Please answer three questions in essay format

"He is 26 and worked at U.S. Steel for just over five months before getting locked out. He

sits with his friends-five others, also junior employees at U.S. Steel-allleery of the media

and reluctant to give their names. They range in age from 26 to 45. They have gathered

around on camp chairs and an old wooden box that they use as a bench. On a grassy lot to

the right of the main gates of U.S. Steel at Burlington and Wilcox streets, their conversation

quickly turns to their frustration, anger and rage about being locked out. Talking over each

other, one of them says that picket duty is 'boring as hell."'

"It's hard to avoid politics. Stan, 54, who has worked at the plant for 33 years, says the

workers have been 'good soldiers' while U.S. Steel has 'reneged on everything' and 'raised

unemployment levels.' They are angry with people, allegedly scabs from other unions,

crossing their picket line. They criticize politicians for showing up for 'photo-ops' during the

federal election campaign and they are angry that they haven't heard from them since .... "

"They are worried about their employment insurance running out at the end of August.

Currently, they receive $400 a week in El, plus $200 a week in strike pay for picketing eight

hours a week.... One of the younger workers who chose to remain anonymous said that

above all else: 'I don't want pity. I just want my job back. '"

[Interview with some of the more than 600 Hamilton workers locked out by their employer

in July 2011]

Source: Vidya Kauri. "Life on the picket line." The Spectator, July 7, 2011. http://www.thespec.com/ news-story/2213930-life-on-the-picket-line/. Reprinted with permission of The Hamilton Spectator.

INTRODUCTION

The members of the United Steelworkers union were locked out, or not allowed to work, by their Hamilton employer, who thus hoped to force their union to accept the company's wage and benefits offer. Eventually, in mid- October 2011, members voted to accept essentially the same offer they had

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received before the lockout began. They did not get the salary increase they had hoped for, and they had to accept the fact that new employees would not get the kind of pension plan that older workers already had. 1

In contrast, in July 2013, after a three-week strike against Coca-Cola, 700 members of the Canadian Auto Workers union voted to accept an offer their union leaders had negotiated with the company. Union leaders announced that their concerns about pensions and about the outsourcing of jobs had been resolved through collective bargaining, while company officials stated they felt the deal was fair for everyone.2

Three months later, in early October 2013, more than 80 percent of 8,500 members of the United Food and Commercial Workers voted to accept the new offer their company had made. They had been on strike against Real Canadian Superstores in Alberta for only three days. While there was one key worker demand that the company did not meet guaranteed minimum weekly hours for part-time workers it did agree to higher hourly wages and improved benefits, including health care coverage.3

Meanwhile, in mid-2013, young baristas in a Halifax coffee shop voted to join the Service Employees International Union, while their counterparts in two other local coffee shops were organizing to do the same. 4 Labour analysts were somewhat surprised by this development, assuming that because many workers in this industry are employed part time while attending school, they would not be so interested in joining a union.

A month later, in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, the results of a vote by Wal-Mart employees to decertify a union were released 51 of 56 employees voted to get rid of the union already in their workplace. This left Wal-Mart union-free at all its locations across Canada, and the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) vowing to renew its efforts to unionize Wal-Mart's Canadian outlets, something it has been trying to do since 1977.5

These brief accounts highlight a number of points we will make in this chapter. The ongoing battle between Wal-Mart and UFCW Canada highlights the rights of workers to join a union, widely considered a basic human right. As we will see, a large minority of Canadian workers are already union mem- bers, but the majority are not, some because they do not have the opportunity and others because they are unaware of or ambivalent about unions' goals and methods. We will also learn that the union movement is not limited to blue- collar manufacturing and resource-extraction industries. Unions have become

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very active in the upper-tier services (particularly in the public sector) and are

also trying to organize lower-tier service workers in the retail and food and

accommodation sectors.

These examples remind us that when labour negotiations reach an impasse and a strike or lockout occurs, we are not simply looking at a "union problem."

There are two parties involved. Both employers and workers (through their

unions) are trying to get a better deal for themselves, and both typically think

that their own position is fair. Furthermore, when unions resort to strike

action, the outcome is not always beneficial to workers. What is not evident

from these examples, though, nor from media accounts of strikes and lock- outs, is that the vast majority of contracts between Canadian employers and

unions are settled without any work disruptions. The data we will examine

clearly demonstrate this.

We have already noted the ambivalence of many Canadian workers

regarding unions. The Canadian public, as a whole, is similarly uncertain about its response to organized labour. For example, a 2012 EKOS Research national public opinion survey found that only 40 percent of Canadian adults

agreed that "all in all, unions are a positive force in society."6 Another survey,

conducted by the Public Response Group in 2012, revealed that 61 percent of Canadians felt that unions "do a good job of protecting their members' jobs," but only 46 percent agreed that "gains made by unions for their members also

improve the lives of other Canadians."7 And, in 2011, a poll conducted by Abacus Research showed that 60 percent of Canadians supported the federal government when it passed legislation to force striking unionized Canada Post

and Air Canada employees back to work. 8

These polling results frame several other questions asked in this chapter.

Just how beneficial are unions for their members but also for society as a

whole? Should unions be rethinking their goals and strategies? What is the

role of government in regulating industrial relations? As we will see, public-

sector unions are now the largest and fastest-growing unions in Canada. This

development raises a unique and difficult dilemma since, for these unions, the government is both the employer and the institution that makes and enforces

the rules governing what unions can do. When is it justifiable for "the public

good" to take precedence over the rights and interests of employees? But before

tackling these contentious subjects, we will review some relevant theoretical

perspectives and provide a brief history of organized labour in Canada.

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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZED LABOUR

Mainstream industrial relations theory views the system ofjob regulation as the core of worker-management relations (Bain and Clegg 1974).9 The rules and

regulations that form the basis of collective agreements are assumed to inject

stability into employment relations by tilting the balance of power slightly

away from management and toward workers. However, this perspective over-

plays the importance of predictable and harmonious industrial relations. By

focusing on the formal system of rules and institutions governing industrial

relations, the mainstream perspective does not question the existing distribu-

tion of power between workers and management. It also overlooks much of

the daily informal interaction between workers and employers, as "the rules

of the game" are constantly being negotiated. It is important to recognize

that work is a power relationship in which conflict is always a possibility

(Chapter 10) and in which unions are frequently involved.

Conflict and Cooperation in Union-Management Relations

Collective bargaining is the process by which a union, on behalf of its mem- bers, and an employer reach a negotiated agreement (called a collective agree- ment or a contract), which defines for a specific time period wages, work hours and schedules, benefits, and other working conditions, and procedures for

resolving grievances. Collective agreements are negotiated and administered

under provincial and federal labour laws and are designed to reduce conflict.

Indeed, the main thrust of modern industrial relations practice is the avoid-

ance of conflict. Thus, for the system to operate with some degree of fairness

and equity for workers, who, on the whole, are in the weaker bargaining posi-

tion, there must be the threat of conflict that could disrupt the employer's

business. While critics often insist that the Canadian industrial relations

scene is too adversarial, a federal government task force on labour relations

responded to these concerns decades ago, explaining that

330

[p] aradoxical as it may appear, collective bargaining is designed to resolve

conflict through conflict, or at least through the threat of conflict. It is an

adversary system in which two basic issues must be resolved: how avail-

able revenue is to be divided, and how the clash between management's

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

drive for productive efficiency and the workers' quest for job, income

and psychic security are to be reconciled. 10

As noted frequently in Chapters 8 through 10, managers of work organizations

must balance the profit-seeking goals of owners (and shareholders) and the

resulting need to control employees with the necessity of achieving a work-

able level of cooperation and commitment from them. Workers aim for higher

wages, better working conditions, and more autonomy in their jobs. Employers

pursue higher profits, lower costs, and increased productivity. The chronic ten-

sion between these opposing interests forces tradeoffs on both sides, and may

also generate open conflict. However, not all union-management negotiations

are a zero-sum game, or a situation in which one side can gain something only if

the other gives up something. Indeed, on some issues, such as improved health

and safety conditions (see Chapter 12), negotiations can produce a win-win

situation in which both workers and management benefit. This approach to

negotiations is called "mutual gains bargaining" (Weiss 2003).

Unions as "Managers of Discontent"

Having observed the oppressive conditions experienced by mid-19th-century

factory workers, Marx concluded that eventually their misery and poverty

would ignite a revolution (Chapter 1). But, as Stephen Hill (1981: Chapter 7)

pointed out, even Marxists, committed to the belief that capitalism pits

workers and bosses against each other in constant struggle, acknowledge that

collective bargaining integrates workers into the existing capitalist system.

In fact, Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Russian Revolution, dismissed trade

unions as capable only of reform, not revolution.

In some respects, contemporary unions function as managers of discontent

(Mills 1948). They channel the frustrations and complaints of workers into

a carefully regulated dispute-resolution system. Unions help their members

to articulate specific work problems or needs, and solutions are then sought

through collective bargaining, or through grievance procedures. For example,

labour legislation prohibiting strikes during the term of a collective agreement

puts pressure on union leaders to contain any actions by their members that

could disrupt the truce with management. Thus, most unions today operate

in ways that contribute to the maintenance of capitalism, seeking reforms that

reduce power imbalances favouring owners and managers.

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Generally speaking, unions are democratic organizations whose con- stitutions allow members to elect their leaders. Theoretically, then, union leaders are responsive and accountable to the union members who elected them, translating their wishes into tangible collective bargaining goals. But this has not always been the case. Robert Michels (1959) was the first to investigate the issue of union democracy. His study of German trade unions prior to World War I concluded that leaders in working-class organizations always dominate members. Michels's famous iron law of oligarchy draws on technical, organizational, and psychological explanations. According to this theory, leaders develop expert knowledge, which gives them power. Once in office, leaders can control the organization to maintain their power. Finally, the masses tend to identify with leaders and expect them to exercise power on their behal£

But in Canada and elsewhere, over a number of decades, we have wit- nessed the emergence of strong grassroots movements challenging entrenched union leadership cliques and, in effect, opposing oligarchic rule. Most unions today espouse democratic principles, but some have been more successful in putting these into practice than others. In fact, union officials seem to be constantly trying to increase the participation of members in union activities (Freeman 1982). Images of corrupt and autocratic leaders, while headlined by the media and reinforced by the history of a few unions, are far from typical. Thus, what Michels (1959) discovered was not a universal trait of unions, but a potential problem faced by all large bureaucratic organizations.

