Book Review-US voting

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Week 3

Rational and Expressive Choice

Rational Choice Theory and the Rational Voter Model (P = B > C; or Participation or voter choice (P) = perceived benefits of participation or choice (B) > perceived costs of participation or choice (C)) became popular in the 1970s. Pursuant to this theory and model, voters decide whether to vote and which candidate to vote for on some rational basis, usually on the basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits. The model lends itself more than others to predicting what effects changes in external conditions will have on the vote. A major contribution of the model was to emphasize the role of issues in voter choice.

The paradox of participation calls into question this theoretical perspective. The paradox theorizes that the rational individual will not waste resources by bearing the costs of taking part in the voting process but will instead take a free ride on the efforts of others. This is known as the free rider problem. The problem is especially acute when the individual does not perceive their vote as being decisive to the election outcome.

Some have used rational choice theory to argue that those in a high socio-economic class would be less active “because they have the education and intellectual sophistication to comprehend the free-rider problem and because their high salaries raise the opportunity cost of participation” (Verba 1995, 284). The facts however suggest this hypothesis is false. In fact, strong empirical evidence demonstrates that those in a high socio-economic class are actually the most likely to be active.

Other rational choice proponents, including Anthony Downs, have argued that lower information and transaction costs for the well educated imply that it is actually easier for them to participate in politics. Verba (1995) notes “[t]his approach has the virtue of fitting the facts but seems somewhat post hoc” (284).

Overall, rational choice theory must be praised for its theoretical elegance. But, the theory has done a poor job of predicting political participation. More specifically, the theory has failed to predict how much political activity and who will take part.

Some have argued that expressive choice theory can provide a more compelling explanation of voter behavior. According to Schuessler in A Logic of Expressive Choice (2000), individuals do not necessarily participate in collective action in order to produce outcomes but instead often do so in order to express who they are by attaching themselves to such outcomes.

Because under Schuessler’s perspective the value of participation emerges not from the outcome but from the process of participation itself, the free-rider problem is no longer a concern. Participation therefore is not a form of investment but rather a form of consumption. Schuessler wrote, “Consumption benefits are inextricably tied to expression: the sports fan’s expression of team support is required for him to enjoy his participation. Similarly, participation in politics, under a consumption-benefit regime, is inextricably tied to the expression of partnership, or the expression of preference toward one of the candidates” (46) (emphasis in original). So while participation was often seen as a cost under the rational choice perspectives, expressive choice theorists see participation as a huge benefit logically driving the individual voter when making voting choices.

Mobilization

Mobilization is the process by which candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate. Two types of mobilization: (1) Directly – leaders mobilize people directly when they contact citizens personally and encourage them to take action and (2) Indirectly – leaders mobilize people indirectly when they contact citizens through mutual associates (family, friends, neighbors or colleagues).

Political leaders do not try to mobilize everyone, and not all the time. For maximum effect, they target their efforts on particular people, and they time them for particular occasions. When targeting, political leaders are (1) more likely to mobilize people they already know; (2) more likely to mobilize people who are centrally positioned in social networks; (3) more likely to mobilize people whose actions are most effective at producing political outcomes; and (4) more likely to mobilize people who are likely to respond by participating. Thus, political leaders are more likely to mobilize (1) people who are employed, especially in large workplaces; (2) people who belong to associations; (3) leaders of organizations, businesses and local government; and (4) the wealthy, educated and partisan. Timing becomes critical when we consider that (1) people participate more when salient issues top the agenda; (2) people participate more when other concerns do not demand their attentions; (3) people participate more when important decisions are pending; (4) people participate when outcomes hang in the balance; and (5) people participate more when issues come before legislatures rather than before bureaucracies and courts.

Social Capital

Social capital is the features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Putnam (2000) in his famous work Bowling Alone advances a theory of social capital that presumes that generally speaking the more we connect with others the more we trust them. Social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated. Significantly, education is the strongest correlate of civic engagement. However education has increased with time but yet, civic engagement has declined.

Putnam (2000) examined a number of potential factors to explain the decline in social capital, social trust and civic engagement. These factors included pressure of time and money; mobilization and suburbanization; the changing role of woman; marriage and family; the rise of the welfare state; the race and civil rights revolutions; age; and television. Putnam concluded that television and generational effects are the most likely culprits to explain the decline.

Life-cycle effects are differences attributable to a stage of life. Period effects affect all people who live in a given era. With generational effects individuals do not change, but society does; like life cycle effects, generational effects show up as disparities among age groups at a single point in time, but like period effects they produce real social change.

Citizen Engagement

Scholars debate whether the general decline in civic participation since the 1960s represents a disengagement from political activity, including voting. Niemi et al. (2010) note that academics have become concerned about the decline in voter turnout and other forms of political participation. Signs of disengagement appeared in the 1960s, and at a time when trust in the American government lessened. Disengagement was also observed in other nations (2010).

