Essay

2t21t2019 The Case for Animal Rights, by Tom Regan

The Case for Animal Rights

by Tcm Regan

ln PETER SfNGER (edl, ln Defense of Animols New York: Basit Bta(:kwetl, 1985, pp. 13-26

? Acr,bat version

I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights - as a part of the animat rights movement. That movement, as I concejve it, is committed to a number of goats, inctuding:

. the total, abotition of the use of anrmals in science;

. the totaI dissotution of commercial animat agricutture;

. the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping. There are, I know, peopte who profess to betieve in animal rights but do not avow these goats. Factory farming, they say, is wrong - it viotates animats' rights - but traditionat animat agricutture is att right. Toxicity tests of cosmetics on animats violates their rights, but important medicat research - (ancer research, for exampte - does not. The cLubbing of baby seats is abhorrent, but not the harvesting of adutt seats. I used to think I understood this reasoning. Not any more. You don't change unjust institutions by tidying them up.

what's wrong fundamentalty wrong - with the way animats are treated isn't the detaits that vary from case to case. lt's tl-e whote system. The forlornness of the Yea[ catf is pathetic, heart wrenching; the putsing pain of the chimp with etectrodes ptanted deep in her brain is reputsive; the slow, to-tuous death of the racoon caught in the teg- hotd trap is agonizing. But what is wront isn't the pain, isn't the suffering, isn't the deprivation. These compound what's wrorg. Sometimes ' often - they make it much, much worse. But they are not the fundam€ ntat wrong.

The fundamentat wrong is the system thal attows us to view animats as our resources, here for us - to be eaten, or surgicatty maniputated, or exptoited for sport or money. Once we acceDt this view of animats - as cur resources - the rest is as predictabte as it is regrettable. why worry about their toneliness, their pain, their death? Since animats exist for us, to benefit us in one way or an()ther, what harms them realty doesn't matter

- or matters onty if it starts to bother us makes us feet a trifte uneasy when we eat our veat escatope, for example. So, yts, tet us get vea[ ca(ves out of sotitary confinement, give them more sPace, a little straw, a few companions. But let us keep our veaI escatope.

But a tittte straw more space and a few ccmpanions won t etiminate - won't even touch - the basic wrong that attaches to our viewing and treating these animals as our resources. A veal calf kitled to be eaten after tiving in ctose confinement is viewed and treated in this way: but so, too, is another who is raised (as they say) 'more humanety To right the wrong of our treatment of farrn animats requires more than making rearing methods 'more humane': it reouires th-" total dissotution of commercial animal agricutture

How we do this, whether we do it or, as in the case of animats in science, whether and how we abotish their use - these are to a large extent potiticat questions. Peopte must change their betiefs before they change their habits. Enough peopte, especiatty those etected to pubtic office, must believe in ( hange - must want it - before we witl have taws that protect the rights of animats, 'T'his process of change is very compticated, very demanding, very exhausting, calting 'or the efforts of many hands in education, pubticity, potitical organization and activity, down to the ticking of envetopes and stamps. As a trained and practising phitosopher, the sort of contribution I can make is timited but, Itike to think, important. lhe currency of phitosophy is ideas - their meaning and rationat foundation - not the ruts and botts of the tegistative process, say, or the mechanics of community organizat on. That's what I have been exptoring over the past ten years or so in my essays and tatks and, most recentty, in my book, Ihe Cdse for Animot Rights. lbetieve the majrr conclusions lreach in the book are true because they are supported by the weight of the best arguments. I betieve the idea of animal rights has reason, not just emotion, on its side.

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In the space I have at my disposal here I cln onty sketch, in the barest outline, some of the main features of the book. lt's main themes - and we shoutd not be surprised by this - involve asking and answering deel), foundational moral questions about what moratity is, how it shoutd be understood and what is the best morat theory alt considered. I hope I can convey something of the shape I think this theory takes. The attempt to do this witl. be (to use a wor,j a friendly critic once used to describe my work) cerebral, perhaps too cerebrat. Brt this is misteading. My feetings about how animats are sometimes treated run just as deep and just as strong as those of my more votatite compatriots. Phitosophers do - to use the jargon of the day - have a right side to their brains. lf it's the teft side we c)ntribute (or mainty should), that's because what tatents we have reside there.

How to proceed? We begin by asking fow the moral status of animats has been understood by thinkers who deny that ani nats have rights. Then we test the mettte of their ideas by seeing how wetl they stand up under the heat of fair criticism. lf we start our thinking in this way, we soon find that some peopte betieve that we have no duties directty to animats, that we owe nothing lo them, that we can do nothing that wrongs them. Rather, we can do wrong acts that invotve animats, and so we have dutjes regarding them, though none to them. SLch views may be catted indirect duty views. 8y way of il.tustration: suppose your neighl)our kicks your dog. Then your neighbour has done something wrong. But not to your d('g. The wrong that has been done is a wrong to you. After att, it is wrong to upset peopte, and your neighbou/s kicking your dog upsets you. 50 you are the one who is wro rged, not your dog. Or again: by kicking your

dog your neighbour damages your propeny. And since it is wrong to damage another person's property, your neighbour has donc something wrong - to you, of course, not to your dog. Your neighbour no more wrongs your dog than your car woutd be wronged if the windshietd were smashed. Your neighcour's duties invotving your dog are indirect duties to you. More generatly, att of our drrties regarding animats are indirect duties to one another - to humanity, How coutd someone try to justify such a vi':w? Someone might say that your dog doesn't feet anything and so isn't hurt by your n,)ighbour's kick, doesn't care about the pain since none is fett, is as unaware of anything as is your windshield' Someone might say this, but no rational person witl, since, along other considerations, such a view witl commit anyone who hotds it to the posit on that no human being feets pain either - that human beings also don't care about \^ hat hapPens to them. A second possibjtity is that though both humans and your dog are hurt when kicked, it is onty human pain that matters. But, again, no rationat person can believe this' Pain is pain wherever it occurs. lf your neighbour's causing you pair is wrong because of the pain that is caused, we cannot rationatLy ignore or dismiss th('morat retevance of the pain that your dog feets.

