new adhesives and attachments to hold people
together. It was not that the past left nothing to cement the society together .
The Revolution had not dissolved all the bonds of the old monarchical society; no revolution could . People stilllooked after their families and kin ; bank directors lent money mainly to themselves and to people they knew; and nearly everyone requested offices for relatives and friends, though now always adding that talent and merit were the prime consid erations. Private patronage remained prevalent; only now there was not
3 29 DEMOCRACY 3 2 8
as much paternalism to dothe it: naked interest seemed to dominate. " T he labor of my farm," said Federalist George Cabot of Massachu setts in 1801 , " is performed altogether by a tenant , to whom I give specific benefits, that he may have no control over the management , and the benefits are liberal, that he may be happy, and tied to me by
his interest. " 5 The national government certainly had little authority to hold things
together . Jefferson had come into the presidency in his "revolution of .1800" determined to reverse the monarchizing tendencies of the Feder alists ; indeed , he later said his e1ection "was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of In6 was in its form ." Even the symbols and ceremonies of government were simplified or e1iminated, and government as a social force became increasingly weaker. By the early nineteenth century, foreign immigrants immediately noticed that " government" in America made " no sensation . " "It is round about you like the air ," said a startled William Sampson fresh from Ireland, "and you cannot even feel it." No people in the Western world ever dismantled its national government rnore completely than did the Amer icans of the early Republic . In time the delivery of themail was the only way most citizens would know that such a government even
existed. 6 Yet , of course, rhere were continued republican appeals to the
natural sociability, the sympathy, and what Joel Barlow called "the attracting force of universal love" that presumably existed in all peopleJ In the three or four decades following the Revolution newly independent American men and women eame together to form hundreds and thou sands of new voluntary associations expressive öf a wide array of benev olent goals-meehanics' societies, humane soeieties, societies for the prevention of pauperism, orphans ' asylums, missionary societies, ma rine societies, tract societies, Bible societies, ternperance associations , Sabbatarian groups, peaee societies, societies for the suppression of viee and immorality, societies for the relief of poor widows, societies for the promotion of industry, indeed societies for just about anything and ev erything that was good and humanitarian . People cut loose from tradi tional social relationships, it was observed as early as 1789, were " necessa rily thrown at a eonsiderable distance from eaeh other, and into a very diffused state of society . " The various voluntary associations and institutions enabled thern to eome rogether in new ways and to eombine their mites for eharity most effectively. By the 1820S in Massaehusetts
The Celebration of Commerce
alone these associations of like-minded men and women were forming at the rate of eighty-five a year."
There was nothing in the Western world quite like these hundreds of thousands of people assernbling annually in their different voluntary associations and debating about everything . In other countries, said Charles Ingersoll, such "various self-created associations" gave the au thorities "so much trouble and alarm" that they tried to prevent their formation . But because their own soeiety was so dispersed and loose, Arnericans found these associations "not only harrnless but beneficial. " So prevalent did these social organizations become that eventually some people like WiUiam Channing eame to fear that the social principles of these organizations were threarening that "individuality of character" that was so important to Arnericans and the real goal of all social action.?
Yet Channing and others need not have worried . For many mern bers soon redefined the ir relationship to these voluntary associations. Instead of giving their time and effort to the benevolent organizations, as in the past, many persons began giving money. The societies became less mutual associations and more fidueiary ones, and philanthropic minded people eould now belong to many voluntary societies at the same time . Money had a way of multiplying people's social re1ationships while at the same time attenuating thern."
Many others came to believe that Christianity might be the best means of tying Arnericans regether. All along , of course, varieties of Protestantism had been a major adhesive force for ordinary Americans, often the principal souree of eommunity and order in their lives. But the Revolution had disrupted Ameriean religion; it scattered congrega tions, destroyed ehurch buildings, interrupted the training of ministers, and politicized people 's thinking. The re1igious yearnings of eommon people, however, remained strong, stronger than any of the revolution ary leaders realized.
During the last quarter of the eighteenth century powerful eurrents of popular religious feeling ftowed beneath the genteel and seeular sur face of publie life, awaiting only the developing dernocratic revolution to break through the rationalistic and skeptical erust of the Enlighten ment and sweep over and transform the landscape of the eountry. The consequenees were far-reaching, not just for the mass of ordinary people but for many of the enlightened revolutionary leaders themselves, who were frightened and bewildered by this democratic revolution, Although sorne of the enlightened gentry rernained immune to what was happen
DEMOCRACY.'3.'30
ing and like Jefferson and young John C . Calhoun in the early nine teenth century enthusiastically predicted that the whole country was rapidlyon its way to believing that Jesus was just a good man without any divinity, other liberal gentry knew better; some of them, rational and enlightened as they had been, even came to find in old-fashioned supernatural Christianity a source of salvation for both their own de spairing souls and the shattered soul of the country . When even a once radical skeptic like Joe! Barlow lamely came to insist that he had not really abandoned Christianity after all, then we know that the Enlight enment was over .
At the time of the Revolution most of the founding fathers had not pur much emotional stock in religion, even when they were regular churchgoers. As enlightened gentlemen , they abhorred " that gloomy superstition disserninated by ignorant illiberal preachers" and looked forward to the day when ••the phantom of darkness will be dispelled by the rays of science, and the bright charms of rising civilization." At best, most of the revolutionary gentry only passively believed in orga nized Christianity and, at worst , privately scorned and ridiculed it. Jef· ferson hated orthodox clergymen, and he repeatedly denounced the "priestcraft" for having converted Christianity into "an engine for en slaving mankind , . . . into a mere contrivance to fileh wealth and power to themselves." Although few of them were outright deists, most like David Ramsay described the Christian church as "the best temple of reason . ' Even puritanical John Adams thought that the argument for Christ 's divin ity was an " awful blasphemy " in this new enlightened age. When Hamilton was asked why the members of the Philadelphia Convention had not recognized God in the Constitution , he allegedly replied, speaking for many of his liberal colleagues, "We forgot. "11
By the early decades of the nineteenth century it was no longer so easy for enlightened gentlemen to forget God . Ir the democratic rev olution of the decades following the Declaration of lndependence meant the rise of ordinary people, it meant as wellthe rise of popular evangelical Christianity ; for religion was the way most commo n peo pie still made meaningful the worId around thern. By the early 18005 these common people were asserting their evangelical Christianity in ways that gentry leaders could no Ionger ignore. When Aaron Burr, I grandson of Jonathan Edwards, was criticized in 1801 for his neglect of religion, a elose political associate reminded hirn of the Presbyterian vote and warned : " H ad you not better go to church? " Even Hamil ton in despair sought to wrap the mantle of popular Christianity
The Celebration of Commerce .'3.'3 1
around his Federalist cause. When Thomas Paine returned to Amer ica from Europe in 1802, he discovered that the popular world he had helped create had turned against hirn and his liberal "infidelity." Everywhere people noted the degree to wh ich the freethinking world of "Hume & Voltaire & Bolingbroke" was passing away, even among the educated gentry. As the Republic beeame democratized, it beeame evangelized."
Throughout theperiod many religious groups resisted the disinte grative effects of the Enlightenment belief in liberty of conscienee and separation of church and state and urged the Republie to reeognize its basis in Christianity by allowing chaplains in the Congress, proclaiming days of fasting and prayer, and by ending mail delivery on the Sab bath.' In 1811, in a notable blasphemy decision of Chancellor James Kent, The People of New York v, Ruggles, the connection between Chris tianity and republicanism was acknowledged in law. Although Kent recognized that the state had no formaUy established ehureh, that its constitution guaranteed freedom of religious opinion, and that it had no statute prohibiting blasphemy, he nevertheless declared that to revile with contempt the Christian religion professed by almost the whole com munity, as Ruggles had done, was "to strike at the roots of moral obligation and weaken the security of the social ties." That Kent was willing to rely upon religion in this way when, like many of the founding fathers, he despised religious enthusiasm and in private called Christi anity a barbaric superstition is a measure of just how mueh the tradi tional gentry had come to fear the social disorder of the earIy Republic .'4 Christianity, in fact, seemed to some Amerieans to have become the only cohesive force now holding the.nation together-"the great bond of civil society," said Federalist Leverett Saltoristall of Massachusetts, "the central attraction, " said Lyman Beeeher in 1815, "which must supply the deficiency of political affinity and interest . "'S
Yet the outpouring of religious feeling in the early decades of the nineteenth century-ealled the Second Great Awakening-actually did not bring people together as much as it helped to legitimate their sepa ration and make morally possible their new participation in an imper sonal marketplaee. Even the New Divinity movement within New England Calvinism, despite its strong repudiation of selfishness, ulti mately grounded Samuel Hopkins's famous concept of universal disin terested benevolenee on the enlightened self-interest of people, and thus set credible moral limits to their aequisitive behavior."
Others thought that religion was actuaUy accelerating social disin
333 DEMOCRACY33 2
tegration in the new Republic by creating a "war of words and tumult of opinions" that rivaled the early days of the Reformation. In the decades following the Revolution the remains of traditional religious establishments were finally destroyed, and modern Christian denomi nationalism was born. Older churches-Congregationalists, Presbyteri ans, and Anglicans that had dominated eighteenth-century colonial society-were now suddenly supplanted by energetic evangelical churches-Baptists, Methodists, and entirely new groups unknown to the Old World, such as the Disciples of Christ. Everywhere the people were "awakened from the sleep of ages" and saw "for the first time I1 that they were responsible beings" who might even be capable of bring ing about their own salvation. I? The American Revolution accelerated the challenges to religious authority that had begun with the First Great Awakening. Just as the people were taking over their governments, so, it was said, they should take over their churches. Christianity had to be ' republicanized. The people were their own theologians and had no need to rely on others to tell them what to believe. We must, declared the renegade Baptist Elias Smith in 1809, be "wholly free to examine for ourselves what is truth, without being bound to a catechism, creed, confession of faith, discipline or any rule excepting the scriptures." I There had been nothing before in America on such ascale quite like the evangelical defiance and democratic ferment of this Second Great Awakening .18
With individuals being told that each of them was "considered as possessing in hirnself or herself an original right to believe and speak as their own conscience, between themselves and God, may detennine, " religion in America became much more personal and voluntary than it ever had been; and people were freer to join and change religious as sociations whenever they wished. They thus moved from one religious group to another in a continual search for signs, prophets, or millennial promises that would make sense of their disrupted lives. With no church sure of holding its communicants, competition among the sects became
i fierce. Each claimed to be right, called each other names, argued end lessly over points of doctrine, mobbed and stoned and destroyed each ' other' s meeting houses. The result was a further fragmenting of Chris tianity. "All Christendom has been decomposed, broken in pieces" in ' this "fiery furnace of democracy," said a bewildered Harrison Gray Otis.'? Not only were the traditional Old World churches fragmented but the fragments themselves shattered in what seemed at times to be an endless process of fission. There were not just Presbyterians, but Old
The Celebration of Commeree
and New School Presbyterians, Cumberland Presbyterians, Springfield Presbyterians, Reformed Presbyterians, and Associated Presbyterians; not just Baptists, but General Baptists, Regular Baptists, Free Will Bap tists, Separate Baptists, Dutch River Baptists, Permanent Baptists, and Two-Seed-in-the-Spirit Baptists. Some individuals cut their ties com pletely with the Old World churches and gathered around adynamie leader like Barton Stone or Thomas Campbell. Other seeken ended up fonning churches out of single congregations, and still others simply listened in the fields to wandering-preachers like the Methodist Lorenzo Dow.
In some areas churches as such scarcely existed, and the traditional identification between religion and society, never very strong in America to begin with, now finally dissolved. The church became for many little more than the building in which religious services were conducted, and church membership was based less on people's position in the social hierarchy and more on their evangelical fellowship. By concentrating on the saving of individual souls, the competing denominations essentially abandoned their traditional institutional and churchly responsibilities to organize the world here and now along godly lines. Consequently, the evangelical churches were less capable than they had been in the eigh teenth century of encompassing the variety of social ranks within their membership. They lost their identity with the community and became more socially homogeneous; the Episcopal and U nitarian churches, for example, catered to elites, while the rapidly growing Baptists and Meth odists swept up middling and lower elements of the population;"
Nowhere in Christendom had religion become so fragmented and so separated from society. Yet nowhere was it so vital. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the evangelical Protestantism of or dinary people had come to dominate American culture to an extent the founding fathers had never anticipated.
Amid this religious fragmentation, Lyman Beecher and others came to realize that making each person alone responsible for his or her sal vation left nothing holding "society against depravity within and ternp tation without" except the force of God's law "written upon the heart" of each individual. Only the self-restraint of individuals-their moral "character" -now remained, it seemed, to hold this burgeoning, un ruly society together. To be successful in America, religion had to pre occupy itself with morality. 21
Only religion, Washington had said in his Farewell Address in 1796, was capable of supplying "that virtue or morality" that was "a neces
335 334 DEM 0 c a A,C Y
sary spring of popular govemment.' , From the beginning of America's republican experiment, the clergy had been repeatedly told that, what ever their doctrinal differences, "you are all united in inculcating the necessity of morals, " and "from the success or failure of your exertions in the cause of virtue, we anticipate the freedom or slavery of our coun try. " Faced with such awesome responsibility, religious groups and oth ers responded to the cause of virtue with an evangelical zeal and clamor that went beyond what any revolutionary leader in In6 could have imag ined. The clergy could no longer rely on exposing the community's guilt through jererniads; they could no longer count on reforming merely the "better part" of the society in the expectation that it would bring the rest along; and they could no longer use government to create the right "moral effect.' Ordinary people themselves had to be rnobilized in the cause of virtue, through the creation of both new institutions of reform and local moral societies-" diseiplined moral militia," Beecher called
them." Members of the moral soeieties, which were generally confined to
rural villages, relied essentiallyon observation and the force of local public opinion. They united among themselves, "collecting the lovers of virtue of every name," and presented "a bold front to the growing licentiousness of the day"; and then, by erecting "a citadel, from which extended observations may be made," they exerted their "infiuence over the moral conduct of others," first by friendly persuasion, and then, if that did not work, by exposing the moral delinquent "to the penalties of law." The hopes were high: "Character, that dearest earthly interest of man, will thus be protected, and thousands who are now settling down into incurable habits of Iicentiousness, will by these means be reclairned. "23
The growing and sprawling eities, however, needed more than moral societies to watch over and intimidate people. They needed new and substantial institutions, such as relief societies, hospitals, free schools, prisons, and savings banks, to improve the character of the weak and vicious of the society. The proliferation in the early nineteenth century of these new institutions eventually transformed and often ec1ipsed the humanitarian societies that enlightened gentry had formed in the im mediate post-revolutionary years in response to feelings of republican benevolence. By 1820 or so the goals and social complexion of these urban philanthropic endeavors had changed. Middling people, usually pious newcomers from rural areas, replaced the older paternalistic gen try as leaders of these charitable societies and transformed the emotional
The Celebration of Commerce
bonds tying them to the objects of their helpfulness. The patrician gen try in the 1780s and 1790s had organized charitable societies for treating the siek, aiding widowed mothers, housing orphans, feeding imprisoned debtors, or resuscitating drowning victims, out of a sense of benevolence befitting their enlightenment and their genteel social position. Their pa temalistic acts of charity were disinterested acts of compassion that called for feelings of dependency and gratitude on the part of the recipients.
It was not gratitude, however, that the founders of the new reform institutions were interested in. The new middling reformers wanted to imbue people, not with deference and dependency, but with "correct moral principles"; they aimed to change the actual behavior of people. Instead of concentrating on relieving the suffering of the unfortunate, as the earlier benevolent associations had done, the new institutions tried to get at the sources of poverty, crime, and other social evils, mainly by suppressing the vices-gambling, drinking, Sabbath-breaking, profanity, horse-racing, and other profligacies-that were presumed to be the causes of those evils. The reformers sought to remove the taverns and betting houses that tempted the weak and impressionable and to create institutions, such as prisons and schools, that would instill in people a proper respect for morality. The reformers wanted to awaken the moral sense of people, and they hoped to do this by rewarding industry and good behavior and punishing laziness and bad habits.
Despite all the talk of moral persuasion, however, all the reform institutions created in these years were designed to change the conduct of people by appealing ultimately to "that which gives the keenest edge to human ingenuity, -self-interest. " The savings bank introduced in New York in 1819, for example, was founded, it was said, "on principles calculated to inspire economy, produce reform, and inculcate a spirit of enterprise and industry, and self-respect, among the laboring classes of the community." People would begin "to see the progressive increase of the little capital" they had put away, and their acquisitive instincts would be aroused. Those acquisitive instincts would be stronger than their instincts for vice. They would, in fact, be the best means of binding the nation together. 34
Of course, Americans in these years continued to rely on the tradi tional ligaments of kinship and patronage; and they continued to mo bilize republican virtue, benevolence, and sociability to tie themselves together. But ultimately many of them came to realize that the United States would need bonds of union stronger than these and different from those possessed by any other nation. Unlike the European states, the
337 DEMOCRACY33 6
United States, already composed of more and more diverse peoples, could not rely on any tribaI or national identity. To be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution: it was the Revolution, and only the Revolu tion, that rnade them one people .
Therefore Americans ' interpretation of their Revolution could never cease; it was integral to the very existence of the nation . Some found the meaning of the Revolution in the Constitution and the union it had created. Others discovered the meaning in the freedomand equality that the Revolution had produced , But many other Americans knew that such meanings were too formal, too legal, too abstract, to express what most actually experienced in being Americans. In concrete day to-day terrns invocations of the Constitution meant the freedom to be left alone, and in turn that freedom meant the ability to make money and pursue happiness.
It was inevitable, therefore, that many came to conclude that this unruly society could tie itself together only by bonds that were in accord with the realities of Arnerican freedom and pursuits of happiness . Noth ing less than interest itself-that "most powerful impulse of the human breast"-would do as an adhesive force in this dynamic busy society." Many Federalists and Republicans, like many Whigs and Democrats later, concluded that interest was about all most Americans had in com mon . They could not be controlled by force, or else they would have no liberty . But appeals to virtue could not contain these busy people either. Only interest could restrain them. Americans govern thernselves, they said, because it was in their interest to do so. The desire to make money and get ahead helped them to develop habits of self-control. "The inftu ence of money is wonderful, and the mi nd changes as the means er acquiring it are presented. ,,26 By the 1830S Tocqueville thought he saw what was holding this diverse, rootless, restless people together. "Inter esr," he concluded. "That is the secret . The private interest that breaks through at each mornent, the interest that, moreover, appears openly and even proclaims itself as a social theory .' " 7
Most of the Americans' defenses of interest and rnoney as the best connecting links in society were thus not cynica1 or reluctant concessions to reality; they were not made obliquely or in embarrassment. Quite the contrary: these defenses were made proudly and enthusiastically, as if interest and the making of money through trade had become deserv ing of as much acclaim and admiration as republican virtue traditionally
The Cekbration of Commerce
had been given. Interest and moneymaking after all were egalitarian and democratic. When people related to each other only through inter est, there was 00 obligation, no gratitude required ; the relationship was to that extent equaI. Many had always believed, moreover, that interest was what preoccupied and moved ordinary working people, and these ordinary working people, including not just laborers and employees but master craftsmen, enterprising farmers, proto-industrialists, and busi nessmen, anyone and everyone who worked for profit and for a living, were "the most useful, honest part of society. "28 Indeed, some were already saying that such working people were now the only people who mattered in America.
One of the earliest and most ingenious full-scale defenses of the so cial benefits of business and commerce was that of Samuel Blodget, merchant, economist, and sometime architect who designed the First Bank of the United States in Philadelphia. Blodget in several pioneering essays on the American economy written during the first decade of the nineteenth century argued that commerce was the major source of co hesion in the society, Of course, from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century, many thinkers, including Montesquieu, had de scribed commerce as beneficial to a country. It brought wealth to the society, tied different nations together, and even helped to civilize peo pIe. But by commerce most of these commentators usually had meant what Montesquieu meant: "the exportation and importation of mer chandise with a view to the advantage of the state," which translated into the traditional view, as one Arnerican put it, that "only exports make a country rich. "29 Commerce was generally equated with inter national trade, not with mere trafticking and exchanging within the community. Such internal trading and retail dealing had traditionally pos sessed little of the importance and respectability of overseas commerce. But now Blodget and others identified commerce with all business activ ities within the community, however petty and vulgar.3°
Indeed, Blodget celebrated economic interest itself as the best ad hesive a society could have. Every people had "social ties. " The first, said Blodget, were those of blood or kindred; the second were those of the laws; the third were those associations for the extension of the arts and sciences . The fourth, "and perhaps the most to be depmded on ofal/, " were pecuniary ties, Because people were naturally so restless and quar relsome, nothing else would work. Everywhere, he said, governments should sponsor and incorporate joint-stock companies-"minor repub lics"-to carry on all sorts of entrepreneurial endeavors, banks, canals,
DEMOCRACY 33 8
insurance companies, manufacturing and other businesses. All good re publicans should do all they could to extend these stock companies throughout the country. Every town should have them, and govem ments and POOr ordinary people alike should be able to buy small shares in them. Sometimes governments might find it necessary "to unite a bank and an insurance company together, till the town becomes suffi cient to have both these in separate operations." But governments, after chartering these companies, should have nothing to do with directing them. By these means governments could "become rich with little or no dependence on taxes and yet [be] so allied, and thereby so dependent on the people as not to dare to infringe their rights in the minor
republics.' , Such commerce and business were the "goldm chains" that held the
society together; they created "th« best socioJ system thaJ eoer was jormed. " The principle of commerce, said Blodget, was in fact "rhe most sublime gift of heaven wherewith to harmonize and enlarge society. It is not only a principal stimulus to all industry; it is thence the grandparent of all the useful arts and sciences, and it is the only deity who frankly tells its votaries, I by untouched credit and industry alone shall ye rise on my wings, to the temple of fortune and to farne.' " It was not true that only farmers and manufacturers were productive, said Blodget. Buying and selling, exchange itself, were sources of productivity in the society. In fact, Blodget went so far as to argue that merchants and traders, con trary to centuries of traditional thinking, were the only men in the so ciety who could be fully trusted. "By the learned professions and by any other calling except that of a merchant, men may rise without that scrupulous attention to reputation and honesty, which is the basis of commercial elevation in all countries where commerce receives fair play." For too long commerce had been stigmatized "by the idle nobles and privileged orders of Europe. " But America has changed all this. In a republic "alone it can ftourish in full bloom. "3
1
Of course, similar cultural changes were taking place throughout the Western world, but it was America, as the French theorist Comte Des tutt de Tracy realized, that carried thern farthest. Tracy, whose several works Jefferson translated and prepared for publication in America (though there is no indication that Jefferson ever comprehended the full import of all of Tracy's arguments), believed that the United States was "rhe hope and example of the world." There in the new Republic, he said, commerce had found its full identity with society. Indeed, com merce was society. "Society consists only in a continual succession of
I
The Celebration of Commerc« 339 EXCHANGES," and thus "commerce and society are one and the same thing.' Commerce for Tracy and for many Americans had shed its traditional reference to overseas merchants and external trade and had come to be equated simply with exchanges, the bulk of which took place within the country. "All exchanges are acts of commerce, and the whole of human life is occupied by aseries of exchanges and reciprocal services. " All the agents of trade-merchants, faetors, retailers, com mission brokers, shopkeepers-were equally useful to society. All those innumerable petty transactions among countless insignificant individu als in which all parties gain-that was commerce, that was society. "Commerce, that is exchange, being in truth society itself, it is the only bond among men; the source of all their moral sentiments; and the first and most powerful cause of the improvement of their mutual sensibility and reciprocal benevolence." And nowhere more than in republican America had commerce been allowed such full and fair play."
America, at a stroke it seemed, had overturned two millennia of Western history . "Everything relative to political economy must be original, " declared the political economist Laommi Baldwin in 1809. "Without recurrence to the past we have to consult futurity; we have every thing to create and little to correct; and instead of remedial insti tutions formed on retrospective views, we are to establish principles that shall interest posterity.' '33
When "exchange" became the primary element of the economy, said Baldwin, then paper money became more important. "The rapid ity and quick succession of exchanges" required increased quantities of money, and this paper money had democratizing effects. James Madi- . son, like gentry creditors everywhere, may have earlier condemned pa per money as destructive of "that confidence between man & man, by which the resources of one may be commanded by another." But now many were extolling that same destruction of confidence between one man and another, for such confidence was simply another name for authority and dependency. In a traditional intimate society it had been possible for a gentleman with a reputation and property to deal with everyone personally. But, said the physician Erick Bollman (a former participant in the Burr conspiracy) in 1810, gentlemen could not relate to people in such a personal manner anymore. When they wished, for example, to buy a turkey from a farmer, they could not say, as they had used to, "I own the big house at the corner of Ninth and Chestnut Street," and expect the farmer to tip his cap and deliver the turkey on credit, Now the farmer will say, "What is that to me!" Proprietary
lillllll;
I
34 1 DEMOCRACY34° wealth, conspicuous property, personal reputation, and genteei author ity did not matter as they had in the past. What the farmer wanted now was ready money, and it did not matter from whom it came: "I want a dollar," says the farmer, "or else you cannot have my turkey . "34
All these commercial activities and exchanges had corrosive effects on what remained of the traditional patronage and hierarchical confi dences between men in the society . Merchants, like the Bull brothers of Hartford in 1802, now advertised they had the "cheapest store " by set ting forth "the following rules-no trust, no goods sent out, no sampies given, no abatement in price first asked, no goods delivered until paid for ." Paper money made these new rules possible: it destroyed personal trust, but at the same time it liberated men from older personal de pendencies. All this trade and trafficking by different individuals freed men from traditional restraints and stimulated what Niles' Wttk{y Register in 1815 called "the almost universal ambition to get forward ." Laborers felt freer working for money wages than they had serving apprentice ships or existing in barter relationships with superiors. Even Caesar Rodney , the attorney defending the Philadelphia cordwainers in their conspiracy trial in ,806, was willing to accept the new liberal notion that labor was a commodity bought and sold in the market. America was different from Europe, said Rodney, who was soon to become Jeffer son's Attorney General . In the Old World, "statutable provisions fix and regulate the price of everything almost. " But "here honesty and industry are sure to meet a due reward ." lt was not their newfound independence from their masters that the cordwainers objected to; they simply wanted their employers to recognize that they lived in a new country "where the poorest individual can claim the full price of his labour, " and was free to withhold that labor from the market if he were
not satisfied with the price .3~ lf everyone in the society was involved in moneymaking and ex
changing, then to that extent they were a11 alike , a11 seeking their own individual interests and happiness. "The market house, like the grave, is a place of perfect equality, " said Philip Freneau in bitter derision .
36
But he was right. All this commercial activity did promote equality, yet not , of course, equality of wealth . Quite the contrary : wealth was far more unequally distributed in the decades following the Revolution than it had been before)7 Nonetheless, early-nineteenth-century Americans feit more equal, and for many of thern that was what mattered.
After all, amid all the age-old instruments of humiliation by which superiors had kept inferiors in their place, wealth was far from being
TIte Cekbration of Commerc«
the most important and most mortifying. When the western Pennsyl vanians in the state legislature declared in 1786 that " a democratic gov emment like ours admits of no superiority," Robert Morris was stunned. "What!" he scornfully exclaimed . "Is it insisted that there is no distinction of charaeter? Surely persons possessed of knowledge, judgment, information, integrity, and having extensive connections, are not to be classed with persons void of reputation or character." But William Findley and his western colleagues would not hear of any of these claims of superiority by Morris and his patrician crowd. They denied that Morris and his Philadelphia gentry were fundamentally dif ferent from thern, denied that such would-be aristocrats were more re spectable than they were ; a11 they had was "more money than their neighbours." And more money did not justify any feelings of superiority on the one side or inferiority on the other. In America, said Findley, "no man has a greater claim of special privilege for his flOO,OOO than I have for my 0." That was what American equality had come to mean, and indeed still means. JlI
Only in the context of this rejection of "knowledge," "character," and "extensive connections" as the criteria of social distinction can we appreciate the celebration of what came to be called the "self-rnade man ." This became such a familiar symbol for Americans that we have forgotten what a novel , indeed radical, notion it originally was. Of course, there had a1ways been social mobility in Western society , some times and in some places more than others. Colonial America had ex perienced a good deal of it, and, as we have seen, many of the revolutionary leaders were the products of considerable social mobility, usually being the first in their families to go to college. But this social mobility in the past generally had been a mobility of a peculiar sort , an often sporisored mobility in which the patronized individual had ac quired the attributes of the social status to which he was raised while at the same time trying to forget and disguise the lowly sources from whence he had come, The genteel sons of artisans did not usually cele brate their origins. Benjamin Franklin's AuJohiography was unusual for doing just that. But we must remember that it was not published in Franklin's lifetirne, and Franklin's countrymen made little of his ob scure origins while he was alive. Indeed, in '790 at the time of Franklin's death his principal eulogist passed over his youth as being too mean and embarrassing to dweil upon,39 In a traditional society social mobility had not been something to be proud of, as indicated by the pejorative terms-"upstarts," "arrivistes," "parvenus"-used to disparage those
343 34 2 DEMOCRACY
participants unable to hide their rise. Although few Americans, includ ing most Federalists, could ever easily get away with ridiculing someone else's obscure origins, many did not hesitate to raise eyebrows and jeer at those such as wealthy Republican businessmen Matthew Lyon of Vermont and J ohn Swanwick of Pennsylvania who had not properly acculturated themselves to the rank they sought. Swanwick, for exam pIe, though one of the wealthiest men of Philadelphia, was looked down upon by the more socially established families of the city and was re garded as "our Lilliputian, (who) with 'his dollars, gets access where without them he would not be suffered to appear.' '4°
But already in America independent mobile men were boasting not only of their humble origins but also of their lack of polish and a gen tleman's education. They had made it, they said, on their own, without family influence, without patronage, and without going to Harvard or Princeton or indeed any college at all. When a South Carolina politician in 1784 was celebrated in the press for being a self-established man who "had no relations or friends, but what his money made for him," a subtle but radical revolution in thinking had taken place. During the first decade of the nineteenth century the modern image of Benjamin Franklin as the "self-made man" was first created, helped by dozens of editions of his Autohiography and the propaganda of ambitious artisans and businessmen. Patronage was widely condemned, and even inven tors, desperate for European-likesupport "from opulent individuals or corporate bodies," were forced, they said, to form an association and "patronize themselves.' '41 The most outrageously nouveaux riches were now getting "great pleasure in telling how they first entered Boston in Pedlars trirn." For many now it was sponsored mobility and the useless ornaments of a liberal arts education that were becoming embarrassing. A man was now praised for having arrived and risen "without friends," for having been "the architect of his own fortune," or for never having been "borne on the shoulders of patronage. " For many Americans the ability to make money-not whom one knew, or who one's father was, or where one went to college-now became the only proper democratic means for distinguishing one man from another. Catharine Sedgwick, author and daughter of an esteemed Federalist family, spoke for all of the old aristocracy when she said of the emerging nineteenth-century hierarchy: "wealth, you know, is the grand leveling principle. "42
Thus our attempts to demonstrate the inequality of the society of the early Republic by measuring wealth alone rnisses the point of what happened.f It is true that by the 1820S some were already trying to put
The Celebration oJ Commetce
poor vs. rich in place of democrats vs. aristocrats as the major antago nists in the society. +4 Yet many could still feel equal to those of superior wealth as long as that wealth was seen as self-achieved and, more im portant, was not accompanied by any other pretensions to social supe rlority, such as those cultural attributes claimed by eighteenth-century gentlemen that money could not easily buy.
Indeed, this leveling through money put enormous pressure on the traditional distinction between ordinary people and gentlemen, between those who labored and those who did not, between those who were in trade and those who were not. For decayed aristocrats, like Hawthome's character Hepzibah in The House oj tJte Seven Gah/es, being forced to enter trade could be the greatest trial of their lives. Hawthorne's lengthy ac count of Hepzibah's agonizing decision to open a shop in Pyncheon House draws all its significance from the real pain the old lady is suf fering. Her misery, wrote Hawthorne, was "the final throe of what called itself old gentility." The patrician Hepzibah, "whose religion it was that a lady's hand soils itself irremediably by doing aught for bread," is convinced that becoming the hucksteress of a cent shop has made her a plebeian; and she takes no comfort from, indeed cannot comprehend, the remarks of the young man Holgrave, who teils her that by engaging in trade she has merely joined "the united struggle of mankind.... These names of gentleman and lady had a meaning, in the past history of the world, and conferred privileges, desirable or oth erwise, on those entitled to bear them. In the present-and still in the future condition of society-they imply, not privilege, but restriction. "4~
The distinction between gentlemen and commoners did not disap pear, but it was buffeted and blurred and was eventually transformed. To visiting foreigners, it seemed that nearly every white adult male had become a gentleman. In the West, at least, "everybody that has adecent coat is a gentleman; every gentleman is as good as any other and does not conceive that he should put hirnself out to oblige his equal. " Dray men, butchers' boys, canal workers, were all called "them gentlemen." Even men in dirty shirt sleeves were introduced as gentlemen, and blacksmiths saw nothing wrong in calling themselves gentlemen. And in their "violent intimacy" they all presumed the right to shake any one's hand and call anyone by his first name. Federalists made fun of the vulgar for claiming to be the "people" and thus equal to gentlemen and men of education. But such satire rang hollow when no one felt embarrassed over such claims. Unlike Europe, said Joel Barlow, in America the "people" were all there were."
345 DEMOCRACY344
Under such circumstances gentlemanly distinctiveness was hard to sustain. Dress became more identical for all social ranks , and fashion mongering as a means of setting people off one from another became more frenzied. Long-exisring aristocratic beliefs and practices came un der increasing attack, In 1802, 1,5°0 mechanics and 1,200 manufacturers of Philadelphia signed a petition proresring the gentry's racing of horses in the city streets, Such an amusernent, they said, "may be agreeable to a few idle landed gentlemen, who bestow more care in training their horses than in educating their children ," but it was very harmful to the "mechanic and manufacturing interest . "47
Honor, that aristocratic sense of reputation, seemed more and more difficult to understand or explain, except of course in the South. The more people talked about it, the less substantial and meaningful it ap peared. "Where is Honour?" asked the successful printer and publisher Isaiah Thomas in 1781. "Shall we look for her in the courts of the most mighty potentates on earth, or in the stately places of the great-alas! we know too weIl that seij-interest is the chief end of their politicks. " To Thomas it seerned that honor in a republic could be found only among the "band of Brothers" within the Masonic craft that was increasingly composed of artisans and middling sorts like Thomas hirnself. Perhaps only within such Masonic societies or in other such organizations could one find the social networks that Nathaniel Chipman believed crucial for the cultivation of any sense of honor or shame. Such social networks , said Chipman, made "all the individuals of the same connection , in some measure sponsors for the actions of each. " Only when enmeshed in such social webs does each person feel, "as of right, the reproach of the other's crimes , and the justice of the punishment.' '48
The proliferation of such associations in the decades following the . Revolution became a testimony to the need people feit to construct ar tificially those social networks that earlier had been taken for granted . Simply being a gentleman, connected by that fact with other gentlemen, was no longer capable of giving individuals the sense of being involved in a select society . Outside of the South honor was attacked as rnonar chical and anti-republican , Honor not only fomented militarism but buttressed inequality and distorted natural relations among men. 49
As honor came under attack, so too did dueling-as the special means by which gentlemen proteered their honor. Despite growing crit icism throughout the Western world, dueling continued to be practiced, especially by military officers and Southerners . Some justified dueling on the grounds that it was a civilizing agent , inhibiting gentlemen from
The Cekbration oj COTTlTTIerce
using "illiberal language" with one another. Others saw dueling all a rneans of maintaining courage as a virtue amidst the spread of an effern inizing luxury. Although Aaron Burr's killing of Alexander Hamilton in 1804 in a duel did much to intensify condemnation of the practice, it was the spread of egalitarian sentiments that most effectively under mined it. When even servants began challenging others to duels, many gentlemen realized that the code of honor had lost its meaning.
Sometimes it appeared that in America's fluid society would-be gen tlemen were using challenges as a means of establishing their status or their dignity. John Sevier, former governor of Tennessee. sneered at young Andrew Jackson's challenge to a duel in 1803 . He condescended to noticeJackson's chaUenge, he said, only because the people had made Jackson a judge and thereby had promoted hirn to the unmerited status of agentIeman . If they had to fight, however, Sevier proposed that they fight with pistols, since he presumed, as he told Jackson, that "you know not hing about the use of any other arms," rneaning, of course, fencing swords.5"
By 1828 Noah Webster in his dictionary saw the term "gentleman" merely as a courtesy title, of general address, applied rnost appropriately to "men of education and good breeding, of every occupation."SI "Of every occupation"-that was the key to the transformation . Tradition aUy gentlemen did not have occupations; they were not in trade or business, and they did not work for money. Even artists and members of the professions who wished to be gentlemen tried to regard their activities as something other than their source of income . When the struggling painter Samuel F . B. Morse told his parents in 1814 that he would never paint portraus and signs simply for money, that he would never make "a trade " of what was "a profession," he was drawing this traditional distinction. "If I cannot live agentIeman," he said, "I will starve a gentleman ." Of course, living like agentIeman now was in creasingly difficult . "Our Lawyers are mere lawyers, our physicians are mere physicians, our divines are rnere divines ," complained John Sylvester John Gardiner, perhaps Boston's most distinguished man of 11 letters in the first decades of the nineteenth century , "Everything smells of the shop, and you will, in a few minutes conversation, infallibly detect 11 a man's profession."52
Gentlemen like Hamilton and Burr had always been embarrassed . by the fact that they had to work for money. Because neither had an 11 independent source of funds, both periodically had been forced to inter 11 rupt their public activities to return to their New York law offices and
34-7 DEMOCRACY34- 6
look after their private affairs. But neither saw himself in modem terms as a lawyer who happened to be a gentleman; instead both tried to see thernselves in traditional terms as gentlernen who occasionally practiced some law . For such men law was not so much a skilled professional occupation as it was a desirable attribute of a man of leaming, one, as John Quincy Adams said, that was "most beneficial to man." James Kent agreed, citing Gibbon: "legal studies require only a state of place and refinement"-that is, only being a gentleman. Such gentlemen law yers were expected to read Horace as weil as Blackstone, Cicero as weil as Coke, history and poetry as weil as common law writs . Jefferson was a lawyer, to be sure, but he scarcely resembled a modern practitioner. He believed that the law, like all ofleaming, was important for a variety of reasons. "It qualifies a man to be useful to himself, to his neighbors, and to the public . It is the most certain stepping stone to preferment in the politicalline. "~3
But by the early decades of the nineteenth century many lawyers were forced to explain what they did in different terms . Law was no longer an aspect of being a gentleman of letters; it had become a rech nical and specialized profession that wholly occupied the person engaged in it. Some struggled against the changes, complaining that "you cannot be men of all work, and lawyers beside; any more than you can be in two places at the same time ."~
In time , however, the profession was transformed . "The bar is now crowded with bustling and restlese men . . . ," wrote David Dudley Field in 1844. "The quiet , decorous rnanners, the gravity, and the solid leaming, so often conjoined in a former generation, are now rarely seen together. A new race has sprung up and supplanted the old." Lawyers were no longer as interested in classical leaming. They had become workingmen like everyone eise. In fact, in 1824 the Franklin Society of Philadelphia opened its first exhibition with a toast to all workingmen doctors and lawyers as weil as saddlers, coopers, bakers, and brickmak ers . If lawyers were not an interest themselves, they had at least become agents for other competitive economic interests. They defended their unusual role as political representatives, however, on the sarne grounds that Hamilton had advanced in The Fetkralist No. 35: that they were not identified with any particular economic interest and therefore could bet ter harmonize those interests.P
These who clung to traditional standards were passed by . Richard Henry Dana, Sr. , could not look at the "exalted character" of his fa ther, Francis Dana, chief justice of the supreme court of Massachusetts
MiddJe-Class Order
for fifteen years between 1791 and 1806, "without a sense of my own littleness." Just the memory of his father's founding generation, he said in 1819, made "the present tasteless, it takes away the vigour of my hope in what is to come.' He abandoned the law for a life of letters, but without independent wealth it was a struggle . His association with the learned North Amm'can Review was tenuous; it was "all gentlemen and no pay." It was not without ironic comment on the cultural changes that were occurring that Dana, Sr., edited The Idl« Man in 1821-22 and as sumed the title as his literary persona for the rest of his career, His son, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., felt hirnself even more out of place in the world in which traditional gentlernen were fast disappearing, even among the legal profession . He discovered only one gentleman among the entire practicing bar of Providence, Rhode Island-"he seemed a pearl among swine ." Dana even found fault with Justice Joseph Story for arguing at dinner "like a lawyer" and talking "like a bookworm": Story "forgot that he was a gentleman dining out." Where nearly ev eryone claimed to be a gentleman, it was difficult to keep one's distinc tiveness in mind.56
19. Middle-Class Order
By the second decade of the nineteenth century Americans were already referring to themselves as a society dominated by the "middling" sort. To be sure, these terms were being used in England at the same time, but their significance in America was different. In England the term "middle dass" had a more literal meaning than it did in America: it described that stratum of people who lay between the aristocracy and the working dass. But in America, in the North at least, already it seemed as if the so-called middle class was all there was . Middling sorts in America appropriated the principal virtues of the two extremes and drained the vitality from both the aristocracy and the working dass. By absorbing the gentility of the aristocracy and the work of the working dass, the middling sorts gained a powerful moral hegemony over the whole society . The aristocracy lost its monopoly of civility and politeness and the working dass lost its exclusive claim to labor. Leisure became idleness, work became respectable, and nearly every adult white male became a gentleman, It happened nowhere else in the Western world quite like this .
"Patrician and plebeian orders are unknown .. . ," wrote Charles
349 DEMOCRACY34 8
Ingersoll in 1810, in one of the first avowed defenses of America's na tional character against foreign criticism . "Luxury has not yet corrupted the rich , nor is there any of that want, which c1assifies the poor . There is no populace. AU are people. What in other countries is called the populace, a compost heap , whence germinate mobs, beggars, and ty rants, is not to be found in the towns; and there is no peasantry in the country . Were it not for the slaves of the south, " wrote Ingersoll, "there would be one rank . '"
The exception is jarring, to say the least; by modern standards In gersoll's judgment that America had become dassless is absurd . We today see the distinctions of early-nineteenth-century society vividly, not only those between free and enslaved, white and black, male and fernale, but those between rieh and poor, educated and barely literate. Yet if we are to understand the wonder, the astonishrnent, and judgments of ob servers like Ingersoll , we must see, as they did, this society of the early Republic in the context of what American society had once been and what societies e1sewhere in the Western world still resernbled. In that context America had experienced an unprecedented democratic revo lution and had created a huge sprawling society that was more egalitar ian , more middling, and more dominated by the interests of ordinary people than any that had ever existed before.
Tocqueville, too, saw almost at once what had happened . In a diary entry made only a few days after he landed in New York in 1831 he noted that in America the middle classes had attained "outward perfec tion," " or rather the whole society seems to have melted into amiddIe c1ass . " No one in America seerned to have "the elegant manners and refined courtesy of the high c1asses in Europe. " In fact, there was "something both vulgar and disagreeably unculrivated" about Arneri can society . Yet "at the same time," said Tocqueville, no one in Arner ica was what the French would call " ill bred. " Americans, "even to the simplest shop salesman,. " seerned to Tocqueville "to have received, or wish to appear to have received, a good education ." All Americans seemed to behave the same respectable way-"grave, deliberate, re served, and they all wear the same clothes. " America, said Francis Grund, was "mediocrt par txetllm&t. . . . The manners of Americans, therefore, are as far removed from the elegance of courts, as they are far removed from the boorishness of the lower classes in Europe ." It was as if the politeness and the vulgarity that Europeans took so much trouble to keep apart were in America somehow mingled and made one-creating, said a disgruntled James Fenimore Cooper, the "fussy
Midd/e-Class Order
pretensions" of the "genteel vulgar" who gOI their manners "second hand, as the traditions of fashion , or perhaps in the pages of a novel. '"
The blurring of the distinction between gentlernen and plain people in America corresponded to a steady vulgarization of eighteenth-century gentility. The prosperous farmers, the shopkeepers, the clerks, the man ufacturers, the retail merchants, the businessmen, and others who made up the middling sort did not repudiate the genteeI Enlightenment but popularized it. The new middle dass extolled education, but not a das sical or even a liberal arts education . They wanted education that was practieal and useful, and why not? Had not the revolutionary leaders themselves told thern that the people of the New World required a dif ferent kind of education from those of the Old World-"an useful American education," saidjefferson, with everyone "instructed in gen eral, competently to the common business of life, " and genius employ ing its talents "to the useful arts, to inventions for saving labor and increasing our cornforts, to nourishing our health, to civil government, military science, &c. "?' Many members of the revolutionary elite, in duding Benjamin Rush, Noah Webster, and Francis Hopkinson, had even attacked the study of the "dead languages" of Greek and Latin as time-consuming, useless, and unrepublican . Such study of Greek and Latin, Rush had said, was "improper in a peculiar manner in the United Stares" because it tended to confine education only to a few, when in fact republicanism required everyone to be educated . Besides, asked Webster in 1790, "what advantage does a merchant, a rnechanic, a farmer, derive from an acquaintance with the Greek and Roman tongues?' '4
Yet some of these enthusiastic republican gentlemen, when they saw the Iengths to which such attacks on liberal learning could be carried, eventuaUy backed away . Even Rush, though he retained his dislike of the heathenish dassies on religious grounds, came to realize by 1810 that "a /eamed education" ought once again to "become a luxury in our country." If college tuitions were not imrnediately raised, he said, "the great increase in wealth among all classes of our citizens" would enable too many ordinary people, particularly plain farmers , to pay for a col lege education for their sons "with more ease than in former years when wealth was confined chiefty to cities and to the learned professions ." It was one thing ror a practical knowledge of "reading, writing, and arith metic . . . to be as common and as cheap as air"; in a republic everyone should have these skills, and "they should be a kind of sixth or civic sense." But it was quite another thing with a liberal arts education.
351 DEMOCRACY35° "Should it become universal, it would be as destructive to civilization as universal barbarism . " Rush had come to perceive that middlebrow adoption of liberal learning was insidiously draining and diluting its integrity without anyone's being the wiser . Better the Visigoths at the gates than this disintegration from within, or so many highbrow gentry
had come to believe .! These developments forced new alignments out of which the modern
distinction between high and popular culture was born . In the eigh teenth century cultivation in the liberal arts was thought to be a personal qualification for participation in gentlemanly society. To be a republican gentleman was to be learned and a member of the republic of letters. Such eighteenth-century genteel men of learning had no doubt of the existence of superstitious, vulgar, and barbaric customs, such as bear baiting, mummeries, witchcraft, or eating with one's hands; but they had scarcely viewed these customs as some sort of "popular culture" in competition with genteei cultivation and civilization. Yet by the early nineteenth century that was precisely what seemed to be happening. The spread of civilizarion, good rnanners, and good taste throughout the society was designed only to enlighten and elevate the public; it was not supposed to create a rival culture that diluted gentility and threat ened its standards. Yet as the traditional distinction between gentlemen and nongentlemen became blurred, cultivation became popularized, breed ing a middling culture that , according to high-toned Federalists, was "widely and thinly spread ." Learning in America, they exc1aimed, was similar to what Dr. Johnson had said about learning in Scotland: "that it is Iike bread in a besieged town, where everyone gets a little, but no man a full meal , ,,6 For some of these middling sorts , it seerned, partic ipation in cultivated civilization had come to mean simply reading a newspaper, owning a tea service, or having a piano in the parlor.
In England, wrote James Fenimore Cooper in his Notions ofthI Al'7leT iams, the aristocracy sought to distinguish itself from the upwardly mo bile middling sorts by acting in eccentric and whimsical ways, thereby making it difficult for aspiring would-be gentlernen to know how to behave. But in America there was " as yet " none of this "high-bred folly." •"T he accession to the cotentS are so very numerous, and are commonly made with strides so rapid," that these hordes of c1aimants to gentility were still likely to be "rationally polite" rather than "gen
teelly vulgar." In this 1828 defense of American manners against decades of criti
cism by European and especially English critics, Cooper was putting as
MitJdJe-Class Order
good a face on America's social situation as he thought possible; for he was by 00 means as sanguine about what was happening to gentility in America as his sometimes controlled arguments suggested . He admitted that an American gentleman was less polite and courteous than a Eu ropean aristocrat, The American was more direct, natural, and sincere in his social relationships. He was without the European's artificiality in mannen: "he will not tell you he is enchanted to see you, when, in truth, he is perfectly indifferent to the matter." But at the same time this very quality of simplicity that inhibited the "superficial courtesy" of the American gentry had the effect of "elevating the mannen of the lower classes, who, considering their situations, are at all times surpris ingly self-possessed and at their ease.' If anything was objectionable in American social behavior, wrote Cooper, it was "the rough and hardy manner" with which ordinary Americans supported their opinions. .In the end what most impressed (and frightened) Cooper about America was the degree to which "both a higher and lower order of men mingle in cornmerce," more so than anywhere else in the world. Commerce was what kept the society unsettled, "in astate of effervescence," and allowed the dregs to "get nearer to the surface than is desirable." Still, despite his deep uneasiness, Cooper in the 1820S remained outwardly confident that American society could eventually sort itself out and re main both republican and civilized .?
The struggles of individuals to rise from humble origins and achieve respectability became in time part of America's folklore. Indeed, so common did such stories become in America that, as Hawthome later remarked, all traditional European romance in them was lost ." Begin ning with numerous editions of Franklin 's AuJ.obiography in the 179Os, dozens upon dozens of accounts of youthful development-a popular American form of the European Bi/dwrgsroman-tumbled from American pens and presses. Most of these narratives recounted the individual's rise to respectability in conventional genteel terms . But some autobi ographies were more frank and honest than others. One of the most fascinating and revealing of these is the journal, unpublished at the time, of an obscure Vermont peddler, James Guild.
Born in 1797 in Halifax, Vermont, Guild at age nine was bound out as a farm laborer for twelve years. When he finally carne of age, he was not sure what he wanted to do . All he did know was that he wanted to do something other than farming. And so, like many other New En gland fann boys in these years, he became a peddler, wondering all the while "why I should stoop so low as to follow so mean a calling ." What
353 DEMOCRACY35 2
he really wanted, and what he eventually came to understand with corn pelling -clarity , was to rnake money and to enter the promised land of gentility and respectability . His joumal was in fact a parody of a tra ditional Puriran spiritual narrative-progressing through the familiar stages of humiliation, depression, surrender, and rebirth. Guild in the end was saved, saved not by Jesus but by money.?
Guild's first experiences with the larger world in Troy, New York, were mortifying: "I thought folks new everything and more to" and "I considered myself inferior to them." In fact, he was so continually hu miliated by the world that he decided to give in complete1y to his abase ment, to get a leather apron and some spoon molds, become a tinker, and thereby sink to as mean and as low a rank as possible: "so rnean that no one would take notice of me" and so low that "I cared not for my looks nor reputation ." If he was to be poor and insignificant, then he intended to go all the way. But such humiliation was in fact only a spiritual preparation for his conversion. In his disgrace and despon dency he thought of returning horne, but he worried constantly that his family and friends would despise hirn. In a moment of utter dejection ("0 misery what shall I do?") Guild suddenly burst into tears and "boohood like a little child although I was one and twenty." "All at once" he decided he would not go back horne; then and there he deter mined "to get into some business before they should see my face
again.Y" Guild now realized that in 1818 in democratic America life was lonely
and the world "troublesome" and that "we are separated one from another to scratch our way ." Experience soon taught hirn how to get out of scrapes by fast talking, how to size up strangers, and in particular how to trust no one. "This," he said, "Iearns me human nature," by which he meant: "I find people are not always what they seem to be." With this insight Guild was able to confront and deal with a capricious world . He trave1ed all over the East Coast, and scrambled , wrestled, and courted people. He took up the cutting of profile likenesses, the painting of miniatures, the teaching of penmanship, and for three weeks even tried "doctoring." In his travels and adventures some people de ceived him, but he deceived far rnore; for he was always ready ro use "disseption " and " to make folks think I was something I was not." He even took to calling himse1f "Guile." He loved to fool people, to act the vulgar clown and then reveal hirnself as polite and well-mannered . He was fascinated with the way "a genteel appearance" could impress peo· pie. He found "from experience if a man thinks he is something and
Middle-CltJss Order
puts hirnself forward he will be something." He found he could be a gentleman by acting as a gentleman. A new suit of dothes made hirn feel "rather large when he walked through the Streets." He polished his conversation, and when talking with people he always mentioned "some big carieter to make them think I was respeeted among respect able people. ""
Yet all the while Guild knew he was not happy. He had long bouts of depression . He tried reading the Bible and praying to God, but "in vain . "" In the end God had nothing to offer Guild emotionally. But Mammon did.
After three weeks of "solitude" and "Iow spirits" in Baltimore, Guild finally realized what he had been doing wrong. "I was and alwas was unhappy because I eould not obtain a furtune, " and he therefore conduded that he would be "one of the happiest fellows in the world Ir I could only be rieh." Ir others "had began with nothin and became men offortune," then why not he? "I said to myselfmoney I must and will have." From that moment on, wrote Guild, "my sole objeet was to make money." Nothing else mattered . He eared nothing for society and for friends exeept " to have them treat me with politeness, and I do the same to them .' He developed no deep attachments: as soon as busi ness became dull in any eomm unity, "I was off." The pursuit of money became a means toward virtue. He developed "a strong mind" against "the weakness and folly of man ." He leamed self-denial . He refused to go bowling, to get drunk, or to go to plaees of "disipation," and he did so by eoneentrating on the making of money-"my whole aim" in life.')
