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Reforming Public Services by Regulation: A Partnership Approach?

Jo Goodship and Stephen Cope University ofPortsmouth

Abstract This article examines the role of regulation in reforming public services in England and Wales. Specifically it analyses the impact of public service- regulation for two important elements of the present Labour Government's modernisation agenda: joined-up government and partnerships. The rhetoric of joined-up government and partnerships is strong in government pronouncements, and embraces not only collaborative working between public sector agencies but also collaborative working between public and private sector agencies in the delivery of public services. Local housing authorities and housing associations have worked togetherfor many years to provide social housing. However, these pioneers of public-private partnerships have been, and continue to be, subject to very different regulatory regimes affecting the way in which they operate. The article argues that more joined-up government not only necessitates partnership- working between policy-makers and service-providers, but also between the key regulatory agencies which oversee the delivery ofpublic services. There are dangers, however, that rivalry between regulatory agencies and regulatory capture may frustrate moves towards joined-up government. Joined-up government, therefore, requires joined-up regulation otherwise so-called "wicked problems" that spread across the joins of government are likely to remain unsolved or at best partially solved.

Introduction This article examines public service-regulation in England and Wales and the implications for the present Labour Government's modernisation agenda, particularly the development of joined-up government (Cabinet Office, 1999). It stems from a research project which compared and contrasted the regulatory regimes of several key public services (including social housing provided by both local authorities and housing associations). The article

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presents our research findings for the social housing sector in which we surveyed and interviewed key actors in a large local housing authority (LHA) and several large housing associations (HAs), all providing housing services within a case study-area. In the last two decades, as the LHA's housing stock had been reduced and the HAs had become the main providers of new social housing within the area, the level of partnership-working between the two agencies had increased. Over this period, however, both had experienced an increase in the level of government-sponsored regulation of their activities. Historically LHAs and HAs had very separate regulatory regimes, despite greater levels of co-operation and joint working between the two deliverers of services within this sector. Both increased regulation and the differences between regulatory regimes have implications for the development of more joined-up delivery of social housing.

As we have argued previously (Cope and Goodship, 1999), the push towards joined-up government is a significant component of the Labour Government's modernisation programme since one of its key aims is to ensure that 'policy making is more joined up and strategic' (Cabinet Office, 1999, p.6). The present Labour Government inherited an increasingly fragmented government machine - organisational and managerial changes introduced since the 1980's placed the focus on narrow agency targets which mitigate against collaboration of agencies towards common goals. The Labour Government's modernisation agenda attempts to redress this fragmentation. At the central level special units, such as the Social Exclusion Unit, have been established with representation from many central government departments in an attempt to coordinate policy-making, while at the local level more joint-working and partnerships have been encouraged (Flynn, 1999). Though not new, the Labour Government's commitment towards greater networking at both the central and local level represents a more explicit focus on partnership as a way of governing (Newman, 2001, p.105), which essentially reflects an emerging paradigm shift, replacing the post-1979 market-based paradigm, which itself supplanted the post-1945 state-hierarchy paradigm of governing.

A critical and perennial problem of governing modern societies is 'governing without government' (Rhodes, 1996). Governance reflects a "'differentiated polity" ... characterised by functional and institutional specialisation and the fragmentation of policies and politics' (Rhodes, 1997, p.7). As a result, the centre (wherever that may be located) is increasingly unable to steer policy made within an increasingly fragmented but interdependent political system because '[i]nterdependence confounds centralisation' (Rhodes, 1997, p.3). In other words, there is too much vertical integration and too little horizontal integration within government, leading to frequent calls to enhance the governing capacity of the centre whether it be in the form of corporate or strategic management, or joined-up or holistic government. The precise details may differ but the general thrust of such reforms invariably remain the same.

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However, the rise of public service-regulation, and variable relations between regulatory agencies, raise important questions about this reform- push for more co-ordinated, coherent and collaborative government. While public service-regulation is often justified to enhance central control of policy-making, empirical research (including our research) suggests that the plethora of regulatory agencies may not ameliorate, and moreover may exacerbate, the problems of governing a 'differentiated polity'. This paper highlights factors which led to the massive increase in public service- regulation over the past two decades, before examining regulation of social housing to analyse how the existence of regulatory agencies further fragments the 'differentiated polity'. It argues that joined-up government requires more partnership-working between regulatory agencies and more joined-up regulation, otherwise so-called "wicked problems" that spread across the joins of government - like social exclusion - are likely to remain unsolved, or at best only partially solved (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; Rittel and Webber, 1973).

