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SAMPLE PAPERS 1 Hermione Granger
Knowledge of good and evil, the third definition of ‘courage’ (Lch. 199c–d; cf. Chrm. 174b), is neither courage nor virtue.
Socrates rejects the third definition of ‘courage’ because of problems with its consequence: one who had it would have all virtues as well (Lch. 199d). The consequence contradicts the earlier premise agreed by Laches, Nicias, and Socrates that courage is only a part of virtue (190d; cf. 198a). Moreover, the consequence contradicts ordinary beliefs about behavior, as Laches makes evident (194d). Similarly, when Socrates suggests the face-virtue analogy, Protagoras protests that someone may be courageous but unjust, or just but unwise (Prt. 329d–e). The claim that knowledge of good and evil is sufficient for virtue (Lch. 199d) is further suspect on grounds that individuals with such general knowledge may fail to apply it appropriately.
It may be objected that Socrates jumped to an illicit conclusion at 199d because the unity of the virtues does not follow from the premise that someone who has courage also has the other virtues. If the argument ended there, the claim that virtue is knowledge of good and evil might be maintained. Precedent for that view is Socrates’ argument against stiff opposition from Protagoras that the virtues are not distinct each from the others and that the Greek equivalents of ‘justice’, ‘temperance’ etc. are really different names for one and the same thing (Prt. 329d).
Socrates’ argument is enthymematic, but we obtain the required consequence by adding a proposition Socrates often assumes plausibly: that to have any one of the virtues someone must have knowledge of good and evil. That knowledge of good and evil is a necessary condition for having and practicing any one virtue is the uncontroversial part of the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge (the controversial part is that such knowledge is sufficient for all the virtues). Socrates suggests the uncontroversial part when he tells Laches they must add wisdom* to endurance if they are to get a definition of ‘courage’—wisdom being knowledge of good and evil—though Laches does not catch on (Lch. 192c–193d). If having knowledge of good and evil is a necessary condition for having and practicing any one virtue, and if having knowledge of good and evil is a sufficient condition for having all the virtues (an undemonstrated premise), it would follow directly that if someone has one virtue s/he has them all.
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* There is an additional difficulty I am not addressing: during the discussion of the first definition, the word Sprague translates ‘wisdom’ is phronēsis, more often translated ‘intelligence’. From the time when Socrates tells Nicias that the courageous person is clearly wise (Lch. 194d), the Greek word is sophia.
1 Based on sample papers from Debra Nails
Harry Potter
Virtue/excellence is knowledge, as Socrates argues explicitly and validly: (P1) Virtue/excellence is essentially beneficial (Meno 87d) (P2) Goods of the body—e.g., strength, wealth—and those of the soul—e.g. courage, moderation—are harmful unless they are used wisely, i.e. guided by knowledge (87e–89c). Put another way, nothing is unconditionally beneficial except knowledge because anything else can be misused and thereby cause harm. (C1) Virtue/excellence is knowledge (89c).
There are other reasons to identify virtue/excellence with knowledge that Socrates does not mention: knowledge sometimes carries with it a moral duty to act. Legalities aside, when a living but unbreathing child is pulled turning blue from the pool, all eyes turn to Jenny, an expert in artificial respiration. If she does nothing, turns over to tweak her tan, we hold her morally culpable. She might complain she is on vacation, not being paid to lifeguard, yet that would not abrogate her moral responsibility to act on her knowledge. We do not blame others who are present but have no knowledge of how to help. Another reason to identify virtue/excellence with knowledge is that doing the right thing in ignorance is not considered virtuous, just lucky: Steve had called the employees to a seminar when the explosion occurred, so no one was in the building. Steve gets no medal or special thanks since he had no knowledge of the impending explosion. A lifetime of virtue/excellence is not a string of accidents. Legal codes often make use of the flip-side of the knowledge coin: we do not charge those who did not know, and could not have known, that their actions would result in deaths; yet we charge those who should have known better.
Socrates raises an objection to the identification of virtue/excellence and knowledge:* if virtue/excellence is knowledge, it is teachable (87b–c), in which case there should be teachers of it (89d), yet a search of Athenian citizens, foreign sophists, and even the poets, long considered the repository of cultural information (89e–96d), produces no teacher. Since there are no teachers of virtue/excellence then, it is not knowledge (98e).
Two things are wrong with Socrates’ objection. First, his search for teachers is inductive and therefore inconclusive.† Second, he seems to mean by ‘teaching’ a direct transfer of information between individuals; whereas the concept may be widened appropriately to include teaching by example, unintentional influence, or habituation through praise and blame.
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* One might also object that virtue and excellence are no longer plausibly considered synonyms. † Socrates’ earlier demonstration that the goods of the body and soul are guided by knowledge is
also inductive.