Phitosophers who hotd indirect duty views - and many still do - have come to understand that they must avoid the two defects just noted: that is, both the view that animats don't feet anything as well as th( idea that onty human pain can be moratly retevant. Among such thinkers the sort of view now favoured is one or other form of what is called contractorionism.

Here, very crudety, is the root idea: mora ity consists of a set of rutes that individuats votuntarity agree to abide by, as we do when we sign a contract (hence the name contractarianism). Those who understand and accept the terms of the contract are coyered directly; they have rights create,l and recognized by, and protected in, the contract. And these contractors can atso lave protection spetted out for others who, though they tack the abitity to understand moratity and so cannot sign the contract themsetves, are loved or cherished by those who can. Thus young chitdren, for example, are unabte to sign contracts an(l tack rights. But they are protected by the contract none the tess because of the sentimentat interests of others, most notably their parents. 5o we have, then, duties jnvrlving these chitdren, duties regarding them, but no duties to them. Our duties in th€ir case are indirect duties to other human beings, usually their parents.

As for animals, since they cannot understal]d contracts, they obviously cannot sign: and since they cannot sign, they have no rights. Like chitdren, however, some animals are the objects of the sentimentat interest ol others. You, for example, tove your dog or cat. 5o those animals that enough peopte care about (companion animals, whates, baby seats, the American batd eagte), though ttey tack rights themselves, witt be protected because of the sentimentat interests of peopte. I have, then, according to contractarianism, no duty directty to your dog or any other animat, not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffering; my dlty not to hurt them is a duty I have to those peopte who care about what happens to tf em. As for other animats, where no or littte

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sentimental interest is present - in the case of farm animats, for exampte, or taboratory rats - what duties we have grow weaker and weaker, perhaps to vanishing point. The pain and death they endure, though reat, are not wrong if no one cares about them.

When it comes to the moral status of anin als' contractarianism coutd be a hard view to refute if it were an adequate theoretical approach to the morat status of human beings. lt is not adequate in this tatter reipect, however, which makes the question of its adequacy in the former case, regarding animats, utterly moot. For consider: moratity, according to the (crude) contractarian position before us, consists of rutes that people agree to abide by. What peopte? Wetl, enough to make a difference - enough, that is, collectively to have the power to enforce the rutes that are drawn up in the contract. That is very well and g)od for the signatories but not so good for anyone who is not asked to sign. And ther€ is nothing in contractarianism of the sort we are discussing that guarantees or requrres that everyone witt have a chance to participate equatty in framing the rules of moratity. The resutt is that this approach to ethics coutd sanction the most btatant fo.ms of sociat, economic, moral and potiticat injustice, ranging from a repressive ca;te system to systematic racial or sexuat discrimination. Might, according to this th,rory does make right. Let those who are the victims of injustice suffer as they witt. lt matters not so tong as no one etse - no contractor, or too few of them - cares ab('ut it. Such a theory takes one's moral breath away ... as if, for exampte, there woutc be nothing wrong with apartheid in South Africa if few white South Africans wer-' upset by it. A theory with so tittte to recommend it at the tevet of the ethics oi our treatment of our fettow humans cannot have anything more to recommend it when it comes to the ethics of how we treat our fetlow animats.

The version of contractarianism just exam ned is, as I have noted, a crude variety, and in fairness to those of a contractarian pcrsuasion it must be noted that much more refined, subtte and ingenious varieties ar€ possible. For exampte, John Rawls, in his,4 Theory of Justice, sets forth a version of contractarianism that forces contractors to ignore the accidental features of being a human being ' for exampte, whether one is white or btack, mate or femate, a genius r)r of modest intettect. Only by ignoring such features, Rawls believes, can we ensure that the principtes of justice that contractors woutd agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice. Despite the improvement a view such as Rawts's reDresents over the crlder forms of contractarianism, it remains deficient: it systematicatly denies that wl have direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice - young chitdren, for instance, and many mentatty retarded humans. And yet it seems reasonirbty certain that, were we to torture a young chitd or a retarded etder, we would be dcing something that wronged him or her, not something that woutd be wrong if (and onty if) other humans with a sense ofjustice were upset. And since this is true in the case of these humans, we cannot rationatly deny the same in the case of animals.

Indirect duty views, then, including the be;t among them, fail to command our rational assent. Whatever ethicat theory we shoutd accept rationatly, therefore, it must at least recognize that we have some duties direclly to animats, just as we have some duties directty to each other. The next two theories l'tt sketch attempt to meet this requrrement,

The first lcalt the cruetty-kindness view. Simpty stated, this says that we have a direct duty to be kind to animats and a direct duty not to be cruel to them. Despite the famitiar, reassuring ring of these ideas, I do not believe that this view offers an adequate theory. To make this clearer, c('nsider kindness. A kind person acts from a certain kind of motive - compassion or cor cern, for exampte. And that is a virtue But there is no guarantee that a kind act is a right act. lf I am a generous racist, for exampte, I wilt be inctined to act kindty trwards members of my own race, faYouring their interests above those of others. My kindness would be real and, so far as it goes, good. But I trust it is too obyious to require argument that my kind acts may not be above morat reproach - may, in fact, be Fositivety wrong because rooted in injustice. So kindness, notwithstanding its status as a virtue to be encouraged, simpty witt not carry the weight of a theory of right action.

Cruelty fares no better. Peopte or their a(:ts are cruet if they disptay either a lack of sympathy for or, worse, the presence of erjoyment in anothe/s suffering. Cruetty in atl its guises is a bad thing, a tragic human feiting. But just as a person's being motivated by kindness does not guarantee that he or she does what is right, so the absence of cruetty does not ensure that he or she av3ids doing what is wrong. Many peopte who perform abortions, for example, are not cr.ret, sadistic peopte. But that fact atone does not settle the terrjbty difficutt question of the moratity of abortion. The case is no

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different when we examine the ethics of our treatment of animats. So, yes, let us be for kindness and against cruetty. But tet us not sr.lppose that being for the one and against the other answers questions about moral right and wrong.

