Behavioral and Psychological Factors to disengage from terrorism

Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization Bertjan Doosje1, Fathali M Moghaddam2, Arie W Kruglanski3, Arjan de Wolf4, Liesbeth Mann1 and Allard R Feddes1

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect

In this article, we review the literature and present a model of

radicalization and de-radicalization. In this model, we

distinguish three phases in radicalization: (1) a sensitivity

phase, (2) a group membership phase and (3) an action phase.

We describe the micro-level, meso-level and macro-level

factors that influence the radicalization process in these three

phases. However, not all people become increasingly

radical — they may also de-radicalize. We specify the micro-

level, meso-level and macro-level factors in de-radicalization.

We highlight the importance of the role of group membership

and intergroup relations in the radicalization process.

Addresses 1 University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2 Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA 3 University of Maryland, Washington, USA 4 Training/Advise De Wolf, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Corresponding author: Doosje, Bertjan (E.J.Doosje@uva.nl)

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

This review comes from a themed issue on Intergroup relations

Edited by Jolanda Jetten and Nyla R. Branscombe

For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial

Available online 18th June 2016

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008

2352-250X/# 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Terrorism

1 is an act of violence (domestic or internation-

al), usually committed against non-combatants, and

aimed to achieve behavioral change and political objec-

tives by creating fear in a larger population. We argue that

group membership plays a crucial role in understanding

why people opt for this violence. Indeed, most terrorists’

attacks (>95%) are planned and executed in groups [1]. Sporadically, a single person may commit a terrorist attack

[2]. Generally, however, terrorism (like other forms of

violence, see (AW Kruglanski et al., unpublished data)) is very much a group phenomenon, because in groups, it is

easier to prepare an attack and people in groups are more

1 We realize that terrorism is a politically motivated term. One man’s

terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. In addition, in some cases, in

people’s perceptions, a ‘terrorist’ can be transformed in a ‘freedom

fighter’ (e.g., Nelson Mandela).

www.sciencedirect.com

motivated to actually commit the attack, rather than to

bail out at the last moment.

The study of terrorism is important because terrorism

poses a serious physical threat to the security of citizens

and to the Open Society [3]. Indirectly, the induction of

fear can have further deleterious effects increasing polar-

ization along ethnic, religious and national lines, promot-

ing conflict among different segments of society.

An important aim of early terrorism research was to find a

clear psychological profile of ‘the terrorist’. As has been

the case with the studies on former high-ranking Nazis

[4], it turned out that ‘the terrorist’ does not deviate from

the general population in terms of psychopathology [5,6 � ].

Thus, terrorists are not ‘crazy’ and maybe ‘there is a

terrorist hidden in everyone’ [7].

In this review, as a consequence of the failure to find a

clear terrorist profile, we start with examining the role of

radicalization as a process that might lead to terrorism. We

then focus on the idea that although it is possible to

distinguish different types of radical groups, these groups

do share relevant characteristics. In the present article, we

distinguish and discuss three phases of radicalization: (1)

Sensitivity; (2) Group membership; and (3) Action. Not

all people become increasingly radical–they may also de-radicalize.

Radicalization Radicalization is a process through which people become

increasingly motivated to use violent means against mem-

bers of an out-group or symbolic targets to achieve be-

havioral change and political goals. In Figure 1, we outline

a model of radicalization (and de-radicalization). Inspired

by the ‘staircase model to terrorism’ [8 � ], this model

distinguishes three phases. Phase 1 is characterized by

a sensitivity to a radical ideology. In Phase 2, an individual

becomes a member of a radical group. Finally, in Phase 3,

this person is ready to act on behalf of the group’s

ideology, for example by planning an attack.

There are 5 types of radical groups that can be distin-

guished. In Table 1 we describe these types and indicate

what their main concerns are.

Characteristics of radical groups The different types of radical groups share common

elements [9,10 � ]. First, all radical groups perceive a seri-

ous problem in society. This problem or grievance is

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

80 Intergroup relations

Figure 1

Micro

Macro

Shield of Resilience Radicalizing Person

Radicalization

Phase 3: Action

Phase 1: Sensitivity

Phase 2: Group Membership

De-radicalization

Meso

Micro

Macro

Meso

Shield of Resilience

Current Opinion in Psychology

The (de)radicalization process and its determinants. From Doosje, De Wolf, Mann and Feddes [18].

different for each radical group — see Table 1 for exam-

ples.

