HLSS3

Public Documents: Is American Intelligence Organized to Thwart the Next Terrorist Attack?

Richard J. Harknett is an associate

professor of political science and chair of

the University Faculty at the University of

Cincinnati. He has published widely in the

area of international and national security

studies as well as international relations

theory. His two most recent published

articles examine cybersecurity both in terms

of deterrence and warfi ghting strategies

and in the context of national policy.

E-mail: richard.harknett@uc.edu

James A. Stever is a professor of politi-

cal science at the University of Cincinnati.

His research and publications focus on

public administration theory, federalism, and

intergovernmental management. He previ-

ously worked in the Government Account-

ability Offi ce, evaluating how presidents

manage intergovernmental relations. He is

also an adjunct professor in the National

Agricultural BioSecurity Center.

E-mail: james.stever@uc.edu

700 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011

Nancy C. Roberts, Editor

Richard J. Harknett James A. Stever University of Cincinnati

Two years after the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Th is act aspired to replace a sprawling agency-oriented intelligence apparatus with an integrated, networked intelligence community. Th e act envisioned a director of national intelligence who would accomplish sweeping structural reforms, while at the same time maintaining and improving the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of intelligence operations. Th is vision has not materialized. Th e director of national intelligence does not have the power to implement structural reforms. Schisms between the legislature and the executive also hamper reforms.

The public administration equivalent of the cosmic big bang occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. To ensure national security, 22 programs

or agencies were moved into a new federal agency— the Department of Homeland Security. Critics of this convulsive organizational change could argue that the consolidation should have taken place decades earlier in response to the new threats of international terror- ism. However, the energy and political will for this crisis-driven creation did not exist until the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center clearly demon- strated the need for pervasive structural change.

Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002 set in motion a series of structural changes with the goal of creating a network of agen- cies throughout the American federal system to mitigate the threat of international terrorism. Within two years of the passage of the Homeland Security Act, Congress initiated structural changes specifi c to the intelli- gence community as part of the Intelligence Reform and Ter- rorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. While diff erent in

form and scope from the Homeland Security Act, the IRTPA shared the same impetus—a sense of failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.

For decades, serious analysts of the American intel- ligence system had warned of its inadequacies and called for reforms. Th e National Security Act of 1947 created the anchor of the intelligence community— the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—and defi ned the parameters in which it would function along with independent military and domestic intelligence agencies. For the CIA, the primary goal was to collect foreign intelligence that would guide policy makers embroiled in the Cold War following World War II and engage in operations to forward policy makers’ decisions. Th e scale and scope of intelligence needs throughout the Cold War, in parallel with the growth of the national security bureaucracy, led to a prolif- eration of intelligence agencies. Th e Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard; and the Departments of State and Treasury created intelligence-gathering units that suited their particular agency’s purpose (Marks 2010, 66). Th e resulting intelligence apparatus, which was in place on September 11, 2001, provided decision

makers with a cacophonous breadth of coverage across the perspectives and purposes of individual agencies. However, it suff ered from its individual-unit bureaucratic, silo-like orienta- tion, which by defi nition lacked strategic allocation of intelli- gence assets and weak strategic prioritization of intelligence- gathering eff orts, particularly in the absence of the previous Cold War framework. Discrete analysis and fragmentation ruled.

Th e National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the

Th e Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11

Within two years of the passage of the Homeland

Security Act, Congress initiated structural changes specifi c to

the intelligence community as part of the Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. While diff erent in form and scope

from the Homeland Security Act, the IRTPA shared the same impetus—a sense of failure to

anticipate the 9/11 attacks.

The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 701

deemphasize foreign threats and minimize interaction with agen- cies devoted to mitigating foreign threats. Amid the new environ- ment created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, agencies are attempting not only to shift their orientation, but also to engage in more frequent and intense interaction with federal, state, and local agencies to which they previously paid less attention.

Homeland security–oriented intelligence is problematic for the intelligence community. Intelligence agencies such as the CIA with a foreign intelligence focus are expanding domestic intelligence ca- pabilities. Th is entails cooperation and interaction with not only the Defense Department and the FBI, but also with state and local law enforcement, which now must cope with foreign threats. To eff ec- tively address these threats, these agencies have acquired a domestic intelligence mission.

