Attached question
AJPH HISTORY
September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9 AJPH Rosner and Markowitz Peer Reviewed Public Health Then and Now 1395
“Ain’t Necessarily So!”: The Brake Industry’s Impact on Asbestos Regulation in the 1970s David Rosner, PhD, MPH, and Gerald Markowitz, PhD
Canada is proposing a ban on asbestos, and the US Environmental Protection Agency has listed it
among the first 10 materials it is investigating under the new Toxic Substances Control Act revisions.
However, this effort is currently running up against enormous industry and political opposition.
Here, we detail the activities in the early 1970s of the Friction Materials Standards Institute, an
industry trade association, to stifle earlier attempts to regulate asbestos use in brake linings, one
of the oldest and most obvious sources of asbestos exposure to mechanics, among others. (Am J
Public Health. 2017: 1395–1399. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2017.303901)
At the end of 2016, the US Environmental Protec- tion Agency (EPA) proposed
asbestos, the cause of fi brotic
lung disease and cancer, as one
of the 10 industrial chemi-
cals to be evaluated under the
newly revised Toxic Substances
Control Act.1 Under the new
act, a risk evaluation of asbestos
is to be completed within three
years and, if asbestos is found
to be an “unreasonable risk to
humans and the environment,”
the EPA is required to mitigate
that risk, possibly through a
ban, within two more years.2
By 1970, asbestos was used
in some 3000 products, such as
roof shingles, fl oor tiles, house
siding, ironing boards, and
particularly in brakes, among
other consumer items. Today, this
carcinogenic material is banned
in the United States in a few
products, including corrugated
paper and fl ooring felt, but it is
still legal in brakes and clutches
and a host of construction and
industrial materials, such as vinyl
fl oor tile, roofi ng materials, and
cement pipe, among others.
Consequently, it is in millions of
homes, gas stations, and repair
shops across the country.3
Historians have documented
one major reason for the
delay in banning this known
carcinogen: private industry
trade groups stifl ed earlier eff orts
at regulation.4 Here, we look at
the specifi c eff orts of one such
group, the Friction Materials
Standards Institute (FMSI),
to forestall the regulation of
asbestos used in brakes and
clutches, one of the oldest
sources of asbestos exposure.
We examine the industry’s
reaction to the newly created
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA)
dramatic reduction of the
Permissible Exposure Limit
(PEL) in the early 1970s. There
is a literature that addresses
the current medical and
epidemiological evidence of the
dangers from asbestos brakes.5
Here, however, using internal
corporate documents, most of
which have not been previously
reviewed but are now available
at https://toxicdocs.org,6 we
explore what the industry
understood about the dangers to
mechanics from asbestos.
The concern about asbestos
in brakes refl ects the broader
acknowledgment of the impact
of industrial toxins on workers
and consumers in the 20th
century.7 In the early 1930s,
E. R. A. Merewether identifi ed
the dust produced by “the
sawing, grinding and turning
in the dry state of articles
composed wholly or partly
of asbestos such as motor car
brake and clutch linings” when
inhaled as a cause of asbestosis,
the fi brotic condition that slowly
strangles aff ected workers.8
Merewether’s early observation
that any material that contained
asbestos could prove to be a
hazard was affi rmed in the
immediate postwar period, as
offi cials noted that “asbestos
has been incorporated into
… protective clothing, brake
linings, cements, … and other
forms of insulation” and that
exposure to asbestos dust caused
by “the breakdown of the native
mineral” was also associated with
cancer of the lung.9 By the mid-
1960s, asbestos was associated
with asbestosis, lung cancer,
and mesothelioma, a cancer
of the lining of the lung and
abdominal cavity, leading the
British Ford Motor Company
to host a conference in 1969 on
the possible dangers presented
to brake mechanics and those
installing or replacing brake
linings.10
In 1970, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act,
establishing OSHA and
the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), was passed.11
Almost immediately, the FMSI
established an Asbestos Study
Committee (ASC), which
focused on the possible impact
of OSHA regulations on brake
and clutch manufacturers.
