Tesla case study

Tesla: Accelerating to Market

Matthew Fisher & Mary Beth McCabe

June 2018 James was senior marketing manager at Tesla, Inc. and was asked to present to the board of directors a reassessment of their marketing strategy. Tesla’s marketing communications strategy largely relied upon influencers driven by their social media savvy CEO, Elon Musk. However, the position of the brand as a leader in electric vehicles was being challenged both internally and externally. Internally, the move to launch a mass-market electric vehicle, with a range sufficient to serve as a primary vehicle, was not going smoothly. Externally, nearly every major car manufacturer had introduced an electric model or had announced that it was in the very near future. James’ responsibilities had largely focused on the strategy formulation and execution of opening showrooms and service centers. Additionally, James had enjoyed his tenure at Tesla and felt as though he was a part of Elon Musk’s vision of transforming the transportation and energy industries to a renewable and sustainable future. James felt that he was part of a movement. Following several high-level marketing departures, James was summoned to offer a new perspective on the way forward and an opportunity to shine. While Elon Musk’s personal brand had driven what many media outlets referred to as a ‘cult-like following,’ the rollout of the Model 3 and the announcement of the upcoming semi truck seemed to necessitate a pivot in their marketing strategy. The Tesla Brand Shapes the Consumer Brands are frequently used as a bridge from the fulfilled promises of the past and present to the future. However, Tesla’s approach to their brand differs by using their associations to Silicon Valley, high tech design, and innovation to shape consumer perceptions. Tesla products recruit people to support a movement larger than just the product. The products are not simply high- performance electric transportation, but embody values and a lifestyle that technology is capable of solving the most intractable problems of humankind. According to Musk, “brand is just a perception, and perception will match reality over time.”1 Musk’s optimism inspires consumers to focus on the seemingly immediate future. A promise of an electrified, high performance, transportation and laden with high-tech gadgetry, available now. Furthermore, the next product, whatever that may be, is announced well in advance of market delivery and drives consumers to begin envisioning owning it. The steady stream of “new” product announcements supports a view that innovation is synonymous with Elon Musk and delivered through his the various firms founded by him (Tesla, SpaceX, The Boring Company, Solar City, Neuralink, and others). However, innovation and latest tech gadgetry didn’t come cheap, and Tesla’s current product line, the Model S and Model X, was aimed at affluent consumers. Elon Musk Elon Musk held degrees in both economics and physics from the University of Pennsylvania.2 Musk then enrolled at Stanford to study for a PhD in energy physics, but dropped out on the second day to launch ZIP2 Corporation, a company that provided online city guides. ZIP2

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Corporation was sold to Compaq, in 1999, for well over $300 million. Musk then launched X.com, which would go on to become PayPal. Ebay, acquired PayPal in 2002, for 1.5 billion.3 Following the acquisition of PayPal, Musk turned his focus to the ventures that would catapult him to worldwide fame. Musk launched both SpaceX, in 2002, and Tesla, in 2003. Solar City was founded by Musk’s cousins, but was acquired by Tesla in 2006. As Musk’s notoriety grew, so did his efforts to make his investments become successful. Elon Musk’s 2013 TEDx talk illuminates his vision for Tesla and the need to transition to renewable energy.4 The talk is inspirational in that it highlights the electric powertrain vehicles of Tesla, the solar and battery storage industry, and the many other goals that Elon has set out to achieve, but has little to do with the success of the car manufacturer itself. He’s creating schools, rockets and underground transportation tunnels, in addition to merging his firm with Solar City, one of the largest energy firms in the world. Musk’s steady stream of product announcements and embracing large scale projects that represent pioneering efforts has resulted in a base of admirers and an outsized share of voice from the press. Casual observers might be compelled to think that Musk and Tesla commanded a large market share and sizable profits based upon the amount of news coverage. Illustrative of Musk’s cult- like status is a t-shirt sold by RedBubble.com that professes, “In Musk We Trust” with Elon’s picture superimposed over the planet Mars (See Figure 2). The t-shirt company offers 52 versions of similar, hero praising, Elon Musk clothing. Several other sites exist that sell ‘Elon Musk’ products, with many employing various forms of religious idolatry and employing phrases as though he could, “save us.” All of the praise surrounding Elon has enabled Tesla, as well as other companies affiliated with Musk, to benefit from a ‘halo effect.’ When Tesla announces something new, this also boosts Elon ’s personal brand. Similarly, when SpaceX has a successful launch, Elon, and Tesla by association, benefit from the positive press coverage. Tesla, Inc. and the NUMMI Plant Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning founded Tesla, Inc. in 2003 in Palo Alto, California.5 Located in the heart of Silicon Valley, the firm benefits from association with high-tech and innovative firms of Northern California. Tesla ’s primary factory is located in Fremont, California, purchased during the depths of the Great Recession for just $42 million, when the facility was valued at $1.3 billion.6 The Fremont Assembly plant, breaking ground in 1961 and producing autos in 1962, was owned and operated by General Motors (GM) to manufacture small cars and pickup trucks. However, the factory was known for turning out defective vehicles, so GM shut the plant in 1982. GM was eager to practice lean manufacturing techniques and Toyota, who needed to circumvent import quotas, reopened the Fremont plant as a joint venture under the New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) in 1985.7 Under the joint venture, the NUMMI plant production peaked at approximately 430,000 units in 2006.8 The joint venture was disbanded in 2010, when Toyota was able to shift production to facilities with lower labor costs while GM faced bankruptcy. GM sold the facility that cost more than $1 billion to construct for a mere $42 million to Tesla, while Toyota took a $50 million dollar stake in common stock.9 The new Tesla production facility is the site of assembly for the Model S sedan and the Model X sport utility vehicle. While the NUMMI plant was projected to have a capacity for 500,000 units

