The Psychology of Religion and Happiness

ETHICS & BEHAVIOR, 23(4), 266–277

Copyright © 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1050-8422 print / 1532-7019 online

DOI: 10.1080/10508422.2013.782814

The Roles of Religiosity and Spirituality in Moral Reasoning

Rachel Baumsteiger and Tiffany Chenneville Department of Psychology

University of South Florida Saint Petersburg

Joseph F. McGuire Department of Psychology University of South Florida

To better understand the influence of religiosity and spirituality on moral reasoning, 1,037 college students completed a survey including demographic questions, a religiosity measure, a spirituality measure, and Forsyth’s Ethical Position Questionnaire. Religiosity and spirituality positively corre- lated with moral idealism, whereas spirituality negatively correlated with moral relativism. However, religiosity and spirituality accounted for a very little variability in moral reasoning, suggesting that they do not directly influence moral reasoning. In addition, female participants reported higher spir- ituality, but there were no gender differences on a spirituality measure. Future research is needed to examine other factors that may influence moral reasoning.

Keywords: religiosity, spirituality, moral reasoning, ethics, Forsyth, gender

Morality commands considerable academic attention because it reflects people’s deepest held values. Although numerous factors influence moral behavior—including habits, social norms, culture, situational factors, motivation—a person’s perceptions and attitudes are some of the most important predictors of how he or she will behave (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Thus, many sci- entists and philosophers are interested in the nature of moral reasoning and related constructs. Because religiosity and spirituality can influence how people perceive the world and develop personal values, they also may impact moral reasoning.

Many researchers have focused on the study of morality. It is important to note that Kohlberg (1981) developed an influential theory of moral development that categorized people’s moral reasoning strategies into three levels—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional— with two stages in each level. Kohlberg asserted that people move through the stages as they develop, with higher levels of reasoning marking moral maturity. Criticisms to this theory include the overemphasis on justice, exclusion of other important values such as caring, and minimal consideration of gender and culture (Crain, 1985; Gilligan, 1982).

Correspondence should be addressed to Rachel Baumsteiger, USFSP, 441 Virginia Avenue Madeira Beach, FL 33708. E-mail: rbaumsteiger@mail.usf.edu

RELIGIOSITY AND SPIRITUALITY IN MORAL REASONING 267

Turiel (1983) used Kohlberg’s assumptions to create the widely cited definition of morality as “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other” (p. 3). Following, moral reasoning is described as “conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people (and situations) in order to reach a moral judgment” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Morality is often used interchangeably with ethics, but there is a subtle distinction between them: Although morality describes beliefs and choices about appropri- ate behavior, ethics is concerned with principles that explain moral choices. In addition, the term “ethics” is sometimes used to describe a set of principles held by a group or individual (Deigh, 1995).

Ethics can help to explain individual differences in moral reasoning. For example, consider the case of a woman who considers stealing food to feed her hungry children. This situation involves questions about morality (What is the appropriate action?). Ethical principles such as deontology (which is based on following moral rules) and utilitarianism (which asserts that the end can justify the means) could be used to evaluate each option (Bentham, 1907; “Virtue Ethics,” n.d.).

Forsyth (1980) created a theory using ethical ideologies to explain individuals’ moral behavior. This model has been used in several studies to examine ethical positions (e.g., Hadjistavropoulos, Malloy, Sharpe, & Fuchs-Lacelle, 2003; Kernes & Kinnier, 2005; Monga, 2005; Shiyong, Shu, & Junxia, 2011). Forsyth’s model provides neutral descriptions of moral reasoning by measuring the extent of individuals’ idealism and relativism. Idealism is the belief that the most desirable outcome can always be achieved, whereas relativism is the rejection of formulating and relying on universal rules when making moral decisions. Relativism is related to ethical skepticism, which holds that there are different ways to view morality.

Scores on idealism and relativism reveal important differences in moral belief systems. To illustrate these differences, consider the example of a parent spanking a child in public. A per- son who is high on idealism may observe this situation and believe that spanking is wrong because it causes the child to suffer, and people should not do anything that might cause harm to others. In contrast, someone low on idealism may believe that spanking children is acceptable because teaching them is worth the suffering. Meanwhile, a person who is high on relativism may believe that the “correctness” of spanking a child depends on each parent’s individual beliefs, whereas someone low on relativism may believe that the practice is either right or wrong for every person based on moral rules regarding spanking. Idealism and relativism do not determine a person’s actions but can help to explain the moral reasoning that leads to actions.