Only after he had made money did he finally decide that he eould go horne and see his family and friends "in the earicter of an indepen dent Gentleman, and something to foot the bill." Partieularly satisfying to Guild was his visit to his old master to whom he had been bound out as a laborer only seven years earlier. At first he found it odd to see his former master bringing his horse and earriage around for hirn, but Guild decided finally that "it was right": he had done the same for his master in the past more times than he wanted to remember. But his middle dass world was d ifferent now from that of his boyhood. He had beeome, he discovered, so genteel and "so aeeustomed to dressing in stile and keeping Stilish eompany," that his former friends seemed lowly and vulgar. "The young Ladies that I used to think so very nice now look to me more Iike servants Girls.' "4
Still, even amidst the flood of his feelings of genteel superiority to
'. I
355 DEMOCRACY354
his fonner friends, •'who live as I used to with a tow Shirt and frock on with a beard a week old," there was a moment of regret, a pang of doubt that maybe by leaving his viUage home and succecding in the larger world he had lost more than he had gained. His friends seemed so content and happy, so strongly artached to one another, with "no ambition to shine," that he could not help admiring them and wonder ing. But the doubt did not last, and he soon "began to feel adesire to get back again to Nlew] Yjork] whire I could enjoy my usual occupation and visiting those families who have daughters thar play so beautiful on the pianifort, and where there is constantly sorne new thing to attrac the eye and artennon. ' ~')
The journal breaks off after Guild went tO Europe to learn portrait pa inting . Perhaps the role the journal had played in Guild 's life was over, He had achieved success and respectability as a member of the new middle dass, and he had done it by catering to what his new middle dass customers wanted .
Indeed, by the ,820S there were dozens of itinerant painters like Guild wandering a11 over the countryside, advertising themselves with "Sign, Ornamental and Portrait Painting executed on the shortest no tice, with neamess and despatch," and selling aspiring middling Amer ican families portra its of themselves. There existed "a decided disposition for painting in this Country," said America' s first art critic, John NeaI, in 1829; " you can hardly open the door of a best room anywhere, without surprising or being surprised by the picture of some body plastered to the wall, and staring at you with both eyes and a bunch of f1owers ." "Wretched" as these pictures may have been, how ever, they did enable countless numbers of middling Americans to pos sess what earlier had been an exclusive luxury of the aristocracy . In just such ways did ordinary people acquire the attributes of gentility and thereby democratize the culture .'6
At the same time as ordinary people were reaching upward and vulgarizing aristocratic and genteel culture, the gentry themselves feit increasingly compelled to reach down and embrace wider and deeper levels of the populace. Central to the republican revolution had been the desire by the revolutionary leaders to refine and improve the moral and aesthet ic sensibilities of the American people. Like all educated eighteenth-century gentlemen, they had been eager to roll back Gothic barbarism and vulgar manncrs and extend enlightened civilization and cultivation among the general populace. Jefferson in the 1780s badgercd his Virginia colleagues into erecting as the new state capitol in Rieh
,:,""C.
Middle-Class Order
mond a magnificent copy of the Maison Carree, a Roman temple from the first century A.D. at Nimes, precisely because he wanted an Ameri can public building that would be a model for the people's "study and imitation" and "an object and proof of national good taste." For too long, said Jefl'erson, this American land had been cursed with architec turaJ monstrosities. Ir Virginians put up another one of those "rude, misshapen piles" of Georgian bricks, he warned, it would simply be come "a monument of our barbarism which will be loaded with execra tions as long as it shall end ure . " He was not ashamed of his enthusiasm for the arts, he said, because its object was "to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the re spect of the world and proeure them its praise. "'7
Gentlemanly literati and artists were urged to join in this educational process-in the words of William Tudor, to "feel something of a 'mis sitmary' spirit" in elevating "the taste of the publick ." Learned academies and critical journals were formed , not simply, as in Europe, for profes sional recognition and communication but also for the instruction and guidance of the people's artistic judgment. The young painter Samuel F. B. Morse wanted nothing more for his country than to have it "ac quire the character of a civilized and literary nation ," to let the world know "that the Americans of the present age were a civilized, refined , and literary people." The architect Benjamin Latrobe thought it the duty of every "good citizen " to promote "the education and cilJilization of the society in which he and his children are to live . '118
Yet in their laudable efl'orts to reach out to the public the gentry found that their messages necessarily became popularized and coars ened. Speakers at academic commencements now saw nothing new or strange in lecturing young gentlemen on the virtues of hard work and punctuality, which were now pictured as the key to "improvement" and "respectability . " Young men were told that they ought to be polite and afl'able only in order to gain the approval of the public . One com mencement speaker even discussed the problems of too much sweat and what that could do to one's relationships in genteel company.'9
For middJe-dass people busy in the making of money, dergymen issued what one of them in 18'0 called "Short Sermons, Designed for the Use of Those Who Have Little Time to Read Langer Discourses. " Digests and shortcuts to gentility-in particular, scores of etiquette books for anxious mobile people-became increasingly common. Etiquette books were now even written ror children, as Americans realized they could no longer wait two or three generations to make a gentleman .
357 DEMOCRACY35 6
"Manners" became equated with sets of rules to be learned, and were now taught in schools. Some of the rules suggest how deep into the society gentility was trying to reach: people were never to sleep in any garment worn during the day, never to sit in a house with a hat on in the presence of ladies, and never to remind others of their lowly origins; it was, however, still polite to eat food off a knife as long as one's lips were not closed over the blade . ilO
These middle-class pressures worked to popularize the morality of the Revolution. Virtue, in the North at least, lost much of the rational and stoica1 quality befitting the classica1 heroes the revolutionary leaders had emulated. Temperance, for example, that self-control of the pas sions so valued by the ancients and one ofCicero's four cardinal virtues, became mainly identified with the elimination of popular drunkenness "a good cause," declared the Franklin Society for the Suppression of Intemperance in 1814. in which ,. perseverance and assiduity seldom fail of securing the denied object.' "1
A republic, Parson Weems, the entrepreneurial biegrapher ofWash ington and a colorful spokesman for the new middle-class values, wrote in 1802, was "the best government for morals. " It was a traditional statement, no doubt, but in Weems's updated early-nineteenth-century version the morals had become vulgarized. A republic meant no "sordid monopolizing aristoctacy" to soak up money and prevent a "poor tax ridden mother" from having enough to pay for light to mend her chil dren's stockings . A republic was now valued for being "the cheapest of all governments, where every citizen may easily attain property suffi cient to purchase books-to command leisure-and to acquire taste and knowledge." A republic was where frugality was "fashionable" and "wealth pours into every pocker ." A republic was "a government where the man is looked at and not his fine coat." A republic was "the best remedy under heaven against national intemperance"; it "imparts ajoy that loaths the thought of drunkenness." And finally a republic was where citizens, "seeing themselves treated with equal fairness and im partiality," knew "no pangs of jealousy and hatred: hence every coun tenance is bright with smiles of contentrnent, and every heart glows with sentiments of BROTHERLY LOVE .••••
These middle-class pressures also worked to alter fundamentally the role and position of women in America. Since civilizations were now being ranked by the way they treated women (did not "savages" regard their women as "beasts of burden"?). enlightened men with genteel aspirations were eager to escape from those "barbarous days" when a
MiJdle-Class Order
woman was "considered and treated as the slave of an unfeeling mas ter." That sort of traditional patriarchalism had to go. Women now had to be treated with particular delicacy and Iove. "A woman of virtue and prudence is a public good-a public benefactor.' She had the power to make "public decency ... a fashion-and public virtue the only example. ''''3
"ln the present state of society," declaredJoseph Hopkinson in 1810, "woman is inseparably connected with everything that civilizes, refines, and sublimates man." Consequently, wives and mothers were now urged to use their special talents to cultivate in their husbands and chil dren the proper moral feelings-the virtue, benevolence, and social af fections-necessary to hold a sprawling and competitive republican society together. Virtue now lost what remained of its classica1 associa tion with martial and masculine severity and became more and more identified with enlightened feminine sociability and affection; indeed, virtue at times seemed to mean little more than female chastiry."
However retarded it may appear to us, this shift in meaning gave women a new sphere of significance separate from that of men. Since they now had become the principal civilizing agents of a new and raw society-"women would effeminate even the roughness of steel and the solidity of wood"-they needed to be educated in the liberal arts even more than men . Women formed the minds of their husbands and chil dren; it was ihey who were "entrusted with the care and guardianship of the rising generation." And therefore "to enlighten the sources from which society receives its earliest im press ions . . . must always be regarded by the man of liberal feelings as a duty, dictated alike by gratitude and policy. ".~
Benjamin Hawkins, sometime senator from North Carolina and In dian agent, used this new understanding of the role of women to help civilize the Creeks and Cherokees. Unlike the missionaries, Hawkins did not try to teach the Indians the mysteries of religion or the intricacies of literature: instead he concentrated on the useful arts of agriculture and manufacture. When he first met the Indian chiefs and told them his plans to civilize them, he was derided and ridiculed. But he told them that "he was now done with the mm"; he would talk with the women. He then proceeded to teach the women "the arts of carding, spinning and weaving; and to these they became soon attached, because petti coats, jackets and articles of dress could thereby be easily procured." He also taught them to exchange their surpluses of corn for material to make petticoats and other feminine items of dress. To engage in trade
359 DEMOCRACY35 8
the women had to learn weights and measures in order to reduce all goods "to an intelligible value in money." "Progressing in these ways, the spinning and weaving of cotton increased rapidly. There were in 1805, twenty looms in the lower, and ten among the upper towns . .. . And such was the power of example prompted by interest , that sorne old men and boys learned to spin and seemed to take pleasure in the exercise." But arnong the Creeks "there was a peculiar difficulty in overcoming the aversion of the men to labour." Like European aristo crats, the Indian males were accustomed to " hunting, indolence and war," and expected others (in their case, their women) ro do the de grading work of the society. The decreasing supply of game in the for ests, however , made the men rnore dependent on the women's work and, produce; "with their pigs, maize and cotton, the fernales had al ready rendered themselves in a good degree independent of the men ." Hawkins then advised "the young women to refuse favors to their sweethearts, and the married women to repel the caresses of their hus bands, unless they would associate with them and assist them in their daily labours. " Although this policy was not rigidly enforced, it did have some effect "in breaking the ferocity of the masculine temper, and re ducing it to a milder and softer tone."
Whether Hawkins actually treated the Ind ians in this way is less relevant than the fact that the authors of these accounts believed that he had. These descriptions of " the business of civilizing Indians" tell us more about what white Americans of the early Republic thought were the sources of prosperity and cultivation in society than they do about the Indians."
At the very moment, however, that Americans were coming to ap preciate their capacity to mold and manipulate the culture of their new Republic, they were less and less sure they had that capacity under control. They knew the world had changed and changed radically since the Revolution, but had it changed in directions they had intended? By the early nineteenth century, America had become a huge bustling, boundless nation fascinated with its own expansion-"an expansion of population, of resources, of territory, of power, of information , of freedom, of everything that tends to magnify man." Early-nineteenth century America had become the most thoroughly commercialized so ciety in the world, where , it seemed, "everyone is a man of business; every thing is in the progress of emulation and improvement." lt was a society of plain, ordinary people all busy pursuing their own private interests . All thought they had equal rights, all were in equal competi
Middlt-Class Order
tion with one another, and all were "enterprising almost to a fault . What may not be expected from such a people in such a country, and doubling every twenty-five yean?" "The decree has gone forth. . . . A gigantic nation has been bom," and in time it will "span the mightiest dominion that ever shook the earth.'?"
But it was increasingly clear that no one was really in charge of this gigantic, enterprising, restless nation. Govemment was weak, the churches were divided, and social institutions were fragmented. Nev erthe1ess, "order" somehow seemed to "grow out of chaos," and people guided themselves "without the check of any controlling power, other than that administered by the coUision of their own interests halanced against each other." The promotion of self-intereet did not create the predicted anarchy, for in the new commercial sodety it became evident that "no man can promote his own interest, without promoting that of others." The society was held together by an "interminable succession of exchanges. " And every single one of these exchanges counted, such that "the minutest excess or defeat in the supply of any one article of human want, produces a proportionate effect on the exchanges of all other articles. "18
The harmony emerging out of such chaos was awesome to behold, and speaker after speaker and writer after writer commented on ir. All those isolated individuals, "each punuing their own interests for their own sake," added up to something great and sublime. People did not have to worry about society or govemment anymore; they would take care of themselves. "The public happiness," said Daniel Webster, "is to be the aggregate of the happiness of individuals. Our system begins with the individual man." People did not have to feel guilty anymore about pursuing their personal happineas here and now . Even the "pur suit of gold" now bad beneficial results, for "by some interesting filia tion, 'there's a Divinity, that shapes our ends' ... and free institutions may be said to have been found in foUowing the fur trade and the fiaheries. ' '29
In a society of many scrambling, ordinary, and insignificant people, the power of genius and great-souled men no longer seemed to matter. "The direct action of great minda on the character of our community is," it was said, "unquestionably less at the present period, than in former daya ." The founding fathen, of course, had thought thatemi nent men and imaginative minds were in control of events and caused things to happen. But that heroie conception of society was now rele gated to a more primitive stage of development. Greatness in America's
3 6 0 DEMOCRACY
colonial period may have been due almost entirely to the exertions of prominent individuals. But the American Revolution had created "something like a general will," in which the course of the society was shaped "less by the activity of particular individuals" and more by "the mass of intellectual, moral and physical powers." Indeed, no country in history ever resembled the United Stares "in the points of greatness, complexity, and the number of its relations." It was a country now so caught up in shifting currents, "rapid, powerful, accumulated in the mass, and uncertain in . . . direction," that it was "scarcely possible for the mind to fix upon any . . . ground of policy or just calculation" of what to do)" America was in the hands of "providence," people said; and this old-fashioned religious term now became identified with "prog ress" and with the natural principles of society created by multiplicities of busy people following their natural desires free from artificial re straints, especially those imposed by laws and government. With such a conception of the social process, educated people found it increasingly difficult to hold to the eighteenth-century conspiratorial notion that par ticular individuals were directly responsible for what happened ."
In 1791 Madison had worried that the sprawling extent of the United States would malte each individual insignificant in his own eyes, a cir cumstance that he thought would be unfavorable to liberty. But a gen eration later the magnitude of the country and the smallness of each individual had become sources of strength and wonder. What would be "more striking and sublime," asked Hugh Swinton Legare in 1823, "than the idea of an IMPERIAL REPUBLlC" spreading over an expanse of territory larger than the empire of the Caesars, "a Republic, in which men are completely insignificant," but blend "in one divine harmony" their "various habits and conflicting opinions. "32 Plain, ordinary people as individuals may no longer have been important, but together they now added up to a powerful force.
People now described society more and more as a "mass" and for the first time began using this term in reference to "almost innumerable wills" in a positive, nonpejorative sense. The individual was weak and blind, said George Bancroft in a common reckoning, but the mass of people was strong and wise,33 From all this followed, too, a new appre ciation of statistics: in 1803 the word "statisticks" first appeared in American dictionaries.> By itself a fact might not mean rnuch, but col Iected together with others it could reveal a whole world. Of course, enlightened gentlemen like J efferson had always spent time gathering facts, but by the early nineteenth century fact-collecting had become a
Middle-Class Ortkr 3 61
national obsession . Americans collected data of a1l sorts-the number of tanneries, paper mills, distilleries, and so on in each state; the number of people in various villages who had lived to eighty, ninety, or a hun dred; the number of leaves on a tree. No one could divine to what use all these "authentic facts" might be put; all they knew was that "the history of human science is a collection of facts," and the .facts could speak for thernselves.P "In composing a work like the present," wrote James Mease in The Picture of PhilotJelphia (18n), "the author is of opinion that the chief object ought to be the multiplication of facts, and the reflections arising out of them should be left to the reader. "36
Everything was being left to the reader, or the listener, or the voter, or the buyer-each person-to decide. Charles Nisbet, the Scottish cler gyman who became the first president of Dickinson College in Pennsyl vania, thought as early as 1789 that Americans were carrying their reliance on individual judgment to ridiculous extremes. He fuHy ex pected, he said, to see soon such books as "Every Man his own Law yer," "Every Man his own Physician," and "Every Man his own Clergyman and Confessor. "37 It was true, declared the learned journal Medieal Repository in 1817, that there were no professional pharmacists in America as there were in Europe; in fact, in New York the situation was so bad that even several women were peddling nostrums and patent medicines on the streets. Some mistakes may result from this lack of professionalism, the RrpOsitory acknowledged, but these mistakes would be no more than occurred in Paris, London, or Edinburgh, "where pharmacy, as a profession, is scientiJu:, exdusu», and privileged." And , as in a11 endeavors in this "enlightened age;" much more good was likely to flow from opening up pharmacy to everyone rather than keeping it secret and elosed. Already new discoveries in natural philosophy and chemistry had resulted in better medical remedies, "exploding one half at least of the old pharmaceutic compounds" and justifying America's rejection of European expertise. Even American literature would have to be different and democratic: it would, in Emerson's words, "embrace the common, (and] explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low. "JlI
The result of all these assaults on elite opinion and celebrations of common ordinary judgment was a dispersion of authority and ultimately a diffusion of truth itself to a degree the world had never before seen . With every ordinary person being told that his ideas and tastes , on everything from medicine to art and government, were as good as, if not better than, those of "connoisseurs" and "speculative men" who had college degrees, it is not surprising that truth and knowledge be
3 63 3 62 DEMOCRACY
came elusive and difficult to pin down. 39 Knowledge and truth, it was argued, now indeed had to become more fluid and changeable, more timely and current. In a fast-moving world "many things, which we now suppose to be true or nearly so, may in a short time be found to be false, or true only under certain circumstances. "40 Americans of the early Republic experienced an epistemological crisis as severe as any in their history. Confident of their ability to deterrnine all by themselves the truth or validity of any idea or thing presented to them, but mis trustful of anything outside of "the narrow limits of their own obser vation," plain, ordinary Americans were thoroughly prepared to be the prey for all the hoaxers, confidence men, and tricksters like Edgar Allan Poe and P . T. Barnum who soon popped up everywhere . They had to see everything for themselves , "for," as Herman Melville wrote of the common sailors of the Pequod, " nothing but their own eyes could per suade such ignorance as theirs .' '4'
In vain did the Federalists and other traditionally minded gentry protest against this democratization of truth where " the unalienable right of private judgment involves the liberty of thinking as we please on every subject. ' '4" Most ordinary people were no longer willing to defer to the knowledge and judgments of those who had once been their superiors. Perhaps plain people did not have the college education, the extensive travel, or the intellectual power of their aristocratic neighbors, but, their spokesmen said , they had eyes and ears , and they knew what was true for them better than sorne "commanding genius" or " Iearned sage " did. Why should they trust what such gentlemen told them? "Of what avail is it to me, " each of them asked , "to believe certain propo sitions without seeing the truth of thern; but merely because my pow erful neighbor believes them?"43
Ever since the debate over the Sedition Act of 1798, by which the Federalists had attempted to punish Republican writers and editors crit icizing the rulers of the national government, the nature of truth and .the ways to discover it had become public issues. While the Federalists dung to the traditional assumption that truth was constant and universal and capable of being discovered by enlightened and reasonable rnen, their Republican opponents argued that opinions about government and rulers were many and diverse and the truth of such opinions could not be determined simply by judges and members of juries , no matter how educated and reasonable such men might be. Thus many Republicans conduded that all political opinions, even those opinions that were "false , scandalous and malicious," ought to be allowed, as Jefferson put
MiddIe-C/ass Order
it, to "stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. "44
The Federalists were dumbfounded. "Truth," they said, "has but one side and listening to error and falsehood is indeed astrange way to discover truth . ' Any notion of multiple and varying truths would pro duce "universal uncenainty, universal misery," and "set all morality afloat." People needed to know the "criterion by which we may derer mine with cenainty, wlJo art righl, anti wlJo art wrong. "45
Yet the Republicans did have a criterion for determining who was right and who was wrong, and it was the opinion of the whole people . Their arguments in favor of freedom of speech rested on the assumption that opinions about politics, like opinions about other subjects, were no longer the monopoly of the educated and aristocratic few. Not only were all opinions equally to be tolerated but everyone and anyone in the society should be equally able to express them. Truth was actually the creation of many voices and many minds, no one of which was more important than another and each of which made its own separate and equally significant contribution to the whole. Solitary opinions of sin gle persons may now have counted for less, but in their statistical col lectivity they added up to something far more significant than ever existed before. They became what Americans obsessively labeled "pub lic opinion. "46
Nearly everyone in the eighteenth century had believed in the power of public opinion and had talked endlessly about it. Indeed, members of the old society were so preoccupied with their reputations and their honor precisely because of their intense concern for the judgment of others. The opinion of others, wrote Adam Smith, was a mirror by which we scrutinized the propriety of our own conduct.v By the word "public," like that of "society," however, eighteenth-century gentle men had usually meant "the rational part of it" and not "the ignorant vulgar"; they often meant by the "public" men like themselves whom they knew from legislative halls and private dining rooms. When they included the larger society within the "public," they still thought of "those philosophical and patriotic citizens who cultivate their reason" as its spokesmen and representatives. tB
The Revolution rapidly expanded this "public" and democratized its opinion . Every conceivable form of printed matter-books, pam phlets, handbills, posters, broadsides, and especially newspapers multiplied and were now written and read by many more ordinary people than ever before in his tory . By 1800, wrote the Reverend Samuel
3 64 DEMOCRACY
Miller in his elaborate compendium of the Enlightenment entitled A Brief Retros/J«t o/Ihe Eightemth Cmtury, much of the intellectual leadership of the country had fallen into "the hands of persons destitute at once of the urbanity of gentlemen, the information of scholars, and the princi pies of virtue." In contrast to pre-revolutionary America, the society of the early Republic had thousands upon thousands of obscure ordinary people participating in the creation of this public opinion.t?
By the early nineteenth century this newly enlarged and democra tized public opinion had become the "vital principle" underlying Amer ican government, society, and culture. It was the standard to "which all things must be brought and a11 subjects submitted. " In every realm of endeavor-whether art, language, medicine, or politics-connoisseurs, professors, doctors, and statesmen had to give way before the power of the collective opinion of the people. Public opinion, said Federalist The odore Sedgwick in disgust, "is of a11 things the most destructive of per sonal independence and of that weight of character which a great man ought to possess.Y'" But no matter, it was the people's opinion, and it could be trusted because no one controlled it and everyone contributed to it. "The public opinion," said Samuel Williams, "will be much nearer the truth, than the reasonings and refinements of speculative and interested men." Of course, some warned that in this "age of excite ment" people must not make "public opinion the standard of their faith, not the authoritative guide of their conduct.' 'SI But it was too late. In no country in the world did public opinion become more awesome and powerful than it did in democratic America.
Public opinion, it was said, was like vegetation, it was like sunshine: no one knew how it worked.?' No governmental institution or even all of the political institutions together embodied it. It resembled the soci ety, which was simply an "order" that came out of a "chaos of char acters, ideas, motives, and interests." Patrons, dependencies, indeed government itself, no longer mattered in holding society together. All that was needed to tie people together was what was now called the "voluntary principle." "Afford but the single nuc1eus of a system of administration of justice between man and man, and under the sure operation of this principle, the floating atoms will distribute and com bine themselves, as we see in the beautiful natural process of crystalli zation, into a far more perfect and harmonious result than if government, with its 'fostering hand,' undertake to disturb, under the plea of directing, the process."
"The choral harmony of the whole," as Emerson noted in 1834, was
Middle-CltJss Ord6 3 65
overwhelming to behold. "Design! It is alI design. It is alI beauty. It is alI astoni8hment."53 Vet earlier Emerson had not been so sanguine. In the 18208 he had described society as "choked with evils ... a com munity composed of a thousand different interests, a thousand various societies filied with competitions in the arts, in trade, in politics, in private life."~ He had believed in traditional fashion that the virtue of the community had depended on the virtue of individuals. But he had gradually come to realize that society was "a routine which no man made and for whose abuses no man holds hirnself accountable." Men now had to forget their own particularities, their private and selfish interests, and concentrate on the natural hannony of the whole. "Man is powerful only by the multitude of his affinities, or because his life is intertwined with the whole chain of organic and inorganic being. "5S Yet this new inner spiritual harmony that Emerson and others now saw amidst the outward agitation and chaos was possible precisely because the old monarchical society had come apart and set people free. "It is the age of severance, of dissociation, of freedom, of analysis, of detach ment. Every man for hirnself. The public speaker disclaims speaking for any other; he answers only for hirnself. The social sentiments are weak; the sentiment of patriotism is weak; veneration is low; the natural affec tions feebier than they were. People grow philosophical about native land and parents and relations." The Revolution and the democracy that resulted from it had destroyed all "the ties and ligaments" of the old society.56 It was as Tocqueville said: "Aristocracy made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king; dernoc racy breaks that chain and severs every link of it. ' '57
This democratic society was not the society the revolutionary leaders had wanted or expected. No wonder, then, that those ofthem who lived on into the early decades of the nineteenth century expressed anxiety over what they had wrought. Although they tried to put as good a face as they could on what had happened, they were bewildered, uneasy, and in many cases deeply disillusioned. Indeed, a pervasive pessimism, a fear that their revolutionary experiment in republicanism was not working out as they had expected, runs through the later writings of the founding fathers, All the major revolutionary leaders died less than happy with the results of the Revolution. Even Benjamin Franklin, who died in 1790 before the full force of the democratic future had become apparent, was at the end of his life deeply angry at the way he was being treated by an ungrateful Congress.58 Only the last of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, seems to
3 66 DEMOCIlACY
.have enjoyed his final years, cynically reveling in the lucrative oppor tunities for business that the new democratic Republic had given hirn.
No one had expected more from the Revolution and the American Enlightenment than Benjamin Rush. "Mr. Great Heart, " Jeremy Belk nap called hirn after the character in Bunyan's Pi/gn:m 's Progress who attacked the giants and hobgoblins that stood in the way of getting to the Celestial City. Because Rush had such high hopes for the Revolu tion, his disillusionment was especially profound. By the early nine teenth century, his letters were filled with despair. He looked back "with deep regret" at all his public efforts on behalf of the Revolution. As "for our Constitution? I cannot meet with a man who loves it." He felt "like astranger" in his native land. The Revolution had changed "the principles and morals " of the people and had allowed government ev erywhere to fall "into the hands of the young and ignorant and needy part of the community." Only by considering the people of his horne state, Pennsylvania, "tilranged upon the subject of their political and physical happiness" could he contain the anger and contempt he feit. He wanted to bum all his "dreams," and like Charles Thomson, the secretary of the Continental Congress throughout its history , Rush eventually threw all the notes and documents for his once-planned mern oir of the Revolution into the fire. Americans, he feit, had no national character and little likelihood of ever acquiring one. "We are indeed," he said in 1812, "a bebanked, a bewhiskied, and a bedollared nation." America's revolutionary experiment on behalf of liberty "will certainly fall. It has already disappointed the expectations of its most sanguine and ardent friends." Like John Jay, Elias Boudinot, Noah Webster, John Randolph, and others, Rush ended by abandoning the Enlight enment and becoming a Christian enthusiast: "nothing but the gospeJ of Jesus Christ will effect the mighty work of making nations happy."~
Many others, of course, never went that far. But the numbers of old revolutionaries who lost faith in what the Revolution had done is star ding: from J ames Warren and Samuel Adams to David Ramsay, Light Horse Harry Lee, and Christopher Gadsden. At the end of his life, George Washington had lost alJ hope for democracy. Party spirit, he said in 1799, had destroyed the influence of character in politics. Mem bers of one party or the other now could ,. set up a broomstick" as candidate, call it "a true son of Liberty" or a "Dernocrat" or "any other epithet that will suit their purpose," and the broomstick would still "command their votes in toto!" John Adams spent much of his oJd age bewailing the results of the Revolution, induding democracy, reli-
Middk-Class Order 3 67
gious revivals, and Bible societies. "Where is now, the progress of the human Mind? ... When? Where? and How? is the present Chaos to be arranged into Order?" he asked in 1813. By the early nineteenth century, many of the founding fathers had come to share something of Alexander Hamilton's poignant condusion that "this American world was not made for me. ,,60 They found it difficult to accept the democratic fact that their fate now resred on the opinions and votes of small-souled and largely unreflective ordinary people.
Even Jefferson, sanguine and optimistic as he had always been, was reduced to despair in his last years and to what seems to us today to be an embarrassing fire-eating defense of the South and states' rights." He hated the new democratic world he saw emerging in America-a world of speculation, banks, paper money, and evangelical Christianity that he thought he had laid to rest. He blamed the New England Federalists for everything that was going wrong, but even in his beloved Virginia he suffered disappointment and dismay. To his astonishment he had to fight like the devil to create his state university in the face of evangelical opposition. More than any of the revolutionary leaders, he had relied on the future to take care of itself. Progress, he thought, was on the march, and science and enlightenment were everywhere pushing back the forces of ignorance, superstition, and darkness. The people in a lib eral democratic society would be capable of solving every problem, if not in his lifetime, then surely in the coming years.
But Jefferson lived too long, and the future and the coming gener ation were not what he had expected. Jefferson was frightened by the popularity of Andrew Jackson, regarding hirn as a man of violent pas sions and unfit for the presidency. He feit. overwhelmed by the new paper-rnoney business culture sweeping through the country and never appreciated how much his democratic and egalitarian principles had contributed to its rise. Ordinary people, in whom Jefferson had placed so much confidence, more than had his friend Madison, were not be coming more enlightened after al1. Superstition and bigotry, with which Jefferson identified organized religion, were reviving, released by the democratic revolution he had led. He was incapable of understanding the deep popular strength of the evangelical forces, of the real moral majorities, that were seizing control of much of American culture in these years. As late as 1822 he still believed that there was not a young man now alive who would not eventually die a Unitarian! Increasingly, however, he came to lament "the rising generation, ofwhich I once had sanguine hopes. " America, induding Virginia, was not progressing, but
3 68 DEMOCRACY
seemed to be going backward. The people were more religious, more sectarian, and less rational than they had been at the time of the Rev olution. The new generation on which he rested all his hopes did not seem to know who he was, what he had done. During the last year of his life he was pathetically reduced to listing his contributions during sixty-one years of public service in order to justify a favor from the Virginia legislature. He had lived too long and feit cast off by the dem ocratic forces he had he1ped to create, "All, all dead," he wrote to an old friend in 1825, "and ourse1ves left alone amidst a new generation whom we know not, and who knows not us.' '62
But the disillusionment feit by Jefferson and others of the founding fathers was astrange sort of disillusionment. It was not the disillusion ment that English and European liberals like Wordsworth and Constant feit over the failure of the French Revolution. That the French Revo lution ended in Napoleonic despotism could to some extent have been expected; the course of the French Revolution followed the cJassic cy clical pattern-excessive democracy leading to dictatorship and tyranny. The failure of the French Revolution did not destroy the idea of revo lution in Europe; the possibiJity of a successful republican revolution next time was kept alive. .
In America, however, the disillusionment was different. The found ing fathers were unsettled and fearful not because the American Revo lution had failed but because it had succeeded, and succeeded only too weil. What happened in America in the decades following the Declara tion of Independence was after all only an extension of all that the revolutionary leaders had advocated. White males had taken only too seriously the belief that they were free and equal with the right to pursue their happiness, Indeed, the principles of their achievement made pos sible the eventual strivings of others-black slaves and women-for their own freedom, independence, and prosperity.
The very fulfillment of these revolutionary ideals-the very suc:cess of the Revolution-made it difficuIt for those who benefited from that success, for ordinary people and their new democratic spokesmen, to understand the apprehensions of the founding fathers. The people looked back in awe and wonder at the revolutionary generation and saw in them leaders the likes of which they knew they would never see again in America. But they also knew that they now lived in a different world, a democratic world, that required new thoughts and new behavior. We cannot rely on the views of the founding fathers anymore, Martin Van Buren told the New York convention in 1820. We have to rely on our
Middle-Class Order 3 69
own experience, not on what they said and thought. They had many fears, said Van Buren, fears of democracy, that American experience had not borne out. 63
A new generation of democratic Americans was no longer interested in the revolutionaries' dream of building a cJassical republic of e1itist virtue out of the inherited materials of the Old World. America, they said, would find its greatness not by emulating the states of classical antiquity, not by copying the fiscal-military powers of modern Europe, and not by producing a few notable geniuses and great-souled men. Instead, it would discover its greatness by creating a prosperous free society belonging to obscure people with their workaday concerns and their pecuniary pursuits of happiness-common people with their corn mon interests in making money and getting ahead. No doubt the cost that America paid for this democracy was high-with its vulgarity, its materialism, its rootlessness, its anti-intellectualism. But there is no de nying the wonder of it and the real earthly benefits it brought to the hitherto neglected and despised masses of common laboring people. The American Revolution created this democracy, and we are living with its consequences still.
l
Illt 1
1
11,:1',".,.','
,I'
Notes
Introduaion
I. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1965), 49. 2. Carl Becker, 1M History of Political Parlies in tJae Province of Nau fort (Madison,
1968; first publ. 1909)' 3. Bernard Bailyn, "Lines of Force in Recent Writings on the American Revolu
tion," paper presented to the XIV International Congress of Historical Seiences (1975), IZO.
4. For confirmation of this point, see J ack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: TIte S«ial Developmmt of Early ModmI Bn'tish America anti tJae Formation of American Cu/ture (Chapei Hill, N.C:, 1988).
5. Bernard Bailyn, The ltÜologieal Origins of tJu American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 283.
6. J. Franklin Jameson, Th«American Revolution as a Social Movement (Princeton, 1967; first published 1926), 9.
7. In fact, it is now doubtful whether any such dass upheaval occurred even in the French Revolution. If the French Revolution should turn out not to be a real revolution after all, then there is obviously something wrong with our generic or sociological sense of what constitutes a revolution,
8. Bernard Bailyn, "The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Inter pretation," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on tJae American RefKJlution (Chapel Hili, 1973), 24; Jack P, Greene, "The Social Origins ofthe American Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpretation," Polit~al &ience Q!mrterly, LXXXVIII (1973), 21.
1. Hierarchy
I. Blackstone, quoted in Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and Congress: 1M Transfer of Politieal LegitimtJl:y, '774-
' ]76 (Princeton, 1987), 24; Franklin to William Strahan, 19 Dec,
1']63, cited in Ralph Ketcham, Presidents Above Party: The First American Presiclmty, '789 18!19 (Chapei Hili, 1984), 215.
2. Lord Adam Gordon, "Journal of an Officer Who Travelled in America and the West Indies in 1']64 and 1']65," in Newton D. Mereness, ed., Travels in Ilte Amm'can Colonies (New York, 1916), 40S; DavidJohnJeremy, ed., Hmry Wans9' anti His Amm'can jDUmlJI, 1794 (Philadelphia, 1970), 123; William Eddis, LeIters ./rom Amm'ca, ed, Aubrey Land (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), sB; Virginia Harrington, TIte New fort Merchant on tJae Eve of tlte Revolution (New York, 1935), 21; Richard Beale Davis, Intell«tual Life in tlte Colonial Soutla, '585-''763(KnoxviJIe, 1978), IU, 1428; HughJones, The Presmt SÜlte of Vir
•
373 37'2 Notes Jor pages 13-18
ginra . . . , ed . Richard L. Morton (Chapel Hili, 1956), 80; "Govemor Will iam Bull's Representation of the Colony, Ino," The Colonial Soulh Ca,olirra Senil : Contnnpo,ary Vitws, 1~7-177f, ed . H. Roy Merrens (Columbia, S.C . , 19n), 268- 69 '
3. Montesquieu , The Spiril 0/ IM Lauu (1748) , trans . Thomas Nugent , ed . Franz Neumann (New York , (949), Pt. I , bk . xix, ch . 27, p. 314; Anhur M . Wilson, " T he Enl ightenmenl Came First to England ," in Stephen B. Baxter, ed ., England's Rist 10 G,talntSS, 1660-1763 (Berkeley, 1983), 1-28. In 1763 the Venetian ambassador in London was astounded by the shared language of English piebeians and patricians ; it was so different from the great separation between popular and aristocrat ic culture that existed in Italy . Linda Colley, " W hose Nation? Class and National Consciousness in Britain, 1750-1830, " Pasland Presou, CXIll (1986) , 97.
4 . John Brewer, Party ldtology and Popular Politia al Iht Acassion 0/ Gto'gt 11/ ( New
York , 1976), 243. 5. E. P . Thompson , TM Malcing of th« English Wo,king Class ( New York , (963), 78 ;
John Brocke, King Gtorgt 11/ ( London , 1972) , 56. 6 . Derek Jarrett, England in IM Agt'o/ Hogarlh (London , 1974), 16-18, 21,36 ; Voltaire ,
Leures PhilosoPhiquts (1734) (Pa ris, 1964), Sixieme Lettre, 47· 7. "Mr. Colden' s Account of the Stare of the Province of New York, " 6 Dec. 1765,
in E. B. O 'Callaghan and Benhold Fernow , eds . , Documents Rtlativt 10 IM Colonial His 10ry 0/IM Statt 0/ NtW Yo,k (Albany , 1856-87), VII. 795; Jarrett, England in IM Agt 0/ Ho garth, 18.
8 . Harold Perk in, " T he Social Causes of the British Industrial Revolution , " Ro yal Historical Socie ty , Trans. • 5th Ser.. XVIII (1969), 123-43; Jarrett , England in Ih, Agt 0/ Hogarlh, 15, 16-23.
9. Ramsay , quoted in William Henry Drayton , TM L,Um 0/ Freema», Etc. : Essays on IM Nonimportatio« Mooemen! in Soulh Carolina, ed . Robert M . Weir (C olu mbia , S .C ., 1977), xxiii ; Rush to Ebenezer Hazard , 22 Oct. 1768, in L. H. Butterfield, ed ., Ltlltrs 0/ Bmjamin Rush (Princeton , 1951) , I, 68; George W . Corner, ed . , Tht Autobiography 0/ Bmjamin Rush: His " T,av, ts Th,ough Lif," togtlh" wilh his Commonplac, Book/o, 1789-/813 (Princeton, (948), 198.
10. Drayton, quoted in William D . Liddie . .. 'A Patriot King , or None ' : Lord Bolingbroke and the American Renunciation of George 111," Journal 0/Amtr~an Hislory,
LXV (1979), 951. 11. Leonard W . Labaree. Royal Govtmmml in A~a: A Sludy 0/ tht R,ilish Colonial
Syslem btJort 1783 ( Ne w Haven, 1930), 85-88 ; R ichard L. Bushman , King and Ptopk in Provin&ial Massafhus,11s (Chapel Hili, Jg85), 18-19; Ma rston , Kingand Congms, 25; Beverly McAnear, Tht Ineom, 0/ Ih, Colonial GoVtmO'S 0/ Brilish Norlh A~a (New York ,
1967), 69· 12 . Anhur P. Seott , Criminal Law in Colonial Vi,ginia (Chicago, 1930), 11']-20; Douglas
Greenberg , Cn'me and Law Enforcemenl in tht Cowny ofNtw York, 1691-1776 (Ithaca , 1974), 130-31.
13 . A. G . Roeber. " Au lhor ity, Law , and Custom : The Rituals of Coun Day in Tidewater Virginia , 1720 to 17SO ," WMQ, 3rd Ser . , XXXVII (1g80), 37; Greenberg, Crime and Law, 224; John Adams to William Tudor, 18 Dec . 1816 , 29 Ma r . 1817, in CharIes F. Adams , ed. , Wo,ks ofJohn Adams(Boston, 18SO-56) , X , 233, 244-45 ·
14. John M . Murrin. " Political Development , " in Jack P . Greene andJ . R. Pole, eds ., CowniaJ Bn'lish Amtriea: Essays in IM Ntw His/ory 0/tht Ea,1y Modtm E,a (Baltimore, 1984), 408-56 .
15. Jon Butler , Awash in a SM 0/Falth : Ch,islianizing IMA~an Ptopl, (Cambridge,
Notes Jor pagts 19-21
Mus., 1990), gS-128, 164-n, 197; Bruce E . Steiner, " New England Anglicanism, A Genteei Faith? " WMQ, 3rd Ser. , XXVII (1970), 122-35; Bruce E. Steiner, "Anglican Officeholding in Pre-Revolutionary Connecticut : The Parameters of New England Community ," ibid ., XXXI (1974), 369-406; Patricia U . Bonomi, UruiIr tht Copt 0/ HtfJlIm: R,ligion, Society, and Polilies in Colonial America (New York, 1986), 39-97 .
16. David Hume, "The Rise and Progress of the Ans and Seiences, " in Eugene F. Miller, ed ., Essays: Mo,al, Political, and Liltrary (Indianapolis, 1985), 126; Abraham Williams, A Sermo.. Prltl&h'd at Bosto« .. . May 1l6, r,{i2, in Edmund S. Morgan, ed ., PuriJIm Palisical ldeas, '558-1794 (Indianapolis, 1965), 332; Christopher M. Jedry, TM Wo,1d 0/Joh.. Clmv,land: Family and Community in EighlNnlh -Cmlury Nn» England (New York, 1979), 94. The social order was beautiful, said Jonathan Edwards, when rhe different members of the society "have all their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capaeities and talents, and everyone keeps his place , and continues in his proper business ." Nonnan Fiering, Jonathan Eduards's MonJI Tlaoughl and Its Brilish Contul (Chapei Hili, 1981) , 131.
17. Geoffroy Atkinson and Abraham C . Keller, Pr,lude 10 IM Enlighltnmenl: F'ln&h Limature, '690'-'740 (Seattle , 1970), 51-52, 56.
18. Edwards , quoted in Fiering, Jonathan Edwa,ds', Mo,aI Thaught and Its Brilish Con tccI, 131; Alexander Pope, "Essay on Man," IV, ii, in Aubrey Williams, ed., Pomy and PrOIl 0/Alexaruilr Popt (Boston , 1969), 148; A. Stuan Pitt, "The Sources, Significance, and Date of Franklin's ' An Arabian Tale,' " Modern Language Association , Publ~· tions, LVII (1942), 155-68; Adams, July 1756 , in L. H . Butterfieid et al ., eds ., Diary and AulobWgraphy 0/John Adams(Cambridge, Mass., IgGl), I, 39. On the eighteenth century's conception of order, see Anhur O . Lovejoy, TM Great Chain 0/ &ing: A Sludy 0/ IM History 0/ an ltiHJ (Cambridge , Mass . , [936), 200-7 ; and Philip Greven, The l'rottstanl TtmpnarMIl: Pattnns0/Child-R,aring, R,ligious Expnimu, and tht &lf in Ea,lyA~a (New York, 1977), 194-g8.
19. Richard Lucas, Ruks R,lating to Sucem in Trade (Boston , (1760», 6; Williams, Sermon, in Morgan, ed., Puritan Polil~1 ldeas, 332; Donald K . Enholm , David Cunis Skaggs, and W . Jeffrey Welsh , " O r igins of the Southem M ind : The Parochial Ser mons of Thomas Cradock of Maryland, In4-1870, " Quarltrly Journal ofSpttch, LXXII I (lgB7), 200-18.
20 . Joseph Henry Benton , Waming Oul in New England, 1656-1817 (Boston, 19"). 21 . Williams , Sermon, in Morgan, ed . , Purilan Polilical Itkas, 333; Boston Evming PoSI,
[3 Apr. 1763 · 22 . William Livingston et a1., TM lrukpmdml Rt}leeto" ed . Milton M. Klein (Cam'
bridge, Mass., IgG3) , 214; Browne , quoted in Carl Bridenbaugh, Cilus in Rwoll: U,ban Lif, i.. A~a, 1743-1776 (New York , 1955), 137 .
23. Roben D . MitcheII, Commereialism and Fronli,,: PtrSptclivts on IM Ea,ly Shtnandoah Vailty (Charlouesville, 19n), 83; Melvin Yazawa, From Cownus 10 Commonwealth : Fami/ia/ ltÜowgy and tht &ginnings 0/tht Amniean Republic (Baltimore, ,g85), 60-66; Charles Moore, ed. , Gtorge WashingIon 's Ruks 0/ Civility and Deeml Behaviou, in Company and ConvtrSalion (BOIton , 1926), 7-8.
24· Adams, Jan., Apr. [76[, in Buuerfield et a1. , eds . , Diary 0/John Adams, I, 198; Randolph Shipley Klein, Portrait 0/an Ea,1y Amtriean Family : Th, Shippms 0/Pmnsylvania Across Fiue Gmnations (Philadelphia, 1975), 203; John Adams to William Tudor, 29 Jan . tn4, in Roben J. Taylor et a1 ., eds., Papns ofJohn Adams, (Cambridge, Mus., 19n
), 11, 104; Labaree, Royal Gollmlmml, 92-93 ; Purdie and Dixon's Williamsburg, Va . Gtutlle, 26 May 1774.
374 Notes Jor pages 22-25
25. SeeJohn K. Alexander , Rtndn Thsm Suhmissive: Responses w Poverty in PhiWhlphia, 1-;60-/800 [Amherat , Mass . , 19l1o), 11 .
26. Mitchell Roben Breitw ieser, Col/on MalAn and Benjamin FranlcJin: 1M Pria of ReprestnltJlive Personality (Cambridge, Eng . , 1984), 241. Although women did not usually have designsred occupations, and indeed , with the exception of widows, had little independ en t legal existen ce apart from their fathers or husbands, they d id participate in the larger economy and often controlled the products of their own labor. Sec Laurei Thatcher Ulri ch, "Martha Ballard and Her Girls : Women's Work in Eighteenth Century Maine , " in Stephen Innes, ed . , Work and Labor in EarlyAmnira (Chapei Hili,
1988), 70-1°5. 27. See Bernard Bailyn , Voyagers 10 IJu Wesl: A Passage in Ihe Pmpling of Amnica on IJu
Eve of IJu RevoluJion (New York, 1986), 147-49; Edward M . Cook , Jr., The FaJ1urs of t1u Toums: Leadership and Community Strucuu« in Eighletnth-Century Nau England (Baltimore ,
(976), 87-90 · 28. Jonathan Boucher, A Vinu of the Causa and Consequenus of t1u American RevoluJion
(London , 1797), 233· 29 . Jackson Turner Main , TJu Social Strurture of RevoluJionary Ammca (Princeton ,
1965) , 38; Carl Bridenbaugh, 1M Colonial Craftsman (Chicago, 1950), g6. 30. See Asa Briggs , " T he Language of ' Class' in Early Nineteenth-Century En
gland," in Asa Briggs and John Savillc , eds ., Essays in Labour Hiswry: In Memory of C. D. H. Col« (London , 19OO), 43-73·
31. Williams, Sermon, in Morgan, ed., Puntan Politicalldeas, 332. See Harold Perkin, TJu Origins of Modern English Society, '780-1880 (London, 1969), 17-62. .
32. Fielding, The Hislory of the Advtnlures ofJoseph Andrews, ed . Martin C. Banestin (Middletown , Conn . , (967), 11 , xiii, 157.
33. Moore , ed . , Washington 's Ruus 0/Civi/ity, 9 ; [William Dover] , Use.ful Miscellanies : Or, Serious RejltCtions, ResptCling Mtns Duty 10 Cod, and Towards One Anot1ur (Landon and Philadelphia, (753), 31 ; Hunter Dickinson Farish, ed.,Journ.a1 and Letters of Philip V.ekers Filhian (Williamsburg, 1943), 161.
2 . Patricians and Plebeians
l. Adams, NOles for " A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law," (1765) , in Taylor et a1 " ed s. , Papers 0/John Adams, I, 107; Douglass Adair, cd. , "The Autobiog raphy of the Re verend Devereaux Jarren, 1732-1763, " WMQ, 3rd Ser ., IX (1952) , 361. In the eighteenth century "the im portant hierarchical distinction was the one that set off the several elites from everyone else. " In comparison with the grcat difference between the genlry and ordinary people , " d ifferences between artisans and laboren were of no real consequence . The effect, needless to say, was to identify middling people mu ch mOre closely with the bOllom of so~iety than with the top ." Stuan M . Blumin , The EmrrgtnCt of Ihe Middle Class : Sodal Experience in t1u Amtrican City, 1'160-/900 (Cambridge , Eng ., (989), 33. John Adams grounded the politicaltheory of his Defence of t1u ConslituJions of Iht United Slales, wrinen in 1787-88, on this traditional distinction : " T he people , in a11 nations," he wrote, "are naturally dividcd into two sons, the gentlemen and the simplemen, a word which is here chosen to signify the common people . " Defence, in Charles F. Adams , cd . , Works 0/John Adams (Boston , 18~), VI, 185 . The besl discus sion of the distin ction between gentlemen and ordinary people in
Notes Jor pages 25-30 375
colonial America is in Rhys lsaac , TJu TrMUftmruJlion of Virginia , '740-'790 (Chapei HiII ,Ig82).
2. J. V. Becken, TJu ArisÜICTacy in Erlgland, 1660-19lf (Oxford, 1986), '7-42; John Cannon, ArisÜICTaJit Cmtury: TJu Pmage 0/EighJmlth-Cmlury England (Cambridge, En g1and, 1984).
3. Becken, Arislocracy in England, 19. As John Adams wrote as late as 1788: "The distinctions which have been introduced among the gentlernen, into nobility greater or Iesser , are perfect1y immaterial to our present purpose; knights, barons, earls, vis counts, marquises, dukes, and even princes and kings, are still but gentlemen, and the word noble signifies no more than knowable, or conspicuous. " Defence, in Adams, ed ., Works ofJohn Adams, VI, 185.
4. Speck , Stahility and Strife: England, 17lf-l;60 (Cambridge, Mass ., 1970),37; Steele, quoted in John BarrelI, English Literature in Hiswry, '730-'780: An EqUIJ/, Wide Surtlt)' (Lenden, 1983), 37.
5. John Adams to Jonathan Sewell, Feb . 1760, in Taylor et al., eds. , Papers 0/Joh" Adams, 1,41 ; Peter Mathias , 1M Trans/tmruJlion of E"gland: Essays i" t1u Economic and Social History of Erlgland in t1u Eighlemth Cmlury (London, 1979), IsB; Washington, quoted in Richard Bridgman, "Jeffenon's Fanner before Jeffenon," American ~Iy, XIV (lgM), 5]6 ; Jack P. Greene, ed ., TJu Diary of Colonel Lando« Carter of &hirteHall, '7!j!l 1778(Charlottesville, 1965), 11, 795; Butterfield et al., eds ., Diary ofJohn Adams, 11, 53; Charles Royster, A ReooluJionary Pmpu aJ War: TJu ContiflmtaJ Army and Amtrican Charruter, 1775-1783 (Chapei Hili, 1979), 317; Greene to Samuel Ward, 9 Oct. 1772, in Richard Showman et a1 ., eds., TJu Papers of Gmeral NathatllJJ!l Creme (Chapel Hili, 1976- ), I, 47; Butler, Awash in a SftJ of Faith, 67-97 ; Morris, quoted in Gerald Stourzh, Ailxandn Hamillon and t1u ldea of Repuhlican Govemmmt (Stanford, 1970), 80.
6 . Jonathan Sewell to John Adams , 13 Feb. 1760, in Taylor et a1 ., cds . , Papers of John Adams, I, 40 ; John Randolph , quoted in Merrill Jensen, "The Articles of Confed eration, " in Library of Congress, Fundamental Testaments of t1u Arnniean Revolution (Wash ington , D .C., 1973), 56; Franklin, in Max Farrand, ed ., TJu R«ords of t1u Fednal Convmlio" of 1787 (New Haven, 19", 1937), I, 83.
7. Hamilton to John Jay, 26 Nov . 1775, in HaroId C. Syrett et a1 ., eds., 1M Papers of Ailxattdn- HamilJ~m (Ne w York, IgGl- ), 1,1]6 ; Samuel Mather, 1M Fall of'Ju Mighty Lammted (Boston, 1738), 7; John Adams to Jonathan Sewell, Feb. 1760, in Taylor et a1 ., eds. , Papers ofJohn Adams, 1,41; Samuel Kinser, ed ., The Mnrwirs of Philip/N de Commynes, trans. Isabelle Cazeauxe (Columbia, S.C ., 1969), I, 361 ; John Locke, Same Thoughts on EducaJio" (1705) , in James L. AxteIl, cd . , TJu EducaJional Wrilings of John Lock (Cam bridge, Eng., 1968), 112-13; Jefferson's Hints to Americans Traveling in Europe (19June 1788), in Julian P. Boyd et a1. , eds ., The Papers of Thornas Jeffmon (Princeton , 19~-55), xrn,~ .
8 . Roben Micklus, " D r . Alexander Hamilton 's 'Modest ProposaI,' " Early Amer iean Li_ure, XVI (1981), "4-15; Homai J . Shroof, The Eightemth-Ctnlury Novel: T1u ldea of t1u Gentlnna" (New Delhi, 1978), 49; Hume, "Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writ ing," in Miller, ed ., Essays, 19/.
9. Adair, ed ., "Autobiography of Devereaux Jarrett, " WMQ, 3rd Ser ., IX (1952), JGI; Carl Bridenbaugh, cd., GenllmuJ,,'s Progress: 1M IlinerariU1ll of Dr. Altxandn Hamiltan, '744 (Chapei Hill , 1948), 90, ~-55; Alfred F. Young, "George Roben Twelves Hewes (1742-18+0) : ABoston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXVrn (1gBI), 561-62; Counlandt Canby, "Roben Munford's 1M Patriots, " WMQ, 3rd Ser ., VI (1949), 500.
377 Notes for pages 30-3537 6
10. Adair, ed . , " Autobiography of Devereaux jarrett, " WMQ. 3rd Ser ., IX (1952), 361; Bartram , quored in Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in Ameri&a, 17'13
1]]6 (New York, 1955), 147-48 . 11. James Reid, "The Religion of the Bible and Religion of K[ing] W[illiam] County
Compared ," in Riehard Beale Davis , ed., Th« Cownial Virginia Satirist: Mid·Eigh1lenth Gmtury Commmtan'es on Politics, Religion, and Sociny, Arnerican Philosophical Society ,
Trans., New Ser., LVII , Pt. 1(1967), 56. 12. Farish, ed . , journal of Fithian , 160-61; Hermann Wellenreuther , "A V icw of the
Soc io-Economie Structure of England and the British Colonies on the Eve of the Amer iean Revolution ," in Erieh Angermann et al. , eds ., New Wine in OMSkins: A ComparatilN View of Some PoJitical Stnu:tures and Values Affecting W American Revolution (Stuttgart , 1976), 18; josiah Quiney , Memoirs 0] the Life of josiah Q]a'nq, junior, 0] Massachusetts &y, 17]4 1775 (Boston , 1875), 88; Browne , quoted in Bridenbaugh , Cities in Revolt, 137; Briden
baugh, ed ., Gentleman 's Progress, 199 · 13. Jan . 1761, in Butterfield et al ., eds. , Diary0] Adams, I, IgS. 14. Mather, Fall 0]W Mighty, 10; Canby, "Robert Munford 's The Patriots, " WMQ.
