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Plato. [Works. English. 1997]
Complete works/Plato; edited, with introduction and notes, by
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p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-87220-349-2 (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Philosophy, Ancient.
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Theaetetus 167
SOCRATES: No, it doesn’t. But there is also an unlawful and unscientific 150 practice of bringing men and women together, which we call procuring; and because of that the midwives—a most august body of women—are very reluctant to undertake even lawful matchmaking. They are afraid that if they practice this, they may be suspected of the other. And yet, I suppose, reliable matchmaking is a matter for no one but the true midwife.
THEAETETUS: Apparently. SOCRATES: So the work of the midwives is a highly important one; but
it is not so important as my own performance. And for this reason, that there is not in midwifery the further complication, that the patients are b sometimes delivered of phantoms and sometimes of realities, and that the two are hard to distinguish. If there were, then the midwife’s greatest and noblest function would be to distinguish the true from the false offspring— don’t you agree?
THEAETETUS: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in most respects.
The difference is that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing c about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth. For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom. The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the d child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is different. At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress— a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring. And a proof of this may be seen in the e many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and thought that I was no good. They have then proceeded to leave me sooner than they should, either of their own accord or through the influence of others. And after they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the result that what remained within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by everybody else. One of these people was 151
168 Theaetetus
Aristides the son of Lysimachus;4 and there have been very many others. Sometimes they come back, wanting my company again, and ready to move heaven and earth to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin again to make progress.
There is another point also in which those who associate with me are like women in child-birth. They suffer the pains of labor, and are filled day and night with distress; indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain my art is able to bring on, and also to allay.
Well, that’s what happens to them; but at times, Theaetetus, I comeb across people who do not seem to me somehow to be pregnant. Then I realize that they have no need of me, and with the best will in the world I undertake the business of match-making; and I think I am good enough— God willing—at guessing with whom they might profitably keep company. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus;5 and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons.
Well, my dear lad, this has been a long yarn; but the reason was that I have a suspicion that you (as you think yourself) are pregnant and in labor. So I want you to come to me as to one who is both the son of ac midwife and himself skilled in the art; and try to answer the questions I shall ask you as well as you can. And when I examine what you say, I may perhaps think it is a phantom and not truth, and proceed to take it quietly from you and abandon it. Now if this happens, you mustn’t get savage with me, like a mother over her first-born child. Do you know, people have often before now got into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when I take away some nonsense or other from them. They never believe that I am doing this in all goodwill; they are so far from realizing that no God can wish evil to man, and that even I don’t do thisd kind of thing out of malice, but because it is not permitted to me to accept a lie and put away truth.
So begin again, Theaetetus, and try to say what knowledge is. And don’t on any account tell me that you can’t. For if God is willing, and you play the man, you can.
THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, after such encouragement from you, it would hardly be decent for anyone not to try his hardest to say what he has ine him. Very well then. It seems to me that a man who knows something perceives what he knows, and the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is simply perception.
SOCRATES: There’s a good frank answer, my son. That’s the way to speak one’s mind. But come now, let us look at this thing together, and see whether what we have here is really fertile or a mere wind-egg. You hold that knowledge is perception?
4. Aristides is one of the two young men whose education Socrates discusses in Laches (see 178a–179b).
5. A famous Sophist. See Protagoras 315d, 337a–c, 340e–341c, 358a–b.
Theaetetus 169
THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But look here, this is no ordinary account of knowledge you’ve
come out with: it’s what Protagoras used to maintain. He said the very 152 same thing, only he put it in rather a different way. For he says, you know, that ‘Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.’ You have read this, of course?
THEAETETUS: Yes, often. SOCRATES: Then you know that he puts it something like this, that as
each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you—you and I each being a man?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that is what he says. SOCRATES: Well, it is not likely that a wise man would talk nonsense. So b
let us follow him up. Now doesn’t it sometimes happen that when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels cold and the other not? Or that one of us feels rather cold and the other very cold?
THEAETETUS: That certainly does happen. SOCRATES: Well then, in that case are we going to say that the wind itself,
by itself, is cold or not cold? Or shall we listen to Protagoras, and say it is cold for the one who feels cold, and for the other, not cold?
THEAETETUS: It looks as if we must say that. SOCRATES: And this is how it appears to each of us? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But this expression ‘it appears’ means ‘he perceives it’? THEAETETUS: Yes, it does. SOCRATES: The appearing of things, then, is the same as perception, in c
the case of hot and things like that. So it results, apparently, that things are for the individual such as he perceives them.
THEAETETUS: Yes, that seems all right. SOCRATES: Perception, then, is always of what is, and unerring—as be-
fits knowledge. THEAETETUS: So it appears. SOCRATES: But, I say, look here. Was Protagoras one of those omniscient
people? Did he perhaps put this out as a riddle for the common crowd of us, while he revealed the Truth6 as a secret doctrine to his own pupils?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by that, Socrates? d SOCRATES: I’ll tell you; and this, now, is certainly no ordinary theory—
I mean the theory that there is nothing which in itself is just one thing: nothing which you could rightly call anything or any kind of thing. If you call a thing large, it will reveal itself as small, and if you call it heavy, it is liable to appear as light, and so on with everything, because nothing is one or anything or any kind of thing. What is really true, is this: the things of which we naturally say that they ’are’, are in process of coming to be, e
6. Protagoras of Abdera was a fifth century B.C. philosopher and sophist; this appears to have been the title of his book.
794 Gorgias
CHAEREPHON: Now then, since he’s knowledgeable in a craft, what is it,c and what would be the correct thing to call him?
POLUS: Many among men are the crafts experientially devised by experi- ence, Chaerephon. Yes, it is experience that causes our times to march along the way of craft, whereas inexperience causes them to march along the way of chance. Of these various crafts various men partake in various ways, the best men partaking of the best of them. Our Gorgias is indeed in this group; he partakes of the most admirable of the crafts.
SOCRATES: Polus certainly appears to have prepared himself admirablyd for giving speeches, Gorgias. But he’s not doing what he promised Chaerephon.
