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Reading5Session3and4WhyExecutivesDerail1.pdf

© Academy of Management Executive, 1995 Vol. 9 No. 4

Why executives derail: perspectives across time and cultures Ellen Van Velsor and Jean Brittain Leslie

Executive Overview Derailment studies conducted by the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) in the 1970s and 1980s provided many valuable insights into the developmental needs of managers aspiring to senior leadership positions in the United States.1 This most recent study by CCL attempts to determine whether or not the concept of derailment and the factors involved have stood the test o f time and are applicable across cultures. The answers are critical in light of today's global and ever-changing business environment where executives are likely to live or work on assignments outside their native countries and where the very pace of change has created new and different challenges for managing people.

A d e r a i l ed executive is one who, h a v i n g r e a c h e d the g e n e r a l m a n a g e r level, finds that there is little chanc e of future a d v a n c e m e n t d u e to a misfit b e t w e e n job r e q u i r e m e n ts a n d personal skills. The executive is either p l a t e a u e d or leaves the organization altogether. Derailment in one company, however, d o e s not p e r m a n e n t l y end a m a n a g e r ' s career. Those who leave their organizations b e c a u s e they resign, a r e fired, or take early retirement often go on to either start their own companies or join other firms w h e r e they a r e successful.

Derailment the n . . . Table 1 s h o w s how derailment factors h a v e fared over the y e a r s . The e a r l i e s t study by McCall a n d Lombardo in 1983 w a s b a s e d on a set of interviews with senior executives in three U.S.-based industrial organizations. 2 This study found that executives who later derailed h a d typically run u p a string of s u c c e s s e s early on a n d were viewed a s technical g e n i u s e s or tenacious problem solvers. Yet a s they moved up in their organizations a n d job d e m a n d s c h a n g e d, s o m e early s t r e n g t hs b e c a m e w e a k n e s s e s a n d some early w e a k n e s s e s b e g a n to matter. The most common r e a s o n s for derailment w e r e specific performance problems, insensitivity to others, failure to d e l e g a t e or build a team, a n d o v e r d e p e n d e n c e on a single a d v o c a te or mentor.

A later study by Morrison, White a n d Van Velsor in 1987 focused on w o m e n d e r a i l e r s . 3 Conducted in 25 companie s across a variety of industries, this study found that women who derailed w e re s e e n a s exceptionally intelligent with good track records early in their c a r e e r s. They d e r a i l e d b e c a u s e they w e r e u n a b l e to a d a p t to a boss or culture, experienced performance problems, c a m e across a s overly ambitious, or did not h a v e the ability to l e a d s u b o r d i n a t e s or to b e strategic .

A third study by Lombardo a n d McCauley in 1988 e x p a n d e d upon the earlie r two studies a n d u s e d a n even larger d a t a b a s e that included both male a n d female m a n a g e r s . 4 The derailment factors that emerge d included problems with interpersonal relationships, difficulty in molding a staff a n d in makin g strategic

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Managers who have problems with interpersonal relationships are those who are successful early in their careers generally because they are good at what is often referred to as task-based leadership.

transitions, a lack of follow-through, a n d overdependence on a n d s t r a t e g i c differences with m a n a g e m e n t.

And now . . . What differences in derailment c a n be attributed to the p a s s a g e of time a n d the context of other cultures? In the most recent derailment study conducted by the Center for Creative Leadership, twenty senior executives from fifteen U.S.-based Fortune 500 companies were interviewed a l o n g with forty-two English-speaking executives from twenty-four l a r g e companies in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, a n d Spain. 5

As in the studies conducted in the 80s, executives were a s k e d to describe t h e careers of two m a n a g e r s they knew well (Americans in the U.S. c a s e , E u r o p e a n s in the E.U.), one who h a d m a d e it to the top of the organization a n d one wh o h a d been seen a s having senior m a n a g e m e n t potential but who did not m a k e it to the top or m a d e it a n d w a s not successful.