Working with the Asbestos
AJPH September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9
AJPH HISTORY
1396 Public Health Then and Now Peer Reviewed Rosner and Markowitz
Information Association of
North America (AIA), another
trade association, it sought to
forestall any drastic regulation.12
Among the ASC’s fi rst acts was
to meet with OSHA offi cials
who had issued an emergency
PEL of 12 fi bers per cubic
centimeter in 1971 and, a year
later, reduced it further to 5
fi bers per cubic centimeter, with
an even greater reduction to 2
fi bers per cubic centimeter by
1976.13
ACKNOWLEDGING DANGER PRIVATELY
The FMSI was aware of why
OSHA was considering this
reduction. At its meeting in June
1972, the ASC received a report
that Rohl and colleagues had
presented a paper at a meeting of
the American Industrial Hygiene
Association, which was held at
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
in New York City. According to
the ASC, the paper revealed that
“the dust concentrations during
the blowing off of brakes are in
excess of the fi ve fi bers per cc
[cubic centimeter] allowance.”14
They acknowledged that
exposure to asbestos dust was a
possibility, if not a probability, for
workers installing and replacing
brakes.15
This raised the question
for the ASC as to whether
the manufacturers, under the
new OSHA regulations, had
an obligation to warn workers
of dangers they potentially
faced.16 Hence, a new rationale
for not warning was developed:
they publically pronounced
that asbestos, when “locked
in” to fabrics, lacquers, plastics,
or other fi nished products,
was not a danger as it could
not be released into the
air.17 In private, however, the
committee members noted
that because their products
were friction materials, there
was an inherent danger in the
“handling [by employees] of
the products with supposedly
locked-in asbestos during …
drilling, grinding, inspection and
boxing.” Furthermore, there was
the potential for the release of
asbestos during “the handling of
the brake lining or clutch facing
by the customer” even far from
the shop fl oor. One member
of the ASC suggested that “a
notifi cation be put in boxes in
brake linings or clutch facings,”
but this was quickly shot down
when another member objected
because “he felt it was another
‘red fl ag’ that would bring more
harm to the industry than the
alleged good that would come
from enclosing such notices.”18
Despite public assurances
that using “locked-in” asbestos
was safe, E. W. Drislane, the
executive director of the FMSI,
wrote to the ASC about an
internal survey that revealed “the
problem [that] in many cases
subsequent operations will be
performed—cutting, grooving,
drilling and grinding [and that]
these subsequent operations
can produce concentrations of
asbestos fi bers in excess of the
current exposure limits.”19 “Most
members of the Committee”
believed that the OSHA
standard was “exceeded in many
areas such as inspection, drilling,
and grinding where there is
not adequate dust collection
machinery.”20
AIN’T NECESSARILY SO In mid-1973, “Ike” Weaver,
an engineer with the Raybestos–
Manhattan Corporation
and chair of the ASC, gave a
major address to the entire
membership that provides a
summary of what the industry
understood about the dangers
of asbestos. He informed them
about the recent meeting of
the International Agency for
Research on Cancer at which
“the most important item
[was] the incrimination of all
major types of asbestos as causal
agents of carcinoma, particularly
mesothelioma.” He further
warned that “since most of us
[in the FMSI] use substantial
amounts of chrysotile asbestos in
our formulations association of
this material with mesothelioma
and other types of cancer is of
serious concern.”21
For an industry that
identifi ed friction as the primary
characteristic of its products,
he knew “of no way any of us
can be absolutely sure that his
friction products, regardless
of whether they are sold as
original equipment or on the
replacement market, …[would
not] result in excessive exposure
“Look What Makes the Disc Brake Brake.” From the 1930s on, sawing, cutting, sanding, or abrading asbestos- containing products in any way was identified as a major concern. Here, we see an “asbestos-based” Johns–Manville disk brake ad from the 1960s with no mention of any potential danger.