GORGIAS: How exactly isn’t he, Socrates? SOCRATES: He hardly seems to me to be answering the question. GORGIAS: Why don’t you question him then, if you like? SOCRATES: No, I won’t, not as long as you yourself may want to answer.
I’d much rather ask you. It’s clear to me, especially from what he has said, that Polus has devoted himself more to what is called oratory than to discussion.
POLUS: Why do you say that, Socrates?e SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asks you what craft Gorgias
is knowledgeable in, you sing its praises as though someone were discredit- ing it. But you haven’t answered what it is.
POLUS: Didn’t I answer that it was the most admirable one? SOCRATES: Very much so. No one, however, asked you what Gorgias’
craft is like, but what craft it is, and what one ought to call Gorgias. So, just as when Chaerephon put his earlier questions to you and you answered449 him in such an admirably brief way, tell us now in that way, too, what his craft is, and what we’re supposed to call Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, why don’t you tell us yourself what the craft you’re knowledgeable in is, and hence what we’re supposed to call you?
GORGIAS: It’s oratory, Socrates. SOCRATES: So we’re supposed to call you an orator? GORGIAS: Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me
“what I boast myself to be,” as Homer puts it.3 SOCRATES: Of course I do. GORGIAS: Call me that then. SOCRATES: Aren’t we to say that you’re capable of making others ora-b
tors too? GORGIAS: That’s exactly the claim I make. Not only here, but else-
where, too. SOCRATES: Well now, Gorgias, would you be willing to complete the
discussion in the way we’re having it right now, that of alternately asking questions and answering them, and to put aside for another
3. Iliad vi.211.
Gorgias 795
time this long style of speechmaking like the one Polus began with? Please don’t go back on your promise, but be willing to give a brief answer to what you’re asked.
GORGIAS: There are some answers, Socrates, that must be given by way of long speeches. Even so, I’ll try to be as brief as possible. This, too, in c fact, is one of my claims. There’s no one who can say the same things more briefly than I.
SOCRATES: That’s what we need, Gorgias! Do give me a presentation of this very thing, the short style of speech, and leave the long style for some other time.
GORGIAS: Very well, I’ll do that. You’ll say you’ve never heard anyone make shorter speeches.
SOCRATES: Come then. You claim to be knowledgeable in the craft of oratory and to be able to make someone else an orator, too. With which d of the things there are is oratory concerned? Weaving, for example, is concerned with the production of clothes, isn’t it?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And so, too, music is concerned with the composition of tunes? GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: By Hera, Gorgias, I do like your answers. They couldn’t be
shorter! GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I daresay I’m doing it quite nicely. SOCRATES: And so you are. Come and answer me then that way about
oratory, too. About which, of the things there are, is it knowledge? GORGIAS: About speeches. e SOCRATES: What sort of speeches, Gorgias? Those that explain how sick
people should be treated to get well? GORGIAS: No. SOCRATES: So oratory isn’t concerned with all speeches. GORGIAS: Oh, no. SOCRATES: But it does make people capable of speaking. GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And also to be wise in what they’re speaking about? GORGIAS: Of course. SOCRATES: Now does the medical craft, the one we were talking about 450
just now, make people able both to have wisdom about and to speak about the sick?
GORGIAS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: This craft, then, is evidently concerned with speeches too. GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Speeches about diseases, that is? GORGIAS: Exactly. SOCRATES: Isn’t physical training also concerned with speeches, speeches
about good and bad physical condition? GORGIAS: Yes, it is.
796 Gorgias
SOCRATES: In fact, Gorgias, the same is true of the other crafts, too. Each of them is concerned with those speeches that are about the object of theb particular craft.
GORGIAS: Apparently. SOCRATES: Then why don’t you call the other crafts oratory, since you
call any craft whatever that’s concerned with speeches oratory? They’re concerned with speeches, too!
GORGIAS: The reason, Socrates, is that in the case of the other crafts the knowledge consists almost completely in working with your hands and activities of that sort. In the case of oratory, on the other hand, there isn’t any such manual work. Its activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. That’s the reason I consider the craft of oratory to be concernedc with speeches. And I say that I’m right about this.
SOCRATES: I’m not sure I understand what sort of craft you want to call it. I’ll soon know more clearly. Tell me this. There are crafts for us to practice, aren’t there?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Of all the crafts there are, I take it that there are those that
consist for the most part of making things and that call for little speech, and some that call for none at all, ones whose task could be done even silently. Take painting, for instance, or sculpture, or many others. When you say that oratory has nothing to do with other crafts, it’s crafts of thisd sort I think you’re referring to. Or aren’t you?
GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates. You take my meaning very well. SOCRATES: And then there are other crafts, the ones that perform their
whole task by means of speeches and that call for practically no physical work besides, or very little of it. Take arithmetic or computation or geome- try, even checkers and many other crafts. Some of these involve speeches to just about the same degree as they do activity, while many involve speeches more. All their activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. I think you mean that oratory is a craft of this sort.e
GORGIAS: True. SOCRATES: But you certainly don’t want to call any of these crafts oratory,
do you, even though, as you phrase it, oratory is the craft that exercises its influence through speech. Somebody might take you up, if he wanted to make a fuss in argument, and say, “So you’re saying that arithmetic is oratory, are you, Gorgias?” I’m sure, however, that you’re not saying that either arithmetic or geometry is oratory.
GORGIAS: Yes, you’re quite correct, Socrates. You take my meaning451 rightly.
SOCRATES: Come on, then. Please complete your answer in the terms of my question. Since oratory is one of those crafts which mostly uses speech, and since there are also others of that sort, try to say what it is that oratory, which exercises its influence through speeches, is about. Imagine someone asking me about any of the crafts I mentioned just now, “Socrates, what is the craft of arithmetic?” I’d tell him, just as you told me, that it’s one ofb
Gorgias 797
those that exercise their influence by means of speech. And if he continued, “What are they crafts about?” I’d say that they’re about even and odd, however many of each there might be. If he then asked, “What is the craft you call computation?” I’d say that this one, too, is one of those that exercise their influence entirely by speech. And if he then continued, “What is it about?” I’d answer in the style of those who draw up motions in the Assembly that in other respects computation is like arithmetic—for it’s c about the same thing, even and odd—yet it differs from arithmetic insofar as computation examines the quantity of odd and even, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And if someone asked about astronomy and I replied that it, too, exercises its influence by means of speech, then if he asked, “What are the speeches of astronomy about, Socrates?” I’d say that they’re about the motions of the stars, the sun and the moon, and their relative velocities.