Second, radical groups are strongly dissatisfied with the

manner in which the current institutions (particularly

police/politicians) deal with their problem. They may

argue that the institutions do not pay enough attention

to their grievance, or they may think that the institutions

do not do enough to handle their grievance [8 � ]. This

creates a low institutional trust and a perception that

authorities are not legitimate [11 � ].

An important third characteristic of radical groups is that

they consider their own group’s norms and values as

Table 1

Different types of radical groups, their main concern and examples.

Type Main concern

1. Nationalistic or Separatist Groups Secure a territory for the own

2. Extreme Right-Wing Groups To safe-guard the high status

‘white race’ that is perceived

by immigrants

3. Extreme Left-Wing Groups Achieve a just distribution of w

perceive capitalism as the ma

4. Single Issue Groups Their main concern focuses o

topic (not an extensive ideolog

environment, animal rights or

5. Religiously motivated Groups They adhere to a very strict in

their religion to justify violence

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

superior to those of other groups. This creates a strong

us versus them distinction, which might form the foun-

dation of the use of violence [12].

The fourth characteristic of radical groups is particularly

important: most such groups embrace an ideology that

legitimizes violence to address their concerns, and this

violence is often directed at an out-group viewed as the

culprit responsible for creating the grievance. This is most

clearly articulated in the application of social identity

theory to radicalization [13], in which identification with

the in-group combined with dis-identification with the

out-group are related to the use of violence against out-

group members.

Examples

group ETA (Spain), IRA (Ireland), Palestine/Israel,

PKK (Turkey), Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka), ISIS

(Syria & Iraq)

position of the

to be threatened

Klu Klux Klan (U.S.), Pegida (Germany)

ealth and

in source of evil

FARC (Colombia), Baader-Meinhof Group/‘Red

Army Fraction’ (Germany), the Red Brigade

(Italy), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation

Party–Front’ (Turkey)

n one particular

y), such as the

abortion

‘Earth Liberation Front’ (U.K.), ‘Animal

Liberation Front’ (several countries), ‘Army of

God’ (Anti-Abortion, U.S.)

terpretation of

against ‘infidels’

ISIS (Syria/& Iraq), Al Qaida (several countries),

‘Army of God’ (U.S.)

www.sciencedirect.com

Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization Doosje et al. 81

Relatedly, the fifth characteristic of radical groups is the

strong belief in the efficacy of the use of violence.

Consequently, radical groups are often inclined to ap-

prove of the violence committed by their members as the

most effective means to achieve their ideological ends.

A model of radicalization and de- radicalization Most terrorists are not mentally ill. Rather, terrorism is a

result of a radicalization process in steps that can happen

to ‘normal’ people [8 � ,14] (see Figure 1). The radicalizing

person forms the central element in our model. As indi-

cated earlier, this person follows three phases during the

radicalization process: (1) sensitivity phase, (2) the group

membership phase and (3) the action phase. Whether or

not this person will follow all the phases depends on

factors at three levels (AR Feddes et al., unpublished data): micro (individual), meso (group) and macro (socie-

tal) level. At all three levels, however, this person may be

protected against radical influences by a shield of resil-

ience [15]. Half way the group membership phase, the

shield of resilience turns around. The radical group is

making the person resilient against de-radicalization

influences from outside the group [16].

Phase 1 of radicalization: sensitivity At the first level, the micro level, factors within the person that may influence this process. In the sensitivity phase,

an important driving factor at the micro level concerns the quest for significance [17

� ,18]. Feelings of insignificance

can be caused by a loss of status, a strong sense of

humiliation, or poor career prospects (personal failure,

criminal activities, and drug abuse). Radical groups such

as ISIS are well-equipped to foster or restore feelings of

significance by providing recruits with a sense of belong-

ing, respect, heroism, status and the notion to fight for a

holy cause.

A second important driving factor at the micro level is personal uncertainty. When people feel uncertain, they

become motivated to identify strongly with a group that

reduces their uncertainty by providing them with clear

norms and values [19]. Radical groups are particularly able

to do this, as they have a clear profile, offer a solid

structure and a black-and-white world view. Thus, ortho-

dox groups, such as Jihadi groups, with well-developed

behavioral rules can be attractive for people who experi-

ence personal uncertainty.

