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Police Practice and research, 2017 Vol. 18, no. 2, 160–173 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2016.1261253

Changes in homeland security activities since 9/11: an examination of state and local law enforcement agencies’ practices

Thomas C. Johnsona  and Ronald D. Hunterb

acriminology and criminal Justice department, Western carolina University, cullowhee, nc, Usa; bcriminal Justice/ criminology, school of liberal arts, Georgia Gwinnett college, lawrenceville, Ga, Usa

ABSTRACT This study investigated differences in state and local law enforcement agencies participation in homeland security activities within the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 13 years later. Further, this investigation assessed whether there were regional differences for these practices during these same time periods. Activities assessed were based on a homeland security initiatives index. Data suggest that, in the year after the attacks, agencies’ participation in all of Stewart and Morris’ homeland security activities was not high and statistically significant differences existed across several regions for some of these practices. However, since then, the number of agencies participating in all of Stewart and Morris’ homeland security activities increased and statistically significant differences between regions decreased. The increase in participation may be attributed to incentives provided by the federal government. Nevertheless, data suggest that support may be waning within law enforcement agencies to participate in homeland security activities.

Introduction

The law enforcement profession was profoundly affected by the September 11th (9/11) terrorist attacks. Many agencies faced uncertainty as it became apparent that agencies at all levels would confront the potential for terrorism in the U.S. and many agencies were unsure of their roles. Further, many state and local law enforcement agencies found it difficult to define their role in homeland security (Morreale & Lambert, 2009) and were hampered in preparing to address terrorism issues by a lack of funding and a unifying strategy (Gilmore, 2003; Henry, 2002; Holden, 2003).

Government agencies are typically quick to respond to public concerns during crises and, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies sought to engage in homeland secu- rity activities to enhance public perceptions of safety (Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007). Indeed, it has been argued that the 9/11 terrorist attacks ushered in a new policing era known as homeland security policing that reflected a change from the traditional approaches to law enforcement services that included local crime analysis, strategies, and responses, to a homeland security approach that includes social event analysis, target-oriented strategies, coordinated intelligence work, and proactive and intensified responses (de Guzman, 2002; Oliver, 2005). Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, local law enforcement agencies were considered instrumental in preventing future terrorist attacks and ensuring homeland security, as they are the agencies that know their communities and are the

© 2016 informa UK limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group

KEYWORDS homeland security policing; homeland security preparedness; homeland security risk; terrorism preparedness; terrorism risk; first responders

ARTICLE HISTORY received 22 July 2015 accepted 3 november 2016

CONTACT thomas c. Johnson tjohnson@wcu.edu

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first responders and the ones that are in the best position to contain incidents and minimize the life loss and property damage (Gilmore, 2003; Hart, Rudman, & Flynn, 2002; Murphy & Plotkin, 2003; Pollard, Tuohy, & Garwin, 2003; Rinaldi, 2003; White, 2004). Many Americans expected state and local law enforcement agencies to enhance security by concentrating resources on preventing, deterring, and responding to potential terrorist threats against the homeland (Henry, 2002) to the detriment of other policing strategies such as community policing (Kim & de Guzman, 2012).

Although public expectations were that state and local law enforcement agencies assume respon- sibility for engaging in homeland security activities, this did not mean that every agency did so. The study assesses the extent to which state and local law enforcement agencies engaged in homeland security activities in the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and whether regional differences existed. This study also explores the extent to which these agencies engaged in these activities 13 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the extent to which regional differences may still exist. This study only assesses these two periods as no data were located that assessed agencies’ homeland security practices before 9/11 for comparative analysis.

This study contributes to the body of research on homeland security. This contribution is important because, compared to other police practices, the volume of research on law enforcement homeland security practices is comparatively small (Burruss, Schafer, Giblin, & Haynes, 2012) with little clarifi- cation as to the activities in which agencies participate (Lum, Haberfeld, Fachner, & Lieberman, 2009). This study’s results hold important implications for understanding how homeland security practices have evolved since immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Related literature

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, attention was directed to the role that state and local law enforcement agencies were expected to play in homeland security. President Bush stated that countering and investigating terrorist activity is the number one priority for law enforcement agencies (President Bush signs anti-terrorism bill, 2001). Further, many individuals perceived that state and local law enforcement agencies would evolve into effective counterterrorism components (White, 2004).