3rd Ser ., VI (1949), 499-500 ; Bridenbaugh, ed ., Gentleman's Progress, 185- 86. 15. Boucher , Vitw 0] the Causes, 233; Reid, " Religion of the Bible, " in Da vis, ed .,
Vi'ginia Satirist, Ameriean Philosophical Society, Trans ., New Ser ., LVII , Pt. 1 (1967), 48; T . H. Breen, Tobaao Culture: Ttu Mentality 0] the Great Titkwaler Planlers on the Eue 0] the Revolution (Prineeton , 1985) , 161 .
16. Bridenbaugh, ed . , Gentleman 's Progress, 163, 8; Pauline Maier , The 0lJ Reoolution ants: Political Liues in theAge 0]Samuei Adams (New York, IgSo), 240; Bushman , King and Peoplt, 69-70 ; Jaek P . Greene , " Society, Ideology, and Polities: An Analysis of the Politieal Culture of Mid-Eighteenth-Century V irgin ia," in R ichard M . Jellison , ed . , Society, Frmkm , and Conscience: The Coming 0] the Revolution in Virginia, Massachusetts, arad New York (New York , 1976), 18-19; Farish, cd . , joumtJl 0] Fithian , :zg; Bridenbaugh, Colonial Craftsman, 164; Alexander, Rentier Them Submissiue, 18; I. W. Stuart , Life 0]jon ' athan TrumlnJl, Senior, GOlNmOr of Conneeticut (Boslon , 1859), u8 .
17 . Jarrett , England in the Age 0]Hogarth , 79-80; Boslon Evening Post, 14 Dec. 1761. See J . E . Crowley , This Sheba, Selj: The Conceptualization 0] Economic Life in Eightmlth-Century Ameri&a (Baltimore, 1974) , 43-45 ; 'b aa e Hunt, The Political Family: Ora Discourse, Pointi,., Out the Reeiproeai Advantages M ich Fww from an Uninterrupud Union Between Grtat Britain arad Her Ameri&an Cownies (Philadelphia , 1775) , 24-25. Despite his rresh think ing on so many topies , Bernard Mandeville still believed thai it was " Fol!y to eure" the wanU of th e poor , for Ihen Ihey would stop working. John Barr el!, The Political Theory 'Oj Painting from Reynolds to Hulitt (New Haven , 1986), 48. See Ihe imponant d iseussion of labor in Hannah Arendt , The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958), 79- 135 .
18. Mun, quoled in Crowley, This Sheba, Selj, 44; Monlesquieu, quoted in Nannerl O . Keohane, Phiksophy and the Slate in Franet: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Prinee' ton , 1980), 419; Jarrett , E,.,iJJrad in theAge 0] Hogarth, 93; Fielding, quotcd in Robert W. Maleolmson , Popukr Recrtations in English Sociny, 1]00-1850 (New York, (973), 156-57; Banks , quoled in G. E. Mingay , The Gentry: The Rise and Fall0/a Ruling CiJJss (Landon, 1976), 85·
19. Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), I Feb. 1770, in Will iam Nelson, cd . , Docummts Relating to the Colonial History 0/the StaU0/New jersey (Palmon , N.J . , 1905) , XXVII , !l6 29. (I owe this citation to Brendon McConville.)
20. Continental Associat ion, 20 Oe!. 1774 , in Jaek P . Greene , ed ., Colonies to Nati01l,
1]63-1789 (New York , 1967), 247-50.
Nous fM pages 36-39
21. Jacbon to Benjamin Franklin, 17 June 1755, in Leonard Labaree et al., eds ., TM Pafl'rs 0] Bntjamin Frtmlclin (New Haven, 1959- ), VI, n. Edward Gibbon, Tlu DKlüv tINi Fall 0] tIu R_ Empi" (Modem Library ed., New York, n.d .), I, ii, 48. On the luxury debate in Engtand, see John Sekoura, Luxury: TM Concepl in WUtml T1IoutJu, Edm to SmDIJdJ (Ballimore , 19n)·
22. Harrington, quoted in Lanee Banning, T1u j'.iflrs01lian Persuasilm: Eoolutilm of a Party IdltJiJJD (Ithaca, 1978), 28; Defoe, quoted in Speck, St4biJity arad Stri]e, 32; jaebon to Franklin, 17 June 1755, Labaree et al., eds. , Papns 0] FraMJin, VI, 77; Farish, ed ., jounud 0]FiJltian , 161; Emory G . Evans, Thomas Ntlsoll 0] YorMoWl\: Reooluti01l4ry Virginiall (Williamiburg, 1975), 19-29. For an illuminating discussion of the ancient Roman ar iSlocracy's attitudes toward work and leisure, see Paul Veyne, "The Roman Emp ire ," in Paul Veyne, ed ., A Hist«y 0] PriDtJU Lift: I . From PtJffJn Rometo ByUlltium (Cambridge , Masl., IgS7), 117-59. These ideal of work and leisure, writes Veyne, "persisted from archaic Greece and India down 10 Benjamin Oonstant and Charles Maurras" (p. 123). lt was the Revolution that ehanged these ideas for Americans.
23. One of the advantages of Thomas Jefferson's locating Monticello on the top of a mountain was that ir removed from sight the produetion ofthe plantation 's erops rar distant markets and thus eontributed to the illusion that Montieel!o was a self-contained and indepe nd en t eommunity . (I owe thil point to information supplied by Daniel P. Jordan, executive director, and Cinder Stanton, direetor of research of the Thomas Jeffenon Memorial Foundation .)
24. Buffon, quotcd in Antonello Gerbi , The DiJpute 0] W New WorM: The History 0] a Polnnic, 1750-1900, trans . Jeremy Moyle (Pittsburgh, 1973), 19-20. Donald M . Seott's signilicant book From Offtu to Profession: The Ntw England M inistry, 175~1850 (Philadel phia, 1978) rests on the assumption that the position of the eighteenth-eentury c1ergy was something other than that of a modern professional. And Gerard W. Gawalt is quite eorrect in arguing that the aeeeptanee of lawyen BI gentlemen required their hav ing no direct tie between their work and their ineome. Gawalt , The Promise 0] Power: TIu Legal Pro]essilm in Massachwetts, 1]00-1140 (Westpon, Conn., 1979) , 16-19.
25. Locke, quoted in Harold Nieolson, Good &haviour: &ing a Study 0] Certain Types ofCiui/ity (New York, 1956), 194; Laurens to Richard Oswald, 7 July 1764, in Philip M . Hamer et a1., eds ., T1u Papns of Henry uurms (Columbia, S.C ., 1968- ), IV, 338; Rachel N . Klein, "Ordering the Baekeountry: The South Carolina Regula tion , " WMQ. 3rd Ser., XXXVIII (lgSl), 667; Edward C . Papenfuse, 111 Pursuit of Profit: Tlu Af"fI.lpolis Mlrclwtts in W Era of the American Revolution, 1]63-1805 (Baltimore, 1975), 141·
!l6. Addilon, T1u SJHdDII1r, No . 549, citcd in Shrolf, Eighuenth-Century Nouel, 39; Ntw E",iMuI MllIGZiru (Mar. 1759) , quoted in Bridgman, "jeffenon's Farmer," Ammean ~Iy, XIV (1g6:z), 568.
2']. [Franklin), Silenee Dogood, No . 5, :z8 May 1722, in Labaree et a1 ., eds ., Papns oJ FrtullcJirt, I, 19; George C. Rogen, Jr. , et a1 ., cds., The Papns of Henry lAurms (Co lumbia, S.C., 1974- ), V, 8on . ; "Letters and Papers of john Singleton Copley and Henry Pelham, 1739-1776," Mus . H istorieal Society , ColJ., LXXI (1914) , 661-66 . "By the eommon people ," wrote john Adams in his Dtjert&e 0] W Cortstitutiorts, "we mean laboren, husbandmen, mechanics, and merchanu in general , who punue their oceu· pations and indultry without any knowledge in liberal ans or scienees, or in any thing but their own trades or pursuiu." Adams , cd ., Works 0]john Adams, VI, 185.
28. Farish, cd., jo_l of Fithian , 161; Harrington, New York Merchanl, 16; Brown , Virginia, 35.
379 Notes for pages 39-45378
29. Joseph Ward to John Adams, 3 Dec. 1775, John Trumbull 10 John Adams , I~ Nov . 1775, in Taylor et al ., eds . , PafNrs 0/John Adams, III, 3~3, 300 .
30. Samuel Osgood to John Adams, 30 Nov. 1775, in Taylor et a1 ., eds., PafNrs of John Adams, III, 328; John C . Miller, AWrandn Hamilton : Portrait in Paradox (New York, (959), 5· For an insightful diseussion of honor among the Continental army offieers, see Charles Royster, A Revolulumary Peopk at War: The Continmtal Ami} and Anurican CMrader, 1775-1783 (Chapei Hill, 1979), 88-g6, 199-200, 206-10, 337-38.
31. Adams to Charles Cushing, 190el. 1756, to Merey Otis Warren, 3 Jan . 1775, in Taylor er al ., eds . , PafNrs 0/John Adams, I, 22; 11, 210.
32. Montesquieu, T1u Spirit 0/ th« UlWS (1748), ed . Franz Neumann (New York, 19~9), Pt. I, bk . iii, eh. 7, p . 25; David Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His DuI}, and His Exp«talions. In Two Parts (London , 17~9), 11, 261, 260.
33. Boston Evming Post, 29 Aug . 176]· 3~ . John E. O'Connor, Williall'l Paurson: Lawyer andStausma«, 1745-1806 (New Bruns
wiek, 1979), I~ . See Montesquieu, Spirit of tM Lauu, ed . Neumann, PI. 11, bk. xxviii, eh. 20, p. 117 .
35. Putnam, TM Mmwirs ofRufus Pumam (Boston, 1903), 23· 36. Pierre Marambaud , Williem Byrd of Westover, 1674-1744 (Charlottesville, 1971),
167. 37. Samuel Breek , Recollections . . . with Passages from His Note Boois, 1774-1862, ed .
H . E . Seudder (Philadelphia, (877), 3~-36, 91, 108-9·
3. Patriarchal DtperuJence
I. Montesqu ieu, Spirit 0/tM UlWS, ed , Neumann. PI. I , bk . i, eh . 3, p. 6 ; Defoe , quoted in Maximillian E. Novak, ed ., English Literature in tJae Age 0/Disguise (Berkeley, 1977), 28; Joseph Addison, Richard Steele et a1 ., TM Sptctator (New York , 1906), No . IBg, 11 , 79.
2. (Dover], Usefv.l Miscellanits, 27; "Observations of James GIen on His General Instruetions" (1753), in Leonard Woods Labaree, ed ., Royallnstrw:1ions ID British Colonial Governors, 167°-1776 (New York, (935), 11,883; Henry R . Mellwaine, ed . , Journals oftM House 0/ Burgessn 0/ Virginia, 1752-1755, 1756-1758 (Riehmond , 1909), 5; IAnon .], Sornt ObservaJions Relating to tIu Present Cireumstances 0/Massachusells- Boy (Boslon, (750), in An drew MeFarland Davis, ed . , Colonial Curreney Reprints, 1682-1751 (Boston , 1911), IV , ~I~, ~28 ; Robert A. Gross, TM Minutemen and Thtir WorM (New York, 1976), 107; Samuel Willard, A COll'lpkIt Body ofDivinity in Two Hundrtd and Fifty Expository Ltctures on IM Assembly 's Shorter Catechism (Boslon, 1726) , 5gB, 600 ; Greven, TM Proteslant TemfNrammt, 178-79; Liddie, " Pa lr iot King," Journal 0/Anurican His16ry, LXV (1979), 955.
3.JohnJ . Walen, "Family , Inheritanee, and Migration in Colonial New England : The Evidenee f,om Guilford, Conneelicul," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XXXIX (1982), 71; James Lockwood, Religion tAe /lightst Inlmst 0/a Civi/ Community, and Sures1 Means o/Its Prosperi!J (New London, 175+), 33. .
~. Waters, " Fam ily , Inherilanee, and Migration ," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XXXIX (1982), 66; Roben J . Taylor, Western MassachwtUs in tAt Reoolulion (Providenee, 1954), 13-14; Kevin M . Sweeney , " R ive r Gods in Ihe Making : The Williamses of Weslern Massaehu· seus," in Peler Benes , ed ., The Boy and tht River(Boston , IgB2), 101-16; Ronald K . Snell, .. 'Ambitious of Honor and Plaees' : The Magistraey of Hampshire County, Massa· ehu~etts. 1692-1760," in Bruee C . Daniels, ed ., Power and Status : Officeholding in Colonial
Nousfor pages 45-48
AIIItri&a (Middletown, Conn., 1986), 2~-25, 35; M. Eugene Sinnans, "The South Car olina Royal Council, '720-1763," WMQ, XVIII (1961), 378; David Alan Williams, "The Smaß Virginia Fanner in Eighteenth-Century V irginia Polit ies, " Agricu1JuraJ History, XLIII (1969), 91-101; Leonard Woods Labaree, Conseruatism in Early American Hiswry (New York, 1948), '7.
5· Daniel Blake Smith, Inside tM Great HOUfe: Pianter Life in Eightetnth·Century Clusll . /J«lU Socitt} (Ithaea, IgBo), 150-5+, 175-230; Emory G. Evans, Thomas Nelson of Yorktown :
RtlKIluliaMry Virtinian (Williamsburg, 1975) , 8-9 ; Allan Kulikoff, "'Throwing the Stocking ' : A Gentry Marriage in Provineial Maryland," Maryland Historuol Magazirll, LXXI (1976), 5'7n . ; Gross, Minulnntn lind Thnr WorM, 71; Fred Anderson, A Peopw's Arm)': MassachuseUs &iMins and SrK"ty in tht Stvm Years ' War (Chapei Hili, IgB~), ~2; Gary WiIIs, Invmtirll America: Jtflerson 's Dedanuion o/Irukptndmce (New York, 1978), 36.
6 . Daniel Scott Smith , " 'All in Some Degree Related to Eaeh Other' : A Demo graphie and Comparative Resolution of the Anomaly of New England Kinship, " Amer iaut HistoricaJ Review, XCIV (Igag), H-79; Daniel Scott Smith, " G enealogy , Geography , and Genesis of Sodal Strueture: Household and K inship in Early Ameriea," Confer ence in Anglo-Ameriean Social History, 5-7 Sept . IgB5, Williamsburg, Va ,
7· James A. Henretta, "Families and Farms : Mentalire in Pre -Induatrial Amer iea," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXV (1978), 3-38; Jedry, World 0/John Cleaveland, 7~, 77; Canby, "Roben Munford's Tht Pamou," WMQ, 3rd Ser., VI (1949), ~63 ; Smith, Inside IM Great Hause, 229; Waten, "Family , Inheritance, and Migration," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XXXIX (19112), 76.
8. Toby L . Ditz, Proptrl} anti Kinship: IrWritance in &rly Connecticul, 1750 - 1820 (Prince ton, 1986), 57, 6~, 102. See Carole Shammas , Marylynn Salmon , and Miehel Dahlin, ln1lniJmu:e in AIIItri&a.from ColO1lial Times 10 tht Presou (New Brunswiek , 1987).
9· C. Ray Keim, "The Inftuenee of Primogeniture and Entail in the Developmenr ofVirginia" (Ph .D. Diss., University ofChieago, 1926), 56, 60-62, lIo-l~, 122, 195-96; Keim, "Primogeniture and Entail in Colonial Virginia ," WMQ, 3rd Ser . XXV (1968), 545-86; Jedry, Wttrld 0/John CwaVtland, 80; John J . Waten, "Patrimony, Succession, and Sodal Stability: Guilford, Conneetieut, in the Eighleenth Century ," Persptctives in American History, X (1976), 160.
10. Ditz, Proptr/)' and Kinship, 153-55 . 11. Smith, Inside tJae GrtaI House, 183; Margaret E. Marlin, MercMnts and Trade ofIM
C01InecticuJ River Vality, 1750-1820 (Nonhampton , Mass. , 1939), 15; Harrington, Ntw York Mtrthanl, 51-52 ; Bridenbaugh, Colonial Craftsrnan, 126-27; Anhur Ceeil Bining, Ptnnsyl Mnia lrort M(J1Iufaclurt i" tIu EightetntA Cenlury (Harrisburg , 1979), 126 .
12. Harry Roy Merrens, Cownial North Carolina in tIu EightetntA Century: A Study in Histori&aJ Gtography (Chapei Hili, 196~), 27; A . Roger Ekireh , "Poor CaroliM " : Polilics anti Socitty in Colonial North Carolina, 1'129-1776 (Chapei Hili, 19BI), 51-85; Edward M. Cook, Jr., Tht FaUlers oftht Towns: uadrrship anti Comll'lunity StrW:lure in Eiglatetnth -Cmlll.ry New ErIlland (Baltimore, 1976), 101, and esp . eh . +; Thomas L. Purvis, " 'High-Born, Long-Reeorded Families' : Social Origins of New Jersey Assemblymen, 1703 to 1776," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXVII (lgBo), 599 ; Thomas L . Purvis, ProprintJrs, Patronage, and PafNr Monq: UgislDJiVt Palilies in New Jersey, 17°3-1776 (New Brunswick, 1986); Smith, •'Genealogy, Geography, and the Genesis of Sodal Slrueture," Conferenee, 5-7 Sept. 'gB5 , Williamsburg, Va .; Bruee C. Daniels, "Family Dynasties in Conneeticut's Larg est Towns, '700-1760, " CanadianJolI.rnal 0/His/()ry, VIII (1973), 99 ; Brown, Virginia, 217; John Adams, lRjm&e oftAt Conslitulions 0/ tIu United Slates (1787), in Adams , ed . , Worb,
3 8 1 3 8 0 Notes for pages 49-52
IV, 393; Will iam F. Willingham , " De ference Democracy and Town Government in W indham, Connecticut , 1755 10 1786, " WMQ, 3rd Ser . , XXX (1973), 401-22 .
13. Walen, " Palrimony , Succession, and Sodal Stabiliry;" PmpectÜMs in Amm"" History. X (1976) , '40 ; Smith, /11 Ihe Grea: House, 76, 159 , 160, 161, 165; Mary Beth Norton, Libmy 's Daughlns: T1u RevolutioMry Expenenc« ofAmnic<vz Womm, 1750-1800 (Boston, 19&), 61 ,63 , 146.
'4 . Sir Roberl Filmer, Patnarcha and Othn Polilical Worb, ed, Perer Lasleu (Oxford, . 1949), 96 ; Kathryn Preyer , "Crime , the Criminal Law, and Reform in Post Revolutionary Virginia, " Law and History Review, I (lgll3), 64; John F. Walzer, "A Per iod of Ambivalence : Eighteenth-Century Childhood ," in Uoyd DeMauss , ed . , The History 0/ Childhood (New York , 1974), 365.
15 . Louis Morton , Robnt Carln 0/ Nomini Hall: A Virgillia Tobaa» Plallte oftht Eilll lemtll Cmtu ry, znd ed . (Williamsburg, (945), 225.
16. Sm ith , /11 the Grtat House, 140-41. 17 . Jedry, World 0/ )ohll Cleaveland, 73, 63-64 , 73-74, 78; Alexander , Rmdn Thtm
Submissioe, 12 ; Henretta, " Fa m ilies and Farms," WMQ, 3rd Ser. , XXXV (1978), 5-7 ; Waters, "Patrirnony, Succession and Social Stability," PmpectiVlS in Amtricall Histmy, X (1976), '50; Waten, "Family , Inheritance, and Migrat ion, WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (1982) , 71 ; Gross, Millultmm and Their World, 75-76, 78; Tom Brownsword, "Moses Cooper 's Tale of Wealth and Status : A Case Study of Rural Rhode bland. 1674-1808" (Honors Thesis, Brown University , 1986), 17-18; Locke, Som« ThaughJs Oll Eduauio«, ed . Axtell, 146; Klein , ShipJ1ens 0/ PmllSylvallia, 212 .
18. Abbot Eme rson Srni th , Colonins in BOlldage: While SnvitudL and Collvict Labor in Amnica, 1607-1776(C ha pel Hili , 1947), 336; Marcus W . Jemegan, Laborillg and Dtpmdmt Clasm ill Colollial Amtrica, 1607-1783 (Chicago, 1931) , 55; Eric Foner, Tom Painr alld Rev olulioll4ry Amnica (New York, 1976) , 43.
19. Laurens , quoled in Ph ilip Morgan, " T hree Planten and Their Slaves : Per spectives on Slaver y in V irg in ia , Soulh Carolina, andJamaica, " in WinthropJordan and She ila L . Skemp , eds ., Rau alld Family ill Iht Colollial &uth Gacksen, Miss ., Igll7), 60-61; Arthur Zilvenmit , T1u First ET:'II.CIMipatioll : T1u Abolilioll 0/ SlalJtrY ill lheNortll (Chi cago, 1967) , 4; Gary Nash, The Urball CrucibiL: Social Change, Polilical COnsCioUSTIIsS, and the Origills of Ihe Amtricall Revolution (Cambridge , Mass ., 1979), 107-8.
20. Thomas Jelferson , Notes Oll theState 0/ Virgillia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hili , (954) , 162 ; Re id , " T he Religion of the Bible, " ed. Davis, Virgillia SaJirisl, American Philosophical Sociely, Trans . (1967) , 56.
21. Jernegan , Laboring and DtpnuJml Clams, 55, 52; Richard B. Morris, GoDmlTIIIIII alld Labor ill Earty Amnica (New York , 1946), 310, 345-63; Jackson Turner Main, T1u Social Siruciure 0/ Revolulionary Amtrica (Princeton, 1965), 33-34 ; Bailyn, Voyagers 10 tht Wesl, 292; Chessman A. H er rick, White SnviludL ill Pnl1lsyllXUlia (Philadelphia, (926),271; Sharon V . Salinger, " To Snut Weil alld Faillifully " ; Labor and Indmturtd Strvants in PmllSylvallia, 1692-1800 (Cambridge, Eng ., Igll7) .
22. James Habe rsham to Lau rens , 22 Feb. 1768, Laurens to Habersharn, 25 Jan . 1;68, to James Wright , 27 Feb . 1968, in Rogers et a1 ., eds ., Paptrs ofHmry Laurms, V , 602, 565, 609; Martin, Mnchanll and TraJL 0/tht Conn«licuJ Rivn, 102.
23. Lawrence W . Towner, " T he Indentures of Boston's Poor Apprentices : 1734 1805, " Colonial Sociel y of Massachusetts , Publications, XLIII (1956-63), 4[7-68 ; Robert F. Seybolt , Apprelltiwllip Eduealioll in Colonial New England and.Ntw Yor! (New York, 19(7).
2~ . Bridenbaugh , Cilus ill Revolt, 147 ; Bridenbaugh, Cokmial Cra/tsrrum, 129 .
Notes Jor pages 53-58
25. Ann Kussmaul, Snvants in Husbandry ill &ur, Modmt E"lland (Cambridge, Eng., Iglll). 3-4, 49, 38-39 .
26. David Galenson, White SmJiJudL ;11 Colollial Amnica: An Economic AM!JIsis (Cam bridge, Eng .• Iglll), 7- 13.
27. Smith, Colonisls in Borulagt, 265, 276; Morris, GoIJmITTllTlt and Labor, 373, 433, 437, 449,484 .
28. Eddis, Lnitrs ftom Amnica, ed. Land, 38; Herrick, White SmliIudL in PmTlSylvallia, 272-83, 213 ; A1eine Austin, MaltMw Lyo", "Neu: Man" o/Ihe Dmwcralk Revolution, 179'1 181l!l (Univenity Park, Pa . • Iglll), 10; Galenson , Whiu SmJitudt in COlollial Amnica, 23m.; Ulysses Prentiss Hedrick , A Histmy 0/Agricullurt in the Statt 0/NtUJ Yor! (New York, 1933), 78.
29. Themas Bacon, Sermons Add"ssed ID Mastes and Strvants, and Puhlishtd ill the Ytar '7+3, and Now republishtd by tht RtIJ. William MttJdt (Winchesler, Va . (1813» , 3; Maram baud, William Byrd, 169.
30. Greene, ed., Diary ofLalldtm Carln, 11 , 941 ; Edward M. RiJey, ed ., 17lt )oUT'TUJl ojjolrn Harrown (Williamsburg, Va., 1963), 38.
31. Rowland Bertolf and John M . Murrin , " Feud al ism , Communalism , and the Yeoman Freeholder: The American Revolution Considered as a Sodal Accident;" in Stephen G. Kurtz andJames H . Hutson, eds ., Essays Oll tJu Amnican RtIJOlutiOll (Chapei Hili, 1973), 270; Sung Bok Kim, LatUilord and TtIl4l1t ill Colollial Nn» Yort: Ma7lOriaJ Socidy, 166+-1775 (Chapei Hili, 1978), 238, 279; Patricia U. Bonomi , A FMtiaus PtopiL: PoliJics and Socitty in Colonial Neu: YorA: (New York, 1911), 185-96; Morton , Rohtrt Cartn, 72-76, 80; Willard F. Bliss, "The Rise of Tenancy in Virginia, " Virgillia Magazitlt ofHistmy and Biogruphy, LVIII (1950), 429; Gregory A . Siverson, Povtrly in a Land 0/PiIrtJy: TtIl4TI&J ill Eiglilmttlr-Cmtury Maryland (Baltimore, 1977), 86, 144-49, 40-41; Jerome H . Wood, COII tslDga CrosSTOlMls: Lancaster, Pmnsylvallia, 1730-1790 (Harrisburg, Pa . , 1979), 111-72.
32. Bliss, "Rise of Tenancy," Virginia Magazinr ofHiIIDry and Biograplly, LVIII (1950) , 435; Edward Countryman, A PeopiL ill RtIJOlution: The Amnicall RtIJOlutioll aruJ PoliticaJ Socitty in Ntw YorA:, 1;60-1790 (Baltimore, Iglll), 18-19; Bonomi, A Factious Peopll, 192-93; Morton, Rohtrt Carln, 73; Kim, Landlord and TtIl4nt, 310, 328. For the conditions of American tenantry that weakened ils monarchical implications, see below, ch . 7.
33. J ames Wilson, CoTlSideratioTlS Oll tJu Naturt and Extml ofthe ugisialilJl Autharity oftJu BritisIr Parliammt ('174). in Robert Green McCloskey. ed., Tht Works 0/)aTTll1s WilsOll (Cambridge, MaIS., 1967), 11, 74'. See Jack P . Greene, All Mm Art CrfaIttJ Equal: Some Rt}ltctUrru Oll tJu Character 0/the Amnican RtIJOlution (Oxford, 1976). 20, 21.
4. PaIro1uJgt
I. Uohn Trenchard and Thomas Gordonl, GaIa's Utttrs, or Essays Oll Lihtrty, Cioil and IUlitious, and 0tJur Importmll Subjtds (Lendon, 1733), No . 60, 11, 229; William Liv ingaton et a1. , lruUptrtdmt Rt}ltctor, ed . Kle in, 216 .
2. Bacon, Smrunts Addrustd ID Mastes and Snvants, 1-2. 3 . See Perkin, OrigiTlS 0/Modmt E"llisll Socidy, 49. 4. John Adams to Nathan Webb, 12 Oet . 1755, in Taylor et 81., ed•. , Paptrs o/)ohn
AdmTIS, I, 5; John J . Waten, Jr. • TM Otis Family ill Ptoviru:ial aruJ RtoOlutiMuzry MassMllu sltls (Chapei Hili, 1968). 103; Bridenbaugh , Colollial Crajtsm4I1, 102 ; Richard J . Hooker, ed . , 17lt Quolina Bodc&oWltry Oll the Eut oftJu RtIJOlutiDn: 17lt joumIJ.l and 0tJur Writi"ll 0/ Charlls Woodmason, Amtrican IIiTllr4ll1 (Chapel HilI , 1953) , 10; Farish. ed . ,jOUT1UJJ 0/Fitlrian,
3 83 3 8 2 Nous joT pages 58-63
:215; Norton, Liberty's Daughltrs, 103; Canby, "Roben Munford's 1M Palriots," WMQ, 3rd Ser., VI (1949), 495; Smith, In tlu GrtIJI House, 104, 136, 160, 161 ; Putnam, MtmiJir, 25·
5. M . J . Daunton, "Towns and Economic Growth in Eighteenth-Century En gland," Philip Abrams and E . A . Wrigley, eds., Towns in Socidin: Essays in Eronomic Hiswry anti Historiaal SoeiJJlogy (Cambridge, Eng ., 1978) , 247-48; Maxine Berg, 1M Al' oJ Marutfa&tures: Intiuslry, InnolllJlion anti Wor! in Brilain, '700-1820 (London , IgB5), 48 ; Speck, SltJbility and Slrife, 66: Bridenbaugh, Ci/ies in Rel1Olt, 5.
6 . Claude-Anne Lopez and Eugenia W . Herbert , The PriVIJ~ Franklin : The Man anti His Fami!J (New York, 1975), 16-17.
7. Nancy Cott, "Eighteenrh-Century Family and Social Life Revealed in Divorce Records, " journal oJ Soeial History. X (19'76-'77), 22-24.
8 . J. A . Leo Lemay and P . M. Zall, eds ., Benjamin Franklin's Autohiograpky (New York, 1986) , 54.
9. Adams to William Tudor, 4 Aug . 1774, 24 July 1774, in Taylor et al. , eds ., Papers ofjohn Adams, II, 126, 127, 114.
10. SCOll, Criminal Lau: in Colonial Virginia, 181-83; William E . Nelson, AmmcaniuuiJJn of tlu Common Law: 1M Imptul of Legal Ckange on MasslJCkusdts SocU!)I, 1760 -1830 (Cam bridge, Mau ., 1975), 39-40·
11 . Bridenhaugh, ed., Genlkmtm's Progress, 146; Eddis, Leuers frem Ammca, ed. Land, 38; PennsylVlJ1litl Gu~ (Philadelphia), 7 Feb . 1740; Herrick, Mite SmJilutk in PlMSylDIJ nia, 22.4., 226.
12. Gordon S . Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style ; Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century ," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (lgB2), 401-41.
13 . Jackson Turner Main, "Govemment by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratization of the Legislatures, " WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXIII (1!)66), 391-407; Countryman, A P'!Ple in RevolwWn, 73; John J. Teunissen, "Blockheadism and the Propaganda Plays of the American Revolution," Ear!J American LilmUun, VII (1976), 148-62
14. Eddis, LeIInsfrom Ammca, ed . Land, 22 ; Robert M . Weir, " 'The Hannony We Were Famous For' : An Interpretation of Pre-Revolutionary South Carolina Poli tics, " WMQ, 3rd Ser . , XXVI (1g6g), 482; Victor C . Johnson, " Fa ir Trading and Smuggling in Philadelphia, 1754-1763," Pennsylvania MagtuilU oJ Histqry and Bwgraphy, LXXXII (1959), 125-49; Bruce C . Daniels, "The 'ParticuJar Courts ' of LocaJ Govem ment : Town Councils in Eighteenth-Century Rhode lsland," Rkode IslaM History, XLI (lgB2), 63.
15. Boston Gut/te, 21 Dec . 1761 ; Waters, DlisFami!J, 119 ; Hugh F. Bell, .. ' A Personal Challenge ' ; The Otis-Hulchinson Currency Conlroversy, 1761-1762 , " Essa InsliJuJ4 His WrUal Coliedwns, CVI (1970), 297-323.
16. Henry Laurens toJames Habersham , 5 Sept . 1767,10 George Appleby, 24 May 1768, to James Penman , 13 Oel . 1767, in Rogers, Jr . el al ., cds . , Papers oJ Henry Laurens, V , 297, 2gB, 688-Sg, 355; David Duncan Wallace, T1u Lifl oJ Hlflry Laurens . . . (New York, 1915), 137-39; Carl Ubbelohde, TkI Via-Admiral!)l Courts aM IkI Anurican Revolwion (Chapel Hili, IgOO), 105-14.
17 . Will iam Smith, Jr. , TM Hiswry oftlu Province oJ Nnv Yark, cd . Michael Kammen (Cambridge, Mau ., 1972), 1I,Sg, 105; Lawrence Lee, T1u LoWlf Gtzpe FItJ1' in Colonilzl Days (Chapei Hili, 1965), 246; Martin, MlTCkants and Trade, 159; Labaree, RBJal GoVll'ft· mml, 163'
Nous JOT pages 64-69
18. [Dover], Usljul MisulÜlnils, 29; Papenfuse, In PursuiJ of ProjU, 15-29; Nash, TM
UrhtJn Cru&ihle, 259. 19. Adams, Def-' of tlu ConstituJÜJns, in Adams, ed., Worh oJjohn Adams, IV, 392;
George M. Curtis Ill, "The Goodrich Family and the Revolution in V irginia, '174- InfJ," Virginitl Magazitll oJ Hiswry aM Biograpky, LXXXIV (1976) , 53; Themas M . Doer Dinger, A VigcwolLr Spirit oJ Enterprisl: MrrcluJnts anti &onomü n-JoprtIInJ in RlI10luJißnary PkiiDtklpkitl (Chapei Hill, 1986), 38 .
20 . See Keith Tribe, Land, Labour, and EC4nomÜ DisCOursl (London , 1978), 37, 44, 5',
56, 59, 82, 83· 21. Janet Riesman. "The Origins of American Political Economy, 16g0-1781" (Ph .D .
Diss ., Brown University, IgB3), 302-33 , 146 . 22 . Crowley, This Sklha, &lf, 88 , 97-99, 38-39; [Smith], IntUpmdenJ R'.fleclor, ed ,
Klein , 106. 23. Richard Lucas, Ruüs RlilJJi"l ta SUl:USS in Trads (Boston, [1760]), 10; [Anon .],
DthtlJr anti Cr«Jiwr: Or a DiscoursIon tkI Followi"l Word!, Haut Patinta wiJk MI, anti I will pay thn all (Boston, 1762), 7-10; Martin, Mrrckant and Trad», 149, 153, 157; W . C . Plum mer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," PennsylllQnitl MlJltUitll of Hiswryanti Biography, LXVI (1942), 388-97; Peter J. Parker, "The Philadelphia Printer: A Study of an Eighteenth-Century Businessman," Busitllss Hiswry RIOUw, XL (1g66), 26-37 ·
24. Henretta, " Fa m ilies and Farms, " WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XXXV (1978) , 3-3 2; Jedry, WorM of john ClmvtUmd, 64-70, 91-92; Bridgman, "Jelferson's Fanner before Jeffer son," AIIIIricmI QJMuter!J, XIV (1g62), 567-n; Winifred B. Rothenberg, "The Emer gence of a Capital Market in Rural Massachusetts, 1730-1838," joumol oJ Eronomic Hiswry, XLV (lgB5), 781-808.
25. Michael Merrill, "Cash Is Good to Eat: Self-Sufficiency and Exchange in the Rural Economy of the United States," RadieaJ Histqry RIOUw, IV (1977), 42-71; Chria topher Clark, "Household Economy , Market Exchange and the R ise ofCapitalism in the Connecticut Va1ley, 1800-1860," journal oJ SociIzJ Hiswry, XIII (1979), 16g-Sg; Bettye Hobbs Pruill , "Seif-Suffidency and the Agricultural Economy of Eighteenth-Century Massachusells," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XLI (lgB4), 333-64 ; Christopher Clark, TM Roots of Rural Capiltz{ism: W,slem MasslJCklLrltts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca, 1990)·
26. Bruce H . Mann, Nngkhors anti Slro."lm: Law anti Communi!)l in &r!J Conn«liew
(Chapei Hill, IgB7). 'rJ. Washington to Thomas Jefferson , 20 July 1770, in John C . Fitzpatrick, cd ., TM
Writi"ls oJ eeorl' Waskington (Washington, D.C ., 1931-44), Ill, 18. 28. George V . Taylor, "Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Rev
olution," Anurican HisWrUal RIOUw, LXII (1g67), 46g-g6 ; William Doyle, Origins of tkI Frenda Revolution (Oxford, IgBo), 17-18.
29. Quincy, Mmwir, 19· 30. Adam Smith, An I"'luiry inw tlu Natu" anti Causu oJ tlu WIditk of Nations, cds .
R . H . Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Oxford, 1976), I, 265 (xi. p. 8); John Wither spoon, "Speech in Congreu on Finances," in TM Worh of john Wilhlrspoon . . . (Ed inburgh, 1805), IX, 133-34· .
31. Taylor, W,slem MasslJClausdls, 20; Robert A. East, Businus Enlerprise in tkI Al1IIrie4n RlI10lwitmary Era (New York, 1938), 20-22; Aubrey C. Land, "Economic Base and Sodal Structure: The Northem Chesapealte in the Eighteenth Century, " joufJUJl oJ &onomic History, XXV (1g65) , 650; Robert D. MitchelI, Commerci4lism anti Front;": Prrs/J«/ivIs on tkI &!J SkenaruJtKJI Valky (Charlottesville , 1977), 116, 123; Martin, Mrrclaants anti Trade, 159; Isaac, Transformation oJ Virginia, 133 ; Breen, Tobacco Cu/lU", 154·
3 85 3 84 Nous JOT /Jates 70-;6
32. Themas Hutchinson , TM HislDry oj IM Coloray and Proviru:e oj MlJSstu:lrusetts-&J, ed. Lawrence S . Mayo (Cambridge , 1936), II, 299, 155.
33. George Athan Billiu , "The Musachusetts Land Bankers of 1740," Univmity 0/. Maine Bulldin, LXI (1959), 16-31 ; Taylor, We.sttm MlJSstu:husetts, 20-21.
34. Jacob M . Priee, Fraru:e arad tIu CMsap.Ju: A HislDry o/tlu Frmc/a Tobtzuo Monopoly, 1674-179', and o/lls Relalionslaip ID tIu British arad American Tobtuto TrfJlies (Ann Arbor , 1973), 1,662 .
35. Land, " Econom ie Base and Social Structure," joumal 0/&onomit HislDry, XXV (1965),645 ,653; Eddis, Lettmfrom America, ed . Land, xvi .
36. Jay B. Hubbell and Douglass Adair, " R obert Munford's The Candidaus, " WMQ. 3rd Ser. , V (1948), 252, 240, 241; Canby, "Roben Munford's TM Patriots," WMQ. 3rd Ser., VI (1949), 457; Smith , Iftsidt th« Great House, 212, 255; Greene, ed., DilJry 0/ Landsn Can«, II , 627; Charles Carroll to his son, 16 Oet . 1759 , in Richard Beale Davis, Inulutlual Life in the ColonÜlI Soutla (Knoxville, 1978), m, 1588; Charles S. Sydnor, G"dleman Frllholdtrs: Political Praaias in WlJShinglon 's Virginia (Chapel Hili, 1952), 123.
37. Hendriek Hartog , "The Public Law of a County Court : Judieial Govemment in Eighteenth-Century Muaachuaetts," Amnitanjoumal 0/Legal History, XX (1976), 321 23; Roeber, "Authority, Law, and Custom," WMQ. 3rd Ser., XXXVII (lgBo),
39,46. 38. Breck, RecolJetlions, 36-37; Esther Singleton. SociIJl Nnu York undtr IM Gtorges,
1714-1'776 (Port Waahington, N.Y .), I, 8-9; Linda Kealey, " Pattern s of Punishment : Massachusctts in the Eightcenth Century," AmeriuJnjoumal ojLegal History, XXX (1g86), 163- 76.
39. Robert Mieklus , " "The History of the Tueaday Club' : A Mock-jeremiad of the Colonial South," WMQ. 3rd Ser . , XL (lgB3), 42-61; Bushman, King and plfIPU, 80; Jonalhan Powell , "Presbyterian Loyal isla: A ' C ha in of Intercst' in Philadelphia," jour nal oj fusbJterian HislDry, LVII (1979), [.)0-51'
40. Waten, Otis Family, 94; Andenon, A plfIPU'S Army, 72; " J oum al of Colonel John W inslow . . . in . . . 1755," Nova Scotia Historical Society, Coll., IV (1885), 117 ; Samuel Osgood to John Adams , 4 Dcc . Ins, in Taylor et al., eds ., Papers ojjohn Adams, 1,353 ,
41. Adams to R ichard Cranch , 18 Oct . 1756, in Taylor el al. , eds., Papers 0/john Adams, I, 20; James Thomas F1cxner, GIorge W4I'lainglDn: TIae Forge 0/Expmmte ('732 1775) (Boston, 1965), 41, 52; Walen, Olis Fomily, 91-92; Klein, Slaippens o/PmnsylvoniIJ, 143·
42. Linda Rces Heaton, " ' T his Excellent Man' : Littleton Waller Tazcwell's Sketch of Benjamin Waller," Virginia MlJgGZiru 0/History arad Biography, LXXXIX (tgBl), 147 , 148• 149-.)0·
43. David Mays, Edmund PmdulDn, '721-1803: A Biograplay, 2 vols . (Cambridge , Mass ., 1952) , I . 11-12 ; Aubrey C . Land, Tlae Dularays 0/MarylaruJ: A Biograplaital Sludy 0/ Doni" Dularay: IM Eldtr (1685-1753), arad IJGniel Dularay, IM YOlUlg" (17n-I797) (Balti more , 1955), 3; Hamilton to Edward Stevens, 11 Nov . [769, in Syrett et al., eds . • Papers 0/ HamillDn, I , 4; Willard Sterne Randali, /kruditl Amold: PlUriol and Traitor (New York, 1990)' 34-36 .
44. Lcmay and Zall , eds ., Bmjamin Fraraklin's Autobiograplay, 23, 26, 45,51, 75· 45. Paul W . Conner, Poor Rithard's PolititA:s: Benjamin FrtJnklin arad His NlUI American
Ordtr (Oxford , 1965), 152 ; Poor Rithard ImprolJlf1 (1749), in Labarec ct aI., cds., Papers 0/ Franklin , 1Il, 344-45 .
Notes JOT /Jages 77-82
46. Franklin, Proposals Relaling ID IM EduttUion 0/ Youtla in Pm/U7lvoniIJ (1749) , in La barce et al., eds., Papers oj Frank/in, m, 400n .
47. Franklin to Hume, 19 May 196:z, in Labaree et al. , eds ., Papers 0/Franklin , X. 84·
5. Political Autlwrity
I. Carl Van Deren, Benjamin Frank/in (New York, 1938), 211-12 ; David Freeman Hawke, Frank/in (Ncw York, 1976), "4-15; Lopez and Herbert, The Priua/l Frank/in, 53 55, 102, 111 .
2. For examples of govemment influence, see Allan Gallay, "Jonathan Bryan 's Plantation Empire : Land, Politics, and the Formation of a Ruling Class in Colonial Georgia, " WMQ. 3rd Ser., XLV (1988), 253-79; Glenn Weaver, jonalhan Trumbull: Conlllditut's Mmlaant Magistrau (17Io-1785J (Hartford, 1956), 35; and the essays in Bruee C . Daniels, ed., Power arad StaJus: Ojficeholding in Colani4l America (Middletown, Conn. , 1986).
3· Manton, King arad Congress, 31 ; Hume, "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences ," "Ofthe Indepcndency ofParliament, " Essays, ed, MilIer, 127, 45; Rev . John Brown, Estimau 0/tIu Man""s and Priru:ipus 0/1!Je Times (1758), in E. Neville WiI· liams, ed . , Th« EiglumJlh-Cmlury Conslilulion, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, Eng . , 1960), 140.
4. William Paley , quotcd in Bemard Bailyn, TM Origins 0/American Politits (New York, 1968), 72-73; Buahman, King arad plOpU, 82.
5. Byron Fairchild, Masrs. WilliIJm peppmll: Mmhanls tU l'istatlJqua (Ithaea, 1954), 174-75·
6. Charles G. Seilen, Jr., " P r ivate Profits and British Colonial Poliey: The Spee ulationa of Henry McCulloh," WMQ. 3rd Scr. , VIII (1951), 535-51 .
7. Eddis , Letters from America, ed. Land, 16, 26; Land, Du/anJs oj Marylarad, 228; WiUiam Douglass, quotcd in Bushman, King and plfIPU, 75; Purvis, Propridors, PatrrlrIIJtl, arad Paper Moruy, 124-27;John Murrin, "Review Essay," HislDry arad TIwry, XI (1972), 268; William Douglass, A Summary, Hislorital and PoliJital, 0/tIu FirslPlanling, Progressivt Improvnnmls, and !'resmt Stau oj tIu British &ttlerrunls in Nortla Amerita, 2 vols. (Boston , 1749, 1751), I, 472.
8. Constitulional Gazette (New York) , 24 Feb. In6 ; 9 Feb . In3, in ButterfieId et al ., eds ., DUJry 0/john Adams, 11, 53; Gordon S . Wood , TM CrtaJion 0/ tIu Amtritan Republit, ITJ6-1787 (Chapcl Hili, 1969), 78; Boston Evming POSI, 5 Sept . 1763 , in Taylor et al ., cds ., Papers 0/joh" Adams, I, 92.
9· Buahman, King and PlfIPU, 97-99, 253-67. 10. Providence Gazette, 26 Feb . 1767 . 11 . [Trenehard and Gordon), Cato's Letters, No . 90, 111, 200; Wood , CrlGlion 0/tIu
American Rtpublie, 154-55; Bailyn , Origins 0/American Polilies, 102 . 12. Hartog, "Publie Law of a County Court, " American journal oj Llpl HislDry,
XX (1976), 282-329; William E. Nelson, "The Eightcenth.Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudenee," Mielaigan lAw RnJUw, LXXVI (1978), 902-4.
13. Judson P . Wood and John S. Ezell, cds ., TM New lJemocrrJ&y in America: Trawls 0/Fran&isto dt Miranda in IM Uni/ed StlJUs, 178:J-'7B.f (Norman, Okla., 1963), 35; Robert Zemsky, M"thanls, Farmers, and Rio" Gods: An EssaJ on Eighumtla-Cmlury l'vlities(Boston , 1971), 2; Douglass, Summary, HislorÜ:al arad Polilieal, I, 507.
3 87 3 8 6 Nous joT pages 83-90
14. Hendriek Hartog, Publie Propnty and PrilJllÜ Power: The Corporalüm of tlu City of Nau York in AmniclJn Laui, 1730-18]0 (ChapeI Hili , IgB3), ~-68
15 . Franeis Hutcheson, A System of MOTIJI Philosophy in Thm Books . . , (London, 1755), 11, 113; Jelferson to James Monroe , 20 May 1782, in Boyd et 31" eds. , plJpers ofJifn-SOll , VI, 185- 86.
16. Washington toJames Wood Uuly 17sB1 , in Fitzpatriek, ed., The WritingsofGeorge Washiragton, 11, 251 ; William Peneak, America 's Burke: Th« Mirrd of ThoT7W Hutchinson (Washington, D .C ., IgB2), 3-4 .
17. Wood, Crtali01l 0/IN American Republie, 145; Williams, " SmalI Farmer in Virginia Politics;" AgricullurlJl History, XLIII (I~), 98; Klein, Shippms of PmnsyllHJllia, 149; Pen cak, Mirrd 0/ ThoT7W HUkhillS01I, 4.
18. Stanley K . Johannesen, "John Diekinson and the Ameriean Revolution, " His torKlJI Rtft«tw.u, 11 (1975), 34; Stephen Brobeck , "Revolutionary Change in Colonial Philadelphia : The Brief Life of the Proprietary Gentry, " WMQ, 300 Ser . , XXXIII (19']6), 423-24; Land, Dul4nys 0/ Mary14rrd, 216-18; Clifford K . Shipton , "Jonathan Trumbull ," Sih/ey 's Haroard GrlJliJ.vJus: BwgrlJphulJl Sluulus 0/ Thase Who Attnu/ed HlJrtJlJrd College , . , (Boston, 1951), VIII , 26g.
19. Taylor, Western Massachusetts, 24. See Smith, Wealth of Nations, eds , Campbell and Skinner, 11, 783-85 (Vvi.f . 51-54), for Smith's discussion of the ineapacity of or dinary people for politieal office.
20. Christopher Collier, Rogn- S/urman 's Conll«tuut: YlJnktt Politus and tIu AmeriaJn RtliolutiOll (Middletown, Conn ., 1971), 14, 21-22; Lemayand Zall, eds., Franklin 's Auto bwgrlJphy (New York, 19B6), 92, 100 ; Louise Todd Ambler , Bmjamin FrlJllklin: A Prrspeetivt (Cambridge, Mass ., 1975), 36.
21. Boston Evtlling Post, 26Jan . 1767, IDee. 1']66 . 22. Boston Evming Post, IDee. 1766; Taylor et al., eds ., plJpers 0/Johll Adams, I, 196. 23. Jessiea Kross, " 'Patronage Most Ardently Sought' : The New York Council,
1665-1775," in Daniels, ed. , PoWn' and Status, 208; Boston Evming Post, I Dec , 1766; Bailyn, Origins of AmniclJn Politics, 85; Wood, CreatiOll of tlu AmniclJn RlfJUb/ie, 145; Rind's Virginia Gazelle, 31 Oe!. 1771 ; J . R . Pole, "Representation and Autho rity in Virginia from the Revolution to Reform ," Joumal 0/Soutlum His/(lry, XXIV (19sB), 23.
24. Am IJrrd Raolves, Pub/ic IJrrd PrilllJk, of tlu ProvillCe of Massachusttts &y .. . (Boston, (878), 111, 70; Robert E. Brown, Middle-Ci4ss Dmwcracy and tlu Revolution in Massachuselts, 16g1-1780 (Ithaea, 1955) , 66.
25. David S. Lovejoy, RIwtU Is14rrd Politia arrd theAmnican Revolutüm, r;6tr-1776 (Prov idence, 1958), 16-17; Counlryman, A People in ReoolutiOll, 33.
26. Shipton, "J eremiah Gridley," Siblty's Haroard GraJuaus, VII, 526; Anderson , "Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldien? Contraetual Principles and Military Conduet during the Seven Yean' War," WMQ, 300 Ser. , XXXVIII (1gBI),
438-39 . 27. William M . Fowler, Jr., Tlu &ron of Btacon Hili: A Biography of John HlJIl&ock
(Boston , Igllo), 225, 230; Charles W . Aken, The Divillt Politi&ian: Samutl Cooper arrd tIu Amnican RtIXIlution ill &s/(ln (Boston, IgB2) , 121, 128, 130, 141, 1']6, 3" ; John Adams to William Tudor, IJune 1817, in Adams , ed., Works o/John Adams, X, 260.
28. Taylor, Western MasSIJChwtUs, 33, 53; Snell, " •Ambit ious of Honor and Plaees, ' " in Daniels, ed., Pown- and StaJus, 17-35.
29. Isaac, Trans/omuJlion 0/ Virginia, 65. 30. Bonomi, A Factiow Ptople, 170. 31. Bushman, Kings and Ptopie, 36-37; Gordon S. Wood , "A Note on Mobs in lhe
Notes fOT pages yo-yO
American Revolution," WMQ, 300 Ser., XXIII (1g66), 635-42; E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crown in the Eightttnth Century," Pas: and l'rtsmt, L (1971) , ']6-136; Peter Burke, Popular Cu/lure i" Early Modlm Europe (New York, 1978), 175; Peter Shaw , Amm'ean Patriob and IN Ritual of Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., IgB/), 197; Brewer, PIJIty 1tÜoloU andPopultu Politics, 190-91; Paul Gilje, The Road /(I Mobocraey: Popui4r Disortkr in New York City, '1763-1834 (ChapeI Hili, IgB7), 5-35 ; Foner, PlJiru and Reoolutionary America, so; Pauline Maier, From ResistalICe /(I RevolwiOll: Colonial Radi&als andtht Ikvtl O/Jmmt of American Opposition 10 Britain, 1'765-1776(New York, 1972), 12.
32. Boston Ga.uttt, 8 Aug. 1']68, in Harry A. Cushing, ed., Tiu Writings of Samutl Adams (New York, 1904-8), I, 237.
33· Maier, From Resisl4llCe to Revolution, 23. 34· Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M . Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Pr%gue to
RtIXIlutwn, rev. ed. (New York, 1963), 166-68; Maier, From Resistana to Revolutwn, 57 sB·
35· Laurens to Joseph Brown, 28 Ocr , 1']65, in Rogers et al ., eds., Papers 0/ Hmry LaurtllS, V , 29-30 .
36. Gordon S. Wood, " Th e Democratizat ion of Mind in the Ameriean Revolu tion," Library of Congress, Uadership in tlu AmniclJn RtIXIlution (Washington , D.C ., 1974), 63-Sg·
37· Carroll, quoted in Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit 0/Dissmsion: ECOIIomi&s, Politia, arrd tht Revolutioll in MlJry14nd (Baltimore, 1973), 111; Gallay, "Jonathan Bryan's Plantation Empire," WMQ, 300 Ser. , XLV (1988), 278; Daniel Blake Smith , " T he Study of the Family in Early Ameriea : Trends , Problems, and Prospeets," WMQ, 3rd Ser . , XXXIX (1g82) , 27n.; Bushman, King and People, 266-67; Greven , Protestant Ttmperammt, 335-61.
6. The Rtpublicanization oJ Monarchy
I. R . R . Palmer, Tlu Age of tht DtnwcrlJtic Revolution: A PolitulJl His/(lry of Europe and Ammea, 1;60-1800, 2 vols. (Prineeton, 1959, t96~); Franeo Venturi, Utopia IJrrd Reform in tht Enli,hlmmmt (Cambridge, Eng ., 1971), 90.
2. Hume, "The British Government," Essays, ed . Miller, 51 ; Linda Colley, "The Apotheosis of George 111: Loyalty, Royalty and the British Nation, t760-182O," Past arrd Presmt, CII (lgB4), 94-129.
3· Hamilton , quoted in Gerald Stourgh, Alaßnder HamiltOll and IN ldea 0/Republican GDvemmmt (StanfoOO, 1970), 44, p . 53; Adams to Warren, 20 July 1807 , Massaehusetts Historical Society, Colüctions, 5th Ser. , IV (1878) , 353; Adams toJ . H . Tilfany, 30 Apr. 18t9, in Adams, ed ., Works of John Adams, X, 378; Venturi , Utopia and Reform in IN Enli,htenmmt, 71, ~.
4· W . Paul Adams, "Republicanism in Politieal Rhetorie Before t776," PolitulJl Scimee Q.ututer/y, LXXXV (1970), 397-~21.
