scada architecture

Water and terrorism

Peter H. Gleick

Pacific Institute, 654 13th Street, Oakland, California, USA. www.pacinst.org. Tel: 510 251 1600. Fax: 510 251 2203.

E-mail:pgleick@pacinst.org

Received 31 July 2006; accepted in revised form 14 August 2006

Abstract

The importance of freshwater and water infrastructure to human and ecosystem health and to the smooth

functioning of a commercial and industrial economy makes water and water systems targets for terrorism. The

chance that terrorists will strike at water systems is real; indeed, there is a long history of such attacks. Water

infrastructure can be targeted directly or water can be contaminated through the introduction of poison or disease-

causing agents. The damage is done by hurting people, rendering water unusable, or destroying purification and

supply infrastructure. More uncertain, however, is how significant such threats are today, compared with other

targets that may be subject to terrorist attack, or how effective such attacks would actually be. Analysis and

historical evidence suggest that massive casualties from attacking water systems are difficult to produce, although

there may be some significant exceptions. At the same time, the risk of societal disruptions, disarray, and even

overreaction on the part of governments and the public from any attack, may be high. This paper reviews the

history of past attacks on water systems and the most pressing vulnerabilities and risks facing modern water

systems. Suggestions of ways to reduce those risks are also presented.

Keywords: Biological warfare; Chemical warfare; Distribution systems; Eco-terrorism; Environmental

terrorism; Water and terrorism; Water supply

Introduction

Water is a fundamental resource for human and economic welfare and modern society depends

on complex, interconnected water infrastructure to provide reliable safe water supplies and to remove

and treat wastewater. This infrastructure is vital for human welfare and economic development

and it is vulnerable to intentional disruption from war, intrastate violence and, of more recent

concern, terrorism.

doi: 10.2166/wp.2006.035

Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503

q IWA Publishing 2006

There is a long history of using water as a political or military target or tool, going back over 2,500

years (Gleick, 2004). Water resources and systems are attractive targets because there is no substitute for

water. Whether its lack is due to natural scarcity, a physical supply interruption or contamination, a

community of any size that lacks sufficient fresh water will suffer greatly. Furthermore, a community

does not have to lack water to suffer. Too much water at the wrong time can also lead to death and

great damage.

The chance that terrorists will strike at water systems is real but poorly understood by water managers

and the public. This paper reviews the history of past attacks on water systems and the most pressing

vulnerabilities and risks facing modern water systems. Suggestions for ways to reduce those risks are

also presented.

Water infrastructure can be targeted directly or water can be contaminated through the intentional

introduction of poison or disease-causing agents. The damage is done by hurting people, rendering water

unusable, or destroying purification and supply infrastructure. Some important water facilities, such as

dams, reservoirs and pipelines, are easily accessible to the public at various points and there are new

worries that computer control systems may be accessible to hacking. Many large dams are tourist

attractions and offer tours to the public, while many reservoirs are open to the public for recreational

boating and swimming. Pipelines are often exposed for long distances. Water and wastewater treatment

plants dot our urban and rural landscape.

What is less clear, however, is how significant such threats are today, compared with other targets

that may be subject to terrorist attack, or how effective such attacks would actually be. Analysis

and historical evidence suggest that massive casualties from attacking water systems are difficult to

produce, although there may be some significant exceptions. At the same time, the risk of societal

disruptions, disarray, and even overreaction on the part of governments and the public from any attack,

may be high.

As an example of the economic and human chaos even moderate disruption or contamination might

cause, an outbreak of Cryptosporidium in Milwaukee in 1993 killed over a hundred people, affected the

health of over 400,000 more (MacKenzie et al., 1994; Smith, 1994) and cost millions in lost wages and

productivity. That outbreak, completely unrelated to terrorism, gives some sense of the vulnerability of

modern water systems to similar undetected, intentionally caused, contamination events.

This article will not offer any new information for those hoping to harm water systems and all

information used here is derived from open sources and readily accessible materials. The purpose is to

identify where productive and protective efforts to reduce risks would be most useful on the part of water

managers and planners and to reduce unnecessary fear and worry. Proper and appropriate safeguards can

reduce the risks identified here significantly and reduce the consequences should an event occur.

The worry

The typical scenario for a terrorist attack on domestic water supplies involves putting a chemical or

biological agent into local water supplies or using conventional explosives to damage basic

infrastructure such as pipelines, dams and treatment plants. This is not as straightforward as it sounds.

The number of casualties that would result from such an attack depends on the system for water

treatment already in place, the type and dosage of poison ingested, individual resistance, the timing of an

attack and the speed and scope of discovery and response by local authorities.

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503482

Most biological pathogens cannot survive in water and most chemicals require very large volumes

to contaminate a water system to any significant degree. Many pathogens and chemicals are

vulnerable to the kinds of water treatment used to make it potable for human use. Indeed, the whole

purpose of municipal water systems is to destroy biological pathogens and reduce the concentration of

harmful chemicals through chlorination, filtration, ultraviolet radiation, ozonation and many other

common treatment approaches. Many contaminants are also broken down over time by sunlight and

other natural processes. Most infrastructure has built-in redundancy that reduces vulnerability to

physical attacks.

Because of these safeguards, one early commentator noted: “it is a myth that one can accomplish

[mass destruction] by tossing a small quantity of a ‘super-toxin’ into the water supply. . .it would be

virtually impossible to poison a large water supply: hydrolysis, chlorination and the required quantity of

the toxin are the inhibiting factors” (Kupperman & Trent, 1979).

It is important to note, however, that terrorist attacks that fail to kill or injure large numbers of people

may still have important political repercussions by affecting public perception, reducing confidence in

institutions and forcing inappropriate political responses. Society reacts differently to natural and

human-caused disasters: we often accept large casualties from natural disasters with a degree of

sanguinity not matched by our response to intentional acts of violence (Wardlaw, 1989). Terrorism

destroys our sense of safety and normality and introduces new and often substantial stress and

uncertainty in individuals and communities (Ursano et al., 2003).

Even a plausible public threat has the potential to cause fear and anxiety. The best defenses against

such threats are public confidence in water management systems, rapid and effective water quality

monitoring, and strong and effective information dissemination. While many water districts and

providers have regular mechanisms for communicating with customers, new tools may be valuable in

countering the threat of water-related terrorism and ensuring public confidence and calm.

As we have seen in the past several years, responses to the threat of terrorism can often be ineffective

or ill-considered. Even governmental and public responses to natural disasters, for which planning – in

theory – is well advanced, are often inadequate when actual disasters occur. As a result, the adverse

reactions resulting from an intentional effort to contaminate or damage public water systems may be

both significant and underestimated. The solution to this must include efforts both to prevent such

attacks and to educate the public and media about actual risks and consequences.