However, at the local level, there was little direction in homeland security practices for agencies to follow (Gilmore, 2003; Henry, 2002; Holden, 2003). Further, exacerbating this problem was the decentralized nature of law enforcement in the United States. There are over 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the U.S., the majority of which operate at the state and local level (Banks, Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, & Kyckelhahn, 2016), of which approximately 50% of agencies employ 10 or fewer officers while another 40% employ 50 or fewer officers (Reaves, 2015). Each of these agencies generally function with autonomy from other agencies with their priorities set by the communities they serve.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, guidance regarding homeland security activities has increased substantially with the National Strategy for Homeland Security serving as the basis for recommended activities for state and local agencies (Pelfrey, Jr., 2007). Stewart and Morris (2009) codified these rec- ommended activities into a homeland security initiatives index. Recommended homeland security activities include:

• implementing the national incident management system (NIMS) for managing terrorism and other major events,

• developing or updating an all-hazards plan to include terrorist activities, • changing the agency’s mission statement to reflect homeland security responsibilities, • broadening an agency’s investigation functions’ to include intelligence gathering and analysis, • creating or updating mutual aid agreements to include homeland security responsibilities, • participating in exercises or drills that include terrorism scenarios, • ensuring interoperable radio communications between public safety agencies, • implementing a linked records management system (RMS) that allows agencies to share records

and information,

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• conducting agency and community risk assessments to terrorist threats, • forming or strengthening non-governmental organizations (NGO) partnerships that increase

resource-sharing, and • participating in anti-terrorism task forces.

National incident management system

The Bush administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) that addressed the management of domestic incidents (Sylves, 2008). One component of HSPD-5 was the develop- ment of a National Response Plan and NIMS. NIMS provides a national, standardized method for managing all incidents and allowing the assimilation of responding agencies and organizations into an effective response protocol (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2016). Although adoption of NIMS is required for federal agencies, it was initially only suggested that state and local agencies adopt it. State and local agencies were eventually required by the federal government to adopt NIMS as a condition to receive federal assistance during a terrorist or disaster event (Association of State & Territorial Health Officials [ASTHO], 2016).

All-hazards plan

The all-hazards plan is an outgrowth of a requirement in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (1988) that all states have emergency operation plans. This act serves as a catalyst for the FEMA to work with state and local governments in developing emergency operations plans. The Stafford Act was amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 that required state and local jurisdictions to have plans if they expect to receive federal assistance for terrorist or disaster events.

The term all-hazards plan is somewhat misleading. This term does not suggest that an agency should prepare for every possible hazard that may occur; rather, an all-hazards plan recognizes that, for terrorist and disaster events, there are many common activities that must be performed, such as emergency notification, evacuation, or mobilizing resources (Schultz, Koenig, Whiteside, & Murray, 2012). These activities should be codified into an all-hazards plan that not only identifies these activ- ities, but addresses how they will occur for different events.

Agency mission statement

An agency’s mission statement is important since it reflects the specific goals and objectives of the agency (Gurley, Peters, Collins, & Fifolt, 2015). Commensurate with a shift to homeland security policing is the belief that an agency’s mission statement should include homeland security activities to inform agency employees and other stakeholders that such activities are important (David, 2012). A carefully constructed mission statement promotes unanimity of purpose within the agency, pro- vides a basis for allocating resources, establishes a general agency climate, serves as a focal point for individuals to identify with this purpose and direction, and translates purposes into objectives (King & Cleland, 1979).

Intelligence gathering

Intelligence gathering, particularly as it relates to homeland security, has been crafted with federal oversight since World War II (Carter, 2005). The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) recommended that each state has a centralized law enforcement intelli- gence function that included participation by every agency. Further, the Commission recommended that all agencies support the federal intelligence function. Similarly, the Police Executive Research Forum identified intelligence gathering as a crucial homeland security activity for law enforcement agencies to perform (Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005).

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A primary reason that local law enforcement agencies are instrumental in intelligence gathering is that they tend to be more cognizant of activities within their communities than are state and federal agencies. While very large agencies may have the resources to form a dedicated intelligence unit, most agencies must assign intelligence gathering to their existing investigative function. Indeed, this function is a good resource for the intelligence information as the investigative function typically serves as a repository for crime reports from the different patrol shifts. The use of the investigations function as the intelligence information repository is a logical choice for detecting a relationship between terrorism and other crimes. For example, terrorists have been known to use techniques to obtain funds, weapons, and other resources that are also used to commit street (Hamm, 2005) and white-collar (Kane & Wall, 2004) crimes.