5· Jeffenon to Lafayette, 4 Nov . 1823, in Paul L. Ford, ed ., Tlu Wri/ings 0/ ThoJ'1W Jeffmon, (New York, 18gB), X, 281.
6 . Hume, •'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Scienees , " EsslJys, ed. Miller , t25; 31July 1797, Diary of TIwJ'1W Robbiru, D.D., 1796-1854, ed. Inerease Tarbox (Boston , 1886), I , 38; Montesquieu, Spin't o/Ilu Laws, ed . Neumann, Pt. I, bk. vii, eh. 2, p. 97, and bk . v , eh. 9.
7· Montesquieu, Spirit of tlu Laws, ed . Neumann, Pt. I, bk. v , eh. 19; Colley,
3 89 3 8 8 Notes JOT pages 98-104
" Apotheosis of George 1lI , " Past end Pmmi , CIl (1914), 94-129; [Trenchard and Gor don) , Ca/o's Leuen, 11, 25·
8 . Livingston, IndepcuJmt Rtjl«wr, ed. Klein, 80-81; Marston, King and Congress, 27· 9 . Venturi, Utopia and Reform, 63; [Trenchard and Gordon) , Cato 's Leuers, Il, 28;
James Burgh , Political Disquisitions: 0" an Enquiry inlo Publü; Errors, Defeas, and Abusts . . . (London, m4-75), I , 9; H , 18; 111, 173 , 'rT/, 425; Duncan Forbes, "Skeptical Whiggism, Commerce, and Liberty , " Essays on Adam Smith, ed . Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (O xford , 1975), 195; Arthur Sheps, "The American Revolution and the Transformation of English Republicanism, " Historaal Rtjl«tions, II (1975), 3- 28 .
10. Simon Scharna, Citisms: A Chronid« 0/the Ftmd: Revolution (Ne w York , 1989), 172 : Paul Robinson, Opera anti Ideas: From Mozart wStrauss (Ithaca, 1985), 8-57; John Barrel!, ThL Dark SitU ofthe LArulscape: ThL Rural Poor in English Painting, 1730-1840 (Cambridge, Eng ., 1980), 7; Conyers Middleton , Ttu HisIlJry 0/the Lift of Marcus Tullius Ciuro, 2 vols. (Lon den , 1741 ), I , ix.
11. Peter Gay , The Enlightmmmt: An Inlnprtl4lion : T1u Rise 0/Modem Paganism (New Yor k, 1966).
12 . Wood , Crt4lion 0/tiu Ammcan Repllblic, 51 ; Bailyn, ldeological Origins o/Ihe American Reoolution, 25; Montesqu ieu, Spiril 0/the Latus, ed ., Neumann , Pt . I, bk . ix, eh . 13, p . 167 ; Gay, Enlighsenment: Rist ofPagtJnism, 109; Harold T . Parker, The Cult 0/Anliquiryand lhe Frtrl&h ReoolutioMrits (Chicago , 1937), 22-23·
13. J. G . A . Pocock , t» MlJI:hiaoellian Mommt: Flormtine Palitical Thought and the Atlantlc Republi&an Tradition (Princeton , 1975)·
14. South CaroliM Gaztlle, 29 July 1749, quoted in Hennig Cohen , The South Carolina Gazette, '732-1775 (Columbia, S .C . , 1953), 218 .
15. Caroline Robb ins, The Eighltmth-Cmtury CommonWtalthmJm : Sludits in tht Trans mission, Dtvelopmmt, and Cireumslance 0/English Liberal Thought from the Reslora/ion 0/Charks 11 unlil the War wilh the Thirltm Colonies (Cambridge, Mass ., 1959): Isaac F. Kramnick , Bolingbrokt and His Cirek: The Politü;s 0/Noslalgia in theAge0/ Walpoie (Cambridge, Mass . , 1968).
16. Howard D . Weinbrot, Augustus CatSar in " Augustan" Englond: The Dtc/ine ofa Clossü;al Norm (Princeton , 1978), 164-65; W . Jackson Bate , Samrul johnson (New York,
1975), 171-72. 17 . Will iam L. Grant , Neo·Latin Litnature and the Pastoral (Chapei Hili , 1965), 255;
Weinbrot , Augustus Ctusa, in " AugllSwn " Englond, 223, 53, 62, 64, 47-48; Hume, " O f the Parties of Great Brita in , " Essays, ed . MilIer , 72.
18. Bertrand A . Goldga r, Walpoie and the Wils: The Relation 0/ Politits to Literature, '7 2 2 1742 ( Lineoln, Neb., 1976), 135,3,2 2-23,158-59 ,26, 147-48;James WilliamJohnson, The Formation ofEnglish Neo -Classieal Thought (Prineeton , 1967), 97-105 ; Reed Brown ing, Politi· cal and Consti/utionalldtlJS oJ/he Court Whigs (Bat on Rouge , 1982), 5·
19. Alexande r Pope , An Essay on Cn'licism, lines 118-21 , in Aubrey Williams , ed. , P~lry and Prose 0/Aluandrr Pope (Boston, 1969), 41.
20. McIlwa ine , ed ., journals oftht HOllSe 0/Burgtssts 0/ Virgin ia, '752-1755 , '756-1758, 4·
21. Quentin Skinner, " T he Idea of Negative Liberty : Ph ilosophical and Historical Perspectives, " in Richard Rorty et 31. , eds., Philosophy in Hiswry (Cambridge , Eng. , 1984) , 193-221; Michael Ignatieff, "John Miliar and Indiv idualism , " in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds ., WttJlth and Virlru: TAt Shaping0/Poli/kal Economy in tht &ol/ish Enlightmmml (Cambridge , Eng., 1983), 329-30 .
22. David Hume, A Trt4tise on Human Nature, ed . L . A. Selby·Bigge and P. N .
Notes JOT pages 105-109
Nidditch (Oxford, 1978), y>.7; Franklin to Colden, 11 Oc t , 1750, Labaree et &I., ed • . , Paptrs ofFrlJllk/ill, IV. 68.
23. JohnlOn, A DiaiDNJry of tJu E",lish ~ .. . (Lenden, 1755); Gordon S . Wood, " Interes ta and Di.intere.tednes. in the Making of the Con.titution , " in Rich ard Beeman et a1., eds., &yoruJ CllIl/lt1Iratitm: Oritiru ofIM Con.rtilwJüm tutd A"""",, Nil tioruJ ItJmtiJ.J (Chapei Hili, IgB7), 84.
24. Gregory H. Noble., Diuisiaru T'luPutMut IM W1lolt: Polilies tutd S«iIty in HlIm/1sllirr COUIII], MIUSlJI:hustUs, 1740-1775 (Cambridge, Eng., IgB3) , 182.
25. John Brewer, PII~ 1d60IoD 1Irt4 PMty Po/iJi&s a/ IM AcussiDn of~ 111 [Cam bridge, Eng . , 19]6), 97; Mabel H. Cable, "The Idea of a Patriot King in the Propa ganda of the Opposition to Walpoie, 1735-1739," PttiJologic4l Qptuwr{Y, XVIII (1939), ng 30 •
26. Jeffenon, NoUs on tJu SIlIIt of Virgillia, ed, William Peden (Chapei Hili, 1955), 165.
27. Roben R . Liv ingston, quoted in Bernard Friedman, "The Shaping of the Radical Consciou.neu in Provinei&l New York," jollTlllli ofA"""",, History, LVI (1970), 786.
28. Kenneth R . Bowling and Helen E. Veit, ed• ., T1u DiIIry of Wil/illm MIJtI4.1 tutd 0tJur Noüs on s-u DtbtlUs (Vol. [X, Do&ummI4ry HisllJry of tJu First Fulli Congrrss of tJu UnittJ SIlIIts ofAmm&iI• ., Mtuth 17Bg-J Manh l79l) (Baltimore, 1988), 6g; Adam Smith, WftIltJa 0/Na/ions, ed , CampbeU and Skinner, I, 265-6] (I. xi. p . 8-10); Robert Micldu., " "The Hiatory of the Tueaday Club'; A Mock-Jeremiad of the Colonial South , " WMQ, 3rd Ser. , XL (lgB3), 53.
29· Jack.on 10 Franklin, 17June 1755, in Labaree el a1 ., eda ., Papm of FrlJllk/in, VI, 82; Gennain, quoted in Esmond Wright, Frtml.:lin of Phil4Mlphia (Cambridge , Mus., 1986), 166; Doerllinger. A Vaprous Spirit 0/Enl6J1riu: MmNstlü tutd Eanumtie DtwIDfmntJ in R-tutÜ1ll4ry PhilotUlplaia (Chapei Hili, 1986); Jelliea Kron, " 'Patronage MOlt Ar dently Soughl' : The New York Couneil, 1665-1775," in Daniela, ed., Power tutd SI4hu, 215.
30 . A. G. Roeber, FtJithjul MlJIislTtIUs tutd Rtpubliaut L4w.1trs: CrrtJlDrs of Vi'linia upl CulJun, 1680-1810 (Chapei Hili, 1981), 107-8, 147, 156-57; WilIiam Bradford to James Madison, in William T. Hutehinson and WilIiam M. E . RaeheI, edl. , T1u Papm 0/ j- Madison (Chieago, 1962), I, 90-92, 95-97.
31· Greene to Samuel Ward, Apr. 1772, in Showman el &I., eds. Paptrs 0/Nat1ItJ._1 GrmII. I, 28; Wood, "Con.piraey and the Paranoid Style : Cauaality and Deeeit in lhe Eighteenlh Century, " WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (1982),423,
32. Gerald Stourzh, &njtImill Frrmk/in tutd AIPItI'iaut Forrip Poliq (Chieago, 1954), 17 18; Franklin, Speech on Salaries (1787), in Albert Henry Smyth, ed. , T1u Wrili",s 0/ 1JnIjllmin FrattA:/in (New York, 1906), IX, 591; ThL Dtjmu ofInjUf"d Mtril U_UtJ . . . (n .p., 1771) , 9.
33· Charlel Turner, A Smnon PrNeIwd &,!on His Exullmcy T1tDrn4s Hukhiruon, Esq., Go_r (BoIton , 1773), 11; Jamea H . HUlson , "The Ongin. of 'The Paranoid Style in Ameriean Politicl': Publie JeaJoulY from the Age of Walpoie to the Age of Jacbon," in David D . Hall, John M . Murrin , Thad W . Tate, ed • . , S4ints tutd R_IUlÜm4riu: EssIlYS on &rly AmmCiln HisllJry (New York, 1984), 339; Lauren. to John Brown , 28 Oet. 1]65, in Rogen et 31., ed •. , Po.pns 0/Hmry LAlU'ens, V, 30.
39 1 39° NOIes 1M' /JGgts 109-11'J 7. A Tr&I1I&4Ild SMety
I. Jell'enon to Benjamin FranJdin, 3 Aug. rrn, in Boyd er a1., eds., Papm ./jtff~. 1I,16.
2. John Adama, in Adam., ed., WorA:s ofjMll Adau. IV, 68-6g; Sarnuel Adam., quolcd in Edwin G. Burrow. and Michael Wallace, "The American Revolulion: The IdeoJosy and Psycholosy of Nalional Liberalion, .. Pm/*tilllS in AIIIIricu Hinory, VI (1972), 198; WragK, in Drayton, lAUm ofF,."..,., ed, Weir, 87·
3. Eddil, 1AtJm.t- Amcritc, ed , Land, 30; Wrighl, FrtlllkJin, 166. 4. Bulhman, Ki", tINl~, 113; Bailyn, IdIo~tiul OrifÜts of 1M..4"""-R~,
3O!n.j MeAnear, 1_ ofdu ColOfliDJ eo-rum. 70; Alollzo Thomas Dill, e.-r T']M ... His PaJDu (Chapei Hili, 1955), 108.
5· Bonomi, UW tAt c.p, ofH.M1. 194. 6 . Greene, ed ., "William Knox'. Explanalion for the Revolution," WMQ, 3rd
Ser., XXX (1973), 304. 7. Nicholu Creuwel1, jolDfllll of.. . , '774-1717, ed. Samuel Thomely (London,
1924), 255, 2S2: Docrilingcr, A Y'I,!O'VIIJ Spirit ./ Etu#rflrist, 139, 159; William T. Buter, 71t H_ ofH_k: BllJiwss in &s,.,.. 1]2f-1775 (Cambridgc, Man., 1945), 224, 76; Richard Para, "A London Wetl-Indian Merehanl HOUIe, 1740-'769," in Richard Para and A. J. P. Taylor, ed•. , EsSIJ:JS PrIUflStJd IDS# LtwisNPlür (London. 1956), 107; Monon, R.6IJt Corur, 207; Filke Kimball, Dvrrwtit AreAiudllrt 0/ tM AIIIIricu CoItnUD Grul of du ~ RIfJuM" (Ncw York. 1922), 70; J. H. Plumb, Mm G1IJi P1G«s (London, ag66), 113·
8. A1an Gowanl, I.., of A~ LiRq (Ncw York, 1964), 141, Lf2, 149; Ricbard Beale Davit. IrtJIIMttaJ Lift ift litt CoiftMJ SouL4 '585-1763 (Knoxville, 1978), ur, 11f8; CreawdI, j--' cd . Tbornely. 252; Chauncy, "A Dilcount on 'the good NCWJ from • rar country,' .. (1766), inJ. W. Thomlon, cd., 1M PlJpilofdu Amm- Rn. lutitnt . . . (Boston, 1860), 123.
9. Bcmard Baüyn, 71t p.u., 0/BriJisA NMtJa AIlIIriu: An IrIlrDtiMailm (Ncw Yortc, 1986), ~; Bonomi, A F«IiRs,., 196-200; MeAnear, I_.r litt CoIotütJl e-,. -,32·
10. Kim, LtAtJlMd tINl TtMlll, 267, 261; Colden. quotcd in Sonomi, A F.umu PIfIJIk. 195; "A P1anladon on Prince George'. Creek, Cape Fear, North Carolina," NtII1 Eil' ".. HisIMilIsJ -' et-üIp.1 ~. LII (18gB), 473i Grcene, cd .• "William Knox 's Explanation for the Revolution," WMQ, 3rd Ser. , XXX (1973),299 .
n. Countryman, A ProJIU in Rnolldiort. 21. 12. Janel A . Rietntan, "The Origini of Amcrican Polilica1 Economy, 11igo-f18t"
(Ph.D. Di.... Brown Univenity, J983), 148, '52; Becken, 71t Arislomu] Üt EfltI-I. 339· 13. Greene, "Socicty. Icleology, and Polilia," in JeUison, cd ., S«itt7. F,..".,
Cotvrimu, '4-76; Weir, " 'The Harmony We're Famoul For' : An Inlerpretation of Pre-RcvoIueionary Sauth Carolina Politics," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXVI ('969), 473-501•
14. Smith, Ittsi« litt CNal Houst, 146:Jamcs T. Flcxner, e-,e W4S~ lJIIIl"" NtfIJ NMiott, '783-l793 (Boston, tg6g), Ill, 41-42; baac, TratII./fInrItJliorl ofYi..p;., 24- 25.
15. Monon, RoItm C-mr, 224: Emory S . Evans, "The Rist and DccIine of the Virginia Arlltocracy in the Eightcenth Century: The Nelson.," in Darret B. Rutman, cd ., 71t OMDomini01l: Ess4Js ftr ThomJu PnärlSAMmtJlltJ (CharlottcsYilJe , '964), 73-74; Dixon Wccler, 17al SlIp ofAllIIriull S«itty: A Rmmi 0/SocitJ AspirGtiorl, 1607-1937 (Ncw York, 1937), 27; Maier, 1M OU RnlOlldiorulrin, 211-12; Carl Bridenbaugh, MJtlu aN! lüaIilils: Socinils ofIM ColtncitJ Soldlr (New York, 1963), 27, 14; Roben L . Meriweeher,
Notes JOT /Jages 11'J-123
17al &fxmsUm ofSoutA CGTOIiM, '729-1765 (Kingspon, Tenn ., 1940), 191-92; Farish, ed ., jOUT1UJ1 of FiIlJÜUI. 101, 211, 234-.
16. Grecne, " Socie ty , Ideology, and Politics," in JelJiJon, ed . , Sorid}, Fr"", aM COnseUrut, 65-'16; Brcen, TohtJao CulJurt; 167-68, m: Wood, "Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution," WMQ, 300 Ser., XXllI (1g66), 27-30; Wood, Crratiorl oftM Amniea Rtpublie, 109-14.
..,. A. Roger Ekireh, "Poor CID"O/i1llJ ": Po/ilics GM Socin.1 in Co~niDJ NMtJa ClD"Olirttl, '729-1776 (ChapeI Hili, 1981), 81-82.
18. Bridcnbaugh, ed ., Gntllmlan's Progrus, 13; EdwaOO M . Cook, Jr. , "Soda! Be havior and Changing Valuel in Dedham, Massachuleltl, 1700 10 1775," WMQ, 300 Ser.• XXVII (1970),576; John Adam., Jan. 1761, in Butterficld et al., cd •. , Düzry o/jolrn AdfJms, I, 198, 28; Andenon, A Pteple's Army, 55.
19· BntjtJmin FranJclin 's AllIobiD!TapAJ, ed , Lemay and Zall, 54, 32. 20. Klein, PomfJiJ 0/an &rl,y AmnieG1l FtsmiJy, 168, 292. 21 . Doerftinger, A Vi,rorollJ SJliril of Enurprisl, 20-36, 20ll, 46, 159-60, 140, 141, 142:
Docrftingcr, "Philadelphia's Merehantl and the Logic of Moderation, 1.,00-1775, " WMQ, 300 Ser., XL (1983), 197; " M r . Colden's Accounl of the State of the Province of New Vork," in O'Ca11aghan and Femow, eds., Docunurlls RllaliDt ID tM Co~niDJ HislDry 0/tM SI4U ofNIW Yon, VII, 795.
llll. Robert E . Mutch, "Yeoman and Merchant in Pre-Indusrrial America: Eightcenth-Century Massachuseltl as a Case Study; " SoculIls-A RIVUw 0/SocUsl History, VII (1977), 279-30ll; Doerftinger, A Vilf"lllU SpiritofEnln/Jrist, 135-64, 183: Countryman, A PIOJ1Ü i" RlIII1Ildiorl, "3 .
23 · WilJiam Douglass, A SummDry, HislDrieGJ aM Po/itWI, o/tM FirstPiGnlns, ProgrusiDt ImJlrorJmlnlts, GM Prtsms SI4U oftM BritisA Stltlmtm/s in Nortlr Amnica (BoIIon, 1749), I, 507; William Smith, History 0/IM Leu ProViNt 0/NIW Yon, ftom l/s Discovny ID . . . Ilfn, I (New Vork Historical Society, Coll., IV (1829)), 309i Jcssica Kross, " 'Patronage Mose Ardendy 5ooghl' : The New York Council, 1665-1775," and Thomu L. PUSVil, "A Beleaguered Elile: The New Jeney Council, 1702-1776," in Daniels, cd . , POIWT flIIfi StIlllU, 208, 251.
24· Jere Daniell, Expnimnlt in RtpuhlieG1lism: NIW HampsMrt Polilies flIIfi IM AmnieG1l RlIJOlutio", '741-'794 (Cambridgc , Mu• . , 1970), 3-33; Greene, "Sociely, Ideology, and Polilics," in Jellilon, cd ., Soritty, FrmJom, aM C01IScim&I, 14-76.
25· Gadsden, in Drayton, Utlns 0/F1WmIJII, cd. Weir, 82; Speck, St4hilit,y aM S/rift, 34-35; G . E. Mingay, E"llislr lAnded SocUty i" IM Eiglrumllt Clllhuy (London, 1963), 19 24; WeIlenreUIher, "A View of Ihe Socio-Economic Siructure of England and Ihe Brlli.h Colonies on the Eve of the American Revolulion," in Angermann et al., cd •. , NIW WiM i" 014 SkiIlS, 16-17.
26. Samuel Osgood 10 John Adam., 4 Dce . 1775, in Taylor Cl al ., cdl., Papns 0/ joA" AtiGms. III, 352; Farish, cd., }oUT1UJ1 of FilltÜUl, 160; Samuel Peten, Gmeral HislDry ofC01Irur:tieul . . . (London, 1781), cd . Samuel Jasvil McCormick (Ncw Vork, 18n). 221 ; Greene, "William Knox's Explanation for the Revolution, " WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXX (1973), 299; Keith Tribe, LtwI, Labour, lUIti EcollOmic DiscOUTSI (London, 1978), 32-33.
27· Wood, CTItllitIn oftM Amniean Rt/Juhlie. 100.
393 Notes JOT pages 124-13139 2
8. Loosming the Bands of Socidy
\. Edward M . Cook , TM FaJhns 0/tAe Towns: LtlJliership anti CommWl19 S~ture in Eightmath-CmJury New Engltmd (Baltimore, 1976). 71 ; James A. Henretta, "Economie Development and Sodal Structure in Colonial Boston," WMQ, 3rd Ser .• XXII (1965). 75-92; Paul G . E. Clemens , TM Atlanti, &onomy end Colonial Maryltmd 's Easlml SIwrt: Ftom To'-co 10 Grain (Ithaca , 1980), 134-·
2. Bailyn , The Ptopling 0/British No"" Ameri&a, 3-4-3 ; Bailyn, VOJlllm ID tAe Wlst, 3 28, Bg-125 ; Bernard Bailyn, "17']6 : A Year of Challenge-A World Transformed; " journal 0/Law and &onomin, XIX (19']6) . 4-37-66 ·
3. Kenneth A. Lockridge, "Land. Population. and the Evolution of New England Society , 1630-1790, " Past and Present. XXXIX (1968) , 62-80; Philip J . Greven , Four Generl1/ions: Population, Land, anti Family in Colonial Andooer, MasslJ&huslUs (Ithaca, 1970);
James Kirby Martin, Men in Rebellion: Hig"" Gooernmmt4l lAJders lJIIIi tAe Comi", 0/ tAe Ameri&an RtvOlutWn (New York, 1973), 23-60; Ekirch , "Poor Carolina, "27 ; MitcheII, Com menialism anti Ftontier, 82; Mare Egnal , A Mighty Empire: tAe Origins 0/tM Ameriam RtvO lution (Ithaea, 1988).
4- . Riehard R . Beeman, " Social Change and Cultural Conßict in Virginia: Lunen burg County. 174-6 to 1774-. " WMQ, 3rd Ser . , XXXV (1978), 4-56; Harry Roy Merrens, Colonial NM/h ClUolina in tM Eightmath Cmtury: A Studyin Hislomal Gtography (Chapei Hili,
1964-) , 67· 5. James T . Lemon , The Best POOl' Man's Country: A Gtographüal Study ofEarly South
taStern Pennsyluania (Baltimore, (972) . 123 ; Merrens , Colonial North Carolill4, 54-; W . Stitt Robinson, The Soutlum Colon ial Frontin, r007-1763 (Albuquerque , 1979), 184-.
6. Bailyn. "1776: A Year of Challenge ," jourfllJl 0/Law anti Economics, XIX (19']6), 4-54--55 ·
7. Douglas Lamar Jones, Villagt anti&o.port: Migration and Socidy in Eighlmlth-Cmtury Massachuutls (Hanover, N.H., 19BI). 116 ; Bailyn. " 17']6: A Year ofChallenge." journal 0/Law lJIIIi Economics, XIX (19']6). 4-54- .
8. M itehelI, Commer,iolism and Frontin, 84-, 74-, 78, 79-80, H, 52, 83· 9. Ray Allen Billington . Westward Expansion : A History 0/tAe Ameriam Frontin, 2nd
ed. (New York. (960), 156. 10 . Jaek P . Greene. " Legislative Turnover in British Ameriea, 1696 to 1'775: A
Quanl itative Analysis." WMQ, 3rd Ser .• XXXVIII (1gBI), 4-61. 11 . MasslJ&husells in AgolI) .. . (1750) , in Davis. ed., Colonial Curreru:y Reprints, r6B1l
'751. IV . +37; Smith , Insitk tM Great House, 227 ; MitehelI, Commncialism anti Frrmlin, 52 53; Lemon, &st Poor Man 'l Country, 3. 1'-97·
12 . M itehelI, COmmef,ialism anti Frontin, 56; Nash, TM Urban Crucihk, 3t2-38. 13 . Jones, Vilkzge anti &o.port, 4-5 ; Louis B. Wright and Marion Tinling, eds. • 0JiIb«
ID Carolina in 178!r'786: Being tM Diary and OhsmxUions ofRobnt HunJIr, jr., a YoUtrg Mn ,hant 0/London (San Marino, Calif., 19H), 118 .
14-. Jones. Villagt anti &o.port, H . 4-7 ; Benton , Waming Out in New Engltmd, 1656-18'7,
74--75 . 79. 52. 114--16. 15. Riehard R . Beeman, Tht Evolution 0/ tM Southem Ba&k&ountry: A Gase Study 0/
Lunenburg County. Virginia, '746-183~ (Philadelphia , IgB4-) , 15 , 27. 29. 4-8-4-9, 54- . 16. Rodney M. Baine . Rohnt Munford: Amni,a 's First Comu DramIJtist (Athens , Ga .,
1967). 160. 14- ; Beeman . Evolution 0/tM Soutlum Ba&k&ounlry, 88-96; Riehard R . Beeman, "Roberl Munford and Ihe Polilical Culture of Fronlier Virginia, " journal 0/Ameri&an Sludits, XII (1978). 182 .
Notes JOT pages 131-137
17 . Robinson . Southem ColDnia/ Frontin, 177 18. Riehard J . Hocker, ed. , The ClJrolill4 Ba&k&ountry 'on tAe EDI 0/tlu Revolution: The
JournallJllli 0tJur Writings 0/Charlts Woodmason, Ameri&an ItinnYl1ll (Chape1 Hili , 1953), 25. 19· Ibid . • 9, 6 , 38, 7,33 , 16. 39, 15, 39, 33, 32• 13, 39, 8, 13. 4-5, 17. 12, 30• 56, 4-7 · 20. Ibid. , 31, 61, 52, 7, 38 . 21. Ibid .• 31, 73, 38. 211 . Carville Earle and Ronald Hoffman, "Staple Crops and Urban Development
in the Eighteenth-Century South ," Pers/,«ti/JIS in A",,""n HislDry, X (1976), 30; Ma ier, 1M Old RevolutiImarW, 26+; Thomas Paine, " Common Sense " (17'76), in Philip S. Foner, ed .• The Compkll Writings 0/ Themas Pai," (New York, 194-5), I , 18. On the development of market farming among New England farmers, see Winifred B. Rothenberg, "The Market and Massaehuseus Farmers, 1750-1855." journal 0/&01IDmÜ HislDry, XLI (1gBI) . 283-3l4-; Rothenberg, "The Emergenee of a Capital Market in Rural Massaehuseus, 1730-1838," journal 0/EcOflomÜ History, XLV (1984-), 781-808; Rothenberg, " The Emer genee of Farm Labor Markets and the Transformation 'of the Rural Eeonomy: Mas sachuseus, 1750-1855," Journal of&onomü History. XLVIlI (1g88). 537-66.
23. Joseph A. Ernst and H . Roy Merrens, " ' Cam den ' s turrets pierce the skies!': The Urban Process in the Southern Colonies During the Eighteenth Century," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXX (1973), 54-9-74-; Earle and Hoffman, "Staple Crops and Urban Devel opment ," Pm/'«tioes in Ameri&an HislDry, X (19']6), il.
24- . Joyee Appleby, ., Liberalism and the American Revolution ," Neo Engkznti 0= mly, XLIX (1976). 14--15; Appleby , "Commercial Farming and the ' Agrarian Myth ' in the Early Republic, " jourruJI ofA",,""n HisliJry, LXVIlI (lgB2), 833-4-9; Carole Sham mas, "The Domestic Environment in Early Modern England and America ." journal 0/S«iaJ HislDry, XIV (1g80), 3-24-; BiIly G . Smith, " T he Material Lives of Laboring PhiJade1phians, 1750 to 1800." WMQ, 3rd Ser . • XXXVIlI (1981). 163-202; T . H . Breen. " 'Baubles of Britain' : The Ameriean and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century," Past and Prumt, CXIX (1g88) . 73-104- .
25. Neil MeKendriek et al., Tht Birth 0/a Consumer Stxitty: The Commer,ializ4lion 0/ Eightmath-Cmtury Engkznti (Bloomington, 1982). 11.
26. Ebenezer Baldwin. An AppnuiiJt, Sl4ting tAe Ht4V) GrinHVWIS 0/Colonus Labour UntUr from tAe Snwral Am 0/tAe British Parliommt . . . (New Haven, 1774-),5\; Alexander. Rentkr Them Suhmissive, 24--25; Charleston. S.C ., Gaztlk, I Mar. In3, quoted in Jaek P . Greene, " ' Slavery 01' Independence' : Some Reßeetions on the Re1ationship among Liberty. Black Bondage, and Equality in Revolutionary South Carolina," South Carolina Hislor i,aI MtsglJZi,", LXXX (1979), 213.
27. Francis Hutcheson. A System 0/ Moral Philosophy in Thrtt Books .. . (London, I' 1755), 11. 319; Alexander, Rmtkr Them Submissive, 24--25 .
28. !saae Hunt, TM PolilÜal Family: Or a Dis,ourst, Pointi", Out tAe R«iprocalAdvanl4ges Müh Flow from an Uninllrruplld Union &tWtnl Grt4t 8n'l4ln anti Her Ameri&an Coloniu (Philadelphia , '775), 24--25.
29. Boston Gtsutll, 28 Dec . 1761. 30. Mare Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst . "An Economie Interpretation of the Amer
ican Revolution, " WMQ, 3rd Ser . • XXIX (1972), 16. 31 . James A. Henretta . "The War for Independence and Ameriean Economie
Development." in Ronald Hoffman et al. • eds .• TM Economy 0/Early Ameri&a: The Rev· olutioll41)l Pnüxl, '763-1790 (Charlouesville, 1988), 4-5-58; Blanehe Evans Hazard . TM Ortaniz4lion 0/tAe Boot anti Shot lntiustry in Massachuutls hefore 1875 (Cambridge. Mau ., 1921) ; 29; Vietor S. Clark , History of Manufa&lures in tM Unilld Sl4l1s, 1607-1860
395 394 Now JOT pages 139-144
(Washington . D .C .• 1916). I. 186; W. C. Plummer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," Pt,IrI.sylvania Mapziru of Histmy aM Bwgraphy, LXVI (1942), 388.
32. Henretta, "War and Economic Developmenl." and Jacob M. Price, "Reßec tions on the Economy of Early Arnerica, " in Holfman et a1 . • eds .• &D1Wmy of &,Iy Amm'ca, 60-68,309-12; Jerome H . Wood. Jr., COfllStoga Cromoads: l.t=as/lr, PlMSylvania,
'730-'790 (Harrisburg, Pa . • 1979). 97· 33. Bridenbaugh, ed . • GmtlmuJn 's Progress, 23. 73, '93; A Brief ACto/ml of IM Rist,
Progrus, aM PrUIfll SlIlU of tJu Papn C,,"1fItJ of Nn» E,.,I4M . . . (In9). and Some Dbs,, lXlliDftS Relalirtt to tJu Pmlfll CircumsliUl&u of IM ProllifICe of MassachWells-Bay .. . (17SO). in Davis, ed .• CoItmiaJ C/IfJ'IfItJ ReprirJIs, IV. 392-93, ~9 ·
34. Bruce H . Mann, "Rationality, Legal Change. and Community in Connecticut, 1690-
1 760 ," Law aruJ Socidy RevUw, XIV (lgBo). 201. 208; Bruce H. Mann, Neighbo's aM
SlrtmgIrs: Law aM CommlUlily in &,Iy Conneclic,., (Chape! H ill, IgB7). /1-..6, 62. 35. Rothenberg, "The Emergence of a Capital Market in Rural Musachusetu,
1730-1838." in Holfman et a1 .• eds .• EcDrJomy of Early Amm'ca, 137-38; Peter Coleman, Debto,s aM Credilors in America: Insolvm&J, 1mp,isDfll'1llfll fo, Debl, aM Bankruplcy, 1607- 1900 (Madison, Wisc .• 1974); William E. Nelson. Amm'canizalwn of tJu Common Law: The Impac/ of Legal Change DfI Massachwe/ls Socit!1. 1;60-1830 (Cambridge, Mus . • 1975).
44-45 · 36. Sec Sidney V . James, Colonial RhodlIsland (New York, 1975); and Peter Cole
man . The T,ansformalwn of Rhork lsl4nd, 1790-1860 (Providence, 196]). 37. Mann. Ntighbors aM StT4fIII's, 39· 38. "Governor William Bull's Representation of the Colony. 177
0 , " in Harry Roy Merrens, ed .• TM Colonial So,,/h Ca,olina Seme: Conllmpo,ary VUws, 16g7-1774 (Columbia. S.C .• 1977), 268; [Anon.]. Eliur Mapum : The PhilosophlfS SlDfll Follflll 011/. lking a C"l4in Me/hod to Eld,acl Sil/ll1' and Gold Dut of /he &,/h in e,l4/ PinI!1 (Philadel phia. 1757). 21.
39.J ohn B. MacInnes, "Rhode bland Bills of Publie Credit , 17tO-1755" (Ph.D. Di.... Brown Universitv. 1952); Tom Brownsword. "Moses Cooper'. Tale of Wealth and Statu.: A Case Study of Rural Rhode bland, 1674-1808" (Honon The.i•• Brown
Univer.ity. 19116), 56; Jame•• Colonial Rhork Isl4M, 173. 178. 40. Janet Riesman. "The Origins of Ameriean Political Economy, 1690-1781" (Ph .D.
Di.... Brown University. IgB3)· 41.Jaeob M . Priee, "The Ri.e ofGlasgow in the Chesapeake Tobaeeo Trade, 17°7
1775." WMQ, 3rd Ser .• XI (1954). 179-99; Jacob M. Priee. F,aru:e aruJ IM Chesap.aJil: A History of IM Freru:h Tobacco MorJOpoly, 1674-'79" and of I,s Re/4lioflShip to tJu Brilish aM Amm'can Tobacco Traders (Ann Arbor. 1973). I. 862 .
42. Alexander White to Riehard Henry Lee. 1758. quoted in J. R . Pole. "Re pre.entation and AuthorilY in Virginia from the Revolution 10 Reform ." JOIUfl4I of Sowhlm His/Dry, XXIX (1958). 23; Purdie and Dixon 's Vi,ginia Gaze/li, 25 Nov . 1773 ; The Deflfl&t of Inj",'d Mtri/ Unmaslced; 0', /M Sc"rrilous Piece of Pltil4nrkr Disseclld and Exposed /0 Public View . By a F,imd 10 Mtri/, wh",ver found (n .p . • 1771) . 11. 8; Morton.
Robnt Carftr, 52· ~3 ' Courtlandt Canby, cd., "Robert Munford·. The Pa/TÜI/S," WMQ, 3rd Ser., VI
(1949).450 ; Grcene. "Society . Ideology. and Politic.... in Jelli.on, cd .• SOCU!1, Fretdom,
aM Corucitrt&e, 14-,6· 44. Joan Remer Gundenon, "The Myth of the Independent Virginia Vestry."
Hislorical Magaziru of IM PrOllSlan/ Episcopal Chureh, XLIV (1975), 133-~1 ; haae, TrtJrlSjor· ma/ion of Vi,ginia, 147-54. 161-73 ·
Noles ftr ptJges 145-152
+5. Richard L. Budunan. Frorn PltriJmt li1 YtmA:tt: CMr.dtr aJ 1111 S«;.J 0rtJtr Ül CDflIIICtitJIl, r6g0-q6j (New York, 1967). 107-95: Bonomi. U". tAt c./JI of H-. IsS 60.
9. EnJightmed Pt1JmllJJism
I . HolFmaD, A ~ of DismuUm, 47. 11. WWard. A e-,IIIr 1Jo9 ofDiviflit.1 Ül Two HIlltdntlIIIU1 Jot}t.1 ~ 1AmIm .,..
1111 ~'I S/IorM' e.tdiIm, 600. , . AdamJ to Thomu B. Adams, 17 Oct . t799. quoted iD Pqe Smith, JMtt A4amI
(New York, Jg61l). 11, 1016-17. +. Joan R. Gundenon and Gwen Vietor Gampcl, "Married Women's Lep1 Status
in Eighteenth-Century New York and Virginia," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (J98lI), 133; DanieI Blake Smith, "The SlUdy of the PamUy in Early America: Trend., Problems, and Prospects," WMQ, yd Ser.• XXXIX (19&), 17, 18i Norton, LibmJ', IJaPkn, ~35; NUICY Con, "Divon:e and the ChangirJ, Status of Women iD EisJlteenth CenlUry Maaachutenl," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIII (!976), 586-&4; Linda K. Kerber, W_ oftAtR"uIif: lrtllll«t atl1__1'1 Ül R,.."".., AIIIIritlI(Chapel HW, JgIlo), 157 a.; Marylynn Salmon, W_ aNl1lll Z- oj Prof1trtJ Ül Earl]AIIIIritlI (ChapeJ HW, Jg86). 58-&.
5. Smith, ItUiJJl1III errat HIIfUI, 13g-40: Daniel Scott Smith and Michael S. Hindu., "Premarital Pregnancy in America,16+0-1971: An ÜYeJView and Interprelation," JOIl1 fIII1 of1tt1fti#ifJIi-.J His'*'7, V (1975), 5'51-70 •
6. Jaroes A. Henretta, "Economie Development and Social Structure iD Colonial Boston," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXII (1!)fi5), 113: Smilh, "SlUdy of the FamUy iD Earfy America," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (19&),18: Karin CaIven, "ChUdren in American Portraiture.167o to J8lo," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (19&), IOO~; Smith, lruidtt tIw e;,., H_, 41, 119, !ZlI8-tg.
7. Jay Fliegeiman, hotUtGÜ fIIId Pi/grim.l: TM AJlllritan RIlIfII",iort ,.inst PrJl1i«nW A."·t.1, '750-1800 (New York, 1982), 43, 36-87; Addison and Steele, TM SP«fI*, Nos. !ZlIO,533·
8. F1iegeJman. Proditaü aNl Pilfrirru, 12-15. 9. James AxteU, ed., 17vE4W41iDuJ Wrilillll ofJolra Lad:I (Cambridge, Eng., 1968).
55;John Locke, Eslll] CNramint H_ UndtnlllMÜIf, cd. Peter H. Niddilch (Oxford, '975). Bk 11. Ch. xxxm, Sect. 8, p. 397.
10. Canby, cd., "Robert Munford's TM Patri«s," WMQ, 3rd Ser., VI (1949), +99 500·
a. J. H . Plurnb, "The New World of ChUdrenin Eighteenth-<:enlUry England," Paslad Prrsat, LXVII (1975). 6+"'93: Locke, s.- n.apu Oll EdWllJitm (1705), in AxteU, ed., E~Writiftp ofIM'", 1!ZlI-1l3; Edwin G. BurTOWl and Michael Wallace, "The American Revolution: ldeology and Psychology cf National Liberation," PmP«ti- ill AIIIIFÜGJI His'*'7, VI (1971l), 1139"'40.
12. John Withenpoon, 1.ttIIrr Oll ~ (1765), in Wilson Smlth. ed., n-.a ./ E4w«iMI ;. Earl] AIIIIrit4, 16;55-1819 (Indianapolis, 1973~ '95,
13· Ibid•• J95, lI04, 194, 200, "', 195· 14· Ibid., 194· 15. Jadt P. Creene, ed., 1M Diat7 of CDlOflIl LaNlIm ClIrlIr ofSolhlll Hall. QSZ"m8
(ChariottesvUle, 1!)fi5), 11, 13.
397 Notls for pages 153-162 39 6
16. Ibid ., 907. 703, 7°2, 9+1 , 1004· 17 . Ibid. , 11 , 702. ']65, 903, 997, 903, 997; I, 310; 11. 9°7, 703· 903-+· 18. Ibid ., H, ']62, 782, 907 · 19. Ibid. , 726- 27 . 20. Ibid ., 775, 1009-1°. ']62. 21. Ibid . • 941 . 923. 22. Ibid ., I . 29. 23. Nicholas Cresswell , Tht jourruU 0/. . . • '774-'m, ed . Samuel Thomely (London ,
1924), 270; Edward M . Riley, ed . • T1w joumaJ 0/joll1l Hrmower (Williamsburg , Va ., 1963), 84, 103 ·
24. Jonathan Mayhew, A DisUJUTse CAn&eming UIIlimiltd Submissioll aM NtJ/I,uis/4tIU 10 tIu Higw Powns (1750), in Bernard Bailyn , ed .• PtJ17Iphlm of tIu AmnUall Revolulitm, '7SO I776 (Cambridge, Mass . , 1965), I, './42; Burrows and Wallace, "American Revolution," Pers/J«liDtS in AmnUall Hislory, VI (1972), 186.
25. WiUiam D . Liddle, " 'A Patriot King, or None' : Lord Bolingbroke and the American Renunciation of George III , " jtJumal ofA".".w,. HisIory, LXV (1979), 955; Gadsden (1769), in Drayton , Leturs of F_, ed. We ir , 59·
26. Locke, Two T,ttllisu of GtJvernmml, ed, Peter Lasleu (New York , IgOO), Ilt, #64, p . 224; Burrows and Wallace , " American Revolut ion ;" Persp«tilJ/ls ill Amtritan HisIory.
VI (1972) , 183. 27. Mayhew, Discourst ~tming Unlimiud Submissio«, in Bailyn , ed ., PtJ17Iphut.s oftIu
Amnican RtIXIlulioll, I. 232. 28. Nonnan Fiering, " T he First American Enlightenment: Tillotson , Levereu, and
Philosophical Anglicanism ," New Engumd OJumnly, LIV (1961), 343-4+, 309; FliegeI man , Prodigcls aM Pilgrims, 156 .
29. Greven, ProusltulJ Tnnpmmll1ll, 265-331; FliegeIman, PrOtJjgoJs aM Pilgrims, 165. 30. Witherspoon, 1AIns Oll &hI&tJJiOIl, in Smilh, ed ., T1uotUs tJ/EdUCDlion, 201; Thomas
Bacon, Smnmts At1JJresstti 10 Masln aM Servallt.s, aM Pub/is1W ill tIu Yea, '743 . . . (Win' chester , Va ., (1813\) , 16; CharIes W . Akers, ed ., " 'A Place for My People israel i: Samuel Cooper's Sermon of7 April 17']6 ," New Engi4nd Hislori&al aM ee-ilJgieal Rt,;sln, CXXXII (1978), 131-32.
31. (Thomas Bradbury Chandler] , TM Amtritan Qymst: Or, Seme ~Slions Proposld Rt14lilJ/l 10 IM Recml Dispuus 6tIwtm G,ttJI Bn·taill aM Her AmnUall Colall;'S (Ne w York , 1774), 5, 4 ; Peter Shaw , Amnican Patriols and IM Rituals oj Rlf10lulitm (Cambridge, Mau .,
1961), 39· 32. Clifford K . Shipton, " T homas HUlchinson ," Sibky's Harvard GrtldlMdU, VIII ,
203, 156 ; Shaw, Amtritan Patriot.s, 167. 33. Shipton, " H u lchinson, " Siblty's HaTVtJ,d G,adtuUts, VIII , 173, 180; Bemard Bai
Iyn, TM 0rrJm/ 0/TIunnas Hulthinsoll (Cambridge , MaiS ., 1974), 74, 182. 190; Roben M . Calhoon, T1It LoJ4list.s ill RnJtJIuliorwy Amnica, 1.,00-1781 (New York, 1973), 59·
34. David Grißith. Passiw 06«Jitnct Consüiertti ill Sm,uJII; PrttJ&htti aJ WiUiomsburg, De umlwr :psI, 177S (Williamsburg, In6) . ed. G. MacLaren Brydon , Hislorital MilfGZiru tJ/ tIu Prous/41Jt Epiuopal ChU1th, XLIV (1975), extra, 77-93; Boucher,...c Vitw tJ/tIu Ctnu,S aM COnsequt1l&IS 0/ IM AmnUtJn RtvOlulion; ill Thirlmt DisUJu,us, PublislW in Nonh A1IIt1Ua &IWItfI tIu YIG'S 1763 aM '775 · . . (London , 1797) , 525. 535·
35. P. S. Atiyah , TM Rist aM Fall 0/ F"ttlmn ojCOlllrtJd (Oxford , 1979) , )6 -37, 139 93; Bruce H . Mann, NtighbtJ,s aM Strangtrs: LAwatUi CtJmmullity in &,ly Conn«licul (ChapeI
Hili . 1967), 25-26. 36. Mann, NtighbtJ,s aM St,angers, n-46 .
Nous for pages 163-169 37. Fliegelman, ProtJigaI.s lINl Pit,rims, 41· 38. Mann, Ntilhlxm lINl ~s, 139; Stephen Botein, "Religion and Politics in
Revolutionary New England : Natural Rightl Reconsldered," in Patricia U . Bonomi, ed., Party lINl Polili&oJ OpposilÜnt i1\ RlPtJhdiotuuy AmnUa (Tanytown, N.Y., IgSo), 23-26 .
39. Fred Anderso», "Why Did Colonial New Englanden Make Bad SoIdien? Con tractual Principles and Military Conduct During tbe Seven Yean' War," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXVIII. (1961), 395-41']; Fred Andenon. A 1'IDpU 's AI'IIl)': Mtus«IIauUs So/dim and S«iIty i1\ IMs.- Y.,s ' War (Chape! HiJI, 1984), 167-g5.
40. Uohn DickinlOnj, Uturs.from a F_ itt Pmruy_itJ . . . (ry68), in Paul L . Ford, ed., T1w Writiftts ofjoAtJ lNki_ (Philadelphia, 18g5), 326; Burro_ and Wallace, "American Revolution," Pers/J«tiws itt AmnitIm HisIm:I, VI (1972) , 217.
41. Wilson , CtJ1ISidmUioru on tIu Nalurl and ExItrU ofIM Ugisl4lirJI AIIIAori47 of tIu BrilisIJ Pal'Üllmntl (1774), in Roben Green McCloakey, ed., T1w WtJI'KS ofj_ Wilstm (Cam' bridge, Masa., 1967), 11, 743; M4SSlll:luueus Sf1.J, 23 Feb . 1775. 6 Apr. 1775; John Adams. "Novanglus," 13 Mar. 1775, in Adam., ed ., Wtds ofjolm AMms, IV, 127; Stourzh. AbmMr HtmJilUm tJ1II1 tIu IdIG ofRtpublictsn GtJM"III1U1It, 41. On the difFerence between aIlegiance and conlCnt. see Wilson, CtJ7ISiiImUitms, in McCloakey, ed., Worb 0/Wilson, H, 736-37: "AIlegiance to the king and obedience to the pariiament are foundcd on very difFerent principles. The fonner il founded on protection: the latter, on represen tation. An inallention to thil difFerence has produccd, I apprehend, much uncenainty and confusion in our ideas concerning the connexion, which ought to sub.i.t betwccn Great Britain and the American colonies ."
42. A1\ EsS4y U/ItJft GtJvmtmmt, Adopt«J by tIu Amniccw, WJimift IM 1AwfuJtws0/RIPtJ lulÜlns Arr DmumstrtJlld . . . (Philadelphia. 1775), 105; Turner, A Smrum PrrtldtMJ &.Im His Exallmey 17Iotruu HultlJittson, 7.
43. (Stephen Hopkinl], TM R;,1Ils 0/ IM CtJlottüs EmmitrMl (Providence, 1']65) , in Bailyn, cd., ptJI1IpIJkts oftIu AmnUa1\ RlPtJlutiort, I, 511, 534-35, 734; Providence ~, 2 Mar. 1']65.
44· Stourzh, &n}4mi1l FrtUtldilI tJ1II1 AmnitIm Fortigrt PtJlicy, 31; Boston E_i"l Post, 1 Oec.l']66.
45. Bailyn, ItMol4{iusJ Or;,ins0/IMAmnicQII R~ 309;JefFenon , A SU1rII1IIIt} Vliw tJ/IM R;,1Ils 0/BrilislJ AmnUa (WiJliamsburg, 1774). in Boyd et a1., cd •. , Pts/)m ofj'.ffmon, I, 134; Samuel Cooke , A Snmoll 1'NIII:JI#d lJt Cflmbridtt i1\ IM Audimu ofHis H_ no-s Hultlawon, Esq. . . . (Boston • ..,,0), in John W. Thomton , cd ., TM PuJfJil tJjIMArrtnWtt Rlf1OhdiDtt: 0" IM Polilic4/ Smrums ofIM PniodtJ/rn6 (Boston, 1860), 162, 163.
+6. Paine. C_ StIIst (rn6). "American Cri.ia m" (rm), in Foner, ed., Wrilm,s ofPaw, 1,19,79; Burrows and Wallace, "American Revolution," PrrS/J«tiws;" Amnitll1l Histmy, VII (1972), 212, 215.
10. Revolution
I. John Adam. to Abigail Adams, 3 July 17']6, and Adam. to Richard Cranch, 2 Aug . rn6' Lyman H. BUllerfield et a1 ., cd• ., Ad4mu FtmJi/y Coms/Jf11tlJmu (Cambridge. M..... 1963). 11. 28, 74.
2. David Ramgy, A Dissn14tiort 01\ IMM_ tJjAequiri"l tIu CIttrratur tJ1II1 PriPi/qu tJj a Citiznt 0/tIu UIIiIMi StIlUs (Charlellton. 178g), 3. On the Revolution'. cn:ation of a new volitional aIlegiance of citizenahip, see Jamea H . Kellner, TM ~ tJjA"""",,, Citizntship, l608-1870 (ChapeI HilI, 1978), f73-209 .
:398 Nous for pages 1J1-1J4
3· J osiah Quincy, Mmwir oJtM Lift oJjosialz Quiruy, ju.nior, oJMlISsa&hustlts: 1744-1775 (Boston, 1874-) , 88; Gadsden, in Drayton , Leiters oJFr_n, ed. Weir, 81-8~. Gadaden 's startling description of eighteenth-century South Carolina society as having no real distinctions was matched b y Chartes Pinckney's praise in the Constitutional Conven tion of '787 of that " med iocrity of fortune " rhat existed everywhere in the United Stares . Such exaggerated, if not b izarre , staternents are comprehensible only in the relative terms in which both men saw America, relative to the great inequalities of rieh and poor they thought existed in Europe and relative especially to the great discrepancy between free white men and enslaved blacks thatthey knew existed in their own society , On this last point, see Edmund S. Morgan, Amni&an SI4vny-Amnican FretdtJm: TM Ortkal olColonial Virginia (New York , 1975) , 376-87; and Jack P . Greene, " ' Slavery or Inde pendence ' : Same Refiections on the Relationship among Liberty , Black Bondage, and Equality in Revolutionary South Carolina," &ulh CaroliM Histori&al Magazw , LXXX
(1979), 193-214-. 4- . Adams, 3 Apr. 1761, in Buuerfield et al ., eds . , Diary and Autobiograplly, I, 208-9 ;
Eddis, Letters from Amema, ed, Land, 65; Burke, "Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies," 2~ Mar. In5 , TM Works ofIM Right HOMUrahk Edmurld Burb, rev, ed, (Boston , 1865-66), II, 125; Petition of the Inhabitants of Orange County, North Carolina, Oet . InO, in William L. Saunders, ed ., TM ColtmiaJ R«ords ofNorlh CaroliM . . . (Raleigh, N.C . , 1890), VIII, 234- .
5. "Mr. Colden '5 Account of the Stare of the Province of New York, " 6 Dee. 1765, in O'Cailaghan and Fernow, eds ., Docummts olIM SI4Je olNmJ York, VII , 797; " J ou rn a l of Josiah Quincy, Jr., 1773 , " ed . Mark A. DeWolfe Howe, Massachusetts Hislorical Sociely, Proc., XLIX (1916), 4-53 ; Russell R. Menard, "Slavery , Economic Growth, and Revolutionary Ideology in the South Carolina Lowcountry, " in Hoffman etal ., eds . , &orunny oJEariy Amnica, 2#-74- ; Greene , "Slavery or Independence, " &ulh Car oliM Histori&al Magazirlt, LXXX (1979) , 201-4.
6 . Tom Brownsword, "Moses Cooper's Tale of Wealth and Slatus: A Case Sludy of Rural Rhode bland, 1674-1808" (Honon Thesis, Brown University, 1966), 95, 98, 100, 1°4, 106; Silas Downer, A Discourst, Dtlivntd in fu~iden&t . . . (1768), in Carl Bri denbaugh, Si/as Dow"", Forgottm Patriot: His Lift and Writings (Providence, 1974), 100.
7. "The beSl poor man's country" was a common phrase 10 describe the colonies, applied as early as 1705to Virginia, used by William Smith, Jr., 10 refer 10 New York, but most often invoked in reference 10 Pennsylvania. Robert Beverley , TAt History arid Present SI4U oJ Virginia, ed. Louis B. Wrighl (Chapei Hili, 1947), 275; Bonomi, A Fa&tious Peopk, 196; James T . Lemon, TAt &st Poor M41I 's Country: A 'Gtograpllieal Sludy olEariy &ulhmstrrn Pmnsylw.nia ( Ballimore, 197'2).
8. Adams , "Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law," 12 Aug. t765, in Taytor et al., eds ., PapnsoJJohn Adams, I, 113; Downer, Discourst, in Bridenbaugh, Si/as Dowrur, 103 ; Bonomi, A Fa&tiow Ptopk, 203n; John MacKenzie , "Second Letter to the People," 14- Sept . 1769 , in Leiters oJ Fr_n. ed. Weir, 24, 25; Charles Chauncey, A Discourse on " T lte good NmJs fr0m 11. Jar Country " (Boslon . 1765), in Thomton , ed ., Pulpil 0JIlte RIOO lwion, 1'29 . See Richard L. Bushman, "Massachu5etts Farmen and lhe Revolution ," in Jellison , ed . , Society, Frtedmn, aM Consc~, 77-124 ; Alan Taylor, Lihnty MIR arid Grldl Proprietors: 17u RnJOlulioMry &ulemnIt on IM Mai", Franlier, 1]60-1820 (Chapei Hili, 1990), 13-14.
