Politics-US voting rights and rules

What We Know about Voter-ID Laws, Registration, and Turnout Marjorie Randon Hershey, Indiana university

urning out to vote is the most common and important act citizens take in a democracy," John Aldrich writes (1993, 246),"and, therefore, is one of the most important behaviors for scholars of dem-

ocratic politics to understand." Turnout matters at the com- munity as well as the individual level; the larger a county's voter turnout, for instance, the more discretionary federal resources it is likely to receive per capita (Martin zoo3). "The blunt truth," according to V. O. Key U9+9, 527), "is that poli- ticians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote."

Scholars' understanding ofturnout has been shaped by the economic model: people are more likely to vote if the benefits they.expect to receive from voting (their expected utility) are greatil than the costs (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). A great deal ofresearch shows that voter tumout declines as the costs ofvoting increase, and that even small increases in cost may make a real difference in turnout rates. But we know much less about some of the more specific and complex questions about turnout: what particular costs ofvoting affect the turnout ofwhat types ofindividuals, and under what con- ditions? The answers can lead to useful hypotheses about the impact of the Indiana voter-ID requirement recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Cowt (Crawford v. Marion County Elec- tion Boail) and other voting rules likely to be passed by state legislatures in the near future.

The collective problem of low turnout would be mitigated ifthose who go to the polls are highiy representative ofthose who don't. The predominant view, however, is that the costs of voting fall more heavily on some subgroups than on others and therefore reduce the voter turnout ofthose groups dispro- portionateiy (see Highton zoo4, 5o8). Most of this research focuses on race and socioeconomic status (SES), but the bur- den ofadded costs could also disproportionately affect some ethnic, language, and age groups as well as Americans with disabiiities and the residentially mobile.

WHAT COSTS OF VOTING HAVE BEEN RESEARCHED?

Registering to Vote

Among the costs of voting, the greatest attention has been paid to the fact that although in many other democracies cit- izens' names are automatically placed on the voting rolls by the government, most American states require voters to pay this cost themselves by visiting a registration site prior to the election. The most common finding here is that stricter regis- tration rules correlate with lower turnout, but that reforms

designed to ease the process do not necessarily increase turn- out substantially.

ln ry78 Rosenstone and Wolfinger reported that an early closing date for registration had the most powerful effect on turnout. They estimate that if the closing date for registration were eliminated, turnout would increase by 6.17.. Other changes-notably, in the number of hours registration sites stayed open-would increase the impact of registration to 97.. However, an electorate expanded by liberalizing these rules would not look much different from the one they currently observed. Rosenstone and Hansen (zoo3, zo6) show that voter turnout in the North dropped 17o/"betweet 1896 and 1916 as registration laws were being instituted in the states. But other changes taking place at this time couid have affected turnout levels as wel1. So to gain more purchase on the causal relation- ships involved, researchers have sought circumstances in which changes in registration requirements could be studied in a longitudinal and quasi-experimental manner.

Most of these over-time analyses support Wolfinger and Rosenstone's findings, though some conclude that the size of the impact was overstated fMitchell and Wlezien 1995). One effort has been to explore state laws similar to those of the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Knack (1995) shows that states adopting "active" motor-voter laws, in which driver's license agency employees take the initiative to ask clients if they'd like to register to vote, or use a form combin- ing driver's licensing with voter registration, had almost a 4o/o turnout increase relative to states with no such program. There was little or no increase in states where agencies simply made registration materials available. Active by-mail registration (in which registrants need not have their forms witnessed or nota- rized) also had some efFect, but allowing prospective voters to register at public agencies had no significant impact on turnout.

Highton and Wolfinger (1998) flnd a turnout increase of 4.7't, (relative to other states) during the four years after Col- orado adopted a registration law that most closely resembled the NVRA; the biggest impact was on young people and recent movers. They also examine Election Day Registration (EDRJ, which, like active motor-voter 1aws, eliminates the cost of a second trip, in this case by combining registration and vot- ing.' They estimate that one-trip voting would increase turn- out by 8.7% compared with a 3o-day closing date, again especially among the young and the residentially mobile. Other studies of EDR have confirmed increases in the range of 3-9"t (Fenster 1994; Knack zoor).