Business versus Social Unionism

Typically, the daily activities of unions focus on two types of goals: gaining more control over the labour process (Chapter 10) and increasing work rewards for members. There are frequently compromises between these two goals. Because of their immediate economic needs or because they are not all that involved in their work (Marx would have called this "alienation"), workers may want their unions to focus primarily on economic rewards. In addition, employers are sometimes willing to give up more of their profits rather than concede to workers' greater decision-making authority. This emphasis by unions on material gain rather than job control, known as business unionism, has become a hallmark of the North American labour movement.

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

In the last few decades, however, we have also seen the emergence in some

unions of social unionism. While still engaging in collective bargaining with

employers over wages, benefits, and other work rewards, some public-sector

unions, such as the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), along with some large private-sector unions, such as the Canadian Auto Workers

(CAW; now renamed Unifor), have taken on a much broader agenda of soci-

etal reform, entering public debates about issues such as globalization, inter-

national human rights, and health care reform (Gindin 1995). And, in a few

cases, some union locals (rather than the complete union) have actively col-

laborated with social justice organizations to implement social reforms in their communities, across the country, or even globally. David Camfield (2011)

describes such involvement by unions in networks of organizations that are

trying to benefit others, not just union members, as social movement unionism.

In a similar manner, some U.S. and Mexican unions have collaborated to resist

the negative effects of globalization on workers in both countries (Kay 2011).

The Economic Impact of Unions

Unions benefit their members financially. On average, Canadian unionized

workers earn about 10 percent more than nonunion workers do, with the impact being greater for women than for men. However, in recent years, this

union wage premium has declined, or even reversed in firms with 500 or more

employees (Statistics Canada 2008i: 41). Union members also are more likely

than comparable nonunion workers to receive additional non-wage benefits.

For example, a study of Canadian child-care workers found that unions raised

wages by 15 percent, had a positive impact on benefits, and provided financial incentives for workers to improve their qualifications and skills (Cleveland,

Gunderson, and Hyatt 2003). Unions also contribute to reducing overall wage

inequality in a nation's labour market, although less so than in the past. The

union impact on wages is greatest for workers in the lower and middle ranges

of the income, education, and skill distributions. In other words, without unions, income inequality in Canada would likely be even higher (Chapter 5).

Indeed, in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, growing

income inequality has been linked, in part, to declining union membership.11

Access to these economic advantages of union membership obviously

depends on where one works. Unionization is significantly higher in large

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

workplaces in the core sector of the economy (Chapter 5), where employers

are in a better competitive position to provide decent wages and working

conditions. In turn, nonstandard jobs, with their lower wages, fewer non-

wage benefits, and less job security (Chapter 4), are typically nonunionized

(Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Barriers to unionization of part-time and temporary workers include restrictive legislation and, until recently, lack

of interest among unions. However, some unions have begun to recognize

the need for and importance of organizing workers in nonstandard jobs

(Vasko 2000). The most thorough analysis of what trade unions do continues to

be a study by two Harvard economists, Richard Freeman and James

Medoff (1984: 5-19), who make a useful distinction between the two "faces" of unionism. The monopoly face represents unions' power to raise

members' wages at the expense of employers and of nonunionized workers.

The collective voice face shifts attention to how unions democratize

authoritarian workplaces, giving workers a collective voice in dealing with

management. Freeman and Medoff admit that unions do impose some

social and economic costs, but think that these are far outweighed by their

positive contributions. Unions significantly advance workers' economic

and political rights and freedoms. And, to the chagrin of their opponents,

unions also typically boost productivity through lower employee turnover,

better management performance, reduced hiring and training costs, and

greater labour-management communication and cooperation (Lee 2007; Gunderson and Hyatt 2009). But because of higher wage costs, productivity gains do not necessarily make unionized firms more profitable. On balance,

unionization appears to improve rather than to harm the social and

economic systems (Walsworth and Long 2012).

HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT

Craft Unionism

Skilled craftworkers carpenters, bricklayers, masons, cabinetmakers,

blacksmiths, shoemakers, and tailors were the first to unionize in

Canada. A strike by Toronto printers in 1872 resulted in the Trade

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

Unions Act, which, for the first time, legalized union activity. Prior to that, unions had been considered a conspiracy against the normal opera- tions of business. Other significant events that laid the foundations for trade unionism in Canada were the Nine-Hour Movement in the 1870s, involving working-class agitation for shorter working hours; and the crea- tion of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) in 1883 as the first central labour body.12

Craft pride based on the special skills acquired through a long appren- ticeship, solidarity with fellow artisans, and a close integration of work and communities were the hallmarks of these early craft unions. Craftsmen (there were no women among them) were the aristocrats of the working class. Printers, for example, reinforced their status by referring to their work as a "profession." As other craftsmen have done, shoemakers bolstered craft pride by going back into history to identify St. Crispin as their patron saint (Kealey 1980: 292).

Craft unions served as benevolent societies, providing members with a form of social insurance years before the rise of the welfare state. They also protected their members' position in the labour market by regulating access to the craft, thus monopolizing its unique skills. Today, this practice would be referred to as a labour market shelter (see Chapter 5). And as small local enterprises of the 19th century gave way to the factories and large corporations of the 20th, unions provided craftsmen with a defence against the erosion of their way of life. Through their unions, artisans vigorously opposed scientific management and the mechanization and reorganization of craft production in factories.

Craft unions dominated the young Canadian labour movement well into the 20th century, a time when the labour market for many skilled trades spanned both sides of the Canada-U.S. border. Hence, these inter- national unions were American based and affiliated with the conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL). The internationals quickly came to control the Canadian labour scene. At the 1902 convention of the Trades and Labour Congress, the AFL unions purged their Canadian-based rivals by successfully moving that no organization duplicating one already in the American federation could be a member of the Trades and Labour Congress. They thus stole power from more radical Canadian labour leaders (Babcock 1974).

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Industrial Unionism

The craft principle underlying the early AFL unions contrasts with industrial unionism, where all workers in an industry are represented by the same union, regardless of their occupation. The Knights of Labour, the earliest industrial union in Canada, organized their first local assembly in Hamilton, Ontario, in 1875. For a brief period in the 1880s, they challenged the dominance of the AFL craft unions. Driven by an idealistic radicalism, the Knights' immediate goal was to organize all workers into a single union, regardless of sex, skill level, craft, or industry, in order to eventually abolish the capitalist wage system and create a new society. Their membership peaked in 1887, with more than 200 local assemblies representing workers in 75 occupations. But rapid membership growth made it difficult to maintain an idealistic philosophy, and political rivalries both internal and external (with the AFL craft unions) led to the demise of the Knights. By the early years of the 20th century, they had all but disappeared in Canada (Kealey 1981) and the United States (Voss 1994).

Only a handful of industrial unions emerged in the early 20th century. Several were part of the rising tide of labour radicalism that reached a crest with the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike. There was a distinctive regional fla- vour to these working-class protests, as most were rooted in western Canada (McCormack 1978). For example, the radical ideology of the Chicago-based Industrial Workers of the World (the "Wobblies") attracted unskilled immi- grants employed in lumbering, mining, agriculture, and railways in the West prior to World War I. One Big Union (OBU), a revolutionary industrial union, received widespread support in the western provinces, particularly among miners, loggers, and transportation workers. One Big Union called for secession from the conservative AFL and its Canadian arm, the Trades and Labour Congress. Its support for the Russian Revolution brought vigorous counterattacks from employers, governments, and craft unions, and caused the union's eventual defeat in the 1920s.

Not until the 1940s did industrial unionism become firmly established in Canada. The breakthrough was the UAW's milestone victory in 1937 against General Motors in Oshawa, Ontario. The United Auto Workers sprang up under the banner of the left-leaning Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1930s to organize unskilled and semiskilled workers in

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

mass-production industries. Many of the initial forays into the auto, electrical, rubber, and chemical factories of corporate North America were led by com- munist organizers. Craft union leaders opposed the CIO largely on political grounds, despite the fact that Canadian workers embraced the CIO form of industrial unionism (Abella 197 4).

In 1956, Canadian craft and industrial unions buried their differences, uniting skilled and unskilled workers within a single central labour organiza- tion: the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). A similar merger of the AFL and the CIO had occurred one year earlier in the United States. The CLC remains Canada's "house of labour." Its affiliated unions represented 3.2 million workers in 2013, almost 70 percent of all Canadian union members. 13 The CLC promotes the economic, political, and organizational interests of affili- ated unions by providing research, education, and organizational and collec- tive bargaining services, as well as by eliminating jurisdictional conflicts. It sometimes becomes embroiled in inter-union disputes over jurisdictions and complaints about unions raiding other unions for members. One prominent example was the Canadian Auto Workers' (CAW) recruitment in 1987 of Newfoundland fishery workers who were at that time represented by the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union. At times, the CLC has become active on the national political stage, for example, by forming coalitions with other community-based groups to oppose free trade in the 1980s. The CLC also has had strong ties to the New Democratic Party (NDP), taking a leading role in founding the party in 1961. In the last several elections, though, CLC leaders have been slower to encourage CLC members to vote NDP, although they have almost always opposed the Conservative government in Ottawa.

Quebec Labour

The history and present character of the labour movement in Quebec con- tribute to the distinctiveness of social and economic life in that province (Deom, Grenier, and Beaumont 2009). Quebec labour's history is a fascinating topic in its own right and deserves more than the brief treatment we can afford to give it here. Many of the issues central to Canada's ongoing constitutional debates are amplified in the arena of labour relations. For example, industrial relations have been shaped by a different legal framework in Quebec (its laws

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

are derived from the Civil Code of France, rather than British-based common

law). A more interventionist state role has created a higher degree of central-

ized bargaining than in other provinces, as well as resulting in some innovative

legislation, such as the 1977 anti-strikebreaking law. Nationalist politics have left an indelible mark on union policies and priorities, too. Indeed, the ques-

tion of special representation for Quebec on the executive of the Canadian

Labour Congress at the congress's 1992 convention raised the spectre of a split

between the national umbrella group and the Quebec Federation of Labour,

which represents CLC affiliates in that province.

The development of unions in Quebec followed a different path from that of the rest of Canada. For example, in the early 20th century, the Roman

Catholic Church organized conservative unions that, unlike their counterparts

elsewhere, emphasized the common interests of employers and employees.

During the years that Premier Maurice Duplessis and the ultraconservative

Union Nationale held power (from 1936 to 1960), the state took repressive actions to stifle more independent union development. Worker militancy

flared up in response, the most violent manifestations being the 1949 miners'

strike at Asbestos and the 1957 Murdochville copper miners' strike. Some ana-

lysts view these strikes as major catalysts in Quebec's Quiet Revolution, which

ushered in sweeping social, economic, and political reforms in the 1960s.