Mutual aid

Mutual aid is the sharing of resources across jurisdictional lines (Stier & Goodman, 2007). The decen- tralized nature of U.S. law enforcement results in many agencies, particularly smaller agencies, having insufficient resources to respond to terrorist events. Many states allow local agencies to develop mutual aid agreements. However, mutual aid agreements between states were problematic until the passage of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact following Hurricane Andrew (National Emergency Management Association, 2013). Now, mutual aid agreements may exist between agencies intrastate and interstate (Stier & Goodman, 2007).

Terrorism exercises and drills

FEMA (2012) suggests that exercises and drills are an effective way for agencies to prepare for an emergency, including a terrorist attack. Specifically, FEMA (2012) indicates that exercise and drill benefits include allowing agencies to evaluate plans, clarifying roles and responsibilities, obtaining participant feedback and recommendations for improvement, measuring performance objectives, improving agencies’ cooperation and coordination, validating training, and assessing existing resources’ capabilities. Functional and full-scale exercises are especially important. While other exercise types, such as seminars and table tops, may allow responders to conceptually envision how their plans may work, functional and full-scale exercises allow responders to physically practice their skills by acting realistically in response to a scenario (Mahoney, 2010).

Interoperable radio communications

The 9/11 Commission found that agencies responding to the World Trade Center had difficulties in com- municating with their own employees due to having a limited number of radio channels and could not communicate with other agencies due to not having a common radio frequency (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Radio interoperability requires that an agency is able to effectively communicate with its personnel. Finally, radio interoperability necessitates that all responding agencies, regardless of jurisdiction, be able to communicate with one another (Huyck, 2015).

Linked RMS

Post-9/11 information sharing among law enforcement agencies is extremely important given the amplified concerns for homeland security (Carter & Carter, 2009; Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2011; Matei, 2009). Indeed, the failure to share information, particularly intelligence informa- tion, was cited as a major problem in failing to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Friedman, 2012). Since the terrorist attacks, the federal government has placed considerable emphasis upon local agencies sharing information and records from which intelligence information may be gleaned (Cordner & Scarborough, 2010). Therefore, an effective records-sharing system is essential to improving the ability of law enforcement agencies to play a meaningful role in detecting and preventing future terrorist attacks.

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Risk assessment

Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated for a risk-based approach to homeland secu- rity (Garcia & von Winterfeldt, 2016). Risk assessment is critical to mitigating the effect of terrorist events because it allows officials to estimate the chances of these events occurring and their potential consequences (Haynes & Giblin, 2014). DHS has identified many potential terrorist targets within communities based on two criteria: the asset’s value and its geographical impact (Nemeth, 2013). Local agencies are encouraged to use this criterion to assess their communities to determine the perceived vulnerability of and risk to potential targets. Risk assessment also includes identifying means to mit- igate the consequences that may result from potential harm.

Law enforcement agencies should assess their own vulnerability to a terrorist attack or disaster. As an armed first responder organization, law enforcement agencies should not ignore the possibility that they may be a potential terrorist target. The loss of an agency’s critical infrastructure, systems, and other assets will affect its ability to immediately respond to a major event (Leson, 2005). Having an effective agency risk assessment process in place helps administrators understand their vulnerabilities that might increase their exposure to a terrorist event. Further, an effective assessment allows agencies to increase monitoring or correction of vulnerabilities and implement basic defensive steps (Leson, 2005).

NGO partnerships

Homeland security cannot occur through governmental efforts alone. Many critical gaps in prepared- ness and critical infrastructure protection exist that can be addressed through effective partnerships between law enforcement agencies and NGOs (Newsome & Jarmon, 2016). These partnerships are essential for ensuring the availability of critical services such as communications, health care, food, water, and other commodities. Further, since approximately 85% of the nation’s critical infrastruc- ture is under the control of NGOs (Busch & Givens, 2012), law enforcement agencies require their assistance for protecting this infrastructure. By enlisting the aid of NGOs, law enforcement agencies may find that they have fewer tasks and responsibilities to manage and fewer resources to expend as NGOs can perform a number of critical functions during a terrorist event (Busch & Givens, 2012). Further, NGOs may be able to perform some functions better as they may have greater resources and less legal constraints than law enforcement agencies (Coppola, 2015).