GORGIAS: And you’d be quite right to say so, Socrates. SOCRATES: Come, Gorgias, you take your turn. For oratory is in fact one d
of those crafts that carry out and exercise their influence entirely by speech, isn’t it?
GORGIAS: That’s right. SOCRATES: Tell us then: what are they crafts about? Of the things there are,
which is the one that these speeches used by oratory are concerned with? GORGIAS: The greatest of human concerns, Socrates, and the best. SOCRATES: But that statement, too, is debatable, Gorgias. It isn’t at all
clear yet, either. I’m sure that you’ve heard people at drinking parties e singing that song in which they count out as they sing that “to enjoy good health is the best thing; second is to have turned out good looking; and third”—so the writer of the song puts it—“is to be honestly rich.”
GORGIAS: Yes, I’ve heard it. Why do you mention it? SOCRATES: Suppose that the producers of the things the songwriter 452
praised were here with you right now: a doctor, a physical trainer, and a financial expert. Suppose that first the doctor said, “Socrates, Gorgias is telling you a lie. It isn’t his craft that is concerned with the greatest good for humankind, but mine.” If I then asked him, “What are you, to say that?” I suppose he’d say that he’s a doctor. “What’s this you’re saying? Is the product of your craft really the greatest good?” “Of course, Socrates,” I suppose he’d say, “seeing that its product is health. What greater good for humankind is there than health?” And suppose that next in his turn b the trainer said, “I too would be amazed, Socrates, if Gorgias could present you with a greater good derived from his craft than the one I could provide from mine.” I’d ask this man, too, “What are you, sir, and what’s your product?” “I’m a physical trainer,” he’d say, “and my product is making people physically good-looking and strong.” And following the trainer the financial expert would say, I’m sure with an air of considerable scorn for all, “Do consider, Socrates, whether you know of any good, Gorgias’ c or anyone else’s, that’s a greater good than wealth.” We’d say to him, “Really? Is that what you produce?” He’d say yes. “As what?” “As a
798 Gorgias
financial expert.” “Well,” we’ll say, “is wealth in your judgment the greatest good for humankind?” “Of course,” he’ll say. “Ah, but Gorgias here dis- putes that. He claims that his craft is the source of a good that’s greater than yours,” we’d say. And it’s obvious what question he’d ask next. “And what is this good, please? Let Gorgias answer me that!” So come on,d Gorgias. Consider yourself questioned by both these men and myself, and give us your answer. What is this thing that you claim is the greatest good for humankind, a thing you claim to be a producer of?
GORGIAS: The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one’s own city.
SOCRATES: And what is this thing you’re referring to? GORGIAS: I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges ine
a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place. In point of fact, with this ability you’ll have the doctor for your slave, and the physical trainer, too. As for this financial expert of yours, he’ll turn out to be making more money for somebody else instead of himself; for you, in fact, if you’ve got the ability to speak and to persuade the crowds.
SOCRATES: Now I think you’ve come closest to making clear what craft453 you take oratory to be, Gorgias. If I follow you at all, you’re saying that oratory is a producer of persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that’s the long and short of it. Or can you mention anything else oratory can do besides instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience?
GORGIAS: None at all, Socrates. I think you’re defining it quite adequately. That is indeed the long and short of it.
SOCRATES: Listen then, Gorgias. You should know that I’m convincedb I’m one of those people who in a discussion with someone else really want to have knowledge of the subject the discussion’s about. And I consider you one of them, too.
GORGIAS: Well, what’s the point, Socrates? SOCRATES: Let me tell you now. You can know for sure that I don’t know
what this persuasion derived from oratory that you’re talking about is, or what subjects it’s persuasion about. Even though I do have my suspicions about which persuasion I think you mean and what it’s about, I’ll still ask you just the same what you say this persuasion produced by oratory is,c and what it’s about. And why, when I have my suspicions, do I ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It’s not you I’m after, it’s our discussion, to have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we’re talking about most clear to us. Consider, then, whether you think I’m being fair in resuming my questions to you. Suppose I were to ask you which of the painters Zeuxis is. If you told me that he’s the one who paints pictures, wouldn’t it be fair for me to ask, “Of what sort of pictures is he the painter, and where?”
GORGIAS: Yes, it would. SOCRATES: And isn’t the reason for this the fact that there are otherd
painters, too, who paint many other pictures?
Gorgias 799
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer
would have been a good one? GORGIAS: Of course. SOCRATES: Come then, and tell me about oratory. Do you think that
oratory alone instills persuasion, or do other crafts do so too? This is the sort of thing I mean: Does a person who teaches some subject or other persuade people about what he’s teaching, or not?
GORGIAS: He certainly does, Socrates. He persuades most of all. SOCRATES: Let’s talk once more about the same crafts we were talking e
about just now. Doesn’t arithmetic or the arithmetician teach us everything that pertains to number?
GORGIAS: Yes, he does. SOCRATES: And he also persuades? GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: So arithmetic is also a producer of persuasion. GORGIAS: Apparently. SOCRATES: Now if someone asks us what sort of persuasion it produces
and what it’s persuasion about, I suppose we’d answer him that it’s the persuasion through teaching about the extent of even and odd. And we’ll be able to show that all the other crafts we were just now talking about 454 are producers of persuasion, as well as what the persuasion is and what it’s about. Isn’t that right?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: So oratory isn’t the only producer of persuasion. GORGIAS: That’s true. SOCRATES: In that case, since it’s not the only one to produce this product
but other crafts do it too, we’d do right to repeat to our speaker the question we put next in the case of the painter: “Of what sort of persuasion is oratory a craft, and what is its persuasion about?” Or don’t you think it’s right to repeat that question? b
GORGIAS: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: Well then, Gorgias, since you think so too, please answer. GORGIAS: The persuasion I mean, Socrates, is the kind that takes place
in law courts and in those other large gatherings, as I was saying a moment ago. And it’s concerned with those matters that are just and unjust.
