trade and globalization
Theory of Trade MIAGE Foundations Class
September 6, 2017 IAGE 6800
International trade refresher
Stephen C. Bannister, Ph.D. Department of Economics
University of Utah
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Trade is forever
International trade, “globalization,” has been going on far longer than international trade theory
: World–Systems Theory – 5000 years!! (Andre Gunder Frank – ReOrient, Immanuel Wallerstein, Karl Polyani)
Ancient trade (we often call it long–distance trade to distinguish it from local markets) is unquestionable – but it was luxury trade
The nineteenth century, during the “Pax Britannica,” was a period of greatly increased trade, partly due to reduced transportation and communications costs
The late twentieth century saw another large boost in global trade due to reduced transportation and communication costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Trade is forever
International trade, “globalization,” has been going on far longer than international trade theory: World–Systems Theory – 5000 years!! (Andre Gunder Frank – ReOrient, Immanuel Wallerstein, Karl Polyani)
Ancient trade (we often call it long–distance trade to distinguish it from local markets) is unquestionable – but it was luxury trade
The nineteenth century, during the “Pax Britannica,” was a period of greatly increased trade, partly due to reduced transportation and communications costs
The late twentieth century saw another large boost in global trade due to reduced transportation and communication costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Trade is forever
International trade, “globalization,” has been going on far longer than international trade theory: World–Systems Theory – 5000 years!! (Andre Gunder Frank – ReOrient, Immanuel Wallerstein, Karl Polyani)
Ancient trade (we often call it long–distance trade to distinguish it from local markets) is unquestionable – but it was luxury trade
The nineteenth century, during the “Pax Britannica,” was a period of greatly increased trade, partly due to reduced transportation and communications costs
The late twentieth century saw another large boost in global trade due to reduced transportation and communication costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Trade is forever
International trade, “globalization,” has been going on far longer than international trade theory: World–Systems Theory – 5000 years!! (Andre Gunder Frank – ReOrient, Immanuel Wallerstein, Karl Polyani)
Ancient trade (we often call it long–distance trade to distinguish it from local markets) is unquestionable – but it was luxury trade
The nineteenth century, during the “Pax Britannica,” was a period of greatly increased trade, partly due to reduced transportation and communications costs
The late twentieth century saw another large boost in global trade due to reduced transportation and communication costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Trade is forever
International trade, “globalization,” has been going on far longer than international trade theory: World–Systems Theory – 5000 years!! (Andre Gunder Frank – ReOrient, Immanuel Wallerstein, Karl Polyani)
Ancient trade (we often call it long–distance trade to distinguish it from local markets) is unquestionable – but it was luxury trade
The nineteenth century, during the “Pax Britannica,” was a period of greatly increased trade, partly due to reduced transportation and communications costs
The late twentieth century saw another large boost in global trade due to reduced transportation and communication costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Robert Allen, Global Economic History, A Very Short Introduction
I 1500–1800, the mercantilist era
I 1800-1900, the catch–up era I 1900–, the “big push” era
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Robert Allen, Global Economic History, A Very Short Introduction
I 1500–1800, the mercantilist era I 1800-1900, the catch–up era
I 1900–, the “big push” era
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Robert Allen, Global Economic History, A Very Short Introduction
I 1500–1800, the mercantilist era I 1800-1900, the catch–up era I 1900–, the “big push” era
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History Of The World
I History is written by the victors
I Much of history is Eurocentric I Frankopan is an antidote
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History Of The World
I History is written by the victors I Much of history is Eurocentric
I Frankopan is an antidote
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History Of The World
I History is written by the victors I Much of history is Eurocentric I Frankopan is an antidote
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Trade in macroeconomic theory
Y = C + I + G + NX
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Common trade theories
Challenges and Opportunities in International Business
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Mercantilism
Accumulate gold and silver, run an export surplus
Still the way countries develop today, but want to accumulate dollar surpluses
Economists are paying more attention to this even in modern economies–Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy, Cohen and DeLong (2016)
We’ll call this neo–Mercantilism
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Mercantilism
Accumulate gold and silver, run an export surplus
Still the way countries develop today, but want to accumulate dollar surpluses
Economists are paying more attention to this even in modern economies–Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy, Cohen and DeLong (2016)
We’ll call this neo–Mercantilism
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Mercantilism
Accumulate gold and silver, run an export surplus
Still the way countries develop today, but want to accumulate dollar surpluses
Economists are paying more attention to this even in modern economies–Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy, Cohen and DeLong (2016)
We’ll call this neo–Mercantilism
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Mercantilism
Accumulate gold and silver, run an export surplus
Still the way countries develop today, but want to accumulate dollar surpluses
Economists are paying more attention to this even in modern economies–Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy, Cohen and DeLong (2016)
We’ll call this neo–Mercantilism
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Absolute Advantage
Adam Smith
Specialize and gain efficiencies
US absolute advantage in beef, Mexico absolute advantage in vegetables
Suggests US does all beef, Mexico does all vegetables, and both trade
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Absolute Advantage
Adam Smith
Specialize and gain efficiencies
US absolute advantage in beef, Mexico absolute advantage in vegetables
Suggests US does all beef, Mexico does all vegetables, and both trade
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Absolute Advantage
Adam Smith
Specialize and gain efficiencies
US absolute advantage in beef, Mexico absolute advantage in vegetables
Suggests US does all beef, Mexico does all vegetables, and both trade
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Absolute Advantage
Adam Smith
Specialize and gain efficiencies
US absolute advantage in beef, Mexico absolute advantage in vegetables
Suggests US does all beef, Mexico does all vegetables, and both trade
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Comparative advantage
David Ricardo
Countries will trade based on their comparative advantages
Based on opportunity costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Comparative advantage
David Ricardo
Countries will trade based on their comparative advantages
Based on opportunity costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Comparative advantage
David Ricardo
Countries will trade based on their comparative advantages
Based on opportunity costs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
38-9
Comparative Advantage
(a) United States (b) Mexico
V e g
e ta
b le
s (
T o
n s )
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
35
40
45
5 10 15 20
Beef (Tons)
V e g
e ta
b le
s (
T o
n s )
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
35
40
45
5 10 15 20 25 30
Beef (Tons)
12
18 8
4
A
Z
LO2
38-11
Comparative Advantage
LO2
38-12
Comparative Advantage
• Terms of trade
• U.S. 1V = 1B
• U.S. will sell 1B for more than 1V
• Mexico 2V = 1B
• Mexico will pay less than 2V for 1B
• Settle between the two
• Depends on supply/demand factors
• Assume 1B = 1.5V
LO2
38-14
Gains from Trade
(a) United States (b) Mexico
V e g
e ta
b le
s (
T o
n s ) 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
35
40
45
5 10 15 20
Beef (Tons)
V e g
e ta
b le
s (
T o
n s ) 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
35
40
45
5 10 15 20 25 30
Beef (Tons)
12
18 8
4
A
Z
A’
Z’
V
V’
W
v
b b’
Trading Possibilities Line
Trading Possibilities Line
B
LO2
Classical trade theories–Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O)
Factor proportion theory
A country will produce and trade goods using the cheapest (highest supply) factor of production
Land (Argentina) Labor (China) Capital (US)
But . . .