Moreover, political knowledge also appears to be declining. The quality of news coverage has worsened. The development of many specialized cable channels and web sites gives individuals the ability to either fully pay attention to politics or avoid it entirely. It is expected that these developments will widen the knowledge gaps between those who regularly follow political news and those who merely use new technology for entertainment (Niemi et al. 2010).

As noted above, Putnam concluded that the observed decline was “generational in nature” (Niemi et al. 2010, 23). For example, it was observed that the decline in participation and political knowledge is especially acute in young people (2010).

Niemi et al. (2010) also acknowledge that other academics see disengagement as a myth. These scholars agree that cable channels and the internet are replacing network television as the primary news source. But, they also argue a change in values has occurred, which young people were eager to adopt. Prior to the 1960s, the World War II generation placed an emphasis on civic duty. Later generations focused instead on engagement, which emphasizes individual autonomy and non-electoral behavior such as community service and directly helping others (2010). “These changes in modes of communication, news dissemination, and values have naturally caused changes in some kinds of political behavior” (2010, 30).

Niemi et al. (2010) also make an important point about the difference in calculating voter turnout. Historically, the base was calculated using the VAP (voting age population). Since the 1970s, however, many individuals in the voting age population have become ineligible to vote, including large numbers of legal or illegal non-citizens and felons or ex-felons who were denied the voting franchise by state laws. A more accurate measure appears to be the VEP (voting eligible population), which actually shows that after 1972, the decline in voting turnout was much smaller than previously observed (2010). A challenge with using the VEP, however, is that each state’s laws must be taken into account so as to capture the most accurate picture of the voting eligible population.

Putnam (2000) acknowledged that it was too early to tell the true impact of the internet on social capital and citizen engagement. Even if we accepted the arguments from the academics that believe disengagement is a myth, the quality of the experience is ultimately very important to political participation. The time spent viewing cable channel news and web sites is increasingly becoming an individual activity. This contemporary experience contrasts with the pre-1960s experience of families listening to the radio together and individuals enjoying face-to-face bridge games where they would discuss the issues of the day collectively (2000). As Putnam (2000) states, “More and more of our time and money are spent on goods and services consumed individually, rather than those consumed collectively” (245).

Civic engagement is subject to criticism. Some scholars have argued: (1) the lack of involvement may signal widespread satisfaction with the status quo rather than a crisis of democracy; (2) participation sparks feelings of powerlessness and frustration; (3) citizen participation may encourage unwise decisions (due to lack of expertise); and (4) highly engaged majorities may repress minorities and produce other injustices. In response, others have argued: (1) there has never been non-self-interested elites who could be trusted to advance the common good; (2) those who are active do a poor job of representing the interests of the inactive; (3) through institutional design, it may be possible to reconcile tensions between just and good government and enhanced participation; (4) civic debate is the best way to discern the truth; and (5) higher turnouts produce electorates less dominated by extremes.

Regardless of one’s position with respect to civic engagement, most agree political participation in the United States is dangerously low. I do not argue that extremely high rates of participation must be achieved, but when government legitimacy is perceived as low and indifference to government and collective life too common, then increased engagement is needed. We must remember that the amount, quality and distribution of political and civic engagement are mostly the product of our political choices.

Youth Participation

Regardless of whether youth participate as much as older individuals, the nature of their participation is clearly different. Instead of traditional political activity such as working for a campaign and voting, youth are engaging in activities such as boycotting and protesting (Niemi et al. 2010). However the quality of these political activities may not yield the same benefit to the newer generations that more traditional political activity had for previous generations.

Verba et al.’s work only deepens the concern. Verba et al. (1995) argue that resources such as time, money and skills are required for political participation. The origins of such resources were traced back to the involvement of individuals in major social institutions such as the family, school, workplace, voluntary associations and religious institutions (1995). “Socially structured circumstances and the constrained choices affect the stockpile of time, money and civic skills available for politics” (271). If individuals choose to engage in activities either alone or in non-traditional organizations and groups, then they may not have the same quality of access to the resources that are necessary for effective political engagement.

Newer generations may prefer to engage in contemporary forms of non-electoral political activity, choosing not to vote. But, evidence exists that government rewards those who vote (Griffin and Newman 2005). Elections can be “successful in refocusing public officials’ attention to the electorate’s desires” (Bennett and Resnick 1990, 800).

If decline in voting continues, even prolonged slight declines using a VEP measure, a shift in the voting model may be warranted so as to better fit this important democratic activity to the non-traditional paradigm embraced by newer generations. Compulsory voting or voting via a secure internet platform or a platform provided by another technology may eventually be an essential change (Niemi et al. 2010). Additional research on the quality of contemporary participation may help inform our electoral policy options.

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