Defining terrorism: the context of water systems

As many previous observers have noted, defining “terrorism” is problematic (Hoffman, 1998;

Wardlaw, 1989; Schmid, 1997; Martin, 2006) A detailed review of the challenges of defining

“terrorism”, especially in the context of water systems, is provided by Gleick (2006: Chapter 1). No

standard or consistent definition is used by federal or state agencies in the United States, although most

follow the form of that adopted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): “the unlawful use of

force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian

population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (US Code of Federal

Regulations (28 CFR Section 0.85)). Similarly, Title 22, Section 2656 of the US Code states, “Terrorism

means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by

sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 483

Both of these definitions focus on motive – the “furtherance of political or social objectives”. Such

motives can also include religious, cultural, economic or psychological factors. Increasingly important,

however, is the question of targets. In traditional discussions about terrorism, targets are usually

governments, political figures, objects of economic or social significance, or random civilians. But both

motives and targets can include environmental and ecological resources such as water and built

water systems.

The social and cultural value and importance of water systems also make them attractive targets. By

calling attention to the inability of governments to protect vital symbols of civilization, terrorists can

raise doubts about controlling authorities. As Thornton (1964) noted: “The relatively high efficiency of

terrorism derives from its symbolic nature. If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a

demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value.” There are few natural

resources with more symbolic power than water.

Environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, and environmental warfare

Important distinctions should be made between two different categories: environmental terrorism

and eco-terrorism. The focus of this article is on the first of these, but I discuss the second to provide

some perspective.

In recent years, US law enforcement agencies have had to deal with a range of concerns and

activities increasingly defined as “terrorism” with an environmental or ecological context. For example,

in 2006 the FBI announced arrests in several cases of property destruction thought to have been

caused by extreme animal rights or groups with “environmental” agendas. Indeed, FBI Director Mueller

said one of the Bureau’s “highest domestic terrorism priorities” is prosecuting people who commit

crimes “in the name of animal rights or the environment” (Janofsky, 2006). This kind of activity,

however, should be considered “eco-terrorism”, not “environmental terrorism” (Schwartz, 1998;

Schofield, 1999).

There is an important distinction between the two. The term “environmental terrorism” should

exclusively refer to the unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems with the intent

to harm individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social

objective. This distinguishes it from “eco-terrorism”, which should only be considered the unlawful use

of force against people or property with the intent of saving the environment from further human

encroachment and destruction. The professed aim of eco-terrorists is to slow or halt exploitation of

natural resources and to bring public attention to environmental issues (see Lee, 1995; Chalecki, 2001).

Simply put, environmental terrorism involves targeting natural resources for a political, social or

economic objective. Eco-terrorism involves targeting social, political or economic resources for an

environmental objective. The former is the subject of this article.

History of water-related terrorism

There is a long history of the use of water resources as both a target and tool of war and terrorism

(Gleick, 1993, 2004). Water resources or systems can be used as delivery vehicles to cause violence to a

human population. Water supplies can be poisoned; dams can be destroyed to harm downstream

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503484

populations. Table 1 lists examples from the Water and Conflict Chronology that can be described as

terrorism. Even popular culture reflects public interest and concern over these issues. Box 1 lists some

popular novels and films that use water-related terrorism in the plot or theme.

The recorded history of attacks on water systems goes back 4,500 years ago, when Urlama, King of

Lagash from 2450 to 2400 BC, diverted water from this region to boundary canals, drying up boundary

ditches to deprive the neighboring city state of Umma of water. His son Il later cut off the water supply to

Girsu, a city in Umma. In an early example of biowarfare (or bioterrorism, depending on one’s

understanding of “states” and “governments” at the time) Solon of Athens besieged Cirrha around 600

BC for a wrong done to the temple of Apollo and put the poison hellebore roots (or rye ergot – reports

differ) into the local water supply. This reportedly caused the Cirrhaeans to become violently ill and

facilitated the subsequent capture of the city (Eitzen & Takafuji, 1997).

Many of the recorded instances of violence by individuals and non-state groups concerning water

focus on perceived inequities associated with water development projects or controversial decisions

about allocations of water. Often, marginalized groups faced with the construction of water systems that

appropriate local water resources have responded by threatening or attacking those systems. This

violence may be related to both absolute deprivation, where access to the most basic of needs is denied to

a group or region, and to relative deprivation, where basic needs are met, but water allocations or control

are perceived to be unfair or inequitable. Examples of violence related to both absolute and relative

deprivation of water can be found in Table 1. In one of the earliest reported acts, an angry mob in New

York in 1748 burned down a ferry house on the Brooklyn shore of the East River, reportedly as revenge

for unfair allocation of East River water rights (Museum of the City of New York (MCNY), no date). In

the 1840s and 1850s, groups attacked small dams and reservoirs in the eastern and central USA because

of concerns about threats to health and to local water supplies (Table 1). In a now famous case, between

1907 and 1913, farmers in the Owens Valley of California repeatedly dynamited the aqueduct system

being built to divert their water to the growing city of Los Angeles (Reisner, 1993).

Box 1. Environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, water and popular culture.

Popular culture often portrays terrorism in dramatic ways that either influence perceptions of

threats (Jenkins, 2000) or reflect public fears and concerns. Environmental and eco-terrorism

involving water have long been included among those threats. Kurt Vonnegut’s classic book Cat’s

Cradle (1963) describes an amoral genius who creates “ice-nine” – a chemical that freezes water at

room temperature and ends up destroying the world. Edward Abbey’s (1975) novel The Monkey

Wrench Gang and Johnson and Bent’s film Christie Malry’s Own Double Entry featured blowing up

dams, poisoning water supplies and attacking resources for political or environmental purposes.

Wilson and Leeson’s 2002 movie The Tuxedo starring Jackie Chan features a power hungry bottled-

water mogul trying to destroy the world’s natural water supply to force everyone to drink his bottled

water. The movie Batman Begins, released in 2005, portrayed a terrorist attempt to destroy Gotham

by introducing a vapor-borne hallucinogen into the water system and releasing it throughout the city.

In early 2006, an independent feature film, Waterborne, was released, which follows the fictional

aftermath of a bio-terrorist attack on the water supply of Los Angeles. And V for Vendetta (2006)

features corrupt government leaders contaminating London’s water supply to kill people, spread fear

and consolidate power.

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 485

Table 1. Water and terrorism chronology 1 .

Date Parties involved

Violent conflict

or in the context

of violence? Description

1748 United States Yes Ferry house on Brooklyn shore of East River burns down. New Yorkers accuse

Brooklynites of having set the fire as revenge for unfair East River water rights.

1841 Canada Yes A reservoir in Ops Township, Upper Canada (now Ontario) was destroyed by neighbors

who considered it a hazard to health.

