Final
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
IMPLEMENTING COMPSTAT PRINCIPLES INTO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND
IMPROVEMENT
by
Mark C. Molinari
December 2016
Thesis Advisor: Erik Dahl Co-Advisor: Patrick Miller
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)
2. REPORT DATE December 2016
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE IMPLEMENTING COMPSTAT PRINCIPLES INTO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND IMPROVEMENT
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Mark C. Molinari
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Roads and bridges, as aspects of transportation that are at the center of critical infrastructure (CI), are central to evacuation and to emergency response. New York City CI needs an accountability and communication model to ensure future progress, focusing on maintenance and prioritized improvement. This thesis focuses on how a performance measurement system, such as the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) CompStat model, will improve and protect the critical infrastructure of New York City’s roads and bridges. The author uses over 20 years of NYPD managerial experience to demonstrate the successes of the NYPD’s CompStat program through its 22-year history and how those successes can be translated to improvement in accountability and communications in road and bridge construction and reconstruction. This thesis investigates CI issues, and multiple sample events demonstrate how using the CompStat model would have resulted in a different outcome. I make the recommendation to create a New York City Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure using New York City Emergency Management’s Emergency Support Functions (ESF) as a method of grouping agencies and private companies together to engage in pre-event non-emergency multi-agency conversations. 14. SUBJECT TERMS CompStat, NYPD, Critical Infrastructure, CI, New York City Police Department, roads, streets
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
147 16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
iii
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
IMPLEMENTING COMPSTAT PRINCIPLES INTO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND IMPROVEMENT
Mark C. Molinari Captain, New York City Police Department
B.S., St. John’s University, 1995
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2016
Approved by: Erik Dahl Thesis Advisor
Patrick Miller Co-Advisor
Erik Dahl Associate Chair of Instruction Department of National Security Affairs
iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
v
ABSTRACT
Roads and bridges, as aspects of transportation that are at the center of critical
infrastructure (CI), are central to evacuation and to emergency response. New York City
CI needs an accountability and communication model to ensure future progress, focusing
on maintenance and prioritized improvement. This thesis focuses on how a performance
measurement system, such as the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) CompStat
model, will improve and protect the critical infrastructure of New York City’s roads and
bridges. The author uses over 20 years of NYPD managerial experience to demonstrate
the successes of the NYPD’s CompStat program through its 22-year history and how
those successes can be translated to improvement in accountability and communications
in road and bridge construction and reconstruction. This thesis investigates CI issues, and
multiple sample events demonstrate how using the CompStat model would have resulted
in a different outcome. I make the recommendation to create a New York City Mayor’s
Office of Infrastructure using New York City Emergency Management’s Emergency
Support Functions (ESF) as a method of grouping agencies and private companies
together to engage in pre-event non-emergency multi-agency conversations.
vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................1 B. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 C. HYPOTHESIS............................................................................................8 D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................11
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................13 A. BACKGROUND ON CI POLICY AND PROGRESS .........................13
1. Government Directives Regarding CI .......................................14 2. Evaluations of Government CI Efforts ......................................16
B. COMPSTAT .............................................................................................19 C. HOW DO WE FIX CI? ...........................................................................22
III. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN NYS AND NYC ...................................25 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................25 B. NEW YORK STATE ...............................................................................30 C. NEW YORK CITY ..................................................................................33 D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................46
IV. SAMPLE EVENTS ..............................................................................................49 A. ARTHUR KILL ROAD WIDENING ....................................................49 B. BAY TERRACE, STATEN ISLAND, WATER RUNOFF ..................53 C. EASTERN PARKWAY...........................................................................57 D. SUPERSTORM SANDY BUYOUT AND REBUILDING ..................60 E. GATEWAY NATIONAL PARK............................................................64 F. HYLAN BOULEVARD—STATEN ISLAND EXPRESSWAY
DETERIORATION .................................................................................65 G. MAJOR ACCIDENT ON VICTORY BOULEVARD .........................68 H. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................71
V. COMPSTAT .........................................................................................................73 A. OVERVIEW .............................................................................................73 B. FOUR PRINCIPLES OF COMPSTAT .................................................76
1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence ...............................................76 2. Effective Tactics ...........................................................................77 3. Rapid Deployment .......................................................................78 4. Relentless Follow-up and Assessment ........................................79
viii
C. MEETING ................................................................................................79 D. COSTS, TECHNOLOGY, AND STAFFING .......................................84 E. OTHER USES OF COMPSTAT ............................................................85 F. PERFORMANCESTAT MODELS .......................................................86 G. CRITIQUES OF COMPSTAT MODELS.............................................89 H. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................93
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................95 A. INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NYC CI .............................95 B. INCREASED COMMUNICATION FOR NYC CI..............................99 C. PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO NYC CI .................................................102
1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence .............................................103 2. Effective Tactics .........................................................................103 3. Rapid Deployment .....................................................................104 4. Relentless Follow-up ..................................................................104 5. Limitations ..................................................................................105 6. Summary .....................................................................................105
VII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................109
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................113
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................125
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. I-35 Bridge Collapse ....................................................................................2
Figure 2. Skagit River Bridge Collapse.......................................................................3
Figure 3. NYC Roadway .............................................................................................6
Figure 4. Car Ownership Rates in NYC ....................................................................35
Figure 5. Cars on Metropolitan Transit Authority Bridges and Tunnels, 2011 ........36
Figure 6. Resurfacing Gap, NYC Department of Transportation .............................39
Figure 7. Pavement Life Cycle, Conditions, and Costs.............................................40
Figure 8. Travel Modes, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Sandy..........................................42
Figure 9. Roads with Most Vehicular Damage Claims .............................................44
Figure 10. Aerial View of Brookfield Park .................................................................50
Figure 11. Aerial View of the Proposed Widening of Arthur Kill Road ....................52
Figure 12. Street-Level View of Approved Widening ................................................52
Figure 13. Aerial Image of Bay Terrace Section of Staten Island ..............................54
Figure 14. Department of Design and Construction Capital Projects .........................56
Figure 15. Department of Design and Construction Capital Projects .........................56
Figure 16. New Installation of Storm Drain on the Corner of Twombly Avenue and Hopkins Avenue ..................................................................................57
Figure 17. Pedestrian Island—Eastern Parkway .........................................................58
Figure 18. Eastern Parkway Pedestrian Island Removal .............................................59
Figure 19. Street Map of Ocean Breeze, Staten Island ...............................................61
Figure 20. Satellite Map of Ocean Breeze, Staten Island ............................................61
Figure 21. Map of Flood Zone, Ocean Breeze, Staten Island .....................................62
Figure 22. Department of Transportation Protected Streets Listing ...........................63
x
Figure 23. Gateway National Park Entrance ...............................................................65
Figure 24. Broken Concrete and Exposed Construction Rebar ...................................67
Figure 25. View of Northbound Hylan Boulevard Overpass ......................................67
Figure 26. Victory Boulevard Accident ......................................................................69
Figure 27. Victory Boulevard Accident ......................................................................70
Figure 28. Spiral of Decline ........................................................................................74
Figure 29. NYPD Hierarchy ........................................................................................76
Figure 30. CompStat Dais Overview ..........................................................................82
Figure 31. CompStat Dais ...........................................................................................83
Figure 32. CompStat Podium ......................................................................................83
Figure 33. Overlapping Mission Statements ...............................................................96
Figure 34. Hierarchy of CompStat Model and the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure Model ................................................................................101
xi
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. American Critical Infrastructure Ratings .....................................................5
Table 2. Conceptual Model of an Integrated Infrastructure Management System ........................................................................................................27
Table 3. NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services Homeland Security Strategy 2014–2016, Goal 2 ......................................31
Table 4. Road Conditions in Urban Cities in New York State ................................32
Table 5. NYS Congestion Costs and Hours Lost .....................................................33
Table 6. Carless Households ....................................................................................34
Table 7. NYC Roads in Poor/Fair Condition ...........................................................38
Table 8. Commute Times, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Sandy .....................................41
xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
CI Critical Infrastructure
CIKR Critical Infrastructure Key Resources
CPR Citywide Performance Reporting
CRS Congressional Research Service
DCO Deputy Commissioner of Operations
DDC Department of Design and Construction
DHSES Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DMI Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure
EM Emergency Management
ESF Emergency Support Functions
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations
GAO Governmental Accountability Office
MTA Metropolitan Transit Authority
NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate
NPS National Park Service
NYC New York City
NYC CI New York City Critical Infrastructure
NYC DoITT New York City Department of Information Technology and Communications
NYPD New York Police Department
NYSDOT New York State Department of Transportation
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review PIP Parks Inspection Program
SIRT Staten Island Rapid Transit
xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Critical infrastructure (CI) comprises the assets and networks that assist in energy,
health, defense, transportation, and other areas to promote an interconnected network of
utilities and services. These assets must be monitored and improved in a prioritized
manner to ensure proper working order and appropriate use of tax revenue designated to
maintain those assets. This thesis explores implementation of a proven accountability
system into the discipline of critical infrastructure to ensure communication,
collaboration, and prioritization.
The CI discussed in this report is more than the ratings of potholes, roadway
conditions, and bridges. CI conditions relate directly to Homeland Security concerns via
evacuations during terror attacks or natural disasters as well as emergency response to
those attacks and disasters or routine police, fire, and medical emergencies. The simple
truth is that poor roadway conditions and construction projects slow down emergency
vehicles during routine responses; a major catastrophe would result in substantially
increased response times and, potentially, more lives lost.
The United States has a major problem with failing CI. This thesis examines a
potential solution involving both real fixes in New York City (NYC) and also a planned
system of accountability and communication that will enable that solution to become
reality, possibly serving as a model for other U.S. cities. CI will continue to disintegrate
without significant investment, and a proper system will ensure those investments go to
best use in best practices. This thesis describes the federal system for CI beginning with
federal orders and continuing through government critiques by the Congressional
Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, and RAND—a nonprofit think-
tank. However, when looking for specific research regarding municipal CI in New York
City, the government review and oversight literature becomes nearly nonexistent. Any
critiques found come from think-tank organizations and politicians in state and city
government, rather than federal legislators or policy analysts. This thesis explores the gap
between current system status and future improvements, and how to improve
xvi
functionality and accountability of agencies performing repairs and improvements of
Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR).
This thesis contains sample events taken from local media sources, elected
officials’ reports, and personal observation, all of which demonstrate the severe effects of
lack of communication between city agencies, including poor repairs, wasted taxpayer
money, and delays in substantial genuine improvement to critical infrastructure. The goal
of listing these sample events is to identify the need for pre-event, pre-construction
communication to determine a correct course of action and ensuring this communication
assists in developing and testing any post-event plans necessary in cases of evacuation
and emergency response.
The transportation booms of the New Deal in 1933 and the interstate highway
system in the 1950s have deteriorated to an unsafe condition infrastructure. What would a
new New Deal investment look like for NYC CI, and how can accountability ensure
improvement without waste?
An accountability system is needed to ensure agencies performing improvement
and repair work to CIKR are working collaboratively and in a prioritized manner to
provide protection and practical improvements. With so many different agencies,
difficulties arise in accountability methods and are further complicated by necessary
cooperation between different partners.
A system to promote communication and cooperation would address the
prioritization of CI repairs and improvements. Homeland Security depends on CI to move
people, products, and emergency equipment. Without proper functionality, a limit to
improvements in CI will continue, due to the lack of government oversight, inadequate
evacuation plans, lack of collaboration between city agencies and private entities, and
shifting populations. The system of accountability recommended in this thesis requires
private companies to be held accountable for inadequate work and communication to be
established between city agencies and private companies.
CompStat is a crime reduction strategy employed by the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) since 1994 that has significantly reduced crime in NYC while
xvii
encouraging communication-enhancing accountability. With more than two decades of
experience in the NYPD, 16 as a supervisor, and more than 13 years attending and
presenting at CompStat, the author examines whether the NYPD CompStat model or a
similar model would greatly enable the rebuilding and re-envisioning of CI.
The Mayor’s Office of Operations is tasked with rating city agencies and
publishing their findings. It is overburdened and unable to monitor CI improvements
adequately by fostering pre-event frequent periodic communication. This thesis
recommends that the mayor’s office prioritize CI by creating the NYC Mayor’s Office of
Infrastructure, and that the Office of Infrastructure implement a CompStat model to
ensure CI fixes, by building on the existing Office of Operations Infrastructure theme,
using NYC’s Emergency Management Emergency Support Functions to group agencies.