SOCRATES: Yes, Gorgias, I suspected that this was the persuasion you meant, and that these are the matters it’s persuasion about. But so you won’t be surprised if in a moment I ask you again another question like this, about what seems to be clear, and yet I go on with my questioning— c as I say, I’m asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion. It’s not you I’m after; it’s to prevent our getting in the habit of second- guessing and snatching each other’s statements away ahead of time. It’s to allow you to work out your assumption in any way you want to.
GORGIAS: Yes, I think that you’re quite right to do this, Socrates. SOCRATES: Come then, and let’s examine this point. Is there something
you call “to have learned”?
800 Gorgias
GORGIAS: There is. SOCRATES: Very well. And also something you call “to be convinced”? GORGIAS: Yes, there is.d SOCRATES: Now, do you think that to have learned, and learning, are the
same as to be convinced and conviction, or different? GORGIAS: I certainly suppose that they’re different, Socrates. SOCRATES: You suppose rightly. This is how you can tell: If someone
asked you, “Is there such a thing as true and false conviction, Gorgias?” you’d say yes, I’m sure.
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Well now, is there such a thing as true and false knowledge? GORGIAS: Not at all. SOCRATES: So it’s clear that they’re not the same. GORGIAS: That’s true. SOCRATES: But surely both those who have learned and those who aree
convinced have come to be persuaded? GORGIAS: That’s right. SOCRATES: Would you like us then to posit two types of persuasion, one
providing conviction without knowledge, the other providing knowledge? GORGIAS: Yes, I would. SOCRATES: Now which type of persuasion does oratory produce in law
courts and other gatherings concerning things that are just and unjust? The one that results in being convinced without knowing or the one that results in knowing?
GORGIAS: It’s obvious, surely, that it’s the one that results in conviction. SOCRATES: So evidently oratory produces the persuasion that comes from
being convinced, and not the persuasion that comes from teaching, concern- ing what’s just and unjust.455
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And so an orator is not a teacher of law courts and other
gatherings about things that are just and unjust, either, but merely a per- suader, for I don’t suppose that he could teach such a large gathering about matters so important in a short time.
GORGIAS: No, he certainly couldn’t. SOCRATES: Well now, let’s see what we’re really saying about oratory.
For, mind you, even I myself can’t get clear yet about what I’m saying.b When the city holds a meeting to appoint doctors or shipbuilders or some other variety of craftsmen, that’s surely not the time when the orator will give advice, is it? For obviously it’s the most accomplished craftsman who should be appointed in each case. Nor will the orator be the one to give advice at a meeting that concerns the building of walls or the equipping of harbors or dockyards, but the master builders will be the ones. And when there is a deliberation about the appointment of generals or an arrangement of troops against the enemy or an occupation of territory, it’sc not the orators but the generals who’ll give advice then. What do you say about such cases, Gorgias? Since you yourself claim both to be an orator
Gorgias 801
and to make others orators, we’ll do well to find out from you the character- istics of your craft. You must think of me now as eager to serve your interests, too. Perhaps there’s actually someone inside who wants to be- come your pupil. I notice some, in fact a good many, and they may well be embarrassed to question you. So, while you’re being questioned by me, consider yourself being questioned by them as well: “What will we get if d we associate with you, Gorgias? What will we be able to advise the city on? Only about what’s just and unjust or also about the things Socrates was mentioning just now?” Try to answer them.
GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I’ll try to reveal to you clearly everything oratory can accomplish. You yourself led the way nicely, for you do know, don’t you, that these dockyards and walls of the Athenians and the equipping e of the harbor came about through the advice of Themistocles and in some cases through that of Pericles, but not through that of the craftsmen?4
SOCRATES: That’s what they say about Themistocles, Gorgias. I myself heard Pericles when he advised us on the middle wall.
GORGIAS: And whenever those craftsmen you were just now speaking 456 of are appointed, Socrates, you see that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on these matters prevail.
SOCRATES: Yes, Gorgias, my amazement at that led me long ago to ask what it is that oratory can accomplish. For as I look at it, it seems to me to be something supernatural in scope.
GORGIAS: Oh yes, Socrates, if only you knew all of it, that it encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished. b And I’ll give you ample proof. Many a time I’ve gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform surgery or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade him, I succeeded, by means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain too that if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn’t make any showing at all, but the c one who had the ability to speak would be appointed, if he so wished. And if he were to compete with any other craftsman whatever, the orator more than anyone else would persuade them that they should appoint him, for there isn’t anything that the orator couldn’t speak more persua- sively about to a gathering than could any other craftsman whatever. That’s how great the accomplishment of this craft is, and the sort of accomplish- ment it is! One should, however, use oratory like any other competitive skill, Socrates. In other cases, too, one ought not to use a competitive skill d against any and everybody, just because he has learned boxing, or boxing and wrestling combined, or fighting in armor, so as to make himself be superior to his friends as well as to his enemies. That’s no reason to strike, stab, or kill one’s own friends! Imagine someone who after attending
4. Themistocles and Pericles were Athenian statesmen of the fifth century B.C.
802 Gorgias
wrestling school, getting his body into good shape and becoming a boxer, went on to strike his father and mother or any other family member or friend. By Zeus, that’s no reason to hate physical trainers and people who teach fighting in armor, and to exile them from their cities! For whilee these people imparted their skills to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, and in defense, not aggression, their pupils pervert their strength and skill and misuse them. So it’s not their teachers who are457 wicked, nor does that make the craft guilty or wicked; those who misuse it, surely, are the wicked ones. And the same is true for oratory as well. The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings to be more persuasive, in short, about anything he likes, but the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors orb other craftsmen of their reputations doesn’t give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would any competitive skill. And I suppose that if a person who has become an orator goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn’t hate his teacher and exile him from our cities. For while the teacher imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use ofc it. So it’s the misuser whom it’s just to hate and exile or put to death, not the teacher.
