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CHAPTER 13 The Categorical Imperative

Immanuel Kant

H · 'd d ari·ous challenges to morality, we turn next to

av mg co ns1 ere v . . som e of th e most important moral theories, competmg explanations of why ce rtain actions are right and others are wrong. One of the mo~t in fluential of all ethical systems is that developed by the German phi- losoph er Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a dominant figure in the history of modern philosophy. Because his views are not easy to grasp, I shall offer a brief overview of them.

Kant argues that the moral worth of an action is to be judged not by its consequences but by the nature of the maxim or principle that moti- va ted the action. Thus right actions are not necessarily those with favor- able consequences but those performed in accordance with correct max ims. But which maxims are correct? According to Kant, the only correc t ones are those that can serve as universal laws because they are applicable without exception to every person at any time. In other wo rd s, you should act only on a maxim that can be universalized with- out contradiction. i To see ~ ha~ Ka nt has in mind , consider a specific example he uses to llustra te his view. Suppose you need to borrow money but it will be lent

t~ you only if you promise to pay it back. You realize, however, that you will not be able to honor the debt. Is it permissible for you to promise to repay the money k · · . , nowmg you will not keep the promise? Ka nt a rgues that domg so is n t · 'bl l . 0 perm1ss1 e b ecause if it we re a u n ive rsal law t 1at promises could be d · h · • h . ma e wit no mte nt10n of keeping th em then t e practi ce of prom ising wou ld be d estroye d. ,

Ka nt refers to h' · I . . ,, is supreme moral p rinci p le as the "categonca 1mpe rat1ve - cat · 1 . , . t'

1 . egonca because 1t does not depend on anyone s pa1 •

1cu ar des ires and · . K . 1

. ' an imperative bec ause it is a command of reason. ant a so claims th t th · · · d · a e categoncal 1111perat ive ca n be reformu late as

CHAPTER 13 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIV E 103

follows: So act that you treat hum · · h arnty, whether · in any ot er person , always at the sam . m your own person or

V . h. e t1 me as an e d

a means. smg t rs version , Kant argues that d , never ~erely as moral because a person making such a pr . . ece~ tful promise is im-. om1se is using . ·h onl)' as a means , not treatmg that individual anot er person as an e nd a . worthy of respect. ' rational being

It is impossible to imagine anything at all in the world ore b . . . , ven eyond

it, that can be ~a1_1ed good without quahfication-except a good will. Intelligence, wit, Judgement, and the other mental talents, whatever we may call them, or courage, decisiveness, and perseverance, are, as qualities of temperament, certainly good and desirable in many re- spects; but they can also be extremely bad and harmful when the will which makes use of these gifts of nature and whose specific quality we refer to as character, is not good. It is exactly the same with gi,fts of fortune. Power, wealth, honour, even health and that total well-being an d contentment with one's condition which we call "happiness," can make a person bold but consequently often reckless as well, unless a good will is present to correct their influence on the mind, thus ad- justing the whole principle of one's action to render it conformable to universal ends. It goes without saying that the sight of a creature en- joying uninterrupted prosperity, but never feeling the slightest pull of a pure and good will, cannot excite approval in a rational and im- partial spectator. Consequently, a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of our worthiness to be happy.

Some qualities, even though they are helpful to this good will and can make its task very much easier, nevertheless have no intrin- sic unconditional worth. Rather, they presuppose a good will which puts limits on the esteem in which they are rightly held and forbids us t~ regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and sober reflection are not only good in many respects: they may even seem to constitute part of the inner

erson. 1et t ey are far from being properly described as worth of a p ,, h goo d without 1 · fi . P

• d qua i cat10n (however unconditionally they were nze by th . . those . _e ancients). For without the principles of a good will

qualities may b . . posure f . . ecome exceedingly bad; the passionless com- . o a v1l1am mak h' di rec tly m es Im not merely more dangerous but also

ore detestabl · to be wi th . e in our eyes than we would have taken him A out 1t.

anct good will is not good b . not becaus f. ecause of its effects or accomplishments e o Its adequac t h ' ' Y o ac 1eve any proposed end: it is good

10 4 PART II TH E OR JES MORAL

1 t • s it is good in itself. Considered i . ·mng-t 1a 1 , . . n 1 by virtue of its wt . mparably higher than anything it on y ured as mco . . 1· .