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O)
Factor proportion theory A country will produce and trade goods using the cheapest (highest supply) factor of production
Land (Argentina) Labor (China) Capital (US)
But . . .
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O)
Factor proportion theory A country will produce and trade goods using the cheapest (highest supply) factor of production
Land (Argentina) Labor (China) Capital (US)
But . . .
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Classical trade theories–Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O)
Factor proportion theory A country will produce and trade goods using the cheapest (highest supply) factor of production
Land (Argentina) Labor (China) Capital (US)
But . . .
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Leonteif paradox
Empirically, the capital–rich US exported labor–intensive goods and imported capital–intensive goods.
Why?
Very high US labor productivity?
US abundance in natural resources which was not controlled for in the Leontief model
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Leonteif paradox
Empirically, the capital–rich US exported labor–intensive goods and imported capital–intensive goods. Why?
Very high US labor productivity?
US abundance in natural resources which was not controlled for in the Leontief model
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Leonteif paradox
Empirically, the capital–rich US exported labor–intensive goods and imported capital–intensive goods. Why?
Very high US labor productivity?
US abundance in natural resources which was not controlled for in the Leontief model
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Leonteif paradox
Empirically, the capital–rich US exported labor–intensive goods and imported capital–intensive goods. Why?
Very high US labor productivity?
US abundance in natural resources which was not controlled for in the Leontief model
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Flexible Exchange Rates
Flexible Exchange Rates
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
39-10
Q 0
D o
ll a r
P ri
c e o
f 1 P
o u
n d
Quantity of Pounds
P
Flexible Exchange Rates
The Market for Foreign Currency (Pounds)
D1
S1
Exchange Rate: $2 = £1
$2
$3
$1
Q1
D2
Exchange Rate: $3 = £1
Balance Of Payments
Deficit
Q2
x a
b
c
LO3
Firm–based trade theories–
Responses to reality of MNCs and intraindustry trade
Incorporate brand and customer loyalty, technology, and quality
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–
Responses to reality of MNCs and intraindustry trade
Incorporate brand and customer loyalty, technology, and quality
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Linder–Country similarity theory
First production for domestic market
Expand into countries with similar domestic markets, think GDP per capita
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Linder–Country similarity theory
First production for domestic market
Expand into countries with similar domestic markets,
think GDP per capita
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Linder–Country similarity theory
First production for domestic market
Expand into countries with similar domestic markets, think GDP per capita
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Product Life Cycle
Innovation centered in US when US had 50% of manufacturing VA
Less true now with R&D around the world
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Global strategic rivalry–Krugman, Lancaster
Firms seeking competitive advantage,
raise barriers to entry
Increasing returns to scale
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Global strategic rivalry–Krugman, Lancaster
Firms seeking competitive advantage, raise barriers to entry
Increasing returns to scale
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Porter’s National Competitive Advantage Theory
National competitive advantage
Local market resources and capabilities
Local market demand
Local suppliers and networks
Local firm characteristics
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Porter’s National Competitive Advantage Theory
National competitive advantage
Local market resources and capabilities
Local market demand
Local suppliers and networks
Local firm characteristics
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Porter’s National Competitive Advantage Theory
National competitive advantage
Local market resources and capabilities
Local market demand
Local suppliers and networks
Local firm characteristics
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Porter’s National Competitive Advantage Theory
National competitive advantage
Local market resources and capabilities
Local market demand
Local suppliers and networks
Local firm characteristics
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Firm–based trade theories–Porter’s National Competitive Advantage Theory
National competitive advantage
Local market resources and capabilities
Local market demand
Local suppliers and networks
Local firm characteristics
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III
, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton
, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List
, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang
, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers
, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrial policy?
Edward III, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrick List, Ha-Joon Chang, East Asian Tigers, Brad DeLong
A neo-mercantilism?