At the meso level, the radicalization process is likely to depend on the social environment (friends, family, and

other groups). An important driving factor at this meso

level is fraternal relative deprivation, the feeling of injus- tice that people experience when they identify with their

group and perceive that their group has been treated

worse than another group [20]. For example, Muslims

in Europe experience this in terms of housing, education

www.sciencedirect.com

opportunities, work and income [21–23]. In addition, they experience discrimination and the use of double stan-

dards from the media [24 � ]. Similarly, right wing groups

experience that native citizens are being treated worse

than immigrants [12].

Another important factor at this meso level concerns

friendship and family. People are social beings and this

makes them vulnerable to social influence from people

close to them and with whom they have frequent contact.

This is true for Jihadi warriors as well [25]. Extremist

groups supply individuals with a strong sense of in-group

belongingness, which is a basic human need [26], and a

clear image of an evil out-group, creating a strong inter-

group dynamic [27].

Finally, at the macro level, the process of radicalization is partly influenced by the larger societal factors [3]. For

example, accelerating globalization and the world-wide

threat due to the political, economic and cultural domi-

nance of the West forms an important driving factor for

radical Muslims. They experience the Western life style

as a cultural threat to the pure Islam and the wars by the

West pose a threat to the larger Muslim community

(‘Ummah’; [28,29]). In this sense, globalization ‘spurs

terrorism’ [30,31].

Phase 2 of radicalization: group membership In the second phase, the individual with a ‘cognitive

opening’ joins a radical group. Mutual commitment is

central in this process. The individual feels attached or

fused with the group, and the group is fused with the

individual. At the micro level, a person starts as a marginal member, and is motivated to show the loyalty to the

group. As such, this person is likely to follow the norms

and values of the group, for example by downgrading an

out-group in public contexts [32 � ].

The meso level is of great importance, as during this phase, ties between the individual and the group are strength-

ened. This can be achieved via initiation rituals. In

addition, physical and psychological isolation can cut

people loose from their old social environment. Finally,

training and coaching form important elements of this

phase [33]. Importantly, in this phase group members are

often encouraged to ‘break bridges’ with friends and

family who do not belong to the group. This makes

the in-group cohesive and strong [34 � ]. This is of course

not necessary when people feel supported in their radical

beliefs and actions by their social environment [35].

At the macro level, the declaration of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possibly has increased levels of perceived

group efficacy. It has demonstrated that it is possible for

Muslims to challenge Western influence and create a

Caliphate in the Middle East, a long term dream of

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

82 Intergroup relations

Muslim extremists. This has led to a great influx of more

than 20,000 foreign fighters to ISIS controlled areas.

Phase 3 of radicalization: action In this final phase, people turn to using violence against

other groups. Though it may not be psychologically easy

for people to commit violence, a driving factor at the micro level often is the confrontation with death of a relative or

friend [36 � ]. This has for example been documented for

the ‘Black widows’ in Chechnya, whose husbands had

died in the conflict with Russia [37].

At the meso level, an important strategy mentioned earlier to prepare for the use of violence (with the possibility of

dying in action), is to have individuals write or videotape a

testament. The idea is that once people have made this

step, it makes it harder for them to withdraw [38]. In

addition, by stressing the non-human aspects of the out-

group (comparing them with vermin such as rats or

cockroaches [39]; Haslam and Stratemeyer, this issue),

in combination with presenting the out-group as an acute

threat to the in-group, people justify their violence toward

that out-group. At the macro level, appeals by authorities to use violence play an important role [28].

De-radicalization As outlined in Figure 1, members of radical groups have a

shield of resilience, which makes them less likely to be

persuaded by anti-radical messages from outside their

group. In some cases, however, this shield may fall apart

allowing de-radicalization to start. De-radicalization is a

process in which people reject the ideology they once

embraced. This is one step further than disengagement,

which is characterized by a change in behavior (stop using

violence and leaving the radical group) without giving up

one’s radical beliefs [40,41 � ]. Often, de-radicalization

(i.e., rejecting the ideology) occurs when people’s com-

mitment to the group decreases.

A factor at the micro level can be the loss of the ideological appeal. By experiencing other major life events (marriage,

birth of a child — which may strengthen other group ties),

the radical group may offer less significance and meaning.

Another factor is intellectual doubt (‘Do I want to live my

life like this forever?’), which sometimes is heightened by

exposure to alternative viewpoints, such as through rele-

vant books and media, but it may also be supported by

other group members, making it a meso factor. An impor- tant element at the meso level is detachment from the group and its activities, sometimes caused by an intra-

group conflict and disappointment in the (leaders of the)

group [42]. At the macro level, prison can sometimes create a context in which people want to make a new

start and de-radicalize [43].

