asian urbanism

Chapter Two

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability: Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century

Andre Sorensen

Tokyo is at the heart of the largest city-region in the world, with about 35 million

people, or 28 per cent of the Japanese population in 2010, living in the Greater

Tokyo Arca. This comprises the cities, towns and wards of the Tokyo Metropolitan

Government area, with a population of about 13 million, and the three adjoining

prefectures of Saitarna, Kanagawa and Chiba. The Greater Tokyo Area also forms the

core of the Tokaid6 Megalopolis, which extends west for about 600 kilometres through

to Osaka and Kobe in an almost continuous belt of urban development and is

home to 68 million people.

The f(xus of this chapter is on the Greater Tokyo Area (sec figures 2.1 and 2.2),

which presems a distinctive set of sustainability, urban form and planning issues, in

because of its great size and high population density. Tokyo has one of the best

rail commuter systems in the world and its dominant central employment

zone attracts over 3 million commuters each day from an area within a radius of

about 70 kilometres. Although there is a high rate of car ownership and congestion,

is not an automobile-dependent city. Excellent public transit, high density and

very rnixed land uses mean that the 'Smart Growth' strategics typically prescribed to

make cities more sustainable in Europe and North America seem oflimited relevance

here 2010). Tokyo also compares well with other developed cities in the

of its vehicles, buildings and industries (Fujita and Hill, 2007), and

in the progress that has been made to reduce vehicle emissions and improve air quality

and Murayama, 2010).

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerab1l1ty Tokyo 111 the Twenty-First Century 41

Figure 2.1. Japan.

Figure 2.2. The prdccturcs l)f(;reatcr 'T()kyo,

thus faces some different

1() understand these

and of the processes of modernization

Isuzu Islands

Ocean

42 Planning Asia11 Cities Risks and Resilience

first part of this chapter therefore describes historical urban and

were adapted

twentieth

from the

of

London and New Y<xk

the ways in which earlier settlement patterns and building

during the creation of the modem city in the late nineteenth

century. The second section examines the

rapid economic i:.,rrowth period of the 1950s and 1960s,

Tokyo's emergence as a global city matched in stature

(Sassen, 2001) to the loss of that exalted status two 'lost decades' of

financial crisis, and economic and population decline. The focus in this section is on

the ways in which successive planning approaches maintained and even exacerbated

the risks and vulnerabilities of certain parts of the city-region.

The third section centres on three m~jor challenges facing the Tokyo city-region

today. The first is the enduring division between the upland I ligh City, west of the

Imperial Palace, and the Low City in the floodplains of the Sumida, Edogawa and

Nakagawa rivers, most of which is now at or below the mean high-tide level. Second

is the continued existence and even growth of highly vulnerable areas of substandard

housing throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, a situation that

contributes to the heightened disaster risks facing major segments of the Tbkyo

population. Third is the huge pressure to redevelop and intensify land use in the central

areas of the city. This is in large part a product of changes in planning rq,,'11lations,

which arc designed more to create profitable opportunities fix redevelopment than to

address existing urban challenges. Tokyo has been highly resilient to past disasters, such

as the massive destruction of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 and the firebombing

ofWorld War II, both of which arc discussed below. A central argument of this chapter,

however, is that recent and current planning approaches may have reduced this

resilience and made Tbkyo more vulnerable to tl1ture disasters.

The Influence of the Past

Unlike virtually all the other mcgacitics in the world today. with the of

Beijing. Tokyo was a giant city of over a million inhabitants to industrialization.

Europe's two giants, London and Paris, were quite small cities at the

eighteenth century and other contemporary like Sao

and Delhi were still tiny at the beginning of the twentieth ccntrny So

is particnlarly important in this because had a urban

system the end of the Edo period ( 1W0-18(J7) and

probably one of the world's largest cities in the seventeenth and ccntnrics

(see figure 2.3). The urban culture and patterns of development of that

influential. After centuries of self-imposed isolation, Japan only

in 1867, casting off its feudal governance system and beginning to modernize and

industrialize. As a result, Tokyo's pre-modem urban patterns have had a

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo 1n the Twenty-First Century 43

period I HS'J.

011 the modern and much

such as the

area of the was reserved for the

the Edo

control over

from various

and fortifications, most of the

who were allocated space and

44 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

location based primarily on rank. Smaller areas were also allocated for commoners and

for temples, which were also necessary parts of the feudal political and space economy.

The main spatial division in Edo, which continues to be reflected in modern Tokyo,

was that between the I Iigh City of the samurai and the Low City of the commoners.

The Low City was mostly built on the marshy estuary of the Sumida River, and on

land reclaimed from Tokyo Bay by landfill. The commoner city was laid out in a grid

pattern of square blocks, following the ancient Chinese measurement system, and

was deeply penetrated by a dense network of canals Qinnai, 1990; Sorensen, 2002).

A system of canals was important because virtually all movement of goods was by

boat. The canals were lined by warehouses and markets, and extended throughout

the commercial areas. In the late eighteenth century the commoner area of Edo

measured about 13 square kilometres and had a total population of about 500,000, with

population densities reaching as much as 58,000 per square kilometre (Rozman, 1973).

This was a very high density for a low-rise city. The streets were generally lined with

2-storey merchant houses (machiya), while the interiors of the blocks were occupied by

rows of single-storey wooden shacks fronting on to narrow lanes (11ra-nagaya), built as

rental housing for poor artisans, labourers and servants.

The samurai High City was a much larger area, built on the ridges and plateaus to

the west of Tokyo Castle and structured by the hilly geography of the Yamanote area.

The dominant land use in the High City was housing for the various classes of samurai,

including the huge compounds of the major feudal lords who were required by the

Shogun to live in Edo every other year, and to leave their families there permanently as

hostages. It was this requirement of residence in Edo that caused the Shogun's capital to

grow so rapidly to the enormous size of a million people by the end of the seventeenth

century. Consumption by that large population stimulated the economic integration

of the whole of Japan during the Edo period. About two-thirds of the area ofEdo was

reserved for the samurai residences, even though samurai were only about half the

population (and about 15 per cent of the total population nationally), so population

densities in the samurai areas were less than a quarter of those of the commoner areas

(Rozman, 1973; Smith, 1978).

In contrast to the planned grid of the commoner Low City, most of the IIigh

City was relatively unplanned with main roads following the ridgelines and valleys

in a relatively organic pattern Qinnai, 1990). So, whereas most commoners lived on

the floodplain in planned mixed-use areas that were busy, noisy, dense, economically

vibrant and culturally dynamic, most samurai lived in the hilly uplands in unplanned,

lower density areas, which were green and quiet, but economically and culturally

sterile. Most houses were set in gardens and surrounded by perimeter walls and, in the

case of the estates of the hundreds of feudal lords (dai111yo ), the gardens were often very

large. This was the source of one enduring legacy of the Edo period, an indigenous

Japanese version of the suburban housing ideal of detached family homes set in walled

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability: Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 45

gardens which became highly influential with the growth of the middle class after the

First World War, when suburban growth towards the west of the city started in earnest

(Smith, 1979;Jinnai, 1994).

The vibrant culture of Edo that is remembered today, including the iconic

woodblock prints, geisha and the teahouses where they entertained, theatres, Sumo

wrestling and Rakugo storytelling, were all based in the commoner Low City, This

'floating world' of brothels, actors, wrestlers and beautiful tea-house girls, integrated

by the canals, rivers, restaurant barges and riverside palaces, was at the heart of Edo' s

urban culture during the feudal period (Nishiyama, 1997). The political, economic

and geographic shift in the early twentieth century away from the lowland areas to the

western uplands served by rail and road, the filling in of canals, industrialization, and

the pollution of the watenvays, were all lamented as emblematic of the slow death of

Edo culture (Seidensticker, 1991).