Domestic intelligence is laden with problems. Any agency expand- ing its domestic security activities will be subject to criticism and high levels of scrutiny, as distrust of intelligence activities is embed- ded in American culture. “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail”

was the comment issued by Secretary of State Henry Louis Stimson in 1929 when he closed the State Department’s code-breaking offi ce. Senator Frank Church accused the CIA of be- having like a “rogue elephant” throughout his 1975–76 hearings, which cataloged various abuses of that agency. Th ese suspicions of the intelligence establishment will not easily be assuaged as various agencies attempt to recast themselves as necessary contributors to the new homeland security mission.

Moreover, the intelligence problem goes beyond that of reeducating the public on the necessity of gathering not only foreign but also domestic intelligence. Th e scope and scale of the intelligence community must expand to include not only the FBI but also domestic law enforcement agencies at the state and

local levels. To be involved in the intelligence community, state and local law enforcement agencies must undergo internal cultural shifts and acquire new capabilities. Unlike countries such as Britain that have extensive experience in gathering intelligence to combat domestic terrorism, the United States has little experience (Marks 2010, 92).

Enter the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act Public Law 108-458, signed on December 17, 2004, better known as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, is a 236- page statute that was written and contextualized as a direct response to the “lessons” learned from the attacks of 9/11 as they related to the role of the U.S. intelligence community. Th e title implies both a connectedness between the needs to reform intelligence and prevent terrorism and a separateness between the two tasks. While a terrorist attack was the precipitating event that led to reform, the act and its subsequent implementation recognized that reform eff orts were to be grounded in a national and international threat environment much more expansive than terrorism alone. Th is starting point is

United States—commonly known as the 9/11 Commission—de- termined that, in retrospect, this was a system primed to fail, and its report conspicuously and painstakingly documented the points of failure. Th e pervasive theme of the commission’s initial 585-page report (2004) was the lack of unity among the existing intelli- gence agencies. Th ough the set of intelligence agencies that existed on September 11, 2001, could be loosely called an “intelligence community,” the mélange of government agencies that constituted this community, according to the commission, had not adequately anticipated the growing homeland threat and could not provide the warning necessary to prevent a sparsely equipped and minimally trained group of al-Qaeda operatives to carry out the most devastat- ing act of terrorism in the nation’s history. In the words of the 9/11 Commission, the existing intelligence community was guilty of four kinds of failures: “in imagination, policy, capabilities, management” (2004, 356).1

In off ering an assessment of the reaction and progress of intelli- gence reform in the wake of 9/11, an old metaphor applies: is the glass half full or half empty? We conclude that the response to the complexity of the intelligence challenge is an incomplete process at this stage because of the complexity of the threat and bureaucratic en- vironments. Hence, the water level of reform is only mid-way in the glass, ten years out from the precipitating event of 9/11. Whether this is the extent of the reform or whether a fuller reform is possible is the open question.

To appreciate the challenges presented to the intelligence community, one must go beyond those enumerated by the 9/11 Commission and recognize that the homeland security problems of the intelligence community are but one component of its larger task: gather- ing and integrating intelligence throughout the world to protect the security interests of the United States. Th e terrorist attacks chal- lenged decision makers to add a new compo- nent to the existing intelligence community: an integrated homeland security component. Th e conceptual and organizational division of domestic versus foreign intelligence no longer corresponded to the new threat reality. Th us, organizational change (both structural and process) had to occur in order to address this reality, while simulta- neously maintaining ongoing eff ective intelligence operations. Th e threat environment could not be put on pause to accommodate the installation of a new organizational framework.

Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002 is a foundational document that created a new post-9/11 context for the intelligence community by requiring existing government agencies at all levels of the federal system to rethink their mission. Th e Department of Defense is a prime example. Before 9/11, the mission of this department was focused on threats originating from outside territories controlled by the United States. Th e new domestic threats evident after 9/11 required the Defense Department to add an internal focus to its intelligence mission parameters. NORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command) was one result. Th e FBI off ers another example. A near- exclusive domestic law enforcement orientation led this agency to

[T]he response to the complexity of the intelligence

challenge is an incomplete process at this stage because of the complexity of the threat

and bureaucratic environments. Hence, the water level of reform is only mid-way in the glass, ten years out from the precipitating

event of 9/11. Whether this is the extent of the reform

or whether a fuller reform is possible is the open question.