Some peopte think that the theory we are looking for is utititarianism. A utititarian accepts two morat principles. The first is that of equatity: everyone's interests count, and simitar interests must be counted as having simitar weight or importance. White or btack, American or lranian, human or an mat - everyones pain or frustration matter, and matter just as much as the equivat,rnt pain or frustration of anyone etse. The second principte a utilitarian accepts is that of utitity: do the act that witl bring about the best batance between satisfaction and frustration for everyone affected by the outcome.

As a utilitarian, then, here is how I am to approach the task of deciding what I moratty ought to do: I must ask who witt be affe,:ted if I choose to do one thing rather than another, how much each individuat witt t'e affected, and where the best resutts are most tikely to lie - which option, in other words, is most tikety to bring about the best results, the best batance between satisfacrrion and frustration. That option, whatever it may be, r's the one lought to choose. That is where my morat duty ties.

The great appeat of utilitarianism rests with its uncompromising egalitorionism: everyone's interests count and count as rnuch as the like interests of everyone etse' The kind of odious discrimination that s(,me forms of contractarianism can justify ' discrimination based on race or sex, for examDte - seems disattowed in principte by util.itarianism, as is speciesism, syst,)matic discrimination based on species membershiD.

The equality we find in utilitarianism, however, is not the sort an advocate of animal or human rights shoutd have in mind. Utititananism has no room for the equat morat rights of different individuals because it has no rcom for their equat inherent value or worth. what has value for the utititarian is the satisfaction of an individuat's interests, not the individuat whose interests they are. A universe in which you satisfy your desire for water, food and warmth is, other things teing equat, better than a universe in which these desires are frustrated. And the sam€ is true in the case of an animal with simitar desires, But neither you nor the animat tave any value in your own right' onty your feetin8s do.

Here is an anatogy to hetp make the F,hitosophicat point ctearer: a cup contains different tiquids, sometimes sweet, som€times bitter, sometimes a mix of the two. What has vatue are the tiquids: the swe€ter the better, the bitterer the worse. The cup, the container, has no value. lt is what goes into it, not what they go into, that has vatue. For the utititarian you and I are like the cup; we have no vatue as individuats and thus no equal vatue. What has value is wh; t goes into us, what we seNe as receptactes for; our feetings of satisfaction have positir'e vatue, our feelings of frustration negative value.

Serious Droblems arise for utititarianism wllen we remind ourselves that it enjoins us to bring about the best consequences. whar. does this mean? lt doesn't mean the best consequences for me atone, or for my f.mity or friends, or any other Person taken individualty. No, what we must do is, roughty, as follows: we must add up (somehow!) the separate satisfactjons and frustrations of everyone tikety to be affected by our choice, the satisfactions in one column, lhe frustrations in the other. We must total each cotumn for each of the oDtions befor{} us. That is what it means to say the theory is aggregative. And then we must choose tlrat option which is most tikety to bring about the best balance of totatled satisfactiors over totatted frustrations. Whatever act woutd tead to this outcome is the one we ought moratty to perform - it is where our moral duty ties. And that act quite clearty might not be the same one that woutd bring about the best resutts for me personalty or for my famity or friends, or for a tab animal. The best aggregated consequence: for everyone concerned are not necessarity the best for each indiYiduat.

That utititarianism is an aggregative the,)ry - different individuats' satisfactions or frustrations are added, or summed, or totiLlled . is the key objection to this theory. My Aunt Bea is otd, inactive, a cranky, sour pe-son, though not physicatty itt' She prefers to go on living. She is also rather rich. I coutj make a fortune if I coutd get my hands on her money, money she intends to give me in any event, after she dies, but which she refuses to give me now. In order to avoid i, huge tax bite, I ptan to donate a handsome sum of my profits to a local chitdren's hos)itat. Many, many chitdren witt benefit from my generosity, and much joy witt be broug rt to their parents, relatives and friends. lf I don't get the money rather soon, att these ambitions witl come to naught. The once'in' a-tifetime opportunity to make a reat kittirrg witl be gone. Why, then, not kitt my Aunt

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Bea? Oh, of course I might get caught. BLt I'm no fool and, besides, her doctor can be counted on to co-operate (he has an eye for the same investment and I happen to know a good deat about his shady past). The d,)ed can be done . . . professionalty, shatt we say. There is ve4l tittte chance of getting :aught. And as for my conscience being guitt- ridden, I am a resourceful sort of fettow a 1d wi(t take more than sufficient comfort - as I lie on the beach at Acaputco - in conterlplating the joy and heatth I have brought to so many othe6. Suppose Aunt Bea is kitl.e,j and the rest of the story comes out as told. Woutd I have done anything wrong? Anytt ing immorat? One would have thought that I had. Not according to utilitarianism. Sinc€ what I have done has brought about the best batance between totatted satisfaction and frustration for all those affected by the outcome, my action is not wrong. Indeec, in kitting Aunt Bea the physician and I did what duty required.

This same kind of argument can be rep€ated in att sorts of cases, itlustrating, time after time, how the utititarian's position leads to resutts that impartiat peopte find moratty cattous. lt is wrong to kitt my Aun: Bea in the name of bringing about the best resutts for others. A good end does not justify an evit means. Any adequate moral theory witl have to exptain why this is sl. Utilitarianism faits in this respect and so cannot be the theory we seek.

What to do? Where to begin anew? The ptace to begin, I think, is with the util.itarian's view of the vatue of the individuat - or, r:ther, tack of vatue. In its ptace, suppose we consider that you and l, for exampte, dc have vatue as individuats - what we'tt catt inherent volue. To say we have such vatu( is to say that we are gomething more than, something different from, mere receptacles. Moreover, to ensure that we do not pave the way for such injustices as stavery or s€xuat discrimination, we must believe that att who have inherent value have it equalty, regardtess of their sex, race, religion, birthptace and so on. Simitarty to be disci rded as irrelevant are one's talents or skitts, inteltigence and wealth, personatity or pa,.hotogy, whether one is toved and admired or despised and toathed. The genius and th(. retarded chitd, the prince and the pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, Mother Teresa and the most unscruputous used- car satesman - alt have inherent value, rtt possess it equatty, and atl have an equat right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of things, as if they existed as reso.rrces for others, My value as an individuat is independent of my usefutness to you. Yours is not dependent on your usefutness to me. For either of us to treat the other in ways that fail to show respect for the other's independent vatue is to act immoratly, to \iotate the individuat's rights.

