#75318 4pgs within 12 hrs

The Abilene Paradox After Thirty Years:

A Global Perspective

MICHAEL HARVEY MILORAD M. NOVICEVIC M. RONALD BUCKLEY JONATHON R.B. HALBESLEBEN

T he accelerating rate of globalization, thefrequent introduction of new technolo- gies, and evolving regulation have all con- tributed to the complexity of conducting business. The standard operating procedures of the past have diminished in value, given the dramatic changes in the business envir- onment. Managers are casting around to identify appropriate business models, as well as the metrics, to determine whether new ‘‘solutions’’ have worked.

With an increasingly limited experience base upon which to make decisions in global environments, managers tend to rely on con- sultants or groups for support and guidance in decision-making. Seeking assistance dur- ing difficult times or with risky decisions is a natural phenomenon in business, but this approach is problematic when it turns into group decision-making on a ‘‘consensus’’ decision. Oftentimes, many of these deci- sions resemble ‘‘a camel rather than a horse,’’ due to the process by which they were reached, although on the surface they may have widespread formal support from all those in the group.

A classic article published in Organiza- tional Dynamics 30 years ago has become a ‘‘must read’’ for academicians and man- agers trying to understand potential pro- blems with group decision-making. The article, the ‘‘Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agreement,’’ by Dr. Jerry B. Harvey, revealed a hidden risk for managers seeking public support for their decisions (without evaluating possible individual dissent behind that public support). We believe that today’s global and knowledge-rich environ- ment is conducive to the Abilene Paradox. Thus, it might be timely for a different Har- vey (‘‘with a little help from his friends’’) to reexamine the Abilene Paradox and mark the 30 years it has been in the management literature.

T H E F U N D A M E N T A L I S S U E S H I G H L I G H T E D B Y T H E A B I L E N E P A R A D O X

The Abilene Paradox is a parable about how groups follow a decision-making process

Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 215–226, 2004 ISSN 0090-2616/$ – see frontmatter � 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.orgdyn.2004.01.008 www.organizational-dynamics.com

L E A R N I N G F R O M P R A C T I C E

215

that is not entirely open to individual differ- ences of opinion. The parable used by Profes- sor Harvey tells of four adults sitting on a front porch in Coleman, Texas (some 53 miles for Abilene), on a very hot summer day. While everyone appears content drinking lemonade and playing dominoes, someone in the group suggests taking a drive to Abilene to eat lunch. Privately, each of the four participants thinks this suggestion is without merit because the only available car has no air-conditioner. But each one goes along, so as not to be perceived as a ‘‘spoiler’’ of the group. Upon returning exhausted and disgruntled, the family mem- bers recognize that not a single one of them wanted to make the trip. They are unable to justify their original decision to take a 106-mile drive in a dust storm merely to eat a mediocre lunch in such hot weather.

In the organizational realm, the Abilene Paradox occurs when agreement/consensus is used in a decision-making process to mask organizational problems. Once the masks fall, the consequences can be very detrimental for the organization (economic loss due to wide- spread conflict) and the people involved (feelings of misery disrupting cooperation). Professor Harvey gave an example of how the Abilene Paradox evolved in a company where top management wanted to go with its pet project to Abilene, while all the individual members of the research and development (R&D) department wanted to go somewhere else. Fearful of being accused of insubordina- tion, the R&D director and his team members wrote ambiguous progress reports so the president and vice presidents could interpret them ‘‘to suit themselves.’’ As the reports were slanted to the positive side—with heaps of praise—a unanimous decision was made to continue the questionable project for yet another year. Symbolically, the organization ‘‘had boarded a bus to Abilene.’’

