THE CHALLENGER DISASTER

THE CHALLENGER DISASTER 71 On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger rose into the sky, its seven crew strapped into their padded seats while the 2,000-ton vehicle vibrated as it gained speed and altitude. The launch was going perfectly. Seventy seconds had passed since liftoff and the shuttle was already 50,000 feet above the earth. From Mission Control at Houston’s Johnson Space Center, Spacecraft Communicator Richard Covey instructed “ Challenger, go at throttle up.” “Roger, go at throttle up,” replied Commander Dick Scobee on board Challenger. But in the next few seconds Challenger slammed through increasingly violent manoeuvres. [Pilot] Mike Smith voiced sudden apprehension. “Uh-oh.” In Mission Control, the pulsing digits on the screen abruptly stopped. . . Mission Control spokesman Steve Nesbitt sat above the four console tiers. For a long moment he stared around the silent, softly lit room. The red ascent trajectory line was stationary on the display screen across the room. Finally he spoke: “Flight controllers here looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction.” 72 The presidential commission, headed by former Secretary of State William Rogers, that was set up to investigate the cause of the disaster had little trouble identifying the physical cause. One of the joints on a booster rocket failed to seal. The “culprits” were the synthetic rubber O-rings that were designed to keep the rockets’ superhot gases from escaping from the joints between the booster’s four main segments. Resulting flames then burned through the shuttle’s external fuel tank. Liquid hydrogen and liquid oxy- gen then mixed and ignited, causing the explosion that destroyed the Challenger. However, “the Rogers Commission” investiga- tions also revealed a lot about the internal workings of NASA. It was a geographically dispersed matrix organization. Its HQ was in Washington, D.C., where its most senior managers, including its head, NASA administrator James Begg, were mainly involved in lobbying activity reflecting the dependence on fed- eral funds (and its subsequent vulnerability to fluc- tuations in funding). Mission Control was located at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas; all pro- pulsion aspects (main engines, rocket boosters, fuel tanks) were the responsibility of the Marshall Space Center in Huntsville, Alabama; while the assembly and launch took place at the Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, Florida. The centers existed in an uneasy alliance of cooperation and competition. The Marshall Cen- ter in particular was known for its independent stance based on its proud tradition going right back through the Apollo program to the early days of rocketry with Werner von Braun. One manifesta- tion of this pride, reinforced by its autocratic leader William Lucas, was that loyalty to Marshall came before all. Any problems that were identified were to be kept strictly “in-house,” which at Marshall meant within Marshall. Those who failed to abide by this expectation—perhaps by talking too freely to other parts of NASA—could expect to receive a very public admonishment. Marshall was also at the center of a “can-do” attitude within NASA, the idea that great objectives are achievable if only the will is there. Born of the Apollo success, this took form in Marshall as a strong pride in the achievement of objectives and strongly held views that if a flight was to be delayed for any reason, it would not ever be because of something caused by Marshall. The Commission also concluded that NASA was working with an unrealistic schedule for flights. The formal schedule was for 12 in 1984, 14 in 1985, 17 in 1986, 17 in 1987, and 24 in 1988. In practice it had managed five in 1984 and eight in 1985. Con- gressional critics had begun to question the appro- priateness of continuing the current (high) level of funding to the program when NASA was falling so far short in meeting its own goals. However, rather than revise its schedules, these were retained and increased pressure to meet the schedules was placed by senior NASA managers on employees and contractors. Most of the design and construction work in the shuttle program was contracted out. One of the contractors was Morton Thiokol, a Brigham City, Utah–based company that had won the contract to produce the solid rocket boosters. At the time of the Challenger launch, Thiokol and NASA were in the middle of contract negotiations that would deter- mine whether or not Thiokol would be awarded a renewal of the contract. The Commission revealed that there had been doubts about the reliability of the O-rings for some time. Since 1982 they had been labeled a “critical- ity 1” item, a label reserved for components whose failure would have a catastrophic result. However, despite evidence of O-ring erosion on many flights and requests from O-ring experts both inside NASA and inside Thiokol that flights be suspended until the problem was resolved, no action was taken. There was no reliable backup to the O-rings; this violated a long-standing NASA principle, but each time a flight was scheduled, this principle was formally waived. A cold front hit Cape Canaveral the day before the scheduled launch; temperatures as low as 18  F were forecast for that night. Engineers from Thiokol expressed their serious reservations about the wis- dom of launching in such conditions because the unusually cold conditions at the launch site would affect the O-rings’ ability to seal. As a result, a tele- conference was called for that evening. At the teleconference, Roger Boisjoly, Thiokol’s O-ring expert, argued that temperature was a factor in the performance of the rings and Robert Lund, Thiokol’s vice president for engineering, stated that unless the temperature reached at least 53  F he did not want the launch to proceed. This position led to a strong reaction from NASA in the form of Lawrence Mulloy, Marshall’s chief of the solid rocket booster program, and George Hardy, Marshall’s deputy director of science and engineering. Hardy said that he was “appalled” at the reasoning behind Thiokol’s recommendation to delay the launch and Mulloy argued that Thiokol had not proven the link between temperature and erosion of the O-rings, adding, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?” A view expressed at the Commission was that the Thiokol engineers had been put in a position where, in order for a delay to be approved, they were being required to prove that the O-rings would fail, rather than to prove that they would be safe at the low temperatures before a go-ahead was approved. A break was taken in the teleconference to allow the Thiokol management team to consider their position. The Thiokol engineers were still unani- mously opposed to a launch. Jerald Mason, Thiokol’s senior vice president, asked Robert Lund to “take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat.” Polling just the senior Thiokol managers pres- ent, not any of the engineers, Mason managed to get agreement to launch. The teleconference was then reconvened, the Thiokol approval was con- veyed, no NASA managers expressed any reserva- tions, and so the OK to launch was given.