Adapting the NYPD’s model of CompStat to CI improvement and protection will create a
system of communication, accountability, and interagency collaboration. The application
of CompStat principles and how they can be applied to CI protection and improvement is
vital to this thesis topic.
The recommendations in this thesis are simple: New York City government must
make agencies more interwoven in their responsibilities. The examples relate to city
agencies entrusted with CI. The systems proposed should begin with those and expand to
all disciplines. Currently, agencies track efforts on an individual, agency-based, silo-
driven system. The proposed system for the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure and the
CompStat Unit recommended within accomplishes three missions at once: increase
accountability, improve communication, and promote inter-agency collaboration.
By bringing together principles from three city agencies—the Mayor’s Office of
Operations Infrastructure theme, NYC Emergency Management’s Emergency Support
Functions, and the NYPD’s CompStat model of accountability, the new Mayor’s Office
of Infrastructure can promote and monitor communication and collaboration between
agencies and private companies.
xviii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I must begin by thanking former New York City Police Commissioner William
Bratton for recommending me for this program, as well as First Deputy Commissioner
Benjamin Tucker and Chief of Counter Terrorism James Waters for submitting my name
to the commissioner.
Second, I must acknowledge two people I have had the pleasure to work for in the
past: New York City Emergency Management Commissioner Joseph Esposito and Chief
of Staff Andrew D’Amora. Their experience in the NYPD and their new assignments in
NYC Emergency Management gave me insight and a behind-the-scenes tour on how to
implement my thesis.
I thank the multitude of members of the NYPD whom I have supervised over the
years, especially those in my current assignment in the Special Victims Division. The
work you do is God’s work, and you took time out of that to mentor me and help guide
my writing and research. Many partner agencies provided muses and proofreaders to my
ideas.
I thank my amazing cohort colleagues who became friends: homeland security
experts from different fields coming together for a common goal. Although you looked
up to me because of the agency name on my patch, you will never understand that the
work you do is so much more detailed, laborious, and important.
I gratefully acknowledge my thesis team, beginning with mentor Lauren
Wollman; co-advisors Chief Pat Miller and Dr. Erik Dahl; the amazing professors at NPS
and CHDS; Carla Hunt from the Graduate Writing Center; and my editor, Rebecca
Pieken. You took a 42-year-old New York City resident with 21 years as an NYPD street
cop and made him an author. Your job was not easy and you each deserve an award for it.
My parents, Michael and Victoria Molinari, and my mother-in-law, Michele
MacDonald, have sacrificed so much for my career well before this amazing educational
opportunity. Thank you.
xx
My beautiful children, Mark Jr. and Sophia, who have lost their father to in-
residences, thesis sessions, and homework during their most important teenage years, I
thank you for your amazing assistance and behavior as always. I hope my adventure
shows you the value of education and gives you a reminder that it is easier to do at 22
than at 42.
Last but definitely most important, a special thank you to my amazing wife,
Jennifer. You have endured as much as I have and more, running a business and a
household while I left to play graduate student. You have been my biggest supporter over
a 21-year career that has always kept me away from home, and the past 18 months have
been no different.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a major problem with failing critical infrastructure (CI). This
thesis examines a potential solution involving both real fixes in New York City (NYC) and
also a planned system of accountability and communication that will enable that solution to
become reality, possibly serving as a model for other U.S. cities. With more than two
decades of experience in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), 16 as a
supervisor, and more than 13 years attending and presenting at CompStat (a NYPD
program stressing accountability and communication), the author examines whether the
current CompStat or a similar model would greatly enable the rebuilding and re-
envisioning of CI.
CI is more than the ratings of potholes, roadway conditions, and bridges. CI
conditions relate directly to Homeland Security concerns via evacuations during terror
attacks or natural disasters as well as emergency response to those attacks, disasters, or
routine police, fire, and medical emergencies. What would a new New Deal investment
look like for NYC CI, and how can accountability ensure improvement without waste?
A. RESEARCH QUESTION
How well would a performance measurement system, such as the NYPD’s
CompStat model, improve and protect CI, specifically NYC’s 6,145 miles of roads, of
which 43 percent are deficient1 and over 2,000 bridges, of which 20 percent are deficient?2
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines CI as “assets, systems, and
networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” as well
1 “Highway Mileage Report 2014,” New York State Department of Transportation, accessed October
8, 2016, https://www.dot.ny.gov/highway-data-services. 2 “Bridges,” New York City Department of Transportation, accessed October 8, 2016,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/infrastructure/bridges.shtml.
2
as the “essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of
our nation’s economy, security, and health.”3
Major CI failures, such as the I-35 Bridge collapse in Minnesota in 2007, shown in
Figure 1, which killed 13 people and injured 145,4 demonstrate the dangers of continuing
to neglect bridges and roadways and therefore the necessity to improve CI. The I-35 Bridge
was built as part of the U.S. highway system boom that occurred in the 1960s. Another
failing CI example is the Skagit River Bridge in Mount Vernon, Washington, which
collapsed in 2013 after a truck struck a section of the bridge, as shown in Figure 2.5 The I-
35 and Skagit collapses represent the possible fate of 70,000+ deficient bridges in the
United States,6 many of which date to the 1930s.
Figure 1. I-35 Bridge Collapse7
Photo credit: Kevin Rofidal, United States Coast Guard
3 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?” Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 28, 2015,
http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 4 S. Hao, “I-35W Bridge Collapse,” Journal of Bridge Engineering 15, no. 5 (2009): 608. 5 Jeffrey L. Horton, “Surviving an Interstate Bridge Collapse,” Public Roads 78, no. 3 (2014). https://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/14novdec/05.cfm. 6 “Falling Apart: America’s Neglected Infrastructure.” CBS News. Accessed April 5, 2016.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/falling-apart-america-neglected-infrastructure/. 7 Source: “I-35 Bridge Collapse,” Wikipedia, retrieved September 28, 2016,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Image-I35W_Collapse_-_Day_4_- _Operations_%26_Scene_%2895%29_edit.jpg/220px-Image-I35W_Collapse_-_Day_4_- _Operations_%26_Scene_%2895%29_edit.jpg.
3
Figure 2. Skagit River Bridge Collapse8
Photo credit: Sarah Aarthun
These collapses are indicative of outdated physical structures as well as a lack of
systems to fix those structures. There is an immediate need to monitor the unattended
deterioration and lack of accountability and prioritization in the CI system. The United
States needs direct investment in CI and in the human communication and accountability
training that will enable real and lasting improvements.
The need for emergency response to an incident, regardless of its size, is less
frequently considered a connection between Homeland Security and CI, but it is
nonetheless crucial. Examples of the relationship between CI and Homeland Security
include an ambulance getting to a sick or injured person, a fire truck going to a residential
fire, a police car responding to a victim, or a mass mobilization of all of these resources
combined in cases of large-scale attacks or natural disasters. The simple truth is that poor
roadway conditions and construction projects slow down emergency vehicles during
routine responses; a major catastrophe would result in substantially increased response
times and, potentially, more lives lost.
Roads and bridges all over the United States are outdated, impaired, and
documented as inferior by civil engineers, research groups, and transportation agencies,
but improvement models have not been implemented. The U.S. transportation
8 Source: “Washington Bridge Collapses,” CNN, May 26, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/24/us/ gallery/skagit-river-bridge/index.html.
4
infrastructure boom had two phases. The first was part of President Roosevelt’s New
Deal (1933) to help the country recover from the Great Depression. The second was in
the 1950s and 1960s, when the establishment of the nation’s interstate highway system
connected the country.9 The roads and bridges constructed were not intended for use as
long as they have been in service; 84 years since the New Deal and 66 years from the
highway system expansion, respectively. Traffic volume, as well as vehicular weights,
have increased exponentially. Current estimates by the Congressional Budget Office state
that $20 billion a year is needed to maintain CI’s current inadequate levels or $80 billion
a year to show positive advances.10
The ratings in Table 1 indicate major CI failures, ultimately resulting in damage
and loss of life. The literature review in Chapter II includes federal CI protection plans
generated by the DHS and analyses of those plans and processes by organizations such as
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Governmental Accountability Office (GAO),
and RAND Corporation. This literature documents the lack of follow-up and
accountability in CI protection and improvement. American Society of Civil Engineer
(ASCE) reports, such as those used to generate the information included in Table 1,
document the dangerously poor state of roads and bridges both nationally and locally.
9 “America’s Crumbling Infrastructure: Bridging the Gap,” Business Insider, June 29, 2014, accessed
May 22, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-crumbling-infrastructure-bridging-the-gap-2014– 6
10 “America’s Transport Infrastructure: Life in the Slow Lane,” The Economist, April 28, 2011, accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.economist.com/node/18620944.
5
Table 1. American Critical Infrastructure Ratings
Critical Infrastructure Field
Nation11 New York City, NY
Philadelphia, PA12
Washington, DC13
Los Angeles,
CA14 2009 201315 201516 2010 2014 2016 2012 Energy D+ D+ C C Transit D D C D- D D C Ports C C+ B Aviation D D C Levees D- D- C- D- Dams D D C- C- C- B- Schools D D B- C- C- Roads D- D D- D- D- D+ C- Inland Waterways
D- D- D+ D+
Wastewater D- D D D+ D- C+ B+ Hazardous Waste
D D B-
Public Recreation
C- C- B- B- B- C+
Rail C- C+ B B B- Bridges C C+ D+ C D+ B- C Solid Waste C+ B- B- B- C+ C+ B+ Drinking Water D- D C D+ D C+ C Storm Water D- D+ B+ TOTAL D D+ C-
11 “Report Card for America’s Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009, accessed
December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/2009/sites/default/files/ RC2009_full_report.pdf.
12 “Report Card for Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.pareportcard.org/.
13 “Report Card for Washington DC’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2016, accessed February 15, 2016, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASCE- DC-Report-Card-2016-Report.pdf
14 “Report Card for Los Angeles County Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2012, accessed December 28, 2015,http://s247942916.onlinehome.us/pdf/2012-ASCE-Report%20Card-Revised- 10-2-2012-REVISED_FINAL_FOR%20THE%20WEBSITE.pdf
15 “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/asce-news/new-york-infrastructure-receives- report-card/.
16 “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2015, accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/new_york/newyork/.
6
Table 1, based on the American Society of Civil Engineers’ “Report Card for
America’s Infrastructure” as well as the ASCE’s regional reports, shows the only reviews
of CI that document nationwide conditions and demonstrate the current realities of U.S.
CI. It shows the nation’s current CI rating by an independent agency, and can be used as
a guideline for improvements. The low grades represent the need for improvement. The
table also documents that New York City’s roads rate lower or worse than its bridges.17
These examples of CI failure and listed deficiencies are indicators of future issues that
need an immediate solution. Report cards assess the situation, but the outcome must be to
prioritize solutions.
Figure 3. NYC Roadway18
Photo credit Chad Rachman
Poor roadways, created by inadequate upkeep, cost taxpayers in both tax dollars
and private money spent on auto repairs. Odometer.com’s article “20 Cities with the
WORST Roads,” rates New York City’s roads as 6th of 20 of the worst roads in the
17 “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/ NY_ReportCard_FullReport_9.29.15_FINAL.pdf.
18 “NYC Is Pothole City,” New York Post, March 19, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/03/19/new-york- city-is-one-big-pothole/.
7
United States, costing an average of $2,300 per year per motorist for auto repairs of
which 74 percent of the roads are in either mediocre or poor condition.19 Lucius Riccio, a
researcher with Columbia University’s Data Science Institute, states that “chronic
underfunding of road repairs for nearly 20 years left city streets in poor shape and thus,
prone to potholes,”20 and “80 percent of potholes are due to inadequate resurfacing,”21
further demonstrating that a solution to CI issues of accountability and pre-event
communication will avoid these inadequacies.
The homeland security enterprise must assist in the strategic foresight needed to
improve upon critical infrastructure key resources (CIKR) in a prioritized, successful, and
cost-effective manner that ensures accountability. The effect of CI failures on Homeland
Security is multi-faceted. Homeland Security serves to protect CIKR, such as bridges,
roadways, transportation centers (airports, train stations, and bus stations), and also cyber
assets, where vital information is often stored and transferred. Part of that CI protection
responsibility necessitates an attack deterrence framework.