9. R ichard Pelers 10 William Smith, 28 May 1763, in Pmnsylw.nia MlJIUin, ofHutory orJd Biography, X (1886), 352; Gary Nash, "The Transformation ofUrban Politics, 1700 1765," Journal 01 Amema" Hislory, LX (1g67), 605-32; J. R . Pole, TAt Gift oJGovernmmt:
Notes for pages 174-181 :399
Politi&tJ ResporuiIJiJity.from tIN English RtstoraliMl to Ameman I~ (Athenl, Ga., 1963), 117-31.
10. Edward H . Tatum, Jr., ed ., T1II AmemanjourMl 0/Ambras, SIr", Smrt4ry to um! HOWl, rn6-1778 (San Marino , Calif., 1940), 149-50; Calhoon, Loyalists in RlIIOlulUmary Ammca, 168.
11. Bailyn, IdltJto,imJ OJYiru oJIM AIPIIric.m RtlIOlUlion, 94-159. Ill. John Adams, quoted in Stephen E. Patterson, Polilieal Panies in RtDOlwionary
MlISsadlusdts (Madison, Wiac ., 1973) 9 ; (Williarn Henry Drayton], A lAJn.from FmmtJn ofSoulh CaroliM, ID IM Dtpulies oJ NortIt Amema, AssemblltJ in tM High Court oJ CMIfI'ISs tU PhilsJelphiIJ (Charleltown, S.C . , In4) , 9, 18; Samuel Sherwood, A Stmton, Conklining Saipturailrutruclitnu ID Civü Rukrs, arid All F,..bom Sul!j«ts . . . (New Haven, '774), vii.
13. Peter Shaw, AIPIIric.m PtUriots aM IM RiltuWolRlOOlUlion (Carnbridge, Mass., 1961), 161,101.
14· Adams, 9 Feb , '772. in Bunerfield et a1 ., eds ., Diary aM AutoIJiograplly, 11, 53; Ptrmsyl_iIJ MlJlIJZine (Apr. 1776), 157.
15. R. R. Palmer, T1II AI' 0/IM l>tm«raJic RlIIOlldÜm: APolitiaU Hutory 0/Eu.1OJII aM Amema, r760-1800: T1II CIralItn,t (Princeton, 1959), I, 188.
16. Wallace Brown, T1II Xi",'s FrinvJs: TAt ComposiJiott arid MolillU of IM Ammcall LoyalisI Cl4imatiU (Providence, 1965),94; A1exander C . Flick, Loyalism in NIW York Dauing IM RIIIOlUlion (New York, 1901), 20.
'7. Doerflinger, A VigorDus Spiril oJ EnllrfWist, llM-55; Stephen Brobeck, "Revolu tionary Change in Colonial Philadelphia: Tbe Brief Life of the Proprierary Gentry," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIII (1976), 410-3-4, 4311.
18. Rober! A . East, Business EIllnJlrist in tIN Amnican RlIIOllliioMry Era (New York, 1938), '220, 1132, 227·
19. Belcher, quoted in McAnear, TM 1",_ ol IM ColtmiaJ Go__s oJ Brilish Norlh Ammca, 6 ; Carol Berkin, jOfl4l1ltm &weil: Odyssty oJ 411 Amnit4n L~ist (New York, 1974), 31.
20. Joseph A. Ernst, Mo"'(J arid PoJws in AIIlIrica, 1755-1775: A Stu.41 ill IM Currrncy Acl ofrt64 aNi IM Politilal EcollfJ'llly oJRlIIOlutWlI (Chapei Hili , 1973), 191.
lll. Charles S. Sydnor, GmlImum Frrtlwldtrs: PolitiaJJ Pr«tices ill WlIShinglOll's Virginia (Chapei Hili, 19511), 1~3 '
2ll . T1II Lsa RtsulJ (In8), in Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, eds ., TM PopulM &urus oJPolwal AutIrority (Carnbridge, Mass., 1966), 3-40; Jefferson, NoUs Oll IM S/QU oJ Virginia, ed . William Peden (Chapel Hili, 1954), 165.
113. H . T . Dickinson, LilJmy arid Property: PolitimJ IdltJiJJgy in EighumtA-Cmlwy Bril4ill (London, 19n), Sg. ~. "The Conltitutional Courant " (1765), in Merrill Jensen, ed., Tra&ts olIM Arner
i&tm RtlIOlution. 1]63-rn6 (Indianapolis, 1967), 83; Stephen Hopkins, TM Rights of IM ColDnies ExtmaintJ (Providence, 1765), in Bailyn, ed. , Pamphlns ofIM AIIlIricaIl RlI1OlUlion, I , 508; Adams. "Novanglus," Ja Jan. '775, in Taylor et a1 .• eds., Papns ofJohn Adams, 11, ll.fl: Joyce Appleby, "Liberalism and the American Revolution," NIW E",latul Quar teriy, XLIX (1976) , 113 .
25· David Ramsay, An OraIio;. Oll IM AdllGlIlDlIs olAmnican I~ (Charleston, '778), in Rober! L . Brunhouse, ed., 1JfwiJ&msay. 1749-1815: &l«tions.from His Wrilings, American Philosophical Society, rrlJftS., LV (1!J65), 185, 183; MmuJirs olSI6fIhtn Bumlfllhs ('796, 1811) (Boston, 1988), 3.
116. Ramsay, Ad_14gts oJAmmean I~t. in Brunhouse, ed. , Dtund Ramsay: &l«tiolls.from His Writi",s, 18.4, 183; Thomas Paine, Rights oJMilli: PartStcotIti (17911), and
4°° Notes JOT pages 181-185
Pairie, Common Sms« (1']76) , in Foner, ed . , Writings 0/Paine, I , 368, 38. "The cottager ma y beget a wise son ; the noble , a fool, " said Samuel Adams . " T he one is capable of great im pro vemen t; the other, not." Maler, TM GMRevoluJionIJrUs, 40 .
27. (CarroIlJ, "Letters of First Cil izen ," 4 Feb , In3, in Kaie Maaon Rowland, TM Lift ofChtJrlts Camll 0/Carrollton, 1737-18p . . . (New York, (898), I, 247, 252; Mason, First Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights [ca. 20-26 May In6J, in Robert A. Rutland , ed., TM Papns ofGemge Mason (Chapel Hili, 1970)' I , 277
28. Farrand, ed., Records of tM Fttieral Convmtion, I, 359, 49, 56; Maier , 1M GM RevoluJionIJrUs, 174.
29. WiJliam Livingston et al. , Tiu Indepnuient Reflector, ed, Klein , 359. 30. Jeffenon, AuJobiography, 1743-179°, in Themas jefferson: Wrilings, ed, Merrill D .
Peterson (Library of Arnerica: New York, 1984), 32, 3. 31. Benjamin Franklin's Autobiography, ed . Lemay and Zall, 3; Codicil 10 rhe Will, 23
June 1789 , in Smyth, ed ., Writings 0/Franklin, X, S02. 32. Stanley N . Katz, " R epu blicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American
Revolutionary Ern," Miehigan iAw Review, LXXVI (1977), 1-29. 33· Ibid . , 13 34· See above, ch . 3, pp. 46-47 . 35. Salmon, Women tJnd the LIJUJ 0/Property in Early AmeriCtJ (ChapeI Hili, 1986), 171 ;
Salmon, "Republican Sent iment, Economic Change, and the Property Rights of Women in American Law," in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J . Albert, eds ., Women in the Age 0/ the AmmCtJn RevoluJion (Charlottesville, 1989), 448-49 ; Robert D. M itcheII, Cammercialism and Frontin: Perspt€tives on tiu Etuly ShentJruiDtJh Vallty (CharIottesviIle, 19n),
55· 36. Salmon , " Re pu blica n Sentiment, " in Hoffman and Albert , eds ., Women in the
Age 0/the Ammazn RevoluJion, 451,448-49 ; Salmon , Women and the Lau: 0/fupert), 58-80. 37. William Miller, "The Effects of the American Revolution on Indenlured Ser·
vitude," Penns)llJ(Jn itJ History, VII (1940)' 136 ; Sharon V . Salinger, "Arlisans , Journey· men , and the Transfonnalion of Labor in Late Eighteentb·Century Philadelphia," WMQ. 3rd Ser . , XL (1983), 64-66; Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, anti Cl4ss: TM Philadelphia Mililia and " Lower Sort" during the AmnictJn RevolutWn, 1775-1783 (New Bruns wick, 1987), 16 .
38. AmerictJn Museum, XI (1792), 84; Frances Wright , VUws ofSociety and MantUrs in Ammea, ed . Paul R . Baker (Cambridge, Mass ., 1!j63), 238; Richard S . Pressman, "Class Positioning and Shays ' Rebellion : Resolving the Contradictions of 77u Contrast, .. EtuI) Ammean LiteralUTe. XXI (1986) , 95.
39. David John Jeremy, ed ., Henry Wansry and His Ammean journlJl (Philadelphia, 1970), 90 ; Frances Trollope, Domesti& MtJntUrs 0/ tM AtnerÜ'ans. ed. Donald Smalley (New York , 1960), 54; Samuel Breck, RuolJectiorlS . . . with Pass~esftom His Noll Books, 1771-1862. ed . H . E. Scudder (Philadelphia, 1877), 299; Nancy F . Cott, 77u &nds 0/ Womenhood: " Women 's Sphne" in New Engle.nd, 1780-1835 (New Haven , 1977), 28-30, 49 ·
40. Jeremy, ed ., Wansry and His Ammean journal, 99 ; M . J . Heale, "From City Fathen to Sodal Critics: Humanitarianism and Governmenl in New York, 1790-1860," journal 0/AmnictJn Hislory. LXIII (1976), 26-27; Douglas T . Miller, jtJCksonian Aristocracy: Cbus and DmwcrtJC) in New York, 183°-1860 (New York, 1967), 5-7 ; Arthur M. Sch1esin ger , LttJming How to &have: A Historical Stud) 0/ Etiquette &oks (New York, (946), 82; Doris Elizabeth King, " T he First-Class Hotel and the Age of Ihe Common Man," journlJl ofSouJhem Hislory. XXIII (1957), 173-88.
• Notes JOT pages 185-194 4°1
41. Sharon V . Salinger, "Ta Strvt Well and Faithfully": 1Ahor tJnd lruimJund ServtJnts in PtMsyIIJlllli4. 1681/-1800 (New York, 1997), 154, 156-57; Providence GtJuIU, 17 July 1824.
42. Eric Foner, Tom PtJiIU and ReuoluJiOMry Ammea (New York, 1976), 39; Sean Wüenlz, CIum1s DmwcrtJIit: NfUJ York City and the Rise 0/the AmeriCtJn Working Cbus, 1788 1850 (New York, 1984), sB.
43. William W . Freehling, "The Founding Fathers and Slavery, " AtnerÜ'an Histomal RevUw, LXXVII (1972), 81-93.
+4. Hendrick Hartog, Publi« fupert) anti PrilKlJe Power: TM Corporation 0/the CiI) of NfUJ York in AmnictJn Laur, 1730-1870 (ChapeI Hili, 1983), 138; Harry N. Scheiber, "Pub lic RiJhll and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, " Co.Jijomia Lau: RevUw. LXXII (1984), 217-51·
45. Hartog, Publit fuperty and Private Power, 155; Harry Scheiber, "The Road to Munll: Eminent Domain and the Concepl of Public Purpose in rhe State Courts," Pm/J«tilJlS ill AtnerÜ'a1l History. V (1971), 363.
46. Hartog, Publie fupert) aruJ PrilKlJe Power, 137 . 47. J . A. C . Granl, " T he 'Higher Law' Background of the Law of Eminent Do
main," Wircon.rirt Law RtvUw, VI (1930-31), 70; William Michael Treanor, "The Origins and Original Significance of the J ust Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendmenr, ' Yale La» jourMl, XCIV (1985), 694-716.
11. Enlightmmmt
I. Paine, "The Foreeter's Leiters " (In6), in Foner, ed., Writings 0/PailU, 11, 82. 2. John Adams 10Jonathan Sewell, Feb . 176o, in Taylor et al., eds., Papers oflohn
AJtJms, I, 42-43; Smith 10 Madison, Nov. 1777-Aug. 1778, in HUlchinson and Rachel, eds ., Papns ofMtJdislm. I, 208-9 ; Edmund S. Morgan , TM Gerltlt Purilfln: A Life 0/Ezra Stilu. 1727-1795 (New Haven , 1!j62) , 167.
3. Adams, "Dissertation on Ihe Feudal and Canon Law" (1765), in Gordon S. Wood, ed . , 77u Rising Gltny 0/AmerietJ, 1'J60-181l0 (New York, 1971), 29.
4. Paine, LItler 10 the Ab'" RaJll41 (1782), in Foner, ed ., Writings 0/PailU, 11, 2~3, 244; Ameri&tJn MIlSIII11I. V (1789), 556.
5. Rush toJohn R . B. Rodgen, 25June 1795, in Butterfieid , ed ., Lnters 0/Rush, 11, 762·
6. Wollaslon , quoled in Garry WiIIs, Invmling Ammca: }dJerson s Declaration ~ Inde pnuimee (New York, 1978), 155.
7. Jefferson 10 Lafayette , 11 Apr. 1787, in Boyd et al ., eds ., ptJpers ofjefferson, XI, 285.
8. Louis Masur, Rills 0/Exemtio,,: Capilfli Punishmmt and the Trans/omllJlion ofAtnerÜ'an CuiIUTr. 1776-1865 (New York, 1989), 65, 71, 80-82, 88, 87; Adam J . Hirsch, "From Pillory 10 Penilentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceralion in Early Musachusetts ," Mithipn Law RtrlUw, LXXX (19ß2), 1179-1269; Linda Kealey, "Patterns of Punishment : Masaachuselts in the Eighleenth Century," AmnictJnjoumtJl ofLtgtJ1 History, XXX (1906), 163-76; Michael Merame, •'The Penitential Ideal in Late Eighteenlh·Cenlury Phila delphia," PmnsylVtJnÜl MtJgdZine 0/History and Biography, CVIII (19ß~), 41!rSO.
9. Rush 10 Thomas Eddy , 19 Oet. 1603, in ButterfieId, et al ., ed ., Letters ofRush, 11 , 875; Masur, Ritu ofE-uJitm, 68 ; Benjamin Frank/i,,'s Autohiography, cd . Lemay and ZalI, 108.
4°2 Notes JOT pages 194-199
10. Sheldon Rothblatt, TradiliOJl anJ Change in Engluh Liberal Edw:aJion: An Essay in History and Cuuurt (London, 1976), 18-19; Raymond Williams, Ktywords: A VocabrJary 0/ Cu/lure anJ S«itty (New York , 1976), 57-60 .
n . Henry Dwight Sedgwick , In Praise 0/GenlInnen (Boston, 1935), 13on. I~ . Rothblau , TradiliOJl and Change in English Liberal Edw:aIWn, ~-31 . 13 . Adams, Dt/met 0/ tht ConsliJulions of Iht Unittd S/ßIts (1787-88), in Adams , ed . ,
Worts 0/John Adams, VI , 185 1+. William Livingston et a1., I~ Rtjitclor, ed . Klein , 219 ; Boston Eoming
POSI, 2 Feb. 1767. 15. John Clive and Bemard Bailyn , " Englan d ' s Cultural Provinces : Scotland and
America," WMQ, 3rd Ser . , XI (195+), 200-13; N . T. Phillipson, "Culture and Society in the 18th Century Province : The Case of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlighten ment," in Lawrence Stone , ed ., Th« Universily in Socitty: Euro/Jt, $col/Qnd, anJ tht Unittd SI4Usfrom Iht 16th 10 Iht 20th Cmlury (Princeton , 197+), +25. Benjamin Rush noted as early as 1766 that "useful and pleasing" conversation was coming to characterize both Ed inburgh and Philadelphia. Stephen A. Conrad, "Polite Foundation : Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson 's Republican Theory ," Suprtme Court Revitw-1!J84, ed, Philip B. Kurland et al. (Chicago, (985), 36~ .
16. Livingston et a1., Indtptndml Rtjitclor, ed, Klein, 2~0 . 17 . Of the ninety-nine founding fathers studied by Richard D . Brown-that is, those
who either signed the Declaration of Independence or were members of the Constitu tional Convention-only eight are known to have fathers who went to college. Brown, "The Founding Fathers ofl776 and 1787: A Collective View ," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XXXIII (1976), +65-80 . Brown hirnself did not note the education of the founding fathers or their fathers in his study. I owe that information to Emily Widmann.
18. G . S. Rowe, ThomtlS McKtlJn : Tht Shaping 0/dII Amtrican RepublicdllUrn (Boulder, Colo ., 1978), 12; Maier, Tht OU RevoluliollJJries, 211, 2+0-+1, 2+6-+7; Peter S . Onuf, ed ., Mary/Qnd anJ Iht Empire, 1773: Tht Amilon-Fi,sl Cilizm LeIIns (Baltimore , 197+), 57-sB.
19. Frederic M . Litto , , "Addison '5 Calo in the Colonies," WMQ, 3rd Ser . (1g66),
+31-+9. 20. Washington to Lafayette, 15 Aug. 1787, to Henry Knox, ~o Feb. 178+, in Fitz
patrick, ed., Wrilings of Washington, XXIX, 259; XXVII , 3+1. See Paul Boiler, Jr. , ~'ge Washington anJ Religion (Dallas , 1963), 9+; FliegeIman, ProdigaiJ and Pilgrims, ~l~.
21. Washington to Rev.Jonathan Boucher, 9July 1771, in Fitzpatrick , ed . , Wri1ings 0/ Wash inglon, IlI , 50.
n . Moore , ed . , Geo'ge Washingion 's Ruks of CiviliJy and Dtcml &haviour, 9, 5. ~ . Bernard Knollenherg, as nOled by Flexner, George Washington : Tht Fo,ge 0/Ex
peri~t (1732-1775), I, 25+. 2+. Rush to John Adams, ~I Sept. 1805 , in John A. Schulz and Douglass Adair,
eds ., Tht Spur 0/Farne: Dialogues ofJohn Adamsand&njamin Rush, 1805-1813 (San Marino, Calif., IgSo), 37·
~5 . Washington to David Humphreys, 25 July 1785 , in Fitzpatrick, ed. , Wrilings of Washington, XXVIII, 203.
26. J . P . Brissot de Warville, New T,avels in Iht Uni/td $/aus of Amtrica, 1788, ed . Durand Echeverria (Cambridge, Mass., 196+) , 3++; James Thomas Flexner, GerJrge WashingIon: Anguish anJ Farewell (1793-1799) (Boston, 1969), IV, +88.
27. Bmjamin Franklin's Autobiography, ed . Lemay and Zall, 57; Bemard Bailyn, Tht O,igins 0/Amtrican Poliliu (New York, 1968), 1+3 ; Paul W . Conner, Poo, Richa,d'sPolilicks: Bmjamin F'anklin anJ His New Arne,ican Ordt'f (Oxford , 1965) , 215, 215-17 ; Thomas J .
Notes JOT pages 200-206 4°3 Schlereth, Tht Cosmopolil4n Idtal in Enlightnlmenl Thoughl: Its Form anJ Fusaion in tht Idtas 0/Frtmklin , Hume, and Voll4ire, r694-179O (Notre Dame, 1977).
28. John J . Waters, Jr., The Olu Fami{y in Provincial and RtvoluliOllJJry Massachusells (ChapeI HilI , 1968), 105; Adams to H . Niles, I+Jan. 1818, in Adams, ed., Worts o/John Adams, X , 715: Peter Shaw, Americdll Patnots and tht Riluals of Revolulion (Cambridge, Mass. , 19BI), 82, 83, 85·
29· Adams, 16 Jan . 1766, 2~ June 1771, 3 Apr. 1761 , in Buuerfield et al. , eds ., Diary anJ Aulobiography, I, 29+; II , 38; I, 207.
30. Charles W . Akers , Calkd unlo Libtrty: A Life 0/JonaJhan Mayhtw, 17!lO-I76fj (Cam bridge, Mass., 196+), 132 , 163 .
31.John E . O 'Connor, William Palnson: LawJ" andStausman. 1745-1806 (New Bruns wick, N .J ., 1979) , 7, 10, 26.
32. Ibid. , 16, ~7 , 66 . 33. Dumas Malone, Je.fft'fSon Iht Virginian: Je.fftrSOJl anti His Timt (Boston, 19+8), I , 8;
Jefferson to John Page, 25 May 1766, in Boyd et aI. , eds ., Papers 0/Je.fftrson, I, 19-~0 . 3+. MerriII D . Peterson, ThOmtlSJe.fftrSOJl and Iht New Nalion : A Biography (New York,
1970),14, 15; Eleanor D . Berman, ThomtlSJe.fftrson among Iht Arts: An Essayin Ea,{y Amtrican ESlhtlics (New York, 19+7), I .
35. Jefferson came to see hirnself as a kind of impresario for America, introducing his countrymen to the finest and most enlightened aspects of European culture , When Americans in the 1780s realized that astatue of Washington was needed, "there could be no question raised," he wrote from Paris, "as to the Sculptor who should be em ployed, the reputation of Monsr. Houdon of this city being unrivalled in Europe. " No American could stand up to his knowledge. When Washington timidly expressed mis givings about Houdon's doing the statue in Roman style , he quickly backed down in the face of Jefferson's frown, unwilIing, as he said, "10 oppose my judgment to the taste of Connoisseurs." Of course, some years later tastes had changed; for a new commemorative statue ofWashington ,Jefferson wanted "old Canova, ofRome," who, he said, "for thirty years, with in my own knowledge, . . . had heen considered by a11 Europe without a rivaI. " Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison, 12 Jan. 1785, in Boyd et a1., eds ., Papers ofJe.fft'fSon, VII, 600 ; Washington to Jefferson, I Aug. 1786, in Fitzpatrick , ed . , Wn'lings of Jfashington, XXVIII, 50+; Jefferson to Nathaniel Macon, 2~ Jan . 1816, in Andrew A. Lipscomb and Alben E . Bergh, eds ., Tht Wrilings 0/ThomasJe.fft'fSon (Washington, D.C., 1903), XIV, +08.
36. Greene to Samuel Ward , 9 Oct . 1772, 26 Sept. 1771, in Showman et a1., eds ., Pafltrs of General NaJllanatl Cremt (Chapei HilI, 1976), I, +7, 23.
37. "Appendix" in Adams, ed ., Wo,ts ofJohn Adams, n, 52+. 38. Jonathan Sewell to Adams, 13 Feb . 1760, in Taylor et a1 ., eds ., Papers of John
Adams, I , 39-+0 ; Stephen Botein, "Cicero as Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in Classical Inftuence ," Tht Ci4ssicaIJourllJJl, LXXIII (1977-78), 313-21.
39· Maier, Tht Old Revo/uliollJJries, 33, +7, .34 . +0. David Humphreys, "A Poem on the Industry ofthe Uniled States of America ,"
in Vemon L. Parrington, ed., Tht ConlltClicul Wils (New York, 195+), +01 ; Wilson, "On the History of Propeny," in McCloskey, ed ., Wo,ks 0/ Wilson, H , 716.
41. Washington, Circular to the States, 8 June 1783, to Daniel McCarty, 22 Feb . 178+, in Fitzpatrick, ed ., Wrilings oj WashinglOJl, XXVI, +86; XXVII , 3+1; Garry WiIls, Cinciruralus: Ceorgt Washington andIht Enlighttnmmt (New York, IgB+), 3-16.
+2. Washington to New York Legislature, 26June 1775 ,.in Fitzpatrick, ed., Wrilings 0/ Washington, H, 305; WiIIs, CincinllJJlus, 13 .
--- ---""," "
4 04 Notes Jor pages 206-211
~3 . When Washington could not take those differences for granted , he cultivated them , He used his natural reticence to rein force the image of a stem and forbidding c1assical hero . His aloofness was notorious, and he worked at it. When the painter Gilbert Stuart had uncharacteristic difficulty in putting Washington at ease du ring a silling for a ponrait, Stuan in exasperation linally pleaded, "Now sir you must let rne forget that you are Gene ral Washington and that I am Stuart , the painter." Washing· ton's reply chilled the air : "Mr. Stuart need Mit!' feel the need of forgetting who he is or who General Wash ington is." No wonder the portraus look stiff. In fact, when he became President and held levees, Washington was criticized for the awkwardness of his bows, which were said to be " more distant and stiff" than those of a king. James Thomas Flexner, ~rgt Washillgtoll anJ IM Nnu Nalioll (1783-1793) (Boston , 1969), III , 4t9; Barry Schwanz , ~rgt Washingll1ll : The Making 01 an Ameman Symhol (New York , /987), 59·
44. Wa shington to Lafayette, 8 Nov . 1785, in Fitzpat rick , ed., Wrilings 01 WashingtOll, XXVIII, 308-9 ; Trevor Colboum , ed ., F_ anJ IM Foundillg Fa/Ms: Essays by Douglass Atiair (New York , 1974), 3-26 .
~5. Jeffenon to Madison, 9 June 1793, in Thomas A. Mason et al., eds. , Papns of Madison, XV , 27; Jelferson tO Dr . Walter Jones , 2Jan . /8/~, in Paul L. Ford , ed . , TM W,ilingsofTlvJmasjt.f!nsoll (New York , 1898), IX , +tß.
~6 . Flexner, Washillgtoll and IM Neu: NaliOll, III, 63-68. ~7 . Washington to Benjamin Harrison, 22Jan. 1']85, to George William Fairfax, 27
Feb . /785, in Fitzpatrick , ed. , Wrilings 01 Washillgtoll , XXVIII , 36, 85. ~8 . Washington to Harrison, 22 Jan . 1785, to Williarn Grayson, 22 Jan. /785, to
Marquis de Lafayette , 15 Feb . /785, to Jelfenon, 25 Feb. 1785, to Fairfax, 27 Feb. 1785, to Governor Palrick Henry , 27 Feb . 1785, to Henry Knox , 28 Feb . 1785, 18June 1785, to Nathanael Greene . 20 May 1785, ibid . , 36, 37. 72, 80-81, 85, ag-gl, 92-93, 167, 146.
~9 . Wash ington to Henry Knox, 8 Mar. 1787. to David Humphreys, 8 Mar. 1787 , ibid ., XXIX, 172 .
SO . Washington to Humphreys, 26 Dec. 1786, ibid . , 128; Flexner , Wash ingtoll alldIM Ntw NatiOll, III, 108. "
5' . Monroe to Jelferson, 12 July 1788, in Boyd et al. , eds ., Papns 01 jtffnsOll, XIII, 352 •
52. PtlllISyl/)(JlliJJ GtJZtlk, 5 Mar. 1788. (I owe this eitation to Barry Schwanz .) 53. WashingIon 10 Hen ry Lee, 22 Sepl. 1788. in Fitzpatrick, ed ., Wri/ings of W/lJh
illgtoll, XXX , 97, 98. 54. Hamilton to Washington, Sept . 1788, in Harold C . Syrett et aI., eds. , 17ItPapns
01 A/aalldtr Hamülbll (New York, 1962), V, 221 -22; Washington to Lin coln, 26 DeI. 1788, in Fitzpatrick, ed . , Wn"lings 01 Washillgloll , XXX, 119 .
55. Dickinson, " Lellers of a Farmer in Pennsylvania" (1768), in Paul L. Ford, ed ., 17It Wrilillgs ofjo/lll DitkillSOIl, I , Polilieal Wrilillgs, 1764-1774 (Pennsyl van ia Historical Society, Mmwirs, XIV [Philadelphia, rag5» , 307: Kenne th R . Bowling and Helen E. Ve it, eds . , TM DitJry of WiUiDm MlUiay arad Ollur Nous on Smau Dcbaus (Vol. IX , Docu· IIItIIlary Hislory 01 IN Firsl Fttinal COlIgrtSS 01 IM Ullitl:d StaUs 01Amniea, 4 March 1789-3 March 1791), (Baltimore , 1988), 69-70 .
56. W . T . Baxter , 17It Houst01Haru:1JC1c (Cambridge, Mass . , 1945), 279, 283: Laurens to Richard Oswald, 7 Jul y 1764 , in Harner et aI., eds., Papns ofHtTlry LAurtTIJ, IV , 338 (see also Rachel N . Klein, " O rdering the Backcountry: The South Carolina Regula· tion, " WMQ, 3rd Ser . • XXXVIII [1981) , 667); David Duncan Wallace , TM Lift ofHtllry wrtTIJ. . (New York, (915), Gg-70. See above , eh. 6, pp . 106-07.
Nous JOT pages 2U-216 4°5
57. Smith, Welth 01 Na/iIms, ed , Campbell and Skinner, I , 411 (III . iv. 3)' 58. Tamara Platkins Thomton, CullilltlliJrg GI'IIllnntrr: TM M-w., 01 CoIIJIh] Lift
lI1ftMII IM &sll1ll EliU, '785-1860 (New Haven, 1!}8g), '5-56. 59. Morris to Washington, 29 May 178t, in E. James FergulOn et al., ed•. , n.
P4J1trs 01 RDhnt Morris, '781-'714 (Pittsburgh, 1973- ), I, g6; Elli. PaxIOn Oberholtser, Robnt Morris, PatriDl anJ Fitumdn (New York , /903), 511-56, 70-71·
60. Morris to Matthew Ridley, 14 Ocr , 1781, in Ferguson et al., eds., Paptrs ofRo6m Morris, I1I, Y,-57·
61 . Mathew Carey, ed ., Ikbaüs aNl PnKndinls 01 IM Gtrural Asstmbf1 ofPmTlS,1llltlllitJ Oll IN M_riaJs Pra,;ng a RIf-I or Suspnuion 01 IM Lam AnnuIJm, IN CItarltr 0/ IN BaA: (Philadelphia, 1786), 81.
62. Oberholtzer, Morris, 285-86, 297-99. 301-3; Eleanor Young, FOTfOIUrI Patriol: Robnt Morris (New York , 19SO) , 170; Barbara Ann Chemow, Robnt Morris, lAtui Sp.u ÜJJDr, 1]90-1801 (New York, 1978); H . E. Scudder, ed., RICOIJKtioru ofSamwt BrtiCk .. . (Philadelphia, t8n) , 203; Bowling and Veit, eds., DiJJry 0/ William MtJ&iaJ, 48 , 73-74, 134·
12. Bmevolmu
I. Belknap, quoted in W . Paul Adams , TM First Ameman OmstituJiIms: R.pllbli&a IdtollJO arad IN Makint ofIM SItJU COIIJtituJiIms in IN RlfIOluJioruIry Era (Chapei Hili, IgBo), 27·
2. Ronald Hoffman, "The ' Disaffected ' in the Revolutionary South," in Alfred F. Young, cd. , TM AmemlJll Rt1lllluJion (DeKalb, III., 1976), 282-83; Bemard MaJOn, TM RotMllo lrulIptrulm&t: TM RlfIOluJiDMrJ MovtmeTll ill New fork, 1773-'777 (Lexington, Ky ., 1966),46.
3. Roben M . Calhoon , TM lAyaJists in RtvOluJiolllJry Amema, 1';60-1781 (New York, 1973) , 278; Jonathan Powell , "Presbyterian Loyalists : A ' C hain of Interest' in Phila delphia," joJmUJI 0/Prts~ History, LVII (1979), /56; 25Jan. Im, "Diary oe Jama AUen, Esq. , of Philadelphia, CounseUor at Law, lno-In8," PtrllISJl_iJJ MtJfGZiru 01 Hislory arad Biograph:!, IX (/885), '93-94 '
4. Calhoon , lAyalists ill RlVOluJUmary Amema, 299. 5. Richard A. Ryenon , TM RrJiOluJioll Is Now Btgun: TM RadiuIJ Commituts 01 Pftil
adelphiJJ, r,65-rn6 (Philadelphia, 1978), 131 ; Calhoon, lAyalists ill RlVOluJiort4tJ A",,"", 295-305.
6. Calhoon , lAyaJists ill RIVOWJiort4tJ Amniea, 144-45,80; Boston Erjmilll Posl, 13 Apr.
1767· 7. Roben Rosenblum , TrlJ1lSlomJillioru in LAk Ei,hletTltll -CmJury Art (Prineeton, 1967,
1969), 68-Gg; Montesquieu, Spirit ofIM Lams, cd. Neumann , Pt . I, bk . vii, eh . 13, pp . 118-19; Conlandt Canby, cd., "Roben Munford's 17It PaJriots," WMQ, 3rd Ser., VI (1949) , 459·
8. Butler, " Se rm ons, " in L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed ., Brilish MoraJists, &i,., &I«tiotu .frorn Wriltrs Priru:ipaJly 01 IM EilhletTltll CerrlIUJ (Oxford, lag7), I , 204, 203; Norman Fier ing, jOTllJl1rsIl Edwa,ds 's Moral ThoUlN anJ Its Brilish COTIlDd (Chapei Hill , 19BI).
9. Hume, "Of Commerce," ESJlJp, Moral, Poli/ual, arad Likrary, ed. Miller, 262-63. 10. Amemtlll MIUtJIm, 11 (1787), llll8-37; George W . Corner, cd., TM A~biopapllJ .1
&njamill RlUh: His "Trawls 17JrtJUlh Lift" TogttNr with His COTTITTIOrrplaet &ok for '78g 1813 (Princeton , 1948), 199, 198.
4 0 6 Notes JOT pages 216-222
11. Conrad, "Polite Foundation," in Kurland et al., eds., Supreme Court RevimJ 19S.t., 361, 363, 365.
12. Joseph Addison, Cato: A Tragedy (1721), act I, sc. iv, in Richard Hurd, ed., The Worts of the Right HonourableJostfJh Addison (London, 18n), I, 225.
13. New York Magazine, 11, (1792), 406. See Lawrence Klein, "The Third Earl of Shaftesbury and the Progress of Politeness," Eightunth Century Stutiits, XVIII (1984-85), 186-214.
14. Livingstonet al., IndtPendtnt Rt}lector, ed. Klein, 219; Paine, Common Sense, in Foner, ed., Wn'tings oJPaine, 1,4; Wilson, "Lectures on Law" (1790-91), in McCloskey, ed., Works of Wils01l, I, 86-87; Rush, Thoughts on tht Mode oJEducatUm Proper in a Republie (1786), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds., Amtrican Politi",l Writing, I, 68g; Uames Sullivan], The Path to Ricnes. An Inquiry into the O,igin and Use of Money . , . (Boston, 1792), 8.
15· Amtrican Museum, 11 (1787), 229; Adams, "Oration Pronounced July 4th 1793 . . . ," in E. B. Williston, ed., Eloqumce oJthe United Staw (Midclletown, Conn., 1827), V, 108-9.
16. The Wor.u ofJohn Withtrspoon , , . (Philadelphia, 1800-1), 111, 470. 17. Carol F. Karlsen and Laurie Crumpacker, eds., The Journal oJ Esther Edwa,ds
Burr, 1754-1757 (New Haven, 1984), 63; Robert Micklus, ., "The History of the Tuesday Club'; A Mock-Jeremiad on the Colonial South," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XL (1983),60.
18, Joseph Warren (1172), in Hezekiah Niles, ed., Principus anti Acts oJ ehe Amtrican Revolution in Amt7'lca (New York, 1876), 4; Tristam Burges, Solitudt anti Society Cont,asttd (Providence, 1797), 10, 15; Masur, Rites oJ Execution, 83.
19. Greene to Samuel Ward, Apr., 1772, in Showman et al., eds., Papers of NatJumul Greent, I, 27; Mayhew, Seoe« Sermons upon the Following Suhj«ts .. , (Boston, 1749), 126; Samuel Cooper, A Sermon Preachtd in Boston, Ne» England, BtJore theSociety JorEncouraging Industry, and Employing the Poor . . . (Boston, 1753), 13.
20. John Adams to Abigail Adams, 29 Oct. 1775, in Butterfield er. al., eds., Adams Family Correspondtnce (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 1,318; Cooper, Sermon Preached in &ston. 2; john Andrews, A Sermon on the Importance of Mutual Kindness, .. (Philadelphia, 1790). 17; Amm'can Museum, 11 (1787), 30.
21. Jeremiah Atwater, A Sermon Preached Before His Exulkn'Y IsatJ& Tiekenor, Esq., Govemor. , , on the Day oJtheAnniversary E/ection, Octobtr 14-, 1802 (Middlebury, Vt., 1802), 20.
22. Zabdiel Adams, B,otherly Love anti Compassion, Dtscribtd anti Recommtndtd ... (W orcester, 1778), 16; [Anon.], An Oration, Pronounced Before tht Soeiety oftht Social Tie, in New Hauen . . , (New Haven, 1802), 10; John Adams to Abigail Adams, 29 Oct. 1775, in ButterfieId et al., eds" Adams Family Co"espondtnct, I, 318.
23. Charles Royster, Light-Horse Harry Lee anti tIat Legacy oJ the Amtrican Revolution (New York, 1981), 71; Evarts B. Greene, The Revolutionary Generation, 1]63-179° (New York, 1943), 418; Colin Bonwick, English Rodicols antitheAmnican Revolution (Chapei Hili, 1977), 13-14; Alan D. McKillop, "Local Attachment and Cosmopolitanism-The Eighteenth-Century Pattern," in Frederick W. Hilles and Harold Bloom, eds., From Stnsibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to Fredtn·c/c A. Pottle (Oxford, 1965) , 197; David Ramsay to John Eliot, 11 Aug. 1792, in Brunhouse, ed., Ramsay .. ' StlectioftS from His Writings, 133.
24. Lewis B. Simpson, "Federalism and the Crisis of Literary Order, ", Ameri&an Literature, XXXII (1g60) , 256; Rush to James Beattie, I Aug. 1786, in Butterfieid, ed., Letters oJRush, I, 394; Allan Guttman, "Copley, Peale, Trumbull: A Note on Loyalty," Amtrican QuarttTly, 11 (1959), 178-83; Anhur L. Ford, Jotl Barlow (New York, 1971), 59; Edward Handler, " 'Nature Itself Is All American': The Scientific Outlook of John
Notes JOT pages 222-231 4°7 Adams," American Philosophical Society, Proc., Cx..x (19'76), 226; Schlereth, Thl Cos mopolita ld«d, 30; Whitfield J. Bell, Ea,ly AmtricMI &itnce: NmJs and OpportunititsJo, Stutiy (Chapet HiIl, 1955), 34.
25. Ramsay to Benjamin Rush, 8 Apr. Im, in Brunhouse, ed., RtmlSay . . . Seleaions .from His Wn'li",s, 54; Ford, &rww, 31; Paine, Common &tue, in Foner, ed., Writings oJ Pairtl, I, 20.
~. Nn» fOTk MtlfGZirtl, I (1790), 290. 27. Catherine L. Albanese, &ms oJ tIat Fathlrs: The CirJil Religion oJ tIat Amtritan Revo
IrdÜm (Philadelphia, 19'76), 129-30; J. M. Roberts, The MythowD of tIat S«rlt Soeittits (St. Albans, Eng., 1974), 37; Conrad E. Wright, "Christian Compassion and Corporate Beneficence: The Institutionalization of Charity in New EngJand, 1720-1810" (Ph.D. Diss., Brown University, 1980); Steven C. Bullock, "The Revolutionary Transforma tion of American Freemasonry, 1752-1792," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XLVII (1990), 347-6g; and Steven C. Bullock, "The Ancient and Honorable Society: Freemasonry in America, 1730-1830" (Ph.D.Diss., Brown Univenity, 1986).
28. Ann Lipson, F'M'IIIUonry in FedertJlist C01ItI«tiau, 1']Bg-1832 (Princeton, 19n), 40; josiah Bartlett, A Discou,se on the Origin, Progress and Design oJFr« Masonry (Boston, 1793), 15; Oe Witt Clinton, quoted in Steven C. Bullock, "A Pure and Sublime System: The Appeal of Post-Revolutionary Freemasonry," Journal oJ tIat &,ly Republie, IX (lgSg), 3']1; CharIes Brockwell, BrotMrly Love R«omm.nu/ed in a Sermon Pr_hld &fort tIat Aneitnt and HtnUJurable SoeiIty of F", 41111 Accepttd Masons in Christ-Chu,ch, Boston (Boston, 1750), 14; john Andrews, A Sermon on the Import4nee of Mutual Kindrtlss .. , (Philadelphia, 1790), 20.
29. Cooper, Sermon Pr_lied in Boston . . . 1753, 3; Geoffroy Atkinson, Thl Stntimmlal Rl'lJOlutiDn: Fmeh Writtrs of'690-174-0 (Seattle, 1966); Norman S. Fiering, "Irresistible Compusion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism," JormuU oJ tIat History oJ ldltu, XXXVII (19'76), 199-21:.1; John B. Radner, "The Art of Sympathy in Eighteenth-Century British Moral Thought," IX, Stutiits in Eightmath Cmtury CUÜUrt(Madison, Wisc., 1979), ISg-210.
30. Burges, SoliluiU and Soeiny Cont,asttd, 15; Jay, quoted in Sandra F. VanBurkleo, " 'Honour, justice and Interest': John Jay's Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, " JournaloJtIat &rly Republie, IV (1g84), 260.
13. Equality
I. Robert Porter, An Oration, to Commemorate tIat Indeptntimce oJthe Unittd StlJtts oJNorth Amtrita IRliwrrd . . . PhilaJelphÜJ, July 4-Ih, 1791 (Philadelphia, 1791), 17-18.
2. Oe Witt Clinton (1794-), quoted in Bullock, "A Pure and Sublime System: The Appeal of Post-Revolutionary Freemasonry," Journal oJ tIat &rly Rtpublie, IX (lgSg), 368.
3. Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Amnican Lo.wyers in a Ch4nging Socitty, 1]76-18]6 (Cam bridge, Mus., 19'76), 37; Gouverneur Morris, in Nius' W.kly Register, VI (1814), 313.
4. Winfred E. A. Bernhard, Fishtr Amts: FttimlJist and Statesman, 1758-1808 (Chapel Hill, 1965), 344, 337; Ames, Monthly AnthowD, 11 (1805), in Lewis P. Simpson, ed., Tht Fltllralist Literat} MiNi: Se/ections from tIat Monthly AnthowD aNi Boston Review, 1803-1811 (Baton Rouge, 1962) , 54. For John Adams's "frantic efforts" to keep the distinction between a republic and a democracy c1ear, see Bailyn, Idtowgical Origins oJtIat Amnican RtrJOlulUm, 282n.
4 0 8 Notes Jor pages 231-237
S. Charles D . Hasen, CtmlmJpo,ary ArrurU-1III Opinüm 0/IM F,nI&h RlIHIlulÜnr (Baltimore, 18g7), 276-n, 2n; Arthur Maynard Walter, Monlh/y AnJJwIoO, II (I80S), in Simpson, ed ., Ftdnalist Li/n'ary MiM, 49; R. R . Palmer, Agt 0/tM Dnrwcratie RtvoIulÜnr: TM CIIaJ lmge (Prineeton, 1959), I, 187-88.
6 . Bemhard, FishIr Amu, 341 . 7. Elias Smith, Th« Louing Kindnes« 0/ GodDispitlytd in IM Triumph 0/ Rtpubliumism ill
America . . . (n .p., IBog), 14-IS. 8. Hugh Swinton Legare. "An Oration, Delivered on the Fourth ofJuly 1823 . . . ,"
in Wrilings of HIIl" Swinton Uga,1 (Charleston, 1146), I, 262. 9 . Herman Melville, Moby Dick (1851), ed. Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker
(New York, 1967), eh. 26, pp. 104-S' 10. Ramsay, An Onrlüm on IM Adva1llagn 0/ArrurU-1III I~I (m8), in Brunhowe,
ed ., Ramsay . . . Sel«tiJms from His Writi"lS, 183; Homai J . Shroff, The EighlmUh-CmJury Nouel: TM lduJ ofIM Gmtlmum (New Delhi, 1978), 37, 282.
11. Lawrenee W . Towner, " T he Indentures of Boston's Poor Apprentices: 1734 I80S," Colonial Society of MassachulletlS, Publieations, XLIII (1956-63), 427; Philip S . Foner, ed .,.The Dmromuie-RtpubliclJII SocUtUs, r,yo-l800: A DocummJary Souruboolc ofCon stitutüms, Add,USIS, Rtsolutions, aM Toasts (Westport , Conn., 1976), 10; Dennie to his parents, 2S Apr . 1793, in Eugene Perry Link, DemDc,alie·Rtpublium S«iniu, 1790-1800 (New York, 1942), 99 .
12 . Charles Royster, A RlIHIlutiolUJty Peopk al Wa,: TM ContinmJtJ1 Army aruJ AmI1'Ü"IJII Cha,Q&/n', '775-1783 (ChapeI Hili , 1970), 316.
13 . PmnsylulJllia PQ&ul (Philadelphia), 26 Nov . 1776; South Carolina aM ArrurU-IJII GtJuttt [Charleston), 6 Nov. 17n .
14. Madison , in Jonathan Elliot , ed. , The IRbatn 0/tM StaU OmDmJiJms on IM Adoptian ofIM Ftdnal Conslilulian .. , (Philadelphia, 18g6), III, S36-37; "The Worceater Specu lator" (1787), in Charles S , Hyneman and Donald S . Lutz, eds ., ArrurU-1III PolitiasJ Wril i"ls Duri"l IM FoUlldi"l Era, I, 700; [Trenchard and Gordon), Cato's Ltuns , 11 , 35; Tillolson , quoted in Leon Guilhamel , The Sinurt lduJl: StwJies on Sincmty in EighJmtth Cmlury English Li/n'atJU't (Montreal , 1974) , 16; Ram.ay , Oratian on AmericlJll ltUieptruJmu, in Brunhouse , ed . , R/J71IS(Jy . . . Sekdians from His Writings, 18S; Jeffenon , A Summary View 0/tM Rights of Brilish America (1774), in Boyd el a1., eds. , Paptrs 0/jtJImon, I, 134.
IS. Columbian MaglUirll, 11 (1788) , quoted in Bloomfield, AmericlJll Lawym, 42; Nor man Hampson, Tlu Enlighlmmml (Baltimore, 1968) , 154; Thomas L . Haskell, "Capi Ialism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibilily, " American HistotüalRtuiew, XC (1985), 339-61, 547- 66 .
16. William Byrd , " H istory of Ihe Dividing Line . . . 1728," in Louis B. Wright, ed., TM PrOSt Worlcs 0/ WillÜlm Byrd0/ Wtstouer (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 221; Chester field to his son, 7 Feb. 1749, in Lord Chutnfuld: ut/n's to His Son anti OtMrs (London, 1929), 93; Hampson, Enlighlntrnml, 154, 155.
17 . Richard D . Brown , KnowUtiKt ls POWtr: Tlu Dijfusian oflriformatüm in Early Amnica, 1700-1865 (New York, 1989), tOS .
18. David Freeman Hawke, Bmjamin Rush: RlIHIlutialUJry Godjl, (Indianapolis, 1971), 107 ; Haakell, "Capitalism and the Origins of Ihe Humanitarian Sensibility," Amtrie(JII Histomal Rtvitw, XC (lgBS), 358.
19. Adams to Jonathan Sewell, Feb . 1']00, Humphrey Ploughjogger to Philanthrop, ante 5 Jan . 1767. Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, 27 Jan. 1766, "U" 10 the Boston Gtueltt, 18July 1763, in Taylor el a1 . • eds ., Pa"",s 0/john Adams, I , 42, t79, 167-68, 71 . It was his con fidence in the judgment of ordinary people Ihat accounted for Adams's
Notes J01 pages 238-243 4°9 remarkable pre-revolutionary faith in popular juries. Shannon C . Stimson, The Ameri C4lI RnohdUm in IM Law: A"llo-Anvriean jlU'is/J'fUtJmu btfortlohn Ma,sha/l(Princeton , 1990), '11-80.
20. Humphrey Ploughjogger to Philanthrop , ante sJan . 1767, Humphrey Plough jogger to the Boston &mittg Post, 20 June 1763, Adams to Samuel Quincy, 22 Apr. 1761, in ibid ., I, 1'79, 63, 6S, 49, SOi Oscar and Lilian Handlin, .04 Rutws Ptopll: AmI1'Ü"IJIIs ÜJ R,btUiMt, '770-1787 (New York, Ig&I), 185.
21. John Andrews, .04 Semum 0/1 IM Imporliltla ofMutlUJl Kirrt/1I1SS .. . (Philadelphia, 1790),14 ; Inereaae N . Tarbox, ed . , Diary 0/17Jom4s Robbins, D.D., 1796-1854 (Boston, 1886), I, 30 .
22. Wilson , " Lec tu res on Law" (1790-91), in MeCloskey, ed ., Worlcs 0/ Wilson, I , 214, 213; Jefrenon to T. Law, 13 June 1814, in Lipseomb and Bergh, eds . , Writi"ls of j'.ffrmm, XIV , 141-42; Nathaniel Chipman, Princip/u 0/ GoDmJnlllll: .04 Trtatis, 0/1 Fr" blStillUiDns, inclwJing IM ConstitulÜnr 0/IM Unittd S/QJu (Burlington, Vt ., 1833), 46; Uohn Perkins), Theory 0/ AgtnCJ, 0' IJII Essay on IM Naturt, Souret lJIId ExJnrJ 0/ Moral Fr. (Boston. tnl), 27. "Men are not born like blank aheets of paper, ready to receive any impression, but virtue and vice, lie latent in their nature until time brings them into action." MIJSSQ&husttts CmIWl (Boston), 19Jan. 178S, in Wood, ed ., The Risi"l Glory 0/ America, 143.
23. Americall MIlUIIm, X (t791), 90 ; Jefferson to Peter Carr, 10 Aug. 1787, in Boyd et a1., eds ., Papm 0/jrffirson, XII, IS'
24. [Perkins], Theory 0/Agmg, 19-20. 2S. AmericlJll Musnun, I (1787), 462; Henry Cumings , A Sermon Prouhtd . . . May 28,
1783 [Boston, 1783), 17-18; Boston lruUpmdmJ Chnmiek, 23 Mar. 1787 . 26. IrJdIpmtierJl Clmmiell (Boston), 21 July 178S' 27. Samuel Adams to E1bridge Gerry, 23 Apr. 1784, in Henry A. Cushing, ed .,
Writi"ls 0/ SamUlI Adams (New York, 1906), IV, 301. See Wallace E. Davies, "The Society of the Cincinnati in New England in 1783-1800," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., V (1948), 3 2S' The charge of aristocracy, as William Davie of North Carolina discovered in 1503, was fatal to a political career in America. McRee , ed . , Lift aruJ ComsporuJmu 0/ IrrdIU, 11, 160. "Men of Ialents" had 10 be " kept down " in America . " T oo much genius , like 100 mueh wealth destroys Equality the very soul of Democraey." James Brown to Henry Clay, I Sepl . 1808, in James F. Hopkins, ed., The Paptrs 0/Htllry Cl4y: The Risi"l Sttuesman (Lexington, Ky . , 19S9), I, 376.
28. Otto to Vergennes, 10 Oet . 1786 , in George Baneroft , History ofIM Formation 0/ IM Constitutüm ofIM Unittd StaUs (New York, 1882), 11, 399-400 .
29. Daniel Chipman, The Lift ofHon. Nalhanül Chiprrum . .. with Seketians from His Misull4tuous Papm (Boston, 18.46), 33, ~' 30, 31-32 .
30. Aleine Austin, Matthrw Lyon: "Ntw MIJII " ofIM Dnrwcratie Rnolution, ''/94-18112 (University Park, Pa., 19BI), 46, 4S.
31. Chipman, Lifl of Nathanü/ Chi""",n, 110. 32. Jeclidiah Morse , Geography Mtuh Easy: Bting an Abridgmunl 0/IM AlllllÜan Gtog
raph, ... (Boston, 1791) , 6S; Mn . Jarvis to Samuel F . B. Mone, in Edward Lind Morse, ed., Samuel F. B. Morst: His ul/n's IJIIdjoumJJls (Boston, 1914), I, 100.
411 41 0 Notes Jor pages 245-2jI
14 . Inunsu
I. Ryerson , Th« RtlHllution Is Now Begun, 66, 31 ; Edward Countryman , A PlOpil in RtIHllu.tion: Th« Ammean RtlHllutiDn twI Political Sociny in Nw York, r;6o-r;go (Baltimore, tgSl), 125 ; Staughton Lynd, Cltw Conjlid, SlJJvery, anti tht Uniud StaUs ConstiMiDn : Tm Essa)s (Indianapolis , tg68), 79-108; Charles S . Olton , Artisansfar IruiIpmden&e: P1rii4dllphia M«htmics and tht Ammean Revolu.tion (Syracuse, 1975) , 55; Richard W . Walsh, CluJrilston's Sans 0/Libmy : A StUily of tht Artisans, 1763-1787 (Columbia, t959), 27·
2. Ryerson, Th« Revolu.tion Is Now Begu«, 32-33, 47, SO' 73, 75; Kenneth Coleman, The Amnican Revolution in Gtorliß, 1]63-1769 (Athens, Ga ., 1958), 63.
3. Essay, Philadelphia, 22 June 1174, in Wood, CreatiDn o} tht Amtrican Republic, 183 . 4. New York Ga.uUt, 4 Apr. '765, New Yorkjournal, 21 Dec , 1769, quoted in Bernard
Fr iedman, "The Shaping of the Radical Consciousness in Provincial New York," journal 0/Ammean HisllJry, LVI (1970) , 78g-go , 793-94 ; Olton, Artisan.s /or IndIpmtlntu, 52·
5. Drayton, Thr Letlns of Frmnan , ed. Weir, 31 . 6 . Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf, "Toward a Republican Empire : Interesr and
Ideology in Revolutionary America," Ammean Qparttrl), XXXVII (lgS5), 521-27 . 7. Royster, Rtvolu.tionary Ptople at War, 86; Paine, " C om mon Sense, " in Foner, ed .,
Wrilings of Paine, I, 31 . 8 . Lau rens , quoted in Albert S. Bolles, The Financißl HislorJ o/Iht Unillti StaUs from
1774 IIJ 1769: Embracing tlat Ptriod o/Iht Ammean RtlJolu.tiDn, 4th cd . (New York, t8g6), 61 62; E. Wayne Carp , To SttJrllt Iht Arm) al Plttuurt: ConJiMltal Arm) Administration and Amtrican Polilical Cullure, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hili, 1984), 106.