SOCRATES: Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many discussions and that you’ve observed this sort of thing about them: it’s not easy for the participants to define jointly what they’re undertaking to discuss, and so, having learned from and taught each other, to concluded their session. Instead, if they’re disputing some point and one maintains that the other isn’t right or isn’t clear, they get irritated, each thinking the other is speaking out of spite. They become eager to win instead of investigating the subject under discussion. In fact, in the end some have a most shameful parting of the ways, abuse heaped upon them, having given and gotten to hear such things that make even the bystanders upset with themselves for having thought it worthwhile to come to listen to such people. What’s my point in saying this? It’s that I think you’re now sayinge things that aren’t very consistent or compatible with what you were first saying about oratory. So, I’m afraid to pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I’d be458 pleased to continue questioning you if you’re the same kind of man I am, otherwise I would drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and who would be pleased to refute anyone who says anything untrue; one who, however, wouldn’t be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don’t suppose there’s anything quite so bad for a person as having false belief about the things we’re discussing right now. So if you say you’re this kind of man, too, let’s continue the discussion; but if you thinkb we should drop it, let’s be done with it and break it off.
Gorgias 803
GORGIAS: Oh yes, Socrates, I say that I myself, too, am the sort of person you describe. Still, perhaps we should keep in mind the people who are present here, too. For quite a while ago now, even before you came, I gave them a long presentation, and perhaps we’ll stretch things out too long if c we continue the discussion. We should think about them, too, so as not to keep any of them who want to do something else.
CHAEREPHON: You yourselves hear the commotion these men are making, Gorgias and Socrates. They want to hear anything you have to say. And as for myself, I hope I’ll never be so busy that I’d forego discussions such as this, conducted in the way this one is, because I find it more practical to do something else.
CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, as a matter of fact I, too, though d I’ve been present at many a discussion before now, don’t know if I’ve ever been so pleased as I am at the moment. So if you’re willing to discuss, even if it’s all day long, you’ll be gratifying me.
SOCRATES: For my part there’s nothing stopping me, Callicles, as long as Gorgias is willing.
GORGIAS: It’ll be to my shame ever after, Socrates, if I weren’t willing, when I myself have made the claim that anyone may ask me anything he wants. All right, if it suits these people, carry on with the discussion, and e ask what you want.
SOCRATES: Well then, Gorgias, let me tell you what surprises me in the things you’ve said. It may be that what you said was correct and that I’m not taking your meaning correctly. Do you say that you’re able to make an orator out of anyone who wants to study with you?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: So that he’ll be persuasive in a gathering about all subjects,
not by teaching but by persuading? GORGIAS: Yes, that’s right. 459 SOCRATES: You were saying just now, mind you, that the orator will be
more persuasive even about health than a doctor is. GORGIAS: Yes I was, more persuasive in a gathering, anyhow. SOCRATES: And doesn’t “in a gathering” just mean “among those who
don’t have knowledge”? For, among those who do have it, I don’t suppose that he’ll be more persuasive than the doctor.
GORGIAS: That’s true. SOCRATES: Now if he’ll be more persuasive than a doctor, doesn’t he
prove to be more persuasive than the one who has knowledge? GORGIAS: Yes, that’s right. SOCRATES: Even though he’s not a doctor, right? b GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And a non-doctor, I take it, isn’t knowledgeable in the thing
in which a doctor is knowledgeable. GORGIAS: That’s obvious. SOCRATES: So when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, a non-
knower will be more persuasive than a knower among non-knowers. Isn’t this exactly what follows?
804 Gorgias
GORGIAS: Yes it is, at least in this case. SOCRATES: The same is true about the orator and oratory relative to the
other crafts, too, then. Oratory doesn’t need to have any knowledge of the state of their subject matters; it only needs to have discovered some devicec to produce persuasion in order to make itself appear to those who don’t have knowledge that it knows more than those who actually do have it.
GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, aren’t things made very easy when you come off no worse than the craftsmen even though you haven’t learned any other craft but this one?
SOCRATES: Whether the orator does or does not come off worse than the others because of this being so, we’ll examine in a moment if it has any bearing on our argument. For now, let’s consider this point first. Is it thed case that the orator is in the same position with respect to what’s just and unjust, what’s shameful and admirable, what’s good and bad, as he is about what’s healthy and about the subjects of the other crafts? Does he lack knowledge, that is, of what these are, of what is good or what is bad, of what is admirable or what is shameful, or just or unjust? Does he employ devices to produce persuasion about them, so that—even though he doesn’t know—he seems, among those who don’t know either, to know more than someone who actually does know? Or is it necessary for him to know,e and must the prospective student of oratory already be knowledgeable in these things before coming to you? And if he doesn’t, will you, the oratory teacher, not teach him any of these things when he comes to you—for that’s not your job—and will you make him seem among most people to have knowledge of such things when in fact he doesn’t have it, and to seem good when in fact he isn’t? Or won’t you be able to teach him oratory at all, unless he knows the truth about these things to begin with? How do matters such as these stand, Gorgias? Yes, by Zeus, do give us your460 revelation and tell us what oratory can accomplish, just as you just now said you would.
GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if he really doesn’t have this knowledge, he’ll learn these things from me as well.
SOCRATES: Hold it there. You’re right to say so. If you make someone an orator, it’s necessary for him to know what’s just and what’s unjust, either beforehand, or by learning it from you afterwards.
GORGIAS: Yes, it is. SOCRATES: Well? A man who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, isn’t he?b GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And isn’t a man who has learned music a musician? GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And a man who has learned medicine a doctor? And isn’t
this so too, by the same reasoning, with the other crafts? Isn’t a man who has learned a particular subject the sort of man his knowledge makes him?
GORGIAS: Yes, he is. SOCRATES: And, by this line of reasoning, isn’t a man who has learned
what’s just a just man too? GORGIAS: Yes, absolutely.
Gorgias 805
SOCRATES: And a just man does just things, I take it? GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Now isn’t an orator necessarily just, and doesn’t a just man c
necessarily want to do just things? GORGIAS: Apparently so. SOCRATES: Therefore an orator will never want to do what’s unjust. GORGIAS: No, apparently not. SOCRATES: Do you remember saying a little earlier that we shouldn’t
complain against physical trainers or exile them from our cities if the boxer d uses his boxing skill to do what’s unjust, and that, similarly, if an orator uses his oratorical skill unjustly we shouldn’t complain against his teacher or banish him from the city, but do so to the one who does what’s unjust, the one who doesn’t use his oratorical skill properly? Was that said or not?