TABLE 1 Forsyth’s Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies

Relativism

Idealism High Low

High Situationist Absolutist Low Subjectivist Exceptionist

Note. From Forsyth (1981, p. 219). Copyright© 1981 by American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

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Forsyth (1980) used the combination of relativism and idealism to describe four styles of moral reasoning that people generally exhibit: subjectivism, situationism, absolutism, and exceptionism (see Table 1). Subjectivists have high relativism and low idealism. Individuals who fall into this category believe that moral behavior depends upon each individual’s personal values. This is in line with ethical egoism, which suggests that moral standards depend upon personal perspectives (Sanders, 1988). In comparison, situationists are highly relativistic and idealistic. These individ- uals tend to be wary of moral absolutes and instead believe that the best outcomes can always be achieved by analyzing each action in each situation. This is consistent with Fletcher’s (1966) situational ethics, which says that morality is based on which action is most fitting rather than which action is most right.

Meanwhile, absolutists have high idealism and low relativism (Forsyth, 1980). Individuals who fall into this category believe that “the best possible outcomes can always be achieved by following universal moral rules” (p. 176) and reject making exceptions to rules based on conse- quences. This reasoning style is consistent with deontology, which emphasizes using natural law or rationality to make moral judgments (“Virtue Ethics,” n.d.). Alternatively, exceptionists have low idealism and low relativism. They follow universal rules but are open to exceptions based on behavioral consequences. This reasoning style is consistent with the utilitarian approach, which says that actions should produce the best result for the most people (Bentham, 1907).

In addition to creating these four categories, Forsyth (1980) measured how the ethical posi- tions influence attitudes and behavior. Forsyth found that absolutists were more likely than others to have extreme views on contemporary moral issues and to display more negative reactions to others’ behavior (especially if those people violated a moral standard). Exceptionists dis- played the least negative reactions to other people’s behavior. In addition, Forsyth found that individuals with all styles of moral reasoning were equally likely to violate a moral rule, but there were differences among their self-satisfaction after the action. For instance, absolutists rated themselves most negatively, whereas situationists reported some self-condemnation and some satisfaction. Subjectivists rated themselves negatively if their discrepancy was detected, and exceptionists rated themselves positively. These findings suggest that Forsyth’s moral classifica- tions may have meaningful implications for interpretations of behavior and consequences on self- worth.

Previous research suggests that morality has a complex relationship with religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson, 1976; Ernsberger & Manaster, 1981; Glover, 1997; Sapp & Gladding, 1989). Religiosity is generally defined as an organized set of beliefs concerning a higher power, accompanied by rituals, texts, traditions, practices, and a shared code of ethics (Helminiak, 2001; Shafranske & Malony, 1990). Specific factors of religiosity have been shown to influence moral reasoning. For example, in comparison to nonreligious people, religious people are more likely to prefer order, structure, predictability, traditions, and conformity; hold culturally conservative and authoritarian beliefs; and base important life decisions on the expectations of authority figures (Duriez, 2003, 2004).

Others suggest that religiosity involves cognitive processes that affect morality. For example, Wahrman (1981) found that religious dogma negatively correlated with higher levels morality, as determined by Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test. In a similar vein, Batson and colleagues (Batson, 1976; Batson et al., 1989) found that people who feel driven to find religious truth and question their own faith are more likely to use principled reasoning that is exhibited in Kohlberg’s higher stages and have more genuine altruistic motives. This line of research suggests that a construct that underlies religiosity, but not religiosity itself, influences morality.

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Athough prior research suggests that religiosity relates to factors that influence moral rea- soning, whether there is a direct relationship between religiosity and moral reasoning remains unclear. Barnett, Brass, and Brown (1996) investigated religiosity in relation to Forsyth’s classifications of moral reasoning and found a significant negative correlation between religiosity and relativism. Meanwhile, they found no significant relationship between religiosity and ideal- ism. Although informative, this study employed a three-item religiosity measure, which limited the range of scores and circumscribed the ability to discriminate between levels of religiosity among participants.

