Gradue Level Case Study and Journal
MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 1
Course Learning Outcomes for Unit VII Upon completion of this unit, students should be able to:
3. Discuss the threat posed by radiological, chemical, and biological devices. 3.1 Demonstrate how the terrorist network impacts trade and acquisition of nuclear arms and
WMD. 3.2 Identify the reasons for companies participating in illicit trading and production of materials
needed for WMD construction.
7. Evaluate medical response capabilities and strategies in relation to the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons by terrorist groups. 7.1 Examine how the strategic placement of supplies can impact the health and safety of the
population.
Course/Unit Learning Outcomes
Learning Activity
3.1 Lesson, Chapter 4.5, Case Study
3.2 Lesson, Chapter 4.5, Case Study
7.1 Lesson, Chapter 4.5, Case Study
Reading Assignment Chapter 4.5: Case Studies, pp. 617-633, 636-654, 657-680, 686-696
Unit Lesson Many countries and nations require assistance in the acquisition of the materials needed to construct nuclear weapons. Vital equipment, special materials, and technological know-how are all necessary ingredients in developing a nuclear yielding device and are traditionally difficult to come by—except for technologically advanced nations. However, recent history has shown that this is no longer the case. Major terrorist groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have assembled enormous resources and technically skilled scientists and engineers, and given the right access to fissile material and enough time, could produce a nuclear bomb. Several nations’ weapon construction has gone undetected for many years, and so has their ability to trade weapon secrets with other nations. The existence of the global proliferation network by Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was active for nearly two decades prior to being discovered. Through this smuggling network, nuclear technology and weapons designs were provided to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, bypassing multiple layers of national as well as international export controls systems designed to prevent it. Furthermore, the discovery of A. Q. Khan’s network shows that nuclear technology is no longer the resource for industrially advanced countries but can be (and is being) sought by well-financed and resourced terrorist groups. Pakistan’s nuclear expert assistance to al Qaeda in Afghanistan has also been well documented, but, like the A. Q. Khan network, it was discovered after the fact—long after the potential proliferation damage had been done (Howard & Forest, 2013).
UNIT VII STUDY GUIDE
The Terrorist Impact on Commercialism and Training
MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 2
UNIT x STUDY GUIDE
Title
What we learned from these experiences is that although Illicit trade of these weapons is not inevitable or unstoppable in most cases, steady vigilance is required as many of these rogue nations and large terrorist groups continually seek an opening to obtain the parts they are missing to complete their design and achieve their ambition. Furthermore, as we can see by virulent rhetoric coming out of North Korea and Iran today, these nations and terrorist groups have no compunction about using nuclear weapons if they can get them. Therefore, they are also continually developing the capability, or currently have the capability, to deliver a nuclear weapon with some degree of success. Fortunately, most nations, and all terrorist groups, depend on foreign suppliers to provide the materials and components that they do not possess. While smuggling networks throughout the world allow many of the terrorist organizations the opportunity to purchase supplies, obtain their goods, and go through a direct order supply agent, one of the vulnerabilities is the ordering process. This process leaves tale-tell signs that can be detected and traced back to illicit programs. Legitimate companies may also supply the terrorist groups because they are paid exorbitant amounts of money for the materials they need. Although the trade is illicit, the high pay rates may be too difficult to turn away. New business allows the companies in third-world nations to flourish and produce more materials. New suppliers are emerging in the developing markets and are not under the same strict guidelines from the U.N. or other first world nations. If there is a way to identify the leakage of nuclear materials, then international prosecution can demand harsh sentences against those who are attempting this illicit form of trading abroad. Three steps can be taken in an effort to maintain lower levels of trading and trafficking:
1. Enforce universal laws and norms against the trafficking of nuclear materials. 2. Establish more secure nuclear assets. 3. Work toward the detection of nuclear trade and trafficking globally.