During this period, the old Roman Catholic unions cut their ties with the church, becoming one of the main central labour organizations in the province

(the CNTU, or Confederation of National Trade Unions) and adopting an

increasingly radical stance. Hence, the Quebec Federation of Labour, made up

of CLC-affiliated unions, differs from its counterparts in other provinces; it

represents a minority of union members in the province and operates in a more

independent manner. Another influential union organization is the Federation des syndicats de 1' enseignement, the organization representing about 60,000 teachers in French school boards across the province. Thus, there is no unified

Quebec labour movement, although these central organizations have banded

together on occasion, the most notable example being the 1972 Common Front

strike by some 200,000 public-sector workers against government policies.

The Role of the Canadian State in Industrial Relations

In Canada, there has developed a legislative and administrative framework that casts the state as impartial umpire, mediating between labour and capital

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

in an effort to establish and maintain industrial peace. The architect of this

system was William Lyon Mackenzie King, the first federal minister of

labour and later a Liberal prime minister. King's 1907 Industrial Disputes

Investigation Act (IDIA) became the cornerstone of Canada's modern indus- trial relations policy that strives to institutionalize conflict through the control of law. The Act provided for compulsory conciliation (fact finding) in disputes during a "cooling off" period, a tripartite board of arbitration, and special treatment of public interest disputes involving public services. It also banned

strikes or lockouts during the term of a collective agreement. At first, the Act

was applied to disputes in coal mines and railways. Its scope was extended during World War I, and in the 1950s, its principles were incorporated into

provincial legislation. In some instances, the state used the powers of the Act

to legislate an end to strikes. This type of state intervention has shaped the

pattern of industrial conflict in Canada some would argue, in the interests

of employers (Craven 1980; Huxley 1979). In 1944, the National War Labour Order, regulation P.C. 1003, brought

Canadian industrial relations into its modern phase. Modelled on the 1935

U.S. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), P.C. 1003 granted employees

in the private sector collective bargaining rights, set down union certification

procedures, spelled out a code of unfair labour practices, and established a

labour relations board to administer the law. These measures paved the way for a postwar labour-management pact designed to maintain industrial peace.

This truce was enshrined in federal legislation in 1948 and in subsequent

provincial legislation.

Another milestone in the legal entrenchment of collective bargaining rights came out of a 1945 strike by the United Auto Workers at the Ford Motor

Company in Windsor, Ontario. The Rand Formula, named after Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme Court, whose ruling was instrumental in settling

the strike, provided for union security through a union shop and union dues checkoff According to the Rand Formula, even though no one should be required to join a union, it is justifiable to automatically deduct union dues

from the paycheques of all employees in a workplace because a union must

act for the benefit of all employees. It does not matter whether or not the employees belong to the union.

The emergence of public-sector unions in the second half of the

20th century changed the industrial relations scene yet again. The movement

toward full-fledged public-sector unionism began in Saskatchewan in 1944.

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The real push, however, started when Quebec public employees were granted

collective bargaining rights in 1964. Another major breakthrough was the

1967 Public Service Staff Relations Act, which opened the door to unions in

the federal civil service. Some analysts argue that industrial relations entered a coercive phase

during the 1980s. Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz (1993) view government

imposition of wage controls, more restrictive trade union legislation, and the

use of courts to end strikes as signals of the end of "free collective bargaining,"

as established by the industrial relations system set out in earlier federal legisla-

tion. Panitch and Swartz characterize this new era as permanent exceptionalism, reflecting how the suspension of labour's rights and more heavy-handed state

intervention became the rule rather than the exception. 14 As we shall see later, there is now considerable debate over whether Canadian industrial relations

are being destabilized.

"Canadianizing'' Unions

The rise of public-sector unions has also helped to Canadianize the labour movement. At the beginning of the 20th century, U.S.-based international

unions represented about 95 percent of all unionized workers in Canada. By 1969, this proportion had dropped to 65 percent, and it has continued

to decline rapidly since then.15 The vulnerability of Canada's branch-plant

economy, particularly during the 1980s, taught growing numbers of workers

the need for greater local control of union activities. Different bargaining

agendas also tended to arise in the two countries, reflecting their distinc- tive industrial relations environments. Canadian autoworkers, for instance,

roundly rejected the concessions made to employers by the U.S. wing of

their union. The issue of national autonomy came to a head in the 1984

strike against General Motors by the Canadian division of the United Auto

Workers. These Canadian autoworkers found themselves pitted against not

only General Motors, but also the UA W leadership in Detroit, which wanted Canadian workers to accept the concessions agreed to by their American

counterparts. While autonomy was not the goal of the Canadian workers

going into the strike, it became an inevitable result.16

Beyond having different bargaining priorities and strategies, some

Canadian branches of international unions felt that their dues were flowing

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

into the U.S. headquarters with few services flowing back. These and other fac-

tors prompted a growing number of separations. In addition to the Canadian

Auto Workers, the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union grew

out of a Canada-U.S. split in an international union. 17 However, even after they split, good working relations were maintained between Canadianized

unions and their former U.S. parents. What will be interesting to watch in the

future is how unions create new forms of international cooperation beyond

Canada and the United States to address the impact of economic globaliza-

tion on workers. For example, the United Steelworkers recently joined with Unite, the biggest union in the United Kingdom, to create the first global

union: Workers Uniting (Workers Uniting 2010).

A strong argument in support of international unions has been that they

are organized labour's best defence against the global strategies of multina-

tional corporations (Garver et al. 2007). Yet the international unions have

not always been effective in dealing with the sorts of problems multinational corporations created for Canadian employees. For example, in response to

the global recession in 2008, U.S.-based unions supported protectionist trade

policies in an effort to preserve members' jobs within the United States, thus

putting Canadian workers' jobs at risk.

UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS

Figure 11.1 traces union membership growth in Canada since 1911, when

there were only 133,000 union members in the country (So/o of all non-

agricultural paid workers). In 2012, there were approximately 4.66 million union members in the Canadian workforce (30o/o of non-agricultural paid

workers). These percentages measure the unionization rate or union density and reflect the proportion of actual union members to potential members. The exclusion of agriculture, where most workers are self-employed

and are, therefore, ineligible for union membership, allows for more accurate

comparisons with earlier periods when agriculture was a much larger sector, and with other countries at different levels of industrialization.

It is important to note that collective bargaining coverage is typically about two percentage points higher than the unionization rate (Statistics Canada

2008i: 73). This difference is a result of some non-members in unionized

workplaces being entitled to the wages and benefits negotiated by the union

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

FIGURE 11.1 Union Membership in Canada, 1911-2012

Number ...... Percent

5,000 40.0% ..... l! 4,500 'rir 35.0% :e 8

4,000 ::a

c:::) .~ .s 30.0% ~ ....,;;;.

3,500 cp ~ ~ ~ 25.0% 3,000 c::: ~ ""'- ~ a Q) e 2,500 20.0% ~~ ~ = ~ 2,000 ..... § 15.0% ~

""'- 1,500 ~ a .... 10.0% Q) Q) ~ 1,000 e

5.0% ~ ~ 500 ..... § 0 0.0%

.,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ ~ 8 ;g gg C\J .,...._ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ !'..., ~ ~

.,...._ 0) 0) 0) <:;:::)

~ ~ ~ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ .,...._ C\J

Source: Source: 1 911-1 975, Statistics Canada. Historical Statistics of Canada. Table E175-177 - Union membership in Canada, in total and as a percentage of non-agricultural paid workers and union members with international affiliation, 1911 to 1 975. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectione/4147 438-eng.htm#6>; 1976-1996, Statistics Canada. CANSIM Table 279-0025- Number of unionized workers, employees and union density, by sex and province, annual (persons unless otherwise noted). <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?1ang=eng&retrlang=eng&id=2790025&paSer=&pattern=&stByVal= 1&p1=1&p2=-1&tabMode=dataTable&csid=>; 1997-2012, Statistics Canada. CANSIMTable 282-0078- Labour force survey estimates (LFS), employees by union coverage, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), sex and age group, annual (persons). <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a05?1ang=eng&id=2820078&pattern=2820078&searchTypeByValue=1 &p2=35>

in a collective agreement. Among them are supervisory employees who are excluded because of their management role, new hires on probation, and indi- viduals who, perhaps because of their religious or other personal beliefs, opt not to join. In 2011, there were 295,000 nonunion members in this category (Uppal2011). Furthermore, Canadian labour law permits nonunion forms of collective representation, such as staff associations, which represent 5 percent of all employees. Another 9 percent of employees belong to professional asso- ciations, and some of these set wages and working conditions for members. 18

Three major surges in Canadian union membership growth can be seen in Figure 11.1. The first two coincided with the two world wars (1914-18 and 1939-45). This pattern is not surprising because national mobilization for these wars resulted in economic growth, labour shortages, and the need for a high level of cooperation between employers and employees, all of which are key ingredients for successful union recruitment. As already noted, in the years during and immediately following World War II, Canada's contemporary

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

industrial relations system took shape. The third growth surge, largely

facilitated by supportive legislation, took place in the 1970s. The rise of public-

sector unions in that decade brought many civil servants, teachers, nurses, and

other public employees into the organized labour movement. Canadian union density peaked at 37 percent in 1984. The decline over

the next three decades can be traced to a number of recessions and to industrial

restructuring, which both cut deeply into the traditional membership strength

of unions in manufacturing and other blue-collar occupations. Similarly, peri-

odic budget cuts and downsizing in the public sector, beginning in the 1990s,

have led to lower union density. Employer pressures for concessions and the whittling away of collective bargaining rights by governments and the courts

have contributed to a more hostile climate for labour relations, a topic to

which we return below.

The labour movement has also undergone organizational changes. A

notable trend is consolidation, resulting from mergers and membership growth since the 1960s (Chaison 2004). In 1968, there were 14 large unions (30,000

or more members), accounting for just under half of total union membership.

By 2012, 42 unions had memberships of 30,000 or more, comprising over

75 percent of total union membership in the country. 19 Nevertheless, a defining

feature of the Canadian labour movement is the large number of locals. In 2008, the 213 national and international unions contained 14,691 locals, the

basic self-governing unit of the labour movement and the legal entity for collec-

tive bargaining. Membership in locals ranged from just a few members to more

than 45,000. In short, despite consolidations, Canadian labour remains frag-

mented and, consequently, collective bargaining is decentralized. Unlike the

situation in some European nations, where industry-wide national bargaining is the norm, the Canadian pattern of single-establishment, single-union bar-

gaining results in thousands of collective agreements in effect at any one time.