The underlying tenet of the Abilene Para- dox is that reliance on formal agreement and/or consensus is sometimes a risky method for a group or an organization to use in making a decision. Basically, the Abil- ene Paradox highlights the collective inabil- ity to manage agreement and reach an

acceptable decision, particularly when indi- vidual participants privately feel that an alternative decision would be better. There are five interrelated components of the Abil- ene example that contribute to the occurrence of the Abilene Paradox. The first component refers to public mutual agreement among group members that the current situation is not acceptable. Privately, however, the mem- bers might not be dissatisfied with the cur- rent situation once they have compared it to a proposed alternative. This type of group ‘‘agreement’’ decision reflects plura- listic ignorance—a manager misperceives the level of disagreement in the covert atti- tudes held individually by group members in a given situation, and therefore goes along with the overt group consensus. The second component refers to ineffective communica- tion among group members when several individuals express strong support for the decision because they presume that is the desire of others. This flow of communication reinforces the silent assumption of group members that their private thoughts are a minority. They are therefore motivated to remain silent (this phenomenon is com- monly referred to as the spiral of silence) and support the formal decision of the group.

The third component of the Abilene Paradox is the vocalization of group senti- ment based on inaccurate assumptions or misinterpretation of the ‘‘signals’’ given by other group members. Such vocalization may result in actions that no one in the group desires or supports. As the group does some- thing that lacks support, members may become individually dissatisfied with the group as a whole. The fourth component refers to the decision-maker’s reprise of the decision in the form of questions: Why did we do this? How did we come up with this solution? How can we justify our final deci- sion to others? Upon reflecting on these ques- tions in hindsight, group members often become frustrated and dissatisfied—not only with the joint decision, but also with the group as a whole. The fifth component refers to the failure of the manager to recognize the

216 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

process that occurred in making a poor deci- sion so to avoid making similar poor deci- sions in the future. These interrelated components led Jerry Harvey to infer that unsatisfying, dysfunctional decision-making based upon false consensus or pluralistic ignorance is the foundation for the misman- agement of group agreement. The outcome is poor decision-making, in spite of a situation where formal consensus was reached among the management team members.

The insight of the original Organizational Dynamics article is that the greater the fear about being ‘‘outed’’ in the group for not sharing the collective attitudes, the greater the risk of poor decision-making that the manager wants to avoid. A group member ‘‘agrees,’’ fearful of ‘‘earning’’ the label of the ‘‘outsider,’’ which is oftentimes attached to those who do not ‘‘go along to get along.’’ Unfortunately, the emphasis on out-group labeling has contributed to the seeming dis- missal of the Abilene Paradox due to the confusion with the related, but distinctly different, phenomenon of groupthink.

C O M P A R I N G A N D C O N T R A S T I N G T H E A B I L E N E P A R A D O X A N D G R O U P T H I N K

The groupthink threat frequently oversha- dows managerial attention to the Abilene Paradox. Managers have been warned to avoid groupthink—a mode of thinking that occurs in a cohesive group when seeking concurrence overrides the critical evaluation of alternatives. Groupthink, as a ‘‘collective pattern of defensive avoidance,’’ is based on the premise that agreement in groups is mostly due to the desire to maintain cohe- siveness in a group. The in-group unanimity tends to override the group members’ moti- vation to objectively assess alternative actions. The primary factor contributing to groupthink is the emotional attachment of individual members to the group, which leads them to value cohesiveness more than improved functioning of the group. As this personal bond of in-group team members

reduces their impartial reasoning, the result is an inability of individual members to con- sider objectively possible alternatives. Such individual unwillingness protects the cohe- siveness of the group to the detriment of improved group functioning.

The defensiveness of members engaged in groupthink can manifest itself in a number of ways: (1) fabricating information that is supportive of the leader’s or group’s posi- tion; (2) omitting superior alternatives that challenge the entrenched position; (3) mis- judging the limitations of the group position and the long-term impact of a poor decision on cohesiveness; and (4) underestimating the warning signs and negative consequences of not enacting the best alternative for the group. The bottom line is that decisions are less functional, due to each individual mem- ber’s emotional dedication to the group and the position taken by the group. As a result, groupthink lowers group efficiency and effectiveness. The dimensions indicating how the Abilene Paradox is distinct from groupthink are shown in Fig. 1. Both phe- nomena lead to dysfunctional group beha- vior, but are different and should be treated as distinct from a management point of view (see Fig. 1). In particular, global factors might lead an organization down the road to Abilene and away from groupthink. Therefore, the identification of these factors may effectively provide signals for management to recognize in time to avoid potential difficulties.