·tself it is to be treas l . order to satisfy some inc ination or i . bout mere y m . . ' could ever bnng a f 11 . linations. Even if it were to happen . h total o a me h · if you hke , t e sum . 1 ly unfortunate face or t e miserly be. f me parucu ar that, because O so this will were completely powerless to

f -motherly nature, . . . quest o a step . . h 'ts utmost effort it still accomplished ut its aims· if wit even i carry_ o ' 1 d will itself remained (not, of course, as a nothmg so that on Y goo . )

•' h b t as the summoning of every means in our power , even mere w1s , u . . · h h · then it would still, like a jewel, glisten in its own ng t, as somet mg that has its full worth in itself ....

We must thus develop the concept of a will estimable in itself and CTood apart from any further aim. This concept is already present in ;he natural, healthy mind, which requires not so much instruction as merely clarification. It is this concept that always holds the highest place in estimating the total worth of our actions and it constitutes the condition of all the rest. Let us then take up the concept of duty, which includes that of a good will, the latter however being here under certain subjective limitations and obstacles. These so far from hidin~ a g~od will or disguising it, rather bring it out by ~ontrast and make It shme forth more brightly ....

It is a duty to help others where one can an . . soul s a re so compassionately disposed th 't besides this many motive of vanity or self-interest th fi , without any further ing j oy around them taking de'1· ehy. nd an mner pleasure in spread-

, 1g t m the fa r as _th ey have brought it about. Yet I ma· co~tentment of others, so a n d kind an ac tion of this son ma be . l~tam that, however dutiful wo rt h. It is on a level with other in~· '_u still has no genuinely moral tion to p urs ue honour whI"ch ·re inations-for example the . 1·

' 1 1.ortunat , inc 1na- genera ll y use fu l and consistent with e enough to aim at somethin ~ono ura ble, d ese rves pra ise a nd duty, something con g ns ~ax irn la cks th e mo ral m . e~,couragement but n sequently nation but o ut of rlu Ly S . . c ru of such actions d ot esteem. For • · · upp ose ti one not · 1an were u ve rcl 0 ud ed b . 1 e n th at the rn. d . out of 1ncli- . . . Y sorrows f h' in of this h . c o mpas s; ron lc, r t h e fat e f · 0 . 1s own wh. h . umannar-

a .')-;i:-,t others in d istrcs5 · Qlo ot hers, but tha t he t~cll e xtinguished all _ • • • , ., 1Ppose th s 1 had h '>tirn:rJ t11rn, bcca us<.: h• · · . o ugh th a t th • t e power to . i s prc occ . e 1r adv . me that, thow.r h n u l o n o ,. . up1 e ct With h". ers1ty no longe

,- . . . o ,-,c 1 n1ovcct 1 , . . is own • r kaVi bun '>clf ou t o f th is <J ,. 1·1 )y any l11 cl1·n . 'and now imag . . . · c.:tc y a p at1o n h - au}· me hnalJ (J rJ , s; q lc:: ly (J ut 0 1· I at iy <lnd do - , h, e nevertheless 1 · . . < 11ty T l es t e . J~ -~ H'.> ~(:t1 u 1ne Htr n-a l w o n h 1 .' : le n f o r th e "' ~Ction Without

. r Urt her . •1 rs t t1 n-. h" - m o r e if .. , e Is acti o n ' nat ure h d - a p u t lit t le

C H AP T E R 13 T HE CAT EG ORI C AL I M P E RATI VE 105

sympathy into this or that person's heart; if h e, th ou gh an honest man , were cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others-perhaps because he has the special gifts of patience and fo r- titude in his own sufferings and he assumes or even demands the same of others; if such a man (who would in truth not be the worst product of nature) were not exactly fashioned by nature to be a hu- manitarian , would he not still find in himself a source from which he might give himself a worth far higher than that of a good-natured temperament? Assuredly he would. It is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show-a moral worth, and incompara- bly the highest-namely, that he does good, not out of inclination, but out of duty ....

The moral worth of an action done out of duty has its moral worth , not in the objective to be reached by that action, but in the maxim in accordance with which the action is decided upon; it de- pends, therefore, not on actualizing the object of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which the action was done , without any regard for objects of the faculty of desire. It is clear from our previous discussion that the objectives we may have in acting, and also our actions ' effects considered as ends and as what motivates our volition , can give to actions no unconditional or moral worth. Where then can this worth be found if not in the willing of the action's hoped for effect? It can be found nowhere but in the prin- ciple of the will, irrespective of the ends that can be brought about by such action ....