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of annual production, Musk reported in 2017, that the facility was, “bursting at the seams.”10 As Tesla looks to expand their product line to include the upcoming Model 3, Mike Ramsey, an analyst with Gartner Inc. noted:11

While Tesla has taken a Silicon Valley approach to everything from product development timelines to sales, the decision to invest in more real estate brings it closer to its Detroit rivals. “If they’re going to be a real automaker like the rest of them, they’re going to have to spend billions of dollars on new plants,” Ramsey said. “They ’re becoming less of a tech company and more of a manufacturer.” To build a factory from the ground up, Tesla will have to invest more than $1 billion, in addition to developing a new vehicle in the next two years. But as long as there is demand for Tesla vehicles, Ramsey said, Musk will be able to raise that cash from capital markets. “There seems to be no appetite for cutting off their capital,” Ramsey said. “As long as it’s related to growth, they’re not going to have any problem selling it.”

Musk’s vision for Tesla in 2015 was to build a car company capable of producing one million units annually by 2020.12 However, the vision represented a doubling of his earlier production projections for 2020 and accelerating his previous production goal of 500,000 to 2018.13 Tesla’s production would have to increase at more than 50% per year to achieve these numbers (see Table 5). While Tesla fans were excited by Elon’s promises to bring scaled production and lower priced offerings, analysts and investors were beginning to become wary of such ambitious forecasts. Most notably, while Tesla was projecting aggressive growth short-term production was falling short. In 2016, Tesla forecast production numbers of 80,000, but fell short, delivering just over 76,230.14 Reconciling the Model 3 with Production Hell Elon Musk had unveiled the Model 3 sedan in July 2016, and began taking $1,000 reservations in 2017. The Model 3 was a lower priced sedan with margins that would require a significant ramp up in production in order to be profitable. High performance electric sedans priced for the affluent was a niche market, but the Model 3 was aimed at that mass market. An affordable electric vehicle, the Nissan Leaf, had been on the market for several years, but held a battery range of only 100 miles, so it was viewed as a second vehicle by many or simply impractical for areas without wide access to charging stations. The Model 3 was Tesla’s move into the mainstream with a price starting at $35,000 and a battery range of 220 miles.15 If the price and range was attractive, then mass-market consumers might set aside notions of “range anxiety” and embrace electrified transportation as their main vehicle. Following Tesla’s announcement of the Model 3, over 455,000 pre-production reservations were collected.16 Being the first automaker to market by announcing a mass-market electric vehicle allowed the firm to capture significant earned media coverage, in addition to early revenues. Following several delays, the first Model 3 vehicles were delivered to Tesla employees in August 2017. However, the first deliveries to regular customers didn’t begin until December 2017.17