1844 United States Yes A reservoir in Mercer County, Ohio was destroyed by a mob that considered it a hazard

to health.

1850s United States Yes Attack on a New Hampshire dam that impounded water for factories downstream, by local

residents unhappy over its effect on water levels.

1853–1861 United States Yes Repeated destruction of the banks and reservoirs of the Wabash and Erie Canal in southern

Indiana by mobs regarding it as a health hazard.

1887 United States Yes Dynamiting of a canal reservoir in Paulding County, Ohio by a mob regarding it as a health

hazard. State militia called out to restore order.

1890 Canada Yes Partly successful attempt to destroy a lock on the Welland Canal in Ontario, Canada either

by Fenians protesting against English Policy in Ireland or by

agents of Buffalo NY grain handlers unhappy at the diversion of trade through the canal.

1907–1913 Owens Valley,

Los Angeles, California

Yes The Los Angeles Valley aqueduct/pipeline suffers repeated bombings in an effort to prevent

diversions of water from the Owens Valley to Los Angeles.

1965 Israel, Palestinians Yes First attack claimed by the Palestinian National Liberation Movement Al-Fatah is on the

diversion pumps for the Israeli national water carrier. Attack fails.

1970 United States No: threat The Weathermen, a group opposed to American imperialism and the Vietnam war,

allegedly attempt to obtain biological agents to contaminate the water supply systems

of US urban centers.

1972 United States No: threat Two members of the right-wing “Order of the Rising Sun” are arrested in Chicago with

30–40 kg of typhoid cultures that are allegedly to be used to poison the water supply in

Chicago, St. Louis and other cities. It was felt that the plan would have been unlikely to

cause serious health problems owing to chlorination of the water supplies.

1972 United States No: threat Reported threat to contaminate water supply of New York City with nerve gas.

1973 Germany No: threat Threat by a biologist in Germany to contaminate water supplies with bacilli of anthrax and

botulinum unless he was paid US$8.5 million.

1977 United States Yes Contamination of a North Carolina reservoir with unknown materials. According to Clark:

“Safety caps and valves were removed, and poison chemicals were sent into the reservoir....

Water had to be brought in.”

1978–1984 Sudan Yes Demonstrations in Juba, Sudan in 1978 opposing the construction of the Jonglei Canal led

to the deaths of two students. Construction of the Jonglei Canal in the Sudan was forcibly

suspended in 1984 following a series of attacks on the construction site.

Continued

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Table 1. (continued)

Date Parties involved

Violent conflict

or in the context

of violence? Description

1980s Mozambique, Rhodesia/

Zimbabwe, South Africa

Yes Regular destruction of power lines from Cahora Bassa Dam during fight for independence

in the region. Dam targeted by RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance).

1982 United States No: threat Los Angeles police and the FBI arrest a man who was preparing to poison the city’s water

supply with a biological agent.

1983 Israel No The Israeli government reported that it had uncovered a plot by Israeli Arabs to poison

the water in Galilee with “an unidentified powder”.

1984 United States Yes Members of the Rajneeshee religious cult contaminate a city water supply tank in

The Dalles, Oregon, using Salmonella. A community outbreak of over 750 cases occurred

in a county that normally reports fewer than five cases per year.

1985 United States No: threat Law enforcement authorities discovered that a small survivalist group in the Ozark

Mountains of Arkansas known as The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord

(CSA) had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium cyanide, with the apparent

intent to poison water supplies in New York, Chicago and Washington, DC. CSA members

devised the scheme in the belief that such attacks would make the Messiah return more

quickly by punishing unrepentant sinners. The objective appeared to be mass murder in the

name of a divine mission rather than to change government policy. The amount of poison

possessed by the group is believed to have been insufficient to contaminate the water

supply of even one city.

1991 Canada No: threat A threat is made via an anonymous letter to contaminate the water supply of the city of

Kelowna, British Columbia, with “biological contaminates” [sic]. The motive was apparently

“associated with the Gulf War”. The security of the water supply was increased in

response and no group was identified as the perpetrator.

1992 Turkey Yes Lethal concentrations of potassium cyanide were reported discovered in the water tanks of a

Turkish Air Force compound in Istanbul. The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) claimed credit.

1993 Iran No A report suggests that proposals were made at a meeting of fundamentalist groups in

Tehran, under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to poison water supplies of

major cities in the West “as a possible response to Western offensives against Islamic

organizations and states”.

1994 Moldavia No: threat Reported threat by Moldavian General Nikolay Matveyev to contaminate the water supply

of the Russian 14th Army in Tiraspol, Moldova, with mercury.

1998 Tajikistan No: threat On November 6, a guerrilla commander threatened to blow up a dam on the Kairakkhum

channel if political demands were not met. Col. Makhmud Khudoberdyev made the threat,

reported by the ITAR-Tass News Agency.

Continued

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Table 1. (continued)

Date Parties involved

Violent conflict

or in the context

of violence? Description

1998 (1994) United States No The Washington Post reports a 12-year old computer hacker broke into the SCADA

computer system that runs Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam, giving him complete control of the

dam’s massive floodgates. The cities of Mesa, Tempe and Phoenix, Arizona are downstream

of this dam. No damage was done. This report turns out to be incorrect. A hacker did break

into the computers of an Arizona water facility, the Salt River Project in the Phoenix area.

But he was 27, not 12, and the incident occurred in 1994, not 1998. And while clearly

trespassing in critical areas, investigators concluded that the hacker never could have had

control of any dams and that no lives or property were ever threatened.

1998 Democratic Republic

of Congo

Yes Attacks on Inga Dam during efforts to topple President Kabila. Disruption of electricity

supplies from Inga Dam and water supplies to Kinshasa.

1999 Lusaka, Zambia Yes Bomb blast destroyed the main water pipeline, cutting off water for the city of Lusaka,

population 3 million.

1999 South Africa Yes A home-made bomb was discovered at a water reservoir at Wallmansthal near Pretoria.

It was thought to have been meant to sabotage water supplies to farmers.

1999 Angola Yes 100 bodies were found in four drinking water wells in central Angola.

1999 East Timor Yes Militia opposing East Timor independence kill pro-independence supporters and throw

bodies in water well.

1998–1999 Kosovo Yes Contamination of water supplies/wells by Serbs disposing of bodies of Kosovar Albanians

in local wells. Other reports of Yugoslav federal forces poisoning wells with carcasses

and hazardous materials.

2000 Belgium Yes In July, workers at the Cellatex chemical plant in northern France dumped 5000 liters of

sulfuric acid into a tributary of the Meuse River when they were denied workers’ benefits.

A French analyst pointed out that this was the first time “the environment and public

health were made hostage in order to exert pressure, an unheard-of situation until now”.

2000 Australia Yes In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April, 2000, police arrested a man for using a computer

and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire wastewater system and release

sewage into parks, rivers and property.