Negative reaction to TPP and TTIP
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–New trade theory
From Wiki–The value of protecting“infant industries” has been defended at least since the 18th century; for example, Alexander Hamilton proposed in 1791 that this be the basis for US trade policy. What was “new” in new trade theory was the use of mathematical economics to model the increasing returns to scale, and especially the use of the network effect to argue that the formation of important industries was path dependent in a way which industrial planning and judicious tariffs might control
Paul Krugman: Sveriges riksbanks pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne, or the Swedish National Bank’s Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2008
Leveraged monopolistic competition theory and increasing returns to scale
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–New trade theory
From Wiki–The value of protecting“infant industries” has been defended at least since the 18th century; for example, Alexander Hamilton proposed in 1791 that this be the basis for US trade policy. What was “new” in new trade theory was the use of mathematical economics to model the increasing returns to scale, and especially the use of the network effect to argue that the formation of important industries was path dependent in a way which industrial planning and judicious tariffs might control
Paul Krugman: Sveriges riksbanks pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne, or the Swedish National Bank’s Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2008
Leveraged monopolistic competition theory and increasing returns to scale
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–New trade theory
From Wiki–The value of protecting“infant industries” has been defended at least since the 18th century; for example, Alexander Hamilton proposed in 1791 that this be the basis for US trade policy. What was “new” in new trade theory was the use of mathematical economics to model the increasing returns to scale, and especially the use of the network effect to argue that the formation of important industries was path dependent in a way which industrial planning and judicious tariffs might control
Paul Krugman: Sveriges riksbanks pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne, or the Swedish National Bank’s Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2008
Leveraged monopolistic competition theory and increasing returns to scale
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Gravity theory (or model)
First applied to international trade by Jan Tinbergen in 1962
Fij = G Mβ1
i Mβ2 j
Dβ3 ij
I F is trade flow, G is constant, M is is the GDP of each country, D is the distance between them
Empirically successful, less so theoretically
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Gravity theory (or model)
First applied to international trade by Jan Tinbergen in 1962
Fij = G Mβ1
i Mβ2 j
Dβ3 ij
I F is trade flow, G is constant, M is is the GDP of each country, D is the distance between them
Empirically successful, less so theoretically
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Gravity theory (or model)
First applied to international trade by Jan Tinbergen in 1962
Fij = G Mβ1
i Mβ2 j
Dβ3 ij
I F is trade flow, G is constant, M is is the GDP of each country, D is the distance between them
Empirically successful
, less so theoretically
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Gravity theory (or model)
First applied to international trade by Jan Tinbergen in 1962
Fij = G Mβ1
i Mβ2 j
Dβ3 ij
I F is trade flow, G is constant, M is is the GDP of each country, D is the distance between them
Empirically successful, less so theoretically
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Thirwall’s Law
And now for a change of pace from the supply–side driven theories
Anthony Thirwall leveraged Roy Harrod’s static foreign trade multiplier by making it dynamic
Y = X m
I Thirwall adds that for most trading countries their balance of payments on international accounts–trade–constrain growth; emphasizes that export and import income (demand) elasticities will determine the size of the multiplier
Importantly, this appears to be empirically supported
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Thirwall’s Law
And now for a change of pace from the supply–side driven theories
Anthony Thirwall leveraged Roy Harrod’s static foreign trade multiplier by making it dynamic
Y = X m
I Thirwall adds that for most trading countries their balance of payments on international accounts–trade–constrain growth; emphasizes that export and import income (demand) elasticities will determine the size of the multiplier
Importantly, this appears to be empirically supported
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Thirwall’s Law
And now for a change of pace from the supply–side driven theories
Anthony Thirwall leveraged Roy Harrod’s static foreign trade multiplier by making it dynamic
Y = X m
I Thirwall adds that for most trading countries their balance of payments on international accounts–trade–constrain growth; emphasizes that export and import income (demand) elasticities will determine the size of the multiplier
Importantly, this appears to be empirically supported
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Thirwall’s Law
And now for a change of pace from the supply–side driven theories
Anthony Thirwall leveraged Roy Harrod’s static foreign trade multiplier by making it dynamic
Y = X m
I Thirwall adds that for most trading countries their balance of payments on international accounts–trade–constrain growth
; emphasizes that export and import income (demand) elasticities will determine the size of the multiplier
Importantly, this appears to be empirically supported
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Thirwall’s Law
And now for a change of pace from the supply–side driven theories
Anthony Thirwall leveraged Roy Harrod’s static foreign trade multiplier by making it dynamic
Y = X m
I Thirwall adds that for most trading countries their balance of payments on international accounts–trade–constrain growth; emphasizes that export and import income (demand) elasticities will determine the size of the multiplier
Importantly, this appears to be empirically supported
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Other theories–Thirwall’s Law
And now for a change of pace from the supply–side driven theories
Anthony Thirwall leveraged Roy Harrod’s static foreign trade multiplier by making it dynamic
Y = X m
I Thirwall adds that for most trading countries their balance of payments on international accounts–trade–constrain growth; emphasizes that export and import income (demand) elasticities will determine the size of the multiplier
Importantly, this appears to be empirically supported
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
And how does this all appear in the twenty–first century?
21st century regionalism and global trade governance
Note that Baldwin goes “there”–the Thucydides Trap
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
And how does this all appear in the twenty–first century?
21st century regionalism and global trade governance
Note that Baldwin goes “there”
–the Thucydides Trap
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
And how does this all appear in the twenty–first century?
21st century regionalism and global trade governance
Note that Baldwin goes “there”–the Thucydides Trap
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990.
The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.”
Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in.
Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories.
Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap.
This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase one: Humanizing the globe–200,000 BCE to 10,000 BCE. Production and Consumption were “bundled”–occurred together. People moved to the production sites.
I Phase two: Localizing the global economy–10,000 BCE to 1820 CE. Production and consumption were bundled. The agricultural revolution: food production was fixed and people came to the food. Villages arose, became cities; cities begat empires.
I Phase three: Globalizing local economies–1820 to 1990. The steam revolution revolutionized production and travel, dramatically reducing travel (and thus trading) costs. The first “unbundling.” Trade volume skyrocketed as “comparative advantage” kicked in. Production microclusterd in advanced–nation factories. Productivity surged in the North, sparking cycles of industrialization, agglomeration, and innovation that yielded a huge North–South knowledge gap. This led to an unprecedented divergence of incomes–the Great Divergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase four: Globalizing factories–1990 to present. The second unbundling.
Revolutions in information and communications technologies (ICT) is the driver. This permitted a movement of production knowledge from the North to the South. The North deindustrialized, the South industrialized. Globally, a shockingly large shift in GDP shares that caused the Great Convergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase four: Globalizing factories–1990 to present. The second unbundling. Revolutions in information and communications technologies (ICT) is the driver.