Anti-terrorism task forces

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft directed each of the 94 U.S. Attorneys to establish an anti-terrorism task force (United States Attorney’s Office’s, 2001). Attorney General Ashcroft indicated that these task forces should serve several purposes. First, the task forces should be a conduit for sharing terrorism information between federal, state, and local agencies. Second, the task forces should serve as a coordinating body that assists agencies with implementing terrorism prevention plans. Finally, the task forces should serve as the organizational structure for coordinating terrorism responses.

Some jurisdictions have also formed local anti-terrorism task forces. For example, Logan International Airport, from which two of the jets hijacked by terrorists on 9/11 were launched, started its own Joint Terrorism Task Force (Sweet, 2001). This task force’s status was solidified in 2011 when Logan International Airport created a self-contained ‘nerve center’ for a counterterrorism task force (Valencia, 2011). While many task forces included federal law enforcement officers, some task forces are comprised almost exclusively of local law enforcement officers. For example, Klamath County, Oregon’s (n.d.) District Attorney formed a local task force designed to promote and coordinate local anti-terrorist efforts (Mark McDaniel, personal communication, May 9, 2016). However, this task force lasted for only a few years until the next district attorney was elected.

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Current study

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a number of studies have been conducted to assess law enforce- ment agencies’ homeland security practices. However, many studies have focused on agencies within individual states such as Illinois (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2009), Ohio (Marion & Cronin, 2009), South Carolina (Pelfrey, Jr., 2007), Texas (Stewart & Morris, 2009), and Virginia (Chappell & Gibson, 2009). One study assessed only state law enforcement agencies (Foster & Cordner, 2006). Morreale and Lambert (2009) assessed New England regional police departments while Lee (2010) assessed large police departments nationally. However, little was found that indicated that state and local law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, were assessed nationally.

Of particular interest in the current study is assessing how law enforcement agencies’ homeland security practices have changed from those implemented immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For example, immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was a strong commitment to do what- ever was necessary to prevent another terrorist attack (Bloch-Elkon, 2011). However, it is unknown if this commitment remains strong. In 2013, President Obama indicated that the war on global terror was over (Burns, 2013) suggesting that interest in homeland security activities may be waning. However, in the interim, the global war on terrorism has shifted to Syria, causing a mass migration from that country and there have been terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino, CA, and Orlando, FL. Therefore, this study investigates law enforcement agencies’ recent homeland security practices compared to those practices implemented in the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Method

To determine if significant differences exist by region between current law enforcement agencies’ homeland security practices and those practices implemented immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, survey data were collected and analyzed. A 61-item survey was developed using Qualtrics, an online survey software package. Several survey question types were used, including Likert-type scale, single-answer, and multiple-answer response questions. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the data and chi-square tests of independence were conducted to determine if statistically significant relationships (p ≤ .05) existed between measures that addressed differences in agencies’ practices.

The survey link was emailed nationally to 6715 law enforcement administrators who were selected from the membership directories for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, state police chiefs associations, state sheriff ’s associations, the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, and individual agency websites. There were responses from 1205 administrators for a response rate of approximately 17.9%. Web surveys are a low-cost option for reaching large groups of individuals (Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012). Despite this advantage, the response rates for web-based sur- veys tend to be approximately 15% or less, substantially lower than other methods for presenting surveys (Lozar Manfreda et al., 2008). Therefore, the 17.9% response rate for this web-based survey is acceptable.

Data were analyzed for associations in current law enforcement agencies’ homeland security prac- tices by region in the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 13 years later. Specific variables studied were based on Stewart and Morris (2009) homeland security initiatives index. The null hypothesis suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between agencies by region for homeland security practices immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and current practices.

Results

Agencies’ homeland security activities immediately after 9/11

Within the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a majority of agencies had implemented NIMS (75%), updated mutual aid agreements to include homeland security responsibilities (55%), included terrorism scenarios in disaster response exercises (64%), and ensured radio interoperability within local government units (64%) and with other public safety agencies (74%). Agencies in the northeast

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had the highest number of agencies that indicated they had implemented NIMS (83%), developed an all- hazards plan that included counterterrorism plans (55%), and ensured radio interoperability with other public safety agencies (83%) and within local governments (72%). These actions are not surprising considered that the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in this region.