9. FrankIin to Benjam in Vau ghn , 26 July 1784 , in Smyth , cd . , The Wrilings of Ben jamin Frank/in, IX , 243-44 ; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, after 24 May 1778 , in Showman, cd., Papers of NalluJNUI Crtmt, 11 , 404; Richard Bud , Jr., "Samson Shorn : The Impact of the Revolut ionary War on Estimales of the Republic's Strength," in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J . Alben , eds ., Arms and Indtptrulmu: The MilittJry CluJracln o/Iht Amtrican RtIHlluliDn (Charlottesville , 1984), 157-60.
10. Remarlc.s on a Pamphlet, Enlilled, " Considnations on tht &nJc of Nort/a -Amtrica" (Phil adelphia, 1785), 14; Madison to Monroe, 9 Apr . 1786, in Rutland et al ., eds ., Papers of Madison , IX, 26; [Will iam BanonI, The Tnu Inlntst oftht United StaUs, and ParticulJJrly of PennsyllJ(Jnia Considntd . . . (Philadelphia , 1786), 20.
11. Ibid ., 4, 25-26. 12 . John Fiske, Tht Critical Ptriod ofAmme4n Hislory (New York, 1888). 13. Jackson T . Main , " G overn men t by the People : The American Revolution and
the Democratization of the Legislatu res , " WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXIII (1g66), 391-407. 14. Wood , Crtation o} Iht Ammean Rtpublic, 405; Jack P. Greene, "Legislative Turn
over in Briti sh America , 16g6 to 1175: A Quantitative Analysis ," WMQ, 3rd Ser ., XXXVIII (lgSl), 442-63 '
15. Madison's Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (1788), in Boyd et al., eds ., Papers o}jtJ!erson, VI , 308-9; Stiles, "The United States Elevatcd to Glory and Honor" (1783), in Thornton, ed ., Pulpil of the Amnican Revolu.tion, 420 ; Independent Chronicle (Boston) , 19 Apr. 1787 ; Conneclicul Courant (Hanford), ~7 Nov . , 5 Feb . 1787.
16. In fact , it was only th is proprietary not ion of wealth that allowed Theophilus Parsons, John Adams, and other drafters and defenders of the Massachusetts const i tut ion of 1780 to identify property with aristocracy and hence with the senate of the
Nous Jor pages 252-257
state. On this issue, see the ten illuminating anic1es by "The Free Republican" (pos sibly Benjamin Lincaln) in the IndtpnuJmJ ChTOflieil (Boston) between 24 Nov. '785 and 9 Feb, 1']86. .
r,. Jerry Grundfest, Gmtt CJ.yrMr: PlailaJüJpJUa RtIHllu.tiDnIII}, 1739-1813 (New York, IgS2), rn; Providmu GLuttI, 5 Aug . 1786,quotcd in David P. Szatmary, SMys' RtbtUiDn: TM MfIkittg of an Äl"aniuI InsumetiDn (Amhent, Mass ., IgBo), 51; Madison, Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (1786), in Rutland et al., eds., Papers o}Madison, IX, IsS-59; Robert] . Taylor, Wtslnn MtJSsaclaustUs in tht Revolu.tißn (Providence, 1954), 166.
18. Royster, RtIHllu.tiDnIII} PlfI/1il at War, 315; Washington toJohn Hancock, 24 Sept . 1716, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Wrilillls 0/ WtJSlailllton, VI, 107-8.
19. Carlisle (Pa.) Cautu, 24 Ocr. 1787, quoted in Herben J . Storing, ed. , The Com pIN Anti-FttJmUisl (Chicago, 19BI), 11, :zo8 ; Washington to James Warren , 7 Oct . 1785, in Fitapatriek, ed ., Writillls of WtJSlaington, XXVIII, 291; [Hamilton), " The Continen talist No. VI" (1782), in Syrett er al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, 111,103; Pmnsylvaniß Pacht (Philadelphia), 11 Mar. '780; The Fttinalist, No . 10.
20. TM FttJmUisl, No. 10; Madison to Washington, 16 Apr. 1787, to Edmund Ran dolph, 8 Apr. 1787, in Rutland et al., eds., Papers of Madison, IX , 384, 370.
21. Stourzh, AloawJn Hamillon anti tht Ideo. 0/Rtpubliean CoIltl'7l1MU, t75. 22. Niabet, quoted in Saul Cornell, "Aristocracy Assailed : The Ideology of Back
country Anti-Federalism; " jourtUJi of Amnican HislorJ, LXXVI (1990), n62; Robert Troup to Hamilton, 31 Mar. 1795, in Syrett et al ., eds . , Papers of Hamilton, XVIII, 310; TM FttinGJisl, No . ]5.
23. The FttJmUisl, No . 57, No . 10. Madison and other Fcderalists were willing to alIow ordinary people to punue their partial sellish interests in the expectation that such interests would be so divene and clash ing that they would rarely be able to combine 10 create tyrannical majorities in the new federal government in the ways they had in the state legislaturea. In an enlargcd society, wrote Madison, " the people are broken into so many interests and panies, that a common sentiment is less likely to be feit , and requisite concen leu likely to be formcd , by a majority of the whole." This competitive situation would then alIow those cducatcd gentlemen "who possess the most attractive merit, and the most dilfusive and establishcd characten" to dominate the national government and promote the common good in a disinterested manner. Madison undentood that it had workcd that way in American religion ; the multiplicity of religious sects in America preventcd any one of them from dominating the state and permitted the enlightencd reason of liberal gentlemen like Jeffenon and himself to shape public policy and church-state relations and protect the rights of minorities. "In a free government, " wrote Madison in The Fttinalisl, No . 51, "the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights . It consists in the one cue in the mult iplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects . "
24 . Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), in Rutland et al .,cds., Papns of M4I1i.ron, IX, 352, 357.
25. Prol1idmu Guttu, 5Jan. 1788 . 26. E1liot, cd., DebtJus 0/IM Statt ConvmlÜJns, 11, 260, 13. 27· Mathew Carey, cd ., Debates and Procetdi,.,s o} tht G#ntral Ammbly o} PmnsyllNlnia
on tht MIf'fIIJTiaJs Pro)ing a Rtf1«Il or Suspmsißn oftht LtwJ A Mulli,., tht C1I4rIn o} Iht &nk (Philadelphia, 1786), 19, 64, 66, 87, 128, 21, 130, 38, 15, 72-73 . For a fuller diacullSion of the debate, see Gordon S. Wood, " In tere sts and Disinterestedneu in the Making of the Constitution," in Richard Beeman et 31., cds., &yonti Confttinatima: Origins ofthe Constitlllion and Amnican NatÜJNJl Idenlity (Chapel Hili, IgS7), ~-Iog .
w
4' 2 Notes fOT pages 259-264
28. Philip A. Crowl, "Anti-Federalisrn in Maryland, 1787-88 ," WMQ, 3rd Ser., IV (1947), ...6...; Walsh, CJuJrlestmt 's Sons 0/Libmy, 132 ; Uames Winthrop), "Leners of Agrippa," Masuuhwttts CauIu, I'" Dec. 1787, in Storing, ed., Compl#le AlIIi-F«lmJJist, IV, 80; Walter HartweIl Bennen, ed ., ltttersfrom IM Ftdlral FdmJn to tM lUpuh/KdtI (Univer sity, Ala ., 1978), 10.
29. Thomas Hartley to Tench Coxe, 6 Oct . • 1788, in MerillJensen et al., eds ., TM DocummttJry History 0/IM First Ftdnal Elt&tioll, 1788-1790 (Madison, Wisc ., 1976- ). I, 30 ....
30. Ibid ., 2g6, 306; Ptllnsyloanitz GazttU, 30 July 1788, ibid. , 2...7; Instructions of the Northumberland County Delegates, 16 Oct. 1788, ibid . , 31....
31 . Ftdlrdl GfJZttb, 18 Nov ., 1788, ibid ., 3...7; Ptllnsyloanitz PlUhl, 25 Nov ., 1788, ibid., 362,363. As ifto confirm the Anti-Federalist view that all politics were really local after all , one of the elected Federalist congressmen from Pennsylvania , Thomas Scott of Washington County in the far western part of the state, announced his resignation before he could take office. Seott did not want to give up his position as prothonotary of the county ; apparently, being a federal congrellman could not compare with the power of the clerk of the county court. However, the Federallara feared that if Scott did resign, the Anti-Federalist demagogue William Findley might replace him , Con sequently, they worked out an agreement whereby Scott's son was appointed prothon otary and Scott took his seat as congressman . Ibid., 23{, ...26.
32. In Massachusetts, for example, those who wanted only "the btsl and most competmt characters" chosen as congressmen in the e1ection of 1788 were opposed by those who wanted an "tqUdI and rldl representation" in the govemment of all the diverse interests of the society . Ibid ., ...68-72.
33. Farrand, ed ., Records 0/the Ftdndl COllllt1ltioll, I, 28g. 3{. Hamilton, in Farrand, ed ., Records ofIM Ftdnal C01IrJt1IJioll, 1,42"': Jay, quoted
in David Hackett Fischer, TM Rt/lolUli01l 0/Amnitdll C01IStI1Idlism: TM Ftdlralisl Pdrty in tM Erd 0/}ljftrS01Iitzll DemomJ&y (New York, 1965), 7.
35. Hamilton (1794), in MortonJ. Frisch, ed ., &/mtd WrilillKs tuui Sfit«Ms ofAlIXlJndn HlJ11Iiltml (Washington , D .C., 1985) , "'15 .
36. Hamilton, "The Continentalist, No . V," (1782), in Syrell et al. , eds. , Pdpm 0/ HlJ11Iiltoll, III , 76.
37. The emergence of England 's "fiscal-military" state , in John Brewer's apt tenn, was the miracle of the century . England mobilized wealth and waged war as no state in hiltory ever had ; with a population only a fraction the size of France's it had built the greatest empire since the fall of Rome. Hamilton saw that the secret of England's achievement was its system of funded debt together with itl banking Itructure and market in public securities ; he aimed to build the same kind of state for the United States . John Brewer, TM SillnlJS 0/ POUNT: War, MOli'" dIId IM E"lIlish SIaII, s688-1783 (New York , IgBg).
38. Hamilton , Speeches in the New York Ratifying Convention, 28, 27June 1788, Syrell et al. , eds ., PdperS 0/HtJmi/IOIl, V , 118,96.
39. Helen R . Pinkney, Christoplur Gort: Ftdlralisl 0/MdSSdChustlls, 17,58-18117 (Waltham, Mass ., 1969), 37·
40. Hamilton, " Th e Defence of the Funding System ," July 1795, in Syrell et al ., eds . , PdperS ofHtJmilton, XIX, 4O-,p.
41 . Sir James Steuart (1767), quoted in Stephen Copley, LilmJture tuui IM Soeitzl Ordn in Eighumth-Cmtury EIIgiJuuJ (London, IgB4), 120 ; Hamilton to Washington, 9 Sept. 1792, in Syrett et a1 ., eds . , PdperS ojHtJmiltoll, XII, 349; John R . Nelson, "Alexander Ham-
Notes fOT pages 265-27° j4' ilton and American Manufacturing: A Reexamination," }0_1 0/ Amnitdll History, LXV (1979), 971-95·
"'11 . Bowling and Veit, eds., Ditzry 0/ Willitzm Md&lay, 1fI; Jack N . Rakove, "The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington," in Beeman et al., eds .,
1Jf:yotuJ C01Iftdnatioll, 283. 43. Troup to Hamilton, 31 Mar. 1795, Hamilton to Troup, 13 Apr. 1795, in Syrett
et al., eds., PdperS ofHfJ11Iiltml, XVIII, 310, 329. In his revelation in 1797 of his affair with Mn. Reynolds, Hamilton sacrificed his reputation for private virtue, and hurt his wife deeply, rather than allow his reputation for public virtue to be tamished. Better to be thought a private adulterer than a corrupt public ofticial.
#. Chester McArthur Destler, }oshri4 Coit: Amnitdll FeJmJist, 1758-17g8 (Middle town, Conn ., 1962), 6...; Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, 5 Oet . 1802, in W . B. Allen, ed., Works of Fisher Amts, dS Publis/red by &t4 Amts (Indianapolia, IgB3), II, 1"'38; Thorn ton, CultilJtlli"II Gmtlmant, 31.
...5. On Federalist dreams of weitem empires, see Andrew R . L . Cayton, TM FrolltUr Rt/Jublic: lcitJoloD dM Politics in tM Ohio COUlltry, 1780-1825 (Kent, Ohio , 1986), 12-32.
...6. Wolcott, quoted in David T . Gilchrilt, ed . , TM Growth oftN SMport Citw, 1790 1825 (Charlottesville, 1967), D9; Ethel E. Raamusson , "Democratic Environment-Aris tocratic Aspiration;" Ptllnsyl/ldllitz MtJgtUiM of History dM Biopphy, XC (1g66) , ISS-82; Benjamin RUlh to John Adams , 22 Apr . 178g, in Maeva Marcus and James R. Perry et al., eds . , TM DocumtnttJry History 0/ IM Suprlmt Courl of IM Ullit«J SltJUs, 178g 1800 (New York , IgSs- ), I, 613.
...7. Fliegeiman, Prodigdls dM Pilgrims, 217, 251-54-; Bowling and Veit, eds., Ditzry of WiUitzm Md&lay, 54-; Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modem Chioalry, ed. Claude M. Newlin (New York, 1937), ...32.
48. [Timothy Ford], "Americanus" (1794), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds ., Amm'aut PolitKal WritillK, II, 921, 92....
"'9 . Reports oftN ProutdillKs tuui ~batu of IM COllllt1lti01l 0/18111, AuembletJ/or IM Ptupose ofAmeruJi"II the Corutitution 0/the Stau of New Yort . . . , ed . Nathaniel H . Carter et al . (Albany, 182/), 219-20, 216, 28..., 220-21, 2...6, 178-79, 219, 268.
50. Ibid ., 2...3. A few years latei" Kent recognized more c1early that modem property was something other than a source of dominion or independe!lce: "the sense of prop erty," he wrote in his CorrrmmltJries (1825), "il beltowed on mankind for the purpose of rousing them from sloth and Itimulating them to action ." Edward S . Corwin, "The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law," MKhigotl Law Rtlliew,XII (191"'), 262. Other jurisls were reaching limilar conclusions. Modem property, said Joseph Story, was not the proprietary wealth of a few "opulent and munificent citizen." that grad ually spreads itself "into a thouland channeIs of charity and public benevolence." Rather modem property was evanescent-"continually changing like the waves of the sea"-and it belonged to everyone. It was the "general blessings, which prolperity diffuses through the whole mais of the community. " It was ., the source of comforts of every kind" and the promoter of "private happiness ; and every man, from the hum biest possessing property, to the highest in the State, contributes his proportion to the general mass of comfort," even those who possess "but a single dollar." Merrill Pe tersan, ed., lJnrI«rdC), Libmy, dM Property: TM Stau ConstilutioMl C01Ivmtions oftNl8Ilo's (Indianapolis, 1966), 79-82. On the new democratic understanding of property as the procluct of labor, see Alan Taylor, Libtrty MtII GM Grttzl Proprinors: TM RtllOlUlirmary &ulmantt 011 tN MdiM FroIlIUr, '760-18110 (Chapei Hili, 1990), 25,28.
~ .....
I i
415 414 Noles for fxlgu !l.,o-2Bl
SI· Rtf-rt,/ liIt DriMMs of liIt NNI Ylri e.-lioIl o/Ilhl, ed, Caner et 11., 14!, 23S, "B, 235, 27+·
SQ . Ibid., '19. 143, 314-, 319·
15. The Assmdt on Ari.rt0c'ra9
I. Abraham Bishop. Cotuwlinll RtfNb/iwtimJ: All Oratitm Oll IM ÜIIIIJ "'" Pewn of PoIitiW lXlusimt . . . (Albany, 1801), 34. 35.
2. (David Daggan). TAr« LAum Ui A~ BisAtlp .. . (Hanford. IBoa). 3. 3· Bishop. CmtlWtinll RtpaMiultism, 28, 31, 32, +6, 47. Biahop, PrNJs of ~,
.,.." Claristiait}, twl litt Co"""""", oJ IM UniuJ SI4us . . . (Hanford, 1802), 29; Biahop, 0nui01I DtliPmtl ill WtJJiIIlf~ Oll IM lIlA of Mtuda 1801, 1Kf00t litt R~ of litt SMu oJ CmtIW/icul .. . (New Haven, IBoI), 59.
4. Bilhop, Oratimt i. WtJ1Jitttford. 30. 5· Biabop. CotuuctiCIIt Rt/JfA6iiutWm, v, 3O-J1; Bilhop, PrNJs of CAJUflitrl9, '9-20 • 6. Bishop, Oratitnt ÜI WJJilll!mJ, IB, 28-29; Biabop, ProoJs of CllflSpitrl9, 26. 7. Bilhop, e-.tinI Rtptt6litaism, 8, S, +0; Bishop. 0ratiMt ÜI WtJJitlQord, 3B. 8. Biahop, CorwrtiBI Rtptt6li&lmimJ, 32...... +0; Biahop, ProoJs of CorufJirog, 27· 9· Bilhop, 0ratiIft ÜI WJJüadml, v; Biahop, CoM«tilul Rlf'tlblieaim, 8,35, ,32. 10 . Biabop, Cot&II«tiad Rt/JtIMit4nUm, 8. 6,-62, 34. Burke'a cdebration of the great
ariatocrauc families aI "the greal Oab that abade a country and perpetuate {their] benefitJ from Generation 10 Generation" came in hil famow '172 Ieuer to the Duke of Richmond. QUOled in laue Kramnick, 77w R4I' oJEbiuINJ BvrU: Prmmlof...AMIItJ1m ~ (New York, 19n). 4-5.
D . Bishop. 0rrJtitnt mWtJJi"I/ord, v. 76; Biahop, CIIfI1WtinII ~ 62, 15-16, 18, 19, 21. .
12. George Wamer, MlGNfor lJu Prutl'flGliott of Polili&4lJ Libmy:All CMlioIl Dtlu-J m IM N_ DtudI CAwd. /111 lIIt Founlt ofJII1J, '797 . .. (New Vork, '197), 13-14: AlIred Young, "The Mechanies and the Jelrenoniana; New York, "Bg-lBoI." LUM HistIn], V (1964). 274; Donald H. Stewan, 77w ~ Pms ofIM FtdmJIist Ptriod (Albany, IgGg). 3Bg; Richard E. EIliI. Jtfftrmtiltn Crisis: CArUls tWJ PoliJiu ÜI lJu Y-.r lüpuMil (New York, 1971), '13.
13. Taylor, LiJIm.1Mnt "'" a-J~, 14-29· 14-. Drayton, Ldlns ofF-. ed . Weir, m-l2, 113. 15. Harold B. Rock , Artiras of IM N_ Rl/llAiJl": 77w Trtul6mtm oJ N_ forA: Cil;y Ua IM
A~ ofJrffl'SVlf (New York. 1979), SO' - eap. 5-7, 53-57· 16. Biahop, 0rlIti0It Ut WalJiat{wrJ, 54. " . Auarin, M.m- LJfH/, 7+. 67: Stewan, Opposihtm Plus, 390· IB. SamucI Eliol Morison. ed., "William Manning 'a 'Tbe Key of Libbeny', "
WMQ, 3M Ser., XII1 (1956>. 202-54. 19. James P. Wabh , " 'Mec:haniCi and Citizena': The Connecticut Artiaan ProtesI
of I7ga," WMQ, 3M Ser. , LXlI ('985). 66-Bg. 20. Stuan M. Blumin, TItt ~oJlJuMiIldU CÜUS: S«iIJ ~Ü11Ju A"""
Cil;y. 1]60-'900 (Cambridse, Eng .• 1989), 33-3+. AI Blumin auggatJ, much of our con fuaion over what Wal happening lOCially in the late eighteenth century COIIIeI from our inability 10 appreciaJe the extmt 10 which the senuy were ,et olr from a1l common people who worked for a living, middling u weU u poor.
1Il. A. G . Roeber, FoiJAjIJ Mqis/TrIUI aJ RIfIlAiJIi-. 1Aw~ : CrftlUlrS ofy-"fÜtiO ü,dl
Nous fOT pages 281-288
Cldturr, z680-1810 (ChapeI HiU, 19BI), 247, 251; Ruth Bogin, Abralwn Ci4rlc tWi lJu QUIll J01 EqlllJ1ily in th4 Rloolulümmy Era, 1774-1794 (East Brunswick, N.] ., IgB2), 32; Austin, MIJJIIuw Lytm, 64.
lIll. Uohn Adams), Dis&ollrm on Dtwii4: A &ries DJ Papers on Po/ilu:al HisUity (1790) (New York, 1973), 91; Antonio Pace , ed ., Llligi Caslig/ioni's Viaggio: TrlUJlls in th4 Uniud StaUs ofNorlh America, 1785-1787 (Syracuse , 1983), 335.
23. Corner, ed., TM AIIlobiography oJ Bmjamin Rush, lIll5. 24. Bogin, Abraham Ci4rlc, 32; Bishop, PtooJs DJ CllftSpirtI&J, 20; ]erome]. Nadelhaft,
" "The Snarls of Invidious Animals ' : The Democratization of Revolutionary South Carolina," in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Alben, eds., &wrlip S/QUs in CIIl Age of
, Unurlainly (Charlottesville, 19BI), n- ' 25. Port Folio, 3rd Ser., ~ (1810) , 571-72 . 26. Muon L. Weems, TM Lift oJ'Washington (IBog), ed , Marcus Cunlilfe (Cam
bridge, Mus .• 1962), 203-14. 27. [Samuel Blodget], EeonomUa: A Sl4listilo/ MCIIlIllJ1 Jot th4 Uniud Staus ofAmerita
(Wuhington, D.C. , 1806), 4; Nowal NeU Luxon , Niles" W«Ic!1 Rtgister: Ntws Magaziu of lJu Ninet«Iltlt CtIllury (Baton Rouge , 19~7) , 37-3B.
2B. Everett, "Lecture on the Workingmen 's Pany" (1830), "Advantage ofKnowl edge to Workingmen" (IB31) , Oraliolls tWi S/JI«Ms Oll Vanous O&&asions, znd ed . (Boston , IB5O) , 285, 287, 320, 292, 294, 303; NortJa Ameritall RtVitw, XXVII (1828), 115.
29. Francia] . Grund, 17u Americans, in Thar Moral, &KiII/, arul PD/il"a/ RtlaJioIls (Boaton, 1837), 157; Michael Chevalier, SiKiny, Mallnns, arul PolilU:s in th4 Uniud StaUs: Lttms tIIl Norlh Amni&a (1836), ed. lohn William Ward (Gloucester, MaIS., 1967), 201-2.
30. A1exia de Tocqueville, DnnocrtI&J in Amerita (IB35), ed .]. P . Mayer (New York , 1969), I, 373; II , 550-51; Chevalier, Socitly, MCIIlnns, arul Polili" in th4 Uniud SI4Jn, ed . Ward , 28~ .
31. EmerlOn, "The American Scholar," in Braoks Atkinson, ed ., TItt Complett Es says twl 0ÜIIr Wrilillgs ofRalph WaldD Emtrson (New York, 1940), 55.
32. Sedgwick, quolcd in Marvin Meyers, 1711 JtII.'lcsollillll PtrSlIIJSion: PDlili&s arul &/itJ (Stanford, 1957), 17~-75; ]ames Fenimore Cooper, NDlions of IM Ameritans Pic/ud Up bya TrtnHUi"l ßtII.'lwwr (1828) (New York, 1963), I, 16m.
33. Stuan M . Blumin, "The Hypothelis ofMiddle-CI..a Formation in Nineteenth Century America: A Critique and Some ProPOialS, " ArnenUn Hislori&al Rlllitw, XC (lgB5). 316-17.
16. Dnnocralic Ojfr&JUJlding
I. lack N . Rakove, TIw &ginni"ls oJ National Polil"s: An /ftIn'/JttI4lilif HisUity oJ lJu C/)IJlilltlllal CofllJ'US (New York , 1979), 216-39, 230, 235, 237; George A. Billi.., El~ e-y: FoUNiu., FaPwr tJNI RlfIlAiJliult St4Iumall (New York, 19']6), 138-39; McRee , ed., Lift arul Corru~I ofJtsmu IrrtÜll, 11,55,56; Chipman, Lift of Nalilllttill C1IifJtft41l, 29, 33· In America, noted ]elferson in 1782, "officea of every kind, and given by every power, have been daily and hourly declined and resigned from the dcclaration of in dependence to thia moment. " ]elfenon to Jamea Monroe, 20 May 17B2, in Boyd et al., eda., Paflns ojJt.ffrrStlll, VI , 185-86.
2. Jelrerson to Riehard Henry Lee, 17 June In9, in Paul L . Ford , ed . , 17u Wrili"ll DJ 'l'1ItmwJ'.ifrrSOft (New' York, 1!lg3), 11, 192; Jetl'enon to William Duane, I Oct. 1812, in Lipacomb and Bergh, eds. , Wrili"ls ofJrffmDn, XIII, 186; ]etl'enon to Francis Willis,
417 Notes fOT pages 288-293416
13 Apr. 1790, in Ford, ed., Wn'tings of Jejferson, V, 157. In fact, said Jefferson, the very "drudgery" of office and the bare "subsistence" provided for officeholders in a repub lic were "a wise & necessary precaution against the degeneracy ofthe public servants." Such aristocratic views naturally increased Jefferson's popularity among Republican plebeians who resented paying taxes to pay for what seemed to be the high salaries of their public officials. Some of these Republican plebeians in New Jersey even regarded the difference between what a militiaman gor for travel-ten cents a day-and what a congressman got for travel-thirty cents a mile-as "an aristocratical distinction." Jefferson to Oe Meunier, 29 Apr. 1795, in Paul L. Ford, ed., Th« Works oj Thomas JtJferson: Federal Edition (New York, 1904), VIII, 174; Leonard D. White, The Ftderalists: A StuJy in Administrative History (New York, 1948), 292-93.
3. At a moment of despair and withdrawal following his troubled term as governor of Virginia, Jefferson did complain that the burdens of public service had become too heavy even for hirn. Leisured gentlemen like hirnself. he admitted, had an obligation to the state to serve their "tour of political duty." But the public had no right to their "whoIe existence." "If we are made in some degree for others," he said, "yet in a greater are we made for ourselves." Jefferson to Monroe, 20 May 1782, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers ojJejferson, VI, 185-86.
4. Morris, quoted in Rakove, Beginnings 0/National Politics, 237. 5. Morris, "Political Enquiries," in Willi Paul Adams, ed., " 'The Spirit ofCom
merce, Requires that Property be Sacred': Gouverneur Morris and the American Rev olution, " AmerikastuJienlAmerican StuJies, XXI (1976), 329.
6. Adams to John Jebb, 21 Aug. 1785, in Adams, ed., Works ojJolm Adams, IX, 533-35·
7· Adams toJebb, 10, 25 Sept. 1785, ibid., 538-42, 543-44· 8. LovelJ, quoted in Rakove, &ginningsoj National Politics, 227. 9. Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, I, 78, 81-85. In his will Franklin
stated that it had "long been a fixed opinion of mine, that in a democratical state there ought to be no offices of profit.' When he had been elected president of Pennsylvania he had, he said, devoted "the appointed salary to some public uses." Codicil to Frank lin's will, 23June 1789, Smyth, ed., Writings of Franklin, X, SOl.
10. Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, I, 211, 219. Connecticut, Delaware, and South Carolina voted to deny salaries to senators; Massachusetts was divided.
11. Farrand, Records 0/the Fedtral Convention, I, 216; Madison, Salaries for Congress, 16 July 1789, Madison to Wilson Cary, 18 July 178g, in Rutland et al., eds., Papers of Madison, XII, 2 93, 295.
12. Bowling and Veit, eds., Diary of Ma&wy, 134. Butler, by his manner and his flaunting of his Anglo- Irish aristocratic connections, probably did more to discredit classical republican sentiments than a multitude of artisan-businessmen: he made him seU obnoxious to his fellow senators, said WilJiam Maclay, by "ever and anon declar ing how c1ear of local Views land] how candid and dispassionate he was." Ibid., 73·
13. Ibid., 134, 149, 259. 14. White, Federalists, 292, 301, 271. By 1797, public office for a c1assically minded
figure like Hamilton had lost some of its former attractiveness. "The pecuniary emol ument is so inconsiderable as to amount to a sacrifice to any man who can emp)oy his time with advantage in any liberal profession. The opportunity of doing good, from the jealousy of power and the spirit of faction, is too small in any station to warrant a long continuance of private sacrifices." Hamilton to William Hamilton, 2 May 1797, in Syrett et a1., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XXI, 78.
Notes fOT pages 294-3°1
15. Hartog, Publi€ Propmy anti Private Power, 133. 16. It was hard to sustain the pretense that office was a burden that prominent
gentry were obliged to bear when the hesitancy of men like J ohn J ay to accept a position in the new federal government was attributed to his "waiting to see which Salary is best, that of Lord Chief Justice or Secretary of State." Samuel A. Otis to John Langdon, [16-22] Sept. 178g, in Marcus and Perry et al., eds., 1J«umentIJry History of W Su.J1rerM Court, I, 661. Part 2 of this volume is full of the awkward letters of men who desired appointment to the Supreme Court but were culturally inhibited from expressing their desires too boldly. See especially the shufHing delicacy of John Lowell. Lowell to Elbridge Gerry, 20 July 178g, ibid., 637-38.
..,. Benjamin Latrobe to Philip Mazzei, 19 Dec. 1806, in Margherita Marchione et al., eds, , Philip MfJZZtI': Selected Writings anti Correspondmce (Prato, Italy, 1983), 439. See Chipman, Prin&ip/u of Govmammt, 62-63: In the absence of an impartial arbiter, Chip man suggested an "amicable compromise" among the competing interests; but of coune "in matten that depend on a mutual compromise, every man is, under the best regulated government, of right allowed to be the judge of his own interest, and an actor in his cause.' ,
18. Latrobe to Mazzei, 19 Dec. 1806, in Marchione et al., eds., MfUZti: Selteted Writi"ts aFUl Comspondence, 439.
19. Everett, quoted \n Shaw Liverrnore, The Twilight of Federalism: The Disintegration of W Ftdlralist Party, 1815-1830 (Princeton, 1962), 266-67; Leonard O. White. TheJejftr sonüuu: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-1829 (New York, 1951), 364-68.
20. Austin, Matthew Lyon, 134. 21. As You Wert! A Word of Advi€e to Straight-Haired Folks: Address to the Fretmen of
eon..ticut (New Haven, [1816]), 14, 3. 22. Niles, quoted in M. J. Heale, The Making 0/Modern Politics, 1750-1850 (London,
19n), 13O. 23. Ronald P. Fonnisano has been making this point for years. Fonnisano,
"Deferential-Participant Politics: The Early Republic's Political Culture, 178g-1840 , " Amniam Politi€aJ Scitnce RtvUw, LXVIII (1974), 473-87; and his Th« Transformation of PoIiJi&aJ Cu/tu,,: Massa&huseUs Partus, 1790$-1840$ (New York, 1983).
24. Jefferson to Lafayette, 14 May 1811, in Ford, ed., Writings ofJejferson, X, 83. 25. Monroe, quoted in Hofstadter, The ldea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate
Opposition in tIIe United StaUs, 1780-1840 (Berkeley, 1969), 196. 26. Martin Van Buren, Aulobiography, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, Annr~aJ Report of the
Amniam HistomaJ AssociDlionfor the Year 1918 (Washington, O.C., 1920), I, 7. 27. Albany Argus, Feb. 29, 1820. 28. Albany Argus, Aug. 26, 1823, quoted in Michael Wallace, "Changing Concepts
ofParty in the United States: New York, 1815-1828," Amnican Histomal Review, LXXIV (1g68-6g), 461.
29. Jay, in Reports antiIJebates 0/ the New fork Convention 0/18f21, ed. Carter et a1., 345; Van Buren, AulolJiography, 105.
30. Reports aFUl IJebates 0/ tIIe New York Convention 0/1821, ed. Carter et al., 262; Robert V. Remini, "The Albany Regency," New fork History, XXXIX (1958),344.345.
31. Jefferson to James Sullivan, 3 Mar. 1808, Lipscomb and Bergh, eds., Writings 0/ J'.ifwson, XII, 3; Jefl'enon to Elias Shipman and others, 12 July 1801, in Ford, ed., Works ofJ'(/ferson: FtderaJ Edition, IX, 274.
32. White, JeJftrsonÜlns, 380; Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service antithePatronage (New York, 1905), 72 .
~
419 Nous JO' pages J0f,l-Jo7418 33. RtfJOrts a1ld Dtbates ofIM New YorA; C01Iverllion of 1B~1, ed, Caner et al., 386, 387,
321, 385-86. 34. Sidney H. Aronson, Slalwand Kirultip i1l IN Higlwr Cioi/ Service (Cambridge,
Mus ., 1964). 35. Lynn Manhall, "Tbc Strange Still Birth of the Whig Party," AnwriaIn HisIMi&4J
Rtoinu, LXXII (1967), 452n.; Harry L. Watlon, LibntJ anti PoWtr: 17u Polws ofjM/uo IlUm Ammea (New York, 1990), 99, 101.
36. Manhall, "Strange Still Birth of the Whig Party," Ammeall HiMriaJl R,oinu.
LXXII (1961), 452· 37. Jackson , First Annual Message, 8 Dec , 1829, in Jamel D. RiehardlOn, ed., .04
Cvmpil4tiOIi oflitt M,ssages aruJ Papers sf IN Pretidnw, /78g-10997 (Waahington, D .C ., 1900), 11 ,449 ,
38. James T . Schleifer , 17u MaJcirrg of ToeqUloilJe's DIrruJmI&y in Ammea (Chapei Hili,
IgBo) , 143· 39. Matthew A . Crenson, TIte Fednal MMItiIlt: Begillllirrgs oj BW'ltJU&rlI&) ill jadcs01lUm
Ammea (Baltimore, 1975) · 40. Marshali, "Strange Still Birth of the Whig Party, " Ammeall HisU11'i&G1 RlDinu,
LXXII (1967), 456, ·m-s8·
17. A World Within Themselves
I. CharIes Nisbet (1787), quoted in Samuel Miller, MmllJir of IN RIlI. CItarUs Nisbet, D . D .• Lall PresitJml of Dickirrstm ColJegt, Car/ir" (New York, IB4O), 167; William Findley, ObstrDaliollS 011 "TIte Two SollS of Oil" Cllfllaill;ng 41 ViruJual;oll of tJu Amm'c411 Cllflslilu lioll . . . (Pimburgh, 1812) , 291; Alexander McLeod (1802) , quoted in Steven Wattl , 17u Republie R,bom: WartJNi IN MaJcirrg oj Liberal AI'PlIrica, I'J9O-1820 (Baltimore, 1987), "3 '
2. Webster, "Addre.. oe Bunker Hili " (1825), in Writings tmtJ Spe«1tu of DGIlili W,b ster: National EdiJiIIfI (BoIIon, Igo3), I, 238-39; Edward EvereII , "An Oralion Pro nounced at Cambridge .. . 1824," in Joseph L . Blau, cd . AI'IIIIieIlll PIIilosofJltuAdiJmsu,
1700-lgoo (New York, 1946), 77· 3. W. J . Rorabaugh , TIte AluMlic Republu: All Ammtan TradilÜlll (1979), 3-21, 87;
Ian R. Tyrell, Sobm'llg Up: From TemptraN' 10 ProltibiJillfl ;11 AIlIIHlIIl1ll AI'PlIrica, 1800-1B60 (Weltport, Conn ., 1979), 3-32; Randolph A . ROlh, TIte ~~ Relitillfl. Reform, aruJ IN SociaI Order ill IM Conll«lietu Ri_ VtdU] 0/ VImlOIlI, 1791-1850 (Cambridge, Eng ., 1987), 48; Elizabcth Cometti, cd., SM1Ig AI'PlIrica and lts Grml MIIl: 17ujounuUs anti Lnters of COUIII FrtJ1lUS(o tW Yerme, '783-/784 (Charlottelville, 1969), 15.
4. Esther B. AreslY, 17u &sI <tMJiDr: 17u CoW's, oj Good Mllllnm-From A~ 10 IM Pruml Q1 S- 1It""'llt CourU.ry aruJ EliqUIIII Books (New York, 1970), IBg-go, 229; NortJa Al'IIIIiean RlDinu, I (1815), 20; Neil K . Fitzgerald, "Towardl an American Abraham : Multiple Parridde and the Rejeclion of Revc1ation in the Early National Period .. . " (M . A. Thelil, Brown Univenity, 1971), 8'"9, uling Tbom.. M. MeDade, comp ., TIte AllIIaIs ofMu": A BibÜIIgrap/ty of Books tmtJ Pampltllts 011 AI'IIIIieIlll Murd#rs frr1m Colollitd Timu 10 1!JOO (Norman, Okla. , 1961); David Hacketl Fischer, 17u R"",/uti01l oj AI'IIIIieIlIl Connroatism: 17u Fednalisl Party ill IM Era ofJeffirsrmi4n ~ (New York , 1965) , 187.
5. Paul A. Gilje, TIte Road 10 Mobocrag: PopuIar Disordn ill NM Yort Cil), 1763-1834 (Chapei Hili, IgB7), 123-288; Howard B. Rock, ArlisallS 0/t1uNew Rt(Jubli&: 17u TrtlIlmIlm 0/ New York City in tIte Age ofJeffirSOIl (New York , 1979) , 59·
Notes Jo, pages JO']-312 6. Gilje, RotJd 111 Mo/J0ar9, ~. 274, 279· 7. CharIes Stewan Daveis, All Mdms Deliomd Oll tJu CorramemorratiOlat F~bwt, MG:!
19, IBs1s (PonJand, Me ., 1825), in JOleph L . Blau , ed., S«i4I '1'1leorUs ofjM*-w. lJe. wt«Nq: JlIFaertlCiDl Writitrts 01 tItI PeriINI 1811j-185O (New Yon, 1954), 49; Ellcanah Wat IOD, Hlst«7 of IM Riu, Propss, lIIId Ezistüat SIiIt6 of ModmJ AgMJtutol S«ietVs Oll tJu &rIcsItin Spüm, ftvm 1807 111 tItI Est4IJlislrnvru oj tIle BocnJ ofA~ iIt tN SIiIt6 oj Nu Yori, J~ 10, 1B20 (Albany, 1820), ~, 142, 160,177-'18, I68D., 169, 182.
8. Samuel Latham Mitchill, Alt Atidrus 10 tIle Citiuru of NM Ycri . . . (New Yon, 1800), 7-8i GnmdCest, e-,. CJ.1mer, Lpi Ludul Venul Bieree, n-ls iIa tIle Soutll '-I, 18r.l-1B1i:J: TMjourul of Lua'//S Ymw Binu, ed. George W . Kneppcr (Columbul, Ohio, 1966), 103.
9. Nilu' W~ RIfÜIIr. I (18n-12), 10. 10.JomWelJl Coward, KIIlIuCIeJ ill tJu Ntw Rlf'tlblu: TM Prouss oj ConstitutiOll Maki,.,
(Lexington, Ky., 1979), 3i R. Carlyle Buley, TM Old Nortlu»m: Püm«r PrriOtl, 181j-1140 (Bloomington, Ind., 1950), 125i Andn:w R . L . Cayton, TIte Frort""R~: l~ lIIId PoIiIia iIIt11e 0ItieG'AIIb.1, 1780-1811j (Kent, Ohio, IglI6), l12i CaihouD, quotcd in William A. Schaper, S«ti«Ylimt Md llIfmsllltMitm ill Sout1l CmliIIG (New York, 1968; &nt publ. Igol), '39' .
D . Evcrett, "Speech at Nashville" (IB29), Orabinu aNl S/J-h6s, I , 191, 192; Cayton, FrortJin Republu, n6i Henry Wanaey, TM jtnlTflal ofl1li LauM Ia tAt UllitldSIIItu ofNortIJ Amerit. iII tIle S_ of t794 (New Yon, 1969), IB3 ; Malcolm J . Rohrbough, TM T1tIIII AfJP'Gl«Aw. FrrIIttin': PIDPIe. S«Utüs, tmd 1ltSIibIJiIIIlS, rm-1B5O (New Yon, I97B), 3&-37, rfi-97.
12. C . F. Voiney, .04 1"_ 01 tIle Soiltmd Cümate of tIle Ullitld Slatu 01 AIIlIritG, tranl. C. B. Browu (Philadelphia, 1804), 3.
13. Patrida S. Watlington , TIte Partiutt Spiril, KmIWky PoIWs, 1779-17'92 (~ew York, 197-1), 46i Morri. Birkbcck, Leuers jrrJm IUiNJis (Landon, IBIB), 14; Rohrbough, TTIIIIS AppalMlIitItt Frortlilr, 50S; WUliam C. Prelton, RmtillircnaetS, quolcd in Charlel L. SanCord, cd ., 0d/or Ammea, 1810-1824 (New York, 1964), 26.
\4. TM P-tJÜs1 aNl MiuWrttn] HtrrUd, XIV (1818), 212-13. 15. F1ower, quolcd in A1ice Feit Tyler, FrmJom 's Frrmmt: PIttJsu of.04",,""" S«i4I
Hislory ftvm tJu Colonial PeriOti 10 tIle Outbreak of Ilte C;oü War (Minneapoli., 1944), IB; Everett, "Spceeh al Yellow Springs, Ohio" (1B2g), Oralions aNl SfJ-hD, I, 209, 210; Slepbcn Hahn and Jonalhan Prude, cdl., TIte Coulltrysitü ;" tN AI' oj CapilllJisl TrtI1Ufor m4tiotl: Euap;1I tN Social HisloT) of Rural Amm'c4 (Chapei Hill, 198~), intro., 4.
16. For the mOlt important work., see George Rogen Taylor, "American Economic: Growth before 1840: An Exploralory Euay," jfJflrll4l of ~ HisloT), XXIV (I~), 4:17-44; Donald R . Adaml, Jr., "Wage Ralet in the Early National Period: Philadel phia, /7113-1830, " joUl'fllJ1 of Emtomu HisloT), XXVIII (1968), 404-'7; Paul A. David, "The Growth oC Real Product in the Unitcd Sialel beCore 1840: Ncw Evidence, eon lroIJed Conjec:lUret," JOIIntIU 0/ Ütmtml" Hiswry. XXVII (1967), 151-97; Dougl"l C. North, 17IfEmtomi& GrowÜl of tJu UllitldStiIIu, /790-1860 (Englewood Clilf'I, N . J ., 1961); Kenneth L. Sokololf, "Produetivily Growth in ManuCacturing during Early IndUltri alization : Evidence Crom the American Northeasl, 18:10-1860," in Stanley L. Engerman and Roben E. Gallman. cd •. , Ltmt- Tnm FMtan ill A"""",, &o-i& GrDlIIlII (Chicago, 1986), 679-736; Sokoloff , "Inventive Activity in Early Indultrial America: Evidence Crom Patent Rccord., r,go-1846," joumaJ ofEcmomic HislDT), XLVIII (1g88), B13-5O, and the anidca by Winifrcd B. Rothenbcrg cilcd above in nOle 22, eh . 8.
17. Adna Ferrin Weber, TIu GnlwtIt of Citiu iJttJuNÜlItuIlIII CertJ"'Y: .04 Stud.7 ill Slatislics
4 2 0 Notes for pages 313-316
(New York, 196<]), 40-41 ; Philip Abrams and E. A. Wrigley, eds . , ToWtlS in S«iny : Essa)s in EcoMmic History and Histori€al S«ÜJlogy (Cambridge, Eng . • 1978), 247-48.
18. WiUiam J. Gilmore, "Blementary LiIeracy on the Eve of the Industrial Revo lution : Trends in Rural New England. 1760-183°," American Antiquarian Society, Proc., XCII (1982), 87-ln; Gilmore, Rwiing BtcMrus 4 Nec.ssity 0/ Lift: Makriizl andCtJ,ural Lif. in Rural Neu: En,land, 1780-s835 (Knoxville, IgBg).
19. Matson and Onuf, "Toward a Republican Empire." Ammi:an Q!uJrterly, XXXVII (1g85), 496-531.
20 . Claudia Goldin and Kenneth Sokoloff, "Women, Children, and Industrializa tion in the Early Republic : Evidence from the Manufacturing Censuses," Journal of Econamic History. XLII (1982), 745-46; Thomas C. Cochran, FlTJ1Iliers 0/ CIttmge: Earl) Indusmalism in Ammi:a (New York, 1981). 57; Gallatin, quoted in ]oyce Appleby, Capi talism anJ 4 Nnu S«iDl Ordn: 1711 Rtpublit:tm Vision 0/ IM 1'J90S (New York , 1984) . 43; Wansey. Joumal 0/an Excursitm (New York , 196cJ; first publ., 1796), 47, 101; James A. Henretta, " T he War for Independence and American Economic Development," in .(
Holfman et al ., eds . • Economy in EarIY Ammi:a, 81. 80; Nila' Wuk[y R.gisUr, III (1812-13), 328. Perhaps nothing is more revealing of what was happening than the pathetic letter written in 1808 by the little border town of St . Albans, Verrnont, to Presidenl]efferson protesting his April 19, 1808. proclamalion that the town was in astate of insurrection for violating the Embargo. The town inhabitants told the President that they could not understand how stopping their trade with Canada could possibly help the United States if it hurt the people of St. Albans. "Exchanging their surplus production for many of the conveniences. and even necessaries. of life," they said, was what the townsmen did; it was the source of their daily existence . Ammi:an R.gisllr, 111 (1808), 4SO-52 .
21. Stanley LebergOlI, "Labor Force and Employment, 1800-1g60," in Output, Em pklymml, and ProdUClivity in tM United Stales a.fter 1800, XXX, Sludies in I~ome anJ WeaUh, National Bureau 0/ EconMllit: R.search (New York, 1966), 128; Niks' Weekg R.gisllr, 1II (1812 13),3 28 .
22. Jonathan Messerli, Hor«. Mann: A Biograp/ay (New York, 1972), 16; Thomas Dublin, "Women and Outwork in a Nineteenth-Century New England Town : Fitz william . New Hampshire, 1830-1850, " in Hahn and Prude, eds., Countryside in IM Ag. 0/Capitalisl Trans/OTT1I4lion, 51-69 .
23. Adams to Jelferson, 16July 1814, in Lester J. Cappon, ed .• TM Adams-Je.fferson ulllrs: TM Complne Corwpondenc. htlw.m T1unn4s JdftrSon and Ahigail and John Adams (Chapei Hili, 1959), 11, 436. Othen, even some of the most radical spokesmen for ordinary people, had no better understanding of economic developments. Abraham Bishop, for example, continued to believe that the amount of wealth was fixed and aIl that it did was circulate aboul. Taking out mortgages and borrowing money were the consequence of extravagance•.he said ; they could not add to the amount of wealth . ,. A Slate of commerce neilher stimulated nor restrained is the natural state for a republic ... Statements Iike these reveal how difficult it was for people in this dynamic period to grasp exactly whal was happening to the economy : everything was so unprecedented. and conventional wisdom died hard. Bishop. Ctmneclit:ut Rtpublicanism, 12; Bishop. Ora lion in WaUingford, 21.
24. Calhoun. quoted in Oscar and Lilian Handlin, Lihnty in ExpansiDn, 1760-1850 (New York. 1989), 197; Nius' Weekl) R.gisltT, I (18n-12), 282. 3; Mathew Carey (1822), quoted in Nathan Miller, -TM Enl#rpris. 0/a Fr.. PtOpu: Aspects 0/Economit: /Xwlopmml in N.w YorK Stale during IM Canal PtriDd, 1792-s838 (Ithaca, 1962). 42; Frances Wright, Views 0/ SocU!J artd ManntTs in Amnica, ed . Paul R . Baker (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). 208.
Notes .for pages 316-322 4 2 1 "There i. no word in the Engliah language that more deeeivea a people than the word _u," wrote Hezekiah Nilea in his WIlDI:lJ' lUgistn in 1814. People everywhere "u aociate with it an idea of great ahip., pu.ing to aII countriea-whereu the rieh eom meree of every community is iu inlmull; a communication of one part with other parta ofthe same.... In the United State. (were we at peace) ourjomp trade would hardly exceed ajurtinA or fiftütA part of the whole _ of the people. These assertions," said Nilea, "may surprise many. but they are founded on what I esteem indisputable data." Ni/u' WIlDI:lJ' R"ütIr, VI (1814), 395.
25· Bray Hammond, &nks tmd Po/itüs in Amnicajmn IM R_ÜdÜm /0 tAe CiDi/ J+'io. (Princeten, 1957). 66.
1I6. Pauline Maier, "The Debate over Incorporationa: Muaachusetll in the Early Republie, " paper delivered at Bicentennial Conference of the Massachusetu Hiltorical Society, tB-19 May 1990.]2;]. Van Fenstermaker, 1M lkwlopmml0/Ammi:tm ComtIIIrCia/ &Mi",: l18Jl-s8j7 (Kent, Ohio, 1965), 4-14.
'1:1. Hammond, BarWtmd Politüs, 145, 165. 28. Hammond, &nks tmd PoliJüs, 147. Philadelphia Gmera/ AdDtrtisIr, 16 Feb. 1793;
Richard Gabriel Stone, Hculci41l Ni/u as an Econornist (Baltimore, 1833). 94-95; Fenster maker, Arneriam C_cia/ &ttkmg, 8. .
29· Hammond, BarWtmd Polilit:s, 188. 196. 18g;]eft'enon to Col. Charlea Yancey. 6 ]an. 1816, in Ford. ed., Worir ofJejfmora: FIt1mJ EtüJiDn, XI. 494.
30. (Samuel Blodget), Ec_Ü."a: A StaJistü:a/ ManutJI JOT tAe Unit«J Stales of Amnica (Washington. 1806). '7.
3'. When in the Philadelphia Convention]ame. MadilOn propoaed that the federal govemment be given the explicit power to grant charten of incorporation, the framen decided to linease the illue by saying nothing in the Con.titution about incorporation. out of fear of arou.ing popular opposition to "mereantile monopolie•. " Frank Bourgin, 1711 Gnat C~: 1711 MytIa 0/ ~-Fai" in tAe Etui)' Rf/ltJJlü (New York, IgBg), 44.
32. Hartog. Nlü Propmy tmd PriDau Power, go. 33· Walter R. Fee, 1711 TrrmsitiDnjmn Arist«rrIg /0 lJem«ra&)' in Nn»JnS#)', 1189-1829
(Somerville. N.] .• 1933), '46; ]oseph S . Davi •• Esscys in IM Etui;" History of Allltl'lt41l CrJT/»raIions, IV. Eig1JlmlJla CITIhuJ' Businus CrJT/»raIions in tAe UnitItJ SI4tu (Cambridge. Mass ., 1917), ]21; P. H. Woodwarcl. One Hundrrd Y.rs oftAeHartford Bank . . . (Hartford. 18g2). SO.
34· (Sullivan), Patla /0 Ridw, 37-38, 10, 43. 35· Cochran, FnmtUrs of CMttge, 21; Hartog. Nlit: Propmy tmd PriDatl Pown, 153;
(Blodget). Ec_Ü."a, '7.
36. Oscar and Mary Handlin. ComnumUJ«JiJJJ: A Sh0 of tAe Roll of GoIImU/IIIIt in tAe Arneriam Eanunny: Moss«/uudts, S774-s86s (Cambridge, Mass .• 1947. 1969). 106-33; Ron a1d E. Seavoy, 1711 Origins oftAe Amnican Businm Corporation, J78f-18j5: Broadmm, tAe Ctmupt of NIü SmJiee Durint lruJwtriDlizDliort (We.tp.....rt. Conn .• 19&); Lincoln. quoted in Maier. "The Debate over Incorporation•• " 18.
37· Sandra F. VanBurkleo. " 'The Paw. of Banks'; The Origin. and Significance of Kentucky'. Decision to Tax Federal Banken. 1818-1820," JountIJI of tAe Early &publie, IX (lgBg), 480-87; Sandra F. VanBurkleo. " 'That Dur Pure Republican Principles Might Not Wither': Kentucky·. Relief Cri.i. and the Punuit of Moral Justice, 1818 1&6" (Ph. D. Dis•.• Univenity of MinneIOta. I~), eh. 6.
38. R. Kent Newmeyer, SuprtrM Collrl JUSliee JoslfJh Story: Statuman of tAe OM Republit: (Chape! Hill, tg85). 1]2; Harry N. Scheiber. "Public Righu and the Rule of Law in American Legal Hi.tory." Ca/ijornia Law RninAJ, LXXII (1984), 217- 51 .
4 2 2 Notes 10r pages 322-324
39. "The proposition, that apower to do, includes vinually, apower to undo, as applied to a legi.lative body," wrote Hamihon , "is generally but not universaJly true . All DUt«J ritlJts fonn an exception to the rule." Hamilton, "The Examination," 113 Feb , 18oIl, in Syrett et aI., eds . , Papers of HamilWn, XXV, 533. Edward S. Corwin called the protection of vested rights " the basic doctrine of Arnerican constitutionaJ law ." Cor win , "The Basic Doctrine of American ConstitutionaJ Law ," Mil:higan Los» Review, XII (1914), 247-76·
40. In 1776 most of the revolut ionary state constitutions did not provide for just compensation for the public taking of private propeny; but, following the adopt ion of the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution in 1791 , this provision was explicitly added in nearly a11 the constitutions of states subsequently admitted to the Union . In the following years, where such a specific reference to just compensation remained absent from the constitutions of the original states, judicial interpretation often inser ted it . J . A. C . Grant , "The ' H igher Law ' Background of the Law of Eminent Domain," WisCOllSin UW RnJiew, VI (t930 -31) , 70.
~. Carey, ed ., Dtbaus olIM GmmJ Asstmb{y ofPmnsylvania, 11-111; Davis, EssaJs in lhe His/Dr;1 ol AnlII'Ü'all Corporations, 313·
42. Pmnsylvtlllia P«ket (Philadelphia), 11 Sept. 1786. 43. "It is the regular administration of the laws by an independent judiciary,"
dec1ared a Federalist in the New York constitutional convent ion ofJ8!W-1I1 in a common reckoning, "that renders propeny secure against private acts of violence. " Reporls ol IMDtballs of IM New YOT! COIIvmtioll of 1821, ed. Caner et a1 ., 11411.