Looking at Table 1, we can s e e that while there a r e some differences a m o n g t h e derailment factors from study to study, there a r e four e n d u r i ng t h e m e s . They a r e present, both over time a n d across countries. They include:6

• problems with interpersonal relationships • failure to meet b u s i n e s s objectives • failure to build a n d l e a d a team • inability to c h a n g e or a d a p t during a transition

Problems with Interpersonal Relationships On the whole, problems with interpersonal relationships were m e n t i o n ed in two-thirds of the c a s e s in Europe, a s compared to one-third of the c a s e s a m o n g derailed American m a n a g e r s . 7 M a n a g e r s who h a v e problems with interpersona l relationships are those who a r e successful early in their c a r e e rs g e n e r a l l y b e c a u s e they are good at what is often referred to a s t a s k - b a s ed l e a d e r s h i p . When presented with a higher level job that requires a more relationship-oriented leadership style, however, they h a v e a difficult t i m e . Among other things, such m a n a g e r s a r e often described a s insensitive a n d manipulative.

He w a s a b a d people m a n a g e r . . . . A manipulator of people. He s t a r t e d creating a poor climate in the office, m a k i n g the work life not productive. After several warnings, he w a s fired. [1993, Europe]

He is a great strategic thinker a n d he h a s high ethical s t a n d a r d s , but h e l a s h e s out at people, he can't build trusting relationships. He is very smart, but he achieves superiority through d e m e a n i n g others. He is a b u s i v e , h e hits people with intellectual lightning. He instinctively goes after people . Many people hav e tried to work on this flaw b e c a u s e he h a s such extraordinary skills, but it seems hopeless. [1994, United States]

Being overly critical a n d using others to further one's own ambitions a r e two other characteristics of m a n a g e r s with interpersonal relationship p r o b l e m s. A European senior executive described what this looked like in terms of the behavior of one country m a n a g e r .

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He w a s a l w a y s criticizing others, he felt free to do so without t a k i n g a n y responsibility for himself . . . His relationships with s u b o r d i n a t e s w e r e not sound; he could b e over-friendly but not over-concerned. His behavior w a s a r r o g a n t . In fact h e use d other people for his ambition. When h e hired p e o p l e h e looked for p e o p l e like himself, mirror i m a g e s. Always a m i s t a k e. He left the company two years a g o a n d I think that he is still looking for a job.

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A p e n c h a n t toward authoritarianism e m e r g ed a s a factor a m o n g d e r a i l e d European m a n a g e r s . They were often s e e n a s ruling by fear or acting in a dictatorial m a n n e r .

People w e r e quitting or requesting transfers. She expected complete loyalty, to the e x t r e m e. She w a s dictatorial, overly protective of the group a n d her own i d e a s which she forced onto the group. O n c e someone left, s h e b a r e ly s a i d hello to them after that, and their accomplishment s w e re forgotten. She tried to isolate the team almost completely from the other d e p a r t m e n t s a n d the o u t s i d e world, cutting all the links. That w a y her people couldn't l e a r n about how other units functioned, how other m a n a g e r s b e h a v e d .

He (the d e r a i l e d manager) stopped d e l e g a t i n g a n d b e c a m e the only central decision maker. He tried to centralize only a r o u n d him. He b e c a m e a dictator.

On the other h a n d , the only time a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n style w a s identified a s a d e r a i l m e n t factor in the U.S. d a t a w a s in the c a s e of a m a n a g e r who w a s u n a b l e to a d a p t to a c h a n ge in the organizational culture.

This difference between European a n d U.S. m a n a g e r s may b e e x p l a i n ed in a couple of w a y s . First, the movement toward participative m a n a g e m e n t h a s b e e n u n d e r w a y in the U.S. for a longer time t h a n it h a s in Europe. Second, the results may reflect differences in the cultural dimension known a s power d i s t a n c e . Power d i s t a n c e is the extent to which one person; e.g., a boss, can d e t e r m i n e the b e h a v i o r of another person; e.g., a s u b o r d i n a t e . 8

The final characteristic of m a n a g e r s with interpersonal relationship problems is a n u n w i l l i n g n e s s to communicate or a preference for operating on a solitary b a s i s .