Three other major legacies of the feudal period were the enduring problem

of urban fires; the limited road system; and an excellent water supply and waste

management system. In the Edo period the problem of fireproofing cities was never

solved. Repeated orders to build with fireproof materials after major fires suggest that

the orders were not followed or effectively enforced (Kelly, 1994 ). To be fair, enforcing

fireproof building standards was difficult everywhere and was usually accomplished

only after a major fire, as was the case for London in 1666, and Chicago in 1871. Japan

also had the particular challenge of frequent large earthquakes, which made building

in stone or brick unwise. Preventing urban fires became one of the major planning

challenges in the modern period.

Second, roads were designed for pedestrians, not vehicles. In the Edo period

virtually all travel was by foot while, as noted above, most goods transport was by

boat. Streets tended to be very narrow, and were often laid out primarily with military

considerations in mind, with narrow bridges, and many sharp turns and T-intersections

to aid defence. Wheeled vehicles were almost non-existent and, apart from the main

highways and castle moats which had military significance, urban infrastructure

maintenance was not considered to be a government responsibility and was delegated

to local residents. Streets were unpaved, creating clouds of dust in the dry season and

turning into quagmires in the rainy season. In consequence, when street railways were

being built in the early twentieth century, road widening and straightening and modern

wider bridges were major priorities. Improving transportation infrastructure has been

a priority of the central government ever since, a task it has carried out with unflagging

zeal.

Third were the excellent water supply and waste management systems. The giant

city of Edo had simple and effective systems of water supply and waste removal. A

water supply system built in the seventeenth century drew water from the Tama river

in the west and brought it in canals above ground to the edge of the city, then in stone

46 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

main conduits underground, with wood and bamboo supplying shallow local

wells in the centre of each block (Hatano, 1994). Early European visitors to Edo tested

the water and frmnd it of very high quality; far better than in most contemporary

cities (I Ian Icy, 1997). But major cholera epidemics in the nineteenth century

meant that an early concern fiir planners was to ensure safo drinking water supplies,

and the drinking water system was an important investment, starting

in the 1890s (I Iayarni, 198(i). Sewerage was not such a priority; as the traditional system

of entrepreneurs collecting human waste and selling it to farmers outside the city

continued to be very effective. Sewers were gradually built, starting in central Tokyo,

bnt in suburban areas the 'honey bucket men' continued to collect most human waste

until well into the 1960s, when petrochemical-based fertilizers became more available

and cheaper, putting them out of business.

The relative success of traditional urban tcclmologies, and the order, cleanliness and

discipline ofJapanesc urban life, lessened the need for new technologies and approaches

to urbanization, delaying the adoption of many modern urban infrastructures. As

suburban growth began in earnest in the 1920s, traditional urban infrastructure and

social systems were employed to create very liveable and desirable (even though

unplanned) suburbs in the uplands west of the central city. Municipalities were able

to rely on neighbourhood-scale civic organizations for the delivery of essential social

services (Bcstor, 1989; Sorensen, 2007). The problematic aspects of unplanned and

unserviced suburban development only really manifested themselves much later, as

discussed below.

Beginning of Modern Planning

the revolution of 1867 the Japanese state focused on the project of

industrialization and the importation of Western tcclmologics and institutions,

constitutional government, milita1y technologies, a postal system,

universal public education and private property rights. The primary rnotivatio11 was

to grow strong enough to be able to prevent colonization the European

powers that were then dividing up the globe. Creating a modern state that could

convince the great powers that Japan was a civilized nation was a top

industrialization and military development.

as were

The initial attempts to modernize followed typical patterns of colonial

advisors to create direct copies of Western town forms

and planning ideas. The first major chance came after a fire destroyed a area of

the merchant district in the Low in 1872. The central government hired a British

named Thomas Waters to plan and supervise the building of a

commercial centre in the Ginza area, later called the Ginza Rcnga-Gai

Brick Tbwn) :md built to a design inspired by London's Regent Street (Fujimori,

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 47

1982; Not-,11Khi, 1988). The rebuilding stalled when it was about two-thirds complete

because the buildings were expensive, damp and ill-suited to the climate, but the

prr:jcct did have the long-term impact of shifting the arc:i of highest retail rents from

Nihonbashi southward towards Ginza 4-chomc, an area that, by the 1990s, could boast

the highest rents in the world (Okamoto, 2000). A second such attempt was a

commissioned by the Foreign Ministry from the German architects Bockmann and

Ende to restructure the government quarter in the grand neoclassical style. That plan,

however, was abandoned bcfrJrc construction began when the minister was disgraced

by his failure to renegotiate the 'unequal treaties' that had been sit,Y11cd under duress in

1858 when the US navy threatened Edo (Beasley, 1995).

In the end, the major early planning achievements were the results of a much more

practical urban improvement plan. In 1889 the central government passed the Tokyo

City Improvement Ordinance (TCIO, Tokyo Shiku Kaisei]orei), which created the legal

authority to carry out an ambitious project to improve roads and to build parks, markets

and schools. Instead of a plan based on the architectural fads of European advisors,

this was basically a large-scale co-ordinated municipal public works pn~ject. The major

priorities of this project, which lasted from 1888 to 1918, followed fairly directly from

the legacies of the giant city of Edo, including fireproofing, road-widening and water

supply. This prl~ect also helped to create a new electric streetcar system after 1890,

which developed into a comprehensive network by 1920. The financial contributions

from the private streetcar company fr)r the use of roads to lay their tracks paid f(x most

of the road-widening projects. Other major initiatives were the building of a new water

supply system and the beginning of a mains sewer system for central Tokyo.

Several of the enduring characteristics of Japanese city planning arc first evident

during this period. These include a strong centralization of power in the Horne

Ministry, with mayors and prcfcctural governors the This

concentration of experts and plan-making in the central government led to

relatively quick attainment of high levels of planning in the I lome

Planning Bureau, but limited the ability of municipalities to devise or

locally specific solutions to particular issues. A farther problem was the weak financial

base for planning, as the Finance retained tight control over the purse

and local governments had few of their own resources available fix

important projects Sorensen, p. 110).

The Meiji period had sccn a drastic halving of Tokyo's population, with the

departure of most samurai to their home and the collapse of the former

economic system, hut Tokyo started to grow once more in the 1890s. It had only

reached its 1800 population again by 1900 and was still contained within its foudal

boundaries in 1910, but thereafter Tbkyo a period of rapid population and

physical growth. By the time of the First World War, Tokyo began to sec major

as rapid industrialization resulted from a combination of the blockade of Germany and

48 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

sales of industrial goods to the allied powers. This presented a new set of problems

of how to manage growth and land development on the urban fringe, and of how to

alleviate the steadily worsening housing conditions of the working class in the inner

city. Rising rents led to increasing population densities, worsening housing conditions,

and serious epidemics of cholera and tuberculosis, while the growing middle class

sought new housing outside the existing urban areas.

Changes in transportation technolot,ry were also significant factors shaping

urbanization in this period. The building of the national railway system was a top

priority of the government during the second half of the Meiji period, and the famous

Yamanote loop line, linking Tokyo Station and Ueno Station, was completed in 1919.

The private railways, which proliferated after 1910, were prohibited from establishing

terminals within the Yamanote loop, so their terminals were located at Ikebukuro,

Shinjuku, Shibuya and Ueno. This later structured urban growth by creating important

sub-centres where commuters transferred from the private commuter railways to the

Yamanote Line or the Tokyo streetcars.

The streetcar system also had profound effects on patterns of urban development.

As in other major cities such as London, Berlin, Paris and New York, the vast majority

of the population travelled on foot before the development of public transport systems.

That meant a relatively compact form of growth, usually within a radius of about 5

kilometres. The development of public transit systems allowed an enormous spread of

population, with the better off who could afford daily fares able to travel the furthest.

The system also encouraged the development of the great department stores in Ginza,

and the central business area in Marunouchi, to serve the whole city. The Ginza

subway, begun in 1920, was originally part of a system with seven routes, of which it

was the only line completed before the World War II.