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Musk’s social media engagement and steady pace of new product announcements, whether for Tesla or any of Musk’s other companies, enabled Tesla to largely forgo traditional marketing. In fact, Tesla did not engage any paid media to promote the brand or the products. Meanwhile, Musk promised another model, not yet available for reservation or named, but widely referred to as the Model Y and promised in 2019.18 Furthermore, the firm unveiled the Tesla Semi and Roadster 2, both to be available in 2020, and currently accepting reservations. However, recent production and quality issues presented a challenge and vulnerability to the brand. While consumers may be willing to overlook production and quality issues for newer firms and products that seem to deliver the future today, Tesla was beginning to face some very real present day issues. The attractiveness of a Tesla auto was rooted in design and performance, and to these aspects the firm excelled. However, quality of the product was seriously lagging behind its competitors. While the Tesla Model S enjoyed significant fanfare upon its launch in 2013, with Consumer Reports ranking the car as the highest scoring vehicle they had ever reviewed, the endorsement was subsequently removed when persistent quality issues arose.19 Consumers may initially regard a well-designed, high-tech car as synonymous with quality, but the reality is that the build quality and reliability ranks below rival firms. Tesla’s 50,000-mile warranty covers many of the issues that arise, but it raises the question of what impacts out-of-pocket repairs will have on the brand when the warranty expires. Quality and reliability issues are persistently plaguing the Model X sport utility vehicle, receiving the distinction of ‘least reliable’ vehicle for 2017.20 The quality issues facing Tesla are not just limited to ‘after the sale’ problems, but are the source of considerable headaches that complicate their efforts to scale production. Nine workers, both current and former, noted in November 2017, that, “Quality checks have routinely revealed defects in more than 90 percent of Model S and Model X vehicles inspected after assembly.”21 Additionally, flawed component parts have further hindered production and drain profitability as, “one current Tesla engineer estimated that 40 percent of the parts made or received at its Fremont factory require rework. ” 22 Lean manufacturing specialist Matt Girvan, founder of MAG Consulting, noted:

Even during what is considered 'launch' mode, if a company is selling its cars to customers, it should not be experiencing large amounts of rework. This speaks to an internal quality issue that is on a magnitude that is not normal for most car manufacturers.23

As it stood, just 9,766 Model 3 sedans had been assembled by the end of March 2018.24 The first deliveries of the Model 3 began in August 2017, and Tesla projected production numbers of 5,000 units per week by December. However, supply bottlenecks, quality defects, and difficulties in automation held the current pace of production to approximately 800 units per week. Munro & Associates, a firm that disassembles new vehicles for analysis, notes that, “Mechanically, I don’t have much good to say,” and, “if it would have come out even decent, they’d have mopped the floor with everybody,” however the assessment was that the build quality of a Tesla was subpar.25 Market Strategy: The Road Ahead

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James left the office to clear his head and develop an objective perspective to guide his plan. Tesla had benefitted from being perceived as a ‘first mover’ and innovator, but James also noted that Tesla had yet to make any money. Silicon Valley startups frequently lost money while the business scaled operations, but a firm that was now in its fifteenth year of operations was hardly a startup. Additionally, James noted that financial markets had seemed to sour on Tesla, and the stock price was down approximately 20% since peaking in the summer of 2017. Furthermore, James sensed that the cash position of Tesla was starting to cause concern. As a result, James realized his plan needed focus and may require some painful tradeoffs. How important was being first? James kept circling back to this question and while he had studied the descriptive factors that lead to achieving a first mover advantage, he noted that what he really needed was a predictive tool to help him. First-Mover Advantage In 1988, strategic management researchers, Lieberman and Montgomery, wrote that a first-mover advantage arises from leveraging three sources:26

1. Technological leadership 2. Securing necessary resources 3. Increase switching costs

The leadership in technology delivers an advantage if rivals need to traverse a learning curve before they can offer up their own alternative offering. The time and resources that laggards expend to copy the technology gives the leader time to capture market share and scale to deter rivals. While technological leadership is rooted in the development of what others lack, securing resources is rooted in exploiting supply chain needs. If certain inputs are limited, then an advantage can be had by securing supply partnerships that make it difficult for competitors to imitate, even if they have the technology to do so. Lastly, switching costs make it more difficult for consumers to abandon the first mover for a competitor offering. Software that only works with certain hardware increases the switching cost for a consumer that wishes to switch by increasing the total cost. The first-mover advantage account offered by Lieberman and Montgomery was used to describe why some firms found success, but it didn’t account for competitors that quickly entered the market second. If competitors were nimble, then the first-mover advantage might never materialize sufficiently to payback the investment in launching a new product. In 2005, Suarez and Lanzolla offered up a different approach to the first-mover advantage by noting the intersection of market growth and technology evolution held predictive power as to whether a short-term or long-term competitive advantage could be had by entering the market first (see Figure 1).27