However, other regions had more agencies performing other activities. For example, the Far West led regions in broadening the investigations function to include intelligence-gathering activities (47%), including terrorism scenarios in disaster response exercises (76%), conducting agency (49%) and com- munity (62%) risk assessments, forming or enhancing partnerships with NGOs (53%), and creating or participating in a local joint anti-terrorism task force (56%). The Mideast had more agencies that changed their mission statements to include homeland security responsibilities (14%) and linking their RMS to other agencies (43%). The Rocky Mountains and Southeast regions had more agen- cies signing or updating mutual aid agreements to include homeland security responsibilities (61%) while agencies in the Southwest had more agencies participating in the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s joint anti-terrorism task force (19%).

Statistically significant differences were found for some activities between agencies by region imme- diately after 9/11 (see Table 1). Ironically, these statistically significant differences exist for activities that the majority of agencies did not do. These activities include assigning intelligence-gather activities to existing investigative units (32%), developing all-hazard response plans the included addressing a terrorist threat (41%), conducting community (41%) risk assessments, having partnerships with NGOs (43%), and participating in a local (38%) and U.S. Attorney’s (11%) joint anti-terrorism task force.

Agencies’ homeland security activities 13 years later

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, more agencies have engaged in Stewart and Morris’ recommended homeland security activities, which had the effect of reducing the number of regions between which there were significant differences. Further, there were additional activities for which a majority of agencies engaged in including developing an all-hazards plan that included a counterterrorism com- ponent (62%), implementing linked RMSs (58%), conducting agency (51%) and community (55%) risk assessments, and forming partnerships with NGOs (59%). Only two significant findings from agencies’ homeland security activities 13 years later are detected (see Table 1). Statistically significant

Table 1. significant differences in homeland security activities by region for the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 13 years later.

Far west Great lakes Mideast Northeast Plains Rocky

mountains Southeast Southwest number of agencies 113 233 150 100 135 82 268 124

assigned intelligence function to investigations unit

Immediately after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .01) 47% 23% 35% 32% 29% 30% 37% 30%

developed all-hazards plan that included counterterrorism plan

Immediately after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .05) 36% 37% 41% 55% 41% 37% 44% 37%

conducted community risk to terrorist attack

Immediately after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .03) 62% 44% 52% 45% 52% 41% 53% 50%

ensured radio interoperability with other public safety agencies

13 years after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .01) 92% 92% 83% 95% 86% 94% 86% 91%

Formed or enhanced partnerships with nGos

Immediately after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .02) 53% 34% 45% 42% 41% 46% 47% 38%

created or participated in local attF

Immediately after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .01) 56% 33% 48% 27% 30% 30% 43% 32% 13 years after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .01) 66% 46% 52% 34% 37% 39% 46% 46%

Participated in U.s. attorney’s attF

Immediately after 9/11 (χ² ≤ .01) 9% 5% 12% 11% 11% 11% 19% 7%

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differences were found between regions for ensuring that radio interoperability exists between local public safety agencies and creating or participating in a local joint anti-terrorism task force.

Discussion

Agencies’ homeland security activities immediately after 9/11

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, state and local law enforcement agencies struggled to find their roles in homeland security (Burruss et al., 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that a majority of law enforcement agencies did not engage in all of Stewart and Morris’ recommended homeland security activities immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and that there were significant differences across regions for several of these activities. The American law enforcement system is fragmented and subject to local community priorities, thus minimizing the potential for a congruent national homeland security approach (Stewart & Morris, 2009). Further, much confusion existed in the attack’s aftermaths while initial government reactions were frequently characterized as knee-jerk reactions (Bosworth-Davies, 2007; McIntyre & Hancock, 2011).

Frequently, agencies who engaged in homeland security activities did so because of their jurisdic- tion size, perceived risk of another attack, and additional funding for homeland security activities (Davis et al., 2004). Consider, for example, that agencies in the Far West were most likely to broaden the role of their investigations unit to assume intelligence-gathering activities immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (see Table 1). This finding is not surprising given that 20% of the Muslims in the United States live in California (American Muslim Council [AMC], 2015) as do a high number of other immigrants (DHS, 2012) and the federal government has encouraged state and local agencies to monitor Muslim (Pew Research Center, 2011) and other migrant (Rhodes et al., 2015) populations in their communities. Further, California has several major port facilities, large crowd venues, and multiple other facilities that can be considered potential terrorist targets.