The Rise of Public Service-Regulation Public service-regulation involves both "regulation inside government" and "regulation outside government", with regulatory agencies firmly located within the public sector (such as the Audit Commission and the Housing Corporation) shaping the activities of those agencies delivering public services located within the public, private and voluntary sectors (for example, LHAs and HAs). We are, therefore, concerned with regulation inside governance". Governance is both multi-level and multi-sectoral, and is concerned with the management of policy networks to deliver public services (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The existence of policy networks is a reflection of a differentiated polity', comprising 'the complex, multiform maze of institutions ... which resist central direction' (Rhodes, 1997, p.3). Consequently public service-regulation needs to be framed within this context of "governance not government". It is a mechanism by which government seeks to manage governance.

Though public service-regulation is not new, it has become an increasingly significant form of management within governance and, generally, its rise corresponds to the rise of new public management. New public management has been used by government to restructure policy networks, many of which have been traditionally resistant to reform. Its rise can be seen, in part, as an attack on the entrenched and relatively autonomous positions of professionals and bureaucrats within government and can be seen as an 'attempt to refashion public services in such ways that they resemble the private sector' (Hughes et al., 1997, p.299). It rests on the twin doctrines of removing differences between the public and private sectors and of shifting 'methods of doing business in public organisations' away from complying with procedural rules towards 'getting results' (Hood, 1994, p.129). New public management also separates 'steering from rowing'

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(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p.34), leaving the centre to steer while decentralising the delivery of policy to a plethora of rowing agencies that exercise managerial and operational discretion within the limits of policy strategy set by the steering centre. Thus policy strategy is increasingly centralised and policy delivery is increasingly decentralised. Central steering agencies (such as central government departments) increasingly, both directly and indirectly, regulate local rowing agencies (such as LHAs and HAs) by setting policy goals for rowing agencies to achieve, fixing budgets within which rowing agencies must operate, awarding contracts (or quasi- contracts) to competing rowing agencies, and establishing regulatory agencies (such as the Audit Commission and the Housing Corporation) to monitor the performance of rowing agencies. New public management seeks to enhance the capacity of steering agencies to manage rowing agencies within their jurisdiction. The regulation of public services is thus central within new public management. The rise of new public management thus represents a very significant push towards the rise of the regulatory state.

Modelling Public Service-Regulation Using the power-dependence model, we mapped out the aims and resources between key actors within a regulatory regime (Rhodes, 1981) - for example, the sponsor (such as the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR), which largely superseded the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)), the regulator (such as the Audit Commission or the Housing Corporation) and the regulated (such as LHAs or HAs). The key assumption behind this model is interdependence which results in actors exchanging legal, financial, professional and/or political resources in an attempt to achieve their aims. From existing research, and our own research, it is evident that there are different degrees of interdependence within regulatory regimes of policy sectors - and within the social housing sector between the regulatory regimes for LHAs and HAs (Cope and Goodship, 1999; Hughes et al., 1997). The different patterns of interdependence between actors within policy sectors is a key explanatory factor in understanding the different forms of regulatory regimes of public services.

A continuum of regulatory-regime models can be constructed, upon which policy sectors generally can be placed (Cope and Goodship, 1999, p16). At one end of the continuum there is the regulatory-control model (either a sponsor-dominant or regulator-dominant variant) where the sponsors of regulators and/or regulators themselves control the regulated. At the other end there is the regulatory-capture model (regulated-dominant) where the regulated control the sponsors and/or regulated. Between these two ends there are a range of regulatory-bargain models where the sponsors, regulators and regulated influence each other as a result of their interdependence. The degree of interdependence between the sponsors, regulators and regulated affects the extent of collaboration within policy

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sectors. Key explanatory factors are the professional and political power of the regulated, the legal and political power of the regulators, and the political salience of policy sectors (and issues within) for the sponsors of regulation. As a result, moves towards collaboration within policy sectors are highly dependent upon the nature of their regulatory regimes.

