EMAN

Question 1: believe that the policies in place in the United States for dual-use and gain-of-function research is comprehensive and addresses current and potential threats, but not to the full extent of potential threats. According to the National Institutes of Health, the United States has systems in place to evaluate risks and benefits of Gain of Function experiments while ensuring the integrity of the research isn’t surrendered in the name of the misuse of information and products from the research (2020). There’s no denying that the government has the responsibility of a balancing act. One side of the debate, the government needs to increase oversight to maintain public safety and national security. On the other hand, extending trust to the scientific community, especially during a crisis is key to avoiding overregulation (Frankel, 2012). I agree with Senator Joseph Lieberman that decisions on publications can not continue to be ad hoc (Frankel, 2012). While the nature of each case of research and the surrounding information is unique, I think the default so be stricter than neccesary; I like to err on the side of caution. Currently, the Presidential National Security Decision Directive, enacted in 1985 states that basic research will remind unclassified unless deemed a threat to national security, in which classifications and censorship will be applied, but there are no clear-cut boundaries (Frankel, 2012). This also seem a bit reactionary, where anything can be published and be made readily available until an organization with ill-intent starts taking actions or making threats that prove otherwise. Then, aspects of the publications are redacted. Personally, that’s a little too late. The DURC policy currently applies to only 15 agents that have been deemed most dangerous. This is out of approximately 80 agents that have the potential to be weaponized with terrible effects. Modifications to the Select Agent Rule have been proposed that would require addition biosecurity and biosafety training for any individuals with a measurable amount of exposure of access to these agents (Wolinetz, 2012). This would increase the monitoring and accountability, as a pathogen being weaponized would probably have its origins in a facility where the agent is being tested or having research. I think this is a great first step to responsible increased oversight by the government. Another step in the right direction would be to only have research, medical, government, and other relevant institutions be the one to have access to the full methods, materials, procedures, and conclusions of these sensitive levels of research. All those individuals would need to be vetted to have those positions anyway and this method is a form of quality control for the information. While I agree that the public absolutely has a right to know what the scientific community is doing, the average person doesn’t need to have that depth of detail to be able to sleep well at night. This way, the scientific community is still building off each other in a healthy way, while the integrity and trust is maintained. Initially, I believed an international tribunal sort of organization would be a good method for checks and balances, but every country has their own definition of what’s appropriate to published based on their national security health. It would be difficult to know who would be included or excluded from that discussion. Also, there might be a political conflict of interest for certain nations to have all the information available for review to determine what should be censored. Question 2: I believe the US policies for oversight of dual-use research is currently appropriate, but yet, it is not comprehensive enough. I believe this because there are checks and balances between government and academia with regard to the research being conducted.  As Lev (2019) explains, there are currently only two countries that regulate such research, the United States and Israel.  In the case of the US, there exists a balance between academic institutions and the government, versus in Israel, where government oversight is the sole entity.  If the US were to mirror Israel, then yes, I would have concerns, as this seems to be a conflict of interest with only the government interests at hand.    Lev does continue to explain that the People’s Republic of China is in the final stages of adopting their policy, and I can only image that the government will be in strict control.  In this case, I guess at least there will be some oversight, a little consolation.      Regarding the comprehensive nature of the US policy, I believe that the policy should be increased with oversight.  This is due to the knowldege that the US policy does not clearly state that if the risks of the research outweigh its benefits, risk mitigation measures should be undertaken to ensure that the balance is reversed (Lev, 2019).  I believe this is a gap that should be minimized to mitigate risk.  This somewhat highlights our module we discussed last week with the mouse/horsepox virus and the risk vs. reward debate we addressed in our weekly discussion (UMGC, 2020).