The 1919 City Planning Act provided the basis for Japan's first city planning

system. The main elements were: land-use zoning; an urban buildings law; the

building line system; excess condemnation; land readjustment; and the designation of

public facilities. Unfortunately, funding measures included in the proposed legislation

were opposed by the Ministry of Finance. Provisions for a betterment tax, a land

expropriation law, and public financing of city planning projects all had to be dropped

before the bill could become law.

Early by international standards, the new zoning system was simple, with only four

land-use zones: commercial, residential, industrial and quasi-iudustrial. The law also

allowed for undesignated zones and non-zoned areas within the city planning area.

Each zone allowed a wide variety of land uses, with the main restriction being that

large-scale factories could only be located in industrial areas, and noisy uses such as

theatres and cabarets were only allowed in commercial zones. Small factories and

retail and otlice uses were allowed in residential zones, however, and housing was still

allowed in heavy industrial areas. It was imagined that zoning would not act primarily

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability: Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 49

to restrict land uses, but rather as an indicator of the appropriate scale and design of

public facilities such as roads in the different zones, with narrow roads in residential

areas and super-blocks in industrial zones. This was quite different as a conceptual

and political basis of zoning from, for example, New York, where the early goal of

zoning was to prevent the encroachment of industrial lofts into upper-class residential

areas.

Figure 2.4. Tokyo's first zoning plan, 1923.

.... _ ~ G:tl.'J!llJI!

llIIIlD :t::•- 11111 :r:--.1'1'-"''*"u l!ttHll x--. (<'..-ll'!'*liO §*!llll!Je o------ lil!l!fftillllUll ... .,.,.

At first glance, the first Tokyo zoning plan (figure 2.4) can be taken at face value, as a

plan to shape the structure ofland use and built form of the city. It is better understood,

however, as a schematic representation of land uses existing in Tokyo when it was

approved in 1923. This was a new regulation for an existing fully built-up area, and it

was merely confirming the broad land-use pattern then existing. A few main aspects

arc worth noting: the entire Low City west of the Sumida River is designated as

a commercial area (solid black), and the transition to the residential zone (diagonal

stripes) on its western edge closely follows the change in elevation to the uplands of

the I Iigh City. Throughout the residential areas of the High City, commercial areas

arc designated as linear corridors along main highways and arterial roads. Many, but

not all, of these follow the lines of the streetcars. This pattern of commercial areas

in long strips along main roads is still common in Japan and, where the building of

a parallel highway or elevated expressway has allowed it, many of these have been

Risks and Resilience

Figure 2.5. A pedestrian shopping street in central Tokvo in 2007.

of

areas that

and crnss-

into two halves, a

commercial/industrial zone in the

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 51

two episodes arc crucial fix understanding the development of Tokyo, in part because

in each case the city was transformed in the process of rebuilding, and in part because

these disasters provide insights into major contemporary risks and challenges for the

city.

The Great Kanto Earthquake struck just before noon on 1 September 1923.

Between 100,000 and 140,000 people were crushed or incinerated, and some 44 per

cent of the urban area of Tokyo was completely destroyed. As Seidensticker (1991)

larnems, this marked the final disappearance of the built form of the feudal city of Edo,

with the destruction of most remaining pre-modern buildings and the transformation

of the cityscape during reconstruction. The areas worst affected were the Low City

commercial and industrial areas, primarily because they were built at much higher

densities than the residential areas of the High City and burned more readily. A vast

area of the capital was utterly devastated and the major investment in reconstruction

made over the next 8 years put a strain on the entire national budget and financial

system. As anyone who has studied urban disaster recovery knows, it is usually very

difficult to accomplish a significantly different urban plan during reconstruction, as

the priority is often to rebuild in the same pattern in order to provide new homes and

business spaces quickly. In Tokyo, however, a major redesign of the central area was

undertaken, creating a new hierarchy of broad avenues, substantial commercial streets,

and smaller streets and lanes. New bridges, parks and schools were also built, with a

number of innovative features including fireproof concrete schools with emergency

shelter areas in the playgrounds and pocket parks at each of the hundreds of new

bridges.

Two problematic outcomes of reconstruction arc important here. First, to allow

rapid rebuilding of housing and businesses during reconstruction, the requirements

for fireproof buildings were relaxed, initially temporarily but then with repeated

extensions. This resulted in huge areas of these flammable buildings being consumed

by fire dnring World War II bombing. Second, all the carcfi1lly prepared plans for

suburban land development pn~jccts and development regulation schemes proposed

under the 1919 Planning Act had been lost in the fires which destroyed Tokyo City

Hall and the Home Ministry in the aftermath of the earthquake. Worse, in the months

after the disaster, suburban development occurred too rapidly, resulting in many

people made homeless by the earthquake moving to new areas outside the city, creating

another vast belt of unplanned sprawl. This area of high-density wooden housing, with

very narrow streets, few parks and few firebreaks, has been a key concern again since

the 1980s, as Tokyo anticipates its next great earthquake (see figure 2.8). Historically

the cycle of m~jor quakes in the Tokyo region has been about every 70 years, so a major

disaster has been expected since the mid 1990s.

Tokyo suffered massive destruction again during the incendiary bombing raids

of 1945, with most of the built-up area burned and some 750,000 houses destroyed.

52 Planrnng Asian Cities: Risks and Resilience

Once more, the commercial and industrial areas of the Low City were the most

heavily damaged. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government prepared a very idealistic

reconstruction plan to transform central Tokyo, especially those areas that had not been

modernized after the Great Kanto earthquake. Redevelopment projects were planned

for 20,000 hectares, while the burned area was 'only' 16,000 hectares. The intcntion

was to create broad avenues, large parks and green corridors. These extensive open

spaces could also serve as firebreaks, a proposal that made great sense given that, within

the space of25 years, central Tokyo had been burned to the ground twice.

But compared with the reconstruction eff(xt after the earthquake, little urban

restructuring was accomplished. Of the 20,000 hectares planned, only 1,380, or 6.8

per cent of the reconstruction projects, were completed (Sorensen, 2002). Most of

these were at main stations along the Yamanote Linc such as Shinjuku, Shibuya and

lkcbukuro, and were designed to improve the railway station plazas and create better

connections between Japan Rail OR) lines, private railway lines, streetcars and buses.

Most of Tokyo, however, was rebuilt quickly along the old pattern, and many areas so

redeveloped are now considered at high risk from earthquake and fire.

By the 1950s the key characteristics of Japanese planning were firmly established,

uamely a high degree of centralization of policy and administrative power in central

government, and an enduring focus of government policy on economic growth, often

at the expense of urban liveability. The pervasive role of the state is a distinctive frature

of Japanese urbanization, especially in Tokyo, which may seem odd for a city that

appears to most first-time visitors to be profoundly unplanned and chaotic (see Shelton,

1999). As noted above, Tokyo was originally planned as a military city, with the priority

placed on defence. During the Edo period the Shogun's government had e:t,.'i:raordinary

powers over patterns of activity and development (Kato, 1994; Sorensen, 2002). In the

Meiji period the urban project was to modernize, industrialize, and create a prestigious

capital city. After the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, and again after World War II,

the central government took direct control of planning and reconstruction. In the

rapid growth period and since, the state has fixuscd on the planning and building of

the large-scale infrastructure that has shaped overall patterns of growth particularly

the Tokyo Bay landfills fr)[ the port and industrial complexes, and the railways,

expressways, bridges and airports that have facilitated economic and physical t,>rowth.

These vast projects and investments established Japan's reputation as the archetypal

'developmental state' or 'construction state' (dokm kokka), and also decisively shaped

the growth of the capital city. At the same time relatively frw constraints were placed

on private urban investment or land development, so even with vast state infrastructure

investments, Tokyo continues to display a rather haphazard and unplanned look. More

important, most residential areas were developed in an unplanned manner, with

little government investment or even regulation. These areas pose some of the main

challenges facing the Tokyo region today.