2001 Israel, Palestine Yes Palestinians destroy water supply pipelines to West Bank settlement of Yitzhar and to

Kibbutz Kisufim. Agbat Jabar refugee camp near Jericho was disconnected from its water

supply after Palestinians looted and damaged local water pumps. Palestinians accuse Israel

of destroying a water cistern, blocking water tanker deliveries and attacking materials for

a wastewater treatment project.

Continued

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Table 1. (continued)

Date Parties involved

Violent conflict

or in the context

of violence? Description

2001 Pakistan Yes Civil unrest over severe water shortages were caused by a long-term drought. Protests began in

March and April and continued into summer, with riots, four bombs in Karachi (June 13), one

death, 12 injuries and 30 arrests. Ethnic conflicts arose as some groups “accuse the government

of favoring the populous Punjab province [over Sindh province] in water distribution”.

2001 Macedonia Yes Water flow to Kumanovo (population 100,000) was cut off for 12 days in conflict between

ethnic Albanians and Macedonian forces. Valves at plants on Glaznja and Lipkovo Lakes

were damaged.

2001 Philippines No Philippine authorities shut off water to six remote southern villages after residents

complained of a foul smell from their taps, raising fears Muslim guerrillas had contaminated

the supplies. Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, accused of links with Osama bin Laden, had threatened to

poison the water supply in the mainly Christian town of Isabela on Basilan island if the

military did not stop an offensive against them.

2002 Nepal Yes The Khumbuwan Liberation Front (KLF) blew up a hydroelectric powerhouse of 250 kW

in Bhojpur District on January 26. The power supply to Bhojpur and adjoining areas was

cut off. Estimated repair time was six months; repair costs were estimated at 10 million

Rs. By June 2002, Maoist rebels had destroyed more than seven micro-hydro projects as

well as an intake of a drinking water project and pipelines supplying water to Khalanga

in western Nepal.

2002 Rome, Italy No: threat Italian police arrest four Moroccans allegedly planning to contaminate the water supply

system in Rome with a cyanide-based chemical, targeting buildings that included the

United States embassy. Ties to Al-Qaida were suggested.

2002 United States No: threat Papers seized during the arrest of a Lebanese national in Seattle included “instructions on

poisoning water sources” from a London-based Al-Qaida recruiter. The FBI issued a

bulletin to computer security experts around the country indicating that Al-Qaida terrorists

may have been studying American dams and water-supply systems in preparation for new

attacks. “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that

Al-Qaida members have sought information on supervisory control and data acquisition

(SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA-related websites” reads the bulletin,

according to SecurityFocus. “They specifically sought information on water supply and

wastewater management practices in the US and abroad.”

2002 Colombia Yes The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) detonated an explosive device

planted on a German-made gate valve located inside a tunnel in the Chingaza Dam, which

provides most of Bogota’s water.

2002 United States No: threat Earth Liberation Front threatens the water supply of the town of Winter Park. Previously,

this group claimed responsibility for the destruction of a ski lodge in Vail, Colorado that

threatened lynx habitat.

Continued

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Table 1. (continued)

Date Parties involved

Violent conflict

or in the context

of violence? Description

2003 United States No: threat Al-Qaida threatens US water systems via a call to a Saudi Arabian magazine. Al-Qaida does

not “rule out. . .the poisoning of drinking water in American and Western cities”.

2003 United States Yes Four incendiary devices were found in the pumping station of a Michigan water-bottling plant.

The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility, accusing Ice Mountain Water

Company of “stealing” water for profit. Ice Mountain is a subsidiary of Nestle Waters.

2003 Colombia Yes A bomb blast at the Cali Drinking Water Treatment Plant killed three workers May 8. The

workers were members of a trade union involved in intense negotiations over privatization

of the water system.

2003 Jordan No: threat Jordanian authorities arrested Iraqi agents in connection with a failed plot to poison the

water supply that serves American troops in the eastern Jordanian desert near the border

with Iraq.

2003 Iraq Yes Sabotage/bombing of main water pipeline in Baghdad. The sabotage of the water pipeline

was the first such strike against Baghdad’s water system, city water engineers said. An

explosive was fired at the six-foot-wide water main in the northern part of Baghdad,

according to the chief engineer for the city’s water treatment plants.

2003–2004 Sudan Yes The ongoing civil war in the Sudan has included violence against water resources. In 2003,

villagers from around Tina said that bombings had destroyed water wells. In Khasan

Basao they alleged that water wells were poisoned. In 2004, wells in Darfur were reportedly

contaminated as part of a strategy of harassment against displaced populations.

2004 Pakistan Yes In military action aimed at Islamic terrorists, including Al Qaida and the Islamic Movement

of Uzbekistan, homes, schools and water wells were damaged and destroyed.

2004 India, Kashmir Yes Twelve Indian security forces were killed by an IED planted in an underground water pipe

during “counter-insurgency operation in Khanabal area in Anantnag district”.

2006 Sri Lanka Yes Tamil Tiger rebels cut the water supply to government-held villages in northeastern

Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan government forces then launched attacks on the reservoir, declaring

the Tamil actions to be terrorism.

Sources: complete source information for each event is available at www.worldwater.org and in Gleick (2006). 1 This table is a subset of water-related conflicts reported in the Pacific Institute’s Water Conflict Chronology (www.worldwater.org). Only included are those

incidents that fall under the broad definition of environmental terrorism, defined here as: “the unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems

with the intent to harm individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social objective”. Please remember the

caution, described in the text, that one person’s “terrorist” is another person’s “freedom fighter”. As a result, some of these events as “terrorism” will be

controversial to some of the parties involved. My objective is not to offend. Also, because of the evolution of the concept of nations and states, I’ve excluded

from this list all water and conflict events before the mid-1700s. I’ve also excluded numerous development disputes where individuals or sub-national groups

take violent action as a result of water disputes, shortages or allocation controversies, i.e. where people fight over water for the sake of water. I note, however,

the difficulty of defining “terrorism” (as opposed to military target, tool, or goal or other category) and caution readers to use care in applying these categories.

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The first reported attack of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, was in 1965 on

the diversion pumps of the Israeli national water carrier (Naff & Matson, 1984) and the region has seen

many more examples. In 2001, Palestinians attacked and vandalized water pipes leading to the Israeli

settlement of Yitzhar to try to force the Israelis out of the settlement. Around the same time, Palestinians

accused Israel of destroying a water cistern, blocking water tanker deliveries and attacking materials for

a wastewater treatment project (Israel Line, 2001a,b; ENS, 2001).