Ansolabehere and Konisky (zoo6) make use of the natural "experiment" that occurred when NewYork, in 1965, and Ohio, in t977, imposed registration requirements. By comparing

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Symposium: Voter-ID fssues in Politics anil Political Science

turnout in counties that did not have registration rules until the state imposed them with turnout in counties in the same state where registration had been imposed or voluntarily adopted earlier, they found that requiring registration reduced turnout by 7"t in the subsequent election and by 3-5% in the long term. Their over-time analysis shows a smaller effect than does their cross-sectional analysis. But even a drop of 3-5%, projected to the voting-age population, is not trivial.

Powell (1986) concludes that in the 197os, the need for U.S. citizens to take the initiative to register decreased American voter turnout by $% compared with other Western democra- cies. Highton (zoo4,5tt) contends, however, that the liberal- ization of state registration rules has accomplished as much as it could. He points out that even with no registration require- ment, North Dakota's zoo4 turnout rate was just 7z% of voting- age citizens. Thus, additional costs ofvoting must be taken into account.

Other Institutional Requirements Many other institutional costs of voting have been eiiminated by court action and legislation. Filer, Kenny, and Morton (r99r) show that poll.taxes, which 1iterally raised the cost ofvoting, significantly depressed turnout over time, especially in coun- ties with a higher proportion of poor people. Literacy tests, outlawed by the Voting Rights Act in t97o,were less strongly related to turnout. And Rosenstone and Wolfinger OszB, z+) did not find residency requirements-how long one must live in a district before voting-to have a sizable effect on turnout, at least by ry72.

Some institutional rules remain. States vary as to whether convicted felons may vote. Manza and Uggen Qoo+, +g+-gS) estimate that such laws prevented 4.7 million people from vot- ing in zooo. These laws affect voter turnout because of the high rate of incarceration in the U.S., especially among black males. The impact of other types of costs, such as information costs, convenience ofthe polling place, and state laws giving workers paid or unpaid time offto vote, are discussed in Her- shey (zoo8).

Costs lmposed by Voter-tD Laws

States have imposed several different types ofvoter-ID require- ments since the passage of the Help AmericaVote Act (HAVA) in zooz: having to state or sign one's name at the polls, having one's signature matched with the signature on fi1e with the local election board, and/or providing an identification (a driver's license, student or military ID, voter registration card, paycheck, or utility bill), with or without a photo. Arizona requires proofofcitizenship in order to vote, and in zoo8 the Missouri legislature nearly permitted the requirement that a prospective voter present a passport, original birth certificate, or naturalization papers as proofofcitizenship when register- ing to vote.

To date, Indiana's is the most demanding voter-ID law Since zoo6, a1l registered voters must provide a document issued by the U.S. governmenr or rhe Srate of Indiana with a photo of the individual, with an expiration date, and that "con- forms to" the name on the voter-registration record. Anyone

without such identification can be given a provisional ballot, which will be counted only if the voter brings the required photo ID to the county election board or the circuit court clerk within ro days after the election or executes an affidavit of indigence or religious objection to being photographed.

This poses no additional costs to registrants with a current Indiana driver's license, state ID card, passport, or other appro- priate ID. For those who lack the required ID, county bureaus of motor vehicles will provide a free ID card for voring pur- poses to those who bring four ofa group of"primary and sec- ondary" documents that could include an authenricated birth certificate, certificate of citizenship, or military ID or pass- port, but must also include proof of Social Security number and Indiana residency. Several ofthese documents cost money, time, in{ormation, and transportation to locations other than where the photo ID is obtained. The burden rises because most people who need this documentation do so because they lack a driver's license, and public transportation is not available in some counties.