Of these three steps, the most blatant shortcoming is the lack of systematic, universally adapted methods to detect nuclear trafficking. On the front line in detection is the International Atomic Energy Agency and the additional protocol, which makes a country’s nuclear program much more transparent and much easier to detect when a nation is harboring a secret nuclear facility. Under this protocol, inspectors can be much more proactive in investigating questionable exports and imports. Another way to improve the detection of nuclear trafficking is to expand government-industry cooperation. Companies that export sensitive or dual use nuclear equipment can provide an early-warning detection opportunity and provide expert analysis that most governmental organizations do not possess. Rather than ignoring potentially illicit trade inquiries, they can strengthen the nonproliferation regime immeasurably by reporting them as well. Nowhere more than in the United States, where technological knowledge is the greatest and export control is the weakest, is a systematic way needed to contact government officials about questionable inquiries. The industries most likely to see potential trafficking activities and inappropriate inquiries need to be able to provide early warnings to various agencies. The current efforts used as a first line of defense are not adequate to deter, catch, and prosecute the traffickers in delivering dangerous nuclear goods. As we have said, the positive news is that few can build nuclear weapons on their own. However, better measures must be put in place, and we must be able to ensure that illegal trafficking does not continue and that legal trade does not become limited across international borders. Implementing universal laws against nuclear trade, establishing more security to protect nuclear assets, and achieving earlier detection of nuclear trade are necessary to ensure the minimum level of international nonproliferation efforts. Anthrax poses another threat to U.S. society and daily lives. The anthrax attack of 2001 offered invaluable opportunities to learn, train, and educate others in the public health responses to such an attack. Historically, an infectious outbreak is discovered within the limited geographical region. Clinical methods are applied, and health officers are able to determine the most threatening cases of the spreading illness. The attack of 2001 was a bit different; the outbreak occurred in five different geographical regions that did not have adequate processes to cope with this type of situation. Such a multi-front attack had not been considered before, and it revealed an unacceptable fragility in the U.S. Public Health system vital to national security. Few elected officials and national security professionals have a real understanding of the degree to which a mere 22 cases of anthrax totally disrupted public health agencies and hospitals involved in the bioterrorist attack (Howard & Forest, 2013). Even more disconcerting, most of the vulnerabilities that
MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 3
UNIT x STUDY GUIDE
Title
manifested themselves during this response and recovery remain unaddressed. Clearly, the traditional health decision-making process was not adequate to handle an attack on this scale or to cope with the extent, pace, and complexities of events surrounding the attacks. Policies and recommendations differed between states, and in some instances, local health departments were reluctant to initiate public health initiatives by recommending prophylactic antibiotics without CDC guidance. In other cases, health department decisions were premature and conflicted with the eventual CDC recommendations. Another lesson learned from the 2001 anthrax attacks was that public health departments were unprepared to handle the media and address the issues surrounding public health, proper protection, and the avoidance of any further contamination. In essence, the media lacked access to reliable information because the public health departments were understaffed with media-savvy professionals who could interact well with the media. Their communications systems were not robust, and they had great difficulty assimilating large volumes of information and reporting credible statements to the public in real time. Furthermore, the lack of personnel, resources, and an overarching operational system to combat such an event were evident from the very beginning. Public health laboratories were stretching their already limited resources, communications technologies were inadequate, limited personnel were available, and there continued to be disagreements with public health leadership that crippled the efforts of the groups attempting to mitigate the situation. In an effort to combat these issues, it will take considerable amounts of time, funding, and a change in visionary leadership in an effort to effectively deal with the issues of bioterrorism. Since the attacks of 9/11, there have been substantial resources, and policies that have been implemented in an effort to mitigate bioterrorism attacks. The creation of regional training facilities, training teams, and the use of emergency responder training centers serving as an All-Hazards Training Center (AHTC) are necessary to combat the global turbulence that is projected from other nations. Biological and chemical weapons have been a threat leading back to Roman times. Bacteria, viruses, and other toxins have caused thousands of deaths. This is usually due to the lack of education regarding health, hygiene, and a particular waste management plan. Today, global devastation can occur with the optimization of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive (CBRNE) devices. The potential has increased over the past decade for a bioterrorism attack, and emergency responders are at risk more than ever. Another area for consideration regarding training and development is containment of a pandemic flu situation. Pandemics are, of course, unpredictable. The proper preparation with organizations, the CDC, and the WHO will reduce the pandemic’s adverse effects on human life. Furthermore, this is effective preparation for the United States in case of a bioterrorism attack. The strategic placement of medicines, supplies, and other essential provisions to combat the flu may also be an indication of useful locations for readily available supplies in the case of a bioterrorism event. The possibility that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons or the materials used to make one are increasing, and it is becoming more likely that an attack could occur. The likelihood of using nuclear weapons is also on the rise. Because of these realities, there will be more focus on nuclear proliferation, attacks using attaché cases in multiple locations, and ways to decontaminate or prepare emergency and first responders.
Reference
Howard, R. D., & Forest, J. (2013). Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 4
UNIT x STUDY GUIDE
Title
Suggested Reading In order to access the following resource, click the link below.
This article, “A.Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network” describes in detail the development and extent of this smuggling network that existed in secret for two decades. It also contains a number of references that may be useful for further study. You are encouraged to review it. MacCalman, M. (2016). A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(1), 104-118.
Retrieved from http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1506&context=jss
Learning Activities (Nongraded) Nongraded Learning Activities are provided to aid students in their course of study. You do not have to submit them. If you have questions, contact your instructor for further guidance and information. You have been assigned as the the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director for your county, and you want to set up an all-hazards training center to prepare for any type of catastrophic emergency. Detail a report to county administrators on your plan to include what is needed to set up this center, why it is needed, how funds can be provided, and why it will benefit the population to responding to any emergency. Use available resources (especially from FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/training) to support your report.