This permitted a movement of production knowledge from the North to the South. The North deindustrialized, the South industrialized. Globally, a shockingly large shift in GDP shares that caused the Great Convergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase four: Globalizing factories–1990 to present. The second unbundling. Revolutions in information and communications technologies (ICT) is the driver. This permitted a movement of production knowledge from the North to the South.
The North deindustrialized, the South industrialized. Globally, a shockingly large shift in GDP shares that caused the Great Convergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase four: Globalizing factories–1990 to present. The second unbundling. Revolutions in information and communications technologies (ICT) is the driver. This permitted a movement of production knowledge from the North to the South. The North deindustrialized, the South industrialized.
Globally, a shockingly large shift in GDP shares that caused the Great Convergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Baldwin’s four phases of globalization
I Phase four: Globalizing factories–1990 to present. The second unbundling. Revolutions in information and communications technologies (ICT) is the driver. This permitted a movement of production knowledge from the North to the South. The North deindustrialized, the South industrialized. Globally, a shockingly large shift in GDP shares that caused the Great Convergence.
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
G7
I US I Germany I Japan I France I UK I Canada I Italy
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Globalization concentration – G7
r8zo
le s
Oo 9oooo rI6 O d 666O O r!Edd
'-.
_:l
-i:
:i;:I:;.3',".!:'o*,on changed around reeo: the'thockingshare shift" (G7 share
Modern globalization, which started around rgzo, was associated wrth the rapid in_
dustrialization of todayt .l.h r"tio.r_..r;;; ;";;;;r;;;:;:ffi ,,
Seven nations, o. Gz fo. short (United i:";;;;;_""y, Japan, France, Britain,
Canada. and Icaly). This rriggered r..llip.rp.,r.,rr r'lr"] o[indusrrial agglomera-
rion' innovacion' "nd "o'oir-h
,t,", proir.iJ-"r'.ri.l,n in rhe rvorrd econom).
I;"rui1;:::,*;*r: .,,. il,',i,* ",*iiJli',,...e \oared r,o* ,uo,,.
The upward spiral was checked frorn rhe mid_r9gos and reversed around r99o.
For the lasr couple of decades, ,tr. Cz ,h"..^h;r';..,, torqueing downward at a
:ir#f":.,..#ilj:i: *.U ro th.l.u.r th"t-,, i..l ",r",,.a at the very beginning
.",,*l,,1Tlr;: ""'; shili suggests thar the nature of globatization changed radi-
DAr.* soL'RCE: \\brld Bank DaraBank (GDp in U.S. .ollars) and Maddison-
project dara pre-r96c ^vic,h auihor., .rt.rlr,ronrl,-l,rri,i/r"ru*-.ggdc.net/n.ra.dison
nraddr.on_proiqcr hom.,hrm, rh( t: :q \er.ion i. u,.i,,n.a rhc roll veriion does
nor updare x'orrd GDp (:'oo9 r'ersion herealier nored as Maddison database).
Accompanying Figure.r s ,,shocking
share shift,,was a changeover
in manufacturing' Today s rich nations-which had seen their share
ofworld manufacturingslip slowly ri;.. ;r;:_witnessed an accel_
erated decline from r99o (figu.. r).
Curiously, the G7t ,h"." ts showed up as share gains in very few
nations' only six developing natio,s (called the 16 in the chart, short
for the Indus triarizi.,g Si*; -,
"- rh .i. rh;;. ; rvorrd nranufactu ring
Z INTRODUCTION
.;()1,
his
du
ih,
na
NC
Pz
rit
m
C(
tl ir
le
a
€g€€ gfl$gf €;38{ g,s
Figure: G7 percent of global income
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Industrializing 6 (I6)
I China I Korea I India I Poland I Indonesia I Thailand
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Globalization concentration – G7, I6, ROW
Ro\( \
".\ l6
- RE 2-: The decline in rich natio,s'share of world manufacturing transrated to . br jurr six der eloping narionr.
' . ,hift in global manulacturing shares was almost as srark as the "shocking share' :' in Figure r. From around r99o, rhe slide in the G7's share accelerared and its ::; is norv below to percenr. Iust six developing nations-which I call the Industrializing Six, or 16 for short
-:ina, Korea, India, Poland, Indonesia, and Thailand)-accounted for almost all : -,:-re G7's decline. The manufacruring share of the rest of the world (RoV in rhe
:-:rr) rvas largely u,affected by these changes. Note that china is a real standout. -:. share ofworld ,ranufacturing (not shown separately) rose from about 3 percent :: :ln-rost ir lifth.
.].rA souRCE: UNSTAT.org.
:ise by more rhan three-tenths of one percentage point since r99o. The curiosity lies in the fact that the effect is so concentrared.
XThy should the impact ofglobalization be so narrow geographically t'hen cheap rransportarion and communicarion are so broadly avail- able? Answering this quesrion requires a broader vier.v of globalization.
INTRODUCTION
9y"oro19rroNN€e6doO 9\666aoOOO
riddd
Figure: Declines of G7 manufacturing share caused by gains to I6
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Three cascading constraints narrative
Figure: Three cascading constraints, by globalization era
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
First unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized
I Trade boomed I Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North
than in the South I The Great Divergence happened I Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
First unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized I Trade boomed
I Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North than in the South
I The Great Divergence happened I Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
First unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized I Trade boomed I Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North
than in the South
I The Great Divergence happened I Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
First unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized I Trade boomed I Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North
than in the South I The Great Divergence happened
I Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
First unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized I Trade boomed I Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North
than in the South I The Great Divergence happened I Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Reinforced comparative advantage
:
,.
;f.".Y;r.3JffII;T:;:il:: advantage: trade' comparative advantage. :,---
Globalization,s firsr acceleration (that is, the 6rsr unbundling) rurned :,
world's le ague table s on their head' *;;.*r;;ioo. "rd b
ackward nacior,.
the European peninsula of ,h. rr.r.i,il;;o..lr": economy.
