A rm has two divisions, each of which has its own manager. Managers of these
divisions are paid according to their e ort in promoting productivity in their divisions,
which is judged by comparison with other managers and other divisions. If both
managers are judged as having expended high e ort," each earns $150,000/year. If
both are judged to have expended low e ort," each earns $100,000/year. But if
one of the two managers shows high e ort" while the other shows low e ort," the
high e ort" manager is paid $150,000 plus a $50,000 bonus, while the second (low
e ort") manager gets a reduced salary of $80,000. Managers make their e ort decisions
independently and without knowledge of the other manager's choices.
(a) Assume that expending e ort is costless to the managers and draw the payo
table for this game. Find the nash equilibrium of the game and explain whether
the game is a prisoners' dilemma.
(b) Now suppose that expending high e ort is costly to the mangers (such as a costly
signal of quality). In particular, suppose that high e ort" costs an equivalent of
$60,000/year to a manager that chooses this e ort level. Draw the game table for
this new version of the game and nd the Nash equilibrium. Explain whether the
game is a prisoners' dilemma and how it has changed from the game in part a.
(c) If the cost of high e ort is equivalent to $80,000/year, how does the game change
from that described in part b? What is the new equilibrium? Explain whether
the game is a prisoners' dilemma and how it has changed from the games in part
a and b.
(d) Assume now that the owner of the rm can't actually observe manager e ort, but
instead determines e ort based on relative output of the two divisions, meaning
that the manager with the division that produces the most is assumed to have
provided the highest e ort. If the payo s are the same in part c, does this change
the outcome of the game? If the managers play this game repeatedly, does it
matter whether e ort is directly observable? 

Additional Requirements 

Min Pages: 1 
Max Pages: 2 
Level of Detail: Show all work 
Other Requirements: The question belongs to the Behavioral Economics, so please focus on the subject, and answer everything in the question(include drawing table or drawing graph)

    • 13 years ago
    Economics
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