G L O B A L F A C T O R S I N C R E A S E T H E L I K E L I H O O D O F T H E A B I L E N E P A R A D O X

We think that now would be an appropriate time to outline and explain the main drivers of change that contrast the business environ- ment of the 1970s (when the Abilene Paradox was introduced in Organizational Dynamics) with today’s business environment. Under- taking such an exercise will emphasize the continued, and arguably increasing, impor- tance of the Abilene Paradox for contempor- ary managers.

217

A c c e l e r a t i o n o f t h e S p e e d o f B u s i n e s s

Today’s manager must be able to make deci- sions in a fraction of the time previously devoted to similar decisions. As the need to utilize time as a strategic tool has been recognized, companies that cannot adapt to this modification in their decision-making will suffer. The pressure to act quickly is more of a problem when one considers that many managers do not possess the experi- ence to make non-programmed decisions in a global environment.

Digital Equipment Corp.’s (DEC’s) chief executive officer (CEO) Ken Olsen and his management team had been building a suc- cessful global minicomputer business for more than 20 years. By 1990, DEC ranked 27 on the Fortune 500 list of the largest U.S. companies. That same year, the threat of workstations and client-server architecture developed by global competitors to meet the changing customer needs became evident privately to individual members of DEC’s top management team. However, as a team they

still remained faithful publicly to the Ken Olsen’s credo, ‘‘We always say that customers are right, but they are not always right.’’ In effect, DEC’s return from Abilene started with a sharp decline and heavy losses in 1992 and 1995; it continued with an attempted turn- around in 1996; and it ended with the acquisi- tion by Compaq Computer Corp. in 1999.

I n c r e a s e i n t h e U t i l i z a t i o n o f C o o p e r a t i v e G l o b a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s

Given the complexity and increased risk associated with global business, decisions are frequently made to enter strategic alli- ances or joint ventures in order to minimize risk in the current environment. Interorgani- zational relationships have always been a means to address markets, but these loosely coupled systems frequently did not have the level of interdependence or the level of coop- eration necessary for long-term success. Today, it is necessary to form networks of relationships with foreign counterparts, along with hybrid organizational cultures

FIGURE 1 COMPARISON OF ABILENE PARADOX AND GROUPTHINK

Abilene Paradox Groupthink

Group Cohesiveness

Not Central & Becomes

Lower after Defective Decision

Members wanting to be

Accepted Most Powerful

Nonexistent, Incompetent or

Ineffective Leadership

Overpowering or Laissez-Faire

Leadership Styles

No Salient External Enemies

External Enemies Show Increased

Group Solidarity

Committed to Private Views

Bring about Pain/Suffering

Preoccupied with Shared

Group Vision/Unanimity

Feeling of Being Coerced

Not Responsible for the Decision

Feeling of Choice Being Made of

Their Own Freewill

Dissatisfaction with the Decision Expressed Satisfaction with the

Group Decision

Blaming of Others in the Group Protect the Leader/Others from

Negative Information

* Adapted from Kim, Y., A Comparative Study of the ‘Abilene Paradox’ and ‘Groupthink’, Public Administration Quarterly, 25 (2), 2001: 168-189.

218 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

that work effectively. However, management of global networks (involving cross-cultural coordination and collaboration) is an area in which many managers have no experience.