GORGIAS: Yes, it was. SOCRATES: But now it appears that this very man, the orator, would never e
have done what’s unjust, doesn’t it? GORGIAS: Yes, it does. SOCRATES: And at the beginning of our discussion, Gorgias, it was said
that oratory would be concerned with speeches, not those about even and odd, but those about what’s just and unjust. Right?
GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, at the time you said that, I took it that oratory would
never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice. But when a little later you were saying that the orator could also use 461 oratory unjustly, I was surprised and thought that your statements weren’t consistent, and so I made that speech in which I said that if you, like me, think that being refuted is a profitable thing, it would be worthwhile to continue the discussion, but if you don’t, to let it drop. But now, as we subsequently examine the question, you see for yourself too that it’s agreed that, quite to the contrary, the orator is incapable of using oratory unjustly and of being willing to do what’s unjust. By the Dog, Gorgias, it’ll take b more than a short session to go through an adequate examination of how these matters stand!
POLUS: Really, Socrates? Is what you’re now saying about oratory what you actually think of it? Or do you really think, just because Gorgias was too ashamed not to concede your further claim that the orator also knows what’s just, what’s admirable, and what’s good, and that if he came to him without already having this knowledge to begin with, he said that he would teach him himself, and then from this admission maybe some c inconsistency crept into his statements—just the thing that gives you de- light, you’re the one who leads him on to face such questions—who do you think would deny that he himself knows what’s just and would teach others? To lead your arguments to such an outcome is a sign of great rudeness.
SOCRATES: Most admirable Polus, it’s not for nothing that we get ourselves companions and sons. It’s so that, when we ourselves have grown older and stumble, you younger men might be on hand to straighten our lives
Gorgias 827
other beloved. As for that son of Clinias, what he says differs from one time to the next, but what philosophy says always stays the same, and she’s saying things that now astound you, although you were present b when they were said. So, either refute her and show that doing what’s unjust without paying what is due for it is not the ultimate of all bad things, as I just now was saying it is, or else, if you leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be dissonant with you all your life long. And yet for my part, my good man, I think it’s better to have my lyre or a chorus that I might lead out of tune and dissonant, and have the vast majority of men disagree with me and contradict me, than to be out of harmony c with myself, to contradict myself, though I’m only one person.
CALLICLES: Socrates, I think you’re grandstanding in these speeches, acting like a true crowd pleaser. Here you are, playing to the crowd now that Polus has had the same thing happen to him that he accused Gorgias of letting you do to him. For he said, didn’t he, that when Gorgias was asked by you whether he would teach anyone who came to him wanting d to learn oratory but without expertise in what’s just, Gorgias was ashamed and, out of deference to human custom, since people would take it ill if a person refused, said that he’d teach him. And because Gorgias agreed on this point, he said, he was forced to contradict himself, just the thing you like. He ridiculed you at the time, and rightly so, as I think anyhow. And now the very same thing has happened to him. And for this same reason I don’t approve of Polus: he agreed with you that doing what’s unjust is more shameful than suffering it. As a result of this admission he e was bound and gagged by you in the discussion, too ashamed to say what he thought. Although you claim to be pursuing the truth, you’re in fact bringing the discussion around to the sort of crowd-pleasing vulgarities that are admirable only by law and not by nature. And these, nature and law, are for the most part opposed to each other, so if a person is ashamed 483 and doesn’t dare to say what he thinks, he’s forced to contradict himself. This is in fact the clever trick you’ve thought of, with which you work mischief in your discussions: if a person makes a statement in terms of law, you slyly question him in terms of nature; if he makes it in terms of nature, you question him in terms of law. That’s just what happened here, on the question of doing what’s unjust versus suffering it. While Polus meant that doing it is more shameful by law, you pursued the argument as though he meant by nature. For by nature all that is worse is also more shameful, like suffering what’s unjust, whereas by law doing it is more shameful. No, no man would put up with suffering what’s unjust; only a b slave would do so, one who is better dead than alive, who when he’s treated unjustly and abused can’t protect himself or anyone else he cares about. I believe that the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many. So they institute laws and assign praise and blame with them- selves and their own advantage in mind. As a way of frightening the more c powerful among men, the ones who are capable of having a greater share,
828 Gorgias
out of getting a greater share than they, they say that getting more than one’s share is “shameful” and “unjust,” and that doing what’s unjust is nothing but trying to get more than one’s share. I think they like getting an equal share, since they are inferior.
These are the reasons why trying to get a greater share than most is said to be unjust and shameful by law and why they call it doing what’s unjust. But I believe that nature itself reveals that it’s a just thing for thed better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable man. Nature shows that this is so in many places; both among the other animals and in whole cities and races of men, it shows that this is what justice has been decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they. For what sort of justice did Xerxes go by when he campaigned against Greece, or his father when he campaigned against Scythia? Countless other suche examples could be mentioned. I believe that these men do these things in accordance with the nature of what’s just—yes, by Zeus, in accordance with the law of nature, and presumably not with the one we institute. We mold the best and the most powerful among us, taking them while they’re still young, like lion cubs, and with charms and incantations we subdue them into slavery, telling them that one is supposed to get no more than484 his fair share, and that that’s what’s admirable and just. But surely, if a man whose nature is equal to it arises, he will shake off, tear apart, and escape all this, he will trample underfoot our documents, our tricks and charms, and all our laws that violate nature. He, the slave, will rise up and be revealed as our master, and here the justice of nature will shineb forth. I think Pindar, too, refers to what I’m saying in that song in which he says that
Law, the king of all, Of mortals and the immortal gods
—this, he says,
Brings on and renders just what is most violent With towering hand. I take as proof of this The deeds of Heracles. For he . . . unbought . . .
His words are something like that—I don’t know the song well—he says that Heracles drove off Geryon’s cattle, even though he hadn’t paid for them and Geryon hadn’t given them to him, on the ground that this isc what’s just by nature, and that cattle and all the other possessions of those who are worse and inferior belong to the one who’s better and superior.