Few studies have examined the impact of voter-ID laws. AIvarez, Bailey, and Katz (zoo8) show that in aggregate data, voter-ID laws had no significant impact on turnout during zooo*zoo6. Mycoff, Wagner, and Wllson (zoo7) concur, and Vercellotti and Anderson (zoo6) find only a modesr correla- tion in zoo4 between two voter-ID requirements-a signature match and a non-photo ID-and statewide tumout, relative to requiring only that voters state their names at the polls. Berin- sky (zoo5) argues that these null findings should be expected; the more politically involved are more likely to learn abour voter-ID rules and also more likely to vote.

But researchers differ in their findings at the individual 1evel. Using CPS data, A7varcz,Bailey, and Katz (zoo8) show that stricter rules-the combination of having to present an ID and a signature match, and the photo-ID requirement-did depress the turnout ofregistered voters relative to the require- ment of stating one's name at the po1ls. Mycoff, Wagner, and Wilson (zoo7), with a smaller N, did not find an impact. Ver- cellotti and Anderson, in a cross-sectional study, showed that the signature, non-photo ID, and photo-ID rules were associ- ated with lower voter turnout it zoo4, in the range of 3 to 4"t .

DO THESH COSTS DIFFERENTI"{LLY AFFECT SUBGROUPS IN THE POPULATION?

Changes in public policy, influenced by voter parriciparion, might well produce substantial marginal gains for members ofdisadvantaged groups. So the fact that disadvantaged groups generally turn out to vote at lower rates than more advan- taged groups is often attributed to the assumption that the costs of voting fall more heavily on the members of disadvan- taged groups (see Dornms ry57, 265, 274).

In examining the effects ofvarious costs ofvoting on par- ticular groups, this article will supplement the voter-ID stud- ies with the much larger literature on registration rules. Although the act ofregistering differs from the act ofvoting in several important ways (Timpone r99B), registering to vote resembles the behavior required of those who lack the speci- fied voter ID. Both registering and obtaining documents man- dated by some voter-ID laws must take place in advance of

88 PS . January zoog

Election Day, when campaign stimuli are not as intense, and at a location different from the polling place. Both are bureau-

cratic procedures, lacking the partisan content ofthe vote and lts direct relationship to the election outcome. Both require spending time to find out what documents are needed and where and when registration (or getting documents) takes place. This information is likely to be more obscure than is information about voting on Election Day. Both involve oppor-

tunities forgone as well as the need for transportation to the registration or documentation site. The infrastructure to mobi-

lize citizens to register or to obtain documentation may be less well developed than election get-out-the-vote drives. These

are reasons to make use ofthe extensive research on the reg- istration requirement, at least to generate hypotheses about the impact ofvoter ID on various subgroups.

Lower-Income and Less-Educated Persons

Researchers argue that more restrictive registration rules dis-

proportionately reduce the turnout oflow-SES people (Jack-

son, Brown, and Wright ryg8, z68; Avery and Peffley zoo5), and that more education and income help overcome the costs

of voting (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Even when Nagler (r99r) re-estimated the Rosenstone and Wolfinger model with 1978 and r9B4 CPS data to corect for a mis- estimatiorl;he still finds that earlier closing dates lowered turn-

out among the least educated. Yet making it easier to register doesn't necessarily increase

low-SES people's turnout. Highton andWolfinger (r998, 84-85)

showed that Colorado's active motor-voter law had the great- est effect on those with moderate education levels; those with the least education were uniikely to vote even if costs were reduced. Karp and Banducci (zooo) found that Oregon's use of voting only by mail increased turnout more among whites, higher-SES individuals, and olderpeople. And Knack andWhite (zooo) showed that EDR 1ed to a rise in turnout among young and residentially mobile people but not significantly among lower-SES persons (see also Brians and Grofm ar':,99g).Labor- union strength seems to increase participation slightiy more among high- and moderate-income than low-income people (Leighley and Nagler zooT). Those with the lowest SES have multiple barriers to tulTrout, whereas those with moderate SE S