A Comparative Perspective on Unionization

Figure 11.2 provides two key measures for 18 countries recent rates of union

membership20 and the change in union density since 1970. In terms of cur- rent union density, Canada is higher than the United States, several European

countries, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan

and South Korea. But it is lower than the Scandinavian countries (Finland,

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

FIGURE 11.2 Unionization Rates in 18 Countries, 2010, and Absolute Change, 1970-2010

1970-2010 absolute change% 2010 union density

Finland 70.0

Denmark 8.5 68.5

Sweden 0.2 68.2

Norway -2.2 1 54.8

Italy -1.5 I 35.5

Ireland -20.3 32.7

Austria -34.6 28.4

Canada --4.6 27.4

United Kingdom -18.6 26.4

New Zealand -35.2 20.8

Netherlands -18.4 18.6

Germany -13.4 18.6

Japan -16.7 18.3

Australia -25.9 18.1

Spain* 8.6 15.6

United States -15.6 11.4

Korea -3.3 9.7

France -14.2

7.8

-40.0 -20.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0

*Absolute change 198D-201 0, since 1970 data are not available.

Source: 1970, OECD Employment Outlook 2004. Table 3.3 -Trade union density and collective bargaining coverage in OECD countries, 1970-2000, p. 145. <http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdemploymentoutlook2004.htm>; 2010, OECD StatExtracts. Trade Union Density. <http://stats.oecd.org/lndex.aspx?Queryld=20167>

344 NEL

Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

Denmark, Sweden, and Norway), Austria, Ireland, and Italy. Union density reveals only part of the strength of unions, however; collective bargaining coverage also must be considered. In Europe, it is more common than in Canada, the United States, or Japan for workers who are not union members to have terms and conditions of employment set by collective agreements. For example, in France, the Netherlands, and Germany, where relatively few wage and salary earners are union members, between 80 and 90 percent are covered by the provisions of collective agreements that these unions negotiate (International Labour Office 1997).

What accounts for these cross-national differences? In North America, key factors are management's traditional opposition to unions, labour laws that make the certification process for new bargaining units difficult, and a decentralized industrial relations system based in local workplaces (Lipsig- Mumme 2009). In Japan, where density and coverage are similar, collective bargaining also is decentralized and firm based. But, unlike in North America and Japan, in many western European countries there is much greater coordi- nation within each industrial sector. This pattern is a result of highly central- ized collective bargaining systems, supported by law, in which national unions negotiate with large employers' federations. Pay and other basic working con- ditions are set nationally or by industrial sector, greatly reducing competition among individual workplaces on these issues (unlike in Canada, where a firm may resist union pay demands because it would increase its wage costs relative to local competitors). So, in France, for example, despite a union density of less than 10 percent (Figure 11.2), employer associations are legally required to regularly negotiate broad agreements with unions, the benefits of which are extended to virtually all employers and employees.

We noted earlier that Canadian union density has been in slow decline over the last several decades. This fact is reflected in Figure 11.2, which also indicates ongoing declines in union membership density in 13 of the other 17 countries listed. Declines in both density and coverage were more common in nations with employer-centred, decentralized industrial relations systems- notably the United States and Japan. Drops in coverage were less likely in countries with strong sectoral or national bargaining regulated by the state to balance employers' and employees' interests. The United Kingdom and New Zealand, two countries with previously centralized systems, stand out with declining density and coverage. In each case, market-oriented governments deregulated and decentralized industrial relations systems in efforts to weaken

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

the power of unions basically, a shift to a more American model of industrial

relations (Freeman 1995). There are also signs in other European countries, Australia, and New Zealand of a shift in collective bargaining from national

or sectoral levels down to firms, largely due to the introduction of more flex-

ible forms of work organization, although the extent and implications of this

decentralization process vary considerably (International Labour Office 1997). In the field of comparative industrial relations there is growing interest in

the transformation of labour relations in countries with economic and political

histories quite different from the countries featured in Figure 11.2 (Bamber, Lansbury, and Wailes 2011). Researchers are interested in unionization trends in Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Central and South America. At issue

are how different patterns of economic development and political change

affect workers' freedom to join unions and, equally important, the efficacy

of unions. In Mexico, union density has declined in the face of increasing

employer resistance to unions and the growing use of what are called "protec-

tion contracts," whereby employers pay unions not to represent their mem-

bers' interests in a workplace (Fairris and Levine 2004). In India, public-sector unions, traditionally aligned with specific political parties, have been unsure

of how to respond to these same parties freezing public-sector wages or cutting

jobs (Roychowdhury 2003). And in former socialist countries such as China and Russia, unions are struggling to find a new role (Clarke 2005). In China economic reforms have reduced direct state regulation of labour relations,

but because unions remain integrated with management, they are unable to

consult or negotiate on behalf of workers (Clarke, Chang-Hee, and Qi 2004). In Russia, former communist trade unions have pursued social partnerships to

reduce industrial conflict and protect members' interests during the transition

to a market economy, but these initiatives have been largely ineffective because

of the history of union collaboration with government and employers during

the Soviet era (Ash win 2004). An interesting new development, in response to the growth of globalized

production networks that link smaller producers, manufacturers, and distribu- tion companies in one part of the world with massive distribution and retail

companies in another, is the emergence of transnational union networks that allow unions in different parts of the world to cooperate in pursuing common

goals of safer and less exploitative working conditions and improved human

rights (Helfen and Fichter 2013).21 For example, unions representing seafarers and port workers have formed a global alliance through the International

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

Transport Workers' Federation, with its Flags of Convenience campaign

(Lillie 2005). Based in London, England, the federation coordinates actions

to maintain minimum pay standards, negotiate collective agreements with

shipowners, and prevent union-busting at ports around the world.

The Decline of U.S. Unions

While it has declined somewhat, Canadian union membership has remained

relatively stable compared to the United States and Japan which also have employer-centred industrial relations (Lowe 1998). In fact, U.S. unions

appear to be in a struggle for survival (Devinatz 2013).22 Membership has

plunged from 20.1 percent of the workforce in 1983 to 11.4 percent in 2010

(Figure 11.2). Observers attribute this decline to a number of factors, but, in

particular, to fierce anti-union campaigns launched by some private-sector

employers and labour laws that permit these coercive tactics. In addition, management innovations offering workers some form of decision-making

participation (see Chapter 9) have been used to keep unions out of many

workplaces, and public-sector downsizing and the privatizing of government

services have led to many fewer unionized jobs (Goldfield and Bromsen

2013). Where unions still exist, concession bargaining (unions agreeing to roll- backs in wages, benefits, and collective rights) has frequently weakened them.

Significant, too, is the shift of employment away from the union strongholds

of the northeastern industrial regions to southern states, where right-to-work laws undermine union security; under such laws, neither union membership nor payment of union dues may be required as a condition of employment,

even if the workplace is unionized (Dixon 2008). 23

Another perspective is offered by Seymour Martin Lipset (1990) who

argues that a core difference between Canada and the United States is the

historically stronger commitment among Americans to individualistic values,

and Canadians' greater sense of collective rights, which are more amenable

to unionization. However, a recent study found that American workers were slightly more approving of unions than were Canadian workers, and

considerably more nonunion workers in the United States would vote for a

union if they had the opportunity (Lipset and Meltz 1997). Yet the actual

level of union membership in the United States, as we have seen, is about

one-third that of Canada. This paradox reflects the difference between deep-

rooted values, which underlie the institutions of labour relations, and more

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immediate attitudes toward unions, which reflect current labour market condi-

tions and union strength. So, in the United States, unions are so weak today

that workers believe they should be stronger, while, in Canada, the greater

power of unions ends up being a source of criticism among many.

The U.S. experience shows the decisive role of legislation and manage-

ment opposition in encouraging or inhibiting free collective bargaining. Some

analysts argue, pessimistically, that unions lack the resources and supportive

public policies required for the massive new organizing successes needed to

grow their membership. However, other scholars detect a few signs of union

revival in the United States, which may reverse or at least slow down the trends

described above.24 Some local unions have developed innovative organizing

strategies that have appealed to low-wage workers, women, and racial and

ethnic minorities.

The Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles is an example. As in many North American cities, janitorial work in Los Angeles is done under short-term

contracts by companies who employ immigrant workers. Trying to counter

many years of industrial restructuring and de-unionization, in the 1990s the

Service Employees International Union launched a successful public campaign

to reunionize the industry and improve the lot of Central American immi-

grants. Many of these workers were women, and many had entered the United

States without documentation. The campaign focused on getting building

owners to help provide health and welfare benefits to janitors and their families

(Cranford 2004). Justice for Janitors shows how some U.S. unions are trying

to build broad coalitions with other community groups to address social justice

issues (Krinsky and Reese 2006), a strategy we earlier labelled as social move-

ment unionism. This strategy has also been effective in Canada, as in 2010

when the same union organized temporary foreign workers employed as jani-

tors at the University of Alberta and helped them negotiate a better wage and

overtime settlement with their private-sector employer to whom the university

had outsourced its janitorial work (Foster and Barnetson 2012).

Canadian Union Membership Patterns

Because of the large industrial and labour force changes that have occurred

over the past half century (see Chapters 3 and 6), the much higher rate of

union representation for men compared to women that once existed in Canada

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

has largely disappeared (Morissette, Schellenberg, and Johnson 2005). In fact,

in 2011, 31 percent of female employees (excluding the unemployed and self-

employed) belonged to a union, compared to 28 percent of men, reflecting the

large number of women employed in the public sector, which is much more

highly unionized.25 However, age remains a major source of variation in union

membership rates. While 30 percent of all Canadian employees were union-

ized in 2011, only 14 percent of young workers (ages 15 to 24 years) belonged

to unions, compared with 30 percent of 25- to 44-year-olds, 36 percent of

those ages 45 to 54 years, and 34 percent of employees 55 years of age and

older. Again, the explanation can be traced back to industry differences-

young workers are much more likely to be employed in the retail and food

and accommodation industries, which have low unionization rates (14o/o and

7o/o, respectively, in 2011).

Looking further at industry differences, education and public administra-

tion had the highest unionization rates in 2011 (68o/o and 67o/o, respectively).

The rate in the utilities sector was almost as high (64o/o), since many utility

companies are or were government owned and, hence, more highly unionized.

Health care's unionization rate was somewhat lower (53 percent); although

almost all nurses are unionized, doctors are not, and neither are some other

health care support workers. In the transportation sector (e.g., railways, air-

lines, trucking), 41 percent of employees were unionized, as were 30 percent

in construction, and 25 percent in manufacturing. In sharp contrast, only

9 percent of employees in finance, insurance, and real estate were union mem-

bers. The unionization rate in agriculture was even lower (5o/o).