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 53

From Rapid Economic Growth to Post-industrial Tokyo

Contemporary Tokyo, although built on the foundations of the pre-war period, and

shaped by the institutions developed thcn, is mostly a product of two decades of rapid

post-war economic growth from 1954 to 1973, another two decades of moderate

growth from about 1973 to 1990, and the following t\vo decades of recession and

low grovvth. Throughout this period the construction of new urban areas, of public

and private infrastructure, and of buildings on redevelopment sites, has been a major

industry, especially during the low economic growtl1 period of recent decades. As

a result, virtually all buildings in Tokyo have been constructed during the last half-

century, with many being replaced on one or more occasions. There is no space to

trace in detail all the urban changes in the Tokyo region in this period, so the focus

here is limited to two major aspects of urbanization and growth. The first is the

continued dominance of the 'developmental state', with its politicized public works

and infrastructure spending, which has skewed urban priorities and planning solutions

towards large-scale engineering approaches and t,>randiose schemes, rather than

towards systematic planning and carcfl1l regulation of development. The second is the

distinctive pattern of suburban sprawl and substandard suburban development that is

characteristic of Tokyo.

The political economy of the Japanese 'developmental state' model has been

e:t,.'i:ensively studied, and it is unnecessary here to do more than summarize the main

features. The core of the model is: a highly centralized government structure and

weak local governments; weak influence of electoral politics on government policy

formation, which is instead entrusted to a relatively autonomous bureaucracy that is to

some degree insulated from political pressures; the prioritization of economic growth

to the detriment of other goals; and a reliance on economic success as the primary

basis of state legitimacy Oohnson, 1982; Cumings, 1987; Deyo, 1987; Gao, 1997; Woo-

Cumings, 1999). The cnduring links between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party,

central government bureaucracy and big business arc referred to as 'the iron triangle'

and continue to be influential (McCormack, 2002; Feldhoff, 2007). This configuration

was particularly powerful in the post-war 'rapid growth' decades a 'conservatives'

paradise', in which a powerful consensus prevailed that post-war rebuilding, economic

growth, and particularly industrial expansion, were necessary and desirable (Samuels,

1983,p. 168).

The state played a key role in facilitating industrial expansion by allocating foreign

exchange, arranging loans, promoting capital formation and plant investment, and

ensuring an adequate supply of industrial land, electricity and water Oohnson, 1982;

Deyo, 1987). In the Tokyo region, the major investments were in creating new

integrated industrial areas on landfills in Tokyo Bay, with associated road and rail links,

port facilities, highways, river engineering, storm-water management, and electricity

54 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

and water supply. Samuels (1983), in his case study of the dcvclopmcm plans f(x the

Tokyo region, details the multiple tics linking the ministries (Construction,

11-ansport, and International Trade and Industry) with business lobbyists, major

industrial groups, and prcfrctural and municipal governments. Ambitious plans

were formulated to fill in two-thirds of the 12,000 square kilometre Tokyo Bay fi:ir

a new airport, new 1bkyo Station, industrial, residential and commercial areas, and

with expressways to link everything together. Although many of the major projects

were uncontroversial, some, like Narita Airport, elevated ex-prcssways and the new

Shinkansen high-speed rail lines, attracted heated protests when they were being built

(McKean, 1981; Samuels, 1983; Apter and Sawa, 1984; llood, 2006). Such protests

seldom had much influence, however, as most mJjor decisions were made among elite

actors long before plans were made public.

It is during the rapid growth period that the dualistic aspects of urbanization in

Japan became strongly apparent. On the one hand, the central government poured

money into ambitious large-scale infrastructure projects, and on the other hand, as

mentioned above, there was a vast amount of uncontrolled, unplanned residential land

development with few public services such as local roads, community centres, libraries

or parks (T•mru, 1999; IfasegawJ, 2004). While 41 per cent of the public works budget

was allocated to roads, harbours and airports in 1960, and 49.9 per cent in 1970, the

percentage devoted to housing and sewer systems was 5.7 per cent in 1960 and 11.2 per

cent in 1970 (Yamamura, 1992, p. 48). Careful planning and huge investments in infra-

structure to aid economic grovvth occurred at the same time as extremely tight budgets

fix social infrastructure and a laissez attitude to living conditions in residential

areas, with frw regulations put in place to limit pollution of air, water and soil.

The results of this approach were mixed in their effects on urban structure. On the

one hand, the huge investment in infrastructure projects undoubtedly

contributed to economic development and mobility in the Tokyo region. On the other

hand, lack of investment in 'social overhead contributed to the 'rich Japan, poor

Japan' problem of low living standards, degraded urban environments and a severe

pollution crisis in the 1960s. There were m;~or investments in transportation systems,

including the construction of a large-scale elevated expressway system, new high-

speed railway links to Osaka and later Tbhoku and the Japan Sea, new and

railway lines, and the major new industrial areas on landfills in Bay. The water

supply and sewer systems were rapidly extended, although until the 1990s the sewers

were still cx-panding more slowly than the urban area. While overseas visitors ofren

admire the lavish investment in infi·astructure, and especially transportation systems,

to aid economic development 1998; Mosk, 2001 ), Japanese commentators

arc more likely to notice the associated accumulation of government the failure

to invest in social infrastructnrc, and the spread of low-quality living environments

(I layakawa and llirayama, 1991; T<iuru, 1999; Hasegawa, 2004).

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo 111 the Twenty-First Century 55

Thus, the fixus on growth-oriented infrastructure in the Tokyo region has

resulted in a neglect of the infrastructure that supports liveability. The problem was

not just a lack of spending, however, but also a failure to regulate private land and

housing development, allowing the continuing spread of unplanned residential areas. 1

Weak regulation of private development, high housing prices and a failure by the

glwernment to invest in residential areas has meant that huge areas were developed

in an entirely haphazard manner with tiny lots, without adequate basic infrastructure

of roads and sewers, and without minimum social facilities, such as parks, libraries

and community centres. As mentioned above, these unplanned residential areas have

long been seen as some of the most vulnerable, dangerous and problematic parts of

Tokyo. In the area shown in figure 2.6, the parts shaded in black have substandard

housing plots of80 square metres, which front primarily on to small dead-end streets

with few connections. Virtually all streets arc extremely narrow. Failure to plan or

Figure 2.6. Unplanned sprawl areas north of'fokyo.

56 Planning Asian Cities: Risks and Resilience

regulate suburban development has also meant that other major infrastructure, such as

sewers, has had to be built retroactively at great cost, while storm-water systems must

be oversized because hard surfaces arc ubiquitous.

This approach to urban planning and urban infrastructure investment was a major

cause of the environmental crisis in Japan that came to a head in the 1960s, with

hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of people made seriously ill, as pollution

emissions expanded rapidly and housing was still being built in industrial zones (Ui,

1992). By the second half of the decade worsening pollution contributed to the t,rrowth

of environmental movements which blamed the central government for the pollution

crisis and lack of investment in community infrastructure (George, 2001 ). This in

turn contributed to major gains by the opposition socialist and communist parties,

particularly in local government elections, where progressive parties were able to elect

mayors and governors in most of the cities and prefectures in the metropolitan areas

(Krauss and Simcock, 1980; MacDougall, 1980; McKean, 1981 ). Of all environmental

complaints, those about vibrations, bad smells and noise consistently topped the list,

and all were a result of poor land-use planning. Although many of the new progressive

local administrations worked hard on environmental concerns, their land-use planning

powers were relatively weak, and they were largely unable to limit the continued

spread of new areas of unplanned sprawl.

Three developments since the time of the environmental crisis arc important here.