He w a s not interested in communicating with his team, co-workers or peers; not committed to sharing and transferring experience, information, k n o w l e d g e or process. He tended to be a block in the flow of information, a bottleneck within the company. (1993, Europe)

He w a s too individualistic. He w a s not a t e a m worker, a n d u n a b l e to work with o t h e r s . A one-man show. He did not accept belonging to a big company. (1993, Europe)

Although problems with interpersonal relationships is one derailment factor that h a s e n d u r e d over time a n d across the cultures considered here, this d o es not m e a n that all m a n a g e r s who have problems with interpersonal relationships will d e r a i l , or that problems with interpersonal relations (or any other single d e r a i l m e n t factor) will lead to derailment in all organizations. 9 The factor a p p e a r s to b e one that h a s much to do with t h e organizational culture. It a l s o may b e the c a s e that, even if a m a n a g e r d e r a i l s for a combination of r e a s o n s , problems with interpersonal relations is one of the most obvious e x p l a n a t i o n s for d e r a i l m e n t after the fact.

Failure to Meet Business Objectives In every derailment study done, a track record of performance h a s been a typical r e a s o n given for derailed m a n a g e r s ' initial success. Early in their

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c a r e e r s , whe n jobs required technical skills or making a n d i m p l e m e n t i ng decisions on one's own in a relatively s t a b le system, d e r a i l e d m a n a g e r s w e r e a b l e to meet b u s i n e s s objectives. But when conditions c h a n g e d a n d n e w skills a n d w a y s of working with others were expected, productivity p r o b l e m s a r o s e for t h e s e s a m e m a n a g e r s .

He h a d very disappointin g b u s i n e s s results. The m a r k e t p l a c e competition w a s tight a n d at that time there were poor quality products to sell, but t h e r e w a s a great p r e s s u r e to produce profits. There were wrong s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s m a d e . In g e n e r a l , corporate h e a d q u a r t e r s w a s very u p s e t. His very senior level position w a s a m a k e or break position but h e could not p r o d u c e r e s u l t s . He left the company a n d is now g e n e r a l m a n a g e r of another b u s i n e s s .

Failure to meet performance expectations h a s b e e n identified a s a source of d e r a i l m e n t throughout the Center's program of research. It w a s a t t r i b u t e d e a r l y on in research to a lack of follow-through on promises or to b e i n g overly a m b i t i o u s . Frequently, t h e inability to deliver results w a s viewed a s a b e t r a y a l of trust or unjustified self-promotion.10

The c a s e of self-promotion without the deliverables to support it w a s cited by m a n y European senior executives in the most recent derailment s t u d i e s . O n e interviewee offered this account:

He w a s very ambitious a n d spent a lot of time d e m o n s t r a t i ng it by telling others "I w a n t to replace Mr. X or Y: I deserve it. I'm in a position to r e p l a c e him." But there w a s no demonstration of competence to a c c o m p a n y this ambition. Over time, h e demonstrated that h e w a s l e s s competent for t h e job h e h a d . . . He is not trusted by internal customers in the field. They didn't s e e him a s credible, k n o w l e d g e a b le enough to b e competent.

Inability to Build and Lead a Team Typically, derailment c a u s e s a r e closely related. For instance, t h e inability to build a n d l e a d a team may h a v e led to a failure to meet b u s i n e s s objectives, but it might a l s o have b e e n a function of some of the more personality- or relationship-oriented factors described earlier.

The inability to build a n d lead a team w a s a n important d e r a i l m e n t factor in one out of four of the European interviews a n d in one out of five of the American c a s e s . O n e European executive described a m a n a g e r who d e r a i l e d a s follows:

When he reached a position where he h a d to d e a l with significant n u m b e r s of people at different levels, h e could not do it. He w a s very isolated, did not create a team, w a s over-confident, tough a n d individualistic. (1993, Europe)

O n e explanation for this outcome may be that traits such a s a s s e r t i v e n e s s a n d initiative which get m a n a g e r s onto the fast track tend to b e t h e s a m e t r a i t s that later get in the way a s these m a n a g e r s face the c h a l l e n g e s of employing a more participative approach at the executive level.1 1 The ability to u s e a more relational orientation, to strike a b a l a n c e between "mastery over" a n d "connection to" is critical to success at higher levels.1 2

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Furthermore, ther e i s reaso n t o believ e tha t th e changin g time s hav e onl y increased th e salienc e o f a relationa l managemen t style . On e America n senio r executive tol d us :

Today, th e leadershi p skill s require d ar e different , eve n fro m fiv e year s a g o . The expectation s o f peopl e aroun d styl e hav e change d greatly . A manage r can n o longe r rel y o n positio n powe r t o ge t th e jo b done . Peopl e wan t t o s e e their leaders , hea r the m tal k fro m thei r hearts , rol l thei r s l e e v e s u p an d spontaneously an d genuinel y buil d tha t trust . Followershi p i s critical , especially i n downsizin g organizations . Peopl e don' t wan t t o s e e yo u onl y when ther e i s a downsizin g announcemen t t o b e made . Peopl e wan t t o kno w what's i n i t fo r the m an d i f th e perso n leadin g the m know s an d care s abou t them enough . Today , i f you'r e goin g t o spil l you r bloo d fo r th e organization , i t will b e becaus e o f persona l loyalt y t o you r team , no t t o som e abstrac t organization.