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Figure 1: Source - The Combined Effect of Market and Technological Change (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2005)

This market and technology intersection describes the four options for market and tech evolution, and gives one example of an industry for each of the quadrants, described below. Calm Waters: A gradual pace of technology change and slow market growth allows little room for the new entrant followers to differentiate. Innovation is frequently not different enough to allow a foothold for the new entrant, the second movers, thus the incumbent has the advantage. First movers have a steady enough position that they can adapt to changes, thereby insulating the firm from competitive threat. Calm waters are the ideal conditions for start-up firms, due to the fact that they ought to be able to scale up production to satisfy demand. For example, ‘calm waters’ is descriptive of 3M’s Scotch Tape, the pace of tech change was slow enough that rivals couldn’t outmaneuver or find a differentiated niche. Market Leads, Tech Slow: When the market develops rapidly, firms with significant resources have the advantage to meet blossoming demand. Small firms are apt to lose their early advantage. For example, Singer sewing machines were second to market, but used their manufacturing scale to overwhelm the market first mover. Tech Leads, Market Slow: Here, nobody is apt to gain a short-term advantage. Firms enter and exit. Wall Street will become skeptical as well, and is likely to pressure the firm to eliminate underperforming projects. Only very well capitalized firms, with robust R&D, should enter this market first, but they must be committed to weathering the storm of lackluster market performance for a long-term durable advantage to payoff. The rapid pace of technology development in digital cameras was offset by slow market growth. Rough Waters: Very difficult to obtain any advantage, short or long-term in nature. Product obsolescence occurs rapidly and usually new entrants steal the momentum. The personal computing market of the 1980s illustrates the intense competition that resulted from a rapidly growing market and rapid technology evolution.

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Tesla held an advantage in their batteries and electronic components, but much of the rest of their vehicles were of inferior build quality.28 While Tesla was first to announce the Model 3, GM beat them to delivering a similar vehicle to the market. GM’s Chevrolet Bolt was priced comparably and delivered 10% greater battery range than the Model 3.29 Additionally, a GM auto could be serviced nearly anywhere in the country, while Tesla lacked the market penetration to sell or service many markets. Tesla had no presence in six states, and was very limited in others. For example, Tesla offered just two service centers for the entire state of Florida, and most independent shops couldn’t service their vehicles. Therefore, James wondered if Tesla would be able to compete directly with such a large competitor as GM, not to mention others that were soon to enter the market. If James was to offer up a marketing strategy committed to Tesla’s current product line, then he would need focus on strengthening the favorable associations of innovation, technology, and design, while anticipating that production and product reliability concerns may remain an ongoing problem, especially since service was so geographically limited for his brand. James was forced to consider a new product rollout, mentioned earlier. If the product strategy pivoted to the Tesla Semi, then the firm may need to retool their current marketing strategy to meet the needs of the B2B marketplace. The Tesla Semi represented an entirely new market driven by different criteria than the passenger automobile market. Semi-truck fleets were commercial haulers that cared less about the amenities than the economics. While Tesla had not yet identified where the Semi would be manufactured, Musk was promising a savings payback in just two years.30 The capital necessary to tool up for the Semi and support its launch would strain the firm’s resources, but would offer healthy product margins. Additionally, if part of Tesla’s mission was to reduce fossil fuel driven vehicles and emissions, then electric trucks offered a path to far greater impact than automobiles. Long haul semi-truck drivers log as many as 125,000 miles per year.31 By contrast, the Federal Highway Administration reports that the average number of miles driven by automobiles was 13,476 miles.32 For James to offer the most compelling marketing strategy, he would need to support his recommendations with evidence. James collected electric vehicles sales data (see Table 1 and Table 2) and overall market figures for the United States automobile market (see Table 3), in addition to semi- trucks (see Table 4).