Provincial differences in labour legislation, industrial mix, and economic

performance also influence union membership. Newfoundland and Labrador

had the highest rate of unionization in 2011 (38o/o) because of the dispro-

portionately large size of the unionized public sector in a historically weak

economy and the strength of unions in the fishing industry. Quebec (36o/o),

Manitoba (35o/o), and Saskatchewan (34o/o) are next, for reasons that largely

reflect the political contexts more supportive of collective bargaining rights. In

2011, Ontario's union density was 27 percent, while Alberta's was the lowest in

the country at only 22 percent. Alberta's industrial relations have moved closer

to the American model, given this province's more restrictive labour legislation

and American-style nonunion human resource policies found in key industries

such as oil and gas (Noel and Gardner 1990; Block and Roberts 2000).

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

Other employment characteristics are also associated with union

membership, with workplace size being one of the strongest predictors. In

2011, 54 percent of employees in workplaces with more than 500 employees

were unionized, compared with 41 percent in workplaces with between 100

and 500 employees, 30 percent in 20 to 99 person workplaces, and only

13 percent in even smaller establishments. Full-time workers (33o/o) were

more likely to be unionized than part-time employees (25o/o), and perma-

nent employees had somewhat higher unionization rates than did temporary

workers (30°/o compared to 26o/o).

In short, the composition of the labour movement has been transformed

since the 1960s. The typical unionist today is a white-collar worker employed

in one of the service industries, quite likely in the public sector. Women have

joined the ranks of organized labour faster than men, and some experts claim

that even more women could become members if union recruitment practices

were less gender biased (Yates 2006). There also is the potential for growing

union representation among immigrants and racial minorities. Wages for

immigrants and visible minorities (often the same people) tend to be lower

than average (Chapter 5). With the exception of Black immigrant women,

immigrants and racial minorities are less likely to be union members than the

white majority (Reitz and Verma 2004). This gap in unionization is somewhat

reduced the longer that immigrants are in Canada. Union campaigns targeting

meatpacking, building services, and other sectors with high concentrations of

immigrants could speed up this process.

Canada's Largest Unions

As already noted, total union density has declined somewhat in Canada over

the past three decades, in part, because of significantly reduced employment

in traditionally unionized sectors like manufacturing. In marked contrast,

union membership has continued to grow in the public sector and in some

other service industries. This trend began back in 1967 when the federal

government passed the Public Service Staff Relations Act, thus allowing col-

lective bargaining for federal civil servants. Provincial government employees

were already moving in this direction; Quebec public employees had received

collective bargaining rights in 1965. Unionism soon spread into municipal

governments, hospitals, schools, prisons, social services, and other expanding

publicly funded institutions.

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

Canada's largest union is the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) with members employed in a wide spectrum of jobs in municipali- ties, social services, schools, libraries, colleges and universities, hospitals and nursing homes, and many other public institutions. Because it had diversified far beyond its core membership in public administration, CUPE had become the largest union of any kind in Canada by the early 1980s. By the begin- ning of this century, it already had close to half a million members, and by 2013, its membership had grown to 612,000. 26 The National Union ofPublic and General Employees (NUPGE), the second-largest union in the country (440,000 members in 2013), is also a public-sector union, as is the Public

Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), the sixth-largest Canadian union, with 188,000 members. NUPGE is an umbrella organization for various federal and provincial government unions while PSAC has members employed only in federal government departments.

Three industrial unions are in third, fourth, and fifth place on the list of Canada's six largest unions. In mid-2013, the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), with close to 200,000 members, merged with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP), which was about half this size, to form Unifor, a powerful Canadian-based industrial union with 309,000 members spread across the manufacturing, transportation, utilities, and many service industries. The CAW had already been aggressively diversifying into other sectors, including food services and casinos before the merger. The merger made the new union the third-largest in Canada. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW Canada), with 245,000 members

in 2013, is the Canadian wing of a U.S.-based union. The fourth-largest Canadian union, it has been actively trying to recruit workers in service industries outside the food-processing sector, where it has been dominant. In fifth place is the United Steelworkers union (231,000 members), also an international union with its home base in the United States. It, too, has been organizing workers in a wide range of manufacturing as well as service indus- tries, including security guards, call-centre employees, and taxi drivers.

WOMEN AND UNIONS

While the unionization rate among female employees in Canada today is higher than the male rate, historically the pattern was reversed. A frequent explanation was that women would be less interested in unions because of

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

their family responsibilities and presumed lower commitment to paid employ-

ment. Hence, work problems that might prompt unionization among men

would be of secondary concern to women. Whether these assumptions were

ever supported by fact is difficult to determine, but they certainly have not held true for the past four decades when women have been joining unions at

a much faster rate than men. During union-organizing campaigns in Ontario

during the 1980s and 1990s, for example, female-dominated workplaces were

far more likely to vote in favour of union representation than were male-

dominated workplaces (Yates 2000: 662-64).27 Women today may be more pro-union than men because of their generally lower-paid and lower-status

positions in workplaces (Chapter 6). Historical differences in unionism across

industries are also important; men and women alike join unions and engage

in militant action according to the established patterns of their industries or

occupations (Briskin 2010). Thus, gender segregation in the labour market is

the key factor in gendered unionization patterns. In addition, in the past, male-dominated unions have acted to keep

women out of certain jobs and, therefore, out of unions. In the early

20th century, for example, craft unions lobbied with middle-class reformers

to keep women out of the industrial labour force, allegedly to protect them,

but also because of fears that their wages would be undercut. In Canada, for

example, the failure of the 1907 strike by female Bell Telephone operators in Toronto was partly due to the lack of support their unionization campaign

received from the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, an exclu-

sively male craft union (Sangster 1978).

Consequently, for many women the option of joining a union has not

existed. Only in the last three or four decades, for example, were major organi- zing efforts launched in the largely female retail and financial industries, with

massive counterattacks by management in banks and in retail stores. Despite

a huge investment of organizing resources since the late 1970s, the Canadian

Labour Congress has achieved only limited success in unionizing banks (Lowe

1981). Thus, while some areas of the retail industry, such as grocery stores,

have achieved moderate levels of unionization, vast areas of the service sector are still not organized.

Feminist scholars have cast new light on the collective struggles of women

to achieve fairness and equality through unions. In predominantly female

occupations, women have a long tradition of collective action. As professionals,

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

female teachers have been organized for many decades, although sometimes in professional associations rather than unions (Strong-Boag 1988). A his- tory of union activism also exists among women in the garment and textile industries, particularly in unions such as the International Ladies' Garment Workers (Gannage 1995; Frager 1992). Women also have exerted pressure on the male-dominated unions to which they belong to have their concerns addressed. As Pamela Sugiman shows in her study of women's struggle for gender equality within the Canadian wing of the United Auto Workers during the 1960s, feminists active in the union used "gendered strategies of coping and resistance," drawing on women's combined experiences as autoworkers, unionists, wives, and mothers. Even so, male UAW members had difficulty getting beyond their patriarchal ideology (Sugiman 1992: 24).

Because of such pressure from feminists within the organized labour movement, pay equity (discussed in Chapter 6) has become a major workplace objective for many unions. Perhaps the most prominent example was the 1991 strike on this issue by the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), which represents federal civil servants. However, it took until the end of that decade to reach a pay equity settlement with the government for these clerical and administrative workers. Gillian Creese's (1999) case study of the white- collar workers' union at BC Hydro shows how public-sector unions' quest for pay equity in the 1990s was made more difficult by the fact that it coincided with employers downsizing, restructuring, and contracting-out work. Even though the job hierarchy at BC Hydro did become more open to women and members of racial minorities, union traditions and culture continued to reflect the values and interests of white males.

Overall, however, women's demands for equality of opportunities and rewards in the workplace have had a major impact on Canadian unions. The CLC elected its first female president in 1986, and CUPE, the largest union in Canada, did the same in 1991. Women are making up a growing share of elected union officers and paid staff, especially in public-sector unions, many of which have developed policies and processes to ensure that women have equal representation in leadership positions (Parker and Foley 2010). Gradually, "women's issues" which really are issues for all workers have come to have higher stature in labour's collective bargaining and social action. Important bargaining items, at least for large unions, now include gender- neutral contract language and clauses dealing with discrimination, sexual

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

harassment, family-related leave, childcare, and rights for part-time workers.

Organized labour's success in achieving this bargaining agenda is obviously

crucial to its future.

MANAGEMENT OPPOSITION TO UNIONS

Despite laws giving each employee the right to join a union and to participate

in free collective bargaining, employer opposition to unionism has historically

been a major obstacle to putting these rights into practice. Before the intro-

duction of a legal framework for union certification and collective bargaining

procedures during World War II, many industrial disputes occurred over an

employer's outright refusal to recognize the workers' union. Surveying the his-

torical record, Pentland (1979: 19) observes, "It is sad but true that Canadian

employers as a group and Canadian governments have never taken a forward

step in industrial relations by intelligent choice, but have had to be battered

into it." Interestingly, a contemporary study of the attitudes of managers

toward unions showed that Canadian managers were more hostile toward

unions than were managers in the United States. The researchers attribute this

unexpected difference to the fact that, compared to the Canadian situation,

U.S. unions are very weak and hence not seen as much of a threat by managers

(Campolieti, Gomez, and Gunderson 2013).

Even though disputes over union recognition are less common in Canada

today than they were in the past, there are still many reasons why the climate for

union organizing remains inhospitable (Bain 1978: 23). White-collar employees,

who form the majority of the workforce today, often have direct contact with

management and, therefore, may identify more closely with a company's anti-

union position than do blue-collar workers. During union-organizing drives,

management usually prefers to deal with each employee individually. This tactic

creates a highly uneven playing field, pitting individual employees against the

power of a corporation. Workers join unions for the benefits, such as better

working conditions, higher wages, job security, or access to a grievance proce-

dure. Concrete proof that unions can "deliver the goods" is obviously lacking

in workplaces and industries that have never had high levels of unionization. In

some cases, a company union or employee association supported by the employer

creates the appearance of democratic employee representation. The difficulty of

overcoming such obstacles can discourage unions from launching recruitment

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

drives. Consequently, the option of joining a union has not been available to

many private-sector, white-collar workers.

