Discount Tutor
In the case of Shell Oil in Nigeria, written John Boatright, the three moral
agents, whose actions need ethical evaluation are: Ken Saro-‐Wiwa, the Nigerian
government, and the Royal Dutch/Shell Corporation. Possibly the one fundamental
issue that both bothers, and ensures the continuation of ethical and moral debate is
that they are largely ambiguous and seldom agreed upon. However, I believe the
most effective approach to the Shell Oil in Nigeria case is both a deontological, and
consequential evaluation. I will evaluate the consequences that resulted from our
three moral agents actions, and will speculate on how these consequences could
have been otherwise had they acted differently. Deontologically, I will evaluate to
whom, and what these three moral agents were responsible and how they either
honored or neglected these responsibilities. The ethical evaluation these two moral
theories, or better put, approaches to ethically evaluating morality, conclude: Ken
Saro-‐Wiwa’s actions are not completely known, and therefore a judgment cannot be
made. The Nigerian government’s actions, regarding Saro-‐Wiwa, because of their
inconclusive nature, cannot be judged, however, their military actions against their
citizens are condemnable as are their actions of intercepting, diverting and hording
governmental funds. The Royal Dutch/Shell Corporation’s actions regarding both
their reluctance to take action in the Saro-‐Wiwa case, and in their interactions with
the government may not be condonable, however, they are not, judging from the
information given, condemnable.
Ken Saro-‐Wiwa was arrested for, and found guilty of ordering the murder of
several Ogoni chiefs who were suspected of collaborating with the military
government of Nigeria. Though our author Boatright depicts Saro-‐Wiwa, as an
advocate of both peace and nonviolence he did reject MOSOP’s proposed strategy to
cooperate with the federal government to reduce violence in return for concessions.
It is this detail that, I believe, must be given more emphasis than our author grants.
Just prior to the murders for which Saro-‐Wiwa was eventually hanged there was
division amongst MOSOP leadership and, I think, it must assumed, at least according
to the case study, that one of the principle issues causing the disagreement and
division amongst leadership must have been whether or not to cooperate with the
government to reduce violence in return for concession; an issue that Saro-‐Wiwa
was opposed to. We do not, from the case study, have enough information necessary
to make a concrete judgment of Saro-‐Wiwa’s guilt or innocence. For example the
concessions the government was offering MOSOP may have been hollow; however,
Saro-‐Wiwa’s noncompliance with the government, even in the face of MOSOP
compliance, would be reason enough to believe that he may have been associated
with the organizing of the murders for which he was executed. I am in no position to
make a determination on whether or not Saro-‐Wiwa did in fact order the murders of
the eight men, however, I can determine that, with the information given me, it is
too inconclusive for me to assume that he did not order their murders. I believe that
the assumption that he did not order the murders informed the actions of world
leaders, human rights activist, journalistic critics, and the author of this case study.
Therefore, depending on your position on capital punishment, the Nigerian
government’s hanging of Saro-‐Wiwa is an action that can neither be condemned nor
condoned because it was an action taken for reasons that have not been made clear.
The Nigerian government’s action in relation to the execution of Saro-‐Wiwa
cannot necessarily be condemned; however, their general treatment of their citizens
is condemnable. In this case we are primarily concerned with the Nigerian
government’s action involving Saro-‐Wiwa’s execution and their relationship with
the Royal Dutch/Shell Corporation. Through a deontological lens we see that the
Nigerian government has a responsibility to look after and protect the citizens that
constitute it’s country. The Nigerian government honored its responsibility to
protect the employees working for the Royal Dutch/Shell Corporation, many of
which I would assume were also citizens. Although the vigilante attacks against the
Royal Dutch/Shell workers may have been an ill advise and isolated instance among
a larger more ethical effort there were people harmed, people who were not in
positions of power and were therefore not directly responsible for the action of
their employer. As a result it was duteous of the Nigerian government to respond
with armed protection for the Royal Dutch/Shell employees. However, if the
government did, in fact, take these efforts beyond the threatened confines to repress
local population these latter actions, unlike the former, would be ethically
condemnable.
An assertion that can be made with much more certainty is the condemning
of the Nigeria government’s intercepting and hording of funding that was intended
for governmental reinvestment. The staggering gap between Nigeria’s elite and the
poor whom, according to 1994 estimates, live off approximately $300 a year
definitely makes explicit a responsibility the Nigerian government was neglecting,
neglect that is worth condemning. Lastly, and concerning this case most pressing, is
the Nigerian government’s execution of Saro-‐Wiwa. As I have mentioned earlier,
capital punishment agendas aside, this action cannot be condemned or condoned
without first evaluating and determining whether or not Saro-‐Wiwa was or was not
instrumental in the ordering of the murders he was executed for. Making this
determination has been made impossible both by the unrest that occurred around
his sentence, a sentence that would not typically be disputed if it were believed to be
rooted in truth, and by Boatright’s description of the jury as a “kangaroo court”.