"^ !ar! lurdrrarr tanomass came to dominate the gi-:
The static version ofR icardot conceptualization cannot explain this sror\.. : _
it has been extended ro include rggl.;*r.;;;"rO *-*rn effects that can. . details are in the next chapter, b;lhJ;;;;:", lr!. ,,-0,. to expiain wirh : _.
diagram-starting with rrr. ai"g*_f ,.;;i.;;;'irndustrial ctustering,).
The clustering-that is to say, agglome."riorr.-o, rndusrry in a nation n__
motes ne\y thinking and new inr,.rrtior, (sho*n in sorthu.est box, *Indurr.,,
innovation"). The innovation ,tr., ,,r.ng,t,".r, ,t.'rr",ior* competitiveness ::
the sector (shown in northwesr b"r, "C.;;;;;r,". "i*r,"r.,). The nexr step_
according to the princip,.r:f ..:_oril#;;;,";._is that the heighrene r
comparative advantage leads to_more cxporrs ",-rd
Jo.. production. The crar.
comes around full circle when this .r.,." pr"ar.rrl, *.rr.r",., additional indL:.-
trial clusrerirrg - * r'vuuLtrurr E
The basic Ricardian logic focuses on the ..who exports whar_
question. The answer ultimately rests on la, "rr.r_paion of nationai
;T'ff':l"T.,T:::::,i:n,as Biven' rhe nrst additron t, ,;;;,;
ffi : * :: 11 *:*, " "." o" d';-r;";.'. ; ; ;. ffi ;: ::::.T:::
lji :i'-'::::-:f '*"; r r s t a r t s #i ; ;;;; ; # ;l'#:', ilT-
trial competencies and industrial "ril;.;";Jr'[ilil;; Iz8 ExTENDING THE GIoBALIZATIoN NARRATIVE
I
Compararile
advanrage
Indusrnal
exporrs
Industrial
clustering
Faliing
trade costs
Industrial
innovation
U
I Comparative advantage leads to exports I Exports leads to scale including clustering (N) I Clustering leads to innovation (N2) (agglomeration) I A virtuous cost–lowering cycle
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Reinforced comparative advantage
:
,.
;f.".Y;r.3JffII;T:;:il:: advantage: trade' comparative advantage. :,---
Globalization,s firsr acceleration (that is, the 6rsr unbundling) rurned :,
world's le ague table s on their head' *;;.*r;;ioo. "rd b
ackward nacior,.
the European peninsula of ,h. rr.r.i,il;;o..lr": economy.
"^ !ar! lurdrrarr tanomass came to dominate the gi-:
The static version ofR icardot conceptualization cannot explain this sror\.. : _
it has been extended ro include rggl.;*r.;;;"rO *-*rn effects that can. . details are in the next chapter, b;lhJ;;;;:", lr!. ,,-0,. to expiain wirh : _.
diagram-starting with rrr. ai"g*_f ,.;;i.;;;'irndustrial ctustering,).
The clustering-that is to say, agglome."riorr.-o, rndusrry in a nation n__
motes ne\y thinking and new inr,.rrtior, (sho*n in sorthu.est box, *Indurr.,,
innovation"). The innovation ,tr., ,,r.ng,t,".r, ,t.'rr",ior* competitiveness ::
the sector (shown in northwesr b"r, "C.;;;;;r,". "i*r,"r.,). The nexr step_
according to the princip,.r:f ..:_oril#;;;,";._is that the heighrene r
comparative advantage leads to_more cxporrs ",-rd
Jo.. production. The crar.
comes around full circle when this .r.,." pr"ar.rrl, *.rr.r",., additional indL:.-
trial clusrerirrg - * r'vuuLtrurr E
The basic Ricardian logic focuses on the ..who exports whar_
question. The answer ultimately rests on la, "rr.r_paion of nationai
;T'ff':l"T.,T:::::,i:n,as Biven' rhe nrst additron t, ,;;;,;
ffi : * :: 11 *:*, " "." o" d';-r;";.'. ; ; ;. ffi ;: ::::.T:::
lji :i'-'::::-:f '*"; r r s t a r t s #i ; ;;;; ; # ;l'#:', ilT-
trial competencies and industrial "ril;.;";Jr'[ilil;; Iz8 ExTENDING THE GIoBALIZATIoN NARRATIVE
I
Compararile
advanrage
Indusrnal
exporrs
Industrial
clustering
Faliing
trade costs
Industrial
innovation
U
I Comparative advantage leads to exports
I Exports leads to scale including clustering (N) I Clustering leads to innovation (N2) (agglomeration) I A virtuous cost–lowering cycle
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Reinforced comparative advantage
:
,.
;f.".Y;r.3JffII;T:;:il:: advantage: trade' comparative advantage. :,---
Globalization,s firsr acceleration (that is, the 6rsr unbundling) rurned :,
world's le ague table s on their head' *;;.*r;;ioo. "rd b
ackward nacior,.
the European peninsula of ,h. rr.r.i,il;;o..lr": economy.
"^ !ar! lurdrrarr tanomass came to dominate the gi-:
The static version ofR icardot conceptualization cannot explain this sror\.. : _
it has been extended ro include rggl.;*r.;;;"rO *-*rn effects that can. . details are in the next chapter, b;lhJ;;;;:", lr!. ,,-0,. to expiain wirh : _.
diagram-starting with rrr. ai"g*_f ,.;;i.;;;'irndustrial ctustering,).