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Figure 2: 'In Musk We Trust.' Source - www.redbubble.com

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Table 1: 2017 Total Sales of Electric Vehicles in the US and Worldwide

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Table 2: 2016 Total sales of Electric Vehicles in the US and Worldwide

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Table 3: U.S. Automobile Sales (Source: Statista.com - https://www.statista.com/statistics/199974/us-car-sales-since-1951/)

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Table 4: Heavy Duty Truck Sales. Source: U.S. Dept. of Energy33

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Table 5: Tesla Production. Source: Tesla34

Image 1: Tesla Lineup. Source: Autoevolution.com (https://www.autoevolution.com/news/tesla- model-y-to-complete-elon-musks-s3xy-lineup-in-2019-124947.html)

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Image 2: Tesla Semi. Source: The Street.com (https://www.thestreet.com/story/14395781/1/five- takeaways-tesla-truck-roadster-event.html)

1 Silicon Valley Business Journal, (2010) Q&A with Elon Musk. Silicon Valley Business Journal Web site. Available at: https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/print-edition/2010/12/24/qa-with- elon-musk.html?s=print 2 Biography.com Web site (May 14, 2018) Elon Musk Biography. Available at: https://www.biography.com/people/elon-musk-20837159 3 Biography.com Web site (May 14, 2018) Elon Musk Biography. Available at: https://www.biography.com/people/elon-musk-20837159 4 TED (Feb. 2013) The man behind Tesla, SpaceX, and Solar City… TED.com Web site. Available at: https://www.ted.com/talks/elon_musk_the_mind_behind_tesla_spacex_solarcity 5 Burns, Matt (Jul. 28, 2015) A brief history of Tesla. Tech Crunch Web site. Available at: https://techcrunch.com/gallery/a-brief-history-of-tesla/ 6 Johnston, A. (Jun. 1, 2015) NUMMI, five years later: Inside Tesla. KALW Local Public Radio Web site. Available at: http://kalw.org/post/nummi-five-years-later-inside-tesla#stream/0 7 Langfitt, F. (Mar. 26, 2010) The End Of The Line For GM-Toyota Joint Venture. NPR Web site. Available at: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125229157 8 DeBord, M. (Oct. 27, 2017) Tesla bought an old GM-Toyota factory and made it cool – but in its former life it made a lot more cars. Business Insider Web site. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-factory-built-more-cars-when-it-belonged-gm-and-toyota- 2017-10 9 Linn, A. (May 27, 2010) Tesla, Toyota give jolt to NUMMI plant. NBC News Web site. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37358614/ns/business-us_business/t/tesla-toyota-give- jolt-nummi-plant/#.WvC2CC-ZP-Y 10 Autoweek (Jun. 14, 2017) Tesla’s Real Capacity Problem? Too Many Employees. Autoweek Web site. Available at: http://autoweek.com/article/green-cars/teslas-fremont-plant-doesnt-have- enough-parking-employees-because-plant-so