The first is the bnbble economy of the 1980s, the second has to do with the long period

of economic stagnation following its collapse, and the third has been the emergence

of large numbers of small-scale, citizen-initiated projects to improve local living

environments, referred to as 'machiz11kuri' (which literally translates as 'community

development' or 'town-making'). During the 1980s Japan experienced an extraordinary

asset inflation bubble, fuelled in part by the huge exporting success of Japanese

corporations, in part by easy credit designed to stimulate domestic demand in response

to US pressure over the trade imbalance between the two countries, and in part by

speculative investment in urban land and real estate. The results were equally diverse

and included a vast inflation of land values, an accelerated spread of development ever

further from central Tokyo in efforts to find affordable housing land, and a severe

economic crash in the early 1990s followed by stagnation which persists to the present.

The Japanese financial system was pushed near to collapse by large numbers ofbad real

estate loans made during the bubble economy period. Since then central government

has sought to encourage construction investment as a stimulus to counteract recession.

Such efforts have been two pronged, including both massive government investment

in infrastructure and construction projects, and a series of deregulations of the planning

system, designed to stimulate private sector investment in redevelopment.

The government's economic stimulus investments have been widely criticized

(Woodall, 1996; McGill, 1998; Fe ldhoff, 2007) as reinforcing the 'iron triangle' while

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 57

creating a deepening dependency on public works. As McCormack (2002, p. 11)

argues,

Japan's public works sector has grown to be three times the size of that of Britain. the US or

(;ermany. employing 7 million people. or 10 per cent of the workfiwcc. and spending betwern

-10 and 50 trillion yen a year around $350 billion, 8 per cent of GDP or two to three times that

of other industrial countries. Naturally there have been short-term benefits fiir many, not least in

terms of up unemployment during the long 1990s recession. Gradually, however, public-

works infrastructure has been replaced by 'extrastructure· developments undertaken for their

own sake, while the collusive alliance at the system's core has corrupted both politics and society.

Just as problematic have been the central government's moves to encourage private

development investment by selectively weakening the national building code, and by

removing normal municipal planning controls in specified areas of central Tokyo, in

order to speed up the process of approval of large-scale redevelopment projects. As

examined in detail in earlier studies (Fttjii, 2005; Fttjii et al., 2007; Sorensen et al.,

2009), during the 1990s the Ministry of Construction (now the Ministry of Land,

Infrastructure and Ti-ansport) weakened regulations controlling the permitted floor

area, height and permissible building envelope of buildings in cities in order to

permit much larger buildings on existing sites These changes were accomplished not

by introducing legislation, but by changing the way the Building Standards Law was

interpreted and administered. For example, a major change was the decision not to

count the area used for elevators, lobbies and corridors as a part of the total floor area

of large condominium buildings. Another major series of changes was to the way the

permitted building envelope was calculated, in order to allow much taller buildings

on sites that front on to narrow roads. These changes have had major impacts on

built form. In one famous case, a 10-storey building, built in the early 1990s to the

maximum size then permitted, was demolished in 2002 and replaced with a 30-storey

building that took advantage of the new regulations (Sorensen et al., 2009).

As can be imagined, the sudden appearance of 30-storey buildings in low-rise

residential areas has provoked bitter conflicts and vigorous opposition movements

(Fttjii ct al., 2007). Few of these have been successfril in preventing redevelopment,

however, and during the last 15 years Tbkyo has seen an extraordinary transfrirmation,

from a largely low-rise and mid-rise built frxm to a predominance of high-rise

buildings over large expanses of the central city: This has reversed the long decline of

the central city population, as intended, bnt increasing density in the central areas of

Tokyo may not be good policy. Unlike many other developed country cities, Tokyo

already has extremely high central area densities and increased burdens on an already

ove1worked infrastructure may be vc1y costly and may exacerbate problems in the

event of a major disaster (Onishi, 1994).

More widespread and much more important than the movements in opposition

58 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

to high-rise intensification arc the many groups, projects and activities that seek to

improve local environments and liveability in Japanese settlements. The 111achizuk11ri

(mentioned above) represent a sclf:-help approach to working on ncighbourhood-

scalc liveability issues. Drawing on the famous examples of the Maruyama and

Mano neighbourhoods in Kobe (Watanabe, 2007) and "faishido in Tokyo (Sorensen

ct al., 2009), where sophisticated community movements worked to improve their

neighbourhoods, 111achiz11k11ri activisim spread throughout the country in the 1990s.

l\1achiz11k11ri includes a very wide range of activities and organizational structures,

including both bottom-up citizens' organizations and more top-down projects initiated

by local governments, but the essential characteristic is the voluntary participation

of residents in managing and ameliorating neighbourhood scale environmental

quality. Typical activities engaged in by marhizukuri groups include the building

and management of local parks and community gardens, children's play areas and

small green spaces, historical preservation campaigns, community centre building,

environmental remediation efforts and local disaster response preparations (Watanabe,

1999; Hein, 2001; Murayama, 2007; Sorensen ct al., 2009).

Although the devolution of planning powers and responsibilities under the revised

City Planning Law of 1992 and the major transfer of legal authority for planning to

local governments in 2000 allowed increased scope fiJr local initiatives and greatly

raised expectations, machizukuri processes arc still important because the massive local

borrowing to help finance central government infrastructure projects during the 1990s

lefr local governments deeply in debt and little able to finance new initiatives and

projects (Schcbath, 2006).

In a recent paper John Friedmann (2010) argues for the central importance of place

and place-making in cities today, and advocates a more positive approach by planners in

supporting etforts to enhance neighbourhood-scale shared places, and to protect them

from the powerful forces of erasure and dislocation. Friedmann provides examples of

three cases of place-making in Japan, China, and Canada and notes the importance

of the institutional frameworks that make successfi1l citizen engagement in placc-

making possible. Although a wide variety of neighbourhood ort,ranizations exists in

cities around the world, their capacity to influence patterns of urban change is highly

uneven. In most cases, developers, governments and planners arc happy to disregard

the priorities of neighbourhood organizations in pursuit of other interests, and

institutional links between the local state and neighbourhood organizations have very

ofrcn been designed to ensure that municipal priorities and interests arc communicated

to the neighbourhood, not the reverse.

The crucial social innovation of machizukuri was the adaptation of existing

institutional structures for neighbourhood self-governance, the traditional neigh-

bourhood associations ofcl1011aikai and jicl1ikai (sec Dore, 1958; Bcstor, 1989), to create

more democratic, inclusive and autonomous groups. This was a complex process,

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 59

lasting several decades. The environmental crisis and the collapse of the economy were

key moments of de-legitimation of existing institutions and, over time, new institutional

frirms of place-based ort,YJnizing have become established and widely disseminated (see

Sorensen, 2007). Two key innovations were a move from the traditional system of

household membership in neighbourhood associations to individual membership in

machizukuri groups, allowing routine membership of women and young adults instead

of household representation by the eldest male, and a formalization of majority voting

instead of the traditional 'consensus' decision making that had allowed most decisions

to be made by small leadership groups. These changes have facilitated the emergence

of more independent groups which do not automatically follow the instructions of

local government, and have fought against place erasure, as well as for place values.

In many cities in Asia, it is precisely the lack of institutional models and frameworks

for autonomous local groups with both organizational and political capacity that is the

greatest hindrance to place-making (Sorensen and Sagaris, 2010). Machizukuri in Tokyo

are important in providing a setting and sense of legitimacy for citizen engagement

in place-making and community development, which would otherwise be almost

completely lacking.

Conclusions: Major Contemporary Challenges for Tokyo

The Tokyo region faces many major challenges today. Of these, probably the most

prominent arc earthquake risks, economic problems related to the lack of growth,

huge government debts, an ageing and declining population, and growing problems of

homelessness and poverty. This concluding section focuses on three issues that have a

distinctly spatial manifestation, and that arc deeply linked to historic patterns of planning

and development. The first is the enduring divide between the upland High City and

the Low City in the floodplains of the Sumida, Edogawa and Nakagawa rivers, most of

which is now at or below the mean high-tide level. Second is the continued existence

and even t,rrowth of highly vulnerable areas of substandard housing, a situation that

contributes to the serious risks facing large segments of the Tokyo population. Third

is the huge pressure to redevelop and intensify land use in the central areas of the city.