Not only individuals can leave radical groups, such groups

can themselves disintegrate and stop existing. Between

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

1970 and 2007, 63% of terrorist groups ceased to exist [44].

This can be achieved in five manners [45]: (1) splintering

(33.7%); (2) political solution (28.5%); (3) actions by

police and intelligence services (26.5%); (4) winning by

achieving their goals (6.7%) and (5) military intervention

(4.7%). Both splintering and political solution involve

changes in the (inter)group dynamics. Specifically, while

splintering in radical groups occurs (by definition) as a

result of intra-group frictions and disagreements, political

solutions occur due to a change in the intergroup political

landscape.

Conclusions In this article, we have outlined how factors at the micro

(individual), meso (group) and macro (society) level can

play a role in a process of radicalization and de-radicali-

zation [46,47]. We argue that it is crucial to take into

account group membership and the inter-group context

that forms the basis of radicalization. Every radical group

is characterized by a strong sense of a (superior) in-group

identity, as well as an (inferior and evil) out-group, which

is held as responsible for the grievance of the in-group and

as such is perceived as a legitimate target of violent

attacks in order to achieve societal and political changes.

Importantly, people are able to resist the temptations of a

radical ideology to the extent that they have a strong

shield of resilience. Interestingly, a shield of resilience

may also make people — once they belong to a radical

group — less susceptible to attempts at de-radicalization.

Thus, we argue that it is not possible to understand

radicalization without taking into account the group-level

psychological processes in terms of belonging, social

influence and polarization. This account does not justify

the illegal and violent behavior of radical groups — it just

makes them more (psycho-) logical.

Conflict of interest statement Nothing declared.

References and recommended reading Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

� of special interest �� of outstanding interest

1. Spaaij R: The enigma of lone wolf terrorism: an assessment. Stud Confl Terror 2010, 33:854-870.

2. Corner E, Gill P: A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone- actor terrorism. Law Hum Behav 2014, 39:23-34.

3. Moghaddam FM, Heckenlaible V, Blackman M, Fasano S, Dufour D: Globalization and terrorism: the primacy of collective processes. In Social Psychology of Good and Evil. Edited by Miller A. Guilford; 2016. [in press].

4. Arendt H: Eichmann in Jerusalem. Penguin Books; 1964.

5. Corner E, Gill P, Mason O: Mental health disorders and the terrorist: a research note probing selection effects and disorder prevalence. Stud Confl Terror 2016, 39:560-568.

www.sciencedirect.com

Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization Doosje et al. 83

6. Silke A: Cheshire-Cat logic: the recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research. Psychol Crime Law 1998, 4:51-69.

This article reviews literature to provide an overview of evidence suggest- ing terrorists suffer from psychopathological disorders. Published in the late 90s, the debate on this issue is still ongoing. Silke concludes that evidence supporting psychopathology is rare and based on weak empiri- cal evidence, as is the case still today.

7. Meertens RW, Prins YRA, Doosje B: In iedereen schuilt een terrorist: Een sociaal-psychologische analyse van terroristische sekten en aanslagen. [There is a Terrorist Hidden in Everyone: A Social–Psychological Analyses of Terroristic Sects and Attacks]. Scriptum; 2006.

8. Moghaddam FM: The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration. Am Psychol 2005, 60:161-169.

In this classic article, Moghaddam describes the process of radicalization by using the metaphor of a staircase, with a ground floor and 5 stairs that people can climb to reach the top. It articulates the different steps that can be distinguished in a process of radicalization, and stresses that only very few individuals will make it to the top.

9. Bergen D, Van Feddes AR, Pels T, Doosje B: Collective identity factors and the attitude to ethnic or religious in-group violence in Muslim youth of Turkish and Moroccan descent. Int J Intercult Rel 2015, 47:89-100.

10. Borum R: Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in violent extremism. Behav Sci Law 2014, 32:286-305.

As it may be difficult to establish the role of mental disorders in extremism, Borum argues it may be more fruitful to explore the vulnerabilities and propensities of people who are involved in extre- mism. Thus, he reviews the literature on the motivational, attributional, volitional, emotional, attitudinal, and worldview propensities of extre- mists.