Because spirituality is closely related to religiosity, it may also be fruitful to investigate the role of spirituality within morality. Spirituality is a relatively new research construct that generally is defined as the broad, personal search for meaning, purpose, and value in life (Frame, 2003; Frame, Uphold, Shehan, & Reid, 2005; Helminiak, 2001). Researchers suggest that religiosity and spirituality overlap, but that there are also some distinct differences between them (Hyman & Handal, 2006; Miller & Thoresen, 2003; Schlehofer, Omoto, & Adelman, 2008). Although religiosity is defined as more general, external, rule based, and community oriented, spirituality is defined as more specific, internal, and subjective.

There is currently a dearth of information about the relationship between spirituality and morality. A preliminary study by Young, Cashwell, and Woolington (1998) measured spiritu- ality and moral reasoning with the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979). They found that spirituality was related to higher levels of moral reasoning. Because this study focused on spirituality and moral maturity, it would be helpful to investigate spirituality with Forsyth’s measure of moral reasoning styles to ascertain additional information about spirituality’s relationship with moral reasoning across the lifespan.

Although it is well documented that female individuals tend to be more religious than male (Francis, 1997; Smith, Denton, Faris, & Regnerus, 2002), there is little information about whether there are gender differences in spirituality. Preliminary research suggests that females also tend to be more spiritual than males (Bryant, 2007); however, additional replication of these results is warranted to confirm generalizablity of these findings.

When looking at gender differences on morality, inconsistent findings emerge. Some research indicates that women have higher idealism than men (Allmon, Page, & Roberts, 2000; McHoskey, 1996; Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1994; Wilson, 2003), whereas others have found that men had higher idealism than women (Byers & Powers, 2006). In addition, some research indicates that women have higher relativism than men (Allmon et al., 2000; Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1994), whereas oth- ers report no gender differences in relativism (Byers & Powers, 2006; McHoskey, 1996; Wilson, 2003). Finally, others suggest that there are no gender differences between idealism and relativism (Forsyth, Nye, & Kelley, 1988; Marques & Azevedo-Pereira, 2009; Yaman & Gurel, 2006). The systematically inconsistent findings suggest that gender differences in moral reasoning may not be present.

In summary, research has indicated that religiosity was negatively correlated with relativism, but this study used a three-item religiosity measure, which may limit findings. In addition, spiri- tuality research is lacking. Although one study suggests that spirituality is related to higher levels of moral reasoning, this finding provides limited information about spirituality’s relationship with moral reasoning across the lifespan. Finally, one study suggests that female individuals are more spiritual than male, but this finding has not been supported by any other research. Addressing these issues can help to create a more comprehensive view of religiosity, spirituality, and moral reasoning.

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The main purpose of this study was to further investigate the relationships between religiosity, spirituality, and moral reasoning. Specifically, this study aimed to (a) build upon previous research on the relationship between religiosity and Forsyth’s moral styles by using a longer, more thorough religiosity measure, (b) investigate the relationship between spirituality and Forsyth’s moral reasoning styles, and (c) examine whether there are gender differences in spirituality. Based on previous findings (Barnett et al., 1996), we hypothesized that religiosity would negatively cor- relate with relativism and that there would be no significant relationship between religiosity and idealism. Because research on spirituality and moral reasoning is lacking, we had no basis from which to hypothesize the direction of potential relationships. Based on Bryant’s (2007) research, we hypothesized that women would score higher than men on the spirituality measure.

METHODS

Participants

The sample included 1037 undergraduate students from a southeastern university who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Participants had to be 18 years of age or older to participate. There were no other inclusion or exclusion requirements.

Materials

Participants completed a survey that comprised general demographic questions (e.g., age, gen- der), reported religiosity (yes/no), religious affiliation, and reported spirituality (yes/no). It also included three psychometrically validated measures: the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SCSRFQ), the Spiritual Intelligence Self-Report Inventory (SISRI), and the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ). Both self-reports and validated measures were used to assess religiosity and spirituality to help account for potential differences in how participants and psychologists view these constructs.