The clustering-that is to say, agglome."riorr.-o, rndusrry in a nation n__
motes ne\y thinking and new inr,.rrtior, (sho*n in sorthu.est box, *Indurr.,,
innovation"). The innovation ,tr., ,,r.ng,t,".r, ,t.'rr",ior* competitiveness ::
the sector (shown in northwesr b"r, "C.;;;;;r,". "i*r,"r.,). The nexr step_
according to the princip,.r:f ..:_oril#;;;,";._is that the heighrene r
comparative advantage leads to_more cxporrs ",-rd
Jo.. production. The crar.
comes around full circle when this .r.,." pr"ar.rrl, *.rr.r",., additional indL:.-
trial clusrerirrg - * r'vuuLtrurr E
The basic Ricardian logic focuses on the ..who exports whar_
question. The answer ultimately rests on la, "rr.r_paion of nationai
;T'ff':l"T.,T:::::,i:n,as Biven' rhe nrst additron t, ,;;;,;
ffi : * :: 11 *:*, " "." o" d';-r;";.'. ; ; ;. ffi ;: ::::.T:::
lji :i'-'::::-:f '*"; r r s t a r t s #i ; ;;;; ; # ;l'#:', ilT-
trial competencies and industrial "ril;.;";Jr'[ilil;; Iz8 ExTENDING THE GIoBALIZATIoN NARRATIVE
I
Compararile
advanrage
Indusrnal
exporrs
Industrial
clustering
Faliing
trade costs
Industrial
innovation
U
I Comparative advantage leads to exports I Exports leads to scale including clustering (N)
I Clustering leads to innovation (N2) (agglomeration) I A virtuous cost–lowering cycle
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Reinforced comparative advantage
:
,.
;f.".Y;r.3JffII;T:;:il:: advantage: trade' comparative advantage. :,---
Globalization,s firsr acceleration (that is, the 6rsr unbundling) rurned :,
world's le ague table s on their head' *;;.*r;;ioo. "rd b
ackward nacior,.
the European peninsula of ,h. rr.r.i,il;;o..lr": economy.
"^ !ar! lurdrrarr tanomass came to dominate the gi-:
The static version ofR icardot conceptualization cannot explain this sror\.. : _
it has been extended ro include rggl.;*r.;;;"rO *-*rn effects that can. . details are in the next chapter, b;lhJ;;;;:", lr!. ,,-0,. to expiain wirh : _.
diagram-starting with rrr. ai"g*_f ,.;;i.;;;'irndustrial ctustering,).
The clustering-that is to say, agglome."riorr.-o, rndusrry in a nation n__
motes ne\y thinking and new inr,.rrtior, (sho*n in sorthu.est box, *Indurr.,,
innovation"). The innovation ,tr., ,,r.ng,t,".r, ,t.'rr",ior* competitiveness ::
the sector (shown in northwesr b"r, "C.;;;;;r,". "i*r,"r.,). The nexr step_
according to the princip,.r:f ..:_oril#;;;,";._is that the heighrene r
comparative advantage leads to_more cxporrs ",-rd
Jo.. production. The crar.
comes around full circle when this .r.,." pr"ar.rrl, *.rr.r",., additional indL:.-
trial clusrerirrg - * r'vuuLtrurr E
The basic Ricardian logic focuses on the ..who exports whar_
question. The answer ultimately rests on la, "rr.r_paion of nationai
;T'ff':l"T.,T:::::,i:n,as Biven' rhe nrst additron t, ,;;;,;
ffi : * :: 11 *:*, " "." o" d';-r;";.'. ; ; ;. ffi ;: ::::.T:::
lji :i'-'::::-:f '*"; r r s t a r t s #i ; ;;;; ; # ;l'#:', ilT-
trial competencies and industrial "ril;.;";Jr'[ilil;; Iz8 ExTENDING THE GIoBALIZATIoN NARRATIVE
I
Compararile
advanrage
Indusrnal
exporrs
Industrial
clustering
Faliing
trade costs
Industrial
innovation
U
I Comparative advantage leads to exports I Exports leads to scale including clustering (N) I Clustering leads to innovation (N2) (agglomeration)
I A virtuous cost–lowering cycle
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Reinforced comparative advantage
:
,.
;f.".Y;r.3JffII;T:;:il:: advantage: trade' comparative advantage. :,---
Globalization,s firsr acceleration (that is, the 6rsr unbundling) rurned :,
world's le ague table s on their head' *;;.*r;;ioo. "rd b
ackward nacior,.
the European peninsula of ,h. rr.r.i,il;;o..lr": economy.
"^ !ar! lurdrrarr tanomass came to dominate the gi-:
The static version ofR icardot conceptualization cannot explain this sror\.. : _
it has been extended ro include rggl.;*r.;;;"rO *-*rn effects that can. . details are in the next chapter, b;lhJ;;;;:", lr!. ,,-0,. to expiain wirh : _.
diagram-starting with rrr. ai"g*_f ,.;;i.;;;'irndustrial ctustering,).
The clustering-that is to say, agglome."riorr.-o, rndusrry in a nation n__
motes ne\y thinking and new inr,.rrtior, (sho*n in sorthu.est box, *Indurr.,,
innovation"). The innovation ,tr., ,,r.ng,t,".r, ,t.'rr",ior* competitiveness ::
the sector (shown in northwesr b"r, "C.;;;;;r,". "i*r,"r.,). The nexr step_
according to the princip,.r:f ..:_oril#;;;,";._is that the heighrene r
comparative advantage leads to_more cxporrs ",-rd
Jo.. production. The crar.