This stand s i n star k contras t t o th e mechanisti c leadershi p styl e preferre d i n th e bureaucratic organizationa l mode l followe d b y man y companies . On e America n executive describe d a deraile d manager' s succes s earl y o n a s follows :

. . . a t tha t time , thes e thing s (e.g. , buildin g a team ) wer e no t important . Bu t the cultur e ha s changed . I t use d t o b e hard-nose d an d authoritarian . I n tha t context a manage r coul d mak e decision s o n hi s own , implemen t those , an d be see n a s successful . H e ha s no t bee n abl e t o mak e thi s transition .

Inability to Change or Adapt During a Transition The fourt h endurin g them e ha s t o d o wit h a manager' s abilit y t o adap t t o changes require d durin g transitions . Whe n examine d acros s studies , thi s them e has severa l dimensions . I t include s th e failur e t o adap t t o a ne w bos s wit h a different style ; overdependenc e o n a singl e skil l and/o r failur e t o acquir e n e w skills; an d th e inabilit y t o adap t t o th e demand s o f a ne w job , a ne w cultur e o r changes i n th e marke t (refe r t o Tabl e 1) .

Yet, despit e it s persistenc e ove r time , thi s i s a them e tha t appear s t o hav e evolved i n meanin g an d significanc e t o senio r executives . Whe n adaptabilit y w a s mentione d i n th e earl y derailmen t studies , i t wa s chiefl y i n connectio n wit h adapting t o a ne w bos s wit h a differen t style. 1 3 Overdependenc e o n a bos s o r mentor wa s a ke y derailmen t facto r then . Th e inabilit y t o be ope n t o ne w w a y s of workin g require d b y differen t bosse s cause d man y manager s t o derail . I n later studie s overdependenc e o n a singl e mento r o r o n a narro w se t o f skill s became important , althoug h i t wa s no t on e o f th e factor s wit h th e stronges t relationship t o derailment . Th e inabilit y t o adap t i s a critica l facto r i n th e derailment o f wome n managers , partl y becaus e women , o r anyone regarde d a s different b y th e dominan t culture , ma y experienc e mor e pressur e t o chang e o r adapt t o the existin g culture. 14

Today, i n bot h Europ e an d th e Unite d States , senio r executive s appea r t o b e placing a grea t dea l mor e emphasi s o n th e importanc e o f bein g abl e t o chang e or develo p i n job , cultur e o r organizationa l transitio n periods . Jus t a s importan t is th e abilit y t o adapt one' s thinkin g t o change s i n th e marketplace .

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On the whole, almost two-thirds of both the American a n d the E u r o p e a n m a n a g e r s who derailed in recent y e a r s were described a s b e i n g u n a b l e to c h a n g e or a d a p t . A European senior executive, reflecting on the c l i m a t e of r a p i d c h a n g e said:

Our industry w a s characterized by nationalization a n d privatization a n d periods of recession which were rapi d a n d unpredictable. We w e r e affected by global disorder a n d the fragile n a t u r e of the world economy. America a n d Japan exercised control. There w a s a n e m p h a s i s on c h a n g i n g c u l t u r e a n d t h e attitudes of people. One n e e d e d to u n d e r s t a n d different cultures, e s p e c i a l l y European a n d Japanese: "think globally, act locally." The c o m p a n y w a s over-structured and top-heavy with a "squelchy" middle m a n a g e m e n t . Those who survived were efficient, flexible, a n d versatile.

While resistance to accepting c h a n g e in organizational culture w a s a flaw a m o n g both Americans a n d Europeans, European m a n a g e r s a r e likely to d e r a i l b e c a u s e of difficulties in adjusting to other country cultures. This finding did not a p p e a r to be a factor in the derailment of U.S. m a n a g e r s . This is not to s a y t h a t American m a n a g e r s do not h a v e difficulty in this a r e a , but that t h e senior executives interviewed did not raise it a s a n important aspect of d e r a i l m e n t .