Duty is the necessity of an act done out of respect for the law. While I can certainly have an inclination for an object that results from my pro- posed action, I can never respect it, precisely because it is no thing but an effect of a will and not its activity. Similarly I cannot respect any inclination whatsoever, whether it be my own inclination or that of another. At most I can approve of that towards which I feel an inclina- t~on , and occasionally I can like the object of somebody else's inclina- tion myself- that is , see it as conducive to my own advantage. But the only th ing that could be an obj ect of respect (and thus a command- ment) for me is something that is coajoi ned with my will pu rely as a gro~nd_ an~ never as a consequence, some th ing that does not serve :y mcl_1~at1on b~t overpowers it or at least excludes it entirely from

Y de~ision-makmg- consequently, nothing but the law itself. Now if an actio~ d~ne out of duty is supposed to exclude totally the influ- e_nce of mclmation, and, along with inclination , every obiect of vol i- tion the h ' . :J ' n not mg remams that could determ ine the will except

106 PA R'l' Tl MOR AL THE ORI ES

. d su bj' e ctively jJure respect for t h is practical 1 • · 1 the law a

11 · . . aw oq1 er t ,ve Y . f-' ·e i's th e m axi m, to obey th is sor t oflaw even h · , , , left there 0 1 · . . W e Wh,lt is . . ·- d1' cial to all my inchnat1ons. n i .. g so is pt e1u . . c

0 111 ·h . 'or al worth of a n action depends n either on the r Thus t e m . . . esu1t l ·t· m th at action nor on any pnnople of action that h expec tec ro . .

1 as to

' t inotive from this expected resu t. For all these re 1

bo rrow 1 s . . su ts (such as one's own ple asurable condition or even the promotion of the h appiness of others) could h_ave been_ brought ~bout by Other causes as well. It would not ~eqmre the. will of a rat~onal being to produ ce th em, but it is only m such a will tha~ the highest and un. co nditional good can be found. That pre-eminent good which w ca ll "moral" consists therefore in nothing but the idea of the law i~ itself, which certainly is present only in a rational being-so far as that idea, a nd not an expected result, is the determining ground of the will. And this pre-eminent good is already present in the person who ac ts in accordance with this idea; we need not await the result of the ac tion in order to find it . . ..

Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a ratio- n al being has the power to act in accordance with the idea of laws- that is , in accordance with principles-and thus has a will. ...

The idea of an objective principle, in so far as it constrains a will, is called a commandment (of reason) , and the formulation of this commandment is called an Imperative ... .

All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wa nts (or that one may want). A categorical imperative would be one that represented an action as itself objectively necessary, without regard to any further end.

Since every practical law presents a possible action as good aJ1cl the refor e as necessary for a subject whose actions are determi ned by

11 · · ·ni ng an re ason , a imperatives are therefore formulae for determi • . . ·11 ·n some actio n which 1s necessary according to the principle of a wi 1 .

eth1ng way good . If the action would b e good o nly as a mean s to som ood else, the imperative is hypothe tical; if the action is t h ought of asl ·rn> in itself an d the refore as necessary for a will which of its_elf con °1 to reason as its principle th en the impe r ative is categorical. · ·

1 · ·n ;i!l

T h · ' actua 1 e re ts, howeve r, one e nd th at we may p resuppose as . pen 1 •

- · l b · · · horn on , 1 at iona emgs (so fa r as they are d e penden t beings tow . ·/ th,11t , . I ,1110 I • tives apply); and th us there is one aim which they not on Y bdn Ji;111

but wh ich we can assume with certainty that they all

C l-I A PT~: R I 3 T l-I E C:ATEGOR I CA L I MPERAT I VE 107

h, a nccf·ss it y of nature and th at aim is per.feel hapjJiness. The hypo- t hct.ical impera tive which affirms the practical necessity of an action :is a means to the promotion of perfect happiness is an assertoric imperative. We must not characterize it as necessary merely for some un certa in , merely possible purpose, but as necessary for a purpose Lhat we can presuppose a priori and with certainty to be present in everyone because it belongs to the essence of human beings. Now we can call skill in the choice of the means to one's own greatest well- being "prudence" in the narrowest sense of the word. So the impera- tive concerning the choice of means to one's own happiness-that is, the precept of prudence-still remains hypothetical; the action is commanded not absolutely but only as a means to a further end.

Finally, there is one imperative which commands a certain line of conduct directly, without assuming or being conditional on any fur- ther goal to be reached by that conduct. This imperative is categori- ca l. It is concerned not with the material of the action and its anticipated result, but with its form and with the principle from which the action itself results. And what is essentially good in the ac tion consists in the [agent's] disposition, whatever the result may be. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality ....