The SCSRFQ is a 10-item measure that was used to examine the degree of individuals’ reli- giosity (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). The statements are broad so they can be used to assess people of different religions. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale—1 (strongly disagree), 2 (dis- agree), 3 (agree), and 4 (strongly agree). Some of the questions included on this measure are “My religious faith is extremely important to me” and “My faith impacts many of my decisions.” Items are added and then divided by 10 to produce a total mean score. This measure has shown to have good internal consistency (α = .95), split-half reliability (.92), and convergent validity with several religiosity measures (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997; Plante, Yancey, Sherman, Guertin, & Pardini, 1999).

The SISRI is a 24-item measure that was used to examine the degree of participants’ spiri- tuality (King, 2008). It contains four subscales: Critical Existential Thinking, Personal Meaning Production, Transcendental Awareness, and Conscious State Expansion. Each statement is rated on a scale comprising 0 (not at all true of me), 1 (not very true of me), 2 (somewhat true of me), 3 (very true of me), and 4 (completely true of me). Some of the items are “I have deeply contemplated whether or not there is some greater power or force” and “I am able to make deci- sions according to my purpose in life.” All items are added and then divided by 24 to produce a

RELIGIOSITY AND SPIRITUALITY IN MORAL REASONING 271

total mean score. This measure has shown to have good internal consistency (α = .92), split-half reliability (.91), test–retest reliability (r = .89), and validity (King & DeCicco, 2009).

The EPQ is a 20-item measure that was used to examine how participants make moral deci- sions (Forsyth, 1980). Each statement is rated 1 (completely disagree), 2 (largely disagree), 3 (moderately disagree), 4 (slightly disagree), 5 (neither agree nor disagree), 6 (slightly agree), 7 (moderately agree), 8 (largely agree), and 9 (completely agree). Some examples of these items are “Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be” and “What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.” The EPQ has two subscales: Idealism and Relativism. Consistent with Forsyth’s (1980) guidelines for scoring the measure, participants’ scores are determined to be high or low based on whether they score above or below the means (Idealism M = 65.52; Relativism M = 52.74). Based on the subscale scores, partici- pants are classified as a situationist (high idealism and high relativism), subjectivist (low idealism and high relativism), exceptionalist (low idealism and low relativism), or absolutist (high ideal- ism and low relativism). This measure has shown to have good reliability and validity with good internal consistency for both the Idealism (α = .82) and Relativism scales (α = .84), moderate test–retest reliability (r = .67), and convergent validity with other measures of ethical ideology, such as the Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility instrument (Etheredge, 1999; Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth et al., 1988).

Procedure

After receiving Institutional Review Board approval, we entered the survey into Checkbox, online survey software. A link to this survey was posted on a standardized data collection program administered by the psychology department at a large southeastern university. This program offers students the opportunity to participate in research studies to earn extra credit in their psychology course(s). If students followed the link, then they were directed to a page on Checkbox.com that explained the study’s title, purpose, risks, benefits, alternatives to participation, and contact information. If participants selected “I understand and fully consent to participate in this study,” then they were led to the first page of the survey. If they performed any other action, then they were directed away from the survey.

Data Analysis

After data collection was complete, responses were exported anonymously and transferred onto a SPSS database. Data were screened by deleting 73 blank entries and analyzed using descrip- tive statistics, correlations, t tests, regression models, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests. Missing data were removed using pairwise/listwise deletion.

RESULTS

Participant Characteristics

The final sample consisted of 788 (76%) female and 249 (24%) male participants ranging in age from 18 to 93 (Myears = 22.3, SDyears = 10.51). When asked to report whether they consider

272 BAUMSTEIGER, CHENNEVILLE, MCGUIRE

themselves to be religious and/or spiritual, 51% of participants identified as religious and 65.3% identified as being spiritual. Across the two questions, 241 participants (23%) indicated that they view themselves as both religious and spiritual. Most participants either identified themselves as Christian (47.7%) or did not report a religious affiliation (46%). The remaining participants identified as Muslim (2.2%), Hindu (1.4%), Jewish (.7%), Wiccan (.3%), or Buddhist (.2%).

Participants who completed the SCSRFQ (n = 552) scored as highly religious (range = 1–4; M = 3.20, SD = .63), although it should be noted that participants who identified as not religious did not complete this measure (n = 478). On the SISRI, participants scored as moderately reli- gious (range = 0–4; M = 3.31, SD = .69). Missing data for this measure were equally distributed between participants who reported being spiritual and those who did not.