Rivers and water supply infrastructure such as reservoirs can be especially vulnerable to this type of

terrorism, since they are publicly accessible in many places. In July 1999, engineers discovered an

unexploded bomb in a water reservoir near Pretoria, South Africa. The bomb, which had malfunctioned,

would have been powerful enough to deprive farmers, a nearby military base and a hydrological research

facility of water (Pretoria Dispatch Online, 1999). In 2000, a simulated terrorist attack on the Lake

Nacimiento Dam caused some local panic in central California until the media was belatedly notified

that the situation was merely a disaster preparedness drill (Gaura, 2000).

Motives for such attacks can be economic as well as political. In July 2000, workers at the Cellatex

chemical plant in northern France dumped 5000 liters of sulfuric acid into a tributary of the Meuse River

when they were denied workers’ benefits. Whether they were trying to kill wildlife, people, both or

neither is unclear, but a French analyst pointed out that this was the first time “the environment and

public health were made hostage in order to exert pressure, an unheard-of situation until now” (Christian

Science Monitor, 2000).

More recently, a series of events in India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East have

reaffirmed the attractiveness of water and water systems as targets for terrorists in a wide range of

unrelated conflicts and disputes. The major water pipeline to Baghdad was attacked in 2003. The same

year, Al-Qaida threatened US water systems in a call published in a Saudi Arabian magazine: “Al-Qaida

does not ‘rule out. . .the poisoning of drinking water in American and Western cities’” (Associated Press,

2003; Waterman, 2003). In 2004, twelve Indian security forces were killed by an explosive device

planted in an underground water pipe during a “counter-insurgency operation in Khanabal area in

Anantnag district” (TNN, 2004). In an unusual twist to this problem, the United States responded to a

Palestinian attack on US diplomatic personnel in the Middle East by canceling plans for a water-

development project in the Gaza Strip (Associated Press, 2004).

Vulnerability of water and water systems

Infrastructure attacks

The most traditional form of water-related terrorism involves physical attacks on water infrastructure –

specifically water-supply dams and pipelines. One such attack might target a large hydroelectric dam on a

major river or a major water supply system for a city. Terrorists equipped with a relatively small

conventional explosive might not be able to cause serious structural damage to a massive dam, which is,

after all, usually a giant block of rock, earth or concrete. But the adverse consequences of a major dam

failure make the risk worth both assessing and reducing. A major dam failure can kill thousands of people

and even more modest damage might interrupt power generation or affect some other important water-

system operation.

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 491

Some natural disasters involving water infrastructure offer insights into the risks of water-related

terrorism. In 1975, the Banqiao and Shimantan dams on tributaries of the Huang He (Yellow) River in

China failed in sequence, contributing to the subsequent destruction of dozens of lower dams and the

deaths of 85,000 people (Yi, 1998). The famous Johnston Flood of 1889 killed more than 2,200 people

when the collapse of a poorly built dam sent a massive wall of water through the poor steel town of

Johnston, Pennsylvania. At least 400 people died in California in 1928 when the Saint Francis dam failed

in San Francisquito Canyon. Worldwide, millions of people live in the floodplains below large dams and

reservoirs. In addition to the potential loss of life, there are also secondary impacts including water

quality problems, loss of freshwater supply and hydroelectric power, damage to property and

commercial fisheries, and recreation losses.

While many municipal water systems are built with redundancy and backup systems, others have

particularly vulnerable points, such as single large pipelines, pumping plants or treatment systems. The

bombing of the major water pipeline entering Baghdad in 2003 highlights such vulnerabilities (Tierney

& Worth, 2003).

A more modern infrastructure concern is the use of remote computers to attack valves, pumps

and chemical processing equipment though computer-based controls. If a group or individual could

gain control over the automated operations of water facilities, water supplies or quality could be

seriously compromised. These control systems were typically developed with no attention to security.

As a result, many of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks used by water

agencies to collect data from sensors and control equipment “may be susceptible to attacks and misuse”

(Heilprin, 2005).

There is growing recognition of this risk (Littleton, 1995). In 1990, the United States issued National

Security Decision Directive 42, which states in part:

Telecommunications and information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception,

unauthorized access and related forms of technical exploitation as well as other dimensions of the

foreign intelligence threat. The technology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is

used extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist groups and criminal

elements. (National Security Directive, 1990).

These risks are more than academic and theoretical. In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April 2000,

police arrested a man for using a computer and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire

wastewater system and release sewage into parks, rivers and property. This is one of the first documented

cases of cyber-terrorism in the water industry (Gellman, 2002). Fears that Al-Quaida were seeking

information on SCADA systems materialized in 2002: “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies

have received indications that Al-Qaida members have sought information on supervisory control and

data acquisition (SCADA) systems” (McDonnell & Meyer, 2002; MSNBC, 2002).

Chemical and biological attacks

Of growing concern is the risk of chemical and biological attacks on water systems. This type of attack

is often portrayed as follows. Terrorists introduce water-soluble biological or chemical contaminants

into a publicly accessible city water supply. In the best-case scenario, the contaminant is detected as it

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503492

enters the water treatment plant and the plant is shut down while the contaminant is neutralized. This can

result in interruption of potable water service to the city and a “boil water” alert for city residents. In the

worst-case scenario, the contaminant is undetected and people begin to get sick, panic ensues and health

and economic damages soar.

Chemical and biological attacks on water may not be as easy as often portrayed. In order to be

effective as a tool of water-related terrorism, a chemical or biological weapon must be:

. (Weaponized: it must be produced and disseminated in quantities sufficient to have the intended

effect. . (Appropriate for water dissemination: it must be viable, dissolvable, stable and transportable in water. . (Infectious, virulent or toxic: it must be effective at causing illness or death, with no widespread

immunity in the target population. . (Effective over time and treatment: it must maintain its effectiveness in water long enough to reach

and affect humans and it must not be negated by standard water treatment systems likely to be in place.

According to easily available open literature, a wide range of chemical and biological agents could be

used in water. Table 2, described in a recent US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) review of

water-related threats, should be considered illustrative of the relevant contaminant classes. As noted,

some of these substances are only likely to be found in military stockpiles; others may be produced by

sub-national terrorist groups; others may have more mundane industrial or even household applications

(US National Research Council 1995; Hickman, 1999; US EPA 2003a). All the listed agents have

strengths and weaknesses, especially in their usefulness as weapons for use in water. These details will

not be described here.

While some of the biological and chemical contaminants listed in Table 2 have been produced for

military use, military-grade chemical weapons are far more difficult to produce, handle and disseminate.

Commercial chemicals that are commonly produced, distributed and used throughout the world are more

likely to be used by terrorists to contaminate water supplies. Of particular concern are pesticides and

related chemicals used to kill insects, rodents and plants. These include organophosphate pesticides,

chlorinated pesticides and rodenticides. Organophosphates affect the nervous system, as do

organochlorine pesticides. Rodenticides like sodium fluoroacetate, strychnine and thallium sulfate are

all capable of incapacitating or killing humans in appropriate doses (Hickman, 1999).