I n c r e a s e d O p p o r t u n i t y f o r E s c a l a t i o n o f C o m m i t m e n t d u e t o t h e C o m p l e x i t y o f t h e D e c i s i o n a n d / o r E n v i r o n m e n t

The risks associated with conducting busi- ness in a global context are exponentially greater than in a domestic market. In parti- cular, the threshold of commitment comes faster than in domestic decisions. Therefore, managers may be forced to defend continued funding of projects ‘‘because so much has already been invested.’’ The escalation of commitment to global projects can increase the insecurity of a manager and will likely magnify the need for group support. For example, prior to becoming the CEO of glo- bal toy industry leader Mattel Inc., Jill Barad owed her success to effectively developing collectible versions of the Barbie doll. As the new CEO, Ms. Barad announced her further commitment and increased deliveries of col- lectible Barbie dolls, despite flat prospects of global toy industry growth. Although this strategic orientation made little sense pri- vately to the rest of the Mattel management team, nobody questioned. Rather, everybody supported Barad’s strategy. The result of Mattel’s drive to Abilene was excess produc- tion and depressed margins of the Holiday Barbie line, one of the company’s premier collectible products.

I n c r e a s i n g U t i l i z a t i o n o f V i r t u a l W o r k R e l a t i o n s h i p s

Most managers understand the difficulty inherent in managing workers in virtual set- tings. The growth of workplace virtualness may erode confidence when managing in such a socially fragmented setting, because the conventional wisdom and ‘‘rules of thumb’’ do not appear to provide managers with much assurance in their positions. Furthermore, a manager may not even per-

sonally know some employees, or, at a mini- mum, may know them less well than was the case in the more traditional face-to-face rela- tionships of the past. One of the cornerstones of management, social knowledge of the people one supervises, is removed in global and virtual organizations.

C o m p e t i n g o n t h e E d g e o f C h a o s

A number of well-known authors have likened today’s business environment to competing in chaos. If a manager internalizes this feeling of ‘‘hanging-on’’ and becomes risk-averse, the level of confidence will be reduced, thus diminishing the capacity to persevere and plan for the future. Risk-averse management is costly when global rivals are striving to enter myriad markets simu- ltaneously and capitalize globally on their increased presence in emerging markets. The inability of managers to thrive on chaos will inhibit them in exploiting the organiza- tion’s global presence and transforming it into global dominance.

With other complexities evolving in the environment, the drivers of change men- tioned in this discussion illustrate how the context of decision-making is fluid and complex for consensus in management teams. As this type of environmental change accentuates uncertainty and lack of confi- dence in top managers, it may push manage- ment teams toward the Abilene Paradox. Due to this increased complexity and the unknown nature of environmental change, it is crucial to identify the early signs of the potential occurrence of the Abilene Paradox in management teams and other groups in a global organization.

I D E N T I F Y I N G T H E W A R N I N G S I G N S O F T H E A B I L E N E P A R A D O X

The effective management of agreement takes on increased importance in the global, hypercompetitive and increasingly virtual business environment. Therefore, it is crucial

219

for managers to identify the early warning signs when groups, teams or the organization as a whole are being ‘‘driven’’ toward Abil- ene. The following set of ‘‘signals’’ can be used to identify the mismanagement of agreement:

1. Mangers who publicly do not fear the unknown: Disdain for what is not known in complex situations may be characteristic of managers who have not recognized how little they know. This form of arrogance leads managers to go along because they lack knowledge or do not have insights into complex problems. As a result, such man- agers tend to acquire the ‘‘that sounds good to me’’ syndrome. For example, Prodigy, an IBM Corp. and Sears Roebuck & Co. joint venture, was the global leader in on-line shopping in 1990. It was evident privately to Prodigy’s top management that new-entrant AOL was growing at a faster rate, due to its focus on early computer adopters (in con- trast to Prodigy’s focus on its average consumers). Still, Prodigy’s top manage- ment was publicly very vocal about its ‘‘unbeatable’’ complementarities between IBM’s competence in computers and Sears’ competence in retailing. Specifically, one of Prodigy’s executives commented on AOL’s rise as ‘‘just a little thing off to the side.’’ This arrogance led the company to visit Abilene and fail in the on-line shopping industry, while AOL became a global leader by the end of the 20th century.