Some of the rational virtues of this viev/ - what I catl the rights view - shoutd be evident. Untike (crude) contractarianism for exampte, the rights view in princlple denies the moral tolerabitity of any irnd att forms of racial, sexual or sociat discrimination; and untike utititarianism, this view in princip{€ denies that we can justify good resutts by using evit means tllat violate an individuat's rights -denies, for example, that it coutd be moral to kitt my Aunt Bea to harvest beneficial consequences for others. That woutd be to sanction the disrespectful treatment of the individuat in the name of the social good, something th -. rights view witt not - categoricatty witl not -ever atlow.

The rights view, I believe, is rationalty th€ most satisfactory morat theory lt surpasses a[[ other theories in the degree to which t ittuminates and explains the foundation of our duties to one another - the domain of ,ruman moratity. 0n this score it has the best reasons, the best arguments, on its side. 0f course, if it were possibte to show that onty human beings are included within its scope, then a person tike mysetf, who betieves in animal rights, woutd be obtiged to look elsewhere.

But attempts to timit its scope to humans onty can be shown to be rationalty defective. Animats, it is true, lack many of the abilities humans possess. They can't read, do higher mathematics, buitd a bookcase o' make baba ghonoush, Neither can many human beings, however, and yet we don't (and shouldn't) say that they (these humans) therefore have less inherent vatue, less of a right to be treated with respect, than do others. lt is the similarities between thos(' human beings who most ctearly, most non- controversialty have such vatue (the p€ople reading this, for example), not our differences, that matter most. And the reatty crucial., the basic similarity is simpty this: we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individuat welfare that has importance t(, us whatever our usefutness to others. We want and prefer things, betieve and feet tl,jngs, recatl and expect things. And atl these dimensions of our [ife, inctuding our pteasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimety death - att make a difference to the quatity of our (ife as lived, as experienced, by us as individuats. As the same is true of those animats that concern us (the ones that are

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eaten and trapped, for exampte), they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a tife, with inherent value of tlreir own.

Some there are who resist the idea that animats have inherent vatue. 'Onty humans have such value,'they profess. How might thjs narrow view be defended? Shatt we say that only humans have the requisite intetligence, or autonomy, or reason? But there are many, many humans who fajt to meet thes -. standards and yet are reasonabty viewed as having vatue above and beyond their usr futness to others. Shall we ctaim that onty humans betong to the right species, th€ species Homo sapiensl But this is btatant speciesism. wil.t it be said, then, that att . and onty - humans have immortal souls? Then our ooDonents have their work cut out f()r them, I am myself not itt-disposed to the proposition that there are immortal souts. Personatty, I Profoundty hope I have one. But lwoutd not want to rest my position on a controyersial ethical issue on the even more controversial question about who or wha: has an immortat sout. That is to dig one's hote deeper, not to chmb out. Rationatty, it is better to resolve moral issues without making more controyersial assumptions than are needed. The question of who has inherent vatue is such a question, one trat is resotved more rationatty without the introduction of the idea of immortat souts lhan by its use.

wett, perhaps some witl say that animals ]ave some inherent vatue, onty tess than we have. Once again, however, attempts to d{:fend this view can be shown to tack rationat justification. What coutd be the basis of our having more inherent vatue than animats? Their tack of reason, or autonomy, or intel ect? Onty if we are witting to make the same judgment in the case of humans who are s mitarty deficient. But it is not true that such humans - the retarded chitd, for examele, or the mentalty deranged - have less inherent vatue than you or l. Neither, thln, can we rationalty sustain the view that animats like them in being the experiencirg subjects of a life have less inherent vatue. ,All who have inherent vatue have it eguall /, whether they be human animats or not.

Inherent vatue, then, betongs equatty to trose who are the experiencing subjects of a tife/Whether it betongs to others - to rocks and rivers, trees and glaciers, for exampte - we do not know and may never know. But neither do we need to know, if we are to make the case for animal rights. We do not need to knoq for exampte, how many peopte are etigibte to vote in the next presidential etection before we can know whether lam. Simitarly, we do not need lo know how many individuals haYe inherent vatue before we can know that some do. '{hen it comes to the case for animat rights, then, what we need to know is whether ttre animats that, in our culture, are routinety eaten, hunted and used in our taboratories, for exampte, are like us in being subjects of a tife. And we do know this. we do know that many - literatty, bittions and bittions - of these animats are the subjects of a tife in the sense exptained and so have inherent value if we do. And since, in order to anive at the best theory of our duties to one another, we must recognize our equal j]herent value as individuals, reason - not sentiment, not emotion - reason compets us to recognize the equat inherent vatue of these animals and, with this, their equal rilht to be treated with respect.

fha\ very roughty, is the shape and feet of the case for animat rights. Most of the detaits of the supporting argument are missing. They are to be found in the book to which I attuded eartier. Here, the detaits go begging, and I must, in ctosing, timit mysetf to four finat Doints.

The first is how the theory that undertie; the case for animal rights shows that the animal rights movement js a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights movement The theory that rationatty grounds the r ghts of animats atso grounds the rights of humans. Thus those invotved in the animal rights movement are partners in the struggte to secure respect for human riglrts - the rights of women, for exampte, or minorities, or workers. The animat rights novement is cut from the same moral ctoth as tnese.