Regulating Public Services - The Case of Social Housing As part of our research we examined the regulation of social housing. Social housing refers to the provision of low-cost rented housing by both LHAs and registered social landlords, mainly HAs. There have been very significant changes in social housing policies and provision since the Conservative Government introduced the "right-to-buy" for local authority tenants. Council housing has been increasingly residualised as the sector for those who cannot afford to buy their council properties, and housing associations have become the major providers of new social housing (Atkinson and Durden, 1994; Balchin, 1995; Kemp, 1999; Mullins 1997). The renewed political interest in housing policy generally, and social housing policy in particular, has arisen in large part due to the present Labour Government's commitment to tackle social exclusion in some of the most deprived communities using a more integrated, systematic and joined-up approach to the problem (Franklin and Hilditch, 1999, p.1).

By the mid-1990s the effects of these legislative measures became more fully apparent: rents in the LHA, HA and private sectors rose significantly; increased rents had led to the cost of housing benefit doubling between 1988/89 and 1995/96; local authority capital building programmes had been virtually eliminated, with capital funds being used to renovate existing council stock or loaned to HAs for new build in return for nomination rights; and, council housing had become the preserve of an even narrower and poorer section of the population (Kemp, 1999, pp.129-130). In the run-up to the 1997 general election the Labour Party's housing commitments were limited to the phased release of capital receipts from the sale of council houses, the reinstatement of some rights for homeless people and the introduction of Best Value to replace compulsory competitive tendering. In office the Labour Government's emerging housing policy was aimed towards both the fight against social exclusion and the regeneration of run- down urban housing estates (Kemp, 1999, pp.134-135). This policy may prove problematic, however, given the contemporary diverse patterns of ownership and management of social housing (Franklin and Hilditch, 1999, p. 12), and the somewhat incoherent regulation of social housing providers.

Since 1964 HAs have been subject to the scrutiny of the Housing Corporation, a non- departmental public body sponsored by the DTLR. No such funder-cum-regulator or government inspectorate has existed for LHAs, instead they have received government funding for housing direct from the DTLR, through the annual Housing Investment Programme (HIP), and have been audited by the Audit Commission to ensure that financial probity and

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value-for-money are being achieved. The introduction, by the Labour Government, of Best Value to public services, including social housing, will change the regulatory picture for both LHAs and HAs. Central government provided the statutory framework for Best Value which applies to all local authority services, and the Best Value in Housing Framework is underpinned by a significantly stronger regulatory regime under the auspices of the Audit Commission, embracing, for the first time, a Housing Inspectorate. By contrast HAs will not be subjected to the Best value regime; however they will be expected to fully embrace Best Value principles in the housing services they provide, overseen and monitored by the Housing Corporation (Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999, para 2.18-2.21).

In the mid-1980s the Audit Commission highlighted the need for LHAs to work jointly with other social housing providers to assess local needs and develop coherent housing strategies; and, as a result, LHAs now produce and publish an annual strategy report, following consultations with other local providers and interested parties. Furthermore, following a comparative study of variations in performance between LHAs and HAs, the first national studies on the performance of HAs were produced by the Audit Commission (Audit Commission, 1999). As for 'partnership' working between regulators the Housing Act 1996 gave the Audit Commission the power to work with the Housing Corporation on value-for-money studies for HAs. Our research revealed, however, that all had not been harmonious between these two regulators and that, at times, they defended their separate territories vigorously. Joint working had not been made easier by the differing powers of the Audit Commission and the Housing Corporation - the latter had the power to evoke various sanctions for unsatisfactory performance by a HA, including the withholding of funds and the transfer of stock to other register social landlords (Kemp, 1999; Mullins, 1997). By contrast and, until recently, the Audit Commission had little in the way of formal sanctions at its disposal. Under the new Best Value regime, however, serious or persistent failures on the part of a LHA identified by the Audit Commission could invoke intervention by the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, and ultimately services being run directly by his or her nominee rather than the LHA.