This is the truth of the matter, as you will acknowledge if you abandon philosophy and move on to more important things. Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time with it than
Gorgias 835
CALLICLES: But I’ve already said that I mean those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city, and brave, too. It’s fitting that they should be the d ones who rule their cities, and what’s just is that they, as the rulers, should have a greater share than the others, the ruled.
SOCRATES: But what of themselves, my friend? CALLICLES: What of what? SOCRATES: Ruling or being ruled? CALLICLES: What do you mean? SOCRATES: I mean each individual ruling himself. Or is there no need at
all for him to rule himself, but only to rule others? CALLICLES: What do you mean, rule himself? SOCRATES: Nothing very subtle. Just what the many mean: being self-
controlled and master of oneself, ruling the pleasures and appetites e within oneself.
CALLICLES: How delightful you are! By the self-controlled you mean the stupid ones!
SOCRATES: How so? There’s no one who’d fail to recognize that I mean no such thing.
CALLICLES: Yes you do, Socrates, very much so. How could a man prove to be happy if he’s enslaved to anyone at all? Rather, this is what’s admira- ble and just by nature—and I’ll say it to you now with all frankness—that the man who’ll live correctly ought to allow his own appetites to get as large as possible and not restrain them. And when they are as large as 492 possible, he ought to be competent to devote himself to them by virtue of his bravery and intelligence, and to fill them with whatever he may have an appetite for at the time. But this isn’t possible for the many, I believe; hence, they become detractors of people like this because of the shame they feel, while they conceal their own impotence. And they say that lack of discipline is shameful, as I was saying earlier, and so they enslave men who are better by nature, and while they themselves lack the ability to provide for themselves fulfillment for their pleasures, their own lack of b courage leads them to praise self-control and justice. As for all those who were either sons of kings to begin with or else naturally competent to secure some position of rule for themselves as tyrants or potentates, what in truth could be more shameful and worse than self-control and justice for these people who, although they are free to enjoy good things without any interference, should bring as master upon themselves the law of the many, their talk, and their criticism? Or how could they exist without becoming miserable under that “admirable” regime of justice and self- c control, allotting no greater share to their friends than to their enemies, and in this way “rule” in their cities? Rather, the truth of it, Socrates—the thing you claim to pursue—is like this: wantonness, lack of discipline, and freedom, if available in good supply, are excellence and happiness; as for these other things, these fancy phrases, these contracts of men that go against nature, they’re worthless nonsense!
Republic I 987
Consider this with the preciseness of language you mentioned. Is it so or not?
It appears to be so. Medicine doesn’t seek its own advantage, then, but that of the body? c Yes. And horse-breeding doesn’t seek its own advantage, but that of horses?
Indeed, no other craft seeks its own advantage—for it has no further needs—but the advantage of that of which it is the craft?
Apparently so. Now, surely, Thrasymachus, the crafts rule over and are stronger than
the things of which they are the crafts? Very reluctantly, he conceded this as well. No kind of knowledge seeks or orders what is advantageous to itself,
then, but what is advantageous to the weaker, which is subject to it. d He tried to fight this conclusion, but he conceded it in the end. And
after he had, I said: Surely, then, no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his patient? We agreed that a doctor in the precise sense is a ruler of bodies, not a money-maker. Wasn’t that agreed?
Yes. So a ship’s captain in the precise sense is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor? That’s what we agreed. e Doesn’t it follow that a ship’s captain or ruler won’t seek and order what
is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to a sailor, his subject? He reluctantly agreed. So, then, Thrasymachus, no one in any position of rule, insofar as he is
a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subject, that on which he practices his craft. It is to his subject and what is advantageous and proper to it that he looks, and everything he says and does he says and does for it.
When we reached this point in the argument, and it was clear to all that his account of justice had turned into its opposite, instead of answering, 343 Thrasymachus said: Tell me, Socrates, do you still have a wet nurse?
What’s this? Hadn’t you better answer my questions rather than asking me such things?
Because she’s letting you run around with a snotty nose, and doesn’t wipe it when she needs to! Why, for all she cares, you don’t even know about sheep and shepherds.
Just what is it I don’t know? You think that shepherds and cowherds seek the good of their sheep b
and cattle, and fatten them and take care of them, looking to something other than their master’s good and their own. Moreover, you believe that rulers in cities—true rulers, that is—think about their subjects differently than one does about sheep, and that night and day they think of something besides their own advantage. You are so far from understanding about c justice and what’s just, about injustice and what’s unjust, that you don’t
988 Thrasymachus/Socrates
realize that justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the truly simple and just, and those it rules do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one they serve happy, but themselves not at all. You must look at it as follows, my most simple Socrates: A just man always gets less than and unjust one. First, in their contracts with one another, you’ll never find, when the partnership ends, that a just partner has got more than an unjust one, but less. Second, in matters relating to the city, when taxes are to be paid, a just man pays more on the same property, an unjust one less, but when the city is giving out refunds, a just man gets nothing, while an unjust one makes a large profit. Finally, when each of them holds a rulinge position in some public office, a just person, even if he isn’t penalized in other ways, finds that his private affairs deteriorate because he has to neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse because of his justice, and that he’s hated by his relatives and acquaintances when he’s unwilling to do them an unjust favor. The opposite is true of an unjust man in every respect. Therefore, I repeat what I said before: A person of great power outdoes everyone else. Consider him if you want to figure344 out how much more advantageous it is for the individual to be just rather than unjust. You’ll understand this most easily if you turn your thoughts to the most complete injustice, the one that makes the doer of injustice happiest and the sufferers of it, who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched. This is tyranny, which through stealth or force appropriates the property of others, whether sacred or profane, public or private, not little by little, but all at once. If someone commits only one part of injustice and is caught, he’s punished and greatly reproached—such partly unjust peopleb are called temple-robbers,11 kidnappers, housebreakers, robbers, and thieves when they commit these crimes. But when someone, in addition to appropriating their possessions, kidnaps and enslaves the citizens as well, instead of these shameful names he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens themselves, but by all who learn that he has done thec whole of injustice. Those who reproach injustice do so because they are afraid not of doing it but of suffering it. So, Socrates, injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. And, as I said from the first, justice is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage.