comes around full circle when this .r.,." pr"ar.rrl, *.rr.r",., additional indL:.-
trial clusrerirrg - * r'vuuLtrurr E
The basic Ricardian logic focuses on the ..who exports whar_
question. The answer ultimately rests on la, "rr.r_paion of nationai
;T'ff':l"T.,T:::::,i:n,as Biven' rhe nrst additron t, ,;;;,;
ffi : * :: 11 *:*, " "." o" d';-r;";.'. ; ; ;. ffi ;: ::::.T:::
lji :i'-'::::-:f '*"; r r s t a r t s #i ; ;;;; ; # ;l'#:', ilT-
trial competencies and industrial "ril;.;";Jr'[ilil;; Iz8 ExTENDING THE GIoBALIZATIoN NARRATIVE
I
Compararile
advanrage
Indusrnal
exporrs
Industrial
clustering
Faliing
trade costs
Industrial
innovation
U
I Comparative advantage leads to exports I Exports leads to scale including clustering (N) I Clustering leads to innovation (N2) (agglomeration) I A virtuous cost–lowering cycle
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Global GDP and population share
Figure: Global GDP and population share c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Ancient 7 (A7)
I China I India I Greece I Egypt I Turkey I Iraq I Iran
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated
growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations I The Great Convergence occurred I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much
more back–and–forth trade (global value chains) I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar
I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations
I The Great Convergence occurred I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much
more back–and–forth trade (global value chains) I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated
growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations
I The Great Convergence occurred I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much
more back–and–forth trade (global value chains) I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated
growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations I The Great Convergence occurred
I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much more back–and–forth trade (global value chains)
I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated
growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations I The Great Convergence occurred I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much
more back–and–forth trade (global value chains)
I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated
growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations I The Great Convergence occurred I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much
more back–and–forth trade (global value chains) I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization
I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The second unbundling’s stylized facts
I The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized
I The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar I Commodity prices experienced a super–cycle that initiated
growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations I The Great Convergence occurred I The nature of North–South trade changed to involve much
more back–and–forth trade (global value chains) I Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization I The impacts were very geographically specific
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
GDP share result of second unbundling
Figure: GDP share
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The Rising 11 (R11)
I China I India I Brazil I Indonesia I Nigeria I Korea I Australia I Mexico I Venezuela I Poland I Turkey
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Redistribution summary
I G7 share of global GDP decline from two–thirds in 1990 to under one–half today–a seventeen percentage point loss
I Fourteen percentage point gain went to just eleven nations, the R11
I China alone accounted for about seven percentage points gain
I Not all due to manufacturing unbundling
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Redistribution summary
I G7 share of global GDP decline from two–thirds in 1990 to under one–half today–a seventeen percentage point loss
I Fourteen percentage point gain went to just eleven nations, the R11
I China alone accounted for about seven percentage points gain
I Not all due to manufacturing unbundling
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Redistribution summary
I G7 share of global GDP decline from two–thirds in 1990 to under one–half today–a seventeen percentage point loss
I Fourteen percentage point gain went to just eleven nations, the R11
I China alone accounted for about seven percentage points gain
I Not all due to manufacturing unbundling
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Redistribution summary
I G7 share of global GDP decline from two–thirds in 1990 to under one–half today–a seventeen percentage point loss
I Fourteen percentage point gain went to just eleven nations, the R11
I China alone accounted for about seven percentage points gain
I Not all due to manufacturing unbundling
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Manufacturing share result of second unbundling
Figure: Manufacturing share c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Manufacturing share result of second unbundling
Figure: Manufacturing share
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The major GVCs
I High–tech, low–wage GVCs are still largely constrained by the high costing of moving people–there is no “Factory World.”
I Instead we have: I Factory Asia–Japan distributing to East and Souteast Asia I Factory Europe–Germany distributing to Poland I Factory America–US distributing to Mexico
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The major GVCs
I High–tech, low–wage GVCs are still largely constrained by the high costing of moving people–there is no “Factory World.”
I Instead we have:
I Factory Asia–Japan distributing to East and Souteast Asia I Factory Europe–Germany distributing to Poland I Factory America–US distributing to Mexico
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The major GVCs
I High–tech, low–wage GVCs are still largely constrained by the high costing of moving people–there is no “Factory World.”
I Instead we have: I Factory Asia–Japan distributing to East and Souteast Asia
I Factory Europe–Germany distributing to Poland I Factory America–US distributing to Mexico
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The major GVCs
I High–tech, low–wage GVCs are still largely constrained by the high costing of moving people–there is no “Factory World.”
I Instead we have: I Factory Asia–Japan distributing to East and Souteast Asia I Factory Europe–Germany distributing to Poland
I Factory America–US distributing to Mexico
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The major GVCs
I High–tech, low–wage GVCs are still largely constrained by the high costing of moving people–there is no “Factory World.”
I Instead we have: I Factory Asia–Japan distributing to East and Souteast Asia I Factory Europe–Germany distributing to Poland I Factory America–US distributing to Mexico
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The political economy of MFN/GATT/WTO
I 1934: US started cutting tariffs through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act applied to most favored nations (MFN). Cut tariffs for one, cut them for all MFN.
I Post WWII: Global trade governed by rules instead of guns–GATT I GATT/WTO inherited nondiscrimination, essentially the MFN
principle I Loophole for developing nations–did not have to reciprocate tariff
cuts I GATT/WTO successful by rearranging the national politics of tariff
cutting. This is by listening to both exporters and importers during reciprocity talks, the so–called juggernaut effect that tips political power toward exporters because it increases their size
I GATT/WTO successful because even with the consensus principle, G7 controlled GATT because of developing nations tariff loophole–they were free–riders interested in success of each negotiating round
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The political economy of MFN/GATT/WTO
I 1934: US started cutting tariffs through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act applied to most favored nations (MFN). Cut tariffs for one, cut them for all MFN.
I Post WWII: Global trade governed by rules instead of guns–GATT
I GATT/WTO inherited nondiscrimination, essentially the MFN principle
I Loophole for developing nations–did not have to reciprocate tariff cuts
I GATT/WTO successful by rearranging the national politics of tariff cutting. This is by listening to both exporters and importers during reciprocity talks, the so–called juggernaut effect that tips political power toward exporters because it increases their size
I GATT/WTO successful because even with the consensus principle, G7 controlled GATT because of developing nations tariff loophole–they were free–riders interested in success of each negotiating round
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The political economy of MFN/GATT/WTO
I 1934: US started cutting tariffs through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act applied to most favored nations (MFN). Cut tariffs for one, cut them for all MFN.