Second, having set out the broad outtine; of the rights view, lcan now say why its imptications for farming and science, among other fields, are both ctear and uncompromising. In the case of the use of animals in science, the rights view is categoricatty abotitionist. Lab animats ar-. not our tasters; we are not their kings. Eecause these animats are treated routi,el, systematicalty as if their vatue were reducibte to their usefutness to others, th(ry are routinety, systematicatty treated with a tack of respect, and thus are their rights routinety, systematicatty vioLated. This is just as true when they are used in triviat, duplicative, unnecessary or unwise research as it is when they are used in studies that ]otd out real promise of human benefits. We can't justify harming or kilting a human beiT g (my Aunt Bea, for example) just for these sorts of reason. Neither can we do so even in the case of so lowty a creature as a laboratory rat. lt is not just refinement or reduction that is catted for, not just larger,

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2t21t2019 The Case for Animal Rights, by Tom Regan

cleaner cages, not just more generous us€ of anaesthetic or the etimination of muttipl.e surgery not just tidying up the system. lt is comptete reptacement. The best we can do when it comes to using animats in scienc€ is - not to use them. That is where our duty Lies, accordjng to the rights view.

As for commercial animat agricutture, the rights view takes a simitar abotitionist position. The fundamental morat wrong lere is not that animats are kept in stressful ctose confinement or in isolation, or that their pain and suffering, their needs and preferences are ignored or discounted. Atl these ore wrong, of course, but they are not the fundamental wrong. They are symploms and effects of the deeper, systematic wrong that attows these animats to be /iewed and treated as tacking independent vatue, as resources for us - a5, indeed, a r,rnewabte resource, Giving farm animals more space, more naturat environments, more companions does not right the fundamentat wrong, any more than giving tab animat: more anaesthesia or biggec cleaner cages woutd right the fundamental wrong in their case. Nothing less than the total dissotution of commercial animal agricutture wil.L d] this, just as, for simitar reasons I wont devetop at length here, moratity require; nothing tess than the totat elimination of hunting and trapping for commercial and jporting ends, The rights view's imptications, then, as I have said, are clear and uncompromising.

My Last two points are about phitosoph /, my profession. lt is, most obvioustt no substitute for potiticat action. The words I have written here and in other ptaces by themsetves don't change a thing. lt is wlat we do with the thoughts that the words express - our acts, our deeds - that chanles things. Alt that philosophy can do, and atl I have attempted, is to offer a vision of wt at our deeds shoutd aim at. And the why. But not the how.

Finatty, I am reminded of my thoughtfut critic, the one I mentioned eartier, who chastised me for being too cerebrat. wetl, cerebrat I have been: indirect duty views, utititarianism, contractarianism - hardty tte stuff deep passions are made of. I am also reminded, howevet of the image another r riend once set before me - the image of the balterina as expressive of disciptined passion. Long hours of sweat and toit, of toneliness and practice, of doubt and fatigue: those are the disciptine of her craft. But the passion is there too, the fierce drive 10 excel, to speak through her body, to do it right, to pierce our minds. That is the image of phitosophy I Y/ould |eave with you, not 'too cerebral' hul disciplined possion. Of r.he disciptine enough has been seen. As for the passion: there are times, and these not infrequent, when tears come to my eyes when I see, or read, or hear of the wretched ptight of animals in the hands of humans. Their pain, their suffering, their lonetines:;, their innocence, their death. Anger. Rage. Pity. Sorrow. Disgust. The whole creatio r groans under the weiSht of the evit we humans visjt upon these mute, powertess creatures. lt is our hearts, not just our heads, that catl for an end to it alt, that demand,)f us that we overcome, for them, the habits and forces behind their systematic opprelsion. ALt great movements, it is written, go through three stages: ridicute, discussion, adoption. lt is the reatization of this third stage, adoption, that requires both our passion and our disciptine, our hearts and our heads, The fate of animats is in our hands. God grant we are equat to the task.

httpr//www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/rogan03.htm

Readins Notes to Care and virtue Approaches to Non-Humaq Animal Ethics

Civen the limitations of the scope of'the articles provided in the course textbook, we will include two online articles in our study ofnon-human animal ethics. They are Danie Engster's "Care Ethics and Animal Welfare,"

and Rosalind Hursthouse's "Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treat nent of the Other Animals" (see article links

below, on the Coursc Syllabus, and/or on tbe D2L Content page).

General Introduction: Care and Virtu€ Ethics Approaches to Non-Human Animal Ethics

While the articles in the course textbook vary in their approaches to the topic, they commonly focused much of their attention on the "recipient" side ofour interactions with non-human anilrrals. Matheny's argument largely

drew from a Consequential Utilitarian approach in focusing on nt'n-human animal suffering, while Cohen and

Wanen's arguments largely drew from a Deontological approach focusing on non'human animal rights.

Altematively, the Engster and Hursthouse online articles place gr.:ater emphasis on the "actors"; they focus on

the human "agents" whose action choices greatly influence the w:ll-being ofthe non-human animals they

include.

ln presenting an Ethics of Care approach to the topic, Engster un(lerscores the acting agent's relationship to the

non-human animals (a mutually dcpendent relationship that should bc based in carc and mutual development of both species/individuals). In presenting a Virtue Ethics approach, Hursthouse emphasizes the character ofthe

acting agent that arises as she/he engages with non-human anima s. Let's take a moment to introduce a few of the main points ofboth articles before you read them online.

Argument Overview: Daniel Engster, "Car€ Ethics and Animal welfare"

Engster's article "Care Ethics and Animal Welfare" focuses on a Care Ethics approach to non-human animal

ethics issues. In his own wortls, Engster outlines our ethical obligltion to care for non-human that depend on us

to '1neet their basic needs, develop their basic capabilities, and ar oid unwanted suffering and pain." (Engster

522) While Engster does not explicitly say so in his article, we can presume that this group includes non-human

animals involved in human activitics such as pet ownership/care, food production, hobbies (e.g. equestnan

activities) and entertainment (e.g. movie stal pets, sport hunting), studies and research (e.g. zoos and medical

research), and "wild" animals who will be impacted by urbanizat)on and human pollution.

With this group in mind, the background claim ofEngster's argurnent is, when dcpendency is created (oI

incidentally arises) in an interpersonal relationship, it is incumbelt upon the able party(s) to consider the

situation in an ethical manner. This is to say, that the action agent should consider her action choice as it

involves and affects herselfand all others. This "herselfand all orhers" context points to the (inter) action as it

unfolds in a relationship between (multiple) persons.