The question now arises "How are all these imperatives possible?" This question does not ask how an action commanded by the impera- tive can be performed, but merely how we can understand the con- straining of the will, which imperatives express in setting us a task. How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Whoever wills the end also wills (so far as reason has decisive influ- ence on his actions) the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power ....

By contrast, "How is the imperative of morality possibl e?" is b eyond all doubt the one question in need of solution. For the mor al impera tive is in no way h ypothetical , and co nsequ en tly the objecti ve necessity, which it affirms, cannot be supported by any presup posit ion, as was the case with hypothetical imperatives. But we mus t never forget that it is impossible to settle by an y exam- p le , i.e ., emp irically, whether there is any imp erat ive of thi s kind at all; we shou ld rath er worry that all imperatives that seem to be ca tegorica l may yet be h ypothetical in some hidden way. For ~x am pl e, when it is said, "You must abstain from making deceit- ful prom ises," one assumes that the necessity for this abstention is not rncre ad ,·i ce so as to avoid some further ev il - a s t h o ugh the rnca11ing of wh at wa s said wa s, You ou ght n ot to ma ke a deceit fu l

= 4¥ £

108

L -r B EO Rl 'E S MORA

. to light, you destroy you r credit 0 hen it comes ld h b . . n ornise 1est, w . . f this kind wou ave to e conside red

pr . acuon o h.b . . . as the contrar y, an . rative of the pro 1 1t1on would be the bad in itself, and the unpeno example can show with certainty thre.

· cal Even so, at fore categon · d t rn1ined here solely by the law without a . ll would be e e b c . . ny the w1 . . lthough it rnay appear to e so; 1or 1t 1s alwa

f - ther rnouvauon, a 1 h "dd d ys ur · c f disgrace perhaps a so 1 en read of oth ossible that iear o ' . W er P_ · nsciously influence the will. ho can prove by ex-

nsks, rnay unco . . h non-existence of a cause? For expenence shows only penence t e h that we do not perceive it. In such a case, owever, t~e so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to be categ~n~al and un- conditional , would in fact be only a pragmatic prescnpt10n calling attention to our own advantage and merely instructing us to take

If! think of a hypothetical imperative as such, I do not know before-this into account. ...

hand what it will contain-not until I am given its condition. But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know right away what it contains. For since this imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity that the maxim conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition limiting it, there is nothing left over to which the maxim of action should conform except the universality of a law as such ; and it is only this conformity that the imperative asserts to be

necessary. There is therefore only one categorical imperative and it is this:

'.'Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." ...

We shall now enumerate some duties .... 1 · A man feels sick of life as the result of a mounting series of mis·

for tunes that has reduced him to hopelessness, but he still possesses enough of his reason to ask himself whether it would not be contrarJ to h,_s duty to himself to take his own life. Now he tests whe

th er

th '

maxim of his a t' ld f nature, H' . c ion cou really become a universal Jaw 0

~s maxim, however, is: "I make it my principle out of self-loV'. to s do rte n my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it prorlli sesf a va ntage " Th . • iple o self

1 · e only further question is whether this pnnc ce

- ove can be . at oJl that come a umversal law of nature. But one sees ,o· a nature whose 1 ant to P mote n h aw was that the very same feeling me . If ,od

hence I e sldould actually destroy life would contradict itse 1d not wou not end £ re coll possibly be a ure as nature. The maxim there o di(ts tb'

supre . general law of nature and thus it wholly contra me pn nc1ple of all duty.

.i.

CHAPTE R 13 TH.E CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 109

2. A nother fin ds h imself d riven by n eed to borrow H 11 . . •n money. e knows very we. that h e will n ot be able to pay it back, but he sees too

that n o body will lend him anything unless h e firmly promises to pa it bac k within a fi xed ~ime. H e wants to make su ch a p romise, but h: still has e nough conscience to ask himself: "Isn't it impermissible and con trary to duty to get out of one's d iffi culties th is way?" Suppose, however, that he did decide to d o it. The maxim of his ac tion would run thus: "When I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, even though I know that t h is will never be done ." Now this principle of self-love or personal advantage is per- haps quite compatible with my own entire future welfare; on ly there remains the question "Is it right?" I therefore transform the unfa ir demand of self-love into a universal law and frame my question thus: "How would things stand if my maxim became a universal law?" I then see immediately that this maxim can never qualify as a self- consistent universal law of nature, but must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that permits anyone who believes himself to be in need to m a ke any promise he pleases with the inten- tion of not keeping it would m a ke promising, and the very purpose one has in promising, itself impossible . For no one would believe he was being promised anyth ing, but would laugh at any such utterance as hollow pretence.