On the Ethics Position Questionnaire, participants scored as moderately to highly idealis- tic (range = 1–9; M = 6.42, SD = 1.39), and moderately relativistic (range = 1–9; M = 5.65, SD = 1.40). Consistent with Forsyth’s (1980, p. 176) scoring instructions, Idealism and Relativism scores were dichotomized to group participants into four moral reasoning categories. Similar to a previous study using the EPQ (Allmon et al., 2000), most participants were clas- sified as Situationists (High Relativism + High Idealism; 76%), whereas others were classified as Absolutists (Low Relativism + High Idealism; 16%), Subjectivists (High Relativism + Low Idealism; 6%), or Exceptionists (Low Relativism + Low Idealism; 2%).

Religiosity and Moral Reasoning

High religiosity scores on the SCSRFQ significantly correlated with high idealism scores and low relativism scores on the EPQ (see Table 2). An independent samples t test compared participants who self-identified as either religious or nonreligious. Results showed that religious people had higher idealism (M = 7.4, SD = .15) than nonreligious people (M = .68, SD = .16), t(985) = 5.63, p < .01. In contrast, self-described religious people had lower scores on relativism (M =

TABLE 2 Scale Reliability and Correlations Between Religiosity, Spirituality, and Moral Reasoning

1. 2. 3. 4.

Religiosity 1. SCSRFQ total score .94

Spirituality 2. SISRI total score .35∗∗ .92

Moral reasoning 3. EPQ idealism total

score .22∗∗ .25∗∗ .88

4. EPQ relativism total score

−.15∗∗ .05 .15∗∗ .87

Note. Cronbach’s alphas for the scales are located on the diagonals. SCSRFQ = Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire; SISRI = Spiritual Intelligence Self-Report Inventory; EPQ = Ethics Position Questionnaire.

∗∗p < .01.

RELIGIOSITY AND SPIRITUALITY IN MORAL REASONING 273

.61, SD = .16) than self-described nonreligious people (M = .65, SD = .14), t(974) = –3.69, p <

.01. Two bivariate regression models found that religiosity explained only 5% of variance within idealism (p <.05) and 2% of variance within relativism (p < .05) within the present sample.

A between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the differences between moral rea- soning styles on peoples’ level of religiosity. There was a significant difference between groups on level of religiosity, F(3, 501) = 11.28, p < .01. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey Honestly Significant Difference test indicated that Absolutists had significantly higher religiosity scores (M = .89, SD = .12) than Situationists (M = .78, SD = .16, p < .01), Subjectivists (M = .76, SD = .13, p < .01), and Exceptionists (M = .72, SD = .19, p < .01). All other between-group differences were not significant (p > .05).

Spirituality and Moral Reasoning

High spirituality scores on the SISRI significantly correlated with high idealism scores, but did not significantly correlate with relativism scores on the EPQ (see Table 2). An independent sam- ples t-test compared participants who responded “yes” or “no” to the question, “Do you consider yourself to be a spiritual person?” Results indicated that spiritual people had higher scores on ide- alism (M = .73, SD = .15) than nonspiritual people (M = .66, SD = .16), t(978)= 7.06, p < .01. In contrast, spiritual people had lower scores on relativism (M = .65, SD = .14) than nonspiritual people (M = .62, SD = .16), t(967) = –-2.51, p < .01. Two bivariate regression models revealed that spirituality only accounted for 6% of variance within idealism (p < .05) and less than 1% of variance within relativism (p < .16).

A between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare spirituality scores between people with different moral reasoning styles. There were two cases in which spirituality differed signif- icantly between groups, F(3, 868) = 4.52, p < .01. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that Absolutists (M = .68, SD = .14, p < .01) and Situationalists (M = .66, SD = .14, p < .01) had significantly higher spirituality scores than Subjectivists (M = .60, SD = .14).

As gender differences on religiosity are already well documented, we examined if gender differences were present on measures of spirituality. An independent samples t test found no significant differences on SISRI scores between men (M = .66, SD = .15) and women (M = .66, SD = .14), t(924)= –.52, p = .60. For a categorical perspective, chi-square analyses were used to measure gender differences on self-reported spirituality. Despite no significant difference on level of spirituality, women were more likely than men to self-identify as being spiritual, χ 2(1, N = 1,029) = 16.39, p < .01.

