Final exam！

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Why marriage?

Eswaran, ch 7

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What is marriage?

• A well-written and interesting book: Stephanie Coontz (2005) Marriage, a History: from obedience to intimacy or how love conquered marriage.

• Extended review/summary can be found at

• https://shaunmiller.wordpress.com/2011/02/ 04/book-review-marriage-a-history-from- obedience-to-intimacy-or-how-love- conquered-marriage-by-stephanie-coontz/

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1. Social and private benefits of marriage

• Social?

• Does society as a whole benefit from the institution of marriage? Is social welfare higher when more individuals are married?

• Private?

• Are married individuals better off than singles?

• Are children better off if their parents are married?

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Social benefits of marriage

• 1. crime rates (marriage civilizes males*):

- married men have lower crime rates than otherwise identical single men

- evidence that marriage is causal

- effect strongest among men who marry relatively early in life – relevant peer group changes.

- some theories based on evolutionary biology - one concern raised over current imbalance in marriage market in China

*nature or nurture?

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2. Private benefits of marriage

• Some the same for men and women, some different.

• 1. less alcohol and drug abuse

• - lower for both men and women

• 2. better physical and mental health

Physical: women live longer because income higher

men live longer because take on less risk

Mental: married people happier than singles, in general (married men tend to be happier than married women)

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Basis for marriage I

• Economic view: gains from specialization

• gains come from comparative advantage

• What is the source of comparative advantage?

• 1. if individuals start with identical skills, but there is learning-by doing, then specialization in market and homework is efficient.

• 2. who does what? Any small initial difference will determine this. If childcare is major part of homework, women have comparative advantage: child bearing, breast feeding…that is all it takes.

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Basis for marriage II

• Evolutionary psychology:

• - human infants need continued care, for a relatively long period of time – before and after birth

• - mother provides much of this care; who provides resources to care for mother and young child?

• - father. Who is the father?

• - Easy to identify birth mother; father not so easy.

• - marriage: women and men trade access to resources for paternity certainty

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Marriage forms

• 3 basic types:

• Monogamy: one partner at a time

• Polygamy: more than one partner at a time.

• Serial monogamy: one partner at a time, but divorce and remarriage

• Polygamy has two recognized types:

• polygyny (most common): one man, multiple wives

• polyandry: one woman, multiple husbands

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Frequencies? • Polygyny common in agricultural societies, and not

unknown today (Bountiful, BC is well known Canadian case: http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/02/when- taking-multiple-husbands-makes-sense/272726/

• Commonly thought that polyandry relatively rare – limited to the Tibetan plateau

• Recent research suggests is was much more common, although seldom the dominant cultural form. http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/02/when- taking-multiple-husbands-makes-sense/272726/

• Monogamy increasingly dominant

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Economic rationales for different forms?

• Emergence of polygyny (Becker)

• Emergence of monogamy (Gould, et al, 2008)

• Consider a society where land is the only asset, and it is owned by men.

• Let there be men in this society, and women.

• Case I: , and all men are identical, as are all women

• - this means that payoff if single to each woman is

• - each man owns same amount of land, and has payoff if single =

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mN wN

w mN N

fP

m fP P

• Suppose that output from land can be increased by adding more workers, but the only way for a man to obtain more labour for his land is to marry

• There is diminishing marginal productivity (MP) of workers.

• MP

•

Pf •

•

•

•

• 1 2 3 4 # wives

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C

B

A

D

Marriage market outcome?

• If monogamy,

• 1. not all women marry (recall assumption of fewer men than women)

• 2. competition for husbands drives “bride price” down to Pf

• What is a bride price? Payment by groom, or groom’s family, to bride, or bride’s family

• Essentially: prior to marriage, woman (or girl) would have helped on the land owned by her parents.

• Bride price paid to bride’s parents is compensation for the loss of her labour

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Marriage market outcome if polygyny?

• In example, if there were enough women (relative to men) all men would be willing to have two wives, given bride price = woman’s payoff if single

• Suppose not enough women for this, but still more women than men, this not feasible.

• If polygyny condoned, then some men have two wives and others one.

• Bride price in this market?

• Greater than under monogamy. Why?

• Now there is a shortage of women – price rises to meet demand.

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Welfare under monogamy vs polygyny?

• Women better off under polygyny.

• All men marry

• All women marry, unless they choose to stay single.

• Does this fit with “real world” evidence?

• If not, what is missing here?

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Polygyny with sex ratio = 1.

• Consider: equal numbers of men and women

men own land, the only asset

unequal distribution of land.

Some men can afford more than one wife,

some can afford only one

some may not be able to marry.

Problem? Arising from inequality amongst men

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Why is polyandry less common?

• Uncertainty regarding paternity

- (evolutionary psychology strikes again)

• Fraternal polyandry: brothers marrying one woman.

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Why is monogamy dominant in developed economies? • 1. With development, human capital becomes

important source of income (instead of, say, land).

- Men with more human capital want kids with more human capital – for this, need/want wives with more human capital.

- price in marriage market for women with more human capital rises (relative to women with less)

- Rich educated men have one wife; wealth grows

- Rich uneducated men have > one wife, but wealth does not grow

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Alternative theory

• 1. Societies where monogamy is dominant perform better economically than societies where polygyny is dominant

• - under polygyny, resources devoted to securing (and maintaining) multiple wives

• - some men may not marry – leads to social unrest.

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Transfers between family members at marriage

• 1. Bride price

• (payment from groom, or groom’s family, to bride, or bride’s family)

• 2. Dowry – Wealth woman brings to marriage, provided by

her family

– Depending on society, may remain under her control or may be controlled by the husband

– Examples?

– Round table (King Arthur)

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Dowries as early inheritance

• Consider altruistic parents, with a son and a daughter.

• If tradition/culture says that son inherits property (farm or other business) and son provides for parents when they are older (so marriage is virilocal), what is best way to provide inheritance for both children?

• Ans (Botticini and Siow, 2003): give daughter share of parents’ wealth when she marries, give son remainder when parents die.

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Rationale for this division?

• Before daughter marries, both son and daughter help support parents – work on farm, in home

• After daughter marries, her labour benefits husband’s family.

• If she receives share of parents’ wealth when they die, she benefits from inputs provided by brother between her marriage date and parents’ death.

• Son does not receive full benefits of his labour once parents die; has incentive to reduce labour.

• Giving daughter inheritance early solves incentive problem.

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Issues with dowries?

• Who benefits?

• Current situation (India,…)

• More on this later.

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• http://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/c ulture/ancient-chinese-marriage-customs.htm

• http://www.mahavidya.ca/the-hindu-dowry- system-origins/

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