CI will continue to disintegrate without significant investment, and a proper
system will ensure those investments go to best use in best practices. CI is increasingly in
danger of destruction by natural or accidental causes or a terrorist attack.22 Components
of CI are also not self-contained; they overlap and impact one another and affect different
services. Santos, Haimes, and Lian are CI researchers who write, “in order to ensure the
stability, sustainability, and operability of our critical economic and infrastructure
sectors, it is imperative to understand their inherent physical and economic linkages, in
addition to their cyber interdependencies.”23 These interdependencies can create
19 “20 Cities with the Worst roads,” Odometer, retrieved September 29, 2016,
http://www.odometer.com/lifestyle/4672/20-cities-with-the-worst-roads/#page=6. 20 Lucius Riccio, “Applying Data Science to the War on Potholes,” Columbia University Data Science
Institute, March 15, 2016, http://datascience.columbia.edu/applying-data-science-war-potholes. 21 Ibid. 22 According to the 2013 American Society of Civil Engineers Report Card for America’s
Infrastructure, the current rating is a D+ with an estimated $3.6 billion dollars needed to be invested by the year 2020.
23 Joost R. Santos, Yacov Y. Haimes and Chenyang Lian, “A Framework for Linking Cybersecurity Metrics to the Modeling of Macroeconomic Interdependencies,” Risk Analysis 27, no. 5 (2007): 1283.
8
obstacles to improvement, but the system proposed in this thesis uses CI’s interconnected
nature to group infrastructure aspects into a forum promoting communication.
C. HYPOTHESIS
An accountability system is needed to ensure agencies performing improvement
and repair work to CIKR are working collaboratively and in a prioritized manner to
provide protection and practical improvements. With so many different agencies,
difficulties arise in accountability methods and are further complicated by necessary
cooperation between different partners. CIKR is currently owned and managed by a
combination of federal, state, and municipal entities as well as private corporations. Some
difficulties are getting these partners to unite, agree, and work together due to
stakeholders’ diverse interests. Also, currently, the federal government has no regulatory
authority over private industry. As such, there is no way to oversee these exchanges. The
accountability system needs to be non-adversarial and to encourage free conversation,24
and the system also cannot be punitive.25
Applying an effective CI communication and accountability model similar to the
NYPD’s CompStat program would increase the performance of agencies and assist in
emergency response and evacuation procedures. The NYPD’s CompStat program, which
revolutionized the way law enforcement agencies work and created safer cities across the
country, is a crime reduction program that began in New York City in 1994. The model is
twofold, with accountability being the focus and addressing quality-of-life crimes as a
component. The theory is to address smaller crimes in an area before larger crimes occur.
The correlation holds true in CI, where we could address minor concerns before they
become larger. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tracks crimes nationwide
utilizing a Unified Crime Report classification guide, which ensures different
jurisdictions are tracking the same types of crimes (index crimes) regardless of what a
24 Robert D. Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat: Or What Are the Key Strategic Choices That a
Jurisdiction or Agency Must Make When Adapting the Compstat/Citistat Class of Performance Strategies?” Public Performance & Management Review 32, no. 2 (2008): 218.
25 James J. Willis, David Weisburd, and Stephen D. Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2003).
9
jurisdiction names that crime.26 When created, CompStat used these index crimes to
focus resources and prioritize the New York City Police Department’s mission. Since its
inception in the NYPD, CompStat produced a 77.4 percent decrease in index crimes,
including an 85 percent reduction in homicides.27 The original NYPD CompStat
principles are accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment, and
relentless follow-up and assessment.28
The author uses his Compstat experience of witnessing the principles, procedures,
and policies and compares that experience to academic articles regarding CompStat to
posit potential CI applications, including the creation of the Mayor’s Office of
Infrastructure. The personal knowledge and expertise are coupled with available research
to demonstrate the success of the NYPD’s CompStat program, similar programs in other
cities, and programs in other disciplines modeled after the NYPD.
This thesis recommends the use of a proven performance management style,
CompStat, into a discipline that requires communication and accountability measurement
for improvement. The author’s experience forms the basis to apply the CompStat
principles to CI protection and improvement as follows:
• Early collection of issues to be addressed
• Multi-agency collaboration
• Prioritized workload
• Post-event or post-improvement critiques
This thesis also explores the gap between what has been done and what needs to
be done to fix New York City’s CI. Topics discussed cover how to improve the
functionality, communication, and accountability of agencies performing repairs and
improvements of CI. The research draws a conclusion between what RAND, the GAO,
26 “Unified Crime Report.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved May 8, 2016.
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. 27 “Compstat 2.0.” New York City Police Department. Retrieved May 7, 2016.
https://Compstat.nypdonline.org/. 28 Jeff Godown. “The Compstat Process: Four Principles for Managing Crime Reduction.” The Police
Chief 76, no. 8 (2009): 36–38.
10
and the CRS state the federal government needs to do to correct CI nationally and applies
that conclusion to the same CI areas in NYC. The anticipated outcome is the effect that
applying CompStat principles will have in CI protection and improvement projects as
well as a projection of how these principles will affect future projects.
The New York State Office of Emergency Management (NYS OEM), particularly
the Office of Counter Terrorism, oversees the NYS system of CI protection and
improvement but, contrary to the federal system, there are no outside entities analyzing the
NYC system. This thesis’ research shows inadequate oversight at the local NYC level.
The NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations “monitors the performance of all City
agencies, holding each agency accountable for providing high quality services and making
data about the City’s performance readily available to the public.”29 Their website uses
numerous indicators to detail agencies’ performance. The NYC Mayor’s Office of
Operations provides this information via the Citywide Performance Reporting (CPR)
tool.30 The CPR tool assigns similar aspects of all city agencies to eight citywide themes,
including Public Safety, Legal Affairs, Education, and Infrastructure. The Infrastructure
theme consists of reports on city agencies tasked with infrastructure but the Mayor’s Office
of Operations does not define collaboration, coordination, or accountability and it does not
encourage participation of private companies. The word “theme” implies a lack of
accountability and a change to the Office of Infrastructure promotes responsibility.
NYC Emergency Management (EM) “plans and prepares for emergencies, educates
the public about preparedness, coordinates emergency response, and recovery, and collects
and disseminates emergency information.”31 City agencies and private companies working
in the same disciplines are combined into EM’s emergency support functions (ESF) model
for post-event repairs and mitigation. This thesis recommends creating an office of the
Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure (DMI), using EM’s ESF model of combining city agencies
29 “Mission,” NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations, retrieved October 15, 2016, http://www1.nyc.gov/ site/operations/about/about.page
30 “CPR: Agency Performance Reporting,” New York City Mayor’s Office, retrieved October 15, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/cpr/html/home/home.shtml.
31 “Overview,” New York City Emergency Management, August 19, 2016, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ em/about/overview.page
11
and private companies to increase communication among all partners in NYC CI.
Combining these models, in addition to implementing a CompStat unit within the Deputy
Mayor of Infrastructure’s office, fosters an accountability model to CI improvements.
Moving Infrastructure from a sub-unit of the Mayor’s Office of Operations into its own
agency will show the dedication the mayor has to improving CI for all New Yorkers, as
well as demanding accountability of the agencies responsible for NYC’s CI.
D. RESEARCH DESIGN
To demonstrate the need for an accountability and communication model in CI,
Chapter II provides a literature review, examining government documents and academic
works on CI and its current state. Next, Chapter III reviews think-tank organizations and
engineering groups’ ratings of CI by detailing causation of road conditions and future
investment needed. Then, Chapter IV lists seven sample events of CI issues and city
agencies’ lack of communication and accountability. These events are collected from
seminars presented by local elected officials, local media sources, and personal
observation. Chapter V presents a detailed overview of the NYPD’s CompStat model and
similar models, not only focusing on successes but also listing critiques and limitations.
Then, Chapter VI analyzes the methodology of implementing the CompStat model into CI,
including structure of the office designated to monitor agencies’ progress. Lastly, Chapter
VII concludes the thesis by stressing the benefits of conducting a CompStat system and the
importance of communication, accountability, and monitored improvement in NYC CI by
creating the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure.
12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
13
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter I reviewed failing critical infrastructure in the United States and
hypothesized a solution for NYC. Although grades and rating systems indicate that most
aspects of CI in NYC need work, this thesis focuses on NYC roads and bridges and
improving them through the NYPD’s CompStat model. Chapter II reviews literature
regarding CI, beginning with government documents and critiques of those documents.
Next, the chapter reviews literature on CompStat, including both negative and positive
aspects, followed by literature on the current state of CI by think tank organizations.
A. BACKGROUND ON CI POLICY AND PROGRESS
Due to the lack of government plans and overwhelming number of critiques of
road and bridge conditions in New York City, this thesis compares CI on a regional level
to that on a national level. The thesis first examines the plans, policies, and goals issued
by the federal government regarding critical infrastructure protection. Next we explore
the critique of those policies and plans, then examine descriptions and criticisms of
CompStat, and finally discuss the need of New York City roadways to be maintained and
improved in a more efficient manner. Even though the government produces many
reports regarding improvements to CI, and federal agencies tasked with reviewing these
reports have chronicled the failures of agencies, little literature exists on how to fix CI.
Are there current accountability methods, measurement systems, or metrics in
place to ensure productive, priority-based protection and improvement to CIKR?
Research says not yet. Reviews by the GAO, RAND, and CRS all recommend
implementation of a better form of metrics. These reports ask one question: How is DHS
tracking improvements made in disaster preparedness? These reports address the lack of
DHS (and sub-agencies) measuring successes, tracking improvements, and monitoring
the results of their published goals. The system recommended in this thesis will create a
communication model and an accountability aspect to ensure correct follow-up.
14
1. Government Directives Regarding CI
Government documents, such as plans, guidelines, goals, and after-action plans,
have examined CI issues since at least the early 1990s, and have included the creation of
Executive Orders and Presidential Policy Directives. When we think of homeland
security, we may think of the post-9/11 world, but the orders, especially as they relate to
CI, date further back.
In 1996, President Clinton issued orders to monitor, improve, share and analyze
information regarding CI. Executive Order 13010, published by President Clinton on July
15, 1996, established the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
tasked to recommend a national policy and strategy to protect CI from physical and cyber
threats.32 This order is the first to mention partnerships between the public and private
sectors. Presidential Decision Directive 63, issued by President Clinton in 1998, created
information sharing and analysis centers to allow the government and critical
infrastructure owners (city, state, and federal agencies and private companies that own CI
components) to consult with each other.33
President Bush issued Executive Orders to create DHS and to establish “establish
readiness metrics to measure progress.”34 These readiness metrics were never specified,
and the federal government did not follow up to ensure the establishment of metrics.
Executive Order 13228, issued in 2001, created the Office of Homeland Security. 35
Executive Order 13231 of 2001 includes the Congressional Approval of DHS.36 The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security as an
32 William Jefferson Clinton, “Executive Order 13010—Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Federal
Register 61, no. 138 (1996): 37347–37350. 33 William Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Washington, DC: The White House, 1998). 34 George W. Bush. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. 17 December
2003.” Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. Accessed March 11, 2016, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217–7. Html.
35 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council,” Federal Register 66, no. 196 (October 10, 2001): 51812–51817.
36 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13231: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age,” Federal Register 66, no. 202 (October 18, 2001): 53063–53071.
15
Executive Department with the mission of preventing terrorism within the United
States.37
President Bush also issued orders to bolster CI and to measure improvements. The
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-7 signed on December 17, 2003,
“requires federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and protect” U.S. CI
assets.38 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8, issued at the same time,
developed the goal of organizing national efforts and investments to strengthen
preparedness and to “establish readiness metrics to measure progress.”39 Again, these
readiness metrics were never specified, and the federal government did not follow up to
ensure the establishment of metrics.
Methods of threat assessment were introduced in orders issued by President
Obama in 2011. HSPD-8 created the National Preparedness Guidelines and the National
Preparedness System.40 This system identifies practices that would be used to generate
the National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness Report, such as the Threat
and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) and the 31 Core Capabilities that
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) utilizes. On February 12, 2013,
President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 21, which created the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan.41
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
requires the publication of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) every
four years.42 The first version, published in 2010, describes how events after 9/11 and the
37 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 38 George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7): Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 39, no. 51 (December 22, 2003): 1816–1822.
39 Bush. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. 17 December 2003.” 40 “Homeland Security Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness,” White House, December 17, 2003.
http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm. 41 Barack Obama. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience (Washington, DC: White House, 2013). 42 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat.
266 (2007).
16
creation of DHS showed the need for links between homeland security and other
functions, such as securing borders, managing immigration, and critical infrastructure.
The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review builds on the 2010 report as well as
critiques of that report. The 2014 version states DHS will adopt strategic shifts and renew
emphasis on strengthening the execution of DHS’s mission through public–private
partnerships.43 Based on reviews by GAO, CRS, and RAND, the QHSR and HSPD-8
require that metrics be developed, yet never gave the format to be used to formulate or
institute those metrics.