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11 Autoweek (Jun. 14, 2017) Tesla’s Real Capacity Problem? Too Many Employees. Autoweek Web site. Available at: http://autoweek.com/article/green-cars/teslas-fremont-plant-doesnt-have- enough-parking-employees-because-plant-so 12 Carson, E. (May 4, 2016) Ludicrous Speed: Elon Musk Sees Tesla Making 1 Million Cars In 2020. Investor’s Business Daily Web site. Available at: https://www.investors.com/news/technology/elon-musk-best-guess-tesla-makes-1-million-cars- in-2020/ 13 Rogowsky, M. (Jan. 4, 2017) Tesla Keeps Missing Forecasts: What This Means for Model 3. Forbes Web site. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2017/01/04/tesla- keeps-missing-forecasts-what-this-means-for-model-3/#6f6816ed726e 14 Rogowsky, M. (Jan. 4, 2017) Tesla Keeps Missing Forecasts: What This Means for Model 3. Forbes Web site. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2017/01/04/tesla- keeps-missing-forecasts-what-this-means-for-model-3/#6f6816ed726e 15 Tesla Web site (2018) Model 3. Available at: https://www.tesla.com/model3 16 Korosec, K (Aug. 2, 2017) The Wait for the Tesla Model 3 Just Got a Lot Longer. Fortune.com web site. Available at: http://fortune.com/2017/08/02/tesla-model-3-orders/ 17 Lambert, F. (Dec. 20, 2017) Tesla Model 3 deliveries for regular buyers are finally rolling out in higher volume. Electrek Web site. Available at: https://electrek.co/2017/12/20/tesla-model-3- deliveries-regular-buyers-rolling-out-volume/ 18 Dow, J. (Apr. 11, 2018) Tesla is reportedly targeting Model Y production in November 2019, supply chain sources say. Electrek Web site. Available at: https://electrek.co/guides/tesla-model- y/ 19 Rechtin, M. (Oct. 20, 2015) Tesla Reliability Doesn’t Match Its High Performance, Consumer Reports web site. Available at: https://www.consumerreports.org/cars-tesla-reliability-doesnt- match-its-high-performance/ 20 Cunningham, W. (Oct. 19, 2017) Consumer Reports survey marks Model X as ‘least reliable.’ CNET.com web site. Available at: https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/consumer-reports- survey-marks-tesla-model-x-as-least-reliable/ 21 Sage, A. (Nov. 28, 2017) Build fast, fix later: speed hurts quality at Tesla, some workers say. Reuters web site. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-quality-insight/build-fast- fix-later-speed-hurts-quality-at-tesla-some-workers-say-idUSKBN1DT0N3 22 Kolodny, L. (Mar. 14, 2018) Tesla employees say automaker is churning out a high volume of flawed parts requiring costly rework. CNBC web site. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/14/tesla-manufacturing-high-volume-of-flawed-parts- employees.html 23 Kolodny, L. (Mar. 14, 2018) Tesla employees say automaker is churning out a high volume of flawed parts requiring costly rework. CNBC web site. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/14/tesla-manufacturing-high-volume-of-flawed-parts- employees.html 24 Glon, R. and Bassett, A. (Apr. 9, 2018) Here’s the latest news on the Tesla Model 3, including specs and performance. Digital Trends Web site. Available at: https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/tesla-model-3-performance-specs-news-rumors/ 25 Welch, D. (Apr. 25, 2018) Tesla teardown uncovers tech prowess, production shortcomings. Automotive News Web site. Available at: http://www.autonews.com/article/20180425/OEM01/180429880/tesla-musk-teardown-criticism- manufacturing?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+autone ws%2FAutomakerNews+%28Automotive+News+Automaker+News+Feed%29&ito=792 26 Lieberman, M.; Montgomery, D. (Summer 1988). “First-Mover Advantages” Strategic Management Journal. Strategic Management Society. 9 (S1): 41–58.

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27 Suarez, F., & Lanzolla, G. (2005). The Half-Truth of First-Mover Advantage. Harvard Business Review, 83(4), 121-127. 28 Welch, D. (Apr. 25, 2018) Tesla teardown uncovers tech prowess, production shortcomings. Automotive News Web site. Available at: http://www.autonews.com/article/20180425/OEM01/180429880/tesla-musk-teardown-criticism- manufacturing?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+autone ws%2FAutomakerNews+%28Automotive+News+Automaker+News+Feed%29&ito=792 29 Manjoo, F. (Sep. 14, 2016) How Did G.M. Create Tesla’s Dream Car First? The New York Times Web site. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/technology/how-did-gm- create-teslas-dream-car-first.html 30 Ferris, R. (Jan. 11, 2018) Tesla Semi could save money over diesels within 2 years of ownership. CNBC Web site. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/11/tesla-semi-could- save-money-over-diesels-within-2-years-of-ownership.html 31 FTI (2015) Five Fun Facts About Trucking. FTI Web site. Available at: http://www.loadfti.com/news/5-fun-facts-about-trucking 32 Office of Highway Policy Information (Mar. 29, 2018) Average Annual Miles per Driver by Age Group. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. Available online at: https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/bar8.htm 33 US Department of Energy. (n.d.). New retail sales of heavy trucks in the United States from 2001 to 2016 (in 1,000s). In Statista - The Statistics Portal. Retrieved April 9, 2018, from https://0-www.statista.com.library.ggu.edu/statistics/261483/heavy-truck-sales-in-the-united- states/ 34 Tesla. (n.d.). Number of Tesla vehicles delivered worldwide from 2nd quarter 2015 to 1st quarter 2018 (in units). In Statista - The Statistics Portal. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from https://0- www.statista.com.library.ggu.edu/statistics/502208/tesla-quarterly-vehicle-deliveries/