2. An organization with little to no conflict or debate on critical issues: Functional conflict is a means of making diversity valuable by stimulating divergent inputs to solve com- plex problems. When this resource is under- utilized, the lack of visible debate and dissent becomes the foundation for misman- agement of agreement. The red flag indicat- ing a climate of conflict avoidance is the ‘‘I will go along with that’’ syndrome.

3. Overriding leaders and a strong organi- zation culture: While on the surface both good leadership and a strong supportive culture would generally appear to be assets, a dominating leader like Jacques Nasser of Ford Motor Company may not only intimi- date subordinates to the point of submis-

sion, but also may also induce tension in alliance relationships. In particular, the past relational culture of Ford-Firestone, having fostered private silence and public denial, created a context for the Ford-Firestone tire scandal to occur. The breakdown of this hundred-year-old relationship occurred due to the low-quality Firestone tires mounted on Ford’s sport utility vehicles (SUVs), which in turn caused a series of deadly accidents. The reputation of both companies was later gradually repaired only when the companies publicly admitted responsibility for flawed tires and replaced them free of charge. This example illustrates how a dominating organizational culture often tends to silence managers who disagree for fear of questioning the corporate culture. The catch phrase for this concern is ‘‘they must know something more than I do’’ syndrome.

4. Lack of diversity and pluralistic perspec- tive in organization: Homogeneous groups tend to reproduce themselves, due to similar learning and thinking styles. Without a variety of diverse viewpoints and the me- chanisms to elicit dissenting perspectives, groups will value consensus (even false consensus) more than searching for and getting to the ‘‘right’’ idea. This form of error is known as the ‘‘I don’t want to stand out, as acceptance is more important that being right’’ syndrome. To prevent the occurrence of this syndrome that opens the path to either Abilene or groupthink, the Nissan Motor Co. board appointed Carlos Ghosn, a Brazilian national, as the company’s CEO. This pro- vided the company with a global mindset that could help to prevent the reoccurrence of the Abilene Paradox.

5. Recognition of a dysfunctional decision- making environment: An environment that rewards ‘‘A’’ while hoping for ‘‘B’’ is dysfunctional because incentives are not aligned with desired behaviors. Manage- ment in this environment has lost control, as the directional prerogative of manage- ment has succumbed to wanting to be liked by avoiding conflict. This is commonly referred to as the ‘‘misplaced means and ends’’ syndrome.

220 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

6. Indifference of employees to the organiza- tion: Indifference breeds complacency, and with complacency comes reduced effort and caring. Lack of caring for the outcomes of the organization leads individual employees to give in to the ‘‘it is only a job’’ syndrome.

7. The feeling of a ‘‘messiah’’ in the organization and action anxiety on the part of management: When an organization is inten- sifying global activities, there is usually one person (or a small group) who has experi- ence to manage in that situation. As a result, there is a tendency to acquiesce to them. While this would normally be a positive outcome, the ‘‘messiah’’ is oftentimes not right, while other managers in the group do not have the frame of reference or back- ground to challenge the top manager. This lack of challenge leads the management group to exhibit the ‘‘great person’’ syn- drome, discounting their own insights.

When ‘‘Chainsaw’’ Al Dunlop, a re- nowned turnaround artist, joined Sunbeam Inc. as a CEO and a proclaimed ‘‘messiah,’’ Sunbeam stock jumped 50 percent over- night. Having implemented several radical downsizing measures, Dunlop announced an ambitious global growth strategic plan with a focus on Latin America and Asia. Although this combination of contradictory strategies made little sense privately to the management team, the Sunbeam board-of- directors, or to Wall Street analysts, nobody dared to question the wisdom of the ‘‘messiah’’ publicly. When Dunlop’s artifi- cial profits from global ‘‘growth’’ were eventually revealed, it was too late for Sunbeam to return from its trip to Abilene.