leve1s, who may feel more connected to politics, might be more

responsive to reductions in the costs ofvoting. Research conflrms that stricter voter-ID rules also dispro-

portionately reduce the turnout ofthe least educated and those with lowest incomes. Vercellotti and Anderson (zoo6) find a stronger relationship between voter-ID requirements and lower

turnout among registered voters with less than a high school education. Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (zoo8, zo) show that the least-educated registrants and those with lower incomes were less likely to vote in states that require a photo ID than in states that require voters only to state or sign their names. And Barreto, Nuflo, and Sanchez (zoo7) report that Indiana registered voters and eiigible non-registrants with incomes under $zo,ooo were much less likely to have the form of ID that the Indiana law requires than were higher-income resi- dents, and less-educated people were somewhat less likely to possess the required photo ID.

Solt (zoo8, 56-58) shows that the more economic inequal- ity in a nation, the less the turnout of all but the wealthiest quintile; the biggest impact was on the poorest quintile. He concludes (58), "One's political engagement .. . is shaped not only by how much money one has, but also by how muchl money everyone else has. Where economic resources are dis-

tributed more evenly, power is distributed more equally, and the resuiting politics encourage relatively poor citizens to take interest and take part" (see also Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1993). A related question involves the impact of economic decline, as opposed to current SES. Rosenstone {p99z,34-41 finds that unemploy,rnent and feeling worse off financially were associated with lower turnout during 1948-1974. F.ad- cliff (t992) reports that decline in real per capita national income depressed turnout, especially among the economi- cally marginal. This is less likely in nations where the full development of the welfare state cushions the effects of eco- nomic decline on the poor.

Presuming that those whose economic situation has deteri- orated might be especially inclined to hold incumbents accountable for poor economic conditions, a finding that these individuals are less likely to vote could undermine demo- cratic responsiveness. However, Arceneaux (zoo3, 7o-7t) reports that those facing economic adversity and who blame the governmentfor their plighf are more likely to vote than are those who do not blame the government. We need to know more about the conditions in which economic decline ener- gizes some individuals or further sensitizes them to the costs ofvoting.

Black Americans and Others of Minority Races and Ethnicities

The story of the relationships among race, ethnicity, and the costs of voting is less clear. A lot of research suggests that when SES and other resource variables (such as free time and facility in English) are controlled, blacks and Latinos are as iikely to vote as whites are (Verba et a7. g93; Jackson zoo3; Cassel zooz). Other studies question this conclusion. Abram-

son and Claggett (1986) used vaiidated votes to show that black respondents were more likeiy to over-report voting than whites, which could lead to a mistaken finding of pariry in turnout rates. Theyfound, as have others (Leighley and Nagler r99za;

ry9zb),that racial differences in turnout remained even when education and region were controlled.

But this racial effect, at least among blacks, seemed to vary by election year (see Leighley and Nagler rygza). Abramson and Ciaggett (1986) suggest that the independent effect of race in 1984 may have been triggered by Jesse Jackson's pres- idential candidacy. The relationship between race or ethnicity and voting costs, then, may be contingent on the stimuli of the election at hand, perhaps by affecting concern about the outcome (Barack Obama's presidential campaign is a case in point) or by prompting group mobilization that reduces the costs of voting for some types of individuals.