In many c a s e s , the senior executives described r e p e a t e d efforts to giv e the m a n a g e r s feedback on a r e a s for improvement. For whatever r e a s o n , t h e derailed m a n a g e r s were u n a b l e or unwilling to learn from or a p p l y t h e feedback.

I w a s coaching her. We h a d many s e s s i o n s together where the p r o b l e m s w e r e identified a n d we tried to come u p with a n action p l a n . Some p r o b l e m s s h e "owned," others she didn't. She really didn't c h a n g e . She would c h a n g e for a week or two, then return to b a s e line.

When the inability to develop or a d a p t w a s related to a c h a n g e in t h e n a t u r e or scope of a position, a derailed m a n a g e r ' s plight w a s often attributed to a lack of depth or "too narrow a functional orientation." Because these m a n a g e r s never h a d the opportunity to develop multiple perspectives, when they w e r e given t h e responsibility for much broader cross-functional a r e a s of the organization, they derailed. 1 5

The Changin g Dynamic s o f Derailment : Difference s Ove r Tim e Although these four themes h a v e consistently a p p e a r e d in d e r a i l m e nt s t u d i e s over time, the actual dynamics of derailment seem to b e shifting. T h e s e shifts reflect the changing and ever more complex d e m a n d s on m a n a g e r s in more highly matrixed and often downsized organizations operating in g l o b a l m a r k e t s .

Several differences stand out when we compare the earlier U.S. s t u d i e s to the most recent derailment research. First, in the view of senior m a n a g e r s , the ability to a d a p t and develop in the face of c h a n g e or transition is more important now than ever before. It a p p e a r s to be a factor in two-thirds of all derailments both in Europe a n d the United States. In fact, one i s s u e m e n t i o n e d in previous research but not found in recent interviews; i.e., strategic differences with management , is now s e e n a s the failure on the part of m a n a g e r s to a d a p t to c h a n g e s in the market or the organizational culture.

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In a s e n s e , our study is a s much a study of senior executives' p e r s p e c t i v e s of contemporary managemen t competencies a s it is a study of what d e r a i l s m a n a g e r s . As the organizational environment h a s grown more u n c e r t a i n a n d the marketplace more global, senior executives a p p e a r to b e using different l a n g u a g e to describe what is n e e d e d for succes s a n d what is involved in derailment. Rather than pointing to specific skill deficits, executives a r e b e g i n n i n g to recognize that it is more important to h a v e m a n a g e r s w h o know how to learn to d e a l with c h a n g e a n d complexity.1 6

A second difference in derailment d y n a m i c s over time is the a b s e n c e in this most recent study of any mention of overdependence on a boss or m e n t o r — a n important derailment factor in early s t u d i e s . It may b e that, given t h e downsizing a n d turbulent environments in organizations today, o v e r d e p e n d e n c e on a single boss or mentor h a s become a n anachronism.

Third, although the inability to build a n d l e a d a team is a theme t h a t c a n b e found in all derailment research, the scope of what it captures h a s c l e a r ly c h a n g e d over time. In the early interviews, this derailment factor h a d to do mostly with failing to staff effectively, to hire the right people or to h i r e one' s own i m a g e . The l a n g u a g e of those early interviews w a s set in the context of traditional hierarchical organizations operating in relatively stable environments. Yet in recent interviews, in both Europe a n d the U.S., senior executives place more e m p h a s is on building productive t e a m s a n d l e a d i n g them effectively over time. Again, this shift in l a n g u a g e may reflect t h e movement over the last decad e toward flatter structures a n d the u s e of t e a m s .

Derailment is a d e v e l o p m e n t i s s u e , not a v a l u e s i s s u e .

Discussion a n d Implications

European vs. American Derailers: More Alike than Different? The e n d u r i ng themes in derailment factors detailed earlier a r e consistent for both European a n d American derailers. Whenever studies a r e done on l e a d e r s h i p or leadership development, w e expect to s e e significant differences b e t w e e n American manager s a n d those in other countries. Such differences a r e u s u a l l y notable when the issue at h a n d h a s to do with values , which t e n d to differ across cultures,1 7 or when m a n a g e r s in the U.S. a r e compared to t h o s e working in organizations in very traditional or rural economies.