I Post WWII: Global trade governed by rules instead of guns–GATT I GATT/WTO inherited nondiscrimination, essentially the MFN
principle
I Loophole for developing nations–did not have to reciprocate tariff cuts
I GATT/WTO successful by rearranging the national politics of tariff cutting. This is by listening to both exporters and importers during reciprocity talks, the so–called juggernaut effect that tips political power toward exporters because it increases their size
I GATT/WTO successful because even with the consensus principle, G7 controlled GATT because of developing nations tariff loophole–they were free–riders interested in success of each negotiating round
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The political economy of MFN/GATT/WTO
I 1934: US started cutting tariffs through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act applied to most favored nations (MFN). Cut tariffs for one, cut them for all MFN.
I Post WWII: Global trade governed by rules instead of guns–GATT I GATT/WTO inherited nondiscrimination, essentially the MFN
principle I Loophole for developing nations–did not have to reciprocate tariff
cuts
I GATT/WTO successful by rearranging the national politics of tariff cutting. This is by listening to both exporters and importers during reciprocity talks, the so–called juggernaut effect that tips political power toward exporters because it increases their size
I GATT/WTO successful because even with the consensus principle, G7 controlled GATT because of developing nations tariff loophole–they were free–riders interested in success of each negotiating round
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The political economy of MFN/GATT/WTO
I 1934: US started cutting tariffs through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act applied to most favored nations (MFN). Cut tariffs for one, cut them for all MFN.
I Post WWII: Global trade governed by rules instead of guns–GATT I GATT/WTO inherited nondiscrimination, essentially the MFN
principle I Loophole for developing nations–did not have to reciprocate tariff
cuts I GATT/WTO successful by rearranging the national politics of tariff
cutting. This is by listening to both exporters and importers during reciprocity talks, the so–called juggernaut effect that tips political power toward exporters because it increases their size
I GATT/WTO successful because even with the consensus principle, G7 controlled GATT because of developing nations tariff loophole–they were free–riders interested in success of each negotiating round
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The political economy of MFN/GATT/WTO
I 1934: US started cutting tariffs through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act applied to most favored nations (MFN). Cut tariffs for one, cut them for all MFN.
I Post WWII: Global trade governed by rules instead of guns–GATT I GATT/WTO inherited nondiscrimination, essentially the MFN
principle I Loophole for developing nations–did not have to reciprocate tariff
cuts I GATT/WTO successful by rearranging the national politics of tariff
cutting. This is by listening to both exporters and importers during reciprocity talks, the so–called juggernaut effect that tips political power toward exporters because it increases their size
I GATT/WTO successful because even with the consensus principle, G7 controlled GATT because of developing nations tariff loophole–they were free–riders interested in success of each negotiating round
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The realities of MFN/GATT/WTO
I In the 1980s, developing countries began cutting tariffs in spite of the loophole.
Why? I Wanted to be included in GVCs I Note that erodes the political economy success factor, and in
fact negotiating rounds of the WTO have usually ended in failure
I Note that the primary thing WTO added was a quasi–judicial process, circumventing national legal systems, thus trying to replace the web of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) that had grown up post–WWII and enabled the GVCs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The realities of MFN/GATT/WTO
I In the 1980s, developing countries began cutting tariffs in spite of the loophole. Why?
I Wanted to be included in GVCs I Note that erodes the political economy success factor, and in
fact negotiating rounds of the WTO have usually ended in failure
I Note that the primary thing WTO added was a quasi–judicial process, circumventing national legal systems, thus trying to replace the web of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) that had grown up post–WWII and enabled the GVCs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The realities of MFN/GATT/WTO
I In the 1980s, developing countries began cutting tariffs in spite of the loophole. Why?
I Wanted to be included in GVCs
I Note that erodes the political economy success factor, and in fact negotiating rounds of the WTO have usually ended in failure
I Note that the primary thing WTO added was a quasi–judicial process, circumventing national legal systems, thus trying to replace the web of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) that had grown up post–WWII and enabled the GVCs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The realities of MFN/GATT/WTO
I In the 1980s, developing countries began cutting tariffs in spite of the loophole. Why?
I Wanted to be included in GVCs I Note that erodes the political economy success factor, and in
fact negotiating rounds of the WTO have usually ended in failure
I Note that the primary thing WTO added was a quasi–judicial process, circumventing national legal systems, thus trying to replace the web of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) that had grown up post–WWII and enabled the GVCs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The realities of MFN/GATT/WTO
I In the 1980s, developing countries began cutting tariffs in spite of the loophole. Why?
I Wanted to be included in GVCs I Note that erodes the political economy success factor, and in
fact negotiating rounds of the WTO have usually ended in failure
I Note that the primary thing WTO added was a quasi–judicial process, circumventing national legal systems, thus trying to replace the web of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) that had grown up post–WWII and enabled the GVCs
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
National competitiveness policies
Figure: Spillover/stickiness matrix
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The third unbundling?
I Telerobotics?
I Telepresence? I “Virtual immigration?” I 3D printing?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The third unbundling?
I Telerobotics? I Telepresence?
I “Virtual immigration?” I 3D printing?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The third unbundling?
I Telerobotics? I Telepresence? I “Virtual immigration?”
I 3D printing?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
The third unbundling?
I Telerobotics? I Telepresence? I “Virtual immigration?” I 3D printing?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age.
The age of mercantilism. I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of
the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age,
the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence,
mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism,
GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus. I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national
corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO,
and the rise of the Washington Consensus. I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national
corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age,
the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence.
Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes.
MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
Eurocentric view of globalization ages
I International institutions from the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) until 1820 — the Hamilton/List/Chang national protectionist age. The age of mercantilism.
I International institutions 1820–1985 — the G7 age, the era of the Great Divergence, mixed national protectionism, GATT/WTO, and the rise of the Washington Consensus.
I International institutions 1985–2016 — the multi–national corporation (MNC) and global value chain (GVC) age, the era of the Great Convergence. Protectionism diminishes. MNC powers tend to supplant certain national powers.
I International institutions post 2016 — the new age of nationalism/populism?
c©2011-2016 Stephen C. Bannister
- Classical trade theories
- Firm–based trade Theories
- Other trade theories