Agencies’ homeland security activities 13 years later

In the years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as the role of state and local agencies in homeland security has been more clearly defined, there has been increased participation in all homeland security activities by state and local agencies resulting in less regions between which there were statistically significant differences. The influence exerted by the federal government over state and local law enforcement agencies has helped to provide guidance for these agencies and incentives in the form of homeland security grants, federal disaster aid that is tied to homeland security activities, free training, and sharing of military-surplus equipment that has ushered in the era of homeland security policing (Oliver, 2005, 2006). Indeed, 56% of the agencies surveyed indicated they directly received at least one homeland security grant while 9% indicated they partnered with another agency for a homeland security grant. Waxman (2008) indicates that the decentralized nature of American law enforcement requires coordi- nation mechanisms to serve as a catalyst to motivate state and local agencies to engage in these activities and the federal government through the DHS provided many of these coordinating mechanisms.

The two areas for which statistically significant differences are found in current practices, radio interoperability with other public safety agencies that many agencies ensure exists and participation in a local joint terrorism task force, are activities for which a majority of the agencies did not perform. Far West agencies participated in local joint terrorism task forces at a higher level than agencies in other regions. In addition to the Far West states having large populations of Muslims and immi- grants and many potential terrorist targets, the Far West states also have the largest region (17%) by population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014) with California having three cities with over 1,000,000 population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Further, the Far West states have the second largest number of ports of entry (U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 2015) with the largest number of immigrants (45%) passing through these ports (DHS, 2013), which suggests that this area is highly vulnerable to

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terrorist infiltration. These issues serve as a catalyst for agencies engaging in intelligence-gathering and participating in task forces.

Although there has been an increase in the number of agencies that engage in homeland security operations, many agencies still do not. Given the many small agencies in the U.S., it appears that many agencies do not have the resources to perform traditional crime-related duties and homeland security duties. Further, small agencies serve small communities, and it may be that these agency administra- tors do not believe that their communities will be terrorist targets or locations of terrorist activities.

Indeed, some data collected suggests that some agency administrators’ perceptions of homeland security may no longer be as strong as they were immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since state and local law enforcement administrators generally rely upon community and political feedback to guide them in directing their agency’s activities, agency administrators were asked to indicate whether their community (X̄ = 3.34, SD = .80) and political leaders (X̄ = 3.04, SD = .91) strongly supported their homeland security efforts. These data suggest that many agency administrators did not agree or disagree with these statements that they were strongly supported in their homeland security efforts. These results contrast with studies done within a few years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that suggested there was strong community and political support for law enforcement agencies’ homeland security activities (National Center for Disaster Preparedness, 2004; Oliver, 2006; Morreale & Lambert, 2009).

Qualitative data gathered in this study also suggests that there may be a waning of support for home- land security activities. One police chief indicated that small agencies in his area were ‘ill-equipped, untrained, and unfunded to deal with homeland security threats.’ Another police chief indicated that he had never been afforded any staff increases to address homeland security activities in addition to crime-related duties. There was even some animosity towards DHS. One chief indicated that DHS should focus on border security and stay out of law enforcement. A police chief for an airport police department expressed his frustration with DHS and what he referred to as ‘unfunded federal mandates.’

Undoubtedly, state and local law enforcement agencies face many challenges in continuing with a homeland security philosophy as their agency’s predominant guiding force. Homeland security initiatives are expensive (Galati, 2011) and may put an agency at odds with its minority community (Lee, 2010). Consider that high profile protests against local law enforcement agencies in Ferguson, MO, Baltimore, MD, and Charlotte, NC suggest that at least some agencies have relationship issues with their communities and repairing these relationships may be a higher priority than homeland security. Future research may wish to focus on whether state and local law enforcement agencies can continue to sustain homeland security activities, particularly among agencies that face staffing and budget challenges. It may be prudent for agencies to focus more on a community policing philosophy rather than homeland security. Indeed, it has been argued that a community policing philosophy may be more effective at ensuring homeland security (Docobo, 2005; Morreale, 2004; Page, 2011) and this approach may provide future opportunities for investigation.

An investigation into agencies’ homeland security practices would not be complete without acknowledging the dynamics related to these activities. This investigation focused on whether agen- cies participated in these activities immediately after the 9/11 attacks and 13 years later; however, it did not investigate the extent to which they participated in these activities. For example, an agency may report that it is NIMS compliant because some, but not all of its employees, have received NIMs training. Further, the agency may indicate in its policy that it will use NIMS for major events; however, it has never used NIMS or even conducted agency-wide training exercises on it. Similarly, agencies may want to engage in homeland security activities; however, budget or political considerations may prevent agencies from engaging in these activities or at least to the extent that they would like to. A suggestion for future research is to determine the extent that agencies participate in homeland security activities or the extent to which they would like to participate in homeland security activities but are prohibited from doing so.