In reality, however, the economies a n d environments that form the working context for European organizations a r e not vastly different from t h o s e experienced by U.S. companies. In fact, recent research h a s shown t h a t both the accountability hierarchies a n d organizational cultures a r e more a l i k e a c r o s s organizations than they are different.18

For the most part, national cultural v a l u e differences don't derail m a n a g e r s . Rather, derailment h a s to do with the fact that a n individual is u n a b l e to "fit" with the evolving demands of the job over time a n d at successively h i g h e r organizational levels.

Derailment is a development issue, not a values issue. All organizations a r e m a d e u p of jobs that successively d e m a n d more a n d different skills a n d perspectives. Because these organizations face similar environments a n d markets, the requisite interpersonal skills, ability to a d a p t , and the ability to l e a d t e a m s to high performance a r e similar. Thus, the dynamics of d e r a i l m e n t will not differ dramatically.

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This does not m e a n that a n American m a n a g e r would h a v e a n e a s y time of it if h e or s h e took a position in a large German or French manufacturing firm, for example. The risk of derailment for that m a n a g e r s t e m s from the d e m a n d to a d a p t to the new country or organizational culture a n d n o r m s . The important point is that interpersonal skills and the ability to a d a p t would still b e t h e critical factors, not the specific features—the norms, v a l u e s , w a y s of b e i n g — p o s e d by that environment.

Can Derailmen t B e Prevented ? Derailment is a fact of life in organizations. Only a relatively few m a n a g e r s will get beyond g e n e r a l m a n a g e m e n t ranks, either b e c a u s e of a lack of fit for more senior level jobs or the lack of open positions in i n c r e a s i n g l y leaner organizations. Downsizing h a s added to the likelihood that even generally competent people will derail.

Derailment c a n b e prevented, but only if m a n a g e r s a n d t h o s e around them are willing to work on some relatively tough developmenta l i s s u e s . Improvement in any of the four a r e a s represented by the derailment t h e m e s described in this article requires that m a n a g e r s take a n in-depth look a t p e r s o n a l i s s u e s such a s self-efficacy, self-esteem a n d need for control. U n d e r s t a n d i n g why it m a y be difficult to relate comfortably to others, to learn in t h e face of c h a n g e or to let go of persona l achievement in favor of team-building m a y involve facing i s s u es around trust, security, self-confidence or power.1 9 The l e a r n i n g that is involved can b e highly emotional, demanding a n elevated level of r e a d i n e s s or maturity on the part of m a n a g e r s . 2 0

M a n a g e r s who a r e trying to improve their behavior and/or develop n e w skills must a l s o b a l a n c e their energy between the d e v e l o p m e n t a l efforts themselves a n d the m a n a g e m e n t of others' perceptions about t h e c h a n g e s . The fact is that a m a n a g e r ' s reputation often l a g s behind whatever t h e reality of that individual's behavior might b e . A senior executive interviewed d e s c r i b e d this c h a l l e n g e a s it related to one potential derailer:

He s e e m s to b e relaxed, laid-back, s e e m s not to work h a r d . Actually h e is c a p a b l e of working very hard, when pushed . He built u p a n e g a t i v e reputation by h a v i n g this relaxed attitude, nobody would believe it if h e tried to c h a n g e . The built-up reputation dominated a c t u a l behavior. He doe s work h a r d e r a n d better than h e used to, but there is no perception of it in the organization. I know what he does a n d how he's improved b e c a u s e I am close enough to s e e it. But the internal perception of him r e m a i n s the s a m e .

Derailment r e m a i n s a useful lens which can be u s e d to e x a m i n e the leadership function in today's organizations. Focusing on what d e r a i l s m a n a g e r s can be a tool for bringing to the surface the collective beliefs a n d v a l u e s executives hold about what is important in the selection a n d developmen t of future l e a d e r s . This a w a r e n e s s can l e a d to a greater emphasis on l e a d e r s h i p development. In the context of globalization, new employment relationships a n d fast-paced change, such a n e m p h a s i s on development is more critical t h a n ever before. Given the enduring n a t u r e of derailment themes a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t a l p a t h w a y s they imply, there is merit in increasing such organizational attention.