702 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011

DNI responsible for integrating the 15 independent members of the Intelligence Community. But it gives him powers that are only relatively broader than before. Th e DNI cannot make this work unless he takes his legal authorities over budget, programs, personnel, and priorities to the limit. It won’t be easy to provide this leadership to the intelligence components of the Defense Department, or to the CIA. Th ey are some of the government’s most headstrong agencies. Sooner or later, they will try to run around—or over—the DNI. Th en, only your determined backing will convince them that we cannot return to the old ways.4

Both the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities and the 9/11 Commission stressed the same theme: structural reform of the intel- ligence community was essential. Th e Commission on Intelligence Capabilities expressed throughout its report serious reservations about whether the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence was positioned for success. Th e commission made 74 specifi c rec- ommendations, many of which dealt with organizational issues in the intelligence community, but all of which were grounded on the same assumptions behind the IRTPA—that the intelligence com- munity was too disparate in its organization and its functioning.

Strategy and Vision under the Director of National Intelligence Th e dual charge of the DNI—to coordinate daily intelligence and to pursue fundamental reform—found its formal outlet in the two core strategy documents mentioned earlier. While the 2009 Na-

tional Intelligence Strategy details the strategic objectives of U.S. intelligence, it is framed within the context of Vision 2015, which lays out the reform-initiated transformation of how U.S. intelligence must operate in the early twenty-fi rst century.

To make the case for a transformative reform, Vision 2015 off ers a strategic assessment of the challenges facing twenty-fi rst-century in- telligence that is consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy produced in 2005 (and updated in 2009). Th e document considers the threat environment to be broad and fl uid:

We live in a dynamic world in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing. Th e continued march of globalization, the growing number of inde- pendent actors, and advancing technology have increased global connectivity, inter-

dependence and complexity, creating greater uncertain-ties, systemic risk and a less predictable future. Th ese changes have led to reduced warning times and compressed decision cycles. … Intelligence must be more integrated and agile to assist in preventing and responding to these challenges. (Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 4)

Building on the presumptions of the 2002 reforms initiated with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the docu- ment further asserts that

found in the two subsequent core strategy documents to emanate from the reformed intelligence community’s Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise and the 2009 National Intel- ligence Strategy.2 Both are anchored on threat assessments in which terrorism is only one component. Moreover, the IRTPA extended the same general logic on which the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was based. Th e act rested on two pillars: an expanded range of threats to U.S. national security and the new exigency to merge domestic and foreign intelligence. Th e IRTPA envisioned a new intelligence community, one that combined 16 intelligence agencies in new ways to enhance information sharing, coordination of intelli- gence activities, and the vetting of intelligence analysis.

Th e single most important reform initiated by the IRTPA appeared in its opening section. Th is section specifi ed the creation of a direc- tor of national intelligence who shall,

(1) serve as head of the intelligence community; (2) act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National

Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; and

(3) consistent with section 1018 of the National Security Intel- ligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct the imple- mentation of the National Intelligence Program.

Th e establishment of a director of national intelligence reshaped the National Security Act of 1947. Th is post–World War II act had cre- ated the CIA and its directorship, but it had not created an integrated intelligence com- munity. Th e congressional record and ensuing debate that forged the IRTPA made it clear that a lack of integration within the intel- ligence community had signifi cantly contrib- uted to the success of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.3

Th e Offi ce of the Director of National Intel- ligence formally began operating on April 22, 2005, with the dual charge of serving as the principal advisor on daily intelligence and the principal driver of near-term and over-the- horizon intelligence reform. It is important to note that this overall starting premise for reform—that structural change was neces- sary—was reinforced shortly before the new DNI, John Negroponte, was sworn into of- fi ce. A month earlier, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction had released its report, noting in its cover letter that “[o]ur review has convinced us that the best hope for preventing future failures is dramatic change.” Its lead- ing recommendation to President George W. Bush was to

Give the DNI powers—and backing—to match his responsibilities. In your public statement accompanying the announcement of Ambassador Negroponte’s nomination as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), you have already moved in this direction. Th e new intelligence law makes the

Th e dual charge of the DNI— to coordinate daily intelligence

and to pursue fundamental reform—found its formal

outlet in the two core strategy documents mentioned earlier.

While the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy details

the strategic objectives of U.S. intelligence, it is framed within

the context of Vision 2015, which lays out the reform-

initiated transformation of how U.S. intelligence must operate

in the early twenty-fi rst century.