3. A third finds in himself a tale nt that, with a certain amount of cultivation , could make him a useful man for all sorts of purposes. But he sees himself in comfortable circumstances, and he prefers to give himself up to pleasure rather than to bother about increasing and improving his fortunate natural aptitudes. Yet he asks himself fur ther "Does my maxim of neglecting my natural gifts, besides agreeing with my taste for amusement, agree also with what is called duty?" He then sees that a nature could indeed endure under such a univ~rsal law, even if (like the South Sea Islanders) every man sh o uld ~e t his ta lents r ust and should be bent on devoting h is life solely to id leness, amusement, procreation-in a word , to enjoymen t. Only h e cannot poss 'bl 'll h h' · 1 Y wz t a t t 1s should becom e a u nive rsa l law of n atu re or shou ld b · I · e imp an ted in us as such a law by a natu ral in stinct. For ~s a rl ational bei ng he necessarily wills that all h is p owers should be

eve oped sine th f all s . ' ey are a ter all useful to hi m a n d g ive n to him for . orts of possible pur poses. 4- A fo urth man h · h ' have t . : w O is imself flourishing but sees others who

o struggle with h . help) th· k . . great ardsh1ps (and whom he could easily

in s to himself- "Wh d · at o I care? Let every one be as happy as

110 PA RT 11 MO R AL T H E ORIES

d s h e can make himself; I won't deprive h' in te n s o r a , c • 1lll of Heave_n . 't even envy him; but I don t 1eel hke contrib .

thing I wo n 1 . h' . h' Ut1ng any . ' l . well-being or to he ping im in IS distress!" ~r nythm g to 11s . . !~ow a . dl . f such an attitude were a unIVersal law of natur ad m1 tte Y 1 1 ll d d e, the Could survive perfect y we an oubtless even b hum a n r ace etter h h e n everybody chatters about sympathy and good will t a n w . , and

makes an effort now and then, to practise them but wh eve n ' . ' , en one can get away with it, swindles, traf~~s 1n h~man rights, or via. \ates them in other ways. But although 1t 1s possible that a universal law of nature in accord with this maxim could exist, it is impossible to will that such a principle should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will that intended this would be in conflict with itself

' since many situations might arise in which the man needs love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature gener- ated by his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants.

These are some of the many actual duties-or at least of what we take to be actual-whose derivation from the single principle cited above is perspicuous. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become a universal law-this is the authoritative model for moral judging of action generally. Some actions are so constituted that we cannot even conceive without contradiction that their maxim be a universal law of nature, let alone that we could will that it ought to become one. In the case of other actions, we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim shou~d be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself. . . . d

If we now look at ourselves whenever we transgress a duty, we fin. h . b me a uni· t at we 1n fact do not intend that our maxim should eco . nd is

vers al law. For this is impossible for us. What we really inte take rather that its opposite should remain a law generally; we only

1 rse

h . r (of cot t e liberty of making an exception to it, for ourselves O ·gbed . . 1 ' fwe we1 Just this once) to satisfy our inclination. Consequent Y 1

1 - we

. l f reasoI it a 1 u p fro m one and the same perspective-that O . · 0 that sh ld fi tradict!O v ou nd a co ntradiction in our own will, the co n . rsal la' · · · a u n ive . f a certain p rinciple should be objectively necessary as ld ad roit 0

a nd yet subje ctively should not hold universa lly but shoU . if exce ptions. . . . in itse

S h e existence be a uppose, however, there were som e thin g w os . lf, cotild h d b d in itse , a an a solute worth , something th a t, a s a n en

CH . .\PTE R 13 THE CAT EG ORI CA L l l\1 P E R AT J\·E 111

("rnu nd of defini te laws. Then in it and i · J ~- • . . 11 It a one, would the o 01 a possible categorical imperati ve that is f . o round