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E n d n o t e s 1 M . McCal l an d M . Lombardo , Off the Track: Why and How Successful Executives Get Derailed, Cente r fo r Creativ e Leadershi p Technical Repor t #21 , (Greensboro , NC : Center for Creativ e Leadership , 1983) ; A. Morrison . R . White, an d E . Va n Velsor , Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Can Wome n Make it to the Top of America's Largest Corporations? (Reading , MA : Addison-Wesley, 1987) ; M. Lombard o an d C . McCauley, The Dynamics of Management Derailment, Cente r fo r Creativ e Leadershi p Technical Repor t #34 , (Greensboro , NC : Center for Creativ e Leadership , 1988) .

2 McCal l an d Lombardo , op.cit . 3 Morrison , White , an d Va n Velsor , op.cit . 4 Lombard o an d McCauley , op.cit . 5 Althoug h w e recogniz e tha t difference s d o

exist amon g th e valu e orientation s o f th e different Europea n cultures , i t wa s no t practica l for u s t o separat e th e si x Europea n countrie s fo r purposes o f thes e analyses . First , w e di d no t have a larg e enoug h sampl e o f interview s t o make th e numbe r o f interview s significan t i n any on e country . Second , man y o f th e organizations i n whic h w e conducte d interviews wer e locate d i n mor e tha n on e country. Give n th e fac t tha t organizationa l culture ma y b e a s stron g a n influenc e i n som e situations a s i s nationa l culture , i t woul d no t seem legitimat e t o spli t compan y dat a alon g national cultur e lines . I n order t o allo w differences t o emerg e fro m th e Europea n data , w e chos e no t t o us e classificatio n scheme s developed fro m previou s researc h (suc h a s McCall an d Lombardo , 1983) , bu t instea d examined th e Europea n dat a fo r commo n themes acros s th e interviews , withou t referenc e to th e categorie s produce d b y earlie r U.S.-based research . W e the n compare d th e American dat a t o bot h th e Europea n an d th e early (U.S. ) researc h categories , lookin g fo r differences an d theme s tha t ma y exis t acros s countries an d ove r time . On e sourc e o f possibl e bias i n thi s stud y coul d b e th e absenc e o f European researcher s o n th e dat a analysi s team. Althoug h w e di d us e Europea n interviewers, th e interpretation s an d conclusions i n thi s pape r ar e draw n fro m th e experience an d framework s o f a cor e researc h team comprise d o f Americans .

6 Ther e als o ar e grea t similarities , ove r tim e and acros s U.S . an d E.U . companies , i n wh y derailed manager s wer e see n a s successfu l i n the firs t place . A s i n th e earl y researc h reporte d by McCal l an d Lombardo , recentl y deraile d executives i n Europ e wer e see n a s havin g strong busines s o r technical expertis e earl y on, a s bein g exceptionall y intelligen t an d strong communicator s an d proble m solvers . Derailed manager s i n th e U.S . i n th e 199 4 sample wer e see n a s successfu l earl y o n because o f thei r intelligence , polishe d self-presentation, busines s an d technica l expertise, har d wor k an d abilit y t o motivat e others.

7 Smal l difference s i n percentage s ar e no t discussed i n thi s pape r becaus e o f th e smal l sample size s i n mos t o f th e intervie w studies .

8 Geer t Hofsted e an d M . Sam i Kassem ,

European Contributions to Organization Theory (Assen: Va n Gorcum , 1976) ; G. Hofstede , Culture's Consequences : International Differences in Work-Related Value s (Beverl y Hills, CA : SAGE Publications , 1984) ; G. Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations (Berkshire, England : McGraw-Hill , 1991); .

9 I n th e questionnaire-base d stud y don e b y Lombardo an d McCauley , problem s wit h interpersonal relationship s wer e correlate d with th e likelihoo d o f derailmen t i n som e organizations, bu t no t i n others .

10 McCal l an d Lombardo , op . cit. ; Lombard o and McCauley , op.cit .

11 B . Kovach , "Th e Derailmen t o f Fast-Trac k Managers," Organizational Dynamics, Autum n 1986; McCall an d Lombardo , op.cit .