The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 703

foremost among these challenges is the blurring of lines that once separated foreign and domestic intelligence, and the increased importance of homeland security…. In this new en- vironment, geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries are blurring; traditional distinctions between intelligence and operations, strategic and tactical, and foreign and domestic are fading; … To succeed in this fast-paced, complex environ- ment, the Intelligence Community must change signifi cantly. (4–5)

Th e change that is envisioned is a shift from an agency-centric com- munity model to an integrated networked enterprise modality.

Th e existing agency-centric Intelligence Community must evolve into a true Intelligence Enterprise established on a collaborative foundation of shared services, mission-centric operations, and integrated mission management, all ena- bled by a smooth fl ow of people, ideas, and activities across the boundaries of the Intelligence Community agency members. (5)

Vision 2015 conceptualized the threat environment as a combina- tion of three factors: fl uidity of technology, uncertainty of source/ threat identifi cation (more potential anonymity), and the multipli- cation of relevant actors who pose a threat, leading to intelligence operatives’ quandary of reduced warning time and compressed decision-making cycles within which they must provide salient information and analysis. Th e document rests on the presumption that the end of the Cold War is actually the appropriate starting point to consider the need for intelligence reform (rather than the attacks of 9/11).

In the past, the Intelligence Community was siloed into dis- crete disciplines (e.g., signals intelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, counterintelligence) and functions (e.g., tasking, collection, analysis, dissemination). Th ese silos often led to competition and duplication. Although the agency-centric operating model worked well during the Cold War, it cannot succeed in the current environment, which changes rapidly. We need a mission-focused operating model that is agile, lean, and fl exible enough to respond to a dynamic environment. (10)

Much of the remaining portion of Vision 2015 details the organi- zational reforms required to bring about a shift to an intelligence enterprise, including joint duty pathways, integrated mission management, and changes in collection and analytical methods. Th e document explicitly recognizes the diffi culty of the shift it requires and anticipates the main objections to its mandate.

Th e fi rst and most signifi cant impediment to implementation is internal and cultural: we are challenging an operating mod- el of this Vision that worked, and proponents of that model will resist change on the basis that it is unnecessary, risky, or faddish. Th ese opponents will posit that incremental change is working, the environment is not really that diff erent, and the new methods are unproven. A second impediment is existing institutional barriers, which create friction. Few things sap the determination for change as eff ectively as the friction induced

by layers of bureaucratic ineffi ciency working to frustrate any endeavor. Stove-piped “back-offi ce” functions that make even simple personnel or operational activities diffi cult will complicate nearly every aspect of transformation. A third impediment is budgetary. Dramatic transformation of the Intelligence Community will require stable and somewhat predictable budgets. (21)

However, perhaps the greatest challenge facing Vision 2015 is the “tyranny of the immediate” (Mazzafro 2008). Th e DNI faces the exigency of implementing signifi cant organizational changes that, by their very nature, disrupt established standard operating procedures, while simultaneously directing the national intelligence program of the United States, which on a daily basis assesses active threats to the United States. Th e DNI’s requirement to produce a daily intelligence briefi ng is in tension with the desire to improve intelligence through structural innovation. Innovation entails risk and disruption to ongoing, proven established operations. In balancing immediate operational concerns against reform concerns, the bias is inevitably in favor of incremental change or no change at all.5

Th e 14-page 2009 National Intelligence Strategy recognizes this tension. On one hand, eight pages are dedicated to providing an overview of the strategic threat environment and a discussion of op- erational goals to address these threats. On the other hand, six pages (nearly half ) are dedicated to the objectives necessary to reform the structure and operations of the intelligence community in order to transform it into a functioning intelligence enterprise. Th e National Intelligence Strategy aspires to simultaneously guide operations in an active and dangerous threat environment and undertake structur- al/functional reform. Th e strategy competently lays out how this can be achieved while recognizing the daunting nature of the dual task.

Th e documentary trail of the past ten years reveals that the attacks of 9/11 precipitated demands for reform that have led to a vision of transformed intelligence. However, vision and implementation are two diff erent things. Both the IRTPA of 2004, which created the foundation for reform, and executive branch implementation created an offi ce that could be visionary, but did not empower an offi cer that could be transformational. Th e most telling example of this, of course, is the fact that four very accomplished offi cials with wide and successful national security experience have held the position in only six years. What is most interesting is that the three men who left the post subsequently concluded in comments and writings that the offi ce of the DNI is essential (its creation was the right thing to do), but fundamentally hamstrung (Blair 2010; Hayden 2010; Negroponte and Wittenstein 2010).6 One of the key

Mission Objectives MO1: Combat violent extremism EO1: Enhance community mission management MO2: Counter WMD proliferation EO2: Strengthen partnerships MO3: Provide strategic intelligence and warning EO3: Streamline business processes MO4: Integrate counterintelligence EO4: Improve information integration and sharing MO5: Enhance cybersecurity EO5: Advance S&T/R&D MO6: Support current operations EO6: Develop the workforce

EO7: Improve acquisition

Enterprise Objectives

Source: Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence (2009, 6–17).