2. Evaluations of Government CI Efforts
Government monitoring groups, such as RAND, the CRS, and the GAO, also
produce reports on CI. Most of these reports regard how DHS (and sub-agencies) have
lacked measuring successes, tracking improvements, and monitoring results of their
declared goals.
Even though the government produces reports regarding improvements made to
CI and the federal agencies tasked with reviewing these documents issue reports on the
failures of agencies, there is little literature on how to specifically fix that disconnect.
DHS produces documents such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the
National Preparedness Report while the GAO and CRS indicate a lack of progress. The
cycle of failures continues as GAO and CRS reports call for DHS to develop metrics, but
they do not provide guidance or advice as to what kind of metrics to develop or how to
implement those metrics. Twenty years later, specifics are more necessary than ever, and
NYC has an opportunity to build on CompStat and lead the country.
Multiple reports issued by the GAO address a lack of initiative by DHS in
advancement of CI monitoring. A 2011 GAO report documents failures by FEMA,
including seven different previously discussed efforts and recommendations that had not
43 Ibid.
17
been implemented.44 The report states the following regarding measurable performance
indicators:
Thus, identifying measurable performance indicators could help FEMA (1) track progress toward established goals, (2) provide policy makers with the information they need to make rational resource allocations, and (3) provide program managers with the data needed to effect continual improvements, measure progress, and to enforce accountability. 45
GAO issued reports documenting failures, but the recommendations were not
followed and CI continues to deteriorate. This thesis describes a performance
management and accountability model employing those indicators, allocations, data, and
measured progress for positive efforts.
In 2013, GAO issued a report as a follow up to the 2009 report on deteriorating
CI.46 The newer report states: “in April 2009, we reported that establishing quantifiable
metrics for capabilities was a prerequisite to developing assessment data that can be
compared across all levels of government.”47 A 2014 GAO report details the National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS.48 The NPPD is responsible for
leading the coordinated effort and partnership between the sector-specific agencies and the
private sector. In 2011, the Senate Committee on Appropriations directed that the NPPD
report to the Committee within 60 days to outline efforts made in improvements, including
implementing performance metrics.49 The GAO failed to provide instruction in the
development of and implementation of performance metrics. In August 2013, the DHS
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made
Limited Progress in Assessing National Capabilities (GAO-11-260) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011), 2, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11260t.pdf.
45 Ibid. 46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but
Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities. (GAO-13-637T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013): 8, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO- 13-637T.
47 Ibid. 48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure: Assessment of the Department of
Homeland Security’s Report on the Results of Its Critical Infrastructure Partnership Streamlining Efforts (GAO-14-100R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/ products/GAO-14-100R.
49 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness, 8.
18
responded with a report that failed to address the points made by the Senate Committee.
The reports written from 2009 until 2014, state that more must be done to define and
implement measurement performance metrics. The latter reports indicate that those metrics
were never developed, yet still do not recommend how to do so.
More recent releases by the GAO highlight the difficulties in the partnership
program between sector-specific agencies and the private sector but also list the failures
of private industry to cooperate.50 Another 2014 report focuses on the difficulty in
assessing CI risks due to the different assessment tools and methods used.51 A review by
the GAO shows that DHS is unable to integrate vulnerability assessments due to different
agencies using different tools to measure different aspects of CI. For example, a 2015
GAO report on electromagnetic threats covers a wide array of issues with the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan’s establishment of the sector-specific Agencies and the
necessary partnership agreement.52 Recommendations state that “testing standards and
measurable improvement metrics should be defined as early as possible and kept up to
date.”53
This section documented a consistent lack in specifics over a period of more than
two decades despite recurring recommendations of the need for metrics. The next section
explores the recommendations of GAO and incorporates them into a NYC model of
accountability and communication based on the CompStat principles, positing an
adaption of CompStat as a means to generate specific fixes and metrics.
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on Key
Factors in DHS’s Implementation of its Partnership Approach (GAO 14-464) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-464T
51 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts (GAO 14-507) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-507.
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Threats to the Electric Grid. (GAO-15-692) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15- 692T.
53 Ibid.
19
B. COMPSTAT
There is a wealth of literature on CompStat starting with the launch of the
program in New York City in 1994, and this literature can be expected to increase as
more departments and disciplines attempt to incorporate CompStat-style tools into their
respective agencies or fields. Most literature examines the development of CompStat and
the distribution to other police agencies and then to other city agencies. A 1999 study
revealed that a third of large departments had a “CompStat-like program” and an
additional 26 percent planned to initiate one.54
In researching performance metrics, we review the literature regarding general
performance metrics and then, more specifically, metrics for the NYPD’s CompStat
program. Performance management researchers credit the creation of CompStat to Police
Commissioner William Bratton of the NYPD. Some literature states that the ideas started
with Bratton’s policies in Boston in the late 1980s and early 1990s.55 Academics
studying CompStat and crime strategies, such as Behn, Willis, and Dabney, have studied
the successes of CompStat and similar programs.
Researchers have attempted to identify progress that can be translated into
performance management. While there is no generally accepted approach yet, computer
advancement and data collection techniques will improve, but a methodology of how to
quantify performance in CI improvements and prevention is needed. An article on the
Homeland Security Today website states that “there is no comprehensive, strategic
approach to identifying, prioritizing and implementing investments for disaster resilience,
which increases the risk that the federal government and non-federal partners will
experience lower returns on investments or lost opportunities to strengthen key Critical
Infrastructure and lifelines.”56 In 1998, transportation analyst A. C. Lemer stated that
54 Willis, Weisburd, and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities. 55 Dean Dabney, “Observations regarding Key Operational Realities in a Compstat Model of
Policing,” Justice Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2010): 28. 56 Anthony L. Kimery, “FEMA Outlines Decade of Progress after Hurricane Katrina, But Millions in
Public Assistance Grants Misspent, IG Says,” Homeland Security Today, http://www.hstoday.us/industry- news/general/single-article/fema-outlines-decade-of-progress-after-hurricane-katrina-but-millions-in- public-assistance-grants-misspent-ig-says/43d7822af3d3a03728600ee072aa5ac9.html.
20
“innovative data-collection technologies and increased computational power will enable
public works asset managers to gain better understanding of infrastructure performance
and the public’s demand and expectations for its infrastructure.”57 Taquechel and Lewis,
who have written about how to deter attacks on CI, state that “there is a considerable
repository of literature offering insights into how deterrence might be quantified, without
ever explicitly stating how to quantify it for CI protection.”58 Government directives and
critiques all discuss the need for communication, accountability, and performance
measurements, but do not specify a method of implementations.
Literature regarding performance management styles similar to the CompStat
model include discussions of PerformanceStat, a term coined by Robert Behn to describe
all of the CompStat-like programs nationwide, most of which incorporate either the
location or the agency involved; Citistat in Baltimore; ParkStat in the NYC Parks
Department; and LouieStat in St. Louis.59 Behn points out that any PerformanceStat is
strategy that should involve regular and frequent meetings, in which a “chief executive
uses data to analyze past performance, follow up on previous decisions to improve
performance, establish performance objectives and examine the effectiveness of
performance strategies.”60 Behn’s earlier literature on performance measurement details
reasons to measure performance to achieve eight specific managerial purposes. Behn
states that public agency leaders need to define the purpose of measurement, identify
specific measures, and put the data obtained to practical use.61
57 A. C. Lemer. “Progress toward Integrated Infrastructure-Assets-Management Systems: GIS and
Beyond.” In Innovations in Urban Infrastructure Seminar of the APWA International Public Works Congress, (Washington, DC: American Public Works Association, 1998): 7.
58 Eric F. Taquechel, and Ted G. Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure Risk,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 12 (August, 2012), accessed March 29, 2016, https:// www.hsaj.org/articles/226.
59 Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat,” 206. 60 Ibid., 215 61 Robert D. Behn, “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures,”
Public Administration Review 63, no. 5 (2003): 588.
21
Positive reviews of the NYPD CompStat system continuously cite the awards
won by the NYPD for changing crime fighting techniques.62 In 2001, George Keeling, a
criminal justice researcher and author, called CompStat “perhaps the single most
important organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the
twentieth century.”63 The documented successes of the NYPD’s CompStat program
depict a vast difference in crime reduction; adapting a CompStat model within the
Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure is likely to create a medium increase in productivity,
accountability, communication, and improvement to CI.
There are also critiques of CompStat. The most repeated idea references the tone
and design of the meetings and quoted that CompStat can be “punitive” or “brutal.”64
Due to this, there was an NYPD executive shift by the end of 1994.65 Research yields
allegations of supervisors downgrading crimes to make crime appear lower.66 In 2009,
Shelly Metzenbaum stated, “what is needed is a performance management approach that
is outcome focused, measurement rich, and inquisitive but not punitive.”67 In developing
an accountability model for CI improvements, the positive and negative aspects of
CompStat and similar programs must be addressed.
Behn and Willis give detailed examples of the process of these performance
meetings, such as why they are needed, when to have, length, frequency, and
organizational psychology that may exist. There must be a deficit that needs to be
addressed, and pointing out flaws yields an analysis of what is happening68 as well as
62 The NYPD won the1996 “Innovations in American Government” award, sponsored by the Ford
Foundation and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. 63 George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York
City’s Police Reforms (New York: CCI Center for Civic Innovation at the Manhattan Institute, 2001), 6. 64 Willis, Weisburd, and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities, 21. 65 Eli B. Silverman, “Mapping Change: How the New York City Police Department Reengineered
itself to Drive Down Crime,” Law Enforcement News, December 15, 1996. 66 Willis, Weisburd and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice, 12. 67 Shelley H. Metzenbaum, “Performance Management Recommendations for the New
Administration” (2009). Edward J. Collins Center for Public Management Publications. Paper 11. 4. Retrieved on November 8, 2015, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cpm_pubs/11.
68 Willis, Weisburd and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice, 7.
22
using this format as a “management tool to influence decisions.”69 Behn also discusses
the timing of the meetings, early morning as to not interfere with the regular work
functions of those attending.70 He then describes how the length and frequency of the
meetings, as well as the room design, are crucial elements in a successful
PerformanceStat set-up.71 One last point from multiple pieces of literature addresses the
cultural psychology of professions and occupations. Will various offices adapt to this
new thinking, tolerate the risk, and encourage new approaches?
Although the literature reviewed involves the need, history, and critiques of
CompStat and programs like it, the application of CompStat principles and how they can
be applied to CI protection and improvement is vital to this thesis topic. The first steps
are to address the current mission, deficits, and technological framework. Once the
mission is developed, the data to be analyzed must be shared with all members attending
the meeting. The subject agency must spread an accurate portrayal of the stat processes,
missions, and methodologies. Maintaining a professional, productive atmosphere is key
to ensure a true method for improvement.72
C. HOW DO WE FIX CI?
Many studies document the interconnectedness and interdependency of critical
infrastructure but do not address how to get those connected parts to work more
efficiently together. Agencies such as RAND, the GAO, and the CRS, concentrate on
overall assessments of what the federal government is doing correctly or what needs to be
improved. As such, there is little academic research on smaller-scale locations, such as
what cities are doing correctly or incorrectly.
69 Jamie Giles. “Do Municipal Stat Programs Improve Services and Reallocate Resources? Evidence
from LouieStat,” (MPS/MPP Capstone Project, University of Kentucky, 2014), accessed March 29, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/4 , 1.
70 Willis, Weisburd, and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice, 7. 71 Ibid. 72 Paul E. O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, the New York City Police
Department’s Compstat Model of Police Management (Arlington, VA: Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2001).
23
Experts in the field of CI research determine that increased budgets will be
required to make necessary improvements, but money must be spent in a prioritized
manner that is tested and evaluated, continuing future progress based on past
improvements. In her 2013 work, Mayada Omer, a resilience product development expert
at the University of Munich, references the need to make transportation systems more
resilient, which “creates a need for developing metrics that measure the current resilience
of the system and provides a benchmark for evaluating different strategies for improving
resilience.”73
Bruce Shaller is a CI researcher at New York University’s (NYU) Wagner School
who presented at NYU’s Rudin Center. There, he references the 2010 New York State
Capital Program for the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) for
2005 to 2010.74 This program gives $17.4 billion to NYSDOT’s Highway Capital projects,
$6 billion of which is for the 14 counties of downstate New York, including NYC.75
Shaller’s research shows that a conservative plan to maintain highways during the reporting
period, 2005–2010, would cost $9 billion and a more aggressive plan to make
improvements would be over $13 billion.76
Transportation analysts Winston and Mannering reported the need to involve
private industry in improvements to public highway performance, including the
requirement by law that private industries use the most modern technologies in roadway
replacement and repair.77 New York City’s PlaNYC, developed by Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, references disasters such as Super Storm Sandy and the destruction caused
by climate change. The report focuses mainly on public transit systems, as opposed to
73 Mayada Omer, Ali Mostashari, and Roshanak Nilchiani. “Assessing Resilience in a Regional Road- based Transportation Network.” International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering 13, no. 4 (2013): 391.