The introduction of Best Value, either statutorily or voluntarily, may create more similarity in the regulatory regimes of the main social housing providers in England and Wales and may improve their joint working arrangements and relations. Certainly consistency in the application and monitoring of Best Value, and the development of its performance indicators for social housing, will be very dependent on the willingness and ability of the Audit Commission and the Housing Corporation to work together more closely and to develop joined-up regulation to cater for greater levels of partnership working among different providers - for example, joint commissioning between LHAs and HAs where funds are pooled and decisions made jointly (Franklin and

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Hilditch, 1999, p.12). The findings from our research suggest that the differing regulatory regimes surrounding LHAs and HAs may work against successful partnerships between social housing providers and such joined-up approaches to tackle housing and other problems.

Advocates of rigorous regulatory regimes may be disappointed that none of our survey respondents from the social housing policy sector agreed that regulation ensures uniformity or high levels of quality in service provision. Both LHA and HA survey respondents agreed regulation makes them more accountable to central government, but while 83.5% in the LHA sector also agreed that regulation enhances central government control, this figure fell to only 43% for HAs (compared to 67% across all policy sectors surveyed). Furthermore, only 14% of those surveyed within HAs felt value-for-money was the primary concern of regulation, either under the previous Conservative or present Labour Governments (compared to 43% for all policy sectors). While HAs have experienced increased regulation, oversight is performed primarily by the Housing Corporation at arms-length from central government, and has yet to reach quite the same levels experienced by LHAs.

The divergence between LHA and HA respondents in relation to the effects of regulation on the business-like management of services may indicate the different approaches taken by the then DETR and the Audit Commission on the one hand, and the Housing Corporation on the other hand. The chair of the case study-LHA housing committee revealed during interview that his authority had been rated as 'outstanding' by the DETR in the delivery of its housing programme (LAH1). He gave credit for this achievement, in large part, to the senior housing manager who had come to the LHA from the private sector and who had cultivated a performance- and consumer-orientated culture within his department, and had been responsible for the introduction of many private sector-management measures to manage its housing stock. Whilst those interviewed acknowledged that the role of LHAs in providing new low-cost housing for rent had been substantially reduced since 1979, they considered that the management of the remaining stock (which in the case study-area was sizeable) and the way in which partnerships with HAs were managed, still made LHAs the most influential in the provision of social housing locally. Given the regulatory changes we have outlined above, it is unsurprising that nearly all surveyed detected increases in the influence of the DETR and that most respondents felt that the Audit Commission's influence had also increased.

The HA survey respondents ranked their key funder-cum-regulator, the Housing Corporation, as the most influential actor over their activities, but the HA chief executives we interviewed felt that the Housing Corporation was influenced increasingly by central government (including the DETR), compromising somewhat its independence (HAHl; HAH2). The influence LHAs had over the activities of HAs was ranked second in terms of influence. Interviews conducted, in both the LHA and HA sectors, indicated

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that LHAs can have considerable influence over the activities of HAs locally, mainly through capital loans made by LHAs to Has. A high proportion of HA survey respondents indicated that the influence of LHAs had increased over time. By contrast with LHAs, the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission have limited regulatory roles for HAs. Nonetheless, one HA interviewee did refer to disputes between some regulatory agencies and the Housing Corporation over certain areas of HA activity - the most recent dispute, or 'turf war' as it was described by the interviewee, being that between the Audit Commission and Housing Corporation over the application of Best Value principles to HAs (HAH2).

Our research findings showed that there were differences between the regulatory regimes for LHAs and Has within the social housing policy sector, and significant differences between regulatory regimes across different policy sectors. Our findings confirmed that public service- regulation represents a control mechanism by which central government seeks to govern the activities of those agencies providing public services. Regulatory agencies, such as the Audit Commission and the Housing Corporation, are a significant link between central steering agencies (such as the DTLR) and local rowing agencies (such as LHAs and HAs). In this sense they represent important catalysts for more integrated, coherent policy making and policy implementation: regulatory agencies enhance the steering capacity of the centre to govern an increasingly fragmented governance. They monitor, influence and in some cases control the performance of agencies delivering public services. For example, the Audit Commission have developed an extensive, albeit much criticised, array of performance indicators; the Housing Corporation funds and monitors the performance and standards of service provided by registered social landlords (such as HAs); the Audit Commission and National Audit Office audit the spending of public monies to ensure financial probity; and, both audit and inspectorate bodies spread so-called "best practice" to agencies providing public services. This substantial regulatory activity performed by regulatory agencies assists steering agencies in ensuring that policy delivery complies with centrally-set policy strategy, thus furthering a sense ofjoined-up government.

