Barrier Analysis Worksheet Project
BARRIER ANALYSIS OF 2007 PROPANE EXPLOSION IN WV 1
BARRIER ANALYSIS OF 2007 PROPANE EXPLOSION IN WV 1
Barrier Analysis of 2007 Propane Explosion in WV
Alex Bangguraa
Running head: BARRIER ANALYSIS OF 2007 PROPANE EXPLOSION IN WV 1
[Type here]
Columbia Southern University
Part 1:
Three-column barrier analysis worksheet
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Barrier Analysis worksheet |
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Column 1 |
Column 2 |
Column 3 |
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Barriers |
Intended function |
Performance of the barrier |
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Failed |
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Unauthorized opening the liquid withdrawal valve |
Only opened when the tank is emptied of liquid |
This failed activity caused liquid propane released uncontrollably from the tank. |
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Inexperience of the junior technician |
An experienced technician should be aware of existence and function of the telltale |
the inexperienced junior technician obstructed the telltale hole |
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Failure to follow instructions |
The technician failed to follow the instructions at the bleed hole which restricts him not to open the tap if in doubt |
This led to excessive volume of propane leaking from the valve |
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Not used |
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Missing tank nameplates |
It would help in identifying and requesting correction of any deficiencies discovered in the year following the acquisition |
The technician did not identify the tank placement as deficient therefore opening it to confirm |
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Pre-Fill Inspection |
Inspect the installation for deficiencies such corrosion, fitness of piping, tank placement and tank labeling |
Pre-fill inspection was not done in Little General Store |
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Did not exist |
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curricula, practical exercises, or knowledge of evaluation in OSHA & NFPA |
Give the technician knowledge on evacuation of the valve and the tank |
The tank was evacuated wrongly |
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Propane emergency trainers |
There were no emergency trainers which could provide safety and emergency to the fire in the store |
The safety emergency provided by parties failed |
Part II:
Potential causal factors as revealed in the analysis
The potential causal factors as per the analysis in the U.S. Chemical Safety Board investigation include the following;
One, the responders of the propane explosion, the two service technicians involved and Little General Store employees failed to evacuate the area of explosion as per the recommendations given in the national emergency propane guidelines (Crawl, Daniel A, 2003). Secondly, there was a defect in the tank holding the liquid which was not discovered during the pre-fill inspection. The defect in the withdrawal valve of the existing tank caused the malfunction thus the explosion in the Little General Store.
Again, the junior service technician working in the store had little experience and lacked formal training with operation of the tank withdrawal valve. The inexperience and minimal supervision given to the technician caused the explosion since he did not recognize the defect at the withdrawal valve. He also failed to read the instructions given.
Another cause is the placement of the propane tank against Little General Store building which gave a direct path for the propane to flow directly into the stores’ interior. OSHA and NFPA is also accused of not including knowledge evaluation, curricula and practical exercises in its propane standards while providing trainings to employees in their institutions (OSHA, 2000). This was a cause of the explosion.
The analysis also states that 911 operators in US lack important information callers and offer life-saving advice which lacks propane emergency guidance that can help in collecting crucial information to be used.
Finally, firefighters in West Virginia have no refresher training since it is not required in the area and the propane safety and emergency training is voluntary making the responders to have few personnel responding to firefighting.
References
Crowl, Daniel A (2003) Understanding Explosions, AIChE/CCPS, New York, NY,
The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB), (2004), Investigation Report, Dust Explosion, West
Pharmaceutical Services, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB),
September 2004.
CSB, (2005) Investigation Report, Combustible Dust Fire and Explosions, CTA Acoustics, Inc,
February 2005
CSB, (2005) Investigation Report. Aluminum Dust Explosion, Hayes Lemmerz International-
Huntington, Inc., September 2005
OSHA, (2000) Technical Information Bulletin, Potential for Natural Gas and Coal Dust
Explosions in Electrical Power Generating Facilities, November 2000