74 Bruce Schaller, Choices at a Critical Junction: New York’s Mobility and Highway Infrastructure Needs for 2005-2010. (New York: NYU Wagner Rudin Center for Transportation Policy & Management, 2005), 1.
75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Clifford Winston and Fred Mannering, “Implementing Technology to Improve Public Highway
Performance: A Leapfrog Technology from the Private Sector Is Going to be Necessary,” Economics of Transportation 3, no. 2 (2014): 158.
24
vehicular traffic on roads and bridges, with specific mention of roads and bridges
considered a moderate risk due to weather-related incidents (precipitation or high heat) as
opposed to marine traffic and subways being a high risk.78 One cause of concern that the
report fails to mention is, that once the transit and marine systems fail, already
overburdened roads and bridges will become overwhelmed. Discussion in Comes’ 2014
work citing Super Storm Sandy and the ensuing infrastructure shutdown involves a way
to conceptualize interdependencies.79
This thesis explores the gap between current system status and future
improvements, and how to improve functionality and accountability of agencies
performing repairs and improvements of CIKR. The hypothesis explored in this thesis is
drawn between what RAND, the GAO, and the CRS state the federal government needs
to correct and how we can solve a lack of initiative in the same areas in NYC. Chapter III
addresses CI issues in NYC as reported by think-tank organizations and CI researcher.
78 Michael Bloomberg, A Stronger, More Resilient New York (New York, PlaNYC Program, 2013). 79 Tina Comes and Bartel Van de Walle, “Measuring Disaster Resilience: The Impact of Hurricane
Sandy on Critical Infrastructure Systems.” In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM2014), ed. Starr Roxanne Hiltz, Mark S. Pfaff, Linda Plotnick and Patrick C. Shih, 196. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2014.)
25
III. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN NYS AND NYC
The facilities of infrastructure are among civilization’s most important assets, a storehouse of resources and wealth that each generation inherits, uses, and passes on to succeeding generations. Decisions influencing infrastructure development and use—asset management—undertaken and executed without fully recognizing the complexity, diversity, and social and technological evolution of the system almost inevitably squander economic, environmental, social, and cultural resources.
—A. C. Lemer80
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II reviewed the literature regarding government plans and critiques of
critical infrastructure, the successes of CompStat, and the current state of CI. Chapter III
delves deeper into both NYC and NYS CI, detailing how usage and vehicle ownership
affects road and bridge conditions. Chapter III also explores the effects of weather and
emergency incidents on transportation and emergency response, highlighting the
importance of improving CI in NYC.
Improving CI is more than just filling in potholes. This thesis describes the federal
system for CI beginning with federal orders and continuing through government critiques
by the CRS, the GAO, and RAND. However, as previously noted, when looking for
specific research regarding municipal CI in New York City, the government review and
oversight literature becomes nearly nonexistent. Any critiques found come from think-
tank organizations and politicians in state and city government, rather than federal
legislators or policy analysts. This chapter includes issues in New York City critical
infrastructure as related by the United States Department of Homeland Security, the New
York City Department of Transportation, New York State Division of Homeland Security
plan, and private transportation firm ratings statewide. This thesis reviews current New
York City roadway issues as reported by the Center for an Urban Future, the Rudin
Center for Transportation, and the New York City government. The information cited
80 Lemer. “Progress toward Integrated Infrastructure-Assets-Management Systems,” 8.
26
from research organizations replaces the lack of governmental review and creates the
accurate intelligence principle of the CompStat process. This thesis recommends a
formation of the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure (DMI) and a CompStat unit
therein to monitor CI agencies. The following research investigates whether roadway
construction and repair can influence commuting, safety, finance, and evacuation, and
increase communication and accountability in city agencies.
Work conducted collecting intelligence regarding CI is useless when there is no
measurability, and those responsible are not held accountable. As A. C. Lemer, a
transportation analyst who created the Integrated Infrastructure Management System
(IIMS) states in his 1998 report, “the inefficiencies are widespread and easy to see:
jammed traffic on roads designed to carry only a fraction of the current demand, newly
resurfaced city streets ripped open to repair old subsurface pipes, news media expressing
public outrage that traffic lanes must be closed for maintenance or that basements are
flooded.”81 Lemer’s flowchart shows a process for infrastructure management, yet only
small parts of each step involve accountability, as depicted in Table 2. To learn from the
intelligence collection process, management must accurately compare intelligence
collected versus previous reports or scenarios and advance from the information.
81 Ibid., 10
27
Table 2. Conceptual Model of an Integrated Infrastructure Management System82
The chart in Table 2 depicts a cycle of intelligence collection similar to the
CompStat process principles described in this thesis: data collection, tactics in the form of
changing technology, and rapid deployment via repair work. The “Management decisions
& actions box” is the only reference to actual learning described by relentless follow-up,
but real accountability and learning is not addressed.
82 Source: Ibid, 11.
28
Multiple agencies and private corporations own the interconnected pieces of CI;
this limits communication as public agencies and private corporations perform
independently and without the follow-up stage that this thesis adapts from the NYPD
CompStat model. Proprietary rights conflict with the need for transparency when fixing
CI due to private companies owning CI and wanting to maintain industry-specific
monopolies. Companies do not want to share trade information that gives their
competitors an advantage.83 In New York City, Mayor Bill DeBlasio initiated a working
group to address this issue by having a neutral third party—possibly academic—
responsible for the repository of such information.84 This process allows for
improvements without endangering corporate secrets. As explored in the introduction of
this thesis, the Governmental Accountability Office cited failures in the Department of
Homeland Security’s Sector-Specific Agency and Industry plans due to private industry
withholding proprietary information to maintain industry superiority. Mayor DeBlasio’s
plan would eliminate the secrecy and allow for more accurate information sharing. The
working group is discussed further in this chapter regarding underground CI resources
and private corporation’s proprietary rights.
Reports indicate trouble with emergency preparedness, yet we lack a follow-up
plan. The system of accountability recommended in this thesis would incorporate a plan
and critiques into a forum that discusses the issues and implements better ideas. DHS has
released reports with overviews of urban CI, noting concerns with current evacuation
plans in the major cities and the effects of population shifts on the nation’s CI system.
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, federal agencies reviewed evacuation plans for urban
areas to assess the need for improvements. DHS’s Nationwide Plan Review and the
Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan
Evaluation cite that “some of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States—New
83 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on Key
Factors in DHS’s Implementation of its Partnership Approach (GAO 14-494) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014); Retrieved February 5, 2016, http://www.gao.gov/products/ GAO-14-494
84 “Infrastructure Report,” City of New York, New York City Underground Infrastructure Working Group, (June 2014), www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2014/ infrastructure_report.pdf.
29
York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago—do not have adequate mass evacuation plans in
place.”85
A DHS case study demonstrated that fluctuations in population have adverse
effects on infrastructure. An increase in population causes a greater need for
transportation infrastructure. Expanding urban centers are growing faster than new
infrastructure is built, improved, or retrofitted. In addition, a decrease in population
causes shortfalls in funding. Households below the poverty line, retirees paying low
taxes, and those who have outstanding tax liens create shortages to local economies.86
Maintaining a stable population level while also increasing economic growth is best for
CI needs.
The combination of population information, research into hours lost, fuel wasted,
and emissions increased due to poor roads and improper construction schedules and
depict a need for prioritized CI improvements. The American Highway Users Alliance is
“a nonprofit advocacy organization serving as the united voice of the transportation
community promoting safe, uncongested highways and enhanced freedom of mobility
since 1932.”87 Their report, Unclogging America’s Highways 2015: Prescriptions for
Healthier Highways, identifies the 50 worst traffic bottlenecks in the United States.
Number one is the Kennedy Expressway in Chicago. By way of comparison, this
chokepoint extends 12 miles, costing drivers 16.9 million hours in time and wastes 6.3
million gallons of fuel annually.88 These delays are not the result of a one-time event or a
construction-related glitch. They are due to a poorly constructed interchange not built for
its current usage amounts. By correcting this area, a reduction of 133 million pounds of
85 Daniel Baldwin Hess and Julie C. Gotham, “Multi-Modal Mass Evacuation in Upstate New York:
A Review of Disaster Plans,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 4, no. 3 (2007). 86 “Impact of Population Shifts on Critical Infrastructure,” Department of Homeland Security—Office
of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, July 6, 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure- analysis
87 “About American Highway Users Alliance,” American Highway Users Alliance, accessed September 5, 2016, http://www.highways.org/about/.
88 “Unclogging America’s Arteries 2015: Prescriptions for Healthier Highways,” American Highway Users Alliance, November 23, 2015, http://www.highways.org/2015/11/unclogging-study2015/.
30
carbon dioxide annually would be achieved.89 New York City has nine of the 50 worst
bottlenecks.90
A system to promote communication and cooperation would address the
prioritization of CI repairs and improvements. Homeland Security depends on CI to move
people, products, and emergency equipment. Without proper functionality, a limit to
improvements in CI will continue, due to the lack of government oversight, inadequate
evacuation plans, lack of collaboration between city agencies and private entities, and
shifting populations.
B. NEW YORK STATE
The New York State Office of Emergency Management monitors New York State
Critical Infrastructure but does not provide the oversight for New York City CI that this
thesis recommends; therefore, the city government must take on that responsibility itself.
NYS OEM issues plans similar to those developed by the federal government, but those
are not reviewed or critiqued by any agencies. The New York State Homeland Security
Strategy for 2014–2016 identifies its second goal as protecting critical infrastructure and
Key Resources.91 As evidenced in Table 3, increasing communication and accountability
is not one of the objectives.
89 Ibid. 90 Ibid., 7. 91 “New York State Homeland Security Strategy 2014–2016,” New York State Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Services, accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.dhses.ny.gov/media/ documents/NYS-Homeland-Security-Strategy.pdf.
31
Table 3. NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services Homeland Security Strategy 2014–2016, Goal 292
Table 3, produced by the New York State Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services (DHSES) as part of their NYS Homeland Security Strategy 2014–
2016, depicts an excellent model for CI improvement, yet fails to discuss the issues
92 Source: Ibid.
32
recommended in this thesis: How can DHSES ensure participation, communication, and
accountability?
TRIP, a private non-profit founded in 1971, promotes CI improvements to relieve
traffic congestion. It is sponsored by those that create equipment or do the physical
repairs associated with roadways.93 The studies released by TRIP rate road conditions.
Table 4 indicates the conditions of New York State roadways in urban areas, with New
York City Metro rates being the worst in the state with 51 percent of the roads rated as
poor and only 13 percent rated as good.94
Table 4. Road Conditions in Urban Cities in New York State95
Table 4 indicates that more than half of NYC metro roads are in poor condition
and one-third in mediocre condition, leaving less than 20 percent in acceptable condition.
NYC depends on CI for basic commuting, routine emergency response, and evacuation
preparedness. This thesis develops an accountability measure to increase repairs of road
conditions and follow-up on failures. When broken down along the same urban areas in
93 “About TRIP,” TRIP, accessed September 5, 2016, http://tripnet.org/about.php. 94 “New York’s Top Transportation Issues: Meeting the State’s Needs for Safe, Smooth, and Efficient
Mobility,” TRIP—A National Transportation Research Group, accessed September 4, 2016, 3. http://www.tripnet.org/docs/NY_Top_Transportation_Issues_TRIP_Report_Jan_2016.pdf.
95 Ibid., 6.
33
New York State, New York City experiences the most in congestion costs and
commuting hours lost, as documented in Table 5.96
Table 5. NYS Congestion Costs and Hours Lost97
Table 5 presents the staggering dollar amount spent per year by the average
motorist on congestion and work time lost due to the same congestion. There are many
reasons for congestion, but this thesis addresses road conditions and road reconstruction
that delay travel. Studies conducted by TRIP also denote past increases in population and
how that will affect cities in the future. “New York’s population reached approximately
19.7 million residents in 2014, an 18 percent increase since 1990.”98 Reports indicate
growth in vehicular travel of approximately 3.3 percent over 2013, 2014, and 2015 as
well as an anticipated 15 percent growth by 2030.99
C. NEW YORK CITY
New York City CI differs from borough to borough, due to population density and
roadway use; therefore, CI needs reflect those differences. There is a lack of research
96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., 2. 99 Ibid., 3.