September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9 AJPH Rosner and Markowitz Peer Reviewed Public Health Then and Now 1397
AJPH HISTORY
of workers or bystanders to
airborne asbestos fi bre.” He
was “appalled to learn … of
instances where this problem has
occurred.”22
He objected to those in
his industry who argued that
most workers were exposed
only “relatively intermittently”
to respirable asbestos dust: “I
say emphatically this just ain’t
necessarily so!” Not only did
“large volume replacement
users [perhaps chains such as
Midas and Meineke] present
major potential hazards,” but
“even small job shops can
needlessly expose people to
high fi bre concentrations if
operations are performed
without controls.” There was
the risk for dread disease
even when exposures were
minimal or of short duration.23
“To me,” Weaver concluded,
“labelling all containers or
packagers of asbestos-containing
friction material is the very
least the industry can do to
fulfi ll its moral obligation to
its customers, their employees
and the public and at the
same time conform with
minimum requirements of the
Occupational Safety and Health
Act.”24
Further evidence about the
potential dangers to mechanics,
including cancer, was provided
with the publication of the Rohl
paper on New York City garages
that the ASC had heard about
before. The ASC acknowledged
that “some of the housekeeping
conditions in these shops
[were] deplorable.” And they
acknowledged that conditions
in New York were “perhaps
no worse than in other shops
throughout the country.”25
COLLAPSING DEFENSES By the mid-1970s, the FMSI
had learned that both national
and international experts,
NIOSH, the International Labor
Organization, the International
Agency for Research on Cancer,
and other researchers agreed that
the PEL was irrelevant to the
question of cancer.26 In addition,
one of the leading fi gures in
industrial medicine and the
leading asbestos researcher,
Irving Selikoff , echoed these
ideas, writing that the “only safe
concentration is zero fi ber per
cc.”27
In April 1975, as the date
for the proposed reduction of
the PEL to 2 fi bers per cubic
centimeter approached, the FMSI
faced a dilemma. They claimed
they were already “having dif-
fi culty meeting the 5 fi bers/cc
limit,” and worried that “it would
be near impossible to meet the
2 fi bers/cc limit due July 1,
1976.” Some on the ASC “sug-
gested that the industry should
oppose this change,”28 and Guy
Gabriellson, vice president of the
Asbestos Information Association,
said that the industry should
simply reject OSHA’s and
NIOSH’s position.29
GROWING PRESSURE, GROWING EVIDENCE
The situation was becoming
dire for the FMSI as they
faced growing pressure to
acknowledge that there was
no exposure below which
workers could be protected
from asbestos-induced cancers.
The pressure came from
NIOSH, the International
Labor Organization, and others.
Selikoff predicted an “epidemic
of asbestos related death and
disease in years to come.”
The FMSI Board of Directors
was alarmed by the growing
consensus that “no known dose
level [of asbestos exposure was]
‘safe.’ ” Furthermore, Selikoff
and his colleagues were “actively
promoting” the view that the
hazards were “associated with
asbestos emissions”—specifi cally
to mechanics—“from brake
lining wear and from brake
service operations.”30
The pressures became even
greater in July 1975, after
NIOSH called a meeting in
Washington of an automobile
company, union representatives,
the major asbestos companies,
researchers, and a trade
association representative.31
They learned that the medical
literature “revealed at least
four cases of these rare tumors
[mesotheliomas] in persons who
were employed in jobs involving
automobile brake servicing.”32
The liability dimensions of the
problem facing the industry
were frightening: “It has been
reported that approximately
900,000 persons are employed
in such work in the United
This ad from Raybestos-Manhattan emphasizes the “safety” of the asbestos brakes, despite the fact that by this point, it was clear that exposure to asbestos dust could cause cancer.