_ _ _ . ' . , 0 a practic a l law, reside :-,,;o,\, I sa,, a huma n b ei ng and 111 general · · . , . . ' ever y rational b e in

does exzst as an e n d 1n h ims e lf, n ot merely as a means t b d ?' . . . . 0 e use by th 1s or tha t w-dl as 1t p leases. In a ll his act10ns whether the d " ' yare 1rec~d co hims elf or to other rational beings a human bei·ng t 1 . _ . ' . mus a ways be ,·1 e,, ed at the same tz me as an end. . . . Beings whose existence de- pends not on our wi ll b ut on nature still have only a relative value as mean s a nd are therefore called things, if they lack reason. Rational beings, on the o t he r hand, are called persons because, their nature alre ady marks t h e m o ut as ends in themselves-that is, as some- thin g which ought n ot to be used merely as a means-and conse- quently im poses restrictions on all choice making (and is an object of resp ect) . Persons , therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose ex istence as a n e ffect of our actions has a value for us. They are objec- tive ends- tha t is, things whose existence is in itself an end , and ind eed an e n d suc h that no other end can be substituted for it, no en d to wh ic h t h e y should serve merely as a means . For if this were not so, there wou ld b e nothing at all having absolute value anywhere. But if all ,·alue were co nditional, and thus contingent, then no supreme principle cou ld b e found for reason at all.

If th en the r e is to be a supreme practical principle and a categori- cal imperative for the human will, it must be such that it forms an objective pri nciple o f t he will from the idea of something which is neces sarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, a principle th at can t herefore serve as a universal practical law. The ground of th is principle is: R ational nature exists as an end in itself This is the way in whi ch a human b e ing necessarily conceives his own existence, and it is therefore a subjective principle of human actions . But it is also the way in wh ich every other rational being conceives his existence, on the same ration al ground which holds also for me; hence it is at the '-'~me time an objective p rinciple from which, since it is a supreme prac- ucal ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical impe ra t ive wi l1 t h erefore be the following: Act in such a way 'hat )OU treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other p erson, r.tlv•a)'S at t!, · · · · te same tzme as an end, never merely as a m eans. We will now see · i·he th er this can be carried out in pra c ti ce .

us keep to our previous exam ples .

1 . , hnt: ···the man wh o contemplates suicide will a sk hims e lf whether

· '' :J<::flr;n 'JJuld be compatible with the Idea of h umanity as an end

11 2 PAR T II MORAL THE ORI ES

-. -, .. If If h e damages himself in order to escape from a p . m 1we . . a1nfttl . at ion, he is makmg u se of a person merely as a means to Ill . ~Itu, · - · ·11 h d f h' 1·c B ainta1n tolerable state of affa irs t1 t e en o 1s he. ut a huma b . a

h . b d n eino- . not a th ing-~ot so_met 1ng to e use merely a~ a means: he t> is a lways in all his actions be regarded as an end 1n himself TJ Illttst

f h b . . . qence I can not dispose o a uman e1ng 1n my own person, by .. corrupting , or killing him. (I must here forego a more prec~aidllting,

. . . . ise efin· tion of this prmc1ple that would forestall any m1sunderstanct· 1- . . ing-ro example , as to having hmbs amputated to save myself or expo . r

· d . sing Illy life to danger 1n or er to preserve 1t, and so on-this discus • . s1on be-longs to ethICs proper.)

Secondly, ... the man who has in mind making a false promi l · 11 h h . . d" se to ot 1ers w1 see at once t at e 1s 1nte_n 1ng to make use of another

person merely as a means to an end which that person does not sh are. For t~e person who°:1 I seek to u_se for my own purposes by such a

promise cannot possibly agree with my way of treating him, and so cannot himself share the end of the action. This incompatibility with the principle of duty to others can be seen more distinctly when we bring in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is manifest that a violator of the rights of human beings intends to use the person of others merely as a means without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they must always at the same time be valued as ends-that is, treated only as b e ings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very sa me action.

Thirdly, ... it is not enough that an action not conflict with h~man- ity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection th;t f. £ h . . wn person. io orm part of nature's purpose or umanity in our o

· lofhuman· neglect these can perhaps be compatible with the surviva it y as a n end in itself, but not with the promotion of that eTI<l.k . their

b · o-s see ' 15 . Fourthly, ... the natural end that all human em1? d d exist if ight m ee own perfect happiness. Now the human race m _ but at the

h • s of othe1 s . everybody contributed nothing to the appines . h ' harrnon 1 z·

. · · 1t T IS same time refrained from deliberately 1mpairmg · b erely neg;i- . · h h · d · · lf Id however, e m s ht' 1ng w it uman1ty as an en in ztse wou , _ as far a ._ . l endeavou1 s, ho i~ t 1ve and not positive , unless everyone a so person w ,

h F th ends of any . e. t,L can, to further the ends o f ot ers. or e . _ f 11

effect 1n 111 an end i n himself must, if this idea is to have its u also, as far as p ossible, my ends.