34
regarding CI in NYC neighborhoods and how they are affected. Emergency response,
evacuation, and daily travel are all affected by the deteriorating CI, which then creates
repercussions for Homeland Security. The discrepancies in vehicle ownership in different
boroughs, as well as the number of vehicles commuting through parts of the city, need to
be tracked by the agencies responsible and the methodology of how to incorporate those
discrepancies into CI protection and improvement must be collaborated. Compared with
other metropolitan areas, New York City has the highest rate of households without
access to private vehicles, as shown in Table 6.100 This translates into the need for
different methods of transportation to evacuate more people. Figure 4 outlines private
vehicle ownership by boroughs and neighborhoods and is presented to display the
disproportionate rate of vehicle ownership across New York City’s boroughs. Parts of
this thesis are dedicated specifically to Staten Island, New York, where vehicle
ownership is the highest of any borough. Chapter IV discusses specific incidents with
lack of communication affecting Staten Island.
Table 6. Carless Households101
100 “The Mobility Factbook,” NYU Rudin Center for Transportation, accessed September 4, 2016, http://nycmobility.org/private-car.
101 Source: Ibid.
35
The data in Table 6 directly conflicts with the map in Figure 4. NYC cannot be
looked at as simply one city; population and road use differ greatly by borough. A
monitoring, communication, and accountability model should be based on these issues so
all populations receive prioritized improvements based on the needs of their area.
Figure 4. Car Ownership Rates in NYC102
The map in Figure 4, when coupled with the NYC bridge crossing rates from
Figure 5, indicates the needs of Staten Island residents to commute via private vehicle.
102 Source: Ibid.
36
The number of New Jersey residents commuting through Staten Island to get to other
parts of NYC also needs to be taken into account. Both of these aspects determine a need
for resilient roadways that are well maintained and monitored. This thesis recommends a
model to account for differences in different boroughs.
Figure 5. Cars on Metropolitan Transit Authority Bridges and Tunnels, 2011103
Figure 5 indicates travel over major NYC bridges, indicating the concern of
Staten Island CI. The number of vehicles crossing the Verrazano Narrows Bridge yearly
103 Ibid.
37
represents those of Staten Island residents as well as those commuting through Staten
Island. Those vehicles arrive at the Verrazano Bridge via major highways, thoroughfares,
and secondary roads, causing damage through use and causing delays while they use
roads not intended for increased traffic. Roads need to be maintained in priority order by
the respective agencies, and accountability must be ensured.
The Manhattan-based Center for an Urban Future is a public policy think-tank
that details current issues with New York City’s Infrastructure based on previous
policy.104 Their report, Caution Ahead, cites failures, such as the previous NYC
administration promoting larger-scale projects and neglecting essential resurfacing, the
resurfacing and funding gap, and the effect that commuting has on businesses in NYC.
The connection between business opportunity and shifting populations, and the effect on
CI relates back to TRIP’s report regarding loss of tax revenue and future CI issues.
Caution Ahead details the policies of the Bloomberg administration that caused
the CI deterioration currently experienced. Michael Bloomberg was the mayor of NYC
and served three terms from 2002–2014.105 An example of failure cited in Caution
Ahead is the construction of New York City’s first new water tunnel in 100 years while
the Department of Environmental Protection fell behind its schedule for water main
replacements.106 This lapse in scheduling also occurred in street repaving.
The report describes a funding gap of $3.2 billion dollars in the 2014–2017 capital
needs for investment in New York City infrastructure but includes many facets not
usually covered academically as infrastructure, such as public housing, hospitals, and
prisons.107 Citing only the Department of Transportation, the report indicates a
$789 million funding gap108 for CI repairs, including the 30.4 percent of NYC roadways
104 “About Center for an Urban Future,” Center for an Urban Future, accessed September 4, 2016,
https://nycfuture.org/. 105 “Michael Bloomberg,” Bio. July 28, 2016, http://www.biography.com/people/michael-bloomberg-
16466704. 106 Forman, Adam. "Caution Ahead: Overdue Investments for New York's Aging Infrastructure."
Center for an Urban Future (2014). 107 Ibid., 49 108 Ibid.
38
deemed in fair or poor condition.109 Table 7 displays roadway conditions broken down
by borough.110
Table 7. NYC Roads in Poor/Fair Condition111
Borough Fair/Poor Roads Manhattan 43% Staten Island 40% Bronx 34% Queens 31% Brooklyn 28%
This thesis focuses on taking cited reports and collected intelligence and
incorporating a communication model to create accountability and improvement. In
analyzing the future, Caution Ahead shows that the New York City Department of
Transportation is not meeting required goals to maintain roadways. The DOT “sets a goal
of resurfacing approximately 1,000 lane miles of streets each year, but the agency has
fallen short of that target on all but three occasions since Fiscal Year 2000 (FY2009,
FY2011 and FY2012). During this period, it resurfaced an average of only 852 lane miles
per year,”112 as displayed in Figure 6
Failures and lack of reaching anticipated CI goals are well documented, yet they
continue. Some reports issued yearly detail specifics but miss the follow-up phase that
contributes to the success of the CompStat model. Information provided to the media by
local politicians indicates the fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016 have also fallen below
expectations, but a new initiative has allotted money to pave 1200 miles in 2016 and
1300 miles in 2017. The budget money allocated does not continue past 2017 and will
109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid.
39
have to be renegotiated back into the budget.113 Some sources indicate that setting the
goal at 1000 lane miles still falls short, and a more appropriate schedule is 1,200 miles a
year to prevent deterioration beyond useful life.
Figure 6. Resurfacing Gap, NYC Department of Transportation114
Figure 6 depicts the years in which the NYC DOT failed to meet their goal of
repairing the targeted number of lane miles. This thesis examines how to take this
information, correct the issues that cause the deficit, and ensure follow up.
The pavement life cycle in Figure 7 demonstrates the importance of routine
resurfacing, a pivotal CI issue. Without an accountability model, roads left to deteriorate
past the fair rating will decline exponentially faster, costing more to fix. As depicted,
paved roads have a surface life of approximately 15 years at which point they experience
113 Vincent Barone, “Smoother Island Roads! City Hikes paving miles by 52%,” Staten Island
Advance, June 9, 2015, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/ staten_island_woll_see_a_89_pe.html.
114 Source: Ibid.
40
a 40 percent drop in quality. In the next 2.5 years, roads experience and additional 40
percent drop, at which time the repair cost is five times what it would have been if the
repairs had been done in a timely manner. The goal is to rate and repair roads promptly to
avoid the extra costs associated.115
Figure 7. Pavement Life Cycle, Conditions, and Costs116
This thesis describes a model of communication and prioritization to prevent
unnecessary deterioration. As discussed in this chapter, there is a cycle and a necessity to
proper maintenance involving budgetary issues. In testimony to the New York City
Council, Adam Forman, a research associate at Center for an Urban Future, highlighted
the need to maintain and improve New York City infrastructure to continue attracting
businesses. “With overcrowded subways, decrepit airport terminals, and potholed streets,
talented individuals will leave the Big Apple, opting for San Francisco, London, or Hong
Kong.” 117 Losing businesses and talented people to work in those companies lowers the
115 Shaller, “Choices at a Critical Junction,” 14. 116 Source: Ibid. 117 Adam Forman, “A Call to Sustain New York’s Economic Vitality by Improving Infrastructure,”
Center for an Urban Future, November 2014, https://nycfuture.org/research/publications/a-call-to-sustain- new-yorks-economic-vitality-by-improving-infrastructure.
41
tax base, widening the budget gap, extending the resurfacing gap, and causing greater
issues with CI.
Studies reveal the effects of emergency incidents on transportation systems
indicating that all modes of transport have not been maintained to the highest level
possible, necessitating the need for rigorous follow-up on all projects. The Rudin Center
for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University’s Wagner School
also explores challenges in transportation and infrastructure.118 As indicated in the Rudin
Center’s 2012 Transportation Before and After Sandy, major events cause shifts in
transportation methods and commuting in New York City. The immediate travel times on
days before and after Hurricane Sandy are shown to have doubled in most places, but
almost tripled for Staten Island residents, as indicated in Table 8.119
Table 8. Commute Times, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Sandy120
Figure 8 demonstrates how commuters changed their driving habits after
Hurricane Sandy, including a 35 percent drop in subway travel resulting in a 1 percent
increase in driving and taxi use, a 3 percent increase in bus usage, and a 7 percent
118 NYU Wagner Rudin Center for Transportation Policy & Management, “About the Rudin Center,”
accessed October 10, 2016, http://wagner.nyu.edu/rudincenter/about/.
119 Sarah Kaufman, Carson Qing, Nolan Levenson, and Melinda Hanson. “Transportation during and after Hurricane Sandy.” (2012). Rudin Center for Transportation NYU Wagner Graduate School of Public Service
120 Source: bid.
42
increase in walking.121 The drop in subway availability and usage caused an increase in
bicycling, buses, and driving; all of which affect road conditions and are affected by road
conditions.122 The concern in the 7 percent increase in walking will be discussed further
in regard to personal injury claims against NYC due to street conditions. Improperly
paved streets cause pedestrians to trip and repeated construction causes pedestrians to
take different and occasionally dangerous routes.
Figure 8. Travel Modes, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Sandy123
Reports address the New York City Department of Transportation’s failure to
accurately track roadwork completed and its misrepresentation of improvements. The
accountability and communication model presented in this thesis would promote
transparency. New York City Comptroller, Scott Stringer, conducted an audit on the
NYC DOT’s Tracking of Pothole Repairs to determine if the agency was adequately
tracking pothole repair efforts. As one of the few examples of an audit or review of city
agencies’ performance in regard to NYC CI, the report reveals the DOT’s denial of the
findings of the audit and the methods used to conclude those findings. “DOT’s response
121 Marjorie Landa, Management Audit: Audit Report on the Department of Transportation’s
Tracking of Pothole Repairs, City of New York Office of the Comptroller, June 29, 2016, http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/ME15_114A.pdf.
122 Kaufman, Qing, Levenson, and Hanson. “Transportation during and after Hurricane Sandy.” 123 Source: Landa, “Management Audit.”
43
contains a disconcerting number of inaccuracies regarding the audit’s methodologies. In a
number of instances… the agency presents scenarios that are simply inaccurate. This is of
particular concern because they come from the agency’s senior management, which
should be familiar with the operations of its own agency.”124
Traffic engineering experts raise concerns regarding reports issued by the DOT.
As the agency increases transparency, critics question the legitimacy of the numbers.
Chapter V indicates the issues CompStat created with fraudulently inflating numbers, but
as the technology and tracking of intelligence progresses, accuracy is increasing. Sam
Schwartz was the New York City Traffic Commissioner, and the second in command of
the Department of Transportation when the agencies merged. He has made a name for
himself in public office and as the head of his engineering firm. Schwartz coined the term
“gridlock” and is considered an expert in traffic-related issues. In August of 2016, the
New York Times posted a story about the never-ending process of filling New York City
potholes. The article quoted a traffic blog, Daily Pothole, and its recent count of 209,436
potholes filled as of August 8, 2016.125 Schwartz, noticing the discrepancy stated,
“Every administration has said they have filled more potholes than ever. The math
doesn’t always work out; 209,436 potholes had been filled this year as of Monday (8/29/
16). That’s about 40 potholes per hour, day and night, seven days a week.”126
City agencies, state agencies and private companies currently work in their own
silos. This thesis focuses on collaboration of disciplines enabling sections, areas, and
neighborhoods of the different boroughs to be repaired simultaneously regardless of who
is responsible to maintain the property. In the Audit Report on the Department of
Transportation’s Tracking of Pothole Repairs, the NYC comptroller describes issues
with DOT’s tracking of pothole repairs. In a previous report, Comptroller Stringer
identified the worst roadways in New York City for pothole-related vehicular damage
124 Ibid. 125 “The Daily Pothole – Mill & Pave,” New York City Department of Transportation, August 8,
2016 http://thedailypothole.tumblr.com/. 126 Emily S. Rued, “Why Are The Streets Always Under Construction?,” New York Times, August 8,
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/18/nyregion/new-york-101-streets-repair-and- maintenance.html?_r=3.
44
and the amounts paid by the city for repairs.127 Figure 9 describes the condition of
roadways maintained by the NYSDOT as opposed to NYCDOT.