AJPH September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9
AJPH HISTORY
1398 Public Health Then and Now Peer Reviewed Rosner and Markowitz
States. It is recommended that
stringent industrial hygiene
measure to control exposure
be implemented as rapidly as
possible.”33 In a separate article,
the industry learned that “during
brake-lining maintenance and
repair, workmen in garages,
service stations and brake repair
shops are exposed to asbestos
and thus may be subject to
serious cancer risk. Others, at
some distance from the repair
work, are perhaps subject to the
same hazard.”34
RESISTANCE RAMPS UP At the same time that these
articles were being published,
OSHA proposed to reduce the
asbestos standard even lower,
which the FMSI described
as a “drastic reduction.”35
The ASC began to mobilize
committee members and the
general membership of the
FMSI to oppose OSHA’s
recommendation that the PEL
be reduced to 0.5 fi bers per
cubic centimeter instead of the
2 fi bers per cubic centimeter
standard that was scheduled to
go into eff ect July 1, 1976. In
June, they proposed a three-part
strategy. First, they intended
to educate their membership
on how to comply with the
2-fi bers per cubic centimeter
standard to go into eff ect in the
following month and further to
recognize “the impact that will
be required to cope with the
0.5 fi bre standard, should it be
imposed.” Second, they planned
to oppose the more stringent
standard with “every possible
means at our disposal,” and “to
enlighten government offi cials
of what informed members
within our industry regard as the
complete impracticality of the
[proposed] 0.5 standard.” Finally,
they planned on “cooperating
with the Asbestos Information
Association and the Institute
Offi ce in their response to
OSHA on the revised standard,”
an eff ort they believed had
already borne fruit.36 In the
end, the standard would not
be reduced until the mid-
1980s,37 and they congratulated
themselves and the AIA on
forestalling the reduction of the
standard. The FMSI thanked the
AIA for “the outstanding job
[they did] in rebutting some of
the reasons for OSHA’s stringent
proposals.”38 The committee
bragged that “we have been told
that our eff orts … have been
effi cacious.”39
The infl uence of the asbestos
industry can be observed
directly by comparing the
warnings the FMSI and AIA
recommended for gas stations
and auto repair shops with those
of the government. NIOSH in
1976 suggested that a sign be
posted at the entrance to the
work area of these garages that
specifi cally warned: “Asbestos;
Dust Hazard; Avoid Breathing
Dust; Wear Assigned Protective
Equipment; Do Not Remain
in Area Unless your Work
Requires it; Breathing Asbestos
Dust May Cause Asbestosis and
Cancer.”40 The FMSI and the
AIA adopted similar wording,
with one crucial diff erence:
they did not use the word
“cancer.” Instead, they adopted
OSHA’s wording from the 1972
standard:41 “Breathing Asbestos
Dust May be Hazardous to Your
Health.”42 As a result of the
FMSI and AIA’s opposition, the
lowering of OSHA’s PEL was
signifi cantly delayed. In addition,
they trivialized the dangers to
workers by not including cancer
in their warnings. As a result,
they belittled and undercut the
warnings of NIOSH, Irving
Selikoff , and many other
scientists that workers were
putting their lives at risk by
working with products made
with asbestos.
For policymakers, it is
important to understand the
tragic history we relate here. It
took 45 years of work on the
part of physicians, laboratory
scientists, regulators, and citizens
to achieve these monumental
victories for public health, but
all of this work can be undone
if the current administration in
Washington follows through
on its threats to undercut the
EPA and other federal agencies.
There are few materials in the
modern environment that are
documented to be as hazardous
as asbestos. It would be tragic if
all this work was to be undone
by new lobbying eff orts aimed
at a new administration and
EPA administrator particularly
receptive to industry’s siren call
to deregulate.43
ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Rosner is with the Center for the
History and Ethics of Public Health,
Department of Sociomedical Sciences,
Mailman School of Public Health, and the
Department of History, Columbia University,
New York, NY. Gerald Markowitz is with the
Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, John
Jay College, and the Department of History,
Graduate Center, both of the City University
of New York, New York, NY.
Correspondence should be sent to David
Rosner, Center for the History and Ethics of
Public Health, Department of Sociomedical
Sciences, Columbia University, Mailman
School of Public Health, 722 West 168th St,
Room 934, New York, NY 10032 (e-mail:
dr289@columbia.edu). Reprints can be
ordered at http://www.ajph.org by clicking the
“Reprints” link.