New managerial strategies such as lean production and high-performance

workplace models that encourage employee participation and commitment

(Chapter 9) have also been used by large companies to maintain a union-free

workplace. The basic assumption, derived from the human relations manage-

ment tradition, is that if management treats employees well and listens to their

concerns, a union will be unnecessary. IBM is a good example of this approach

in action. In Scotland in the late 1970s, the corporation's employees were

balloted at the request of the government's industrial relations board to find

out whether they desired union recognition. Over 90 percent voted against

unionization (Dickson et al. 1988). This vote was not the result of corporate

coercion or intimidation. Rather, it reflected the attention and resources that

the company had devoted to employee relations. These human resource man-

agement policies produce a corporate culture based on strong employee loyalty

and identification with management's goals (Keenoy 1985: 98-102). Some

Canadian firms, most notably the Hamilton steel producer Dofasco, have

developed their own unique brand of nonunion labour relations to obtain the

cooperation of employees (Storey 1983). They thus remain union-free.

Pradeep Kumar explains why innovative managerial strategies pose

difficulties for unions:

... unions and management have different views of the goals of work-

place innovations. Management goals are primarily efficiency-oriented.

The general mission of HRM [human resource management] is to

improve organizational effectiveness and achieve competitive advan-

tage through a more efficient utilization and development of human

resources.... Unions, on the other hand, are voluntary organizations

of workers that serve as their collective voice in order to improve their

physical, economic, social, and political well-being. The underlying

values of the unions are inherently pluralistic and collective.28

Even so, as Kumar (1995: 148) observes, some of the more successful innova-

tions of this kind suggest that union involvement may be a prerequisite. The

examples of Saturn, Shell, and NUMMI (see Chapter 9) make this point. But

in most cases, unions have tended to respond with either passive acceptance

of such new managerial initiatives or active rejection (Downie and Coates

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

1995). The CAW, after extensive experience with lean production, adopted a policy of carefully assessing the benefits and costs of participation (CAW 1993: 12). Only if workers' interests could be advanced and the union as an organization strengthened would the CAW enter into such change programs with management. Crucial ingredients are worker education and openness on management's part to share information (Martin 1995: 118-21).

An insightful study of a union's experience with new management sys- tems (Rinehart, Huxley, and Robertson 1997) focused on CAMI, a joint venture between General Motors and Suzuki involving a new automobile factory in Ingersoll, Ontario. The CAW represented the workers, making CAMI one of the few North American "Japanese transplants" to be union- ized. While the company's position was that lean production had empowered workers and, thus, made the enterprise highly competitive, the researchers concluded that CAMI was just fine-tuning Fordism. Chronic understaffing to reduce costs put intense pressure on workers who, despite the rhetoric of involvement, were still doing largely low-skill and repetitive work with a high risk of injury. "CAMI values" declined as worker discontent rose, and the reality of conflict replaced the promise of "win-win." Workers eventually went on strike for five weeks in 1992. As a result of the strike, the union gained more voice in setting production standards, in addition to negotiating higher wages.

ORGANIZED LABOUR AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

How do workers come to act collectively through unions in a capitalist society where individualism is strongly valued and where employers may actively oppose unions? There are two dilemmas that a worker must resolve if she or he is to seriously consider joining a union or, if already a member, becoming

• • an acttvtst.

The first is the free-rider problem. Just like social movements concerned with environmental, peace, or feminist issues, unions provide collective goods. In other words, all potential members have access to the organiza- tion's achievements a sustainable environment, a world with fewer weapons, employment equity programs, or a grievance procedure and negotiated regular wage increases whether or not they have assisted in achieving these objectives

356 NEL

Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

(Crouch 1982: 51-67). Mancur Olson (1965) asserts that individuals will not

naturally organize to further their collective interest. "The rational worker,"

explains Olson (1965: 88), "will not voluntarily contribute to a union pro-

viding a collective benefit since [s]he alone would not perceptibly strengthen

the union, and since [s]he would get the benefits of any union achievements

whether or not [s]he supported the union." This insight provides one reason

for low unionization levels in European countries such as France and Germany.

Given that the centralized, state-regulated industrial relations systems in these

countries guarantee many non-members the full benefits of union-negotiated

wage agreements, the incentive to join is considerably reduced. In contrast, in

the United States where such legislation is absent, right-to-work laws weaken

unions by taking advantage of the free-rider dilemma.

Albert Hirschman's (1970) comparison of exit and voice methods of expressing discontent highlights the second dilemma. According to

Hirschman, a dissatisfied employee can either leave the employer or stay and

push for changes. The presence of a union increases the chances that the

employee will pursue the latter strategy. But in nonunion workplaces, the poor

employment conditions that could spark an organizing drive also increase the

chances of an individual opting to quit the job and look for another one. This

kind of response is a major obstacle to unionization in low-wage job ghettos

in the service industries today.

Joining and Becoming Active in a Union

The process of mobilizing initial support for a union requires obtaining

signed union cards from the majority of employees in a workplace. This

effort seldom succeeds without the financial assistance and organizational

expertise of an established union. Once organized, a union faces the problem

of rallying members in support of collective bargaining goals. According

to Charles Tilly's (1979) research on the causes of social protest, what is

essential is a sense of shared identity with the group. Collective action in the

workplace will be easier when the work group is an important part of each

employee's life. Strong social ties inside and outside the workplace integrate

employees into the group. Individual interests become synonymous with

group interests, acting as a springboard to collective action. Good examples of

groups possessing this solidarity are miners and members of other blue-collar

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

occupations, in which an occupational culture encompasses much of a

worker's life. Levels of unionization and industrial militancy tend to be higher

under such conditions (Conley 1988).

Strong leadership is also critical. Especially important are organic leaders who, by virtue of being part of the group, understand the experiences of

group members and can gain their trust better than an outsider could. As in

any formal organization, effective leaders will build up group solidarity, create

an awareness of common interests, map out a realistic program of action, and

seize opportunities to launch the plan. Also important is the environmental

context a supportive community, a hostile employer, or fair labour legisla-

tion, for example factors that can either nurture or dampen union activity.

Even if such conditions are favourable, a majority of employees may not sign

union cards, or unionized workers facing a deadlock in negotiations with man-

agement over a new collective agreement may not strike. Often missing is one

or more precipitating factors: an arbitrary change in work practices; the denial

of a long-awaited salary increase; the dismissal of coworkers; or a pent-up sense

of being treated unfairly by management. Such perceived injustices could be

the catalysts that mobilize workers to take collective action (Buttigieg, Deery,

and Iverson 2008).

Research on the inner workings of two Canadian unions gives us glimpses

of how some of these factors contribute to militancy. Julie White's (1990: 147) study of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) quotes a worker

in a Saint John post office: "We're a militant union, and I really believe that

Canada Post has made us that way." This view is typical of CUPW members,

White argues. The union has developed a "culture of struggle," based on the

belief that management does not have the interests of workers at heart and,

further, that any past improvements have been extracted from management

by militant action (Langford 1996). Against a background of unsuccessful

efforts to resolve disputes through negotiation, mediation, and conciliation,

this culture of struggle within CUPW has been cultivated by an openly demo-

cratic structure based on rank-and-file involvement. Similarly, Charlotte Yates

(1990) attributes the CAW's success at resisting concessions demanded by

North American auto firms in the 1980s to its greater membership solidarity,

compared with the United Auto Workers union in the United States, which

agreed to concessions. Some of the key features of union organization that

contributed to CAW militancy were members' influence over union decision

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

making and effective communication channels linking all levels in the union

(Yates 1990: 77).

Going on Strike

Strikes are high drama on the stage of industrial relations. Members of the

public typically view strikes as an inconvenience or even as a major social

problem. Many politicians and business leaders argue that strikes harm the

economy. The participants seldom want strikes, least of all the union mem- bers, who will seldom recoup the wages lost should the dispute drag on. But if

conflict has been largely institutionalized, as described earlier in this chapter, why do strikes occur at all? What motivates workers to strike, and what are

the larger social and economic implications of their actions?

Workers go on strike, that is, they deliberately stop working in order to try to force their employer to agree to some set of demands. Since workers are selling their labour power to an employer in return for wages, their ultimate

bargaining lever is to withdraw that labour. Similarly, employers may initiate

a lockout refusing to let workers come to work and, hence, be paid to get workers to agree to some demand. Overall, strikes are infrequent events, as we

will see in the next section, and lockouts occur even less often. So, contrary to

what the media sometimes suggest, settlement of union-management disputes without recourse to work stoppages is clearly the norm in Canada today.

But strikes are only one possible form of workplace conflict. Richard

Hyman distinguishes between unorganized and organized conflict (1978: Chapter 3). The former is not a calculated group action and typically involves

workers responding to oppressive situations by individual absenteeism, quit-

ting, or sabotage. The latter is a planned collective strategy, the aim of which is to change the source of the discontent. Canadian labour legislation insists

that strikes are legal only after the collective agreement has expired and specific

conditions, such as a strike vote, have been met. Unauthorized strikes during

the term of an agreement, often spontaneous responses by ordinary workers

to an immediate problem in the workplace, are known as wildcat strikes. 29 For example, in April2013, two Edmonton jail guards were suspended for writing

e-mails to management about poor working conditions. Within hours the

next shift of guards was picketing the jail, and within several days, guards at

10 jails across Alberta had joined the wildcat strike. In addition, many court

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

workers, sheriffs, and parole officers, members of the Alberta Union of Public

Employees, left work to take part in a sympathy strike (Wingrove and Walton 2013). Strikes do not necessarily entail all members of the union leaving the

work site as a group. Under certain situations, rotating strikes across a number of work sites, working-to-rule (doing the minimum required or refusing over- time work), or staging work stoppages by "sitting down" on the job are variants

of strike activity that can also communicate workers' demands to management.

Research by Eric Batstone and his colleagues in a British automobile

factory highlights the day-to-day processes that may culminate in a strike

(Batstone, Boraston, and Frenkel 1978). Strikes, argue these researchers, do

not just happen. Rather, as a form of collective action, they require a high

degree of mobilization. A crucial factor is how the social relations within the union allow some individuals or groups to rhetorically frame the course of

events leading up to a strike and identify potential strike issues. Typically,

most workers are reluctant to strike, so there will not be much support for a

strike until a vocabulary has developed to justify such action. This undertaking

involves the translation of specific grievances into the language of broad prin-

ciples and rights such as fairness and equality.