704 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011

General James Clapper. Th e appearance of four candidates before the SSCI within a fi ve-year period is interesting in itself—suggesting that the IRTPA may have created a diffi cult role that mortal men have found quite diffi cult to perform. Beyond that, however, the existence of four identical hearings within a fi ve-year period aff ords an excellent opportunity for some comparative observations, both quantitative and qualitative.

Predictably, the Negroponte hearings were the most intense and required more printed pages of testimony (Negroponte, 59 pages; McConnell, 29 pages; Blair, 38 pages; Clapper, 42 pages). It is clear from the intensity of the senatorial questions that those on the panel held not only high expectations for the new DNI position, but also anticipated a greater role for the SSCI in the intelligence commu- nity. A question from Chairman Pat Roberts captured the SSCI’s mind-set:

Chairman Roberts: Mr. Ambassador, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited?

Ambassador Negroponte. Yes, sir.

Chairman Roberts: Do you agree to send the intelligence community offi cials to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited?

Ambassador Negroponte: Yes, sir.

Chairman Roberts: Do you agree to provide documents or any material requested by the Committee in order to carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities?

Ambassador Negroponte: I do, sir. Yes.

Chairman Roberts: Will you ensure that all intelligence com- munity elements provide such material to the Committee when requested?

Ambassador Negroponte: I do. (SSCI 2005)

From the foregoing interchange and others throughout the hear- ing, it is evident that the committee believed that with the passage of IRTPA, they were forging not only a new relationship to the intelligence community, but also a new foundation for congressional involvement in intelligence policy.

Th e tone of subsequent hearings indicated that the high expecta- tions the senators believed they had established in the initial hear- ings had not been met. A statement by an irritated Vice Chairman Senator Christopher Bond in the second DNI confi rmation hear- ings articulated the new mood of the SSCI.

We are not going to accept national security issue judgment without examining the intelligence underlying the judgments, and I believe this Committee has an obligation to perform due diligence on such important documents. When we ask for documents, however, we’ve run into resistance, and the IC claims we should not be looking over its shoulder and check- ing its work. To me, that’s basically what oversight is all about.

problems is embedded in the IRTPA legislation and can be found in the opening section, which establishes the offi ce. While the IRTPA enumerates the elevated purpose of the DNI relative to the existing intelligence community, section 1018 of the law specifi es guidelines for the president in implementing the creation of the DNI,7 stating,

Th e President shall issue guidelines to ensure the eff ective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National Intel- ligence by this title and the amendments made by this title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments.

Th e IRTPA was the foundation for a vision of a very diff erent intel- ligence community—an intelligence enterprise model consistent with that articulated by the 9/11 Commission and the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities. However, the IRTPA proved to be a tenuous step toward genuine structural reform. It created a central offi ce without giving this offi ce broad control over separate existing agencies. Th e IRTPA did not emulate the sweeping reforms inherent in the Homeland Security Act of 2002—reforms that involved the creation of a new department complete with a cabinet-level secre- tary. Th e IRTPA placed emphasis on the person who would hold the offi ce and the relationship that he or she would have with the president. Th e empowerment for transformation would not come from the legislation, but from granted presidential authority and power of persuasion vis-à-vis existing intelligence agencies. Although the act leaves the door open for structural transformation, it is dif- fi cult to imagine that any president being briefed every morning on imminent and active threats would allow the DNI to risk a major break in ongoing intelligence, as the DNI proposes new structural reforms that would better integrate the intelligence community. If one adds to the “tyranny of the immediate” traditional public administration variables such as bureaucratic budgetary turf and organizational culture clashes, it is diffi cult to imagine the reforms begun in the wake of 9/11 moving any diff erently in scale and pace.