This article was accepted May 4, 2017.
doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2017.303901
CONTRIBUTORS The authors contributed equally to the
research, writing, and conceptualization
of this article.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We acknowledge that many of the
primary source documents were gathered
in the process of litigation regarding
asbestos-related diseases. These documents
are available online at http://www.
toxicdocs.org, a Web site of corporate
memos, letters, reports, and other articles
developed through the cooperative eff orts
of the Center for the History and Ethics
of Public Health, Columbia University
and the City University of New York.
We have appeared as expert witnesses on
behalf of plaintiff s in asbestos lawsuits.
ENDNOTES 1. This revision is now known as the
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety
for the 21st Century Act.
2. Environmental Protection Agency,
“News Releases From Headquarters:
EPA Names First Chemicals for Re-
view Under New TSCA Legislation;
Agency Answers Call to Move For-
ward on Chemical Reform, Naming
Asbestos Among the First to Undergo
Risk Evaluation,” November 11, 2016.
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/
epa-names-first-chemicals-review-under-
new-tsca-legislation (accessed December
29, 2016).
3. Environmental Protection Agency,
“US Federal Bans on Asbestos.” https://
www.epa.gov/asbestos/us-federal-bans-
asbestos#main-content (accessed Decem-
ber 29, 2016). See also Kathleen Ruff,
“Asbestos Lobby Launches Attack to
Undermine Upcoming UN Conference
on Trade in Hazardous Substances.”
http://www.rightoncanada.ca/?p=3963
(accessed April 17, 2017).
4. See, for example, Barry Castleman,
Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 3rd
edition (Englewood, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1990); Gerald Markowitz and
David Rosner, “ ‘Unleashed Upon an
Unsuspecting World’: The Asbestos
Information Association and Its Role
in Perpetuating a National Epidemic,”
American Journal of Public Health 106, no.
5 (2016): 834–840.
5. See Castleman, Asbestos, pp 443–479,
for one of the first reviews of the
existing scientific evidence of the dangers
of asbestos in brake linings.
6. These documents are available on the
Web site https://www.toxicdocs.org, a
collection of nearly 6 000 000 corporate
memos, studies, letters, and notes
gathered through a variety of law suits
over toxic materials.
7. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz,
“A ‘Gift of God’? The Public Health
Controversy Over Leaded Gasoline
During the 1920s,” American Journal of
Public Health 75, no. 4 (1985): 344–352;
William Graebner, “Hegemony Through
Science: Information Engineering and
Lead Toxicology, 1925–1965,” in
David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz,
eds, Dying for Work: Workers’ Safety
and Health in Twentieth Century
America (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1987), 140–159;
David Egilman and Marion Billings,
“Abuse of Epidemiology: Automobile
Manufacturers Manufacture a Defense
to Asbestos Liability,” International
Journal of Occupational and Environmental
September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9 AJPH Rosner and Markowitz Peer Reviewed Public Health Then and Now 1399
AJPH HISTORY
16. Title 29, Labor, Chapter XVII—
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Department of Labor,
Part 1910—Occupational Safety
and Health Standards, “Standard for
Exposure to Asbestos Dust,” Federal
Register 37 (1972): 11321: “Caution
Labels shall be affixed to all raw
materials, mixtures, scrap, waste, debris,
and other products containing asbestos
fibers or to their containers, except that
no label is required where asbestos fibers
have been modified by a bonding agent,
coating, binder, or other material so
that during any reasonably foreseeable
use, handling, storage, disposal,
processing, or transportation, no airborne
concentrations of asbestos fibers in
excess of the exposure limits prescribed
in paragraph (b) of this section will be
released.”
17. Ibid, p. 11319: “Employers in
general strongly contend that finished
products that effectively entrap asbestos
fibers, so that these would not be released
in the normal use of the products, should
not be required to be labelled.”
18. FMSI, Asbestos Study Committee,
“Minutes,” August 17, 1972.
19. E. W. Drislane to Asbestos Study
Committee, “Interpretation of OSHA
Labelling Requirements,” November
6, 1972.
20. FMSI, Asbestos Study Committee,
“Minutes,” February 16, 1973.
21. FMSI, Annual Meeting, “Minutes,”
June 27–28, 1973. Weaver noted that
“risk is greatest with crocidolite, less
with amosite and apparently still less
with chrysotile.”