This is, in large part, a product of the recent changes in planning regulations noted

above, which arc designed more to create profitable opportunities for redevelopment

than to address existing urban challenges and risks.

The continuing spatial divide between the Low City in the cast and the lligh

City to the west of the Imperial Palace is a surprisingly enduring characteristic of

Tokyo. Dating back to the feudal era policy of class-based separation of the city into

different districts for samurai and commoners, and powerfully reinforced by the early

zoning of the city into a 'residential' zone in the salubrious former samurai areas, and

commercial and industrial zones in the areas frmncrly inhabited by commoners, these

60 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

t\vo halves continue to demonstrate very diffcTent urban fimn characteristics

and problems. Apart from the zoning, a major factor been that it was primarily

the low-lying commoner areas that were destroyed in the earthquake of 1923,

and that were rebuilt with a of wide roads. This has

densities in these areas than in the upland areas with their

much higher built

narrow roads.

The industrial areas continue to have an extraordinary mixture of factories, housing,

office, retail and warehouse uses. with almost every urban block all of those

uses. During the environmental crisis of the post-war period, these were the areas

that suffered the worst cffrcts of uncontrolled pollution emissions, but much stricter

pollution controls since 1970 have greatly reduced such problems. In many ways these

arc extremely sncccssfol examples of the sort oflow-risc, high-density, mixcd-nsc areas

promoted by advocates of urban sustainability.

They arc, however, still vulnerable to a major ongoing risk that is a by-product

of the unregulated industrialization of the rapid growth period: most of the lowland

area ofTok70, with a population of2.5 million, is built on land that is up to 2 metres

below the mean high tide level (sec figure 2.7). Excessive groundwater pumping by

factories from the aquifor below the delta from the 1940s to the mid 1960s resulted

in widespread subsidence of ground levels. Although strictly cnf<.irccd regulations

have prohibited the removal of groundwater since the mid 1960s, and subsidence has

stopped, huge areas arc still vulnerable to flooding. Dykes. water gates and locks protect

these areas, but 1hkyo's heavy rains must be pumped out over the dykes, so these areas

arc always at risk of floods from a failure of the emergency pumps, from a surge of

river or sea water levels during a storm, or from the failure of a dyke (as happened in

New Orleans). As sea levels arc cJqicctcd to rise considerably over the next century,

this presents a significant ongoing risk fiir a major part of the Tokyo population. The

unstable alluvial soils of the delta area arc also considered to present greater risks in the

event of a factor that may the risk of floods.

The second

the weak planning regulations in place

1s a consequence primarily of

the first half of the t\Vcntieth century,

and the hasty rebuilding after World War ll. As shown in fignre 2.8, just beyond the

Yamanotc line there 1s a of suburban residential areas with very high

population densities, and a of dwellings that arc constructed of wood.

These arc almost all areas that were initially suburbanized afrer the ]!)23 earthquake,

in a wholly unplanned and tend to have a substandard road infrastrnctnre,

with many houses on very narrow lanes and paths that even the tiniest car cannot

enter. Some of these areas arc charming living environments, with lots of small houses,

potted plants in the alleyways, and pedestrian and bicycle traffic in the streets.

The problem is that they arc also at high risk of fires in the

event of earthquakes, as few houses arc fircproofrd and they stand within inches of

each other in most cases. In the Kobe earthqnakc of 1995 virtually all fatalities were in

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 61

Figure 2.7. Tokyo below sea level.

areas just like these, as collapsed buildings blocked escape routes and residents were

trapped, unable to flee the advancing flames. While the risk of another great earthquake

is well known, the very uneven geography of vulnerability in the city is less frequently

mentioned.

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has, since the early 1980s, identified these

Low City areas as a major target for disaster prevention investment, but progress has

been slow. Initial plans to bulldoze the areas and replace them with wide boulevards

and high-rise towers in the modernist style were vigorously opposed by residents, so

an incremental approach has been pursued instead, with investment put into building

emergency escape routes, fireproofing buildings and installing water cisterns in case of

disaster.

The third major risk and vulnerability identified here is rather different, as it is

not associated with potential earthquakes or other natural disasters. Rather, it is one

62 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

Figure 2.8. High-density wooden buildings areas, 1997.

that is entirely linked to weaknesses of the planning system, and the tendency to use

urban regulation as a tool of economic policy. While the prevailing wisdom today is

that higher population densities arc associated with greater urban sustainability, it is not

at all clear that this makes sense for Tokyo, with its already very high densities. It is not

known precisely at what density the benefits of greater concentration give way to the

disbcncfits of overcrowding, and that density is likely to be very different in different

locations, different cultures and even for different individuals. But the current policy

of encouraging indiscriminate intensification through the redevelopment of low- and

mid-rise neighbourhoods into super high-rise condominium buildings of over thirty

storeys seems very likely to create more problems than it solves (sec figure 2.1()). The

problem is not associated with vulnerability to earthquakes most new high-rises are

probably safer in the event of earthquakes than the buildings they are replacing. But

these super high-rises tend to be much more energy intensive than low- and mid-

Figure 2.9. Shimokitazawa in Tokyo's wooden housing belt.

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 63

rise buildings, so the wholesale replacement of Tbkyo's low- and mid-rise buildings

with super high-rises seems more likely to reduce local resilience in the face of disaster

rather than to increase it. Also, many of these new high-rises arc built within a metre or

two of2-storcy residences, so the immediate neighbours arc understandably concerned

about loss of sunlight, wind funnel effects, falling objects and increased traffic. Protests

have been widespread but, as noted earlier, largely ineffective (Fujii ct al., 2007).

The current incentives to rebuild in the form of high-rise buildings have sparked

a wave of redevelopment and intensification throughout the Tokyo region, but there

is no overall planning framework to guide intensification, and few areas arc protected

from such redevelopment. A major risk of this approach is that overbuilding will

create more vulnerable populations in central areas, requiring ever larger infrastructure

investments to keep them supplied with water, wastewater treatment and energy, while

the characteristic resilience and flexibility of the low- and mid-rise urban forms they

replace arc diminished.

Tokyo is such a vast and complex city-region that a brief survey cannot do justice to

its multiple strengths and weaknesses. What is clear, however, is that the institutional

structure of government has consistently worked to leverage Tokyo's centrality as a

vehicle for land development profits, with less priority given to dealing with the risks

that the city faces from earthquakes, floods and other catastrophic events. Until this

dynamic changes, it is rcasouablc to expect that Tokyo will remain highly vulnerable to

natural disasters.

Figure 2.10. Rcccnt high- risc tower development in Tokyo.

64 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

Postscript

As this book went to press, the tragic events of March 2011 - the huge earthquake,

the resulting tsunami which caused appalling destruction and loss of life, and the

explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant north of Tokyo - focused

the attention of the world on the vulnerability of Japan's cities. It is premature for any

detailed assessment of this tragedy; but a few points already seem obvious. First, the

large investments of recent decades in careful earthquake engineering of buildings in

cities have paid off Despite the strongest earthquake in Japanese history; there were

very few building failures, and almost none of newer buildings. Second, the terrifying

images of the tsunami showed the vulnerability of low-lying coastal communities

to sudden huge rises in sea levels and gigantic waves. In areas prone to tsunamis,

settlements must be sited on higher ground. Third, the failure of multiple backup

systems at the nuclear power plants suggests that, if such plants arc to be located on the

coast, as virtually all in Japan arc, they must be much better protected. Finally; one can

only hope that the 2011 Sendai disaster will prompt early and significant measures to

better protect the extensive areas of Tokyo which are currently at or below mean high

tide levels, as discussed in this chapter. In Japan major earthquakes and tsunamis in

future arc inevitable.

Note 1. The term 'sprawl' (supuroru) is applied to these areas, but they are not the same as North America's

sprawling suburbs. Tokyo's unplanned suburbs have been the suhject of a number of studies (sec Hanayama, 1986; Hebbcrt, 1994; Mori, 1998; Sorensen, 2001).