Nevertheless, sometimes strikes erupt because of grassroots protest by

workers who don't need union organizers to frame the issues for them. Jerry

White (1990) provides an example in his analysis of the 1981 illegal strike

in Ontario hospitals by nonprofessional service workers, such as orderlies,

housekeepers, food handlers, lab technicians, and maintenance workers. While

the union leadership was generally not in support, the workers went on strike

anyway. Interestingly, the motivations to strike were different for women and

men involved. Male workers wanted higher pay, a reduced workload, and

guaranteed benefits. Women, in contrast, were far more concerned with how

cutbacks had led to deteriorating relationships with patients. In the end, the

workers won slight wage improvements, but at a price: thousands of strikers

were suspended, 34 were fired, and 3 union leaders were jailed.

Canadian Strike Trends

On an annual basis for more than the past two decades, work stoppages have

typically accounted for less than one-tenth of one percent of all working time

in Canada (Table 11.1). This pattern indicates that the seriousness of the

360 NEL

Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

strike "problem" often gets blown far out of proportion. Historically, though, we can identify eras when strikes were much more common and widespread. There have been four particularly stormy periods of industrial conflict in Canada during the 20th century, gauged by the percentage of total working time lost due to strikes and lockouts.

A number of issues were at stake in early-20th-century strikes. Skilled artisans in the 19th century had been able to retain much of their craft status, pride, and economic security through their control of the production process. This privileged position was eroded by industrialization after 1900, as advancing technology and scientific management techniques undermined craftworkers' autonomy. Thus, craftworkers angrily resisted rationalization of their work, sparking many of the 421 strikes and lockouts that occurred between 1901 and 1914 in southwestern Ontario manufacturing cities (Heron and Palmer 1977).

Before union recognition and compulsory collective bargaining became encoded in law during World War II, many strikes were precipitated by an employer's refusal to recognize the existence of a union, much less bar- gain with it. The historic peak in labour militancy occurred at the end of World War I. Workers across the country were protesting against oppressive

TABLE 11.1 Work Stoppages (Strikes or Lockouts) Involving One or More

Workers, Canada, 1976-2012, Multi-year Averages

1976-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995-99

2000-D4

2005-9

201G-12

Average Average Work Number of Days Lost

Stoppages Workers during Year Involved

988 666,622

823 293,677

684 376,852

338 171,986

347 212,933

323 153,480

192 83,103

201 95,121

Workers per Stoppage

654

445

562

375

635

538

350

478

Person Days per Worker Not Worked Involved

7,51 0,188 14.5

6,401 ,314 18.5

3,97 4,936 14.4

2,11 0,056 12.8

2,666,832 12.7

2,349,609 14.8

1 ,949,830 24.0

1 '157 ,335 14.1

Days Lost:% of Estimated Working Time

0.33

0.26

0.17

0.09

0.09

0.07

0.05

0.03

Source: Adapted from data provided by Government of Canada, Labour Program. <http://www24.hrsdc.gc.ca/dr-ir/default. aspx?lang=eng>

NEL 361

Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

working conditions, low wages, and declining living standards due to soaring

wartime inflation. Most of all, they wanted recognition of their unions.

Western Canadian unions were far more militant and inclined toward

radical politics than those in the rest of the country. Thus, in 1919, when Winnipeg building and metal trades employers refused to recognize and

negotiate with unions over wage increases, the Winnipeg Trades and Labour

Council called a general strike. A massive display of working-class solidarity erupted, bringing the local

economy to a halt. Sympathy strikes spread to other cities across Canada

and even into the United States. The battle lines of open class warfare (one of the few instances of this in Canadian history) were drawn when, fearing a

revolution, Winnipeg's upper class fought back with the help of the state. For

several days, strikers squared off against police and employer-sponsored armed

vigilantes. The confrontation ended in violence after the Royal Northwest

Mounted Police, sent in by the federal government, charged a crowd of dem- onstrators. Strike leaders were arrested and jailed, while the workers' demands

were still unmet (Bercuson 1974; Jamieson 1971).

Strike activity declined with rising unemployment during the Depression

of the 1930s. As a rule, unions are less likely to strike in tough economic

times. Conversely, when industry is booming and there is a relative shortage of

labour, reflected in low unemployment rates, a strike becomes a more potent bargaining lever. The World War II era marked the rise of industrial unionism in manufacturing industries. Organizing drives accelerated as military produc-

tion demands helped to restore the ailing economy. Again, union recognition

was a dominant issue, driving workers in automobile factories, steel plants,

and mines onto the picket line. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the 1945

Ford strike led to the introduction of the Rand Formula to protect union security and ensure orderly collective bargaining (Russell 1990).

Canada experienced a series of strikes in the mid-1960s. The fact that

about one-third of these work stoppages involved wildcat strikes (mainly over

wages) led the government to perceive a serious crisis in industrial relations.

A task force, chaired by Professor H. D. Woods of McGill University, was set up to investigate the causes of industrial unrest and to recommend ways of achieving labour peace. Yet rampant inflation during the 1970s, and an

increasingly militant mood among public-sector workers, escalated labour-

management confrontations.

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

The most recent strike wave reached its apex in 1976. The Trudeau gov-

ernment's imposition of wage and price controls in 1975 as part of its anti-

inflation program made strikes over higher wages a futile exercise (Reid 1982).

But in the 20 years following 1976, lost time due to work stoppages dropped to post-World War II lows. The recession-plagued 1980s and 1990s damp-

ened strike activity, a trend also evident in the recession that began in 2008.

Table 11.1 profiles the labour relations patterns of the past three decades

by highlighting four ways to look at strike activity: frequency (number of work

stoppages), size (number of workers involved), duration (days lost), and overall

volume (days lost as a percentage of total working time). A series of multi- year averages clearly demonstrates how strike activity in terms of frequency,

size, and overall volume has declined, although strike duration has not. For

example, in the late 1970s, an average of 988 work stoppages per year involved

almost 700,000 workers. Comparable figures for 2010-12 were an average of

201 work stoppages annually involving about 95,000 workers. What is most striking about these trends is that, even in the late 1970s, strikes and lockouts

resulted in only one-third of one percent of estimated annual working time. By

2010-12, this figure was 10 times smaller. In short, while strikes and lockouts

get a great deal of media attention, they no longer have much of a cumulative

effect on economic productivity.

A Comparative Perspective on Strikes

How does Canada's strike record compare with that of other industrial

nations? Even though there are some cross-national differences in how strikes are defined and measured (Ross, Bamber, and Whitehouse 1998), we can,

nonetheless, get a rough idea of where Canada stands in this regard. Based

on the annual averages of working days lost in nine industrialized countries

between 1970 and 1992, Canada's rate was the second highest, with Italy first

(Adams 1995: 512). But as we have seen in Table 11.1, the earlier years in this

period were historically high for Canada, inflating the overall average. By the mid-1990s, Canada was reporting significantly lower strike volume than Italy,

France, or Australia, but considerably higher than other countries, in par-

ticular, the United States and the Netherlands (International Labour Office

1997: 249-50). It is also important to note that the strike volume in highly

industrialized countries had declined in general, in large part, because of

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

difficult economic times and high unemployment through much of the 1990s. Some experts suggest that while strikes are less frequent, when they do happen they are now more intense confrontations (Aligisakis 1997).

There are major institutional differences that account for international variations in strikes. For instance, in Italy, disputes, while short, are frequent and involve many workers. By contrast, the Swedish system of centralized bar- gaining, along with the country's powerful unions and their huge strike funds, means that a work stoppage could quickly cripple the economy. This aware- ness imposes much pressure to peacefully resolve potential disputes. In Japan, unions are closely integrated into corporations in what really amounts to a type of company unionism. Strikes are infrequent; workers voice their grievances by wearing black armbands or by making other symbolic gestures calculated to embarrass management. German union-management collective bargaining is centrally coordinated but, at the individual workplace, employee-elected works councils frequently negotiate employment conditions (see Chapter 12). German laws require these participatory councils; the same laws also make it very difficult to strike. Even though the strike rate in Canada is relatively low now, the fact that employees in this country have to confront employers when seeking collective bargaining has created a far more adversarial system.

Thus, legislation governing the structure of collective bargaining is vitally important. The North American system of bargaining is highly decentralized and fragmented, involving thousands of separate negotiations between a local union and a single employer, each of which could result in a strike. Low-strike nations such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden avoid these problems by having national or industry-wide agreements, and by legislating many of the quality-of-working-life issues that Canadian unions must nego- tiate with employers on a piecemeal basis.

There are also major industrial and regional variations in strikes within Canada, which may be the result of how industries are organized. The least strike-prone industries are finance, trade, and services, which makes sense given their low unionization levels. Of the highly unionized industries, mining has historically been the most strife ridden. Similarly, Newfoundland and Labrador and British Columbia have had significantly higher-than-average strike rates because of their high concentration of primary and other strike- prone industries.30 With their isolation hypothesis, Kerr and Siegel (1954) provide one explanation of these differences, writing that isolated workers

364 NEL

Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

"live in their own separate communities: the coal patch, the ship, the water-

front district, the logging camp, the textile town. These communities have

their own codes, myths, heroes, and social standards."31 Canada has always

had large numbers of remote, resource-based, single-employer towns (Lucas

1971), where a combination of social isolation and a limited occupational

hierarchy is more likely to mould workers into a cohesive group in opposition

to management.

CONCLUSION

Canada's labour force has been growing steadily over the past several decades

(Chapter 3). Union membership has also been growing, although not as

quickly. There were more than 4.5 million Canadian union members in 2012.

As for union density, it has remained around 30 percent since the beginning

of this century (Figure 11.1). Compared to some other Western industrial-

ized countries, however, organized labour in Canada remains relatively strong

(Figure 11.2), at least in terms of numbers. But strike activity has clearly

declined in Canada over the past 35 years (Table 11.1). Does this decline

signify that the Canadian industrial relations system has reached some kind

of equilibrium, with all three parties involved employers, unions, and the

state being relatively satisfied with the outcomes?

Our assessment is that it does not. As we observed in Chapter 10, the

labour process can be conceptualized as a shifting .frontier of control (Friedman

1977) in which, at different times, employers and employees gain or lose

power. The last several decades have been a time in which employers have been

gaining the upper hand. As we have noted, union density has increased signifi-

cantly in the public sector CUPE and NUPGE are the two largest unions in

the country. However, for public-sector workers, their employer (typically the

federal or a provincial government) is also the rule maker, and the Canadian

state has not always been the "impartial umpire" that William Lyon Mackenzie

King envisioned a century ago.

During the 1990s, Canadians began to see nurses, teachers, librar-

ians, social workers, government clerks and, in some cases where they were

unionized, even university professors going on strike for higher wages and

improved working conditions, and to maintain the quality of public services.