Figure 9. Roads with Most Vehicular Damage Claims128
The graph in Figure 9 indicates raw numbers of claims but fails to indicate that,
while the Belt Parkway causes 28.2 damage claims per mile and the Brooklyn-Queens
Expressway causes 12 claims, the Staten Island Expressway causes 48 damage claims per
mile.129 The road incidents that cause these events cause slower traffic as well as drivers
moving to surface streets to avoid the damaged roads or traffic backup. New York City
paid out substantial amounts of money for pedestrian injuries and vehicle damage
resulting from defective roadways between July 2009 to July 2015. NYC paid $1.5
million for 1,529 of the 12,286 claims filed for vehicle damage and $138 million for
2,681 of the 5,913 claims filed for personal injury.130 Unnecessary expenditures spent on
127 Mozes Zarate, “Potholes Put a Dent in New York City Budget,” Wall Street Journal, July 30,
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/potholes-put-a-dent-in-new-york-city-budget-1438303741. 128 Source: bid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid.
45
injury and damage claims is better directed toward maintenance and improvement. A
better method of repairing and maintaining roadways, as well as communication between
the state DOT and city DOT, would reduce these claims.
Weather- and usage-related potholes are not the only CI issues with road surfaces.
Underground CI maintenance and construction cause roadways to be pockmarked with
patches. Mayor Bill DeBlasio’s working group studied better procedures for
underground critical infrastructure repair. The report issued develops strategies for
communication between the city and the major utility providers. The report cites that
“approximately 40% of all DOT street opening permits are issued to Con Edison [the
local energy provider] or National Grid [the local natural gas provider] for work related
to their utility networks.”131 The strategies, however, do not address methods to ensure
communication between city agencies.
The system of accountability recommended in this thesis requires private
companies to be held accountable for inadequate work and communication to be
established between city agencies and private companies. Street opening permits allow
private utilities companies to open up pavement to do underground repair work to their
systems. Currently, there are no criteria in place for how and when to conduct these
openings, and more importantly, the size and type of closure required. As a vocal
proponent for road repair, Staten Island Borough President James Oddo addresses this
troubling issue in his social media briefings. Oddo noted that in 2003, New York City
issued 116,000 permits to cut open a street. In 2015, the number almost doubled to
223,271.132 The borough president is a vocal critic of the DOT and pushed Mayor
DeBlasio to increase street repaving to achieve Staten Island’s share of the 1,000 lane
miles paved each year. These cuts by the utility companies receiving 40 percent of the
223,000 permits cause weakened pavement, making them more susceptible to the abuses
of snow, rain, freezing expanding water, and salt used for snow removal, thus, more
131 Infrastructure Report, City of New York, New York City Underground Infrastructure Working
Group, (June 2014), 6, www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2014/ infrastructure_report.pdf.
132 James Oddo’s Facebook page, accessed September 3, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/ jamessoddo?fref=ts.
46
potholes. On Monday, October 31, 2016, Borough President Oddo posted information to
Facebook regarding a meeting he held with the DOT and National Grid, the local natural
gas provider, regarding street cuts in newly paved protected streets. He mentioned, “our
next meeting will include other utilities, as well as contractor industry representatives and
other city agencies, namely the DEP.”133 Is the monitoring of an asset as crucial as CI
being overlooked by responsible city agencies, leaving it to local elected officials to
develop a system of communication, collaboration, and accountability?
In addition to Hurricane Sandy, another emergency event tested Staten Island CI
with frightening results of complete traffic shutdown on major thoroughfares and smaller
secondary roads. On Friday, July 17, 2015, an emergency incident brought Staten Island
traffic to a halt by a suspected terror threat. One day after the shooting in a military
reserve center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, a retired police officer observed what looked
like men and woman in Middle Eastern clothing loading rifles from one car to another.
After he had called the police, a predictable massive response occurred. In an attempt to
find the vehicles, all outgoing bridges were limited to one lane. The bridge closures
caused a prolonged back-up on all highways, service roads, and major thoroughfares. “If
there had been a real threat, if there actually had been a vanload of terrorists looking to
shoot up the Island, or carrying a payload of explosives or biological weapons, we
would have been screwed” stated one reporter. “Not only would Islanders have been
sitting ducks, but the clogged roads would have prevented emergency responders from
getting to the scene of any actual mayhem.”134 The shutdown prevented escape and
response. The purpose of this thesis is to ensure roads are maintained properly and
move as smoothly as possible.
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter demonstrates the current state of roadway conditions in NYC and the
recognized need to improve them. Those conditions impact Homeland Security in
133 Ibid. 134 Tom Wrobleski, “Terror and traffic: Staten Island on Edge,” Staten Island Advance, July 20, 2016,
http://www.silive.com/opinion/columns/index.ssf/2015/07/terror_and_traffic_staten_isla.html.
47
different ways. First, in a post-9/11, post-Hurricane Katrina, post–Hurricane Sandy
environment, escape routes and emergency vehicle access is dependent on both the
conditions of the roadways and the timeliness of repairs. Second, appropriate use of tax
dollars must be a top concern to prevent any misappropriation. Third, organizations
interested in cleaner transportation must take into account ways in which to make
commuting more cost efficient and environmentally conscious. A method of ensuring
communication and accountability can start in NYC and then develop to other geographic
areas. Currently, there are accountability lacks within city agencies and communication
lacks between city agencies. The next chapter provides specific incidents of
communication failures between NYC agencies as reported through local media and
politicians’ social media. The failures and the resulting actions duplicated work, caused
traffic delays, and wasted taxpayers’ money.
48
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
49
IV. SAMPLE EVENTS
Chapter III examined many issues with New York State Critical Infrastructure
(CI), specifically focusing on New York City. Chapter IV contains sample events taken
from local media sources, elected officials’ reports, and personal observation, all of
which demonstrate the severe effects of lack of communication between city agencies,
including poor repairs, wasted taxpayer money, and delays in substantial genuine
improvement to critical infrastructure. The goal of listing these sample events is to
identify the need for pre-event, pre-construction communication to determine a correct
course of action, ensuring this communication assists in developing and testing any post-
event plans necessary in cases of evacuation and emergency response. This chapter lists
events in order of increasing collaboration required: failures of city agencies to
communicate with each other, followed by city agency/state agency failures, then city
agency/federal agency failures, and finally, post-emergency event communication
failures.
A. ARTHUR KILL ROAD WIDENING
Arthur Kill Road, a main thoroughfare in Staten Island, is an example of the lack
of communication between the DOT and the Parks Department, as well as the exclusion
of other stakeholder agencies. The widening of Arthur Kill Road impacted emergency
traffic and wasted taxpayer dollars. The Brookfield Landfill is adjacent to Arthur Kill
Road and was one of five New York City landfills illegally used between 1974 and
1980.135 In 1982, a New York City Department of Sanitation official and a private
sanitation hauler wound up incarcerated after the federal government investigated the
illegal dumping.136 In 1990, New York City set $600 million aside for the cleanup of the
five facilities.137 The city began work on four of the five locations, neglecting the fifth
135 “Staten Islanders Sue For Toxic Waste Cleanup,” Earth Justice, October 14, 2008,
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2008/staten-islanders-sue-for-toxic-waste-dump-cleanup 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid.
50
site, the 272-acre Brookfield Landfill in Staten Island.138 In 2008, residents near the
Brookfield Landfill filed suit in Manhattan Federal Court to force the city to clean up the
site. The residents were successful, and in 2009, New York City allotted $141 million for
cleanup.139 After some setbacks, remediation began in 2010. By mid-2012, NYC
scheduled Brookfield Park for a 2017 completion, but the expected price rose to
$266 million.140 Figure 10 shows an aerial view of the Brookfield site including its
borders, Richmond Avenue and Arthur Kill Road.
Figure 10. Aerial View of Brookfield Park141
138 “Brookfield Landfill: Cleaning Up a Toxic Dump,” Earth Justice, accessed September 9, 2016,
http://earthjustice.org/our_work/cases/2008/brookfield-landfill-cleaning-up-a-toxic-dump#. 139 “City Budgets $141 Million for Toxic Waste Cleanup at Staten Island Site,” Earth Justice, June
18, 2009, http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2009/city-budgets-141-million-for-toxic-waste-cleanup-at- staten-island-site.
140 Mark Stein, “Former Brookfield Landfill on Staten Island Being Transformed,” Staten Island Advance, October 27, 2012, http://www.silive.com/eastshore/index.ssf/2012/10/ former_brookfield_landfill_on.html.
141 Adapted from Google Maps, “Brookfield Landfill.” Accessed September 9, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Arthur+Kill+Rd,+Staten+Island,+NY/@40.5640205,- 74.1571289,1126m/ data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x89c24adc72a56fb1:0xa075b2c456c84349!8m2!3d40.5558469!4d- 74.2016273?hl=en.
51
The Brookfield Landfill, as it transitions into the Brookfield Park, abuts Arthur
Kill Road, a narrow winding roadway slated for widening due to traffic congestion. As
both projects—the widening of the road and building of the park—overlap, the lack of
communication between city agencies wasted time and tax dollars with unnecessary
projects completed and scheduled for removal at completion. In this area, Arthur Kill
Road is a two-lane road (one lane in either direction). The proposal of widening the road
gained momentum in 2012 when a new NYC mayor, Bill DeBlasio, was elected.142 In
late 2012, Staten Island borough president James Oddo presented the proposal to Mayor
DeBlasio, who accepted the merit of the idea.143 The proposal was discussed at length
until early 2015, when Mayor DeBlasio allotted $15 million for completion of the
project.144 Although 18 months later—at the time of the writing of this thesis—the
project has not commenced, the adjacent Brookfield Park has new trees planted directly
inside the newly installed fence, all of which are slated for removal when DOT widens
Arthur Kill Road. Figure 11, similar to Figure 10, shows the aerial view but also depicts
the area of proposed widening.
142 Vincent Barone, “Mayor Allocates $15 Million for Arthur Kill Road Expansion,” Staten Island
Advance, May 7, 2015, http://www.silive.com/southshore/index.ssf/2015/05/ mayor_allocates_15_million_for.html.
143 Ibid. 144 Ibid.
52
Figure 11. Aerial View of the Proposed Widening of Arthur Kill Road145
Figure 12 shows a street-level view of approved street widening, noting new trees
planted and the replaced fence along the inside of the fence line, which will have to be
removed to widen the road. The red area will become the right lane of southbound traffic,
necessitating sidewalk and new fencing to be placed past that area.
Figure 12. Street-Level View of Approved Widening146
145 Source: Ibid. 146 Source: Ibid.
53
A system of communication established between city agencies would enable
discussion to prevent unnecessary projects and, on a larger note, to ensure limited
resources are properly utilized. The unnecessary work demonstrates a need for multi-
agency collaboration and an accountability model. The Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) “holds monthly meetings with the Brookfield Landfill Citizens
Advisory Committee, a board of volunteers that works in close collaboration with the
department on oversight for the remediation of the Brookfield Landfill.”147
Representatives designated by Community Board 3 and from the offices of
Representative McMahon, the Staten Island borough president, the New York State
Assembly, the State Senate, and the City Council comprise the committee.148
The NYC DEP is overseeing the remediation process, but the meetings and
committees listed fail to include the New York City Parks Department, which is tasked
with the planting of the trees and installation of the fences, or the Department of
Transportation (DOT), which could have provided information on the future street
widening process.
B. BAY TERRACE, STATEN ISLAND, WATER RUNOFF
Good f**cking luck, Captain, getting DEP and DOT to work together.
—DEP Supervisor, Personal Communication
Recently, there has been a lack of initiative and collaboration between the NYC
DOT and the NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) with continuing
storm drainage issues, which destroyed streets, curbs, sidewalks, and other personal
property in Staten Island. Storm drainage issues create hazardous conditions for
emergency response and cost citizens money due to improper maintenance and
improvement of CI. Beginning in 2004, residents of Twombly Avenue, in the Bay
Terrace section of Staten Island, began making complaints to various city agencies
147 New York City Environmental Protection, “Brookfield Landfill Remediation, accessed September
9, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/dep_projects/cp_brookfield_landfill.shtml. 148 Ibid.
54
regarding damage from water runoff due to improper street grading and lack of a
correctly positioned storm drain. The author came face to face with this issue, as a
resident requesting collaboration from city agencies to perform a necessary repair. As
shown in Figure 13, the sea-level elevation of the marked locations pitches water runoff
from the Staten Island Rapid Transit (SIRT) tracks to Twombly Avenue from 82 feet to
56 feet, respectively. The marked area at the northwest corner of Twombly Avenue and
Hopkins Avenue does not have a catch basin for water runoff, and the marked pedestrian
crosswalk is at a greater elevation than the street elevation immediately to the northwest,
causing water to pool along the curb line for approximately 200 feet. This pooling of
water deteriorated curbs and sidewalks, causing the issuance of violations to homeowners
by the Department of Finance, as well as deterioration of the road asphalt. Figure 13 also
shows the indicated elevation above sea level and key aspects of the complaints, as
measured by the author.