11. Doosje B, Van den Bos K, Loseman A: Radicalization process of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: the role of uncertainty, perceived injustice and perceived group threat. J Soc Issues 2013, 69:586-604.

In this article, the authors have non-radical youth in The Netherlands with an Islamic background. They examined whether potential triggers of a radicalization process (uncertainty, perceived injustice and per- ceived group threat) can be related to radical attitudes and beliefs in this sample.

12. Doosje B, Van den Bos K, Loseman A, Feddes AR, Mann L: ‘‘My in-group is superior!’’: susceptibility for radical right-wing attitudes and behaviors in Dutch youth. Negotiation Confl Manage Resolution 2012, 5:253-268.

13. Reicher SD, Haslam SA: Fueling extremes. Sci Am Mind 2016, 27:34-39.

14. Schmid A: Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter- radicalisation: a conceptual discussion and literature review. ICCT Research Paper. 2016.

15. Mann L, Doosje B, Konijn EA, Nickolson L, Moore U, Ruigrok N: Indicatoren en manifestaties van weerbaarheid van de Nederlandse bevolking tegen extremistische boodschappen: Een theoretische en methodologische verkenning. [Indicators and Manifestations of Resilience of the Dutch Population Against Extremist Messages: A Theoretical and Methodological Exploration]. University of Amsterdam/Ministry of Security and Justice; 2016.

16. Doosje B, De Wolf A, Mann L, Feddes AR: Radicalisering en De- radicalisering [Radicalization and de-radicalization]. In Gezichten van het Recht: psychologie van het Recht. Edited by Van Koppen PJ, Jelicic M, de Keijser JW, Horselenberg R. Wolters- Kluwer; 2016. [in press].

17. Kruglanski AW, Gelfand MJ, Bélanger JJ, Sheveland A, Hetiarachchi M, Gunaratna R: The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: how significance quest impacts violent extremism. Polit Psychol 2014, 35:69-93.

In this article, the authors describe a model of radicalization/deradicaliza- tion. They distinguish between the motivational component, namely the quest for personal significance that defines a goal, the ideological component in which the use of violence is legitimized, and the social process by which they share and strengthen the ideology.

www.sciencedirect.com

18. Webber D, Klein K, Kruglanski A, Brizi A, Merari A: Divergent paths to martyrdom and significance among suicide attackers. Terror Polit Violence 2016. [in press].

19. Hogg MA, Kruglanksi A, van den Bos K: Uncertainty and the roots of extremism. J Soc Issues 2013, 69:407-418.

20. Crosby FJ: A model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psychol Rev 1976, 83:85-112.

21. Ersanilli EE, Koopmans R: Do integration policies matter? A three-country comparison among Turkish immigrants. West Eur Polit 2011, 34:208-234.

22. Feddes AR, Mann L, De Zwart N, Doosje B: Duale identiteit in een multi-culturele samenleving: een longitudinale kwalitatieve effectmeting van de weerbaarheidstraining [Dual identity in a multicultural society: a longitudinal qualitative effect study of the resilience training]. Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid 2013, 12:27-44.

23. Kunst JR, Tajamal H, Sam DL, Ulleberg P: Coping with Islamophobia: the effects of religious stigma on Muslim minorities’ identity formation. Int J Intercul Rel 2012, 36:518-532.

24. Slootman M, Tillie J: Processes of Radicalisation. Why Some Amsterdam Muslims Become Radicals. University of Amsterdam; 2006.

The authors investigate what factors play a role in radicalisation pro- cesses. A qualitative study was conducted with 12 Dutch Muslim youth who radicalised (operationalised as not regarding Dutch authorities as legitimate and approving violence to defend their ideology; the so called salafi-jihadis). The authors conclude that radicalisation is not a charac- teristic of ‘irrational madmen’ but a process involving factors related to religion (‘who am I’, ‘how should I live my life’), politics (perceptions of injustice), and a social dimension (need for acceptance, sense of secur- ity).

25. Sageman M: Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century. University of Pennsylvania Press; 2008.

26. Baumeister RF, Leary MR: The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychol Bull 1995, 117:497-529.

27. Tajfel H, Turner JC: The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Edited by Worchel S, Austin WG. Nelson-Hall; 1986.

28. Geelhoed F: Purification and Resistance: Global Meanings of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Netherlands. Erasmus School of Law; 2012.

29. Lakhani S: Preventing violent extremism: perceptions of policy from grassroots and communities. How J Crim Justice 2012, 51:190-206.