In focusing on the specific Care Ethics framework ofhis argumer t, he explains this ethical engagement

obligation in the context ofhuman to non-human animal relationships like this:

The reason to oppose animals suffering from the perspectjve ofcare ethics is not because we wish to

maximize utility las is the case in the consequential utilitarian approach] or consistently apply our right

theory across species fas is the case in the deontological a rproach], but becaus€ we have relations with

animals and care about them...Care theory derives our m(,ral obligations not from some abstract quality

such as autonomy or self-consciousness but rather from orrr relations with others a dependcnt social

creatures." (Engster 521 , 525)

In the scction "Care Theory and Human Beings," hc adds:

...[M]ost care theorists agree that caring at least entails h|lping others to meet their basic needs, develop their basic capabilities, and avoid unwanted suffering and pain. Building upon this minimalist approach,

caring may be defined as everything we do directly to hel) others (l) to satisff their basic needs for ibod, sanitary water, clothing, shelter, rest, a clean envirorrment, basic medical care, and protection from

harm; (2) to develop and maintain their basic capabilities for sensation, emotion, mobility, speech, reason, imagination, affiliation, and literacy and numerac;r; and (3) to avoid harm or alleviate unwanted suffering and pain. The most general goal ofcaring is to help others to survive and function so that they tak€ care of themselves and others and pu6ue some conc( ption ofthe good life. (Engster 522)

In the section "Care Ethics and Nonhurnan Animals" Engster arg res that our "duty" to care for others (including non-human animals) rests on "dependency," rather than "autonomy" (aulonomy being a critical elemcnt of Warren's argument). He explains:

We take on moral obligations to animals only when we ta (e some action that makes them dependent

upon us for their survival, functioning, and well-being, Ws assume moral duties to animals when we

make them dependent upon us because we then actively bring them into a relationship ofdependency

with us. We make their ability to achieve aims that we carr recognize as good for them-survival, dcvelopment, and basic well-being--{ependent upon our care. .. We contradict ourselves when we take

some action that generates a need whose fulfillment we rccognize as good but then refuse to fulfill it. ln other words, we should not create dependency without be ng prepared to care for the creatures that we

make dependent upon us. (Engster 527)

In translating this argument in to the specific context ofthe agricrLltural industry, in "Care Ethics, Factory

Fanns, and Moral Vegetarianism" he argues:

If we think it is morally wrong to deprive pets ofnecessary care, and more generally agree that we have moral obligations to carc for animals that we have made dcpendent upon us, then we logically must

conclude that human beings' treatment of most animals crrrrently under our care is morally deplorable.

The factory farming system that accounts for almost all the meat, eggs, and dairy products consumed in

the United States provides one ofthe most egregious exar rples. Each year more than cight billion

chickens, 100 million pigs, and forty million corvs pass through the factory farming system in the United

States alone. No one even prctends to defend this system l)y suggesting that it provides deccnt care to

animals. The only defensc given for factory farming praclices is the high profits and cheap food and

other products they generate. (Engster 529)

The factory farming system is norally indefensible from the perspective of care ethics. Having made

billions of animals dependent upon us for their survival arLd basic well-being, w€ deprive them of some

of their basic needs (including a clean environment and nrrtritious diet), thwart the development of their

basic capabilities (such as movement and nesting), and in lict unnecessary pain upon them. The care provided to these animals is so inadequate as to seem the ;ery antithesis ofcaring: in many cases, it seems to approximate a form oftorture. Animals under or r care ought at least to be provided adequate

food, water, and shelter, enjoy a clean and healthy envirotrment, have the opportunity to develop and

practice their basic capabilities for movement, sensation, companionship and the like, and live as much

as possible l}ee fiom pain. If we recognize this principlc t s valid in the treatnent of pets-as we should-then we should also consistently apply it to chickens, pigs, cows, and other farm animals. The

only practical way to achieve this goal, however, would br to abolish factory farming.

Primary responsibility for the treatment of animals in fact rry farms falls upon the owners, managers,

and workers in these businesses. Secondary responsibility falls upon consumers who implicitly support these practices by purchasing meat, eggs, milk, and other animal products from these companies- A

more general collective responsibility falls upon all of us "vho live in societies that legally sanction and

even provide govemment subsidies to the factory farming indushy. At the very least, we should all cease to support factory farms by refusing to purchase products from them and advocate for their legal

abolition. The abolition of factory farming is morally obligatory from the perspective of care ethics given the arguments outlined above. (Engster 530)

ln further clarifying this argument, he turns to the question ofwh.ther the care ethics approach requires moral vegetarianism (i.e., forgoing all meat eating) or even moral vegarism (i.e., re{iaining from the use ofany animal products whatsoever). He argues:

While care ethics allows some space for reasonable disagr eenent about animal slaughter and meat-

eating, it nonetheless draws a tairly sharp line around wh,t constitutes the acceptable heatment of animals. If one is going to raise animals for slaughter or c,)nsume animal products, one has an obligation to make surc these animals are well cared for. This obliga.ion is all the stronger because ofthe questionable na$re ofraising animals for consumption at all. Farmers should ensure that their animals

are happy, healthy and can practice th€ir capabilities. The I should further provide them with the

opporrunity to enjoy a happy existence fbr some reasonab e amount of time-allowing chickens, for example, to Itve at least a couple ofyears. We all should advocate for the passag€ ofstricter animal

wclfare legislation mandating that animals raised for hurr m purposes should have their basic needs

adcquately met, have an opportunity to develop and exercisc their basic capabilities, enjoy a happy

existence for some reasonable amount of time, and live as much as possible free from pain and

suffering. We likewise should advocate for tighter regulatLons on slaughterhouses and the shict

enlbrcement ofthese regulations, as well as encourage th€ development of more humane ways o1-

killing. At least until these reforms are put into place, we ,rll should refrain from using animal products,

or at least take special care to consume animal products orrly from farmers who raise and kill animals according to these guidelines. Care ethics does not necess.rrily support moral vegetarianism on

philosophical grounds, but given the cunent t€atment of rnost animals in the United States and many

other countries, it does practically support moral vegetariz nism at least until animals receive bettel care.