However, in another sense regulatory agencies can also undermine a sense of joined-up government in three significant ways. First, the establishment of regulatory agencies further fragments governance. Their relations with both their sponsors and regulated agencies are sometimes fractious, making collaborative government less likely (Hughes et al., 1997, pp. 302-304). Second, the mere existence of public service-regulation suggests non-collaborative government and a lack of trust between steering and rowing agencies. The chief executive of a local authority argued (MISC1):

... being in the civil service you can see it really. You start off with virtue; we have a responsibility to ensure that people get decent standards of service or they are protected in some way from criminal or incompetent behaviour. You solve the virtue

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but then you do get the switch-over to say "and I'm the only person who can be trusted to ensure this". But unfortunately I have to allow people out there actually do these things and deliver these wonderful policies and services and standards and so on, but I don't actually trust them because I'm so much cleverer and better than they and that leads to over-regulation....'

Regulation can be seen as a manifestation of mistrust by the centre of those agencies providing public services locally (Power, 1997, pp.134-138). As a result, such regulation, though joining-up government, is not based on mutual collaboration but more on enforcement imposed from the centre.

Third, there is much evidence that regulators are captured (or partly captured) by those agencies being regulated. Our research suggests that those public services that are most professionally organised (such as policing and health-care) are less likely to be controlled by regulators and more likely to be captured by the regulated. Less professionalised public services (such as further education, probation and social housing) are more likely to be controlled by regulators. In the case of further education, Holloway argued that the Audit Commission 'has undoubtedly had considerable influence' partly because of 'the weak professional identity of staff' (1998, pp.53-54). There are asymmetrical patterns of interdependence between sponsors, regulators and the regulated across policy sectors, reflecting different distributions of legal, financial, professional and political resources between these key actors within different policy sectors. The following four key factors largely determine whether regulatory regimes are more likely to display forms of regulatory capture than regulatory control:

(a) if regulators have close professional ties with regulated agencies - for example, in policing where HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is staffed by serving police officers;

(b) if regulators are highly dependent upon regulated agencies for expertise - for example, in health-care where historically the medical profession has dominated decision-making and consequently resource allocation;

(c) if regulators are highly reliant on regulated agencies for implementation of their recommendations - for example, in social services where social workers have a large amount of discretion at the point of service delivery; and,

(d) if regulators have little political and media support - for example, in social housing where housing policy lost much of its political salience in the post-'right- to-buy' era.

Existing research and our research findings confirmed that there had been a degree of regulatory capture by HAs of the Housing Corporation during the 1970s and 1980s (Mullins, 1997; Walker, 1998), but that the managerial and financial reforms in social housing introduced from 1988 onwards had increasingly challenged this relationship between the regulator and regulated. Also LHAs were among the first public service-deliverers forced to adapt and adjust to the Conservative managerial reforms of the 1980s and new

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regulatory frameworks. As council housing lost much of its political salience (after large numbers of tenants had exercised their "right-to-buy"), LHA managers found that the new management systems they had put in place stood them in good stead when it came to regulatory compliance, and some have even developed close working relationships with district auditors. No regulatory regime, however, is purely based on regulatory control or regulatory capture because of interdependence between key actors necessitating a regulatory bargain, although some regimes (such as policing) display more signs of capture than others (such as social security, but the nature of such regulatory regimes will change over time as the aims and resources of key regulatory actors change. For example, the health-care policy sector will experience greater government-sponsored regulation with the establishment of National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), reflecting increased government, media and public concern. The prospects for joined-up government within policy sectors will be highly dependent upon the nature of their regulatory regimes: those regimes where the regulators have been captured or part-captured will be more resistant to reform leading towards joined-up government as they are more likely to promote and defend sectional interests.