Several inorganic chemicals are also widely available and potential threats to water systems, including

various forms of arsenic and cyanide. Both are soluble in water and can be lethal. Hickman (1999)

discusses the challenge posed by a material like sodium cyanide (NaCN) for a small water system.

Sodium cyanide is relatively plentiful and accessible because of use in the mining and metals industry. It

is an odorless white salt, which is stable and highly soluble in water.

A conference, Early Warning Monitoring to Detect Hazardous Events in Water Supplies, held in

May 1999 in Reston, Virginia, concluded that terrorist use of bio-weapons can, under some

circumstances, pose a significant threat to drinking water. While most biological warfare agents were

developed for the purpose of aerial dissemination, some can be effective if digested, and some of these

are stable and soluble in water. There are two main types of biological threats: pathogens and toxins.

Pathogens are live organisms, including bacteria, viruses and protozoa. Toxins are chemicals that are

derived from biological processes (Valcik, 1998). Table 3 shows a subset of known biological threats

to water supplies including at least four that were reported in the public literature to have been

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 493

Table 2. Chemical and biological contaminants of water: classes, availabilities and restrictions.

Class Examples (not exhaustive) Sources Limited access?

Microbiological contaminants

Bacteria Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia

spp., Campylobacter spp., Clostridium perfringens,

E. coli O157:H7, Francisella tularensis, Salmonella

typhi, Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae

Naturally occurring, microbiological

laboratories, state-sponsored programs

Yes for select

agents

Viruses Caliciviruses, Enteroviruses, Hepatitis A/E, Variola Naturally occurring, microbiological

laboratories, 1 state-sponsored programs

Yes for select

agents

Parasites Cryptosporidium parvum, Entamoeba histolytica,

Toxoplasma gondii

Naturally occurring, microbiological

laboratories 1

No

Inorganic chemicals

Corrosives and caustics Hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide Retail, industry No

Cyanide salts or cyanogenics Sodium cyanide, potassium cyanide, amygdalin,

cyanogen chloride, ferricyanide salts

Supplier, industry (esp. electroplating) Yes

Metals Mercury, lead, osmium, their salts, organic compounds

and complexes (even those of iron, cobalt, copper are

toxic at high doses)

Industry, supplier, laboratory Yes 2

Non-metal oxyanions, organo

non-metals

Arsenate, arsenite, selenite salts, organoarsenic,

organoselenium compounds

Some retail, industry, supplier, laboratory Yes 3

Organic chemicals

Fluorinated organics Sodium trifluoroacetate (a rat poison), fluoroalcohols,

fluorinated surfactants

Supplier, industry, laboratory Yes

Hydrocarbons and their oxygenated

and/or

halogenated derivatives

Paint thinners, gasoline, kerosene, ketones, alcohols,

ethers (e.g. methyl tert-butyl ether or MTBE),

halohydrocarbons (e.g. dichloromethane, tetrachloroethene)

Retail, industry, laboratory, supplier No

Insecticides Organophosphates (e.g. Malathion), chlorinated organics

(e.g. DDT), carbamates (e.g. Aldicarb) some alkaloids

(e.g. nicotine)

Retail, industry, supplier (varies with

compound)

Yes

Malodorous, noxious, foul-tasting,

and/or lachrymatory chemicals 4

Thiols (e.g. mercaptoacetic acid, mercaptoethanol), amines

(e.g. cadaverine, putrescine), inorganic esters

(e.g. trimethylphosphite, dimethylsulfate, acrolein)

Laboratory, supplier, police supply,

military depot

Yes

Organics, water-miscible Acetone, methanol, ethylene glycol (antifreeze), phenols,

detergents

Retail, industry, supplier, laboratory No

Pesticides other than insecticides Herbicides (e.g. chlorophenoxy or atrazine derivatives),

rodenticides (e.g. super-warfarins, zinc phosphide,

a-naphthyl thiourea)

Retail, industry, agriculture, laboratory Yes

Continued

P . H . G le ic k / W a te r P o lic

y 8 (2 0 0 6 ) 4 8 1 – 5 0 3

4 9 4

Table 2. (continued)

Class Examples (not exhaustive) Sources Limited access?

Pharmaceuticals Cardiac glycosides, some alkaloids, antineoplastic

chemotherapies, anticoagulants (e.g. warfarin). Illicit drugs

such as LSD, PCP and heroin.

Laboratory, supplier, pharmacy,

some from a natural source

Yes

Chemical warfare agents

Chemical weapons Organophosphate nerve agents (e.g. sarin, tabun, VX),

vesicants, [nitrogen and sulfur mustards (chlorinated alkyl

amines and thioethers, respectively)], Lewisite

Suppliers, military depots, some

laboratories

Yes

Biotoxins

Biologically produced toxins Biotoxins from bacteria, plants, fungi, protists, defensive

poisons in some marine or terrestrial animals. Examples

include ricin, saxitoxin, botulinum toxins, T-2 mycotoxins,

microcystins

Laboratory, supplier, pharmacy,

natural source, 5 state-sponsored

military programs

Yes

Radiological contaminants

Radionuclides Does not refer to nuclear weapons. Radionuclides may be

used in medical devices and industrial irradiators

(cesium-137 iridium-192, cobalt-60, strontium-90). Class

includes both metals and salts.

Laboratory, state sources, waste

facilities

Yes 2

Source: modified from US EPA, 2003 a,b and US NRC, 1995. 1 The quantity of bacteria, viruses or parasites needed for widespread contamination of a water system is not typically available in a typical clinical laboratory,

although the seed cultures could be available. For viruses, vaccine production-grade volumes would be needed, requiring special equipment and facilities,

perhaps with state sponsorship. 2 Availability may be commercially limited for the more toxic materials, especially the heavy metals, which can be quite expensive. Iron and copper are readily

available, but not usually in soluble (bio-available) forms. 3 Availability of arsenicals and selenium compounds in the retail sector has been reduced owing to environmental regulations, but such products can

occasionally be found as part of older inventories of merchandise. Supplies of such materials may generally be too small to cause concern. 4 This grouping includes riot-control agents and other mucous membrane irritants.

5 The quantity available from laboratories, suppliers and pharmacies needed for widespread contamination of a water system is typically not available from

these sources. Many biotoxins that occur naturally would need to be purified or prepared to be of significant concern to water, which could make production

beyond the capabilities of most individuals or small groups.

P . H . G le ic k / W a te r P o lic

y 8 (2 0 0 6 ) 4 8 1 – 5 0 3

4 9 5

produced as biological weapons. Table 4 shows known biological toxins that pose a water threat,

including three known to have been turned into weapons. Both tables also describe the ability of

chlorine – commonly used in municipal water systems – to neutralize these toxins or pathogens. Less

information is available on how these threats may be affected or neutralized by some of the newer,

non-chlorine based water-treatment systems including advanced filtration, ultraviolet disinfection

and ozonation.