(Engster 532-33)

Argument Ov€rvi€w: Rosalind Hursthouse, "Applying Virtu( Etbics to Our Treatm€nt ofthe Oth€r Animals"

Like Engster, Hursthouse's afticle "Applying Virtue Ethics to Ouf Treatment ofthe Olher Animals" outlines a

component ofour ethical obligation to care for non-human animals, However, her article, drawn from a Virtue

Ethics approach, argues that developing and exercising moral vifiue can provide importance guidance or-

choosing the manner in which we engagement with other, non-human animal sp€cies. Her goal is to bring our

attention to the rather straightforward argument that "l mustn't pr.ll the cat's tail because it's cruel."

ln the "Against Moral Status" section, she outlines an argument r:garding the "moral status" of fetuses in the

context of abortion. She holds that while this line of argumentatir n may have merit in the context of abonion,

thc "moral status" issue does not address all ofthe issues involve,l in our interactions with non-human animals.

She says:

The consequentialist and deontological approaches to the ights and wrongs ofthc ways we treat the other animals (and also the environment) are structured [around determining thc moral status of"Xs" - rcpresenting the recipients of action]. Here too, the questi()n that must be answered first is "What is the moral status ofthe other animals (or other living things, such as trees, or indeed other natural things such as rocks and mountains)?" Here too, it is supposed that to establish that the other animals (or some subset ofthem) are Xs would be to establish that they hav3 rights, or that their interests should be given

the same moral weight as those of other Xs, or that prohibitions that apply to other Xs apply to them And here too, virtue ethicists have no need to answer the (luestion. .

What happens when we tum to debates about the status or'the other animals? Most philosophers writing on this come down on the animals' side, classifying thcm as Xs and thereby gcncrate the complcmcntary version of the problem... the assigning of differing moral jtatus is not merely recognizing a few features often relevant to good practical decision-making. It is recognizing them and ranking the possessors of those features accordingly. That, after all, is what the contiept of status does. h welcorning recognition of (some of the obvious differences between cats and men as an improvement on always lumping them together as sentient, or experiencing subjects ofa life, virtue ethicists are not going to commit themselves in advance to saying that the cited differences will always guarantee that, in cases of conflict, it is the cats that will go to the wall because of their inferi,:r starus. After all, we can recognize differences between women and men as features that shor ld often be taken into account when deciding what to do, without for a moment thinking that we thereb:/ commit ourselves to any kind of ranking, ..

...vi ue ethics can dismiss the question ofthe moral status of animals without a qualm. As a tool in the aborlion debate, the concept ofmoral status had its uses.. However, in the context oflhe ethics ofour treatment of the other animals it is simply useless. There isn't one familiar set of facts conceming the other animals, but a whole host of sets of (largely unfami)iar) facts about different species, and another host ofsets about individual animals, and another host ab()ut groups-pets, zoo animals, the animals we eat, the animals we experiment on...Questions about righ and wrong actions in relation to animals arise in a wide variety of contexts, far too many to be settled b) a blanket assignment of status. (Hunthouse 137- 140)

After addressing the moral status issue, she tums her attention to way virtue ethicists address the issue of human/non-human animal interactions. Much in the same way ErLgster did, in making her argument she focuses

on choices concerning the manner in which we go about feeding,rurselves- ln "Vegetarianism," sho explalns:

One way I begin to approach [the question, "Is Vegetariar,ism a virh:ous practicc"] is by taking several

leaves out of Singer's first book, lnin al Liberation. As s0me reviewers on the Amazon.com Web slte note, you can skip over Singer's philosophy in this book rvithout missing anlthing important. What is

doing the work are the detailed descriptions of factory farning (and animal experimentation). Thirty

years ago, they showed his readers that what we are being party to in eating meat is a huge amount of animal suffering that could be substantially reduced if we changed our habits. So I take the leaves on which he does that and thin! about them in terms of, for example, compassion, temperance, callousness,

cruelty, greed, self-indulgence-and honesty. Can l, in all honesty, deny the ongoing existence ofthis suffering? No, I can't. I know perfectly well that although there have been some improvements in the

regulation offactory farming, what is going on is still tenrble. Can I think it is an)'thing but callous to

shrug this off and say it doesn't matter? No, I can't. Can I deny that the practices are cruel? No, I can't.

Then what am I doing being party to them? It won't do for me to say that I am not actually engaging in

the cruelty mysell There is a large gap between not being cruel and being truly compassionate, and the

virtue ofcompassion is what I am supposed to be acquirirg and exercising. I can no more think of myself as compassionatc while I am pany to such cruelty than I could think of myself as just if' scrupulously avoiding owning slaves, I still enjoyed the fruits of slave labor,

What if I needed to eat meat to survive? That would, of cc,urse, be a very diff'erent situation.. .Once again, honesty compels me to admit that I do not need me rt, I just like it. A lot, lt gives me an enorrnous amount of pleasure. However, precisely what temperance requires is that I do not pursue such pleasure

while ignoring the claims ofthe other virtues. Pursuing th: pleasures ofconsuming meat, in the teeth of the claims ofcompassion, is just plain greedy and self-indulgent

...So, with respect to vegetarianism, a vinue ethicist may reach roughly the same practical conclusions as Singer and, albeit to a lesser extent, Regan [and other animal rights theorist], though on different

gounds. The practices that bring cheap meat to our tables are cruel, so we shouldn't be party to them. (Hursthouse l4l -43)

In the section, "Experiments on the Other Animals" she outlines he Virtue Ethics approach to practices

involving interactions that fall under the category of "cruelty." Slre explains the relationship between "cruelty"

and "action intentionality" likc this:

Does virnre ethics run the same line ofthought about using sentient animals in scientiltc experiments? To a limited extent, yes. ..Consider the use of the other an imals to test cosmetics. A virtue ethicist should agree with Singer and Regan [and other animal rights theorist] that this is wrong, for it is, in my

view, quite certain that such experiments are cruel.