Regulatory Reform: From Silo-Regulation to Joined-up Regulation? The Labour Government is explicitly committed to the idea of joined-up government (Cabinet Office, 1999). The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, argued (1998):

Even the basic policies, targeted at unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown, will not deliver their full effect unless they are properly linked together. Joined-up problems need joined-up solutions.' The Government has launched a series of initiatives as a way of

enhancing joined-up government, such as the Social Exclusion Unit, Performance and Innovation Unit, Women's Unit, Public Sector Benchmarking Project, Best Value, and Home Office's Crime Reduction Programme. More specifically, it encouraged the recent establishment of the Public Audit Forum, comprising all audit bodies, to promote greater cooperation between audit bodies. It is committed to joined- up audit where 'more than one auditor is involved in the audit of joined-up activities' (Public Audit Forum). It also seeks to promote greater cooperation with other regulators (such as inspectors) in the form of 'exchanging information, subject to statutory constraints, joint inspection arrangements, co-ordination of work programmes and the timing of visits to public sector bodies, and exchanging staff to facilitate closer understanding of the role and remits of each body' (Public Audit Forum, 1999). The Government has set up a Best Value Inspectorate Forum to look in part 'at whether inspectorates take sufficient account of joint working between the bodies they inspect; ... [and]

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... at the scope for co-ordinating their programmes and sharing information' (Cabinet Office, 1999, p.43).

Even before these recent initiatives there is much evidence that regulatory agencies both co-operate with each other. For example, the Audit Commission increasingly works with other regulatory bodies (such as the National Audit Office and the Housing Corporation) in its value- for-money investigations, begging the question of "where does audit end and inspection begin?" as the boundaries between them 'grow messier' (Hood et al., 1998, p.67). Since 1996 it has worked closely with the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI), though at the start both 'went through some of the stages organisations often experience in setting up partnerships, vying for territory and wanting to each retain our own ways of working whilst working together' (Nottage, 1999, p.3). It took them both two years to agree upon a methodology for such joint working. The SSI also works closely with other central government inspectorates, such as the HMIC and HM Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP). However, the SSI has no statutory powers, unlike most other inspectorates, and consequently relies heavily on cooperation of those it inspects to exercise influence; such cooperation has been forthcoming amongst social services than health authorities in its review of their collaboration to support mentally ill people in the community (Nottage, 1999, p.3).

However, regulatory agencies, with their different remits, agendas and styles, often compete with each other, resulting in frequent 'turf-wars'. For example, both the Audit Commission and HMIP investigated the probation service at the same time. There have been difficulties between the Audit Commission and Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) with school inspections because OFSTED's judgmental approach to inspection is very different from the Audit Commission's evidence-based method of working' (Travers, 1998, p.14). Regulatory agencies, particularly inspectorate bodies, are functionally organised, and as presently constituted will run into problems of collaborating in assessing the performance of policies that cut across functionally-organised agencies delivering public services - joined-up government requires joined- up regulation to assess the joined-up performance of those partnership agencies. Hood, James, Jones, Scott and Travers argued that 'there is a lack of systematic exposure of regulators in government to productive competition and rivalry, rather than ad hoc turf battles or collaborative deals where responsibilities overlap', noting that such competition appears 'to be regarded as a principle to be applied only to producers of public services and not to their regulators' (1998, p.67).

The Government in its drive towards joined-up government is hoping that different regulatory bodies will co-operate and has shied away from establishing super-regulatory bodies to "police" joined-up government. Central government may be somewhat fearful of any such super-regulatory body because of its potential clout, and existing regulators may be somewhat reluctant to merge together. Arguably joined-up government requires joined- up regulation, otherwise solutions to "wicked problems" that cut across

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government agencies and policy sectors, such as social exclusion, cannot be effectively assessed. The Government stated that policy should be designed 'around shared goals and carefully defined results, not around organisational structures or existing functions' (Cabinet Office, 1999, p.16). However, there are considerable obstacles in achieving joined-up government (Wilkinson and Appelbee, 1999). Moves towards joined-up government, including joined-up regulation, are likely to be hindered by the way in which the state is functionally organised and the entrenched interests of politicians, bureaucrats and professionals that have sustained such an organisational and functional carve-up of the state. On the idea of a super-regulator, the chief executive of a local authority believed that 'they'll drive you to the funny farm very quickly doing that job' (MISC1). Consequently progress towards joined-up government, if the past is anything to go by, is likely to be slow and possibly more aspirational than real, though a lot will depend on the political will of central government. Without such political will, joined-up regulation is unlikely to happen and instead a maze of "silo" regulatory regimes organised around relatively discrete policy sectors will remain more- or-less intact.

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