In response, governments frequently resorted to legislated restrictions on

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

strike action. Furthermore, the deficit-cutting strategies of both provincial

and federal governments often involved imposing wage rollbacks through leg-

islation, effectively suspending the collective bargaining rights of government

employees (Reshef and Rastin 2003).

This trend has continued. In late 2013, for example, the federal

Conservative government included in its budget implementation act (Bill

C-4) a number of proposals that would restrict the rights of federal govern-

ment workers. Included in the list was a planned change to the Public Service

Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) that would give the government the right to

decide, without any neutral third party involved as had been the case for

many years, which of its employees were providing essential services. Once

declared as essential, these workers would lose their right to strike. 32 About

the same time, Canada Post (a Crown corporation) signalled that it intended

to demand large cuts to the pension plan previously negotiated with CUPW

(McKenna 2013). In late 2013, as well, the Alberta government introduced

Bill 46, the Public Services Salary Restraint Act, which would force the

Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (AUPE) to accept whatever wage

rates the government proposed if a negotiated settlement was not reached by

January 31, 2014 (Ibrahim 2013). In the past, if the union and the employer

(the Alberta government) could not reach a satisfactory settlement, the law

required binding arbitration whereby a neutral third party would decide what

was fair.

In the private sector, the Canadian labour relations environment has also

generally become more restrictive. Concession bargaining, or employers trying

to force unions into accepting wage rollbacks, reduced benefits packages and

pensions, and greater flexibility in hiring practices, has been widespread for the

past several decades. Many large employers have reduced their costs and also

the need to deal with unions by outsourcing much of their activity to non-

unionized suppliers, in Canada or outside the country. Some employers with

unionized workforces have moved quickly to lock out their workers, hoping

to force them into accepting an offer. Applications for court injunctions and

legislation to end strikes have been another employer strategy. In other cases,

rather than trying to negotiate a settlement, employers have quickly brought

in nonunionized workers, hoping to eventually force unions into accepting

offers they considered to be unsatisfactory.

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

So, the declining strike rates in Table 11.1 clearly do not signify that organized labour in Canada is satisfied with changes in the industrial relations

climate which some analysts see as having placed severe restrictions on free col-

lective bargaining. 33 It remains to be seen whether and where the huge unions

in the public sector begin to push back more aggressively to protect the job

security and economic well-being of their members. 34 As for the private sector, it will be interesting to see whether unions' current organizing efforts in the

service industries are effective, and whether the 2013 merger of the Canadian Auto Workers union and the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers

(CEP) union into Unifor will shift the balance of power in the labour relations

"frontier of control."35 The involvement of Canadian unions in transnational

union networks may also give them some new ideas and increased energy. In

both sectors, it remains possible that a shift in tactics from business unionism

to social or social mobilization unionism will have positive outcomes for orga-

nized labour.

In Chapter 12, we turn our attention to alternative approaches to eco- nomic organization that might move us beyond the adversarial nature of

contemporary labour-management relations toward institutional structures

that more fully recognize the rights and potential of workers and more effec-

tively address the social problems of conflict and inequality.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Public opinion in Canada is divided over the role of unions in the economy and society. Do you think that unions have outlived their use-

fulness? Why or why not?

2. What are the greatest challenges Canadian unions face today, and what strategies will most likely help them meet these challenges?

3. Do unions contribute to more or less income inequality in society? Could

they have a larger effect?

4. In the typical strike or lockout, who are most often the winners and the

losers? Why?

5. Would you join a union if one existed in your workplace? Why or why

not?

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

WORK AT THE MOVIES

• On Strike: The Winnipeg General Strike, 1919 (directed by Joe MacDonald and Clare Johnstone Gilsig, 1991, 19:46 minutes). This NFB docu-

mentary focuses on the Winnipeg General Strike, which began with

the building and metal trades and culminated with over 30,000

workers walking off their jobs. It is available through the National Film

Board of Canada: http:/ /www3.nfb.ca/ objectifdocumentaire/index. php?

mode=view&language=english &filmld=3 3.

• Matewan (directed by John Sayles, 1987, 135 minutes). This historical film is based on the Battle of Matewan, a deadly confrontation between

coal miners struggling to form a union and company operators in West

Virginia.

• 24 Days in Brooks (directed by Dana Inkster, 2007, 42:03 minutes). Set in Brooks, Alberta, this NFB documentary tracks the transformation of

a socially conservative, white town. As immigrants and refugees migrate to Brooks for work in a slaughterhouse, the town experiences its first-ever

strike. The documentary is available through the National Film Board of

Canada: http:/ /www.nfb.ca/film/24_days_in_brooks.

• Bread & Roses (directed by Ken Loach, 2000, 110 minutes). Two Latina cleaners fight for the right to unionize in this film based on the Justice for

Janitors campaign of the Service Employees International Union.

SOUNDS OF WORK

• "There Is Power in a Union" (Billy Bragg). This pro-union song asserts the

potential power of collective action.

• "General Strike" (D.O.A.). Canadian punk rockers put forth a straight-

forward message about collective action, encouraging listeners to stand up

and unite. • "Horses" (Rheostatics). After going on strike, workers watch from the

outside as replacement workers are brought in. Some say this song was

inspired by the long and violent 1986 strike by the United Food and

Commercial Workers against the Gainers meat-packing company in

Edmonton, owned by Peter Pocklington.

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

• "Solidarity Forever" (Ralph Chaplin). Written in 1915 for the Industrial Workers of the World, this song carries a strong message of the power of worker solidarity. It retains relevance with many unions today.

NOTES

1. http:/ /www.thespec.com/news-story/2222372-u-s-steel-lockout-over/ [retrieved

December 8, 2013].

2. http://www. thestar.com/business/20 13/07 I 18/ caw _reaches_ tentative_ deal_ with_ cocacola_over_strike_in_brampton.html [retrieved December 8, 2013].

3. http://www. cbc.ca/ news/ canada/ calgary/ superstore-strike-ends-as-union-

members-agree-to-new-deal-1.1930881 [retrieved December 8, 2013].

4. http://www. cbc. ca/ news/ canada/ nova-scotia/halifax-coffee-shop-workers-in-

unique-drive-to-unionize-1.1361776 [retrieved December 8, 2013].

5. http: I lwww. h uffington post. ca/20 13 I 0 8/ 16/walmart-canada-union- decertifies_n_3769807.html [retrieved December 8, 2013]

6. Cited with permission from EKOS Research Associates; all rights reserved.

7. http:/ /www.cbc.ca/ news/ canada/unions-on-decline-in-private-sector-1.1150 562

[retrieved December 8, 2013].

8. http://www. torontosun.com/20 11/06/29 I striking-unions-offside-with-public [retrieved December 8, 2013].

9. This systems approach to industrial relations is contrasted with a political

economy approach by Taras, Ponak, and Gunderson (2005).

10. Canada. (1969). Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, p. 19.

11. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004) and Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) pro-

vide a cross-national analysis. Brady, Baker, and Finnigan (2013) present U.S.

data showing that higher levels of unionization are associated with lower rates of

working poverty.

12. For historical accounts of the rise of the Canadian labour movement, see Heron

(1989), Smucker (1980: Chapters 7 and 8), and Godard (1994: Chapter 4).

13. http:/ /www.labour.gc.ca/ eng/ resources/ info/tools/ directory _labour_

organizations/organizations.shtml [retrieved December 15, 2013].

14. See also Briskin (2010), Bartkiw (2008), Russell (1990), and Kettler, Struthers,

and Huxley (1990). Similar concerns about collective bargaining in the United

States and the United Kingdom are discussed in Freeman (1995).

15. See endnote 13 for an online source showing unions' Canadian or U.S.

affiliations.

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Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

16. See Gindin (1995) and Wells (1997) for discussions of the CAW's shift away

from principled militancy to more pragmatic cooperation with management.

Yates (1998) and Eaton and Verma (2006) examine how the CAW has met the

challenges of renewal and growing membership diversity.

17. See Roberts (1990). The Communications Workers, the Energy and Chemical

Workers, and the Canadian Paperworkers Union later merged to form the

Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada.

18. On nonunion forms of representation, see Taras (2002) and Lowe and

Schellenberg (200 1: 25-29).

19. See endnote 13.

20. These union membership rates are based on all wage and salary earners (including

agricultural workers and managers) so the Canadian rate is lower than the rate

reported in Figure 11.1.

21. Dehnen (2013) refers to such networks as global union federations, an indication that this new field of study is still developing a common vocabulary. See also

Levesque and Murray (2010) and Youngdahl (2008).

22. Kimeldorf (2013) provides a useful historical account of the growth of the U.S.

union movement a century earlier.

23. Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson (2013) discuss violations of labour legislation in

the United States. See Ponak and Taras (1995) on right-to-work legislation from

a Canadian perspective.

24. On union renewal, see Voss and Sherman (2000) and Rose and Chaison (2001).

Kay (2011) argues that the legal frameworks established by the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allowed collaborating U.S. and Mexican unions

to gain strength and resist globalization trends.

25. All 2011 unionization rates discussed in this section are from Uppal (2011). For

additional data on unionization rates from 1981 through 2012, by occupation,

industry, province, gender, and detailed age groups, see Galarneau and Sohn

(2013).

26. Union membership data from Government of Canada Labour Program (2013):

http:/ /www.labour. gc.ca/ eng/ resources/info/ tools/ directory _labour_ organizations/

organizations.shtml [retrieved December 16, 2013].

27. On women in unions, see also Yates (2006), Briskin and McDermott (1993),

Creese (1999), and Gannage (1995).

28. Kumar, Pradeep. (1995). Unions and Workplace Change in Canada. Kingston, ON: IRC Press, pp. 148-49.

29. See Gouldner (1955) for a classic study of a wildcat strike. Jamieson (1971:

Chapter 4) and Zetka (1992) discuss wildcat strikes during the decades after

World War II in Canada and the United States, respectively.

370 NEL

Chapter II: Unions and Industrial Relations

30. Gunderson, Hyatt, and Ponak (1995); see also Craven (1980: Chapter 8).

31. Kerr and Siegel (1954: 191). For critiques, see Shorter and Tilly (1974: 287-305)

and Stern (1976).

32. http: I /www.h uffington post. ca/larry- rousseau/ turning- back-the-clock- 50 b 4325416.html. --

33. See Panitch and Swartz (1993), Russell (1990), and Godard (1997).

34. Cunningham and James (2010) discuss strategies used by public-sector unions in

the United Kingdom to counter outsourcing of jobs.

35. Larine (2013) describes the union politics leading to the formation ofUnifor and

argues that the most vulnerable workers in Canada are not really the concern of

Canada's largest unions.

NEL 371