In 1970 (sometimes dated “early 1970s”), the US radical group the Weather Underground reportedly

attempted to blackmail a homosexual officer at the US Army’s bacteriological warfare facility in

Fort Detrick, Maryland, into supplying organisms that could then be used to contaminate urban

water supplies (Mullins, 1992; Berkowitz et al., 1972, citing the New York Times of 21 November

1970). According to one source, the terrorists apparently succeeded in gaining the cooperation of the

officer in question but “This plot was discovered when the officer requested issue of several items

unrelated to his work” (Purver, 1995). Another reported incident was the arrest by Los Angeles police

and FBI agents of a man “who was preparing to poison the city’s water system with a biological poison”

(Livingstone, 1982).

Individual and groups have been known to plan and carry out chemical attacks on water systems

in the belief that they can be effective. A few cases of actual chemical contamination of water

Table 3. Biological pathogens considered to be water threats.

Pathogen Type Weaponized Stable in water Chlorine tolerance

Anthrax B Yes 2 years spores Spores resistant

Brucellosis B Yes 20–72 days Unknown

C. perfringens B Probable Common in sewage Resistant

Tularemia B Yes ,90 days Inactivated, 1 ppm, 5 min

Shigellosis B Unknown 2–3 days Inactivated, 0.05 ppm, 10 min

Cholera B Unknown Yes “Easily killed”

Plague B Probable 16 days Unknown

Q Fever R Yes Unknown Unknown

Hepatitis A V Unknown Unknown Inactivated, 0.4 ppm, 30 min

Source: modified from Valcik (1998). B – bacteria; R – rickettsia; V – virus.

Table 4. Biological toxins considered to be water threats.

Toxin Weaponized Stable in water Chlorine tolerance

Botulinum toxin Yes Stable Inactivated at 6 ppm, 20 min

T-2 mycotoxin Probable Stable Resistant

Aflatoxin Yes Probably stable Resistant

Ricin Yes Unknown Resistant at 10 ppm

Staph enterotoxins Probable Probably stable Unknown

Microcystins Possible Probably stable Very resistant at 100 ppm

Anatoxin A Unknown Inactivated in days Unknown

Tetrodotoxin Possible Unknown Inactivated, 50 ppm

Saxitoxin Possible Stable Resistant at 10 ppm

Source: modified from Valcik (1998).

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503496

supplies, or confirmed plans to conduct such attacks, have been reported in the open literature.

In 1972, a right-wing, neo-Nazi group known as the “Order of the Rising Sun”, “dedicated to creating

a new master race”, acquired 30–40 kg of typhoid bacteria cultures to use against water supplies in

Chicago, St. Louis and other midwestern cities (Kupperman & Trent, 1979; Purver, 1995). According

to Ponte (1980), those arrested had “in their possession detailed plans for dumping the deadly germs

into the water supplies”. It is likely that typhoid bacteria, even if introduced into an urban

water supply, would have been destroyed by normal chlorination (US Office of Technology

Assessment, 1991).

In a case of criminal extortion, in 1973 a German biologist threatened to contaminate water supplies

with bacilli of anthrax and botulinum unless he was paid a financial ransom US$8.5 million (Jenkins &

Rubin, 1978; Kupperman & Trent, 1979). The Israeli government reported in 1983 that it had uncovered

a plot by Israeli Arabs to poison the water supply of the city of Galilee with “an unidentified powder”

(Douglass & Livingstone, 1987). In 1985, federal law enforcement authorities discovered that The

Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) – a survivalist group in the Ozark Mountains of

Arkansas – had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium cyanide. Their goal was to poison

water supplies in New York, Chicago and Washington in the belief that this would make the Messiah

return more quickly by punishing unrepentant sinners (Monterey Institute for International Studies

(MIIS), 2004).

A chemical poisoning attempt was reported in March 1992 when lethal concentrations of potassium

cyanide were found in the water tanks at a Turkish Air Force base Istanbul. The Kurdish Workers’ Party

(PKK) claimed credit (Chelyshev, 1992). The media reported that proposals were made at an early

February 1993 meeting of fundamentalist groups in Tehran, under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign

Ministry, to poison the water supplies of major cities in the West “as a possible response to Western

offensives against Islamic organizations and states” (Haeri, 1993).

Responding to the threat of water-related terrorism

No easy estimate of the true risk of water-related terrorism is possible. The fact that there are

numerous examples of actual and planned attacks on water systems in the past suggests that the

risk is real. What is more challenging is evaluating both the probability of future attacks and their

consequences – the separate components of calculating risk. In the absence of any definitive

assessment of risk, however, it is vital to both understand vulnerabilities and to put in place

measures to reduce those vulnerabilities and ultimately the overall risk. This can be done by

reducing the probability of water-related terrorism, the consequences of an attack should one occur,

or both.

Addressing the probability requires a wide range of actions, from reducing the fundamental

motivation for terrorist attacks (not addressed here) to limiting the vulnerability of water resources and

systems through selective and focused efforts of protection and detection. Addressing the

consequences of attacks requires putting in place an array of responses suitable for different kinds

of events. This can include responses like rapid repair teams to fix infrastructure, the development of

redundant delivery and treatment systems, and preparing the health system promptly to detect and treat

water-related illnesses.

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 497

Denying physical access

Perhaps the most fundamental action that can be taken to protect water systems is to limit or deny

physical access to vulnerable points. Sometimes this may be as easy as locking gates or buildings, or

reducing public access to sensitive locations. As examples of new activities put in place since September

11 2001, the Coast Guard increased patrols in the area of Chicago’s water intakes from Lake Michigan.

New York City increased the number of daily water samples it takes. California has reduced access to

some dams and pumping plants and blocked off some roads close to water reservoirs. Many water

agencies have stationed guards at “critical sites” (Center for Defense Information, 2002).

Among the recommendations for reducing the physical risk to infrastructure are:

. (Facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, storage facilities, pumping plants, intake facilities and

control systems) should be identified and inventoried. Physical access to those most critical to

operations, or most vulnerable to attack, should be controlled. . (Access to water distribution maps and facility plans should be controlled when there is a clear

security risk. . (Lighting, surveillance cameras and motion detectors should be installed in appropriate places. . (To prevent hacking, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) for monitoring and

controlling water should not be connected to the Internet or should be connected to appropriate

electronic security, firewalls and passwords. . (On-site water treatment chemicals should be kept in secure facilities and they should be inventoried

on a regular basis.

Often, however, this approach is not possible, given the vast exposed length of pipelines or aqueducts,

or the public uses of lakes, reservoirs, rivers and land. As a result, limiting physical access is an

important, but not sufficient approach.