-M. {Henry Chipman], All Oratioll Oll IMStudJanti Professwn ol lhe Law (Middlebury, Vt., 1806), 7; Richard E . Ellis, TM JeJ!ersolliall Crisis: Courls alld Politil:s in lhe YOJUl8 Republil: (New York, 1971), 163, 1]6, 177 .
45. Sandra F. VanBurkleo, " '.Honour, Justice, and Interest ' : John Jay's Repub lican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench," }oumo.l of IM EoT{y Reftublil:, IV (1984) , 1163-64, '26g ; Russell Wheeler, " Ex traj udicial Activities of the Early Supreme Coun," Suflrtm6 Court Review (1973), 123-58.
...6. George L. Haakins and Herben A. Johnson, FOU1ldaliolls of Power:JoIIII MaTslut.!l, /80/-15, in Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, History of tJu Suprtm6 Court of IM Ullit«JStaJes, II (New York , 19BI), 18g, 193-95, !W3-04, 246, 297, 336, 354, 395-96, 400, 421; George L . Haskins, " Law versus Politics in the Early Years ofthe Marshali Court, " Ullivern'/)' ol Pmnsylvonia Law Review, CXXX (1gBI), 1-27; Jennifer Nedelsky , "Confining Demo · cratic Polities: Anti-Federalists, FederalislS, and the Constitution," HaTvoTd Law Re oiew, XCVI (1982-83), 351-60; Morlon J. Horwitz, The TTansfOTfTllJlwn ol American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 1157; Newmeyer, }ospeh Siory, 38. 5+. The conlro versy that arose over the constitutionality of the Congress's assigning of administrative duties to the couns in its 17911 Invalid Pension Act was a consequence of this emerging distinction between political 80d legal malters. Some of the justices, on the grounds that they would violate the separation of powers, objected to becoming pension commissioners and making such magisterial decisions . J . M . Sosin, The ATislotTaey of IM Lall' Robe: The OrigillS of }uditial Reouw ill America (Westport, Conn . , IgBg), 1185-8 7.
47. Hamilton, Remarks in New York Assembly , 6 Feb . ry87, in Syrett et 81 ., eds .• Papers of Hamilloll , IV, 35. The view expressed by Hamilton did not of course imme diately take hold . The attomey general of Nonh Carolina, for example, argue"cl in 1794 that the dauses of the state constitution referring to due process and the law of the land were not limitations on the legislature; they were " declara tions the people thought
Notes for pages 325-129 423 proper to malte of their rights, not against apower they supposed their own represen tativea might usurp, but against oppreuion 80d usurpation in general . . .. , by apre tended prerogative against or without the authority o( law. " Thua the phrase that no one could be deprived of his property except by the law of the land meant simply "a law for the people of Nonh Carolina, made or adopted by themaelves by the interven tion of their own legialature." Edward S. Corwin, "Tbe Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil War," HarvtUtJ uw Reoiew, XXIV (19u), 371-72. Blackatone had written that one of the absolute rights of individual. was "the right of propeny: which con.iats in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of 811 his acquiaitions, without 80Y 1
1 control or diminution, Stlvt DrJlJ by IMlaws 0/IMland"-which of course for Blacbtone included those laws enacted by Parliament. Corwin, "Basic Doctrine of American Consututional Law," Mi&hitan uw Reoiew, XII (1914), 254. I~; I
48· A1exander J. DaIIas, quoted in EIIi., JejJrTsrmi4TI Crisis, 179; Michael Les Bene dict, "Laiasez·Faire and Libeny: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of II~, I Laiasez·Faire Constitutionalism," lAw lUIIl His/Dr;1 Review, 111 (lgB5), 323 .- 26
49· Harry N . Scheiber, "The Road to MIllIlI: Eminent Domain 80d the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Couns, " Persp«tiDU in Amm&1ZlI His/Dr;1, V (1971), ]66; I George Darge, La» ill IM New Repuhli&: PriPaJe Law lUIIl IM Publi& EstaJe (New York, IgBS), +0; Madison to JeJrerson, 27June 1823, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., Writi"l1l1fMadisolI (New York, 1900-10), IX, 140; Tocqueville, DemDer«y ill AmnictI, ed . Phillip. Brad1ey (New York, 1956), I, 278.
I~ i i
18. T'he Ce/ebration of COI'TU7Ime I ,I
I. SaulUe! L. Mitchill, All Addnss 16 IM Citiuru ol New York . . . (New York, t8oo), 23; Chevalier, SocUty, M_s, lUIIl Polities in IM UIliUt/ SliIIes, 1183; J .A . Leo Lemay, 1 1 "Poe'. 'Tbe Business Man': Its Contexts 80d Satire of Franklin's AuIobiDgrapiay, " Pot I SlvJits XV (1982), 30; Clay, Speech in the House of Representatives, 211 J8O. 1812, in HoplUm, ed., Pa/Jm ofCltzy, 1,6116. I
2. Nilu' W-.tlJ RIgimr, V (1813-14), 1-16; Corner, ed ., AuIobiDl'apltJ 0/&..jamin Rush, 338; Harriet Silvester.Tapley, &ima Imprinls, 1768-1825: A His/Dr;1 0/IM FiTst FiftJ Years I1f PriTlJi,., in Salma, Mass«huseus (Salem, 1927), 106. 1 1
3· Steven Watts, 17Ie Repuhliean Rem: War lUIIl IM Maki,., ol LilHral Amm&a, '790 Ilho (Baltimore, IgB7), 63-107. 1I
I 4· NiUs' W.kly R~, I (18n-III), 1152; William Craft., Orati4Tll1l1 IMIIIjl_ of Moral
C4luu, rm NaJüma/ ~ .. . (Cambridge, M8II., 1817), 40. I1 1 5· Cabot, quoted in Fischer, Revoluw)II 0/AmericOll CIJfISmJtIIism, 3.
6. JeJrerson to Spencer Roane, 6 Sept. 1819, in Ford, ed ., Writi,.,s of }effersoll, X, 140; Bloomfield, Amm&IZlIUWprS, 37. 'II!I!
7· Ford, Joel &ritJw, 8g' 'l 8. AmenQm MIUeIlnJ, V (178g), 555; Richard D . Brown, "Tbe Emergence of Urban
Society in Rural Maaaachusettl, '760-'820," }otml4ll1f Anteri&an History, LXI (t974), 2g 51; Brown, "The Emergence of Voluntary Asaociationa in Massachusetts, 1760-1830 , " I Jl1unuJlof Volrml4ry ActwlI Research, 11 (1973), 64-73.
9· Ingersoll, "Inftuence of America on the Mind" (1823), in Blau , ed ., AmericlZll ,,11 !'fti/oSf1/1hi& Addresses, 36; William E. Ch8Oning, "Remarks on Auociations" (1829), in Works of William E. Clumllilll (Boston, 1877), 139-40. Ilil·
1
III1111 11
4 25 4 24 Notes fOT pages 329-335
10. On thc changing nature of these bcnevolent societies. see Conrad E. Wright. "Christian Compassion and Corporate Beneficence: The lnstinnionalizauon of Charitv in ~ew England. 'i20- ,810" (Ph.D, Diss .• Brown University. I~()).
n. Nicholas Collins. "An Essay on those inquiries in Natural Phüosophy whieh at present are rnost beneficial ro the United Stares of America, " Ameriean Philosophical Sociery, Tmns., 11 (1193). vii; George H. Knoles, "The Religious Ideas of Thomas Jefferson," Misswippi ~illk)' Historical Reouu, XXX (1943-+4-), 194: Henry May, The En/ighlmmmt in Ammca (New York, 1976). 12-13: Butler, Awash in a $ea ofFaith. 195-96. 214-15; Trevor Colboum. ed., filme alldthe FoulIding Fathm' ESJa)'s~, Douglars Adair (New York, 1914-). 141n.
12. Mjarinus] Willet 10 Aaron Burr, 8 Mar. 180:, in Mary-Jo Kline et al., eds., Politiral Co"ts!K'lIdtnU and Publi, Papers oJAaron Burr (Princeton, 1983), 1,522; Colbourn, ed .. Fanu alld the FounJiing Fathers, 149-59: May. En/ightnlmmt in .'tmtrua, 326-34.
13. In 1806 SI. George Tucker of Virginia. a1though a lifelong deisr, became fright ened enough by the social chaos that infidelit)' supposedly had eaused that he was willing ro suppon state subsidies for Christian teachers regardless of sect. May, ElI/ight· mmmt in Amnica, 331.
14· John T. Honon, james Kmt: A Stud.)· in COllsmatism. 1'763-1847 (New York). 190· Joseph Story in his Commenlllnts (1833) also discovered that Christianity was pan of the common law. Franklin Hamlin LittelI, From Sliltt Chur&h to Pluralism: A PrDksta1lt lnkr pret4tion oJ Rtligion in Amnuan History (l';ew York. 1962). 48
15. Salstonstall. in journal oJDebatt: anti ProCtedings in tlaL Convention of DtkgaUs, Clwsm to Revist tlaL COllStitution 0/Massa€husetts, &gun and HoUJen al &ston. Nounnber '5, 1820, a"d Continued ~)' Adjoummtnl to janUlJry 9, 1821 (Boston, 1853), 201; Beeeher, On thL lmportJJra« oJAssistill! roung Mm 0/Piety and Ta/mts in Obtainillg an Education for the Gosptl Minut1)' (New York, 11815)), 16.
16. Willlam Breitenbach. "Unregenerate Doings: Selftessness and Selfishness New Di"inity Theolog)'," Amtrican QutJrttr[y, Xx...XIV (1982). 419-502.
in .:\1 }:~!
I:J I
11. joseph Smith, The Pmrl oJ Great Price (Sah Lake City, 1914), 41; John Rogers, TJv Biograph) of Eldtr &rton Wa"en St01ll ... (Cincinnati, 1841). 45.
18. Elias Smith. Th, UDillg KinJi"m of God DispUl"dill the TrilUflph ofRtpub/icanism in Ammea ... (n.p .. 1809). 27. See in general Nathan O. Hateh, TAt DmwertatiZ4tioll of Amtrican Chnstia",~)' (Ne",. Haven. 1989). for the popular effecu on religion of the Second Great Awakening.
19· Abel M. Sargent. The Dtstrwti01l oJ the Etast ill tJu Downfal/ ofStctariallism ... (n.p .. 11806», 15: Otis. quoted in Josiah Quinc)', Th, History ofHarvtl,rtl UniDtrSity (Carn bridge. Mass., 1840). 11, 663.
'20. DonaJd M. Scon, From Offict to ProJession: TAt New EngUllld Ministry, 17S0-18jO (Philadelphia. 1918). 34. 41-.f.8.
21. Lyman Beecher, "The NeeessilY of Revivals of Religion to the Perpetuiry of Our Civil and Religious Institutions, ,. The Sp;rit oftJae Pilgrims (1831). 467-11.
22. Washington, "Farewell Address" (1196). in W. B. Allen. ed., G«Irgt J+iuhingtoll: A Colleetioll (lndianapolis. 1988), 521; Rush. "Ta the Ministers of All Denominations," 21 June '788, in Butterfie1d, ed .• Letkrs oJ Rush, I. 46,-62; Beecher, A RtjomJlJtion oJ Morals Practuahlt and lndispmsablt: A Strmon Dt/lUtred at Neu' HalJnJ on the ElJnJillt oJOctober 27, 1812 (Andover, Mass., 1814). 18.
23.•. Formarion and Constitution of the Columbia Moral Sociery," Columbia Mag azine, I (18 14-15), 179-85.
24. Josiah Quiney, quoted in Frederic Cople Jaher, The Urban Est4b/ishment· Upptr
1t.fotes for pages 336-341
Stralll i1l &stoll, NftIJ York, Cluzr/uto", Chiulto, alld Los AlIftles (Urbana, 111., 1982), 41; M. J. Heale, "Humanitarianism in theEarly Republie: The Moral Reformers of New Vork, 1176-1825," Journal ofAmmcall StuJus, 11 (1g68), 161-15.
25· Ferd, "Amerieanus," in Hyneman and Lutz, eds., Amtrieall PolitieaJ Wn'tillg, 11, 924.
26. Jeremiah Atwater, A Sermon Prmehed INfort His bell/nuy lsaac Tichmor, Esq., Col1mll}r . . . on tIu Doy of tJuAnlli~trrary Eketio", October 14, 180:z (Middlebury, Vt., 1802), 18-19; Niln' W"kJy Rttistn', 111 (1812-13), 328.
27· Tocqueville, quoted in Wood, "Tnterests and Disinterestednesa;" in Beernan er al., eds., &ytmd tJu CDftjtrJmdion, 103.
28. Christopher Manwaring. Rtpub/icallUm aruJ AristDtTttey COlltrastld ... F.xhibited ;11 d1I Oratioll, Dtlivertti Ilt Ntw LoNioll, ju/y 41h, 1/hf. (Norwieh, Conn., 1804), 9.
29· Montesquieu, Spirit of tJu Laws, ed. Neumann, Pt. I, bk. xx, eh. 13, p. 32$ [Anon. ], Tht Cqmmnew CDfUluct oJtJu U"iUtJ SlilttS ofAmnica COftSitkrtti, aruJ tJu Trw llltn'tst t1tIrIoj, AttmapUd to & Swn 1Jy a Citut1l ofNtw }'ort (New York, 1186), .f..
30. "Perhaps the most eontroversial subject of political economy," said De Witt Clinton in 1814 , "is whether the ho me or foreign eommerce is most produetive of national wealth." De Wiu Clinton, A Discourrt Dt/ivered btjorr tJu Ntw- York Historlea/ SMtty, Ilt TMir AlIniDtrSary Mming, 6t1t D«nnber ,811 (New York, 1814), 31.
31. [BlodgetJ, Ecollomica, 12. 9, J(y,z; [Samuel Blodgetj, Thoughts on tItI/lIcrt4SllIg Wta/th alld Natiolla/ Ef01Iomy of tJu U"illd Staks ofAmtriea (Washington. D. C., 1801).
32. [Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracyj, A TreaJut 011 Po/itical EcoNJmy ... (Georgetown, 1811), xvi. xix; [Destutt de TracYI, A Commmtary aruJ RtfJUw oJM01Itlsqui",'s Spirit of tJu lAws ... (Philadelphia, 1811), 232; Emmet Kennedy, "A Philosophe in the Age of Revolution: Destuu de Tracy and the Origins of Jdeology," Ameriean Philo sophieaJ Society, Mmtllir, CX.XIX (Philadelphia, 1918), 212; Joyee AppJeby, "What Is Still American in the PoJitical Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?" WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (1g82), 287-309.
33· Laommi Baldwin, TltoUfltts on the StuJy ofPo/itiea/ Ecollortty, as C01l1l«tld with tJu Popul4lion. lndwtry alld Paptr CU""'cy of tJu UlIitea States (Cambridge, MaIS .• 1809), 61·
34-. Baldwin, Tlwugltu 011 Po/it'cal &0110"'.1, 45; Madison. Notes for a Speech Oppos ing Paper Money, ca. I Nov. 1186, in RutJand et al., eds, Pa/JtTr of .'4atiisoll, IX, 158 59; [Eriek Bollmanj, Parfll"aplu 011 &1I1r.s (Philadelphia. 1810), 24..
35· Margaret E. Manin, Mtrcluzn/.! and Trade ofthe COllll«ticut Riutr Va//ey, 1750 - 1820 (Nonhampton, Mass., 1939), 148: Ni/es' WttK" RtglSkr, IX (1815).238: Rodney, in John R. Commons ct al.. eds .. A Docummtary HisU1ry ofAmmea1J 11ldustria/ Socitty: Labor Con spirttey CastS (Cleveland. 1910), HI. 110.
36. Freneau, quoted in Watts, Repub/" Rtborrz, 81. 37· See James T. Lemon and Gary Nash, "The Distribution 01' Weahh in
Eighteenth-Century Ameriea: A Century ofChange in Chester County. Pennsylvania. 1693-1802," journa/ oj SoeÜJJ History, 11 (1968), 1-'4; Allen Kulikoff. "The Progress of InequaJity in Revolutionary Boston," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXVIII (19il), 375-"12; Lee Sohow, "Economic InequaJity in the United States in the Period from 119 to 1860," 0 jOUmd/ of EcotUlmie History, x...x..XI (1911), 822-39; Jackson Turner Main, "Trends in Wealth Concentration berore 1860'," joun141 aj Ecorunnic History, XXXI (1971), <H5-51.
38. Carey, ed., DtbaJu oftItr Gentral Assnnb/y oj Pt1ItlSy/uallia, 38, 21. 130 . 39· William Smith, Ell/ogium 011 Bmjamin Frallk/ill, LL. D. .. Dt/illtrtd March. I,
'79', ... bejort tltt Amtrieall Plailosophica/ Soeiety ... (Philadelphia, Ij92 ) .
426 Notes Jor pages 342-345 40. Roland M. Baumann, "John Swanwick: Spokesman for 'Merchant-Republic
anism' in Philadelphia, 1790""17911," PtftllSJIlHmUa MllpZitll of HistMy tltII1 Biol'd/Jh" XCVII (1973) , 141·
41 . GJ.u#I o/Ilu SkJU 0/ SouJla Caro/itIIJ (Charlelton), 13 May 1784; [Anon .), R_1cs on tIu RigJus 0//,wenlD,s, lJIId tIu /njlwrJr' 0/tluir SttuJus in 1'rrmuJlirag tIu Enjoymmts of Lif" oM Mlu Prospnity (Boston, 1807), 15.
+2 . William L. Hedges, "Washington Irving : Nonsense, the Fal of the Land and the Dream of Indolence," in Matthew J. Bruccoli, ed ., TIu Chilf GIlt} of Ewry Ptopl6 (Carbondale, IIl. , 1973), 156; Mes.erli, HortIU Mtllln, 90; Stanley E1kins and Eric McKitrick, "A New Meaning for Turner's Frontier: Oemocracy in the Old North west, " Poülical &intu Q]MIrtnl}, LXIX (19~), 334; Oe Witt Clinton, "Oration before the New York Alpha of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Schenectady, July 22, 1823," in Williston, ed ., Eloqumu of tIu U"itN SIiIUs, V, 516-17; Sedgwick, quoted in Stow Penons, TIu /Neli", of Amm&mi GmtiliJy (New York, 1973), 50.
43. Edward Pessen. "The Egalilarian Myth and American Social Realiry : Wealth ', Mobility, and Equality in the 'Era of the Common Man,' " Arnniat" HislDrieal RIIJUw, LXXVI (1971), 989-1034. For an acute criticism of Pessen's formulations, see Jaher, UrlJan Esl4blishmmJ, 68-71 .
44. Obsnvalions Oll Publie Prineipks ond Cha,odm; with RtJmnu ID RICIftl Emw (n.p. , 1820), 29-31. '
45. Hawthorne, T1II Hous, of ,''' &vm Gobles (Boston, 1883), eh. ii, 55-64. 46. Chevalier, SociII" MtllltUrs, lJIId Polities i" tIu U"illti SttJus, 212; Frances Trollope ,
Domul" MtIIIM'fs of tIu ,Amm'cans, ed . Donald Smalley (New York, 1960), 99-100; Jane L . Melick , T1II Eraglish TrtWIln i" AmtritG, 1785-1835 (New York, I~O) , 307, 308; Grund, Amm'cans, i" Tluir Morrzi, S«i4l, aruf Politieal R,lalilms, 25; Port Folio, (1804), 214; Joel Barlow, Äau", ID tIu Priuilegttl Ordns i" tIu SnmJI Staus of EIm1f1e R,sulJittg.frorn tIu N«ISsity ond ProFiltJ 0/" Gmnal RIVOIIltiOII in tIu Prituipksof GoIJmU'lllfll (J792) (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956), 18 . In IBM the buyer of a church pew in a New England meeting house called himself a "gentleman," but the .eller Iabeled him a "blacksmith." Jonalhan Prude , T1II Corn irag of /ruiJUtri4J Ordn: Town tltII1 Ftui4ry Lif, i" RJUal Massoehusl/tS, 1810-1860 (Cambridge, Eng., 19113), 32.
47. Peter Goldberger, "The Trial of Joumeymen Shoemaken and the Collaple of Philadelphia's Artisan Community" (Honon Thesis, Brown Univenity, 19112), 16.
48. Isaiah Thomu, An Oratimt Dtlivmd in . . . LtmeIASIIrr . . . MlASs«/austtts . . . In9 .. . (Worceller, Mass., '781), quoted in Sleven C . BuUock, "The Revolutionary Transfonnation of American FreemalOnry, 1752-17~," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XLVII (1990), 368; Steven C. Bullock, "The Ancienl and Honorable Sociely: Freemasonry in Amer ica, I730-1830" (Ph . D. Dias., Brown Univenity, 1986). 124; Nathaniel Chipman , SJwIau 0/tIu Prinnples 0/Gowmmml (Rutland, Vt., I793), 55.
49. Tunis Wortman, Oralion 0" tIu /"fl- of Soci4l /nstituMn II/»n HUm4" Morals aruf Happittess . . . (New York, '796); Lyman Beecher, T", R",.,Qy/or DwUirag . . , (Sag Harbor, N. Y., 1807); Evarta B. Greene, "The Code of Honor in Colonial and Rev olutionary Musachusetts, " Colonial Society of Musachusetta., Tnms., XXVI (1924 26), ,368-87 ; Kenneth S. Greenberg, Masllrrs tAJIti SWumm: TIu Po/ilual Cu/lur, oj Amniean Slawry (Baltimore, 19115) , 23-41 ·
50. David Ramaay 10 Benjamin Rush , :29 July m4, in Brunhouse, ed., Dtwid Ramsay . . . Sehelions from His Writirags, 51 ; Amm&mi Mus,.."., XI (1792), 218-19; Roherl C . McLean, G«Jrge Tuekn: Moral Plai~sopIan and Mon 0/ Utllrrl (Chapel Hili , 1961), 214 15 ; RIfIorIs of tIu lJIbtJus0/ tIu NIW fo,t C01I/II1Ilion 0/18gl, Carter et a1 ., eds. , 208; Thomas
. r }\
I ,
Notes.lo, pages 345-354 427 P. Abernethy, Frrnn FrrntIÜr ID PltmItAJion i" TnJ1IISS«: Ä Stutiy i" FrrmtUr 1JmuJmIq (Chapel Hill , '932). tn-78.
51· Noah Weblter, Ä" Ämm'e"" DKtitnuzry of tIu Eraglislr ~ . . . (New York, 1828), I .
52· Mone, ed., SturuJIl F. B. MOnl: His Lttters tltII1 Jollnl4ls, I, 164; Gardner (1806), in SimplOn ed . , Fttlnaiisl LiJmuyMituJ, 81.
53· Roberr A. Ferguson, 1Aw ond Ulllrrs i" Ämm&a.t Cultur, (Cambridge, Mus., 19fI4), 12; Kent, "An Introductory Leeeure to a Course of Law Lectures " (t794), in 'H yneman and LUIZ, eds., Ämm&a.t Politi&tJl Wrilirags, 11, 945;Jefferson to Thomu Mann Randolph, Jr., 30 May 1']90, in Boyd et al., eds ., p"pm 0/J'.ffnso", XVI, 449.
~. Ferguson, 1AwlJIId Lttters, 21. 55· Ferguson, 1Aw lJIId Lttters, 201; Gerald W . Gewalt, TM PrrJmis, of Pown: TM E~ of tIu Lqal Pro./usünt i" MlASsadtuslUs, 1]60-1840 (Westport, Conn ., 1979), 39 69; Bruce Sindair, PltiWIlphUa 's Plti~sophn Mtehanies: Ä Histqry of tIu FrlA1Ilclin /nstituJl, Ißg4-186s (Baltimore, 1974), 40-41.
56· FergulOn, 1AwondLeuers, 244 , 246.
19· MüJdI4-C/ass Order
I . (CharleI Jared IngersoU), /ne/Uquitt, tIu Jm.;"s Lttters . . . (1810), in Wood, ed., Risirag GlJny 0/Ä",,"", 387.
g . George WillOn Pierson , T«lfWIiiiU i" ArnnictA, abridged by Dudley C . Lunt (New York, 1959), 4-+: Grund , Ärnniams, i" Tluir Moral, S«i4l, lJIId Political Rtlations, 14-5:
1 Cooper, quoted in Edwin H . Cady, TIu Gmtlmttm i" Ämme.z: A Litmuy Sltuly i" Ämm&a.t Cu/bArs (Syracuse, 1949), 121.
3· Jefferson toJohn Banister, Jr., 15 Oet . 1785, in Boyd et a1., eds., p"pns ofJ'.fftrson, VIII, 6J6; Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, 28 Nov. 1820, in Ford, ed., Wrilittgs ofJ'.fftrso", x. 166. See Lawrence A. Cremin , Ämnican &.IuetlliD,,: TIu Natimtal~" 1783-18;6 (New York, 1980), 11, 249-334.
4· Meyer Reinhold, Ciasna: Ämm&mttA: T1II cmd; ond R_ HtriltAtt in tIu U"il#d Sl4lIs (Detroit , 1984), 129, 124.
5· Rush to Jamel Hamilton, 21 June 1810 , in ButterfieId, ed., Uttm of Rush, 11, 1053. Othen too thought that the number of those attending collegel and academies in the United Statel ought to be Iimited, "Iince but few men can, or ever ought to live by their learning." David Bamel, Ä Discours, Oll EtitIuIlion (Boslon 1803), 11 .
6. Joseph Stevens Bucluninlter (lllo9), in Simpson , ed ., FttlIrtAÜsI LiJerory Miruf, 100. 7· Cooper, Notilms 0/tIu Ämm'earu, I, 153-~, 155, 172, 176, 164, 165. 8. Hawthorne, TIu Hous, 0/tIu SIPm GtJ!J1es, eh. xii, 211. 9· "From Tunbridge, Vennont , to Landon, England-TheJoumai ofJames Guild,
Peddler, Tinker, Schoolmuter , Portrait Painter, from 1818 to 1824," ed . Arthur Wal !ace Peach, Vennont Historical Society, PrPt., V (1937), 250.
10. Ibid., 256, 258, 260. D. Ibid ., 276, 2&1, 298, g6I, 300, 279, 288, 304. 12. Ibid ., 218. 13· Ibid ., 300, 301, 305. 14· Ibid ., 306, 307, 308. '5· Ibid. , JOB.
429 4 28 Notes jor pages 354-360 I
1',
16. David Jaffe, "One of the Primitive Sort: Portrait Malters of the Rural North, 'I
1]60-1860," in Hahn and Prude, eds., Countrysitle in theAge of Capitalistic Transformo.tion,
111, 110. 17. Jefferson to Madison, 20 Sept. 1785, in Boyd et al. , eds., Papers ofjejferson, VIII,
535; Jefferson, Notes on the Statt of Virginia, ed, Peden, 153· 18. Williarn Tudor, North Ammcan Review, 11 (1815-16), 161; Oliver W. Larkin, Samuei
F. B. Morse anti Ammcan Dmwcratu Art (Boston, 1954), 16; Latrobe to Hugh Henry Brackenridge, 18 May 1803, in John C. Van Horne and Lee W. Formwalt, eds., TJu CorresporuJeru:e and Miscellaneous Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe (New Haven, IgB4) , I,
3°°· 19. Port Folio (1810), 499· 20. Youth 's Gujth to Happi'IUss, Consisting of Poems, Essays and Sermons, Particularly Cal
culattdJor the Pious lnstru&tion of the Rising Generation ([New York] , 1810); Schlesinger,
Learni"g How to Bthave, 22. 21. Franlclin Society for the Suppression of Intemperance (Broadside: Greenfield, Mass., 23
Feb. 1814)· 22. Mason L. Weems, The True Patriot: Or an Oration on the Beauties and Btatituths of a
Republic. . (Philadelphia, 1802), 37· 23. Destutt de Tracy, Commmtary and Review of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Lauis, 72 ;
Joseph Hopkinson, "Annual Discourse, Delivered before the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts" (18Ig), in Wood, ed., Rising Glory of Amenca, 333·
24. Hopkinson, "Annual Discourse," in Wood, ed., Rising Glory of Amtrica, 333; Ruth H. Bloch, "The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America," Signs: journal of Women in Culture and Socitty, XIII, No. I (lgB7), 37-58·
25. Literary Maguine, V (1806); CharJes G. Ferris, An Oration, Delivered before the Tam many StKitty ... on the Fourtli ofjuly, 1816 (New York, 1816), 10; Niles' Wttkly Register, I (1811-12), 61.
26. Samuel L. Mitchill, "The Progress of the Human Mind from Rudeness to
Refinement ... ," Ammcan Montlaly Magazine, 111 (1818), 358-63.
27. [Ingersoll], lnchiquin, thejesuit's Leuen, in Wood, ed., Rising Glory of Amtrica, 385,
388; Elkanah Watson, History of the Rise, Progress, and Existing Condition of tht WesttTrt CaNJls in theStatt ofNew York . . . (Albany, 1820), gl; Charles Sprague, "Oration, 4July 1825, " in Willison, ed., Eloqunue in the Unittd Statts, V, 339·
28. Wright. Views 01 SDciety and Manners, ed. Baker, 174; Edward Everett, "Accu mulation, Property, Capital, Credit" (13 Sept. 1838), in Orations and Speeches, 11, 291.
29. {Bollman], Paragraphs on Banks, 8; Webster, "The Boston Mechanics' Institu tion" (1828), in Writings and Sptlt:hts of Ddniel Webster: NatioNJI Edition (Boston, 1903), 11, 40; Daveis, "Address," in Blau, ed., Social Theories ofjacJcsonian DernDcracy, 4°·
30. Theron Metcalf, An Address tIJ the PAi Beta KappaSociety of Brown University, Dtliv ered stJa September, 1832 (Boston, 1833), 4; North Ammcan Review, III (1816), 345-47·
31. Jacob Viner, The Roleof Providence in theSocial Order: An Essay in Intellectll41 History (Philadelphia, 1972), 111; Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Cau sality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," WMQ, 3rd Ser., XXXIX (lgB2), 440
41. 3~' Gordon S. Wood, "The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolu
tion," in Robert H. Horwitz, ed., The Moral FoundDtions of the American Republic (Char lottesville, 1977), 125-26; Legare, "Oration on Fourth ofJuly 1823," in Writings, 1,268
69· 33. Everett, ••An Oration Pronounced at Cambridge hefore the Society of Phi Beta
Notes Jor pages 360-365
Kappa" (1824), in Blau, 00., Ameri&an PAiIosoplat'eal Addresses, 75; Bancroft, "The Offiee of the People in Art, Govemment, and Religion," ibid., 107.
34. Patricia Cline Cohen, A CakuJoti"l People: Tlu SpreoJ. ofNumeracy i" &rly AmIJ"ied (Chicago, IgB2), 151, 154·
35. Everett, Oratioru anti Spt«hes, I, 272. 36· Cohen, C4l&rJali"l People, 154. 37. James H. Smylie, "Charles Nisbet: Second Thoughts on a Revolutionary Gen
eration," PmnsylvtUlUJ MtJlGZine ofHistory and BitJgraJJlay, XCVIII (1974), 201. 38. MedieaJ Rl/JOsitory, XVIII (1817), 26g-70; Emersen, "American Scholar," in At
kinson, ed., Complete Essa)s anti Other Writi"ls, 61. 39. Hopkinson, "Annual Discourse," in Wood, ed., Rising GIory of Amerita, 328; Samuel
Wileiams, 17tt NotumJ anti Civil HistDry of Vm1IOIII (Burlington, Vt., r808), 11, m. 40. John H. Wilkins, EIemIrw of Astronom) ... ,2nd 00. (Boston, 1823), vi, quoted
in WilliamJ. GiJmore. " "The Annihilation ofTime and Space': The Transformation of Event and Awarenels in Ameriean Consciousness, c. 1780-1850," paper deJivered at Conference on Printing and Society in Early America, American Antiquarian Society, 24-25 Ocr, IgBo, 50·
41. George Tucker (1827), quoted in Gordon S. Wood, "EvangelicaJ America and Early Monnonism," New York History, LXI (lgBo), 369; Neil Harns, HumbUf: 1M Art of P. T. Ba",um (Boston, 1973), 61-ag; MelviJIe, Moby Dick, ed. Hayford and Parker, eh. 124 , p. 425.
42. David Tappan, A Discourse Deliwretl in the Chapei ofHtuf)(Jrd College, june 19, 1798 (Boston, 17gB), 4-5.
43. Edward Everett, An Oralion Deliwretl al Concord, April tIu Ninetemth 18flS (Boston, 1825), 49; Bishop, Oration in Wallingford, iii, iv.
44. {George Hay], An Essay 0" tIu Liberty oftlu Press ... (Philadelphia, 1799), 40; Jefferson, Inaugural Address, 4 Mar. 1801, in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds., 1M Lift and Sele&tetJ Writings ofThomas jejferson (New York, 1944), 322; Wood, ••Democ ratization of Mind," in Horwitz, ed., Moral Fount.ltui01lS, 123-28.
45. Judge Addison (Pa.), quoted in John C. Miller, 1M Ftderalist Era, 'l8g-IBoI (New York, 1960), 232; !saac Chapman Bates, An Oration, Pronouncetl al Nortlrampton, jrJy 4, IBoS (Northampton, Mass., 1805),6-7, 15.
46. Wood, "Democratization of Mind," in Horwitz, 00., Moral FoUllli.alitJ1IS, 124-25. 47. Adam Smith, The Tkeory of Moral Sentiments (1759), ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L.
Macfie (Oxford, 1976), 112. 48· Madison to Rush, 7 Mar. 1790, in Charles Hobson et aI., eds., Papers ofMadison,
XIII,93· 49. Samuel Miller, A Brief Rmospect of the EightemtJa Cmtury ... (New York, 1803),
11, 254-55. 50. Tunis Wortman, A TrllJlise Concemi"l PolitieaJ Enquiry, anti tIu Liberty oftIu Pms
(New York, 1800), 180; Daveis, "Address," in Blau, 00., Social Theoriu ofjacksonillta Dmwcracy, 45; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Theodore Sedgwt'ek, FetÜralist: A Politi&al Portrait (Middletown, Conn., 1965), 211.
51· Williams, HistIJry ofVmnont, 11, 394; Metcalf, Address to PM BetIJ Kappa, 4, 21-22. ,52. Daveis, "Address," in Blau, ed., Social Theories ofjaeJcsonia" Dmwcracy, 49-50. 53· Emerson, "Science" (1834), TJu &rly Let:tures: 1833-18j6, ed. Stephen E. Whicher
and Robert E. Spiller (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), I, 49. 54. Emerson, TJu joum4ls and Miscella'IUtJus NottbooJcs, ed. William H. Gilman and
Alfred R. Ferguson (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 103-4.
43° Notes Jo, pagts 365-369 ',' ,I ' I
55. Emenon, "Human Culture," "The Philosophy of History," TM Early lMtruts: 1836-1838, ed . Stephen E. Whicher et aI. (Cambridge, Mus., 1964), 11, 218, 17 .
56. Emersen, "Historical Notes of Life and Letten in New England," 1MtIJns muJ -.
BWgTapllual Skn&Ms, in TM CompkU Worb (Boston, 1883), X, 326. 57. Marvin Zetterbaum, TOU/fUvilk aM IM Problnn of~ (Stanford, 1967), 59. 58. Franltlin to Charles Thomson , 29 Dec, 1788, in Smyth, ed ., Writi",s ofBntjami"
Fradli", IX, 6gJ-g7. 59. Rush tojohn Adams, 19 Feb., :l9june, 14 Aug. 1805,:1 Apr. 1807, 13june 1808,
:I Oet . 1810, 27JUDe 1812, in lohn A. Schutz and Douglasa Adair, eds., TM Spw ofF_: , I DWopes 01Jo"" Adams aM Bmjamin Rw", 1805-1813 (San Marino, Calif., IgBo), 22, 28, 31, 32, 79, 108, 109, 16g, 227; Rush to Granville Sharp, 8 Ocr . 1801, in lohn A. Woodl. "The Correspondenee of Benjamin Rush and GranviIle Sharpe, 1773-180g ," Jolmltll of AII'IIrica.. Studw, I (1967), 35. Following the defeat of the Federalists in 1800, even AI exander Hamilton underwent a deep religious convenion . Douglasa Adair, "Wu Alesander Hamilton a Christian Statesman?" F_ au tIJe Fowuli", FatMrs: Essays by Do",l4ss Adair. ed. Trevor Colbourn (Chapei Hill, 1974), 154-56; May, Eflligllttmrllnl ill AmmCa, 329.
60. Wuhington to jonathan Trumbull, 21 july 1799, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Wrili",s of Waskillgloft, XXXVII, 312-13 ; May, ErtÜlhJmmml in AIIIIri&tz, 335; Adams tojelfenon, 15
't ,' july ISt3, in Cappon, ed ., Adams-JeffmOtl Ldun. 11, 358; Hamilton 10 Gouverneur Mor ris, 29 Feb , 1802, in Syrett et al., eds ., Paptrs ofHtJmiJJon, XXV, 544.
61. Roben E . Shalhope, "Thomas jelferaon's Republicanism and Antebellum Southern Thought," Jolmltll 01 Soullamt HisllJry, XLII (1976), 529-56.
62. jelfenon to Dr. Themas Humphreys, 8 Feb, 1817, to Francis Adrian Van Oe Kemp, 11 Jaß. 18:15, in Ford, ed., Writings 01Jeffmoft, X, 77, 337.
63. RtfJOrts oftIJe INbaIes 0/ IM NtW York ClIlIlJfIIlion of1821, ed . Carter et al ., 261 .
Index
Adams, john, 3, 14, 266; background of, 196, 197; on balanced govemment, 267; on banking, 318; on Cicero, 204; on common people, 27, 374nö cosmopolitanism of, 221; on court iers, 175-6; disiUusionment of, 366-7; on education, 190; on enlightenment , 191; on equalily, 171,237; on fame, 40,59 60; on family authority, 48, 147, 182; on freedom and servilude, 172, 179; on friendship, 58; on gentlemen, 31, 118, 195, 374n, 375n; on govemment salaries, 288-9; u "Humphrey Ploughjogger," 237-8 ; on intemperance, 306; on interest, 175,267; on M.... government, 16-17, 410-11n; on moneylending, 69; on Otis, 200; on patronage, 64, 80, 88; prolperity feared by, 315; on republicanism, 95, 407n; on locial afl'ection, 220; on .odal rank, 21; on religion, 330; resentment. of, 200-1, 289-90; on Revolution, 169; on Washington, 40, 288-9; on work, 281
Adaml, john Quincy, 218, 231, 301, 346 Adaml, Samuel: background of, 197;
disintereltedneas of, 253; dilillusionment of, 366; on English example, 110; PI Freemuon, 223; on heredity, ~n; on mobl, 90; on Order of the Cindnnati, 241; and republicanism, 205
AddilOl1, joseph, 38, 103; and CtlIII, 143, 197-8,216-17; on commerce, 37; on patriarchy, 43; and politeness, 216
African·Americanl, 90, 236 Albany Regency, 300 Alexandria, Va., 134 allegiance, 11, 15,40; and consent, 166,
397n Allen, Jamel, 84, 176, 213-14 Allen, William, 73, 76, 177 Allen family, 176 AllilOn. Francil, 197 America: compared to England, 16-17,
110, 112-17,296-7; compared to
Europe, 306; population of, 6; s• .uo society, colonial; society, U .S.; United Statel
American Revolution, SIt Revolution , American
Amel, Fi.her, 230, 231, 266, 293 Amory family, 119 Anglican church, SM Church of England Annapolil, Md ., 37 Anti·Federalill., 255, 258-9, 294, 296,
412n antiquity, c1allical, 100-1,284--8,
369 apprenticeship, 23, 51, 52, 162, 185-6; s.
diso servitude Arendt, Hannah, 3, 376n ari.tocracy, 8, 320, 363; and American
Revolution, 276; attaeh on, 240-1 , 242, 243, 255, 305, 409n; in Conn., 272-3 ; in England, 15, 25-6, 122; and govemment laIariel, 291, 416n; and judiciary, 325: introduction into coloniel, 174; nature of, 25, 27, 150, 273, 293; paslion. of, 27, 28, 39-40, 273-4; and proprietary wealth, 68, 410 Iln; revolutionariel' idea of, 195, 196, 237,262-3,291, 315n; in South, 71, 115-17,281 ; weakness of, 30,113 ,121, 266, 271; SM diso gentlemen
Arnold, 8enedict, 75 Aniclel ofConfederation , 313 ani.ans, 22, 23, 317, 341; and
Freemuonl, 344; and govemment , 85, 244-7; and intereltl, 85, 107; and labor, 37, 277; and mobl, 244; and patron., 63-4; u Republicans, 276; IlatUI of, 23, 38, 185-6,280,341,344, 426n; weaknellof, in South, 115
_mbHel, colonial, 174 Alsociation, Continentill, 35 _iations, voluntary, 328-9 Athen., ancient, 100 Augu.tu. Caesar, 102-3 AUlten, Jane, 68, 194, 196
..
433 Index43 2
authority, 11,294; and contracts , 164; and equality, 241; and Landon Carter, 152-5; and mobs, 89-91; nature of, 16, 111, 155-9; new structures of, 213; and paper money, 339; royal, 16, 17-18 ; of V .S . government, 328 ; weakness of, 145, 146, 157-8 , 159, 161,308 ,361-2
Babyion, 273 Bacon, Sir Francis, 284 Bacon, Thomas, 54 Baldwin, Laommi, 339 Baltimore, Md ., 134,316 Baltimore, Frederick Calvert, Earl of, 55,
79 Bancroft, George, 360 Bank of North America, 256-8, 316, 319,
322 Bank of the United Stares, 263, 316, 337 bankruplcy, 117,212,266 banks, 65, 279, 367; land , 66, 141;
numbers of, 316-17 Banks, Sir Joseph, 34 Bapt ists, 144, 160, 332, 333 Baring, Alexander, 318 Barlow, Jod, 222, 330, 343 Barnum, P . T., 362 Barre, Col. Isaac, 73 Bartram. John, 30 Bartram. William, 30 Beccaria, Cesare Bonesana, Marehese di,
193 Becker, Carl , 3 Beecher , Lyman , 331, 333, 334 Beekman, Henry, 56 , 89 &ggar's Ofwra, T1u (Gay), 102 Belcher, Jonathan, gov. of Mass., 177 Belknap, Jeremy, 213, 366 benevolence, 239, 240, 357, 424n; and
reforrn, 191, 328-9; 334-5 ; and republicanism, 213-15; sa also love ; politeness
Berkshire County, Mass ., 308 Biddle , Owen, 213 Biltlurrgsro""'rt, 351 Bingham, William , 211 Birmingham, England, 59 Bishop, Abraham, 271-5, 420n Blackstone, Sir William, 11, 84, 346, 423n Blodget , Samuel, 318, 337-8 Blumin, Stuart M ., 374n, 414n Boardman, Andrew, 48 Bolingbroke, Henry St. John , Viscount,
156,331 Bollman, Erick , 339-40 Boone, Daniel .. 127
Boston, Mass ., 22, 31, 311; banks in, 316; population of, 127; punishmenu in, 72-3; slavery in , 51; social mobility in, 342; titles in , 233
Boswell, James; 194 Boucher, Jonathan , 161 Boudinot, Elias, 366 Boylston family, 119 Brackenridge, Hugh Henry , 126, 197, 267 ;, Bradford, William, 107 Brattle , William, 21 Breck, Samuel , 42, 185, 212 Breckenridge family, 129 Brewer, John, 412n Brewster, Walter, 280 BrÜf RelrDs/Nd DIIM Eigllt«rUla Cmlury, A
(MilIer),364 Bristol , England, 12 Bristol, R. 1., 62, 317 Brockwell, Charles, 223-4 Brown, John , 78 Brown, Richard D., 402n Browne, Arthur, 20 Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de,
37 Bull , William, gov. er s.c ., 45,141 Bull brothers, 340 Bunyan, John, 366 bureaucracy, Jacksonian, 304-5 Burgh, James, 99 Burke, Edmund, 171, 196 Burnet, WiUiam, gov, of N .Y ., 75 Burr, Aaron, 330, 345-6; conspiracy of,
339 Burr , Esther, 219 Burroughs, Stephen , 180 businessmen, 262, 276, 303; origins of
term, 326 Butler, Bshp. Joseph , 215, 219 Butler, Pierce, 212, 292, 293, 416n Byrd, Elizabeth, 49 Byrd, William, 11, 42, 50, 116; on
equality, 235-6; mansion of, 112-13; on population movement, 126; on servanU, 54; on Southside Virginia, 130
Byrd, WiJliam , IIl, 49, 116
Cabot, George, 211, 231, 328, 177 Cabot family, 177 Caesar, Julius, 28 , 238, 284 Calhoun, John C ., 268, 309, 315, 331 Calvert, Cecilius, 79 Calvinism, 331 Cambridge, Mass ., 48, Camden, S .C ., 126 Campbell , Thomas , 333
Index
Campbell family , 129 Canada, 311 , 420n CaNJid4Jn, TM (Munford), 71, 131, 143 Canova, Antonio, 403n Cape Fear, N .C., 48 Carleton, Sir Guy, 110 Carroll, Charles, of Annapolis, 69, 92,
134; patronage of, 71; wealth of, 112 Carroll, Charles, of Carrollton, 92, 365-6;
on being agentIeman, 197; on downward mobility, 117, 181-2; on envy, 145; on families , power of, 181; on precariousness of his estate, 116
Carter, John, 74-5, 152 Carter, Landon, 224; on common people,
27; enlightenment of, 152; on dislOlutenell of heirs, 117; inftuence of, 71; u master, 152-5
Carter, Landon, 11, 152 Carter, Robert, 31, 50, 64; on new
polilics, 143; and tenants, 55, 56 Carter, Robert Bladen, 50, 116 Carter, Roben Wonndey, 152 "Calo" (pseud . for radical whig writers),
81, 98, JOI, 235; s« also Gordon, Thomas; Trenchard, John
CaID (Addison) , 143, 197-8,216-17 Cato, Marcus Poreius, the younger, 28,
102, 103 CtJIJJ 'S UulrS, (Trenchard and Gordon), 101 Champlain, Lake, 127 Chandler, Thomas Bradbury, 159 Channing, WiJliam, 329 Charles I of England, 155 Charles 11 of England, 17 Charles V of Holy Roman Empire,
238 Charles River Bridge decision, 321 Charleston, S.C ., 37, 233 Chase, Sarnuel, 324 Chastellux, Fran~ois Jean de Beauvoir,
Chevalier de, 203 Chauncey, Charles, 113 Chebacco, Mus., 47,50 Cheetham, James, 188 Cherokees, 357-8 Chesapeake: economy of, 142; and
tenantry, 55 Chesterfield, Philip Donner Slanhope,
Lord, 148; on contracts, 163;-on . educalion, 151; on equality, 236; on
family, 153; on politeness, 194 Chevalier, Michael, 284 Chew family, 176 children, 314, 315; and families, 49, 50,
147-8, 158; reputation of, in America, 155
Chipman, Henry, 323 Chipman. Nathanid, 197,239,242,344,
417n; as ar istoerat, 243 ChisweIl, John , 178 Christianity, 27, 231, 332, 367; and
authority, 18; and common law, 331 , 424n; evangelical, 330-1; and Freemasonry, 223; relation to natural philosophy, 219-20; as soeial adhesive, 329, 331 ; SN also religion
Chureh of England, 17, 89, 132, 332 ; and monarchy, 18; in Virginia, 144; weakness of, 111-12
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 100, 102, 103, 291, 346, 356 ; and John Adams, 59-60, 237; Middleton's Lift Df, 100
Cincinnati, Order of, 207, 241, 263, 280
Cincinnati, 285 Cincinnatus Lucius Quinclius,
Washington as, 205-6 cities , 31, 134; and artisans, 244-5;
disorder in, 307 ; English and American compared , 58-9, 312 ; poverty in, 122
citizenship, 169, 233 Cüue« TUrnM GmIlmt4n, TM [Ravenscroft),
233 civilization, 31, 192; defined, 194; decline
of, in America, 310-11 Clap, Thomas, 20 Clark family , 177 dass , social, 21, 234, 307 ; conll ict, 3-6
ptusim; middle, 21, 23, 31, 344, 347-51, 414n ; middle, development of, 136, 245 ; middle, and gentry, 196; and premodern society, 23 , 170, 213
Clay, Henry, 326 Clinton, DeWitt, 223, 299, 425n cliometrics, 311-12 Clymer, George , 211, 251, 264 Ccit , Joshua , 265 Coke, Sir Edward, 11, 346 Colden, Cadwallader, 14, 69, 104, 114; on
social mobilily, 119-20 colleges, 20, 21, 279, 427n colonists, American, compared to the
English, 11-13, 14, 20 commerce : celebralion of, 336-41 passim;
domestic, 65, 139, 141-2, 250, 315-16; genled contempt for, 36, 37-8, 326-7, 338, 351; Hamihon 's view of, 262-3 ; inerease in 'export s of, 134; new meaning of, 216, 337, 339, 420n, 421n, 425n; overseas, 313-14, 315, 337; spread of, 271, 312, 327, 358; and virtue , 107, 218; SN also Irade, inland
committees, revolutionary, 213
Index434 common people , stt people , common Commons , Hou se of, 13, 17, 318 ;
represen tation in, 129 common sense , 239-40 , 277; SN also moral
sense CommonSlnst (Paine ], 168, 222 condescension, 41, 224, 235, 277 Condorcet, Marie-Je an ·Anl oine·N icolas
Caritat de, 231 confessions, public, 72 Congregationalists, 160, 332 Congress, Confederation , 242, 247 , 290,
292, 316 Congress, Continental, 35, 287 , 324 Congress, U .5 . , 324 , 365 ; election to,
259-61 ; 6ghting in , 307 ; interests in , 267; sala ries of, 292, 293
Connecticut, 39, 54, 271-5 passim, 320, 416n ; debt in , 140; equality of, 123; Great Awaltening in, 144; penal reform in , 193; populat ion movement in , 127; warning-out laws, 130
Connecticut Agricultural Society , 266 Connecricut River, 88-9, 313 consent : and allegiance , 166, 397n ; in
family relar ions, 157, 163 consignment system , 70-1, 142 consp iracy, belief in, 60-1 , 109, 174-5,
360 Constant , Benjamin , 368, 377n constitut ion, English, 13, 14 Const itution , U .S . , 209, 253 , 261, 271,
330 ,336, 421n , 422n ; Art . I , sect . 10, 316, 322 ; debate over, 254 , 259 ; and economy, 325 ; elitism of, 254-5
consntutions, state, 80 , 290, 422n consumption , 192, 354 ; of distilled spirirs,
306; by common people, 34 , 135-6 , 137,249; increase in, 137, 170,229-30 , 314 ; as obl igat ion of gentry , 34-6
conrract, 140, 162-6 Consrasl, Tlu (Tyler), 184 Convention, Philadelphia , 208-9 , 291 , 292 conviclS, 51 Cook, Cap!. James, 222 Cooper, James Fen imore, 348-9, 350-1 Cooper, Moses , 172 Cooper, Samuel, 159,219,220 Copley, John Singleton, 38 , 221 Corinthians, New Testament, 20 ~orporations, 318-22 , 337-8 corruption, 174-5 , 301, 320 ; and
Hamilton, 263; Hume on, 78; revulaion against, 80-1 , 104, 178, 305 ; and virt ue, 104 .