30. Moghaddam FM: How Globalization Spurs Terrorism. Praeger; 2008.

31. Moghaddam FM: The omnicultural imperative. Cult Psychol 2012, 18:304-330.

32. Noel JG, Wann DL, Branscombe NR: Peripheral ingroup membership status and public negativity toward outgroups. J Pers Soc Psychol 1995, 68:127-137.

This article examines which in-group members are most likely to express out-group derogation and under what conditions. It is demonstrated that peripheral — but not core — members of a desirable in-group derogated an out-group when this derogation was publicly shared, but not when the derogation remained private. This supports the idea that peripheral group-members use out-group derogation to gain acceptance by other in-group members.

33. De Wolf A, Doosje B: Aanpak van radicalisering: een psychologische analyse [Dealing with radicalization: a psychological analysis]. SWP 2015:2015.

34. Swann W, Jetten J, Gómez Á, Whitehouse H, Bastian B: When group membership gets personal: a theory of identity fusion. Psychol Rev 2012, 119:441-456.

The authors propose that identity fusion — a feeling of oneness with a group — underlies extreme sacrifices for one’s group. The authors review literature showing that measures of identity fusion strongly predict extreme pro-group behavior (i.e., fighting and dying for the group), overt pro-group behavior (i.e., donations of personal funds), and other pro- group behaviours.

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

84 Intergroup relations

35. Ginges J, Atran S, Sachdeva S, Medin D: Psychology out of the laboratory: the challenge of violent extremism. Am Psychol 2011, 66:507-519.

36. Pyszczynski T, Abdollahi A, Solomon S, Greenberg J, Cohen F, Weise D: Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: the great Satan versus the axis of evil. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2006, 32:525-537.

This article hypothesizes that mortality salience increases people’s will- ingness to support violent action against a threatening outgroup. Two studies indeed demonstrate that reminders of death increase support for martyrdom attacks against Americans among young Iranians, and they increase support for extreme military interventions in the Middle East among young Americans.

37. Speckhard A, Akhmedova K: The making of a martyr: Chechen suicide terrorism. Stud Confl Terror 2006, 29:1-65.

38. Silke A: Understanding suicide terrorism. In Investigating Terrorism: Current Political, Legal and Psychological Issues. Edited by Pearse J. Wiley; 2015:169-179.

39. Haslam N: Dehumanization: an integrative review. Pers Soc Psychol Rev 2006, 10:252-264.

40. Altier MB, Thoroughgood CN, Horgan JG: Turning away from terrorism: lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology. J Peace Res 2014, 51:647-661.

41. Bjørgo T: Dreams and disillusionment: engagement in and disengagement from militant extremist groups. Crime Law Soc Change 2011, 55:277-285.

Bjørgo is the founding father of EXIT programs, to help members of extreme right-wing groups to disengagement from the group. In this

Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 11:79–84

article, he describes different types of radicals: sensation seekers, ideo- logically/politically motivated people, people with a strong need to belong to groups and socially marginalised people. He advocates a dynamic interpretation of this typology, as people can change easily.

42. Van der Valk I, Wagenaar W: The Extreme Right: Entry and Exit. Anne Frank House/Leiden University; 2010.

43. Feddes AR, Mann L, Doosje B: Empirical study as part of a scientific approach to finding indicators of and responses to radicalisation (SAFIRE). Report Presented to the European Commission. 2013.

This is one of the first attempts to quantitatively as well as qualitatively examine the effect of a program to prevent radicalization in a longitudinal study. The authors have followed a small number of vulnerable Islamic youths during a 4 month intervention. They observed changes in some factors related to radicalization, such as self-esteem and perspective taking of the out-group.

44. Blomberg SB, Gaibulloev K, Sandler T: Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations. Public Choice 2011, 149:263-280.

45. Jones SG, Libicki ME: How terrorist groups end: lessons for countering al Qa’ida (monograph MG-741-1). RAND 2008.

46. Kruglanski AW, Bélanger JJ, Gelfand M, Gunaratna R, Hettiarachchi M, Reinares F, Orehek E, Sasota J, Sharvit K: Terrorism — a (self) love story: redirecting the significance quest can end violence. Am Psychol 2013, 68:559-575.

47. Feddes AR, Mann L, Doosje B: From extreme emotions to extreme actions: explaining non-normative collective action and reconciliation. Behav Brain Sci 2012, 35:432-433.

www.sciencedirect.com