Th e future scenario for implementing reforms inherent in the IRTPA would be more promising if Congress were an eff ective part- ner in guiding and supporting these reforms. Such is not the case. Th e following section argues that congressional assistance is unlikely in part because of a lack of analytical capacity and eff ort.8

Missing Evaluative Component Handicaps Legislative Documents Congressional Hearings As government documents,9 congressional hearings are concatenat- ed, rambling, and inherently unsystematic. However, the confi rma- tion hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to confi rm the initial director of national intelligence and his three successors are instructive. Th ey provide some insight into why Congress has not been an eff ective component in the mosaic of intelligence reform.

On April 12, 2005, the SSCI held hearings to confi rm the fi rst DNI, John Negroponte, who served 22 months. He was succeeded by Admiral Michael McConnell, who served 23 months. Den- nis Blair, the third DNI, served 18 months and was succeeded by

The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11 705

its marginal role. Four years after IRTPA, amid mounting congres- sional discontent, it argued before the Senate for a greater role in intelligence analysis (GAO 2008). In his testimony, Comptroller General David M. Walker stressed that management oversight could improve personnel management throughout the intelligence com- munity and the laborious security clearance process.

Conclusions It is still an open question whether the IRTPA’s vision of transform- ing agency-based intelligence into an integrated networked intelli- gence enterprise can succeed. Th e intelligence community confronts an old conundrum: revolution versus evolution. Reform in the latter

mode defaults to the importance of the imme- diate and thus to a less disruptive incremental approach; reform in the former mode gives priority to the consequences of future failure and thus supports dramatic overhaul. As we noted earlier, the intelligence reforms of 9/11 created an offi ce that could be visionary, but it did not empower an offi cer that could be transformational. If one accepts the premises of Vision 2015—that we face a threat envi- ronment that requires an intelligence structure that is agile, fl exible, and adaptive—then the conclusion one must draw ten years out from 9/11 is that we have a vision of where we need to go, but not the legislative basis on which to move beyond the half measure of intelligence reform that is the IRTPA. Ten years after 9/11, it remains unclear whether the IRTPA and the documents that the act inspired rep- resent a road to reform that is potentially only half traveled or has run its course.

Acknowledgments Th e authors wish to thank Donal d Kluba for

his constructive review and John Callaghan for providing back- ground information that informed this article.

Notes 1. Th e 9/11 Commission’s conclusion that organizational structure and processes

were central to an intelligence failure on that day is vehemently rejected by the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, Michael Scheuer, who resigned from the agency in November 2004. See his blog post “Might as Well Call in the Marx Brothers,” May 24, 2010, at http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/ is-it-time-to-kill-off -the-dni.php [accessed May 25, 2011]. Th is article sets aside this debate and focuses on the reforms that followed from the commission’s report.

2. Th e fi rst National Intelligence Strategy was released in 2005. For the purposes of this essay’s focus on the evolution of reform since 9/11, the 2009 updated strategy conveys the essence of the 2005 version and, at time of publication, represents the national strategic position paper for intelligence and thus is the version to be analyzed.

3. It is important to note an alternative view of the past ten years that might sug- gest that the most important change regarding intelligence has been an almost doubling of spending on intelligence. Ultimately, one might argue that more im- portant than structure is simply the relationship between resources and tasks. If you dedicate enough resources to a target, you enhance the chances signifi cantly of intelligence success. Of course, two issues with this operations perspective are

And I think the Committee must look into the materials on which you base the judgment. (SSCI 2007)

Senator Bond’s frustration stems from an enduring issue in the intelligence community grounded in the U.S. system of divided government: specifi cally, who is in charge of the intelligence—the executive or the legislature? Neither the DNI nor the IRTPA eff ec- tively addressed this issue.

Th e schism between the executive and Congress has been exacer- bated by the CIA. Th e CIA refuses to supply information to the Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) and encourages other intelligence agencies to do the same (Donald- son 2010, 21–23). Th is controversial refusal is supported by the Justice Department Offi ce of Counsel’s 1988 opinion that intelligence activities are exempt from GAO reviews.10 When the Senate in 2010 attempted to settle the issue and pass legislation granting the GAO the authority to review the full array of agencies in the intelligence community, Peter Orszag, director of the Offi ce of Management and Budget, informed Senator Dianne Fein- stein that the president would veto the bill if it included that provision.11

Th is schism has reduced the scope of legisla- tive involvement in the intelligence commu- nity. Deprived of GAO analysis to inform and support its recommendations, the congres- sional impact on the budget, policy, and structure of intelligence agencies has been reduced. Th e secondary eff ect is that GAO analysis is not available to institutions outside the Congress and to the public. Th e Offi ce of Management and Budget, which has full access to intelligence community budgetary information, does not share and publish this information in the same manner as the GAO.