Having emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once liked a bath attendant, Thrasymachus intended to leave. But those present didn’t let him and made him stay to give an account of what he had said. I too begged him to stay, and I said to him: After hurling such a speech at us, Thrasymachus, do you intend to leave before adequately instructing us or finding out whether you are right or not? Or do you think it a smalle
11. The temples acted as public treasuries, so that a temple robber is much like a present- day bank robber.
1000 Glaucon/Socrates
They say that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad, but that the badness of suffering it so far exceeds the goodness of doing it that those who have done and suffered injustice and tasted both, but who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it, decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice359 nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice. It is intermediate between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is a mean between these two extremes. People value it not as a good but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has the power tob do this, however, and is a true man wouldn’t make an agreement with anyone not to do injustice in order not to suffer it. For him that would be madness. This is the nature of justice, according to the argument, Socrates, and these are its natural origins.
We can see most clearly that those who practice justice do it unwillingly and because they lack the power to do injustice, if in our thoughts wec grant to a just and an unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then follow both of them and see where their desires would lead. And we’ll catch the just person red-handed travelling the same road as the unjust. The reason for this is the desire to outdo others and get more and more. This is what anyone’s nature naturally pursues as good, but nature is forced by law into the perversion of treating fairness with respect.
The freedom I mentioned would be most easily realized if both people had the power they say the ancestor of Gyges of Lydia possessed. The story goes that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler of Lydia.d There was a violent thunderstorm, and an earthquake broke open the ground and created a chasm at the place where he was tending his sheep. Seeing this, he was filled with amazement and went down into it. And there, in addition to many other wonders of which we’re told, he saw a hollow bronze horse. There were windowlike openings in it, and, peeping in, he saw a corpse, which seemed to be of more than human size, wearing nothing but a gold ring on its finger. He took the ring and came out ofe the chasm. He wore the ring at the usual monthly meeting that reported to the king on the state of the flocks. And as he was sitting among the others, he happened to turn the setting of the ring towards himself to the inside of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to those sitting near him, and they went on talking as if he had gone. He wondered at360 this, and, fingering the ring, he turned the setting outwards again and became visible. So he experimented with the ring to test whether it indeed had this power—and it did. If he turned the setting inward, he became invisible; if he turned it outward, he became visible again. When he realized this, he at once arranged to become one of the messengers sent to report to the king. And when he arrived there, he seduced the king’s wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him, and took over the kingdom.b
Republic II 1001
Let’s suppose, then, that there were two such rings, one worn by a just and the other by an unjust person. Now, no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice or stay away from other people’s property, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go into people’s houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he wished, and do c all the other things that would make him like a god among humans. Rather his actions would be in no way different from those of an unjust person, and both would follow the same path. This, some would say, is a great proof that one is never just willingly but only when compelled to be. No one believes justice to be a good when it is kept private, since, wherever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it. Indeed, every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than justice. And any exponent of this argument will say he’s right, for someone d who didn’t want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who didn’t touch other people’s property would be thought wretched and stupid by everyone aware of the situation, though, of course, they’d praise him in public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice. So much for my second topic.
As for the choice between the lives we’re discussing, we’ll be able to make a correct judgment about that only if we separate the most just and e the most unjust. Otherwise we won’t be able to do it. Here’s the separation I have in mind. We’ll subtract nothing from the injustice of an unjust person and nothing from the justice of a just one, but we’ll take each to be complete in his own way of life. First, therefore, we must suppose that an unjust person will act as clever craftsmen do: A first-rate captain or doctor, for example, knows the difference between what his craft can and 361 can’t do. He attempts the first but lets the second go by, and if he happens to slip, he can put things right. In the same way, an unjust person’s successful attempts at injustice must remain undetected, if he is to be fully unjust. Anyone who is caught should be thought inept, for the extreme of injustice is to be believed to be just without being just. And our com- pletely unjust person must be given complete injustice; nothing may be subtracted from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, he has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice. If he happens to make a slip, he must be able to put it right. If any of his b unjust activities should be discovered, he must be able to speak persua- sively or to use force. And if force is needed, he must have the help of courage and strength and of the substantial wealth and friends with which he has provided himself.
Having hypothesized such a person, let’s now in our argument put beside him a just man, who is simple and noble and who, as Aeschylus says, doesn’t want to be believed to be good but to be so.1 We must take
1. In Seven Against Thebes, 592–94, it is said of Amphiaraus that “he did not wish to be believed to be the best but to be it.” The passage continues with the words Glaucon quotes below at 362a–b.
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Contents
- Introduction
- I. The 'Canon' of Thrasyllus
- II. Chronological vs. Thematic Groupings of the Platonic Dialogues
- III. Plato and the Dialogue Form
- IV. Reading Plato
- V. The Translations
- Editorial Notes
- Acknowledgments
- Euthyphro
- Apology
- Crito
- Phaedo
- Cratylus
- Theaetetus
- Sophist
- Statesman
- Parmenides
- Philebus
- Symposium
- Phaedrus
- Alcibiades
- Second Alcibiades
- Hipparchus
- Rival Lovers
- Theages
- Charmides
- Laches
- Lysis
- Euthydemus
- Protagoras
- Gorgias
- Meno
- Greater Hippias
- Lesser Hippias
- Ion
- Menexenus
- Clitophon
- Republic
- Book I
- Book II
- Book III
- Book IV
- Book V
- Book VI
- Book VII
- Book VIII
- Book IX
- Book X
- Timaeus
- Critias
- Minos
- Laws
- Book I
- Book II
- Book III
- Book IV
- Book V
- Book VI
- Book VII
- Book VIII
- Book IX
- Book X
- Book XI
- Book XII
- Epinomis
- Letters
- I
- II
- III
- IV
- V
- VI
- VII
- VIII
- IX
- X
- XI
- XII
- XIII
- Definitions
- On Justice
- On Virtue
- Demodocus
- I
- II
- III
- IV
- Sisyphus
- Halcyon
- Eryxias
- Axiochus
- Epigrams
- Abbreviations of Titles
- Index