12 R. Kaplan , W . Drath , an d J . Kofodimos , Beyond Ambition (Sa n Francisco , CA : Jossey-Bass Publishers , 1991) .

13 McCall an d Lombardo , op.cit . 14 Lombard o an d McCauley , op.cit . 15 Although senio r manager s i n th e earlies t

research di d no t directl y attribut e derailmen t t o having a narro w functiona l orientation , McCal l & Lombardo's compariso n o f th e caree r histories o f successfu l an d deraile d manager s showed tha t derailer s wer e fa r mor e likel y t o have ha d th e sam e se t o f experience s ove r an d over an d tha t manager s wh o continue d t o b e seen a s successfu l ha d bee n i n a wid e variet y of jobs .

16 I n this, ou r researc h confirm s th e result s reported b y G . Ekval l an d J . Arvonen , "Leadership Profiles , Situatio n an d Effectiveness," Creativity and Innovation Management, 3 , 1994 , 139-161 . Using larg e samples o f manager s fro m differen t countries , industries, function s an d levels , thes e researchers foun d unequivoca l suppor t fo r a three facto r mode l o f leadershi p effectiveness , incorporating th e well-know n tas k an d relationship oriente d behavior s an d addin g a third factor , relate d t o change orientation .

17 Hofsted e an d Kassem , op.cit. ; Hofstede . op.cif., 1984 ; Hofstede, op.cit. , 1991 ; Edward T . Hall, Beyon d Culfure , (Ne w York , NY : Doubleday, 1981) ; M.H. Hoppe , A Comparative Study of Country Elites: International Differences in Work-related Values and Learning and Their Implications for Management Training and Development. Unpublished doctora l dissertation , Th e University o f Nort h Carolin a a t Chape l Hill , 1990; Fons Trompenaars . Riding the Waves of Culture (Grea t Britain : The Economis t Books , 1993); H.C. Triandi s an d R . Bontempo , "Th e Measurement o f th e Eti c Aspect s o f Individualism an d Collectivis m acros s Cultures," Australian Journal of Psychology, 3(3 ) 1986, 257-267 ; H.C . Triandis , C . McCusker , an d C.H. Hui , "Multimetho d Probe s o f Individualis m and Collectivism, " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(5) , 1993 , 1006-1020 .

18 E . Jaques , A General Theory of Bureaucracy (London: Halsted Press , 1976) ; E. Jaques and S . Clement, Executiv e Leadership (Ne w York , NY : Blackwell. 1991) ; Hofstede, op.cit., 1991 .

19 W. Drath , Why Managers Have Trouble

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Empowering: A Theoretical Perspective Basedon Concepts of Adult Development, Technica l Report No . 15 5 (Greensboro, NC : Center for Creative Leadership , 1993) .

20 Kaplan , e f al., op.cit.; J . Conger , Learning to Lead: The Art of Transforming Managers into

Leaders (Sa n Francisco , CA : Jossey-Bas s Publishers, 1992) ; C.J. Palus an d W.H. Drath , Evolving Leaders: A Model for Promoting Leadership in Programs, Repor t No . 165 (Greensboro, NC : Center fo r Creative Leadership, 1995) .

About t h e A u t h o r s Ellen Va n Velso r i s a researc h scientis t an d Director o f the Product Developmen t Researc h grou p at the Cente r fo r Creative Leadershi p i n Greensboro, Nort h Carolina . Sh e holds a B.A . i n sociolog y from SUN Y Ston y Brook , an d M.A. an d Ph.D. i n sociology fro m th e University o f Florida. Befor e joining th e CCL she was a postdoctora l fello w i n adult developmen t a t Duke University . Sh e is co-author o f Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Can Women Reach the Top of America's Largest Corporations? (Addison-Wesley , 1987) . He r man y activitie s an d reports includ e Gender Differences in the Development of Managers (Cente r fo r Creative Leadership , 1990) , an d Feedback to Managers, Vols. I & II (CCL, 1992) .

Jean Brittai n Lesli e i s a researc h associat e a t the Center fo r Creative Leadershi p i n Greensboro, North Carolina . Sh e holds a n M.A. i n sociology fro m th e University o f North Carolin a a t Greensboro . Before joinin g th e CCL, sh e taught sociolog y course s a t Elon College , Guilfor d Technica l Community College , an d Greensboro College . Sh e is co-author o f Feedback to Managers, Vols. I & II (Center fo r Creative Leadership , 1992) .

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