8. The development of a ‘‘spiral of silence’’ in the organization: The spiral of silence occurs when one’s perception of the majority opi- nion in the organization suppresses one’s willingness to express any challenging opi- nion against the most visible point of view. The spiral of silence when managers assess the distribution of opinions in an organiza- tion in order to evaluate the chances for success of their minority viewpoints. This minority opinion assessment can escalate to become prevalent throughout the organiza-

tion, resulting in the ‘‘keeping my head down and off the radar screen’’ syndrome. For example, the spiral of silence among its partners about Enron Corp.’s off-balance sheet accounting ‘‘practices’’ destroyed Arthur Andersen, formerly a leading global accounting and auditing company.

Any of the above warning signals can be discounted by management, and therefore may go unobserved for some time in an organization. Without a proactive surveil- lance process, the organizational climate may encourage managers and employees to fall into the trap of the Abilene Paradox in their group decision-making processes. The challenge is how to effectively remediate these processes in an organization so man- agers and groups can avoid the trap of the Abilene Paradox.

T H E S Y S T E M A T I C A P P R O A C H T O C U R I N G T H E A B I L E N E P A R A D O X

Managers might ask themselves, ‘‘Now that we have a clearer picture of the issues asso- ciated with managing agreement, what can be done if my group or organization has lapsed into this dysfunctional behavior?’’ Modifying a corporate culture is a difficult, time consuming, and high-risk option. How- ever, if the Abilene Paradox is a reality, it must be addressed in a systematic fashion. The steps in the process of wrenching groups in an organization out of this problem are illustrated in Fig. 2. Each of these steps will be discussed separately; however, one must recognize that the whole sequence of steps needs to be undertaken to break the hold of the Abilene Paradox.

D e v e l o p m e n t o f a n O r g a n i z a t i o n a l A s s e s s m e n t T e a m

The first step in the assessment process is to decide the membership of the assessment team. The managers assigned to determine the organizational ‘‘health’’ need to be broadly selected and representative of the

221

various functions and sub-cultures in an organization. While it is important to have functional areas represented in the assess- ment process, it is equally important to have diversity of perspectives. A pluralistic cul- ture on the team allows for a wide variety of perspectives. This reduces the tendency of the team to have the corporate ‘‘logic’’ as its mental model. Such diversity is necessary to assess the tendency to support the dysfunc- tional management of consensus. This step is critical, as the worst outcome would be for this team to succumb to the Abilene Paradox while trying to address that problem.

A s s e s s m e n t o f O r g a n i z a t i o n C u l t u r e a n d S u b - C u l t u r e

The first step in the formal assessment of the organization is for the team to examine the

gap between the organizational culture and sub-cultures. In this gap analysis, the team can gauge the strength of the corporate cul- ture over the various sub-cultural contexts within the organization. The principle of a strong culture has often been seen as an attractive characteristic of global organiza- tions (e.g., IBM, Microsoft Corp., General Electric Co., Unilever PLC, and Philips Elec- tronics N.V.). However, problems arise when this culture becomes a blueprint for manage- ment of agreement that suppresses dissent by depicting it as a behavior not ‘‘supportive of the corporate culture.’’ The key elements that should be assessed relative to this pro- blem of strong organizational culture are: (1) hiring practices (inside vs. outside), as well as the socialization process and integra- tion of newcomers to the organization; (2) the identification of the in-group and the com-

FIGURE 2 STEP-BY-STEP ABILENE PARADOX ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Establishment of Assessment/Audit Team

Assessment of Organization Culture & Subculture

Assessment of Communication Patterns/Flows

Key Group Membership/Culture

“Reality”, Knowledge, Information Assessment by Subgroups

Feedback

Encouragement of Transparency of Decision-Making

222 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

position of that group; (3) analysis of the organization’s informal structure and the related in-group influences; (4) determining who the ‘‘gatekeepers’’ are relative to the flow of information; (5) the level of consensus in the organization; and (6) the opportunity for dissent and input from outside. This assessment would provide the team with key information for ascertaining the potential for dysfunctional management of agreement in the organization.

