philosophy

The Social Contract Thomas Hobbes

CHAPTER 0

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English philosopher who played a crucial role in the history of social thought. He develops a moral and political theory that views justice and other ethi_cal ideals as resting on an implied agreement among individuals to relmqmsh the nght to do whatever they please, thus achieving security for all.

Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery

Nature hath made men so equal , in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stron- ger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reck- oned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the stron- gest: either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger as himself.

A nd

as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the ans grounded upodn wo

rd s, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general an tnfal11ble rules c 11 d · . '

few th· . . ' a e science; which very few have, and but in ings, as being not a nat' v f 1 b (as prudence) wh·1 1 k I e acu ty, orn with us; nor attained ,

' 1

e we oo after som 1 ) 1 equality amongst m h eone e se, find ye t a grea te r en, t an that of st h F experience· which 1 . rengt . or prudence, is but

, equa hme, equally bestows on all men , in ;h ose Fro 111 T ho1nas Hob] . .

L _ )es . Lev ia th an ( 165 } ) . 154

C H A PT E R 20 TH E SO C IAL C ONTRACT 155

thin gs th ey equ a ll y a pply th e mselves unto. That which l . · d · bl · may perhaps

a ke such equa 1ty m ere I e, 1s but a vain conceit f , tU . . . o ones own

·sdom whtch almost all men thmk they have in a gre t d w1 , . a er egree I all

th e vulgar; th a t 1s , than a11 men but themselves and c h ' t 1 . . , a 1ew ot ers

1 . 10

m by fam e, or for concurrmg with themselves they ap F ' w , prove. or such is the n ature of me_n , that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned· t

1 . h b · ' ye

th ey will hardly be ieve t ere e many so wise as themselves: For the see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But thi: prove th rather ~hat _men are in t~at point equal, than unequal. For th ere is not ordmanly a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

from this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attain- ing of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, (which is principally their own conserva- tion, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and de- prive him , not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their d~fe_nce, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of do- minion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

_Again, men have no pleasure , (but on the contrary a great deal of gnef) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe t~em all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him , at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all sig ns of con- tempt o d . ' r un ervalumg, naturally endeavours , as far as he d a res

w

156 pART II

MORAL THEORIES

that have no common power to kee

(w hich amongst thhem make them destroy each other) tp thelr\ i

oug to , o ex quiet, is far en his contemners, by damage; and frorn Oth toq a

ter value from ers h grea . . ' y the example. of man, we find three pnncipal

. the nature . d . cause So that in ·t·on· secondly, d1ffi ence; th1rdly, glor s of

F. t compeU I ' • h y. quarrel. irs ' h n 1· nvade for gain; t e second, for sac maket ma . i.ety· The first, . n The first use violence, to make the 'and

. d for reputauo . . h'ld lllselv the th1r , 's persons wives, c 1 ren, and cattl es

f other men ' . e; th masters O c d them. the third for tnfles, as a word, a srnile . e

d to de1en , . , a d1f seco. n , . . d any other sign of undervalue, either dire . - r nt opm10n, an . k. d d h . . ct in 1ere by reflection in their 1n re , t e1r fnends th . their persons, or . , e,r

. their profession, or their name. nauon, d · h t' 1· ·

b 't •s manifest that unng t e 1me men 1ve without Here y 1 1 ' . . a

common power to keep them all 1n a':e, they are 1n that ~ondition which is called war; and such a war, as 1s of every man, agamst every man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal In such con<liti~n, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertam: and conse 1 . . quent y no culture of the earth· no navigation, nor use of the commod · t · h ' dious buildin . . 1 ies t at may be imported by sea; no commo-

g, no mstruments f . . as require much fi O moving, and removing such things

orce; no k 1 d account of time· no now e ge of the face of the earth; no I ' arts; no lett • · f a l, continual fear and d ers, no society; and which is worst o r ' anger of . I so itary, poor, nasty, brutish vio ent death; and the life of man, h

_It may seem strange to so'mand short. t mgs· th e man th h . ' at nature should h . ' at as not well weighed these mvade a d d t us disso . . '. n estroy one an th ciate, and render men apt to to this In£ o er: and h . sam erence, made from th . e may therefore not trusung

e confirm d b e passion d . ' h e Y experience L _s, esire perhaps to have t e · et him h · h t erefore consider wit

C HAPT E R 20 THE SOC IAL CONT RA CT 157

him self, when _taking a jo~rney, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be Jaws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all: and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a pos- tur~ of war. But because they uphold thereby; the industry of their s~bJects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompa- nies the liberty of particular men.

To this war of every man against every man, this also is conse- ~ue~t; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, JUStice and iajustice have there no place. Where there is no common ~ow:r, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, t~e t war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of b

e_ aculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might em am h pas . an t at were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and

sions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in

158 P A R T 11 MORAL T H EO RI ES

so litude. It is co n s~ q~ e nt a lso ~o th e sa~e c~n~iti~n, that there be 11 pro pri e ty, no d o m 1 n ion , no mine a nd thine d1stmct, but only that to b a every man 's, that h e can get; a nd for so long, as he can keep it. A e t hus muc h for th e ill co ndition which many by mere nature is actu 11d

·b·1· t f 't · · ally place d in ; t houg h with _a p~ss1 1 1ty to come ou o 1 , consisting Part! i n t h e passions, partly m his reason. Y

T h e p ass ions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; de . d

. 1. . sire of such t hin gs as are necessary to com mo 10us 1v1ng; and a hope b the ir industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenien~ a r t icl es of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement T h ese articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature : whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two follow. ing c h a pters.

Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments: which impedi- ments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.

A LAW OF NATURE, (lex naturalis,) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as o bliga tion, and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsiste nt.

And because the condition of man, (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in

CI; A Pl'ER. ~O

. . . Tl-It soc1AL CONTaACT -

Preserving his hfe against h. . 159 . . is enern1es .

condition, every man has a right t ' It followeth th . A d h c o every th· , at in s h body. n t ere1ore, as long as th. Ing: even to o uc a

every thing endureth, there can bis natural right of e:e another's . e no secu . ry rnan to strong or wise soever he be,) of livin _nty to any rna (h

. 11 h . . g out the tun h' n, ow nanly a owet men to hve. And conseq 1

. . e, w •ch nature d' h uent y it Is a or 1-rule of reason, t at every man, ought toe d precept, or gener

1 b . . . n eavour pea a hope of o taznzng zt; and when he cannot obt . . ce, as Jar as he has azn zt, that he all helps, and advantages of war. The first b h may seek, and use

ranc of wh· h ' taineth the first, and fundamental law of nat . h" ~c rule, con- . Th ure, w tch Is to kp and follow zt. . e second, the sum of the right f ' see eace,

all means we can, to defend ourselves. 0 nature; which is, by From this fundamental law of nature by which men a

. . . ' re commanded to endeavor peace, 1s derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as Jarf orth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel, whatsoever you require that others should do for you, that do ye to them. . . .

Of Other Laws of Nature From that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to an- other, such rights as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a 'third; which is this, that men perform their covenants made: without which covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and~ h • ' . . ·11 · the con 1-t_ e nght of all men to all things rema1n1ng, we are stl m tion of war

A · · · nd original of nd 1n this law of nature, consisteth the fountain a . ht JDSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no ng _ be th. ng· and conse en transferred and every man has right to every 1 ' h to quent1 . ' . ant is made, t en b Y, no action can be UilJUSt. But when a coven h than reak it is Unjust; and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no 0 ~ ~r

the not p . niust is ;ust. B erformance of covenant. And whatsoever is not u :J • ' f not Ut because covenants of mutual trust, where there is fear O )

Perforrn . . h former chapter, ance on either part, (as hath been said 1n t e

160 PART II MORAL THEORIES

are invalid; though the original ofjuSlice ?e th

e making of c • • .

1 h can be none, ttll the caus f ovenan

yet tnJUSUCe actual Y t ere . e O

such fe ts;

k h . h while men are m the natural cond't• ar be

ta en away; w 1c . 1

ion of

d Th erefore before the names of Just and . war

cannot be one. . ' u~ust ' h m

ust be some coercive power, to compel m can have place , t ere en equ c. nee of their covenants, by the terror of som ally to the penorma e puni h

at er than the benefit they expect by the breach of hs _-

ment, gre · h' h t e1 . nd to make good that propnety, w IC by mutu 1 r convenant, a • a con

Ul . re in recompense of the umversal right they b ·

tract men acq , . a an.

d . d such power there 1s none before the erection f

on. an o a commonwealth. An~ this is also t~ be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice m the Schools. for they say, that ;ustzce ,s o,, con. stant will of giving to every man his ~wn. therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there 1s no mJusuce; _and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, w~ere ~here 1s no c?mmonwealth, there is no propriety; all men havmg nght to all thmgs: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that

propriety begins. The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice;

and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every man's conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make: keep, or not keep covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one's benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such_ bre_ach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether injustice taking away the fear of God (for th c 1 h h 'd . . ' . , e same 100 at sa1 m his heart there 1s no God,) may not someti d · h . mes stan wit that reason, which dictateth to every man his own go d· d . such a b fi O ' an particularly then, when it conduceth to

ene t, as shall put a · . . the dispraise and . 1 . man ma cond1t10n, to neglect not only

, rev1 mg but I h specious reasoning . ' h a so t e power of other men .... This F h is nevert eless false

. or t e question is not of r . . nty of performance on . hp OI~uses mutual, where there is no secu- ere t d e1t er side· as h h c e over the parties . . ' w en t ere is no civil power nants· b · promismg· for s h • · ut either where one f h ' . uc promises are no cove-

0 t e parties h as performed already; or

CHAPTER 20 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 161

where there is a power to make him perform; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifes- tation whereof, we are to consider; first, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reck- oned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of war, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruc- tion, without the help of confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the confederation, that any one else does: and there- fore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single power. He therefore that breaketh his cove- nant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for :~ace an~ defence, but by the error of them that receive him; nor th ~n he is received, be retained in it, without seeing the danger of

e1r error h. h th ' w ic errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as e means f h. . societ h O _is security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of

othe/' e per_isheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors of men, which h ld quently a . e cou not foresee, nor reckon upon; and conse-

ga1nst the . contribut reason of his preservation- and so as all men that e not t h" . ' ' of What is good ; 18 destruct10n, forbear him only out of ignoran ce

or themselves.