References Apter. D.E. and Sawa. N. ( 1984) Against the State. Cambridge, MA: I Iarvard University Press. Beasley, W G. ( 1995) The Rise ojJ!fodern japan. New York: St. Martin's Press. Bestor, TC. (1989) Nc(~hborlwod Tokyo. Stanfr,rd. CA: Stanford University Press. C:ervero, R (1998) The Tt-ansit Metropolis: A Global lnquity. Washington DC: Island Press. Cumings, B. (1987) The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial

sectors, product cycles, and political consequences. in Deyo, F.C. (ed.) The Polirirnl Eet'll<llllY oftlze New Asian Iud11stria/is111. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 44-83.

Deyo, F.C. (ed.) (1987) 771e Political Ew110111y of the New Asian lndustrialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell U nivcrsity Press.

Dore, R.P. (1958) Ciry Liji· in japan -A Study ofa Ti>kyo Viilrd. London: Routledge and Kcgan Paul. Fcldhot1~ T (2007) Japan ·s construction lobby and the privatization of highway-related public

corporations, in Sorensen, A. and Funck, C. (eds.) Living Cities in japan: Citizens' J\!fovemmts, A1arhizukuri and Loral E11viro11111ents. London: Routledge.

Friedmann,J. (2010) Place and place-making in cities: a global perspective. Planning Theory and Practice, 11(2), pp. 149-165.

Fujii, S. (2005) The mechanism of Manshon Conflicts and the View for a New Planning System (lvla11shonfi111so 110 kozo to k6shin kontororu shulul ni kansuru kenkyti). Tokyo: Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Urban Engineering, University of Tokyo.

Fujii. S., Okata, J. and Sorensen, A. (2007) Inner-city redevelopment in Tokyo: conflicts over urban place, planning governance, and neighborhoods, in Sorensen, A. and Funck. C. (eds.) Liui11g Cities in japan: Citizens' J\1oue111mts, Afad1iz11k11ri and Local Environ111ents. London: Routledge.

Uneven Geographies of Vulnerability Tokyo in the Twenty-First Century 65

F1tjirnc1ri, T. (1982) 'Jokyo Pla1111i11g i111/ze c'viciji Period(:vfeiji 110 'ltlkyo Kdkak11). Tr>kyo: lwanami Shotcn. Fujita, K. and ! Jill, R.C:. (2007) The zero waste ciry: Tcikyo\ quest for a sustainable environment.

journal ofC0111ptlratiue l'oliryA11alysis, 9(4). pp. 405-425. Gao, B. (1997) Ero110111ir !dcolcyy and Japanese !nd11stritil l'oliry: Dn'l'iop111mtalis111 .J'o111 1931 to 1965.

Cambridge: ( :ambridge University Press. George, TS. (2001) :'vfi11cunat<1: Po//11tio11 and the Strug~le jlir /)e111omtr)'. Cambridge. MA: l Iarvard

University Press. ! lanayama, Y. (1986) Land Markets mu/ Land Policy i11 a Metropolitm1 :1rea: A Case Study of'JM:yo. Boston.

MA: Oclgeschlager, Gunn and ] Jain. lanley, S. (1997) Ewryday 711ings i11 Prc111odernfapa11: Jl1c I Iiddm L1gacyofiv1a1erial Culture. Berkdey, CA:

University of California Press. l lascgawa, K. (2004) Comtruai1(~ Cil'il Society i11 japan: H>iccs of E11uiron111mtal Mcwe111rn1s. Melbourne,

Vic: Trans-Pacific. I latano,J. (1994) Edo's water supply, in McClain,J.L., Merriman, J.M. and Ugawa, K. (eds.) Edo and

Paris: Url){ln Li/(· and rhe Stclte i11 the Early ,'vfodcm lira. Ithaca. NY: Ccirnell University Press. l layakawa, K. and I Iirayama, Y ( 19')!) The impact of the minkatsu policy on Japanese housing and

land use. Etllliro11111e111 <111d J'/,11111ing D: Society mui Space, 9, pp.151-164. l layami, A. ( J98<i) Population changes, in Jansen. M.B. and Rozman. c;. (eds.)japan in Hansitio11: Fro111

'Il\kugawa to J'vfciji. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. l lcbbcrt. M. (1994) Sen-biki amidst Desakota: Urban sprawl and urban planning in Japan. in Shapira,

P, Masser, I. and Edgint,'ton, D.W (eds.) Plm111i11g jiir Citie.; and R1git>11s in .fap,111. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

I lcin. C. (200 I) Toshikcikaku and Machiznkuri in Japanese urban planning: the reconstruction of inner city neighborhoods in Kobe. Japamwdirn}ahrlmd1 des Dc11tsr/1rn Institutsfiir jap,111st11dim der Philipp l'ra11z uon Siehold Stifiung. 13, pp. 221-252.

l lood. C. (201)(,) From polli11g station to political station' Politics and the shinkanscn. ]<1pa11 forum. 18(1), pp. 45-(J3.

Jinnai, l l. (1990) The spatial structure ofEdo, in Naka11e, C. and and Oishi, S. (eds.) 7z,k11gawajapa11: Social a11d cco110111ir Awcredc11ts of,v1oda11japa11. 'fokyo: University of'fokyo Press.

Jirmai, I!. ( 1994) 'fokyo. a Modd for the 21st Century? Paper pn:scnted to the European Associatio11 of Japcmese Studies confcre11ce. August.

Johnson, C.A. (1982) "HI71 mu/ thcfap1111esc :'\!lirade, the Crowth of!11d11strial Poliq, 1925-1975. Sta11frird, CA: Stanfi.)rd University Press.

Kato, T (1994). Governing Edo, in McClain,]. L Merriman,]. M. and Ugawa, K. (eds.) Edo and Paris: Url>m1 Life and the State in the Early :'vfodcm Era. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kelly; WW (1994) Incendia1y xtions: tires and firefighting in tltc shogun's capital and the people's city. in McClain.J.L., Merriman.JM. and Ugawa, K. (eds.) lido ,711d fl<ris: ( 'rh1111 Life and r/1e State in rhe E1rly .Hodcm I:'m. lthaca. NY: Cornell University Press.

Krauss. E.S. a!lL! Simcock. B. (1980) Citizens' movements: the growth a11d impact of envinmrncntal protest in Japan. in Steiner. K .. Kraus. KE. and Flanagan. S. (eds.) !'tiliti(a/ Opposirion and Loml l'olitirs infapa11. Princeton. NJ: Pri11ceton University Press.

Kurasawa. S. ( l 9t\(1) Soria/ Atl,zs orli>kyo. 'fokyo: Univcrsitv of'fokyo. Mac Dougall. T.E. ( l980) Political opposition and big city elections in Japan. 1947-1975, in Steiner,

K .. Kraus, K.E. and Flanagan. S. (eds.) Politiriil Opposition and Loral Polirirs infapm1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

McCormack. G. (2002) Breaking the lron 'frianglc . . \Jew Left Rcuic1e, 13( 1 ). pp. 5-23. McGill, l' (1998) PavingJapa11- the construction boonduggk.}<1p1111 Quarterly. 45(4), pp. 39-48. McKean, M. (1981) bwiro11n1mtal i'roresl ,n1d Ciri:::m l'olirit.> i11 japan. Berkeley, CA: University of

Calif(m1ia Press. Mori. I I. (1998) Lmd conversion at the urban fringe: a comparative study ofJapcm, Britain and the

NetherL!l!ds. ( 'rha11 Studies, 35(9), pp. 1541-1558. Mosk. C:. (2001)Japancsc lnd11strial J Iis101y 'fhlmoh~~y. UrlJm1i:::111ion, and faonomic Gw1uth. Armonk, NY:

M.E. Sharpe. Murayama, A. (2007) Civic rnm-emurt for sustainable urban regc11eratio11: downtown Fnkaya city.