Corwin , Edward S ., 422n cosmopolitanism, 195, 221
courtiers, 92, 235 , 278 courts, 16-17 ,21,60,85 ,324-5; colon ial ,
authority of, 71-2, 81-2 Coxe, Tench, 314 Cradock, Thomas, 20 Crafts, William , 327 Crawford , W . H ., 301 credit : and banks, 316-17 ; bills of , 66;
gentry control of, 68-9, 72, 279; increase of, 139, 140; and paper money, 251-2 ; stt also debt ; wealth, proprietary
Creeks, 357-8 crime, reform of, 335 Critical Period, The, 250 Cromwell, Oliver , 3, 28 crowds, Stt mobs Cruger family, 176 ' f culture: as human Invention, 190-1, 236,
272, 358; improvement of, 354-5 Cumberland River, 127 currency, paper, su money, paper
Dana, Francis, 346 Dana, Richard Henry, Jr . , 347 Dana, Richard Henry, Sr. , 346-7 Dartmouth College , case of, 322 David, Jacques·Louis, 100, 216 debt, 69 , 72, 251 ; in book accounr s, 68;
increase of, 139; national, used by :"'1 Federalists, 263; and Revolutionary W ar , 248-9 ; Stt also credit ; money , paper
Declaration of lndependence, 234, 237 , 270
deference , 63, 85 Defoe, Daniel, 36, 37, 43 deism , 330, 331, 424n DeLancey , James, 177 DeLancey family, 48, 174, 176 Delaware, 416n demo cracy , 86, 296, 302, 305 , 325, 348,
409n ; and ar istocracy, 40, 241; and bureaucracy, 305 ; and common people , 378, 395 ; and consumption, 354 ; and equality, 409n ; and founders , 366-7 , 369 , 401n ; individualism of, 352 ; and interest, 244, 247, 250, 252, 257, 336 , 337 ; mean ing of, 232, 243, 257-8; and mobs, 244; and monarchy , 300, 318 ; and paper money, 339, 340 ; and politeness, 356; and public opinion, 363-4 ; and religion, 329-31, 332 , 367 ; and truth , 362-3; su also people, cammon
Democratic-Republican party. 298 , 320; of N.Y ., 299 , 300
Dernocratic-Repub1ican IOcietics, 276
Index 435 Demosthenes, 284 Dennie. Joseph, 233 dependency, 6, 19, 23, 38, 288 ; and
American Revolution, 173, 179, 184; in the economy, 66, 340 , 399; and rhe farnily, 49 , 50 , 53 ; Fielding on, 23-4 ; and gratitude, 225; and localism , 24'>; meaning of, 11, 14,24,56, 140; and patronage, 58, 63, 78; prevalence of, 20 , 44, 50-I , 56; and slavery, 54, 179; and tenantry, 55-6 ; Set also independence; servitude
DePeyster, Abraham , 45 DePeyster family, 176 Derby, Edward Stanley, Earlof, 112 Destun de Tracy, Antoine Louis Claude,
Cornte, 338-9 D ickinson, John, 84, 165, 210 Dinwiddie, Robert , It . gav . of Va. , 43 Disciples of Christ, 332 disinterestedness, 104-5; and Anti-
Federalists , 256-8; in commerce , 107; the founders on , 206, 253, 265, 284, 288; and gentlernen. 247, 294; rarity of, 252-3, 267 , 287, 294-5, 296; Stt also interest; virtue
dist illeries , of spirits , 306 Douglass, William, 80 Dow , Lorenzo, 333 Drayton, William Henry, 16, 175, 246,
277 dress , 15, 33, 240, 344, 357 Drinker family, 119 drinking, of distilled spirits, 306, 335,
356 dueling, 40-1, 344-5 Dulany, Daniel, Jr., 84-5 Dulany, Daniel, Sr ., 75 Dwight, Joseph, 69
East Guilford, Conn., 45 economy , American, 70, 134, 296, 337-8 ;
and banks, 316-18; colonial, personal nature of, 64-8; colonial , pr im itiveness of, 66-7, 120, 123-4; compared with England, 66, 138, 139, 312 ; competition in, 308, 321 ; and exchange, 338; miraele of, 311-16, 325-6, 339; reliance of, On paper money , 318 ; women in, 138, 314, 315, 374n; SN also commerce ; manufactures; trade, inland
Eddis , William, 53, 61 Edinburgh , Scotland, 402n education, 335, 354-5; and child'rearing,
150-2; in liberal arts, 28, 37, 108, 195, 197, 199, 202, 246-7, 277, 349, 377n; and Locke, 236-7 ; and Revolution, 190-1;
vulgarizarion of , 349 , 427n; and women , 357
Edmundson, Joseph , 21 Edwards, Jonathan, 19, 330, 373n E1iot, John, 160 Elizabeth, N.J . , 138 Ellsworth , Oliver, 324 Emersen, Joseph , 45 Emersen, Ralph Waldo, 286, 361 , 364-5 eminent domain , 188, 322 , 422n England, 15,312,319; cit ies of, 312;
compared with France, 13, 14, 15, 26, 146, 412n ; constitution of, 98-9 ; as 6scal·mililluy state, 412n ; population of, 309 ; reputation of, 12, 13, 146
Enlightenmenr, 146-7, 189-96,330,350, 367; and cosmopolitanism, 221 ; disco vers hidden forces , 218; and education , 354-5 ; and Freemasonry, 223-4; and humanitarianism, 192-3, 224, 237 ; and refinernent , 42; and religion, 329-30, 366; sociability central to , 219 ; vulgarization of, 349; ue also benevolence ; politeness
entail , 45 , 46, 116; abolition of, 183; in Va., 47 ,182
Episcopal Church, 333 equality, 7, 12, 168,232-43,304,320,258
9, 409n ; and common people, 278, 285-6; and duel ing, 345; in England, 14-15,57, 372n ; the founders on, 180, 237, 398n; and interest, 294-9; and money, 311, 340; and moral sense , 239-40; of opportunity, 233-4 ; of propeny, 123, 183,234; as source of instability, 170-4, 310
" Era of Good Feeling," 298 Erving family, 177 Euelid, 181 Europe, 277 , 286 Evans, Oliver, 326 Everell , Edward, 284, 296-7, 306 exchange, commercial : as source of
productivity, 338; as source of social cohesion, 339
facts, American fascination with, 360-1 fair, county , 308 Fairfax , Thomas, Lord, 74 Falk, William, 64 fame, 40, 107,207-10; and democracy,
283, 327 • family: changes in , 129, 148, 155, 1~7,
183-5 ; as image of empire, 16~-7; importance of, 43-6, 48, ~2, 81, 147, 315 ; and revolutionarie., 182-3, 1+7. 201 ; and women, 49
Farewell Address, Washington's, 333
437 43 6 Index
farming : and commerce, 67-8, 134-5, 139, 248-9, 313-14, 339; and manufacturing, 138, 314; reform of, 308
Farquier, Franeis, lt. gov. ofVa ., 17, 117. 138, 203
"Federal Farmer." 259 F,dnaliJt. Tht. 253. 254, 257, 259. 346,
411n Federalists, 243, 280, 314, 320, 323, 341,
367; and election to First Congress, 259-61 ; on free speech , 362-4; and interests , 260, 264-7, 336; and Jacltsonianism, 303; and judiciary, 324; and labor, 281; as a party, 298, 301; and patronage, 300, 301-2 ; and the people , 268-70, 297, 300, 343, 350 ; and religion, 331; on salaries , 293; of 1790s. 261-6 ; as suppcrters of the Constitution, 253, 255; see also founders
Feke. Roben, 86 Fenelon, Fran~ois de, 149 Few, William, 131 Field, David Dudley, 346 Fielding, Henry. 23-4, 32. 34. 131-2 Filmer, Sir Robert, 49, 147, 155. 156,
157, 161 Findley, William, 256-8, 261. 294, 341,
412; and democracy, 257-8 Fiske, John, 250 Fitch, Thomas, gov. of Conn . , 163-4 Fithian, Philip Vickers, 24, 31, 32. 39,
123 Fitzsimmons, Themas, 264 Florida, 310; West, 127 Flower, George, 311 Ford, Timothy, 268 Formisano, RonaJd P. , 417n founders : aversion 10 party, 298; and
banks, 316; disillusionment of, 255, 365-8; modernity of, 190; and obligations of office, 83; and religion, 158, 198, 330. 333
Fou, Booh ofArchit«tu,t (Palladio) , 203 France , 17, 95, 98, 215, 289; compared to
England. 13. 14. 15, 26, 146, 412n Frankfort, Ky . , 303-4 Franklin, Benjamin. 12, 28, 35, 51, 77,
198.365 ; AUlobiogrllphy of, 77, 342, 351; background, 182. 197; on being a . gentleman, 38, 85-6 , 118-19 ; on consumption, 248; on enlightenment, 158, 194, 199-200,222,223; and government salar ies, 291-2, 416n ; land speculation of, 128; on passions, 108; and patronage, 69, 77; reputation of, 59, 206-7 . 283, 342; and social
'~Imobility , 76-7, 341 ; on virtue , 104; and ··otwork, 38. 284 li
Franklin, Mau., 315 .. Franklin Society for the Suppression of ,
I';Internperance, 356 Franklin Society of Philadelphia, 346 Frederick 11 of Prussia , 238 freedom : degrees of, 19, 51, 55, 56, 57;
and disorder, 308, 356; meaning of', in America, 336; of speech, 13, 362-3
Freemasonry, 223-4, 344 Freeport, Sir Andrew , 38 French, John. 119 French Revolution, Sill Revolution, French Freneau, Philip, 327, 340 friendship, 20, 342; as euphemism for
dependencies, 58. 224; Franklin on, 76; as patronage, 71, 75, 89, 178.214
frontier, 308. 310, 311; instability of, 126, 127, 130-3
Gadsden. Christopher, 156, 170- 1, 366, 398n
Gallatin, Albert, 314 Gardiner, John Sylvester John, 345 Gay, John, 102 Gay, Peter, 100 Gennal HiJlory of C01I""tieUl (Perers), 123 genius, 27. 28, 75, 108,284,296;
aesthet ic sense of, 236; John Adams on, 238; stimulated by republicaniem , IBO; un importance of, in democratie America, 359, 362, 369, 409n; ltt also aristocracy
gent ility. Jet gentlemen; politene.. gentlemen : attacks on, 240-1, 242-3, 339;
aversion to trade, 30, 36, 37, 38, 90; and commonen, 24, 30, 245-6, 343, 350; and country sealS, 119, 265, 287; and dueling, 40-1 , 344-5; ease of becoming , 85. 118. 295. 343, 347, 349. 353, 355-6 ; and government , 73, 85, 91-2, 168, 180, 253-4, 294; and Jacksonians, 303;J. F. Cooperon, 350-1 ; John Adams on. 237, 281, 374n, 377n; inftuence of, 31, 68, 70, 73, 87-8, 92, 273-5, 274, 279; and language, 274; and liberal arts, 195, 196-7, 202, 203-4, 211,246,277,349-50; and military , 29. 41,74,118,287 ; and mobs. 90-1; nature of, 24-6, 30, 31, 36, 40, 41-2 , 73, 120-1,236.260.266,273,279, 374n; new meaning of, 194-5, 196; obligation of. to consume , 34-6; and occupations , 22, 36-7, 38, 85, 255-7, 266, 426n; and professions. 37, 345-6 ,
Index
347; and proprietary wealth , 38, 68, 70, 106, 251-2; and work, 33, 34, 36, 68, 69, 281-2,284 , 287; see also ariltocracy
Gentz, Fredericlt von. 231 Geo rge I of Great Britain, 98 George II of Great Britain. 98 George III of Great Britain. 14, 34. 174 Georgia, 52, 245, 310; population of, 126.
129 Germain, George, Lord, 107 Germanl, 51, 125. 245, 260-1 Gerry. Elbridge. 197, 211 Gerry family, 177 Gibbon. Edward, 36. 101-2, 346 G1asgow, Scotland , 142 Glocester, R .I., 141. 172 Glorious Revolution. see Revolution ,
Glorious Glover, R ichard, 103 God, 43, 86, 236; authority of.
questioned, 158 Goldsmith, Oliver. ~9. 148 Gooeh , William. It. gov. ofVa., 17,75 Goodrich, John. 64 Gordon, Thomas , 57, 101, 103.240 Gore, Christopher, 263, 266 government: colonial, 16, 63, 74. 81-4.
111,121 ; siee of, 61-2,128-9 governmenr, republican : public power of.
8. 187-9. 296, 322; as umpire, 253-4, 294. 323 ; reversion of, to private means, 318; see also republicanism
govemment, U .S. , 2!i3-4, 261. 262. 275; weakne .. of, 296, 321, 328 . 359
gratitude, 337; and dependence, 224-5 , 289-90. 335; as interest, 267
Gray. Thomas, 28-9 Gray family. 177 Great Awakening, 144-5, 332 Great Awakening, Second, 331, 332, 424n Great Seal, 191 Greece , aneient. as model for American
democracy, 306 Greek language, 29, 348 Greene . Nathanael, 27, 108, 197.203-4,
219. 249 Greene and Delaware Moral Society,
306 Gt'eenwich Park, 15 Gridley, Jeremiah. 88 Grund, Francis, 285, 348 Guild, Jamel, 351-4
Hal ifax, Vt., 351 Hamilton, Alexander. 28, 209, 223. 254,
293, 302, 345, 413n ; background of. 40,
75; diliUusionment of, 264, 367. 43On; ideu of govemment, 95. 166,261-2. 265,267.300, 412n; onjudieiary. 421n, 422n, 324; on moral sense u adhelive, 262; on professionl, 254, 345-6; on religion, 330-1, 430n; RIJIorI Oll MII"l(tM:tures. 313, 314
Hamilton, Alexander, Md . phylieian, 29, 32,42, 118
l:1amilton. Andrew, 76 Hamilton family. 176 Hampshire County, MUI .• 45 Hancock, John, 29, 47, 210; patronage of,
69,88. 115 Hancock, Thomas. 47, 112-13 Harrington, Jamel, 36 Harry. David. 118 Hartford, Conn.• 22. 340 Hartford Bank. 320 Hartley, David. congrellman. 259-60 Hartley, David, philosopher, 40 Hartog, Hendriek, quoted, 82, 83, 188 Harvard College. 21, 145. IBO. 242.
342 Hateh , Nathan, 424n Haverill, Ma.... 137 Hawkins, Benjamin, 357-8 Hawley , Joseph, 204 Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 343, 351 Henry, Patrick, 178 Hewes, George, 29 hierarchy, 11-24; collapse of, 305, 319,
332, 340; and the economy, 64. 319: and Federalisll, 263; Jonathan Edwardl on , 19, 373n; and mobs, 90-1, 244: and republicanism, 225; and s1avery, 54-5: weaknellof. in colonies, 112, 118, 122, 135; sn also ariltocracy; inequality: society. colonial
HigginlOn family. 177 Hoadly . Bshp. Benjamin , 157 hoaxes , 362 Hobart, John. 320 Hogarth . William, 122, 148 Holston R iver. 127 Homer. 181 honor. 39. 207, 263,363, 378n; and
dueling. 40-1; and gentry, 39-41. 236, 275; questioned, 344; and work, 281. 285-6
Hooper. William, 126 Hopkins. Samuel. 331 Hopkinl, Stephen, 167, 179 Hopkinlon. Franeil, 348 Hopkinson. Joseph. 357 Horace , 346 hoteil, 185
",'
438 Index r '
,i· Index 439 -! king : personal a1legiance to , 11; Madison Lesher , John, 48
Houghton (Walpole's country house), 115 IredelI, James. 287 ;~'
seeks surrogate far, in Constitution. 255; Lexington, Ma ... . 45
Houst ofIM Stvno Gabw, TM (Hawthome). Ireland , 51. 110, 125,328.242
Houdon, Jean Antoine, 403n Invalid Pension Act, 324, 422n
nation u family of, 64; prerogatives of, libel, seditious. 86. 362-3 343 Irving, Washington, 306, 327 81; u source of honon, 78; SII als. liberty: and corporaricns, 320; in England,
Howard, Martin. Jr., 167 Isaac, Rhys, 374n monarchy 13-14 . 146; and free land, 311; as Howe, George Augustus, Viscount. 41 Izard, Ralph, 212, 292 King. Rufus, 302 independence, 179; positive and
Howe, Sir William , 222 kinship, 44-6, 58, 77 negative , 104, 189; and society, 11; humanitarianism , 224. 237. 239. 334. Knox , Henry, 208-9, 266. 293 touchine.. about, 169-73; SII alsD
328-9 Jackson. Andrew, 303, 305, 311, 345 , 367 .", Knox , William, 112, 114 freedom Lihtrty (Thompson), 102 Hume, David, 77. 136,331; on Jackson, R ichard , 35. 36, 107
corruption , 78. J03; on monarchy, 16. Jackson family , 177 Li/t ofCicmJ (Middlelon), 100 78, 95. 97 ; on moral sense. 239; on Jacksonianism. 302, 303, 305 labor, 34. 270. 272-3. 280, 281. 312, 340. Lincoln, Benjamin. 209 republicanism, 97. 102. 103; on salaries, James, Able. 22 376n; meanneu of, 8, 23. 33, 34, 38, Iiteracy, 33. 313 289; on virtue, 104, 215 James I of Engiand, 13. 155 54. 170,358; new value of. 136, 170-1, Livingston, Philip, 52
Humphreys, David, 205 James 11 of England, 17 277. 413n; and slavery, 54, 186; ut also Livingston, William, 146, 182. 195. 196, Hutcheson , Francis, 83 , 219, 220 Jameson. J. Franklin, 5 work 217 Hutchineon. Themas, 62, 70,91 ,200; on Jarrett. Rev . Devereux, 25. 29. 30 Labourers, Society of, 280 Livingston family. 174
common people, 34. 136-7 ; on offices, Jay,John , 197,225,261,366; on offices, Lake Champlain, 127 Livingston Manor, 55
83, 84, 324; paternalism of, 83. 160-1 ; 324.417n Lancaster, Pa ., 55, 139 L1oyd, James, 317 and patronage, 175 Jay. Peter, 299-300 Lancuter County. Va ., 48 L10yd family , 177
Jebb .John, 289 land , 50, 127-8,266.269,311; Locke, John , 50, 161; on education, 28. Jefferson, Thomas, 3,198,237 .271 .338, inheritance of, 45-7, 50 149. 150-1 ; on gentlemen, 28. 37; on
/dk Man, TJu (Dana), 347 340, 420n; on ans. 191.354-5, 403n; Lascalles, Henry, 112 labor, 33; on patriarchy, 50, 156, 157; Imports, 134, 137 background of, 178. 182. 197; on Lathrop. Dr . Daniel, 75 sensationalism of, 190. 234. 236, 240, improvements, internal, 315. 316 common people, 28. 192; Latin, 29, 91, 202 , 348 409n incorporation, 318.321. 421n; s« also disillusionment ef, 367-8; on economy, Latrobe. Benjamin . 295-6. 355 Logan, James, 75
corporations 106. 318. 320. 377n ; on education, 349; Laurene, Henry, 62-3. 69. 109.211 ; on London, England, 12, 34, 58. 65. 102 independence : and equal ity, 234; nature enlightenment of, 193. 236. 326, 360; apprenticeship, 52; ennoblement of, Lords. House of. 15. 17.25
of, 19.24. 57.68, 104; from market, on free speech, 362-3 ; and gentility, 210-11; on gentility , 37; and mob, 91; Loudoun, John Campbell . Earl of. 88. on paper money, 248; and slavery . 51 163-4
property, 46-7. 68, 178-9. 413n ; 168. 281. 293, 298. 328; on moral sense. 33. 68; and paper money, 142, 340; and 196,202-3. 346; on government . 97,
Laurens, John, 210 Louisburg, Canada, 79 significanceof. H. 33, 54.178 .179, 239, 240, 262; on offices. 83. 300-1, law, 242, 323 Louis XV of France, 98 265; s« als. dependence; property ; 415n, 416n ; on property, 179; on lawyers: and govemmenl office. 254. 287; Louis XVI of France, 95, 98 wealth, proprietary religion, 158, 330; on republicanism, and Hamilton, 254, 345-6; nature of, Louisiana, 294, 310
Indians, 132, 133, 201, 310, 236, 357-8 109,252 ; on sincerity , 235; and 107. 210, 377n; u profe..ionals, 323, love: u enlightened source of authority. individualism, 329, 332. 352 Washington. 207 345-7; and work. 281. 284 158, 189. 215-16. 217-20, 328 ; and industrjaliaation, 3 11 Jesus, 158.321,366 Lebanon, Conn., 33 republicanism, 229, 356; Federalists' inequality .. 2o-l. 24. 272-3 ; and gentry. 25, John BuH, 14 Lee, Henry. 209, 222, 366 contempl for, u adhesive, 262. 267; and
40; natureof,19, 20, 32; ofwealth, 21. Johnson , Dr . Samuel, H, 103; on civility, Lee, Richard Henry, 178.223,258 women, 216, 357 22, 340, 342; Stt als. equality ; hierarchy 194; defines citizen, 233; defines Leeds, England. 59 Lavell, James, 290
inRation, 251 disinterest, 105; on gentlemen. 26, 196; Lee family. 45, 177 Lowell family . 177 Ingersoll, Charles, 329. 347-8 imitates Juvenal, 102; on learning in Leffingwell, Chrillopher, 280 loyalists. 176-7, 214. 242 inheritance : importance of, 26, 31-2, 45 ; Scotland. 350 Legan!, Hugh Swinton, 232. 360 Lunenburg, Va .• 130-1
patterns of. 46. 47, 50: and Revolution. Johnson . Sir William. 88. 114 legislatures, state ; and banks, 316-17; luxury. 314, 345. 348. 377n; and common 181-2. 183-4 . 400n Johnston. Gabriel. gov. ofN.C . • 118 changes in, from Revolution, 250-1 ; people, 135-6, 248-9; debate over. 35-6,
interest, 37. 174.243-70 passim, 288, 346, Jones. John Paul, 75 and due process . 324, 422-3n; fighting 137,202,315; and gentry. 35-6; and 417n ; as benevolence. 331; and common journeymen . 23, 185-6 in, 307; and incorporation . 320. 321; society. 14. 117. 144. 169.354 people, 27. 85. 106. 230. 244; defense judiciary , 263. 323-5, 422n ; SIt als. courts interests in. 320; limitations on, 324-5; Lyon. Matthew. 53, 242 . 243, 278. 297, of. 245-6.257 ,293; and democracy. JuvenaI, 101-2 and propeny, 322; tyranny of. 251, 323 342
Leigh, Egerton, 62 263.264-7; in government. 244. 247, 244. 246, 293, 305; and Federalists.
Leigh famHy. 174 260-1 . 294, 297. 320, 325; as gratitude. Kalm. Peter, 15 leisure, 36,107.281.285,287, 377n; Mably, Abbe Gabriel Bonnot deo 290 267; as patronage, 71. 73. 79, 80. 87. Kant. Immanuei. 238 contempt for. 276-80, 281, 282-3. 284-5, Maclay, William . 26+. 293 89; power of, 246. 247. 252. 253. 268. Keith. William, gov. of Pa ., 76 347; Franklin u man of, 86; and Madison. James, 223, 281. 292, 310, '67. 326. 328, 335; public. 251, 256; AI Kendall , Amos, 303 gentry . 33. 34 . 36. 69. 267-7 421n ; and common people. 234-5; and soeial connection, 58. 267. 335. 336. Kent. James, 230, 268-70. 331, 346 , 413n L'Enfant, Pierre, 212 democracy, 256, 261, 323; on 359. 377-8 ; s« als. commerce Kentucky, 298. 306. 310. 317 Lenin. Nikolai, 3 disinterestedness. 254-5 ; education of.
Index44° Index 44 1
Madison, James (co'IJiJlUld) 197; on extent of V .S ., 360; and Federalisu of 179Os, 262; on interests, 253, 259. 411n; on judiciary, 325; on lawyers, 107-8; on paper money, 251, 339; on paniee, 257; and patronage, 301; and pluralism, 258
Maine, 127 Maison Carree, 355 Manchester, England, 15, 59 Mandeville, Bernard, 37, 136. 376n Mann, Bruce, quoted, 140-1 Mann, Horace, 315 Manning, William, 279-80 manufactures, 17,280; growth of, 137-9;
among Indians, 358; rural, 314, 315; and War of 1812, 327
Mao Zedong, 3 Marcus Aurelius, 100 market: and equality, 340; freedom in,
321; growth of, 134-5, 138, 140, 313, 315, 316, 393n; independence from , 33, 68; Jefferson on, 106; and Virginia planters, 117
Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke of, 28
Marley, John, 38 Marmontel, Jean Francois, 148 MarshalI, John, 197 Manhall, Lynn, quoted, 305 Marxism, 5. 95 Maryland, 37, 42; assembly of, 61, 202;
economy of, 70, 142; families of, +5 Muon, George, 181, 258 Massachuaetts, 3+, 45, 74, 32+; banks in ,
141,317; corruption as issue in , 81; courts in. 16-7, 25; corporations in. 321; families in, +5; Freemasonry in, 223; govemment of, 61, 82, 87 , +10n, +12n, 416n ; JPs in, 80; manufacluring in, 314; militia of, 74; patronage in, 85; penal reform in, 193; population movement in, 127; republicanism of, 110-11 ; voluntary associalions in, 328-9; waming-out laws of, 20, 130
Maurras, Charles, 377n Max6eld , Joseph . 62 Mayhew , Jonathan , 156, 157, 158. 161,
201,219 Mazui, Philip , 295 McCulloh, Henry. 79 Meue , James. 361 mechanics, SH anisans Mechanics Hall, N.Y ., 244 MttÜC4{ RtposilDry, 361 Melville, Herman, 232-3, 362 Mercer, J ames, 117
merchants: ennoblementof. 210-12; interests of, 106-7 ; precariousness of, 11~20, 137; status of, 22. 37. 39. 66, 137, 139, 280; lruSt in, 338; wealth of, 112
Methodists, 1++, 332, 333 Middleton, Conyers, 100 militia, 163-+; palronage in, 7+, 88 Miller, Rev. Samuel, 363-+ Mihon, John, 110 Minutemen, 45 Missi..ippi River, 126. 127,310 MitchilI, Samuel, 308, 326 mobility, geographical, +6, 185, 309 mobility, social. 19, 7+-5, 135-6, 172,
351; downward, 117. 181-2 ; in England, 15; of merchanu, 119-20; new kind of, 341-2; and Revoletion , 180; sponsored, 7+-5, 3+2
mobs, 306, 213-14; premodern, conservatism of, 89-91, 24+; in cities of early Republic, 307
Mohawk River, 127 monarchy : accouterments of, 16; colonists'
admiration of, 15, 16; and common people, 27-8 ; compared to republics, 97-9, 105; and corporate grants, 319; and democracy, 300. 318. 327; English, 13, 15,98; and family, 11-12, +3, 156; and Federalisu, 255, 261-4, 271-2; governmenl of, 81, 187; and honor, 40, 97; and idleness, 278; 8lId John Adams, 267; and patronage, 78, 80-1; and religion, 18; revolulionary breaking of the bonds of, 177, 179. 180.213-15. 229, 365; subjects of, defined, 169
money, paper : and banks, 66, 1+1. 316 18; colonial increase in, 140-1; compared with England. 65, 318; effects of, 251-2 , 340; Opposilion 10, 251-2, 318,367; prohibilions on, 1+1,316; in Revolution, 248-9; supporl for, 66, 69 70, 248-50. 316, 317
monopolies, 188, 318-19 Monroe, James, 209. 298. 301 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron
deo 13, 216, 225, 337; on Augustus, 102; on culture as construcled, 236; and honor, +0, 97; on mixlures of governmenl, 97-8; on obligation of rieb to spend, 34; and patriarchy, 43
Monticello, 203, 377n Moore, Daniel, 62 Moore, Sir Henry. gov. of N.Y ., 107 Moore, Maurice, 48 Moore, Roger, 48 moral sense, 215-20; anillll1S' appeaI to, 277;
and equality. 239-40; Hamillon's contempt
for, as adheIive, 262;.. aiJtJ benevoIencc; common _; equa!ity; vinue
Mormonism, 310 Morri•• Gouverneur, 27, 288 Morris, Roben, 211-12, 256-7. 266, 3+1 Morris. Roben, gav. of Pa., 61 Morse, Jedidiah, 243 Morse. Samuel F. B., 3+5, 355 Moselly, Edward, +8 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 27, 100 Muhlenberg, Frederick, 292 Mun, Thomas, 3+ Munford, Roben, 29; on family, 150; on
friendship, 71; on oalhs, 215; on politic., 1+3; on Southside planten, 131
murder, 306, 307
Namier, Sir Lewis, 78 Napoleon, 3,28+, 368 navigation laws, 17 Neal, John, 35+ Needham, Marehamonl , 40 Nelson, Thomas, 36, 117 Nelson family, 116 Nero Claudius Caesar, 102 Newark, N .J ., 185 Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Helles, Duke
of, 78, 79 New Divinity movement, 331 New England, 20, 21,56,293; conlracts
in, 163-+; equalily in, 243; and families, +8, 182; inheritance in, +6, 47; land in, 50; literacy in, 313; manufacturing in, 138; militia of, 163-+; population in, 126, 127; poveny in, 129; warning-out law• .in, 130; s« also Connecticut; Maine; Massachuaetu; New Hampshire; Rhode bland; Vermont
New Hampshire, 127, 130, 138; government of, 61, 121, 188, 250
New Haven, Conn ., 271 New Jersey, 30-1, +1, +8, 193; equality
in, 123; fox-hunting in, 3+-5; government of, 61, 80, 320; manufacturing in, 31+
Newpon, R.I., 317 new.papers, 279 Newton, Sir lsaac, 10+, 28+ New York, 22, +1, 56, 310; artisans in,
2+6; banks in, 316, 335; con.titutional convention of 1820-21, 268-70, 299 302, 368-9, +22n; corporation. in, 321; goyemment of, 16,61,82, 181,293-+; party in, 298, 299; population of, 127. 128, 309; puni.hmenl in, 73, 193; tenantry in, 11+, 2+2
New York City, 51, 188,292,307 Niles, Hezekiah, 421n Hius' Wlfk/y R"ullr, 297, 340, +21n Nimes, France, 355 Nisbet, Charles, 254, 305-6, 361 nonimponation, 35, 117 Norfolk, vs ., 22, 13+ Norris, Isaac, 6+ North, 285, 287 Nort1I Amnietm RIffiew, 3+7 Nonhampton, Mus., 138 Nonh Carolina: constitution of, 183, 188,
+22-3n: politica in, +8, 79, 111; society of, 117-18, 126, 131
Nonhumberland County, Pa ., 260 Norwich, Conn., +8, 280 Norwieb, England, 12 No/Ums oJ /AI AlIIII'iellJlS (Cooper), 350-1 Nova Scotia, Canada, 127
OGt1I oJ /AI HorGlii, TM (David), 100, 216 oaths, 214-15 occupationa: and census, 286; and
interests, 106, 107; representation of, 258, 260; status of, 22, 247, 278, 283, 290,3+5-6; s« also people, common
officeholding : Adam Smith on, 386n; competition for, 257, 296-7 ; democratic, 8, 287-305 /'IJSsim,: as gentry burden, 82, 83, 85; and Hamilton, +16n; JacklOnian concept of, 29+, 303-5; Jefferson on, 83, 288, 415n, +16n; and occupations, 247; and patronage, 77-8, 300; plural, 177-8; republican view of, 103-4; and Revolution, 87; and salaries, 286, 287 93 /'IJSsim, 296; traditional view of, +8, 8+,86, 121; and vinue, 105, 109
officers, military: ranks of, 20; reaponsibility of, 287; and parole, 29, +1
Ogden family, +8 Ohio,309 Ohio River, 127,266,310 opinion, public, 38-9, 363-+ Olis, Harrison Gray, 332 Otis, James, Jr., 62, 136-7, 197,200,223 Otis, Jarnes, Sr., 7+ OltO, Louis, 241 Orange County, N.C., 131, 171
Paine, Thomu: compares government and society, 217; on commerce, 13+; on enlightenment, 190, 191,222; and patriarchy, 168; and religion, 331; on Revolutionary War's elrceu, 2+8; and vinue, 181
Index44 2
Palladio, Andrea, 203 239-40; and public opinion, 334, 363-4; Palmer, R . R . , quoted, 85 and religion, 27, 329-31, 424n; Papageno, of Mozart 's MfZlie Fluü, 27 sentimentalization of, 240; on truth, pardon, power of, 16 361-3 ; and work, 8, 33-4, 171,274, Parker, Capt. John, 45 284-5, 286; sn also artisans; democracy Parliament, British, 292, 423n Ptopll 01NIW fort v , RUUIn. 331 Parsons, Theophilus, 410n Pepperell, William, 79 party, 87 , 247, 257, 294, 298-300 , 323, PtqUDd, of Moby Diek, 362
417n ; and Jacksonians, 303-5 Peters, Samuel, 85, 123 passions, aristocratic, 28, 108-9, 291 Perrik in, William, 258 Paterson, William , 41, 197,201-2 Pettit, Charlel, 120 patriarchy: challenges to, 147-8, 185, 315; Philadelphia, Pa ., 22, 34, 35, 271, 319,
of gentry, 43, 55-6, 72; as model for 361; anri-slavery society in, 186; banks empire, 159-60, 164-8 ; republ icanized , in, 256, 316, 337; and gentlemen, 260,
. 146, 147, 157; revolution against, 149; 341,344; manufacturing in, 137. 138; and women, 49, 357; Slt tWO family population of, 12, 58; revolutionary
Patriotic Society of Pa., 244 committees of, 245; society of, 53, I J9, PGlriots, Tht (Munford), 143, 150, 215 129, 184, 244, 295, 402n patronage, 271, 302, 327-8 , 385n ; and Philadelphia, College of , 319
aristocracy, 114, 115, 279; and Philipsborough, 55 Chesapeake planten, 70-1, 88-9 , 142-3; Philipse, Frederick, 56, 114 and colonial politics, 77-81, 87-8 , 92, Putur« Pj Plti/tuklphÜJ, Tht (Mease) , 361 113,173,174; as corruption , 80-1, 300; Pi/trim 's Progrm (Bunyan), 366 and Federalists, 263, 272; and gentry of Pinckney, Charles, 398n western MaIS., 45, 70, 88-9 ; and John Pinckney family, 174 Hancock, 115; justificarion for, 83; new Pill , William . 73. 105-6 meaning of, 300, 303-5 ; and paper Plutareh, 205, 225 money , 141, 142; revolutionary anault Poe, Edgar Allan, 362 on, 175-6, 177, 180,300,342 police, 85, 307
Patton, James, 69 politeness : in England, 8; and Peacham , Vt ., 306 enlightenment, 192-5 passim, 198, 202, Peale, Charles Wi1llOn. 58, 75 216,217-18 ; and middle clan, 347, 350, Pendleton. Edmund, 75 355-6; relation of, to virtue, 216; and penitentiary, 193 the Revolut ion, 192-5 passim, 216, 354; Penn, Thomas , 73, 77 Rush on, 402n; and Washington , 198-9 Penn family, 55 politician, modern , defined, 297 Pennlylvania, 189, 298, 306, 317, 322, politics: colonial , 48, 56, 62-3, 77-81,87-8,
366, 412n; families in, 45, 73, 176; 89 , 173-4 ; and democracy, 256, 259, Findley-Morris debate in , 256-7, 341; 296, 297, 323; and interelts, 246, 297; and offices of proht, 287-8, 289, 416n ; pluralism of. 245, 258-9 , 260-1 and penal reform. 193; population of. "Poor Richard," 77 126. 128, 129; representation in Pope, A1exander. 19, 101. 103,238 Congress, 259-61 Pope's Day. 42, 90
people, common: Adam Smith on, 386n ; population : of citiel, 58, 312; growth of, Chesterfield on, 236; and commer«, 125. 129, 248, 308-9 ; movement of, 139, 313, 325-6; and consumption, 35-6, 125-9. 133-4. 309-11, 313; youth of, 135-6, 248-9, 315; deference of , 63, 85, 309 91 ; and disorder, 90, 306-7; dominant Port Folio, TIu, 233 in America, 8. 348, 350, 358, 368-9; portrait painting, 38, 345; of families, 148, and equality , 234-40 ; and gentlemen, 184; of Franklin. 86; and gentry, 33; 24-9 passim, 34, 235, 275-6, 278. 280, and middle class, 354; of Washington, 343, 414n; and government, 87, 243-6, 404n 294-5, 304; and interests. 85 , 106, 252, poverty: in cities, 122, 124, 170; as 337; and Jelrerson, 240, 367; John ineitementto work, 34, 136, 315, 376n; Adams on, 237, 374n, 377n. 408-9n ; relative lack of. in America, 122, 170, meannelS of, 27, 29, 30, 42, 73, 85. 348 246, 273, 326. 374n ; moral sense of. Pownall, Thomas, gov. of Mais ., 17, 88
IndIx 443 Prat, Benjamin, 236 Randolph, John, 366 Presbyteriani, 12, 144,332-3 Randolph family, 182 Prelton, William, 129 Ravenscroft, Edward, 233 Preston family, 129 Read, Joseph, 84 Priestley, Joseph, 231 religion: and authority, 18, 89, 158; in the primogeniture, 45, 46, 116; abolished in colonies, 14, 17-18, 111-12, 144-5, 170;
Revolution, 183; in Virginia, 47, 182 81 dilintegrative force, 112, 232, 331-3, Princeton, N .J ., 202 424n; in England, 14, 111-12; and Princelon College, 31, 39, 180,242,276, enlightenment, 191; and incorporation,
342 321; and morality, 333-4; represenwion prilOnl, 335 of, in government, 245. 258, 260; privacy, 59 Revolution'l elrect on, 329; and professionl, 21, 22, 279, 284, 338, 377n; revelutioneries, 158, 198, 366, 411n,
changei in, 346-7, 361; eue of entering, 43On; 81 social adhesive, 329, 331; sn 118, 361; and gentlemen, 22, 36, 37, 345 tJlso Chriltianity 6; govemment officials 81, 290, 294, 298; Renaissance, 101, 194 81 umpires, 254; and woric, 284, 346-7 Rensselaenwyck Manor, 55
progress, 191-2, 360, 367 representation : actual, 245, 257, 259, 294; Progressive hiltorianl, 3-4 in colonial assembliel, 128-9; in property : and corporadens, 318, 322; and Congrell, 260-1, 412n; in England, 13,
equality, 183, 234; govemment officei 129; in S.C., 268 81, 84, 297, 304; and independence, 23, Representatives, U .5 . House of, 292, 297 68, 178, 269; Jelrenon on, 179; and republicaniam: and avenion to party, 298; judiciary, 421n ; and labor, 277, 413n; and Chriltianity, 331, 332; and modem meaning of, 68, 270, 415n; and corporatlons, 318-20; and Mus. conltitution, 410-11n; coemopolitaniem, 221-4; and quali6cationl for lulrrage, 269-70; and democracy, 230-1, 252, 296, 356,369; Revolution, 252, 268-70; rightl of, 322, and education, 190-1, 348; emotional 423n; sn wo wealth, proprietary signiticance of, 180; in England, 15, 98
proto· indullrialization, 137-8, 314, 315 103; and equality, 233, 235; and family, providence, 191, 360 147; and govemment salanes, 291, 293, Providence, R .I. , 130,315,317,347 294; Gouverneur Morril undermines, public opinion, 38-9, 363-4 288; and hierarchy , 225, 233, 240, 265; Pulteney, William, 102 John Adamion, 288-9, 407n; and punishmenl, criminal, 29, 49, 72-3, minority rightl, 322-3, 325; and public
revolutionary changes in, 192-3; IOlitary power, 187-9, 320, 321-2; and lincerity, con6nement 81, 193, 219 235; and surrender of private intereitI,
puritanism , 18, 33, 110, 352; and 252; and War of 1812, 327; and work, contractl, 163; on family 81 "Iiltle 277, 284, 285, 286 commonwealth, " '44; jeremiadl of, Republicans, 243, 265, 280, 296, 298, againlt luxury, 136; on rigor of 336, 416n ; and bulinen, 263-4 , 266; Jehovah, 158 favor weak government , 262, 328 ; fear
Purviance, Samuel, 73 democracy, 323; feu monarchy, 263; PUlnam, Ruful, 41 and free lpeech, 362-3 ; and modem
propeny, 270; in New York, 269-70, 299,302,307; Nonhem and Southem,
Quebec, Canada, 126 compared, 281; on patronage, 301-2; u Quincy, JOIiah: hatred of HutchinlOn, temporary party, 298
175; on independence from market, 68; republic of letten, 181, 221, 5SO on S .C., 31, 170 Revolution, American : 81 ....ult on
dependency, 184; compared to Prench Revolution, 7, 251; conservatiUD 0'. '-S,
Ralph. Jamel, 118-19 231; and democracy, 7, 245, 548, "'-4, Ramsey, David, 15, 197,330; on 369; and destruetion of aristocncy, 2";
cilizenship, 169; on cosmopolitanism, 222; dilintegrative efl'eetl of, 508, 'SI, ses; disillusionment of. 366; on equality, 180, u famUy squabbJe, 165, 168; and 233, 238; on sincerity, 235 loyaliltl, 176-7 ; and natun 0'
:, 444 Index Index 445 Revolution, Ameriean (co"ti"UId) condemned by, 282; on monarehy , 15 slander, 60, 86 31,115-16,212,282 ; anisans in, 245;
government, 187; and patronage, 77; 16,216; on politeness, 402n ; on slavery, 7,42 , 153-4,277; and anisanal backcountry of, 131-2 ; eolonial and pauerns of inheritance, 183; and Washington, 198 erafts , 115; eolonists' fear of, 51, 172-3; government of, 82; equality in, 170-1; property, 269-70; radicalism of, 4, 5 , Rutledge, john, 292 compared to servitude, 52-3, 54; and government salaries, 292 , H 6n; interests 30, 169, 179, 189,230, 232 , 238; and dependency, 55, 179; and equality, in , 268 relig ion, 329, 332; and slavery, 186-7 ; 398n ; harshness of, 124; opposition to, StJu.tJt Cdrolina Gazt/II, 101
l ~ ~
soeial eharaeter of, 4, 5, 6, 87, 175-9; a. Sackville family , 113 ' '/'' weak, 54; Revolution's effect on, 186-7; Sparta, 100, 103, 215 souree of national unity, 336; sueee •• of, St . Albans, vr .. 4200 and society, 19,25, 122; in S.C ., 170, specie, 65, 317 368; as utopian movemem, 189-90, 229; St . Louis, Mo., 310 268 "spoils system," 303 and virtue , 204; and women , 183; on salaries, government, 82, 285, 287-93 Small , William, 203 Stamp Act , 63 , 91, 244 work and leisure , 377n ; St6 also passim, 296, 416n; and equality, 286 Smith, Adam , 219, 363; on common statistics, American faseinat ion with, Revolutionary War Sallust, 100 people, 386n; on govemment, 97, 99 ; 360-1
Revolutionary War: and artisans, 247 ; SaItonstall, Leverett, 331 on labor, 136; on landed gentry, 68, Staunton, Va ., 128 effeell of, 247-8; veterans of, used by Sampson, William, 328 266; on merchants, 106-7,211 Sreele, Sir Riehard, 26, 37, 194 Federalists, 263 Scandinavia, Iiteraey in, 313 Smith, Elias, 232, 332 Steuart, Sir james, 263
Revolution , French, 3, 231 , 368, 371n Scotch-Irish, 110, 260 ; in S .C . , 131-3 , Sm ith, joseph, 310 Stiles, Ezra, 88, 128, 190, 251 Revolution, Glorious , 13, 101, 155 268 Smith, Melancton, 258 Stoddard family, 70 Rhode bland, 50, 130, 294; banks in, Scotland , 125, 126, 350 ; eompared with Smith, Samuel Stanhope, 190 Stone , Thomas, 287
317; faction in, 122; as modern colonial America, 195-6 Smith, William , of New York, 66 Stone, Banon, 333 economy, 140, 141; and paper money, Scott, Thomas, Hin Smith, William, of Philadelphia, 66, 222, Story, joseph, 347, 413, 424n 141, s1avery in , 51 Scottish factors, 142 293 strangers, 19,31 ,60,129,133,175;
Richardson, Samuel , 148 Scottish moral sense, 238; st6 dUO common smuggHng, 17 gentry ability to relate to, 222, 224; and Riehmond, Va ., 354 sense; moral sense socialism, inhibited in V .S ., 286 paper money , 141; scrutinized c1osely, rights: of Englishmen, 13-14; and &dSlJfU, Tlu (Thompson), 100 societies, moral, 334-5 60 ; warned out, 20, 130
judieiary, 323, 325 ; of minorities, 322 , seats , eountry, 115, 119, 265, 287 society, colonial: agricultural and rural strikes, labor, 186 Hin; of property, 324, 423n; in Sedgwick, Catherine, 342 nature of, 123; affection in, 219-20; Stuart, Gilbert, 404n republies, 188-9; vested, 322, 422n Sedgwick, Theodore, jr., 286 barbarism of, 42, 54-5 ; bonds of, 57, subjects, of king, 11, 12, 169
riots, St6 mobs Sedgwick , Theodore, Sr., 252, 264, 364 70; changes in, 170; compared to suffrage, Stt voting Rip Van Winkte, 306 Sedition Act , 362 England, 20, 44, 46, 52-3, 57, 58, 65, suicide, 306 Rittenhouse , David , 222 telf-made man, 77; novelty of, 341- 2 66-7 ,76-7 ,110-17 passim, 119-24 SuUivan, james, 218, 320 "river gods," 89,213 senate , Mass ., 410-lln passim, 134, 135, 164; eompared to sumptuary laws, 35, 136 Robbins , Rev . Thomas , 97, 239 senste, N.Y ., 268-9 Europe, 46, 69 ; distribution of wealth Supreme Coun, V .S ., 321, 322 , 324; Set Robespierre, Maximilien , 3 Senate, V .S ., 292, 293 in , 22; and family, 43-6; as hodgepodge also courts; judiciary Robinson, Benjamin , 75 sensibility, humanitarian, power of, 235 of pr ivileges, 111; intimacy of, 59-60; Susquehanna River, 127 Robinson , Beverly , 114 separation of powers, 324 and kinship, 46, 77; landowning in, Swanwick, john, 317, 342 Robinson , john, 178 Sermon on the Mount, 158 123; and mobs, 89-91; patemalism of, Swifl, jonathan, 27, 101 Rob inson , William, 322 Servier, john, 345 57-8; population of, 133-4; sympathy, 224, 235, 237, 239-40, 328 Robinson Crusoe, 19 servitude, 19, 172, 242, 345, 351, 353; primitiveness of, 123-4; prosperity of, Robinson family, 85 compared to English, 52-3 ; compared to 169, 172, 398n; public and private Rockingham, Charles Watson Wentworth , slavery, 52-3, 54; decline of, 145, 148, spheres of, blurred, 11, 59, 61-3 , 84 , Tacitus, 100, 103
Marquell of , 113 184-5; harshness of, 124; prevalenee of, 86; ranks in, 20-1, 23-4, 25; and lelegraph, 311 Rodney, Caesar, 340 51-4; runaways from, 60 republicanism, 109-10, 169 temperance, 356 Rollin, Chartes , 148 Seven Years' War, 41, 45, 74, 118, 163 society, V .S.: adhesives of , 327, 328, 329, tenantry: in England, 14; nature of, 55-6; Roman. 13, New Testament, 18 Sewell. Jonathan, 86, 167,204 335-6; agrieultural and rural nature of, and proprietary wealth , 68; weakne •• of, Rome , aneient , 36, 59, 215, 288, 403n ; Shaftcsbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl 312 ; aristocracy in , 241-2 ; barbarism of, 113-14
and republicani.m, 101-2 ; and of,219 311,354; commercialization of, 313, Tenne.see, 129, 306, 309, 310 demoeraey , 306 Shakespeare, William, 284 338-9; compared with Europe, 340, 348 ; Tennesaee River, 127
rotation in office, 304 shame, 193, 236, 344; of common people, disorder of, 305-10 passim, 328, 331, Thacher, Oxenbridge, 177 Rothenberg. Winifred B. , 393n 72-3 359, 365; as mau, 360; pluralism of, Thebes, 100 Rumford , Benjamin Thomp.on , Count, Shenandoah Valley, 129 258-9; power of idea of equality in, 233; Third World, .34
221 Sherman, Roger, 69, 85 transformation of, 177, 232; vulgarity of, theft, 306 Rush, Benjamin, 16,266-7 ; on Shippen, Edward, 111, 84 350-1,369; youm of, 309 Thomas, baiah, 31'
benevolenee, 192; on classical languages, Shippen, William, 50 Sons ofLiberty, 244 Thompson, Jame., 100, 102 349; on eommeree, 218, 326-7; Shippen family, 45 , 74, 176 South : persistenee of honor in, 344 ; Thomson , Charlel, 366 disillusionment of, 366 ; enlightenment Shipton, Clifford K ., quoted, 160 compared with North, 186, 277, 285, Thrale, Heiter (Mra. Henry), .4 of, 191, 193,236; fears democratie Shirley, William, gav . ofMass., 17,74,87 287; and Republican pany, 267 Ticonderora, Fort, 41 education , 349-50; gentlemanly leisure Sidney, AIgernon, 110, 179 South Carolina, 43 , 45, 48; ari.tocraey in , Tillot.on, Ab.hp. John, 158, 2"
"
44 6 Irukx .~'I Index 447
in, 30,31 , 32, 115; and Jelferaon , 367; tillel: ariltocratic, 25, 31, 33, 42; manufacluring in , 138; patronage in, repuratien of, 206; retirement of , as 239, 2+0; on polireness , 216; on sociery
colonilll ' scramble for, 21, 80; Jobn 80,88; penal reform in , 193; planters '
Timothy , Peter, 101 74; on politeness, 198; as presidenr , 209; gentlernen-Iarmers, 205; on moral sense ,
commander in chief, 289-90, and self and governmenl, 217 Adamion, 375n ; and honor , +0; in new intermarriage in , 45; polilics of, 121-2, education , 197; statue of, +03n ; tenants Winslow family, 177 Republic , 233; and office, 8+; scarcity 143; population of, 128, 129; religion in, of, 55; wealth of, 112; Weems on , 283 ; Winthrop, john , 19 of, in colonies, 20, 30, 38 112; Revolution in, 178; sense of ruin .,ö, BI work ing man, 284 Witherspoon , John, 69, 151-2 , 159,219
tobacco , 70-1, 134 of, 117, 143; aociety of, 130-1, 143-4; '.\1 Washington, D.C ., 275, 311 Wolcon, Oliver, Jr., 231, 266, 293 Tocqueville, Alexii de : on democratic sulfrage in, 294 Wallon, Elkanah, 307-8 Wolfe, Gen . James, 126
disinlegration , 365; on equality of virtue: lU adhesive, 215-20, 249, 335; weallh: ·distribution of, in colonial society, Wollaslon, William, 192 governmem offieiall, 304; on interest , c1aslical, defined , 104; and common 3, 22; distribution of, in early Republic, women , 7, 8; changed role of, 356-7 ; 336; on legal profeuion, 325; on middle people, 261; cultivation of, 190, 409n , -' , li 22,271 ,340; and equality, 242-3, 342-3: colonial and English compared, 147: clan, 348 ; on work, 285-6 Emersen on, 365; Greene on , 204; and and gentry, 32; importance of , to Guild, dependence of, 56; and economy, 374n;
Toland, John, 179 Hamilton, 249, 413n; importance of, 353; and social superiority, 242-43; and and education, 357-8 ; and equaliry , Tracy, Destun de , SN Destun de Tracy 105-6, 109; and interest, 106; and virtue, 282-3 ; SN also property 236; and family , 49; and Ind ians, trade , inland: celebration of, 336-7 , 421n; Jeffenon , 179, 249, 262; Jobn Adaml weahh , proprietary, 68-9, 316, 413n; and 358; and inheritance, 46, 47 ; in
growth of, 137-9, 315; and paper on , 289; new meaninga of, 215-16, 249, Federal ists, 263, 266: and genlry, 251, manufacturing, 138, 314, 315; and money, 142; primitivenCSll of, in 356, 357; and panies , 299; private , 104; 279; and Mau. eonstitution , 410-11; mobs, 90; and modern virtue, 216; and colon ies, 65-6; Revolulionary War'l and religion , 334; and Revolution, 264; weakening of', 338-9; su also property Revolution, 183-4: righll of, 147; effeci on , 248-50; SN wO commerce weaknen er, 229, 252-3, 336-7 ; and Webster, Danie1, 306, 359 separate sphere of, 357 , and voting,
Treaaury Oepanment, 263 weallh , 282-3 ; and women , 357; SII also Websler, Noah, 345, 348, 366 178-9 Trenchard , John, 57, 101,2+0 disimerestedness Weeml, Paraon Masen Locke, 283, Woodmason , Rev , Charles, 58, 131-2 Troup, Robert, 265, Visigalhs, 350 356 Worcesler, Mass ., 314 Tray, N .Y., 352 Voltaire. 14, 102,231 ,331 Wenlworth, Benning, gav . of N.H ., 121, Wordsworth, Williarn, 368 Trumbull, John, painter, 191 voting : debate over , in N.Y ., 269-70; 138 work : in ancient Rome , 377n; celebration TrumbuU, John, poet , 39 denial of, 56; imponance of, 113, 259; Wentworth, Thomas, 99 of, 277, 284-6, 337, 355; gentry free Trumbull, Jonathan, 33, 85 infrequency of, in colonies, 87-8; spread Wenlworlh family, 48 from, 33; in household, 44; identified truth : and common people , 362-3 ; of right of, 294, 295; and women, 56, Wentworth Woodhouse, 113 with marketplace , 68-9 ; for living ,
diffUlion of, 8, 361-2 ; and gentry , +J ; 178 Wesley, Jobn, 282 414n ; and middle c1ass, 347; Mandeville and religion , 332 West : equality in, 310; and Federalill on , 376n ; neceuity of, 38 ; and
Tucker, St . George , 424n dreams, 266 , 413n ; gentlemen in, 343: professions, 284, 346-7; and puritan Tudor, William , 59-60 , 355 Wadsworth, Jeremiah, 52, 264-5 and migranu, 126, 128,309-10 ethic, 33; as lource of prosperity, 325; Turner , Fredericlr.Jaclr.lOn, 311 Walei, 182, 309 West, Benjamin, 75, 221 and Washington, 283; SN also labor Tyler, RoyalI, 184 Wallace , Charles, 37 Westerly, R .I., 317 Worthington, john, 89
Waller, Benjamin, 74-5 Welt Indies , 134 Worthington family, 70 Walpoie, Sir Robert, 102, 103, 115 Whanon family, 119 Wright, Conrad E. , 424n Walton family, 176 Whig party, 303, 336 Wright, Frances , 316 Unitariani, 333, 367 Wanaey, Henry, 314 Willard, Samue1, 43, 146 Wright, Silas , 300 United States: commerce of, 313, 315-16; war, and honor, +0, 275 William and Mary, College of , 75, 203 Wyom ing Valley , Pa ., 127 new adhelivel for, 336; size of, 310; SII Ward, Samuel, Jr., 203-4 Williami, Israel, 89, 213 Wythe, George , 203 also commerce ; economy; society, V .S . ; warning·out laws, 20. 130
William., joseph, 280 Irade, inland War of 1812,298,327 Williaml, N., 302 urbanization, 311 Wamer, George, 276 Williams, Samuel, 364 Yale College, 20, 145, 242 , 243; and
Warren, James, 177, 204, 366 Williamsburg, Va . , 12,203 Abraham Bishop, 271 , 275; rank ing of Warren, Mercy OIil, 61 Williams family, 70 students in, 21
Van Buren , Manin : and conlempt for Warville , BriSSOI de, 199, 314 Willing, Thomas, 316 Yeates, Jaaper, 74
Federaliltl, 300; on democracy, 368-9; WlUhington, George. 3, 197-9, 205-10; Wilson , J ames, 197, 291; on a1legiance York, Pa ., 126
al new polit ieian , 299; on partiel, 300; aloofneu of, 199, +04n; BI Cineinnatus, and consent, 166, 397n: bankruptcy Yorkshire, England, 12
on patronage , 302 205-6; and common people, 27, 252; of, 266-7; on dependence, 56 ; on Young , Anhur, 34
Venturi, Franco , quoted , 96 coamopolitanism of, 221, 222; Vermont , 127, 242-3, 313 disiUulionmenl of, 366; disinteresledneu Veyne, Paul, 377n of, 265; on diltiUed Ipirits, 306; and violence, in eitiel, 307 enligblenment, 198: and fame, 207; :os Virgil, 100, 265 Freemaaon, 223; and govemment Virginia, 25, 36, 43; architCCIUre in , 355; salaries, 288, 289, 291: and john
conltitulion of, 178; COUrtl in, 16; Adams, +0, 289-90; on " monied economy of, 69, 70-1 , 134, 142; and Gentry," 68; and moralily, 333; on entail, 46; and familiei, 45, 46; gentry obligalionl of office, 83; and patronage,
- Wood 1991 - The Radicalism of the American Revolution 1
- Wood 1991 - The Radicalism of the American Revolution 2
- Wood 1991 - The Radicalism of the American Revolution 3
- Wood 1991 - The Radicalism of the American Revolution 4