A s s e s s m e n t o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n F l o w s a n d P a t t e r n s

By identifying the flow (downward/upward direction) and pattern (within-group/ between-group frequency) of communica- tion, the assessment team can determine the likelihood of dysfunctional behavior resulting from bottlenecks of communica- tion. The identification of key gatekeepers may provide valuable insights into the cul- ture’s openness to change. In addition, the barriers to modifying the decision processes in the organization can be assessed. Overall, communication analysis may provide the most important insight whether the corpo- rate culture is conducive to the Abilene Para- dox.

K e y G r o u p M e m b e r s h i p a n d C u l t u r e D e t e r m i n a t i o n

The identification of group membership and the overlapping in memberships can provide the assessment team with valuable insights to the relational and political centrality of key individuals. The stock of political influence that managers have, both individually and as members of power groups, accentuates the gravity points of power distribution in the organization. For example, some man- agers often have significantly more influence in an organization than the formal orga- nization chart indicates. Therefore, their involvement in important groups in the orga- nization, due to the informal dedication of others to these individuals, may make them opinion leaders.

‘ ‘ R e a l i t y , ’ ’ K n o w l e d g e , a n d I n f o r m a t i o n A s s e s s m e n t o f S u b g r o u p s i n t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n

Jerry Harvey, in his original article, indicated that if the Abilene Paradox does exist in an organization, then it is important to reframe organizational ‘‘reality’’ so that the organiza- tion’s groups can begin to address how to break internal cycles of silence. Once the assessment team has identified the problem and its realistic magnitude, outsiders usually accomplish such modification to the basic cultural foundation of the organization. The reality of the problem must be identified for two reasons: to know who in the company has the insights and knowledge to bring about change, and to know who is the least likely to want to change—because they have control of knowledge (often translated into power). Identifying these bottlenecks of information is the key to unlocking the dys- functional aspects of a culture, and therefore, pivotal in the dismantling of the Abilene Paradox.

E n c o u r a g e m e n t o f T r a n s p a r e n c y i n D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g

It is important for executives and senior managers to ‘‘open’’ the organization up to participation in decision-making. This can be accomplished by providing access to cri- tical operating data, having open discus- sions about key strategic aspects of the organization and insuring meaningful invol- vement of managers. The key to this trans- parency of decision-making is to encourage managers to ask questions, in order to better understand how decision-making in the organization operates, and how to gain insights into its successes or its failures. One technique that has been successful is to initiate a regularly scheduled manage- ment information exchange (MIX) meeting. In this type of interaction, the various groups in the organization are ‘‘taught’’ how the organization operates and how each of their functions impacts the ‘‘bottom line.’’ At the same time, there should be an open forum for

223

managers to ask questions that will help them do a better job. This MIX practice pro- vides the communications forum to bring decisions into the light, and to cross-com- municate the interrelationships that are cri- tical to understand relative to making new decisions in the complex global business environment.

C O N C L U S I O N

The notion of the Abilene Paradox has been so popular in the past, in part, because it is such an intuitive concept. All of us have faced group decisions that we do not sup- port, but agree to nonetheless. Today’s global business environment further accentuates the need to recognize how the Abilene Para- dox can negatively influence group decision- making, as well as the need to understand the

steps necessary in identifying and alleviating the problem. In effect, managers can address the factors contributing to the Abilene Para- dox and improve decision-making in their teamwork.

In summary, the Abilene Paradox has been an intractable problem. The complexity of the existing business environment will create a myriad of novel opportunities for the Abilene Paradox to negatively influence the performance of organizations. It is our hope that we have provided some advice that will minimize its occurrence. Doubtless, the next 30 years will bring novel changes that will require new ways for managers to navi- gate the route away from Abilene.

224 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

In 2002, an article in Organizational Dynamics highlighted the problems associated with the use of managerial ‘‘conventional wisdoms’’ in a chaotic globalizing marketplace, see: M. Harvey and M. Buckley, ‘‘Assessing the Con- ventional Wisdoms of Management for the 21st Century Organization,’’ Organizational Dynamics, 2002, 30 (4), 368–378.