22. FMSI, Annual Meeting, “Minutes,”
June 27–28, 1973.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. FMSI, Asbestos Study Committee,
“Minutes,” June 14, 1974.
26. The International Labor
Organization’s “Meeting of Experts on
Safe Use of Asbestos” stated that “the
2 fibres/ml standard should be regarded
as an interim concentration related to
fibrogenic effects and not to carcinogenic
effects, for which no standards exist at
the present time.” See Report of
International Labor Organization,
“Meeting of Experts on Safe Use of
Asbestos,” in Geneva, December 11–18,
1973, in “Asbestos Study Committee
Report,” June 1974, attached to Minutes
of Annual Meeting, June 18–19, 1975.
27. FMSI Board of Directors,
“Minutes,” June 25, 1974.
28. See also FMSI, Asbestos Study
Committee, “Minutes,” April 28, 1975.
29. See: Gerald Markowitz and David
Rosner, “Unleashed on an Unsuspecting
World,”: The Asbestos Information
Association and Its Role in Perpetuating
a National Epidemic,” AJPH, 106(May,
2016), p.838.
30. FMSI, Board of Directors, “Minutes,”
June 17, 1975; “Asbestos Study Commit-
tee Report,” June 1975.
31. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, CDC, NIOSH, “Minutes
of Occupational Exposures to Asbestos
Dust From Brake Linings Meeting,” July
21, 1973.
32. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, CDC, NIOSH, “Minutes
of Occupational Exposures to Asbestos
Dust From Brake Linings Meeting,”
July 21, 1973. See also J. W. Lloyd,
NIOSH, to “Dear Colleague,”
“Current Intelligence Bulleting 5:
Asbestos Exposure During Servicing
of Motor Vehicle Brake and Clutch
Assemblies,” DHHS (NIOSH),
Publication No. 78-127, August 8,
1975 (in FMSI file). At the meeting, Dr
George Wright, representing the Johns
Manville Corporation, “emphasized that
manufacturers have a responsibility to
ascertain what happens to their products
after being sold to others.” He was not
surprised about “the [high] fiber counts
reported” and expressed the belief that
one might subsequently encounter the
full spectrum of asbestos-related disease
among grinders.
33. Arthur N. Rohl, Arthur M. Langer,
Mary S. Wolff, and Irving Weisman,
“Asbestos Exposure During Brake
Lining Maintenance and Repair,” Envi-
ronmental Research 12 (1976): 110–128.
In this article, the authors describe the
work practices in repair shops and the
attendant hazards: “When a vehicle is
brought into a repair shop for brake
lining inspection or replacement, the
wheel is removed and loose dust is
removed from the drums and back plates,
generally by means of a compressed
air jet. … The cloud of dust that is
produced is visible for several minutes
afterwards. Table 3 shows that fiber
concentrations are high in the operator’s
area under these conditions (an average
concentration of 16 fibers/ml), and that
there are significant concentrations at
least 20 ft away. … It is evident that any
person 65–75 ft away can be exposed”
(p. 118). “It was generally found that
there was minimal, if any, effort to control
dust in most garages. Workmen do not
use respiratory protection. There was
little awareness of the potential hazard
of brake dust” (pp. 117–118).
34. Arthur N. Rohl, “Asbestos Exposure
During Brake Lining Maintenance
Repair,” ca. January 1976, enclosed in
Selikoff to Drislane, January 14, 1976.
Rohl says in a handwritten note, “Dr.
Selikoff has asked me to send you the
results of our asbestos fiber counts
during brake repair work.” (This reference
is to the early draft of paper published
in mid-1976).
35. Asbestos Study Committee, FMSI,
“Minutes of Annual Meeting,” June
16–17, 1976.
36. “Asbestos Study Committee
Report,” June 2, 1976.
37. See US Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, “Occupational Exposure
to Asbestos,” Final Rules, 29 CFR
Parts 1910, 1915, and 1926, Final
Rule for a more complete review of
the unfolding attempts at lowering
the PEL in construction and other
industries. https://www.osha.gov/pls/
oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_
table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_
id=13404 (accessed January 17, 2017).