Most researchers agree that race and ethnicity can struc- ture the relationship between the costs of voting and turnout, that racial and ethnic groups differ in their access to politi- cally relevant resources, and perhaps even that particular

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Synrposiurn: Voter-ID lssues in Politics anil PoliticaI Science

resources and costs may affect different groups in different ways (see Verba et al. 1993, 458). For insrance, blacks and Latinos are much less likely than Anglo-whites to belong to non-political groups, but about as likely to be church mem- bers, which couid convey political information at 1ow cost. While these skills may be more relevant to political activity beyond voting, they should aiso make it easier to register ro vote and obtaln needed documents. And although blacks were more likely than Anglo-whites to report that someone in church had asked them to vote, Latinos were much less likely to say so (Verba et a7. 1993, +8+-8S). It may be that forces in the black community, such as churches, act to counter the costs of voting to a greater extent than among Latinos. Examining these racial and ethnic differences, however, requires measur- ing a wide range of variables, from command of English and acculturation to native-born status and ethnic identity, and the literature in this area shows little consensus (see, for instance, Shaw, de laGarza, and Lee zooo; Cho 1999;Jackson zoo3).

With respect to voter ID, Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (zoo8) find no evidence that a photo-ID requirement, or requiring a voter ID plus a signature match, affected turnout among black registrants between zooo and zoo6. Vercellotti and Anderson (zoo6) confirm in the aggregate that voter-ID requirements did not disproportionately reduce turnout among blacks, though they did report a relationship in their individual-level data, and to a greater degree among Latinos and Asian Amer- icans. Further, Barreto, Nuflo, and Sanchez (zoo7) found that black registered voters and eligible non-registrants in Indiana were significantly less likely than whites to have a valid, state- issued ID matching the criteria required by the state's law. It could be that when faced with restrictive requirements, blacks in some areas are even more likely to mobilize to vote than whites are.

Thus, any disproportionate effect ofstricter voter-ID rules on blacks may well reflect the fact that blacks tend to be lower in SES (though the fact that the impact is not specifically racial makes it no less real). There are suggestions, however, that there may be real racial differences in the administration of some voter-ID regimes. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall (zoo7, z4-25) flndthat in New Mexico, poll workers enforced voter-ID rules inconsistently. And a 1s-state study (Alvarez et al. zoo8, r7), reports that a much higher proportion ofblack voters said they had been asked for an identification in zooT and in the zoo8 Super Tuesday events than white voters did, regardless

the state's voter-ID rules. In sum, the immense literature on the costs of voting has wn that costs ranging from the registration requirement

to strict voter-ID laws do reduce voter turnout to some degree and that the impact seems to fall disproportionately on the least educated and the least wealthy. There is less evidence, however, that reducingthe costs ofvoting necessarily increases the turnout ofthese groups, probably because advance regis- tration and photo-ID rules are only two of multiple burdens on their likelihood of voting.

f We know litrle about the impact of other costs-rhe acces- fl sibility of poiling places (but see Burmila zoog), changes in I voting systems, and the interactions among various types of *-

costs. And we need to research the impact of these costs on other Iarge groups: people with disabilities, and raciai, ethnic, and language groupings other than black Americans. Research- ers shouid also consider the effects of perceiyed costs; although Alyarez et a1. (zoo8) find relatively shorr waits at the polis in most precincts, media stories about long waits could affect people's willingness to vote, even ifthese stories are inaccu- rate or unusual.

In particular, research would benefit from classi$zing costs of voting according to their specific demands on citizens. One important aspect ofadvance registration, strict voter-ID laws, and laws requiring proof of citizenship, is that those who are unregistered or who lack the specified documents must make a separate trip-on a day other than Election Day, to a place other than the polling place, whose location and open hours wiil need to be learned, to take a bureaucratic step that does not lead directiy to an election outcome. The burden of this extra trip falls most heavily on people with lower education and income, but it would also be likely to affect persons with disabilities and, due to HAVA's requirement of proof of resi- dence for first-time voters, those who have recently moved. Given the importance of turnout to democratic politics, the need for research on the impact ofvoter-ID laws and those requiring proof of citizenship is compelling. I

NOTE

r. One difference between motor-voter laws and EDR, however, is that motor-voter r€gistration puts the individual's name on the list ofregis- tered voters that may be made available to parry organizations and

-other

groups, who could then mobilize the individual to vote. The names ofEDR voters would not become available to these groups until the next campalgn.

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