Finally, this study would not be complete without acknowledging the fluid nature of terrorism. A terrorist event can occur anywhere at any time and the repercussions result in a rapid change from an agency’s previous practices. The data collected for this study represents a snapshot of the agency’s

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practices at the time data were collected. Future studies may wish to continue assessing local agencies’ homeland security practices to ascertain the effect of future terrorist events upon these practices.

Conclusion

This study investigated the differences in state and local law enforcement agencies’ participation in homeland security activities immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 13 years later and whether there were regional differences. Data suggest that, immediately after the attacks, participation in all of Stewart and Morris’ recommended homeland security activities was not high and statistically signifi- cant differences existed across several regions for several of these activities. The level of participation and differences across regions may be due to a lack of understanding of these activities, the limited resources that existed for agencies immediately after the attacks, and concerns whether an agency’s community was vulnerable to an attack.

However, over the years, the number of agencies participating in homeland security activities increased and the number of regions between which there were statistically significant differences have decreased. This finding suggests that law enforcement agencies nationally are more congruent in their approaches to homeland security practices. The increase in agency participation may be due to the federal government enacting homeland security policies and laws, providing homeland secu- rity grants, tying federal disaster aid to homeland security activities, providing training, and sharing military surplus equipment. For the few activities where statistically significant differences between regions are found, agencies in the Far West have emerged as having the highest level of participation. The reasons for this finding may be due to the large population that is found in the Far West region including large Muslim and migrant populations. Further, the many ports that may allow for terrorist infiltration along with the existence of high-profile targets may offer further explanation.

Data suggest that there may be a waning of support for law enforcement agencies to participate in homeland security activities. Quantitative data indicate that law enforcement administrators gener- ally neither agree nor disagree that they receive strong support from their communities and political leaders to engage in homeland security activities, thus suggesting that there is not strong support for law enforcement agencies engaging in homeland security activities. Qualitative data suggest that some law enforcement administrators feel that homeland security may be an unsustainable burden upon agencies, particularly smaller ones, given their limited resources and issues of community relationships. This may be an area for future investigation.

Similarly, there has been greater scrutiny by local officials and communities of law enforcement agencies’ acquisition of surplus military equipment. The Ferguson (MO) Police Department’s response to the civil disturbances in their community that was broadcasted on social media and major news networks left many individuals questioning what is perceived as the militarization of America’s police. President Obama responded to this concern by ordering a review of the transfer of military-style equipment to local agencies. Reviewers concluded that the vast majority of transfers of military-style equipment strengthened local policing even after the Ferguson Police Department was criticized for its use of military vehicles and weapons to quell protests. Reviewers also concluded that the vast majority of equipment transferred to local agencies did not include weapons or tactical vehicles, but general use equipment such as office furniture, clothing, and medical supplies. President Obama responded to this review by stating that local authorities needed common standards in the types of hardware they requested and better training in how to use it. Therefore, future research may also focus on military surplus equipment training and use standards.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

170 T. C. JOHNSON AND R. D. HUNTER

Notes on contributors Thomas C. Johnson holds the rank of assistant professor within the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department at Western Carolina University. He received his PhD in Instructional Systems, Leadership, and Workforce Development from Mississippi State University. He has completed graduate criminal justice studies at Fayetteville State University and graduate emergency management studies at Eastern Kentucky University and University of North Carolina – Pembroke. Before entering academia, Dr Johnson was a career law enforcement officer in Florida, West Virginia, Mississippi, and North Carolina and retired as a police chief. His research interests are in the area of law enforcement professional standards, homeland security, and technology use in emergency management.

Ronald D. Hunter holds the rank of professor within the criminal justice/criminology program at Georgia Gwinnett College. He received his PhD in Criminology from Florida State University. Before entering academia, Dr Hunter was a sergeant with the Tallahassee Police Department. He also served seven years as a part-time municipal judge in Cave Spring, GA. Dr Hunter is a past president of the Southern Criminal Justice Association and of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. His research interests are primarily in the areas of crime prevention and law enforcement.

ORCID Thomas C. Johnson   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4544-8816

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