38. Asbestos Study Committee, FMSI,
“Minutes of Annual Meeting,” June
16–17, 1976.
39. “Asbestos Study Committee
Report,” June 2, 1976.
40. NIOSH, “Recommended (Interim)
Procedures for Asbestos Brake and
Clutch Servicing,” enclosed in FMSI,
Bulletin No. 581, October 12, 1976.
41. Markowitz and Rosner, “Unleashed
Upon an Unsuspecting World,” p. 837.
42. AIA, “Recommended Procedures
for Reducing Asbestos Dust During
Brake Servicing,” ca. September 1976
(these were sent out by the FMSI on
February 23, 1977).
43. Hearings on the Nomination of
Attorney General Scott Pruitt to be
Administrator of the US Environmental
Protection Agency Before the Senate
Committee on Environment and
Public Works, 115th Cong, 1st Sess
(2017). Transcript pw 011817.pdf
available at: https://www.epw.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm/2017/1/hearing-
on-nomination-of-attorney-general-
scott-pruitt-to-be-administrator-of-the-
u-s-environmental-protection-agency
(accessed July 17, 2017).
Health 11 (2005): 360–371; Castleman,
Asbestos; Anthony J. Lanza, ed, Silicosis
and Asbestosis (London, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1938), 419. See also
S. B. McPheeters, “A Survey of a Group
of Employees Exposed to Asbestos Dust,”
Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology
18 (April 1936), 229; he summarized
the problem created by “the dangerous
dust diseases, silicosis and asbestosis,”
writing that “while it [currently]
employs a relatively small number of
persons, the asbestos industry has had a
remarkably rapid expansion … by reason
of the widespread and varied uses of this
products which includes [sic] matches,
filter pads, paints, roofing, high pressure
jointing, electrodes, brake linings, clutch
rings, and insulating material.”
8. [E. R. A. Merewether],
“Memorandum on the Industrial
Diseases of Silicosis and Asbestosis,”
London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office,
1932, p.12, https://www.toxicdocs.org.
9. “Wartime Operations Emphasize
Industrial Hygiene Problems of Asbestos
Industry,” Illinois Labor Bulletin 3 (1943):
10–11. See also V. J. Castrop, “Fume and
Dust Exposure,” National Safety News 57
(February 1948): 20–21, 52, 73–79; H.
Wyers, “Asbestosis,” Postgraduate Medical
Journal (December 1949): 631–638;
“Asbestosis and Cancer of the Lung,”
Journal of the American Medical Association
140 (August 13, 1949):1219–1220;
Richard Doll, “Mortality From Lung
Cancer in Asbestos Workers,” British
Journal of Industrial Medicine 12 (1955):
81–86; “Hygienic Guide Series,”
American Industrial Hygiene Association
Journal 19 (1958):162.
10. E. Hickish, “Exposure to Asbestos
During Brake and Clutch Maintenance,”
Annals of Occupational Hygiene 13
(1970):1; D. E. Hickish and K. L. Knight,
“Exposure to Asbestos During Brake
Maintenance,” Annals of Occupational
Hygiene 13 (1970): 20–21.
11. L. Leopold, The Man Who Hated
Work and Loved Labor: The Life and
Times of Tony Mazzocchi (White River
Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing,
2007).
12. Friction Materials Standards Institute
(FMSI), Bulletin No. 406, “Asbestos
Study Committee,” ca. 1975. All of the
FMSI documents were attained through
discovery proceeding in a variety of
asbestos lawsuits, in some of which
we participated, and we are making
all of them available at https://www.
toxicdocs.org.
13. FMSI, Asbestos Study Committee,
“Minutes,” February 10, 1972;
Markowitz and Rosner, “Unleashed
Upon an Unsuspecting World.”
14. FMSI, Asbestos Study Committee,
“Minutes,” June 14, 1972.
15. FMSI, Asbestos Study Committee,
“Minutes,” August 17, 1972.
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