The classic article that is the foundation for this article was: J. Harvey, ‘‘The Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agreement,’’ Organizational Dynamics, Summer 1974, 63– 80. The same author provided a more detailed discussion of the issues associated with dysfunctional agreement management in his book The Abilene Paradox and other Meditations on Management (San Diego, CA: Lexington Books, 1988).

Groupthink has been discussed in the literature over the past 30 years. It is impor- tant for the reader to note the differences between groupthink and the Abilene Para- dox. These works should help to clarify the distinctions: I. Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); J. M. Esser, ‘‘Groupthink: Effects of Cohesiveness and Problem-Solving Procedures on Group Deci- sion-Making,’’ Social Behavior and Personality, 1984, 12 (2), 157–164; and D. Goleman, ‘‘Fol- lowing the Leader,’’ Science, October 1988, 18–24.

For a detailed discussion of the defensive postures that group members revert to when in a groupthink mode, see R. Sims, ‘‘Linking

Groupthink to Unethical Behavior in Orga- nizations, ’’ Journal of Business Ethics, 1992, 11 (9), 651–663.

The importance of emerging markets is discussed in the following articles/book: J. Garten, ‘‘The Big Emerging Markets,’’ The Columbia Journal of World Business, 1996, 31 (2), 6–31; The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Mar- kets and How They Will Change our Lives (New York: Basic Books, 1997); and ‘‘Troubles Ahead in Emerging Markets,’’ Harvard Busi- ness Review, 1997, 75 (2), 38–49.

A discussion of hypercompetitive mar- ket conditions is presented in the following articles/book by Richard D’Aveni: Hyper- competition: Managing the Dynamics of Strate- gic Maneuvering (New York: Free Press, 1995); ‘‘Waking up to the New Era of Hypercom- petition,’’ The Washington Quarterly, 1997, 21 (1), 183–195; and ‘‘Strategic Supremacy through Disruption and Dominance, Sloan Management Review, 1997, 40 (3), 127–136.

The spiral of silence is explained in the following articles: G. Taylor, ‘‘Pluralistic Ignorance and the Spiral of Silence: A Formal Analysis,’’ Public Opinion Quarterly, 1982, 46 (3), 311–335; C. Glynn, A. Hayes, and J. Sha- nahan, ‘‘Perceived Support for One’s Opi- nions and Willingness to Speak Out: A Meta-Analysis of Survey Studies on the ‘Spiral of Silence,’’’ Public Opinion Quarterly, 1997, 61 (3), 452–463; R. Sternberg, ‘‘Cost and Benefits of Defying the Crowd in Science, Intelligence, 1998, 26 (3) 209–215.

Michael Harvey received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of Arizona in 1976. He has held teaching and research positions at Southern Methodist University and the University of Oklahoma. Harvey was the Puterbaugh Chair of American Free Enterprise at the University of Oklahoma. Presently, he holds the Hearin Chair of Global Business in the School of Business Administration at the University of Mississippi.

225

Harvey has been an active consultant in global organizations as well as to family owned and operated companies for the last 25 years. (mharvey@- bus.olemiss.edu)

Milorad M. Novicevic (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma, 2001) is an assistant professor of international management at the University of Mississippi. His teaching interests include international management, strategic management and international human resource management. His research has appeared in Journal of World Business, International Journal of Human Resource Management, Human Resource Management Journal (U.S.), European Management Journal, among others.

M. Ronald Buckley (Ph.D. in industrial psychology, Auburn University) is the McCasland Professor of Management in the Michael F. Prices College of Business and a professor of psychology at the University of Oklahoma. His research interests include decision-making in the employ- ment interview, performance appraisal, organizational entry processes, and the issues surrounding unethical behavior in organizations. He has published over 60 refereed articles in, among others, Academy of Management Review, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Management, Organizational Behavior and Human Processes on topics related to human resource management.

Jonathon R.B. Halbesleben (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma) is a visiting assistant professor of management in the Michael F. Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. His research interests include social comparison, stress and burnout, and the role customers play in the delivery of services.

226 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS