U.S. Intervention in 1965 Indonesia
Most of what is written about the relations between Indonesia and the United States after 1965 is to discuss whether or not the U.S. was complicit in the coup. The question of whether or not the United States was directly involved in the September 30th movement is very vexed and heavily debated among scholars. There are many who claim that the U.S. was directly involved in the coup, while others claim they were not involved at all. Jaechun Kim in “U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences” (2002) argues that “[t]he U.S. had been far more than just an innocent bystander to the evolving course of events in Indonesia” (75). H.W. Brands, however, in “The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn’t Topple Sukarno” (1989) makes the conclusion that Sukarno’s fall from power was not the responsibility of the United States, and neither are the deaths of the PKI members (808). Experts were only able to make tentative conclusions not only because there was an insufficient number of credible evidence and documentation on the event, but also because the evidence that were available aligned with Suharto’s narrative of the coup and was widely accepted by the West.
The narrative of the Suharto regime was reflected in the 300-page CIA report written by Helen Louise Hunter published in 1968, which insisted that the September 30th movement was an inevitable reaction of those not involved in the PKI. Major General Suharto—who would eventually become Indonesia’s second president—insists that “the September 30th movement was a devious conspiracy by the PKI to seize state power and murder all of its enemies” (Roosa et al). The Indonesian army’s anti-communist propaganda included accounts of how the the PKI had abducted the army officers, tortured, mutilated, and danced around their dead bodies. Official autopsies of the victim’s bodies later on showed no signs of torture, army media such as Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudha still expressed the propaganda created by the army. David Easter argues in his work “Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966” (2005) that because both the narrative provided by the Indonesian army and the Western propaganda relayed the same message, it is difficult to separate between the two (69). U.S. officials had always denied Washington’s involvement and kept avoiding questions regarding U.S. covert operations in Indonesia prior to the coup, while radio programs in the United States spread the anti-PKI propaganda produced by the Indonesian army. The information portrayed by western sources served as a confirmation for the information relayed to the Indonesian people by local media outlets. David Easter explained in his work that the ultimate goal of the propaganda was to justify killing the communists.
In order to justify the killings, most of the official evidence which are in the form of interrogation reports were obtained through means of torture. John Roosa claims in “The Truths of Torture: Victims’ Memories and States Histories in Indonesia” (2008) that much of the evidence attained were generated by members of the Indonesian military who interrogated the PKI members (43). From the beginning of October 1965 the army detained around one million Indonesian civilians who were suspected to be members of the communist party, or anyone who were suspected to have a connection with the members. In hopes of justifying what Suharto’s troops were doing, the fabrications from the torturing procedures became official evidence. The anti-PKI propaganda established by the army was so successful, even army officers who were executing the tortures gradually had difficulties in differentiating between accurate intelligence with their propaganda. The statements made by the victims could not be trusted and the—thus, the events of October 1965 were poorly understood.
Since then, partially declassified CIA files have shed new light on the presence of The United States in Indonesia prior to the coup. The key to learning more about the coup and the genocide rests within the participation of the United States. Although it is not yet known whether or not The U.S. had a direct planning in the coup, the evidence available shows the significant effects of their intervention in Indonesia. In Bradley Simpson’s “The United States and the 1965-1966 Mass Murders in Indonesia” (2015), he claims that “declassification of just a fraction of the CIA’s records…reveal that the Johnson administration was a direct and willing accomplice to one of the great bloodbaths of twentieth-century history” (46). Partial declassification of files makes it possible to evaluate with greater precision the role of the United States in what the CIA refer to as “one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century.” Although this evidence does not assert the United States a mastermind of the coup, this shows the long-running interest the U.S. had in Indonesia. Rather than naming the United States as the mastermind of the coup, declassified CIA files and evidence on covert actions provide a better understanding of the massacres as well as the presence of the United States in Indonesia as the result. Through analyzing the relationship shared by the U.S. and Indonesia during Sukarno’s time as president, shows how beneficial the overthrow of Sukarno was for the interests of the United States.
Indonesia is strategically situated between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and had been seen as an important country in South East Asia. As Kai M. Thaler quoted in “U.S. Action and Inaction in the Massacre of Communists and Alleged Communists in Indonesia” that the United States was afraid of losing “100 million people, vast potential resources, and a strategically important chain of islands” to communist forces. Indonesia’s location was important to the U.S. due to the fact that U.S. naval power and oil supply goes through Indonesia’s seas. Jaechun Kim points out that protecting Indonesia from communist or Soviet influences was important for U.S. interests in terms of security (64). If Indonesia were to be influenced by communist powers, oil could not be delivered through Indonesia for the interests of the United States and its allies. Furthermore, U.S. business interests were also at stakes. The abundant amount of natural resources possessed by Indonesia had attracted the interests of United States businesses. Kim points out that by the end of WWII, large U.S. corporations have made large-scale investments in Indonesia. However, protecting investments in Indonesia became increasingly difficult due to disagreements between Sukarno’s policies and the policies of the West.
The independent and nationalistic policies Sukarno had adopted in Indonesia—which includes Sukarno’s vision of a foreign-capital-free Indonesia—proved to be an obstacle for U.S. business interests. Sukarno’s reputation in the West became even more deteriorated due to his hostility towards foreign business ventures in Indonesia, which he vocally expressed often during his presidency. Sukarno’s declarations such as “go to hell with your aid” goes to show the tensions that existed between the two countries during that time. Prior to the coup, Sukarno intended to nationalize two U.S. oil companies—Caltex and Stanvac—which were located in the island of Sumatra. Sukarno’s intentions of eradicating Dutch colonialism from Indonesia by means of rewriting laws regarding the exploitation of Indonesia’s natural resources were also seen as an obstacle to U.S. business investments. Sukarno also did not look fondly upon the intentions that come with the economic assistance given by the United States. Sukarno claims that “America tolerates underdeveloped Asian countries for two reasons. One, we're a good market. We pay back with interest. And two, she worries we'll turn communist. She tries to buy our loyalties” (Factsanddetails.com). His disapproval of the strings-attached aspect that comes with aid coming the United States is often shown in his speeches. As a result, Sukarno’s views on western imperialism strengthened to western forces the notion that he was eventually leaning more towards the PKI. As Tan Swie Ling claimed in his interview with Intan Suwandi, that “obviously the reason [for the United States’ involvement] was economic, with human beings sacrificed on the altar” (2015). The risk of Indonesia overtaken by left-wing forces and the safety of U.S. commercial investments is what had motivated the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations to take covert actions toward Indonesia.
U.S. efforts to overthrow Sukarno began during Eishenhower’s administration from as early as 1955. Peter Dale Scott in “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967” (1985) argues that one of the factors contributing to what happened in 1965 was due to the millions of dollars the CIA had given in support of the Masjumi party (246). The Eisenhower administration during the Indonesian general election campaign in 1955 had decided to support PKI’s opposing party—the Masjumi party in the hopes of overthrowing Sukarno. When the support of the right-wing party did not go as expected, the Eisenhower administration reverted to military aid by supporting anti-PKI forces with military equipment. When this effort to overthrow Sukarno also failed, it only gave Sukarno the confirmation of The U.S. involvement in the rebellion—thus, the relationship between the two countries soured.
For a brief moment during the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the relationship between the two countries had seem to brighten. Jaechun Kim explained that unlike his predecessor, the Kennedy used economic and military aid in an effort to influence Indonesia through a well-kept relationship. Once the relationship began to deteriorate once again, covert operations were taken in Indonesia until the Kennedy administration was replaced with the Johnson administration. During the Johnson administration, the covert actions in Indonesia continued with greater intensity. Unlike the Kennedy administration who increased aid to Sukarno and the army, the Johnson administration decreased it. Scott explains that “the gradual cutoff of all economic aid to Indonesia in the years 1962-65 was accompanied by a shift in a military aid to friendly elements in the Indonesian Army” (253). The decrease of economic aid was also accompanied by the increase of military aid from $39.5 million in four years from $28.3 million in the thirteen years prior. Moreover, the United States government invested $5 million in training around 2,100 people from the Indonesian army in the U.S.
On March 1966, Suharto has officially replaced Sukarno and became Indonesia’s second president. Unlike Sukarno who believed in adopting nationalist and anti-imperialist policies as a means of economic self-sufficiency, Suharto’s administration believed that their long-term economic growth would be made possible through the help of foreign aid. The replacement of Sukarno as the president was also accompanied by stream of foreign aid coming into Indonesia. Shipments of goods such as rice and clothes resulted in the lowering of prices was made to make the Indonesian people believe Suharto’s presidency was an improvement from Sukarno’s. During Suharto’s presidency $2 billion were invested in Indonesia’s oil industries by U.S. companies, which accounted for 90 percent of the amount produced by Indonesia. unlike his predecessor, Suharto did not look to the Soviet Union or other communist forces to attain financial support. Suharto turned to Western forces such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for support.
Alongside the help obtained from Western forces, Indonesia’s revenues from oil and gas exports when their prices were high encouraged the country to take out loans to further develop the country. The momentum of economic growth in Indonesia ended with the Asian economic crisis and the capital flight that happened in 1997. Falling oil prices caused Indonesia to allocate large sums of foreign debt from foreign institutions. John Roosa and Joseph Nevins in “The Mass Killings in Indonesia” (2005) claim that “[t]he Suharto regime lived by foreign capital and died by foreign capital.” Even after selling Indonesia’s natural resources to the western world, the amounts needed to be paid on foreign debt amounted to a large sum that took over much of the government’s budget. Soon after, Indonesia began to import goods such as sugar, rice, and soybeans—that could be produced in Indonesia, and the primary occupation for villagers are working as migrant workers. As a result, Indonesia became increasingly dependent on foreign aid.
It is difficult to determine who the masterminds were and whether or not the involvement of the United States was ultimately helpful for Indonesia. As Peter Dale Scott claims, it would be foolish to blame on only one group involved—the U.S., the Indonesian military, or Sukarno and the PKI. Each group involved in some way contributed to what had happened in 1965, no one was completely blameless or had all the control in the events. Although evidence of the U.S. involvement in Indonesia has only been partially declassified—and it is still not known to what extent they provided assistance to the Indonesian Army—the evidence that is available prove that the U.S. provided an important, if not secondary role. It could also be assumed that the motives that drove the United States was due to its business and commercial interests of the private investments made in Indonesia. The covert action done by the U.S. during that critical time aligned with their interests they had at stake, and those interests are ultimately reflected on the amount of aid and U.S. business interests present during Suharto’s presidency. Since the perpetrators of the events which unfolded in 1965 were never condemned, Suharto and the new order in the upcoming years engaged in brutal mass-killings in East Timor and West Papua.
Works Cited
Brands, H. W. "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno." The Journal of American History, vol. 76, no. 3, Dec. 1989, pp. 785-808. JSTOR, doi:10.2307/2936421. Accessed 16 Oct. 2016.
Easter, David. "‘Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling’: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965–March 1966." Cold War History, vol. 5, no. 1, 16 Aug. 2006, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1468274042000283144?tab=permissions&scroll=top. Accessed 16 Oct. 2016.
Hays, Jeffrey. "Indonesia under Suharto." Facts and Details, 2008, factsanddetails.com/indonesia/History_and_Religion/sub6_1c/entry-3960.html. Accessed 13 Nov. 2016.
Kadane, Kathy. "Ex-agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians." Namebase, 1990, www.namebase.net/kadane.html. Accessed 13 Nov. 2016.
Kim, Jaechun. "U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences." Journal of International and Area Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, Dec. 2002, pp. 63-85. ProQuest, www.shoreline.edu:2048/login?url=http://www.shoreline.edu:2360/docview/223820001?accountid=1164. Accessed 16 Oct. 2016.
Roosa, John, and Joseph Nevins. "The Mass Killings in Indonesia." CounterPunch, edited by Jeffrey St. Clair, Nov. 2005, www.counterpunch.org/2005/11/05/the-mass-killings-in-indonesia/. Accessed 5 Nov. 2016.
Scott, Peter Dale. "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967." Pacific Affairs, vol. 58, no. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 239-64. JSTOR, doi:10.2307/2758262. Accessed 16 Oct. 2016.
Simpson, Bradley. "The United States and the 1965-1966 Mass Murders in Indonesia." Monthly Review Press, vol. 67, no. 7, Dec. 2015, pp. 31-49. ProQuest, www.shoreline.edu:2048/login?url=http://www.shoreline.edu:2360/docview/1744761662?accountid=1164. Accessed 13 Oct. 2016.
Suwandi, Intan. "No Reconciliation without Truth: An Interview with Tan Swie Ling on the 1965 Mass Killings in Indonesia." Monthly Review, vol. 67, no. 7, Dec. 2015, pp. 14-30. ProQuest, www.shoreline.edu:2048/login?url=http://www.shoreline.edu:2360/docview/1744761675?accountid=1164. Accessed 16 Oct. 2016.
Thaler, Kai M. "U.S. Action and Inaction in the Massacre of Communists and Alleged Communists in Indonesia." Harvard University, scholar.harvard.edu/files/kaithaler/files/us_action_and_inaction_in_indonesia_massacres_2.pdf?m=1446331795. Accessed 13 Nov. 2016.