DISCUSSION

The overall aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between religiosity, spirituality, gender, and moral reasoning. As hypothesized, religiosity negatively correlated with relativism. This is consistent with previous findings (Barnett et al., 1996), suggesting that religious people are more likely to believe in universal rules (Forsyth, 1980). Conversely, although we hypothesized that religiosity would not significantly correlate with idealism, there was a significant, positive relationship between these constructs. This is inconsistent with previous findings (Barnett et al., 1996) and might indicate that religious people are more likely to believe that best outcomes

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can be achieved without harming anyone (Forsyth, 1980). Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that although there were statistically significant differences in moral reasoning across religiosity, the association between these constructs was very small in magnitude. Therefore, the relationship between religiosity and Forsyth’s moral reasoning styles do not appear to be meaningful.

The second aim was to examine the relationship between spirituality and moral reasoning. We found that highly spiritual people appeared to be more idealistic and less relativistic than nonspiritual people. According to Forsyth (1980), this indicates that spiritual people may be somewhat more likely than nonspiritual people to believe that the best possible outcome can always be obtained and to value moral absolutes. However, similar to correlations between reli- giosity and moral reasoning, correlations between spirituality and moral reasoning were low; spirituality accounted for very little variance within moral reasoning. This suggests that the rela- tionship between spirituality and Forsyth’s moral reasoning styles are not meaningful. Because the relationship between spirituality and moral reasoning has not been previously researched, it might be helpful to further examine this finding within a different sample.

According to Forsyth’s (1980) research, ethical positions are based on the ethical principles people follow and can provide insight into moral reasoning. Because religiosity and spirituality are based on shared values, one might think that all religious people or all spiritual people may follow common ethical principles, and thus approach moral situations in similar ways. In contrast, based on current findings, it appears that religiosity and spirituality do not determine people’s ethical positions. This means that it may not be appropriate to make assumptions about a person’s moral reasoning based on their religiosity or spirituality.

Based on Bryant’s (2007) research, we hypothesized that women would score higher than men on the spirituality measure. This hypothesis was not supported; women did not score higher than men on the spirituality measure. This inconsistency may indicate that gender differences in spirituality are not generalizable. Alternatively, this finding may reflect an atypical sample or may be a function of the spirituality scales used in different studies. Of interest, women were more likely than men to self-identify as spiritual. If gender differences in reporting spirituality (rather than differences in spirituality itself) are found to be real, then this could significantly influence findings based on self-reported spirituality.

The findings from this study should be taken into consideration within the context of its limi- tations. First, the sample did not represent all major religious affiliations, which could influence the nature of participants’ religiosity. However, the distribution is similar to the distribution of religion among current Americans (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009), so the sample may adequately represent the American population. Second, the sample included only college students at a south- eastern university, which may not represent the general population. Third, the spirituality measure reflects a construct without an absolute definition; there is evidence of considerable disagree- ment on spirituality definitions among psychologists and lay people (Hyman & Handal, 2006; Wuthnow, 1998). To address this issue, we utilized both self-reported spirituality and scores on a spirituality measure. Moreover, correlations with each type of spirituality information and moral reasoning were consistent in direction. Finally, the sample did not exhibit an equal distribution of ethical positions. Nonetheless, another study found a similar distribution within its sample (Allmon et al., 2000).

Despite promising indicators from the literature that religiosity and spirituality might signifi- cantly influence moral reasoning, results from this study suggests that other factors may be more influential in determining moral reasoning. For example, future research could investigate the

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relationship between dogmatism or empathy and moral reasoning (Davis, Andersen, & Curtis, 2001). Additional research could examine whether there are gender differences in reporting spirituality (in contrast to spirituality itself), as this issue could influence spirituality research. Researchers could also examine these constructs within a sample with more diverse religious ori- entations and denominations to determine whether aspects of moral reasoning are associated with other types of religiosity. Finally, researchers could further investigate the validity of Forsyth’s EPQ by administering a vignette and asking questions that evaluate participants’ ethical posi- tions, as well as collecting additional information on ethical positions and age and socioeconomic status. This line of research could lead to a better understanding of moral reasoning.

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