Th ere are, of course, two separable points of contention here relating to congressional involvement. First is the potentially less controver- sial notion that more GAO access in evaluating budgets, policies, and structures of intelligence agencies would position congressional committees to more eff ectively conduct their oversight roles. In the particular area of how structural reforms are infl uencing function, the lack of GAO analysis likely handicaps informed congressional action. Second, and more to Senator Bond’s point, is the more con- troversial and problematic contention that greater access is needed so that analysis of the analysis could take place. Here, the point is that if committee staff had more access to the raw intelligence underlying fi nished intelligence products (judgments produced by the intelligence agencies), the committees could make their own analytic judgments and thus judge the professional assessments of the intelligence agencies. Of course, the inherent political nature of Congress raises the concern that legislative involvement in intelli- gence analysis would politicize the analysis.

Where the GAO should fi t regarding these points of contention was not addressed in the IRTPA. Th e GAO has not been silent about

It is still an open question whether the … vision of

transforming agency-based intelligence into an integrated

networked intelligence enterprise can succeed. Th e

intelligence community confronts an old conundrum: revolution versus evolution. Reform in the latter mode

defaults to the importance of the immediate and thus to

a less disruptive incremental approach; reform in the former

mode gives priority to the consequences of future failure and thus supports dramatic

overhaul.

706 Public Administration Review • September | October 2011

11. Letter from Peter Orszag to Dianne Feinstein, March 5, 2010, http://www.fas. org/irp/news/2010/03/omb031610.pdf [accessed May 25, 2011].

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that it does not resolve the issue of which tasks should be prioritized and whether they are the right priorities and what happens if spending cannot stay at a high level. Neary (2010) raises the concern that spending is unlikely to be sustained, and thus structural reforms need to be pursued.

4. Subsequently in practice, the two agencies have reacted a bit diff erently to the creation of the DNI. Some suggest that the Defense Department has largely ignored the DNI, where direction has not been taken and infl uence has not been accepted. Th ere are indications, particularly in the area of mission management, that the CIA, on the other hand (perhaps as a result of its status as an agency and not a department), has been more willing to accept infl uence bordering on guidance from the DNI.

5. Some scholars suggest that the IRTPA has as much potential for structural reform as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the U.S. military structure. A critical diff erence is the environment in which they were instituted. Th e military reforms were conducted in a strategic environment that was stable and, in the late 1980s, improving between the United States and the Soviet Union. Th e post-9/11 envi- ronment is both unstable and laden with new threats. Hence, the tyranny of the immediate is much more salient as a hurdle to post-9/11 intelligence reform.

6. Some make the counterargument that the creation of the DNI was a mistake. One example is Pillar (2010). A very good range of opinion on the DNI reform can be found on the blog site http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/is-it- time-to-kill-off -the-dni.php [accessed May 25, 2011].

7. Neary (2010) has a similar focus on section 1018 and how it undermined the DNI. Neary’s piece provides an excellent insider view of the initial challenges and hurdles faced in opening the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence.

8. Congress has held four DNI confi rmation hearings in the past fi ve years. Yet the testimony reveals very little evolution of congressional thinking from the original appointment of Negroponte. One is reminded of the movie Groundhog Day, in which the protagonist wakes up every morning, starting the same day over again. While he is aware that life has moved, no one else is. McConnell, Blair, and Clapper likely experienced something like this sensation facing very similar questions to the ones posed to Negroponte.

9. Traditionally, there are four producers of government documents: the executive branch, the legislative branch, government agencies, and the court system. Th e search for government documents related to IRTPA logically focuses on the executive and legislative branches, for several reasons. Th e act is comparatively new, and the presidency and Congress were the two major branches that framed the act. Hence, one would expect that these two branches would do the heavy lifting—producing both the strategic documents to frame and complement the IRTPA, and the evaluative documents to assist and shape its implementation. Using this search criterion, one fi nds an uneven quality between the strategic and evaluative documents produced by the executive and legislative branches.

10. Th e details of this controversy are beyond the scope of this article. It is instruc- tive that Leon Panetta as a congressman supported GAO review. Upon becoming CIA director, Panetta reversed his position.

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