The causing ofpain or suffering can count as cruel even v'hen it is unintentional; people can be found guilty of cruelty to children and animals without the pros< cution having to establish intent. More

commonly, a cruel action is intentional, but the agent's professed or manifest purpose is quite enough,

and neither his pleasure, his indiftbrence, nor his regret is required for the assessment ofhis action as cruel or not. All that is needed is that the action is the infl ction ofpain for a purpose that does not justify it. Some experimenters on animals have inflicted hcrrifying suffering on cats; their purPose was to discover how much pain cats can stand before it kills d.em. Such experiments can be rightly

condemned as cruel simply on the grounds that the knowl:dge gained was far too insignificant to justify

the expedments, without any consideration ofthe experinLenters' feelings.

The same is true ofcxperiments to test new cosmetics, for, as Singer so rightly remarks, we don't leel any new cosmetics, and, as virtue ethicists mindful ofthe vices of vanity and self-indulgence could add, we don't actually need any cosmetics at all. Their use cou ld be a harmless pleasure, but only if limited to the use ofthose produccd by companies that do not test their products on thc other animals So, as before, the three different approaches may reach the same practical conclusion regarding the use of animals to test cosmetics-that we should rcfrain from being party to these practices. A utilitarian

shouldn't be party to the infliction ofunnecessary sufferir g, a deontologist to the violation ofrights, and

a virtue ethicist to cruel practices.

However-moving on now to the ways in which a virtue,)thicist cannot continue to pursue this line- this is action guidance only if"refraining fron being partl,to such practices" can amount to something that I can do, something that people who are being party t,) them don't do. , ..Suppose I had accepted that

Singcr and Regan [and other animal rights theorist] have, in their different ways, shown that most/all

experiments on the other animals are wrong. How does thrt provide action guidance? What does it tell

me to do? Obviously, to refrain from performing such experiments. For most ofus, that's not an issue

I'm not an experimental biologist or technician, I'm a phi osopher, (Hursthouse 143-45)

What is it to refrain tiom being party to medical experimentation on animals? One might, if the choice were offered, refuse to save or prolong one's life by accelting a transplant ofa vital organ from a nonhuman animal, but that is an issue for very few ofus. .\nd, short of refraining from any ofthe benefits modem medicine has to offer, there doesn't seem to be anything that most ofus could do that would count as "refraining from being party to the practic:." (Hursthouse 145)

Medical experimentation is, unlike lying, a practice, But, ,rnlike meat production, it is not a Practice that any onc of us can readily, in our individual actions, refrair r fron being party to.. . fthe medical industry is a set ofinterlocked institutionsl that most ofus, individ"rally, are utterly powerless to change. That is why the debate over whether "it," or only many, o some, aspects of it, are wrong is not important, practically speaking. Settling that issue one way or the other will not make most of us one whit less powerless. (Hursthouse 147)

Any ofus can sign petitions, support animal rights pressu'e groups, and vote for politicians who speak up on behalf ofthe other animals. In this context, the role that lawyers play in combating the racism entrenched in the legal systems will mostly have to be played by scientists within the set of institutions that enshrine the practice, but it is up to the rest ofus, collectively, to make enough noise to get more of them concemed about bringing about changes. (Hursthou,;e 149)

You may complain that none ofwhat I have said about or.rr actions in relation to the other animals is cxciting but all pretty obvious. I think myself that this is how it should be. Most of the results of applying virtue ethics should be pretty obvious, because, r ather than constructing theoretical principles,

virue ethics just applies the everyday virtue and vice tem,s to our actions in the world as we find it. But what is there to be found, even right under our noses, is oiien not obvious until it is pointed oul. We have to make sure we really are looking at the ways human beings are affecting the world and, ifthey are bad, that we ask ourselves "What can I do?" instead ol'getting tied up in abstruse questions about

moral status. (Hursthouse 150-51)

ln the section "Human-centeredness," she looks at the virtue ethics apprcxsh in terms ofits inclusion of others (beyond the actor himselfArerself). She explains:

According to ancient Greek ethics, my final, architectonic end Itelor]-and everyone else's-is indeed human flourishing, living a good human life. But, as Julia Annas has frequently pointed out, this is not, in itself, a form of egoism, nor, we may now add, does it in any way privilege the value ofhuman flourishing or human life. It is not egoistic in virtue ofits Jirecting me to think about my flourishing, my good life. I am to think about how I should live my life, h,rw to give it a shape, simply because it is only my life that I can live, not because I am to take it to be ner:essarily more worth preserving than yours. It is not chauvinistic in virnre of its salng that my end-anrl everyone else 's-is human flourishing, living a good human life. This doesn't rank human life over othr r animals' lives and direct me to choose to live

a human one because it is more valuable. .. (Hursthouse I i2-53)

Singer and Regan fand other animal rights theorist] have become rightly famous for making it obvious to many ofus that a great deal of gratuitous suffering is involved in our use of some of the other animals

for food and experimental purposes. Once we have brouglrt ourselves to recognize this fact, the ordinary

usage of"cruel" and "compassionate" latches on to it quiti unproblematically However, as environmentalists constantly urge, we need a substantial change in our outlook to get any further-in virtue ethics' terms, a cl€arly seen and affective recognitit'n ofthe fact that human beings, and thereby human lives, are not only interwoven with cach other but with the rest ofnature. Then, and only then,

will we apply virtue ethics correctly to what we are doing (Hursthouse 154)

Article Links:

. Daniel Engster, "Care Ethics and Animal Welfare" httn://webs.rvoffor<I.cdu/williamsnm/rnimalTu20ethics /o20articleslcarcTn20ethicsTo20andTo20ani ntalTo20rvelfare.ndf

. Rosalind Hursthouse, "Applyrng Virtue Ethics to Our Tre ltment of the Other Animals" htrp://www.hackeltpublishing,conr/pd1'.s/ll urslhouse I ssav.Ddf