ANSWER THIS QUESTION IN YOUR OWN WORDS. What aspects of NASA practice revealed in the aftermath of the Columbia disaster suggest that the changes sought in the aftermath of the Chal- lenger disaster were not sustained?

WHAT YOU THINK OF JUDY RESPONSE : After the Challenger disaster, although NASA claimed to have implemented changes in its organizational structure and processes to ensure safety of future crews, the changes did not become embedded within the organization. Instead, over time, NASA reverted to its old ways, where the culture of a hierarchy of management was able control and domineer the organization, although perhaps more stealthily. Once again, this flawed organizational culture and leadership with a brazen attitude based on a false sense of confidence from previous successes led to a second disaster and the additional loss of life. Communications were cut-off and lower-level voices were drowned out. The same mistakes were made, indicating that NASA had not learned from previous errors in their organizational structure and strategic decisions. Outside pressures to meet unrealistic launch schedules coupled with less funding also contributed to the failure to sustain the new strategic plan to ensure the safety of the Columbia crew. 

WHAT YOU THINK OF Patrick RESPONSE : I was in the first grade watching the challenger launch on a small tv set wheeled into our classroom. There was such a sense of patriotism at the time. I remember the explosion quite well but never understanding what was going on. There were teachers running in out of classrooms and crying. It wasn't again until the fourth grade that I was given an assignment to do a research paper on just something small for my social studies class concerning current events. It was around the time of the coming anniversary so I chose that to better understand what I was watching at the time. I covered the event and not the cause. I did another paper in high school on Christa McAuliffe whom was one of the astronauts on board. For my English 101 paper freshman year of college I did an extensive paper on the just what the article covered was appalled at how much drama entailed to even get that far for an approval for launch after so many people said it wasn't safe. In another research assignment I did a paper on Ronald Reagen and covered his speech on the disaster as one of the highlights of his presidency. In hindsight I see the tragedy as genius minds with childlike temper tantrums and God complex tendencies who cost the lives of the astronauts on board. Sure NASA and its contractors promised to play nice in the sandbox and a management committee was created to acknowledge and investigate possible mission and life threatening events in the future. But evidently as in most cases just like this after some years those egos rose again in the minds of new engineers and scientists who overlooked a small piece of foam insulation being a potential hazard and sent another shuttle with astronauts on a mission they would not return from in 2003. With scientists so eager to see their work in motion I feel that they overlook too often hazard potentials and rush into things with very unrealistic project times. A very unfortunate reality.