Another consideration highlighting the inconclusiveness of Saro-‐Wiwa’s
involvement in the murders, which may actually suggest that he was indeed
involved, which is contrary to the apparent popular position, is that he was very
strongly opposed to any sort of compliance with the Nigerian government. The
extremity of his opposition was evident from his disagreement with MOSOP’s
proposed cooperation with the Nigerian government; an issue that created division
amongst the leadership of MOSOP, an organization of which Saro-‐Wiwa was a
founder. As a result of this last consideration I do not think, even considering his
previous nonviolent position, that he can be ruled out of involvement, in fact, I
would go as far as to suggest that the position he was in during the murders would
make him a very likely suspect. Deontologically, the Nigerian government’s action,
regarding their handling of the murders, were, depending of course on the validity
of their judiciary conviction, condonable, in so far as criminal punishment is one of
the primary responsibilities of a government. However, because of the inconclusive
nature of the crime I believe the Nigerian government’s action of executing Saro-‐
Wiwa is neither condonable nor condemnable.
In our ethical evaluation we must approach the Royal Dutch/Shell
Corporation differently than the moral agents previously considered because they
are primary being evaluated for the moral worth of their inaction. We must ethically
evaluate their intentions and motivations for inaction and can only speculate on
what influence their action may have had. The Royal Dutch/Shell Corporation,
which, for the sake of convenience, I will refer to as “Shell” in this paragraph, had
responsibilities to both the safety of their employees, and the company’s overall
well being. As a result of their responsibility to their employees Shell enlisted the
protection offered by the Nigerian government following vigilante attacks that were
tied to the MOSOP organization. Although Shell purchased arms to aid the Nigerian
government’s protection of their employees, they were, allegedly, not involved in, or
aware of the oppressive efforts the Nigerian government thereafter used the arms to
conduct. Therefore, Shell’s providing the Nigerian government with guns is not a
condemnable act because it was action taken to honor the responsibility of ensuring
the safety of their employees and the oppressive consequences that came from the
Nigerian governments use of these guns cannot be attributed to the Shell
Corporation.
Shell was also responsible for guaranteeing the general well being of their
corporation. Resulting from this responsibility Shell was reluctant to implement
their influence on the Nigerian government, even though they were responsible for
almost 40% of the government’s income. Shell was reluctant to intervene with the
governmental affairs concerning Saro-‐Wiwa’s execution both because the Nigerian
government was a 55% stakeholder, and because, though it sounds a bit morbid,
Saro-‐Wiwa’s execution was, if at all, only loosely related to the Shell Corporation. By
definition stakeholders are, “those groups without whose support the organization
would cease to exist.” This definition would seem to hold doubly true considering
that the Nigerian government was the majority stakeholder. Though it is arguable
that Shell would most definitely have been able to influence the Nigerian
government, it could have been a self-‐sacrificial act for a cause that was too external
to the Shell Corporation or any conduct that they had been involved in.
Our deontological and consequential ethical evaluation of Shell Oil in Nigeria
exposes the extreme complexities inherent to multinational corporations such as
the Royal Dutch/Shell Corporation. Unfortunately these complexities are often
missing from the majority of journalism and are replaced with that author’s implicit
judgment. In fact, Boatright offers an example in his Shell Oil in Nigeria. In the
second sentence of the case study Boatright writes, “The Nigerian junta, headed at
the time by General Sani Abacha, was criticized worldwide for bringing trumped-‐up
charges against Saro-‐Wiwa and fourteen co-‐defendants in order to suppress a
resistance movement that had criticized the operations of Shell Oil Company in the
oil-‐rich Ogoniland regian of Nigeria.” Whether or not this sentence was intended to
influence the reader is debatable, however it does draw a misleading tie between
the Shell Corporation and Saro-‐Wiwa’s arrest. An arrest which was for his alleged
involvement in the murdering of Ogoni chiefs. Without this strange, and rather
forced connection made, Shell’s actual relation to the Saro-‐Wiwa case, which was
minimal if existent at all, would have been much more apparent. However, with this
connection as his first premises, Boatright goes on to construct an implicit argument
against Shell, often quoting sources that were critical of Shell’s inaction and Shell
officials who were ill advised to comment. It is also a bit curious to ponder why
Boatright never cites the Shell sources he quotes, while he makes sure to, on two
occasions, cite critical sources from the New York Times. Boatright concludes his
case study, which in actuality is more of an implicit and subtle argument, by noting
that, “Within a week of Ken Saro-‐Wiwa’s death, Shell announced plans for a $4
billion liquefied natural gas plant in a partnership with the Nigerian government.”
An obvious implication to depict Shell as insensitive and to put the finishing touches
on his condemnation of Shell. The primary reason that I raise such a point is that
journalism and reporting done in such a manner allows people sitting at home in
their armchairs to make quick and uninformed judgments about world affairs.
Journalism created in this fashion fallaciously turns the reporting of facts into
didactic propaganda and compromises the ethical worth of journalism as a whole.
Work Cited:
Santoro, Michael A.. “Case Study: Chrysler and Gao Feng: Corporate Responsibility for
Religious and Political Freedom in China.” 227-229.
O’Brien, Thomas and Scott Paeth. Religious Perspectives on Business Ethics. Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007.
"Stakeholder (corporate)." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(corporate)
(accessed 07/09/2009).