Detection and protection challenges

Unlike more traditional weapons used by terrorists, water-related threats pose some special challenges

in the areas of detection and response. As noted above, an attack on a water system may be done

surreptitiously through the introduction of a chemical or biological agent. In this case, unless immediate

publicity is an objective of the attack, the first evidence may be increased incidences of sickness and

death. Identifying the nature of the illness, the source of the contamination and then identifying and

quantifying the specific threat could take a substantial amount of time.

New security measures – such as more extensive monitoring of pipelines, water supplies or more

guards at power plants – will be expensive and mean higher costs for consumers. Nevertheless, it seems

clear that some such measures will be required. In 2002, the US Congress passed the Public Health

Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act), which

President Bush signed into law on 12 June 2002. Among other things, the Bioterrorism Act established

requirements that community water systems serving more than 3,300 individuals perform a system-

specific vulnerability assessment for potential terrorist threats, including intentional contamination

(http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/community.html). This sort of assessment, if properly done, can

provide valuable information for planning and protection.

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503498

Early warning systems (EWS)

“Early warning” monitoring systems can help to identify contamination events early enough to permit

an effective response. An EWS must be reliable: it should minimize the potential for significant numbers

of both false negatives (missing a true event) and false positives (reporting a false event). It must be easy

to install and operate, provide continuous monitoring and result in rapid notification of an event.

Continuous monitoring reduces the likelihood that contamination events will be missed. The

development of standard monitoring systems would reduce cost, permit sharing among users and

facilitate repair and replacement (Foran & Brosnan, 2000).

New and developing technologies are being developed rapidly to detect pathogens in real time, both in

source water and water distribution systems (US EPA, 2005). Included among these technologies are

DNA microchip arrays (Betts, 1999a), immunologic techniques (Betts, 1999b), microrobots (Hewish,

1998) and a variety of optical tools, molecular probes and other techniques (Pelley, 1999; Sobsey, 1999).

Such technology would be useful for a wide range of purposes, including regular water-quality

monitoring at municipal systems, but wide development and dissemination of such systems is moving

forward slowly. Most of these technologies are not yet commercially available, nor have they been tested

in large drinking water systems. Some organizations are now working to improve both available

technology and knowledge about tools useful for detection and response. The American Water Works

Association (AWWA), for example, offers seminars on these topics for water managers. In 2003 and

2004, the US Environmental Protection Agency published a series of guides for water utilities to help

them identify and respond to contamination attacks (US EPA, 2003b). Similarly, in 2003 the World

Health Organization updated and released a comparable international planning document (WHO, 2003).

Public and governmental responses

It is extremely unlikely that physical barriers, early warning systems and other preventative measures will

be adequate to prevent all attacks. It is also possible that threats alone will trigger reactions. A threat to a

drinking water system, whether real or a hoax, may cause as much of a problem as an actual terrorist act. As

a result, it is vital to develop tools and advanced plans to respond to both real and threatened events.

Responses may include public advisories, temporary shutdown of the system, identification and use of

alternative water supplies, chemical and biological treatment and disinfection, additional data gathering

or monitoring, epidemiologic studies, health interventions or some combination of these actions.

Responses to actual events will depend on the nature of the attack, the population affected and

characteristics of the water system itself.

A key component to the success of any response will be the advance preparation of a process or plan

that provides guidelines for all appropriate stakeholders, including water users, emergency responders

and law enforcement agencies, water utility staff and community leaders and local media. Such a plan

should be considered part of comprehensive emergency planning for a variety of threats to public health,

both waterborne and non-waterborne.

There is already extensive experience of emergency response plans developed in different

communities, although recent experience with Hurricane Katrina has revealed gaping holes in those

plans. The US Environmental Protection Agency, American Water Works Association, American

Society of Civil Engineers, US Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Infrastructure

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 499

Protection Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Emergency Management and

Emergency Preparedness Office of the US Health and Human Services all offer some guidelines for

water plans and some effort has been made to develop post-event responses (Simon, 1997; Macintyre

et al., 2000; Waeckerle, 2000; US EPA, 2003a,b; American Water Works Association, 2006). Local,

regional and national planning, however, are still inadequate.

Water security policy in the United States

Even prior to 11 September 2001, analyses were prepared evaluating the risks and threats of terrorism

(see, for example, Gilmore Commission, 1999, 2000). The focus of US security policy, however,

underwent a fundamental shift in 2001, toward domestic security and challenges. Title IV of the

Bioterrorism Act of 2002 pertains to drinking water security and safety requiring vulnerability

assessments and emergency response plans for most community water systems. Water systems must

certify to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) within six months of the

completion of the vulnerability assessment that they have completed an emergency response plan.

According to the EPA in February 2006, all large- and medium-size systems had completed their

assessments; 97% of small systems had completed assessments (Johnson, personal communication, 6

February 2006). No separate information is available on the adequacy or comprehensiveness of the

assessments, or whether actual response plans have been put in place.

In early 2006, the US EPA announced a new effort called the WaterSentinel Initiative to design, deploy

and evaluate a water contamination warning system. This program was called for by the Homeland

Security Presidential Directive 9, which charges the EPA to develop surveillance and monitoring systems

to provide early detection and awareness of water contamination events. HSPD-9 also directs the EPA to

develop a network of integrated federal and state water testing laboratories (US EPA, 2006).

Conclusions

There is a long history of water-related violence and conflicts, including what must be categorized as

environmental terrorism targeting water resources and infrastructure. The threat of future attacks is real,

and the plans for responding to such attacks appear to be inadequate. The actual risks of serious human

health consequences are less clear, given the complex nature of our developed water systems,

protections already put in place to identify and eliminate biological and chemical contaminants and the

attractiveness and vulnerability of other targets.

These protections must be strengthened in areas where clear risk assessments indicate high

vulnerability, especially where critical infrastructure is exposed or where rapid monitoring can provide

time for effective response. It is vital that sensitive water systems be protected through a combination of

improved physical barriers, more extensive real-time chemical and biological monitoring and treatment

and the development of smart and integrated response strategies at all levels.

Among the best defenses against terrorist threats to water systems are public confidence in water

management systems, rapid and effective water quality monitoring, and strong and effective information

dissemination. New tools for communicating with water users may be valuable in countering the threat

of water-related terrorism and ensuring public confidence and calm. Such tools will also have value

during natural disasters and accidents.

P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503500

It is equally important, however, that the risks not be exaggerated, so that limited financial resources

can be spent efficiently and effectively, and so that the public is not made fearful of risks that are low or

manageable. The best approaches will require careful assessment of both the probability and the

consequences of attacks. By evaluating both, it will be easier to identify vulnerabilities and put in place

appropriate and measured responses to those vulnerabilities.

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