Saitama prefecture. in Sorensen, A. and Funck. C. (eds.) Lieing Cities infapan: Citizcm' ;vfouemellts, ;\;fod1izuknri and Lorn/ l:'nl'iromnrnts. Londo11: Routledge.

66 Planning Asian Cities Risks and Resilience

Nishiyama, M. (1')97) Edo C11lt11re: Daily Life a1f(J Dil'ersio11s i11 Urhm1 }<1pa11, 1600-/li68. I lonolulu: University of! lawai"i Press.

Noguchi, K. ( 1988) Construction of (;inza Brick Street and conditions of landowners and house owners, in Ishizuka, 11. and Ishida, Y. (eds.) IN.:yo: Urha11Growth1111d Plm111i11g lli68-1988. 1(ikyo: Center for Urban Studies.

Okamoto, S. (2000) Destruction and Reconstruction ofGinza l(iw11, in Fukui, N. andJinnai, I I. (eds.) Des1mctim1 mu/ Rchirtlt o{Urb11111!11uiro11111e111. Tokyo: Sagami Shobo Publishing.

Okata,J. and Murayama, A. (2010) 'fokyo's urban growth, urban form, and sustainability, in Sorensen, A. and Okata,J. (eds.) ;\fr~acities: ( !r/;1111 fon11, Gwcmm1rc 1111d S11stai1whility. 'fokyo: Springer Verlag.

Onishi, T ( 1994) A capacity approach for sustaimble urban development: an empirical study. R1gimwl Swdic.<, 28( l ), pp. 39-51.

llozman, G. (1973) Urban Netl/)orks i11 Ch'ing Clti1111 1111d Ji1lmga11•a ]apmt. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sanmds, R. J. (1983) The Politic' of l«;~io1111I Policy i11 Japan: Localities !t1w1poratl'l/1 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sassen, Saskia (2001) Tlte Global City: Nc1u Yiirk, Lo11do11, Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2"'1 edition).

Schcbath, A. (2006) Fiscal stress of Japanese local public sector in the 1990s: situation, structural reasons, solutions, in I Icin, C. and Pelletier. I' (eds.) Cities, A11tottolll)' a11d Dermtrali.zatio11 i11Jap1111. London: Routledge.

Seidensticker, E. (1991) Low City, H(Qh City. 1okyofmn Jjdo to the 1:.arthq11akc: !tow the slf('.Qlllt's a11ric11t capiwl bcr11111c a great modem rity 1867-1923. C:ambridgc, MA: I larvard University Press.

Shelton, Barrie (1999) Lcami11gj(o111 thc)ap1111c.;c City:Mlcst 111ccts East in Urbmi Des(Qll. London: E & FN Spon.

Smith, I I.D. (1978) Tokyo as an idea: an cxplor:ition ofJapanesc urban thought until 1945.Joumal of Japanese Studies, 4(1), pp. 45-80.

Smith, 1-1.D. (1979) Tbkyo and London: comparative conceptions of the city, in Craig, A.M. (ed.)]ap1111: A Co111parati1;c Vtell'. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sorensen, A. (200 l) Building suburbs in Japan: continuous unplanned change on the urban fringe. Town Pla1111ing Rcuicw, 72(3), pp. 247-273.

Sorensen. A. (2002) T71e J\.1aking of Ur/!1111 jap1111: Cities and l'l111111i11g.fro111 b'do to the 21st Cmt111y. London: Routledge.

Sorensen, A. (2007) Changing governance of shared spaces: Jvlarhiz11k11ri in historical, institutional perspective, in Sorensen. A. and Funck, C. (eds.) Liui11g Cities in ]ap1111: Citizens' J\101;cmmts, J\.1aclti.z11k11ri al/(/ Lorn/ Lit!1!irm111u'lllS. London: Routledge.

Sorensen, A. (2010) Urban sustainability and compact cities ideas in Japan: the diffusion. tramt<.irmation and deployment ofpbnning concepts, in Healey. I~ and Upton, It (eds.) Crossi11g Borders: I11tcmario11al fr.:clw11gc and P/a1111i11g Prartiffs. London: Routledge.

Sorensen, A .. Okata, J. and Fujii, S. (2009) Urban renaissance as intensification: building regulation and the rescaling uf place govcrmncc in Ttikyo's high-rise Manshon boom. Urban Studies, 47(3), pp. 35(>-584.

Sorcnsen, A. and Sagaris, L. (2010) From participation to the right to the city: democratic place management at the neighbourhood scale in comparative perspective. Plm111i1z~ Praaiff mu! Rcsrnrrh, 25(3), pp. 297-316.

'Eurn, S. ( 1999) The />olitiml liro1w111y oftltc b1!'iro1111f('m: 171c Case London: The Athlone Press. Ui,J. (ed.) (1992) J11d11strial J>o/111tio11 i11]ap1111. "fokyo: United Nations University Press. \XZ1tambc. S. ( 1999) Citizm Pa11icipatio11 Based ,'vfarltiz11k11ri: Fro111 the Poi/II ofVic1!' ofi'vlciki11g Master Plans.

(S!timi11 Sa11ka 110 ,'vfacltiz11k11ri: J\.1as11tfi P111w1 /,11k11ri No Gmj6 Kara). Tokyo: Gakugei Slrnppansha. Watanabe, S. (2007) 'foshi kcikaku vs machizuknri (Emerging paradigm of civil society in Japan, 1950-

1980) in Sorensen, A. and Funck, C. (eds.) Liui11g Cities it1Japa11: Citi.ze11/ :'vlwc11u'11ts, ;Vfacltiz11k11ri a11il Lor<1I b1/Jiro11111c1us. London: H.outledge.

Woo-Cumings, M. (ed.) (1999) Tlte J)cuclopmc11t11I State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Woodall, !3. (1996) Japan Under Co11stmctio11: Corruption, Politics 1111d Public vVcirks. Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press. 't1mamura, K. ( 1992) LDP dominance and high Lmd price in Japan: a study in positive political

economy, in I Ialcy,JO. and Ymiamura, K. (eds.) Land Issues infap1111: A Policy Failure' Seattle, WA: Society tlirJapancse Studies, pp. 33-76.

Chapter Three

The Dragon's Head: Spatial Development of Shanghai

Susan Walcott

Booming Shanghai, the giant 'dragon's head' at the mouth of the Yangtze River, 1 has

a population of over 20 million early in the twenty-first century and one that has

more than doubled over the past 20 years. The city's long history as a prosperous site

for business and agriculture (silk, tea and rice cultivation) has made it an enduring

destination for migration and a target for ex1Jloitation. Its name is often interpreted

as meaning 'on the ocean' and its importance as a port has been recognized since

the eleventh century. Shanghai has transcended occupation by Western colonizers

in the mid-ninetecnth century and Japanese military imperialists a century later, as

well as revolutiona1y turmoil and retarded grO\.vth during the early communist era.

Drawing on its outstanding location frJr internal and foreign trade, and a histo1y of

entrepreneurial innovation, Shanghai now serves as China's model city and face to the

world.

The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 began Shanghai's period as the spearhead of

European colonial-led and t()reign concession-based industrialization (Lu, 2004 ).

Factories in the concessions were fed by refi.1gees from turmoil in the count1yside. The

founding of the Chinese Communist Party took place in Shanghai's French quarter

in 1921. Shanghai's prosperity in the 1930s (the 'Paris of the East') was followed by its

control by the central govermncut during the Maoist period as a 'cash cow' providing

taxes to replenish the national coffers. Until its economic liberation in 1984, Shanghai

sent up to 8(1 per cent of its revenue to the national treasury, representing one-si:x1:h

of national income (Ibid.). In 1992 Deng Xiaoping, following his famous tour of

southern China, expressed regret for the delay in letting Shanghai use its resources to

finance its own development. The same year, the Fourteenth National Party Congress