Figure 13. Aerial Image of Bay Terrace Section of Staten Island149
149 Adapted from “Bay Terrace State Island,” Google Maps, accessed September 9, 2016,
https://www.google.com/maps/@40.558286,-74.1334856,140m/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en.
55
Residents cited the need for a catch basin to be positioned correctly on Twombly
Avenue to the west of the intersection with Hopkins Avenue. The current placement was
only eight feet away on Hopkins Avenue just north of Twombly Avenue. Residents
witnessed a DEP engineer test the water flow southbound on Hopkins Avenue from the
indicated fire hydrant. The engineer reported to the DEP that there was no water flow
problem. The residents grew more frustrated due to the DEP’s inattention to details. A
careful communication process between all agencies and private companies might have
rectified residents’ complaints.
During a work-related assignment as a NYPD captain, the author of this thesis
was present with a supervisor from the DEP. The author and the DEP supervisor
discussed the water flow issue and the need for the DEP to install a catch basin and then
have the DOT grade and repave the street. During a personal communication with the
author, the DEP supervisor then stated, “Good f**king luck, Captain, getting DEP and
DOT to work together.” Multiple requests for cooperation were ignored by city agencies
and hopes of all work being completed correctly on an appropriate schedule vanished,
leaving residents to push local elected officials to get involved, which resulted in street
repaving in 2006. A model of communication and follow-up could have prioritized work
to save taxpayer money and create a safer living environment.
In 2014, the New York City Department of Design and Construction hired
contractors to replace the sidewalks and curbs of the residents who received violations,
billing the homeowner for the replacements. After ten years of complaints and damage,
the city agency involved, DOT, addressed the issue. The work was improperly performed
and caused damage to property, a situation that is currently in litigation. Beginning in
March 2016, the Department of Design and Construction began a capital project to
address water flow issues, which included installing catch basins on South Railroad
Avenue to prevent water from flowing through residents’ properties and on Twombly
Avenue west of Hopkins, to properly drain water running along the curb on Twombly
Avenue. Figure 14 shows the scope of the project, and Figure 15 describes the work.
56
Figure 14. Department of Design and Construction Capital Projects150
Figure 15. Department of Design and Construction Capital Projects151
As of October 2016, the project is still under construction and the newly installed
storm drains have been elevated, preventing water from flowing into them as shown in
Figure 16. However, this is a temporary fix that has actually worsened conditions for the
past seven months. As the issue continues, the NYC Department of Health is involved
due to the standing water, which breeds mosquitos. West Nile Virus is a common fear in
the summer, but the summer of 2016 also added the Zika virus to the list of concerns. The
Department of Design and Construction, in their lack of response to complaints and lack
150 Source: “NYCityMap,” New York City Office of Information Technology &
Telecommunications, accessed November 8, 2016, http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/nycitymap/ template.jsp?z=4&p=991201,192667&c=GISBasic&f=DDC_PROJECTS.
151 Source: Ibid.
57
of communication, added more problems to existing ones. A multi-agency oversight
organization, allowing public viewing and input, could have resolved issues more quickly
with less money wasted.
Figure 16. New Installation of Storm Drain on the Corner of Twombly Avenue and Hopkins Avenue
C. EASTERN PARKWAY
A third communication failure risked pedestrian safety and wasted money when
the NYC DOT failed to consult the NYPD and neighborhood civic organizations before
removing recently installed pedestrian safety devices in the Crown Heights section of
Brooklyn. Eastern Parkway was labeled as the fourth highest intersection in NYC in 2012
for pedestrian fatalities.152 Due to those fatalities and other injuries, in late 2015 the
DOT installed the pedestrian islands shown in Figure 17.153
152 “High Pedestrian Crash Locations - 2012,” New York City Department of Transportation,
retrieved October 11, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/2012-nyc-top-20-pedestrian- crash-locations.pdf.
153 Rachael Holliday Smith, “City Rips Up New Eastern Pkwy Pedestrian Islands For West Indian Day Parade,” DNA Info. August 30, 2016, https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20160830/crown-heights/ city-rips-up-new-eastern-pkwy-pedestrian-islands-for-west-indian-day-parade.
58
Figure 17. Pedestrian Island—Eastern Parkway154
Photo Credit: Angel Chevrestt
The lack of communication prior to installation caused neighborhood issues to be
overlooked; once installed, the removal of the pedestrian island endangered the
pedestrian community and closed off the thoroughfare during reconstruction. Eastern
Parkway is the location of the annual West Indian Day Parade on Labor Day Weekend.
The parade consists of Caribbean-costumed participants and flatbed tractor-trailers with
bands and speakers. Before the 2016 parade, the DOT removed the pedestrian island,
causing traffic build-up and limiting response to potential emergencies, as indicated in
Figure 18.155
154 Source: Ibid. 155 Ibid.
59
Figure 18. Eastern Parkway Pedestrian Island Removal156
Photo Credit: Rachael Holliday Smith
Scott Gastel, a spokesman for the NYC DOT stated “the concrete islands were
removed due to safety concerns involving parade participants and large vehicles.”157
Gastel added, “we are looking at potential replacement treatments in the area and for the
long term.”158 In addition to the short-term construction issues, the removal sparked
community outrage with one resident stating, “The parade is one day out of the year. The
main thing is the pedestrians, the kids and the schoolchildren.”159 The controversy
regarding the pedestrian islands has supporters on the pedestrian safety side as well as the
parade organizers side. The recommendation of this thesis is to study issues more
carefully and have an open forum for communication to prevent removal of vital
infrastructure 10 months after placement.
156 Source: Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 Dean Balsamini, “City to Destroy Safety Barriers for West Indian Day Parade Floats,” New York
Post, August 28, 2016, http://nypost.com/2016/08/28/city-to-destroy-safety-barriers-for-west-indian-day- parade-floats/.
159 Smith, “City Rips Up New Eastern Pkwy Pedestrian Islands for West Indian Day Parade.”
60
D. SUPERSTORM SANDY BUYOUT AND REBUILDING
Another example of communication breakdown between the NYC DOT and the
NYC Parks Department involved New York State agencies as well. New York State
purchased Superstorm Sandy ravaged land on Staten Island, turning it into park land for
the NYC Parks Department. The DOT paved the streets on that land as routine scheduled
roadwork. Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, at approximately 8 pm
EST in Atlantic City, New Jersey, just 125 miles south of Staten Island, New York. The
storm began a week earlier in the Caribbean and upgraded and downgraded numerous
times before hitting New York and New Jersey with 80-mile-an-hour sustained winds and
14-foot waves.160 Sandy is responsible for 42 deaths in New York, 12 in New Jersey,
and many others in the continental United States.161 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) estimates the damage at approximately $50 billion.162
Waves devastated the Ocean Breeze beach front section of Staten Island as indicated in
Figures 19 and 20. Figure 19 shows a map of the area and Figure 20 shows a satellite
image of the same area. Figure 20 depicts the area regarding proximity to the water,
clusters of houses, and the surrounding empty land.
160 John Rafferty, “Superstorm Sandy,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Last updated May 31, 2016, https://
www.britannica.com/event/Superstorm-Sandy. 161 Ibid. 162 Tim Sharp, “Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm,” LiveScience, November 27,
2012, http://www.livescience.com/24380-hurricane-sandy-status-data.html.
61
Figure 19. Street Map of Ocean Breeze, Staten Island163
Figure 20. Satellite Map of Ocean Breeze, Staten Island164
Figure 21 shows 6–18-foot waves, the highest reported in NYC, hitting the area
and causing destruction to some homes and significant damage to others, but all homes in
163 Source: “South Beach, Staten Island Map View,” Google Maps, accessed September 9, 2016,
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Liberty+Ave,+Staten+Island,+NY/@40.5790106,-74.0807927,16z/ data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x89c24ec520d75279:0xd6da8bb73021cd22!8m2!3d40.5841604!4d-74.0891183.
164 Source: “South Beach, Staten Island Satellite View,” Google Maps, accessed September 9, 2016, https://www.google.com/maps/place/Liberty+Ave,+Staten+Island,+NY/@40.5790106,- 74.0807927,1127m/ data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x89c24ec520d75279:0xd6da8bb73021cd22!8m2!3d40.5841604!4d- 74.0891183.
62
the area were affected.165 As indicated in Figure 21, the circled area was assaulted by 6–
18-foot waves, leaving behind significant damage and destruction.
Figure 21. Map of Flood Zone, Ocean Breeze, Staten Island166
New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a state of emergency after the
storm, and, one year later, announced government funded buyouts of over 100 houses.167
The buyout replaces destroyed homes with parkland and creates a barrier between the
ocean and houses farther inland. Barbara Brancaccio, the spokeswoman for the
Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, stated, “It’s really a resiliency program, we are
going to get you out of here, because it’s dangerous, and we’re also going to make it safer
for everybody else through this natural buffer.”168
165 Matthew Bloch, Ford Fessenden, Alan McLean, Archie Tse and Derek Watkins, “Surveying the Destruction Caused by Hurricane Sandy,” New York Times, accessed September 9, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2012/1120-sandy/survey-of-the-flooding-in-new-york-after-the- hurricane.html.
166 Source: Ibid. 167 “Cuomo Announces Buyouts for Sand-Decimated Staten Island Homeowners,” NBC News,
November 18, 2016, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/11/18/gov-cuomo-announces-buyouts-for-ocean- breeze-homeowners/.
168 Nathan Kensinger, “Residents Retreat From Staten Island’s Hard-Hit Waterfront,” Curbed New York, October 29, 2014, http://ny.curbed.com/2014/10/29/10029950/residents-retreat-from-staten-islands- hard-hit-waterfront.
63
Six months later, in April 2014, the NYC DOT announced plans to repave the
streets in the Ocean Breeze section. After community and political outrage, the outspoken
Borough President of Staten Island, James Oddo, said, “This is simply ridiculous. Next
time a crotchety senator or congressman rants on and on about not wanting to provide
New York with federal money, they will point to things like this.”169
The Department of Transportation completed the road resurfacing project in the
affected area, Liberty Avenue, on June 20, 2014, and informed Borough President Oddo of
another street with the same situation in the nearby Midland Beach section, street
resurfacing on Baden Avenue in Midland Beach on May 5, 2014, as displayed in Figure
22.170
Figure 22. Department of Transportation Protected Streets Listing171
169 Judy Randall, “City DOT Milling, Paving Streets in Sandy Buy-out Neighborhoods,” Staten Island
Advance, April 16, 2014, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/04/ city_dot_milling_paving_street.html.
170 “Protected Streets Listing,” City of New York City, accessed September 9, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/segallboro.pdf.
171 Adapted from Ibid.
64
E. GATEWAY NATIONAL PARK
The lack of communication, collaboration, and accountability between NYC and
federal agencies demonstrates the need for improved focus. The National Park
Service (NPS) oversees Gateway National Park but is not maintaining the land that abuts
land that falls within NYC Parks Department, NYC Metropolitan Transit Authority
(MTA), and NYC DOT property. Although this has no direct threat or effect on
homeland security, national and city parks are listed as infrastructure and received a C-
rating nationally in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) ratings provided
earlier. The lack of communication between city agencies and the federal government
displayed in this event is problematic; allowing property conditions to degrade due to
lack of accountability wastes taxpayer money and frustrates residents.
Gateway National Park and Great Kills Beach, located south of Hylan Boulevard
in Staten Island, have been maintained by the National Park Service since 1972. In 2014,
residents complained to local elected officials regarding the deteriorating condition of the
park and garbage accumulation. Officials held a press conference at the location after
letters and requests were not answered by the respective agencies. Congressman Michael
Grimm delineated the agencies and property responsibilities to the attendees.172
Councilman Vincent Ignizio joined Congressman Grimm and added, “Clearly,
government is not working properly. It’s a filthy mess,”173 and “Let’s sit around the
table and come up with a solution that will keep this place clean,”174
This thesis recommends an accountability and communication model, similar to
the NYPD’s CompStat model, to promote, foster, and ensure that exact process results in
improved critical infrastructure. Figure 23 depicts the adjacent property of agencies
involved.
172 Kiamwa Rich, “Staten Island Elected Officials Call on Government to Clean Up Garbage in Bay
Terrace,” Staten Island Advance, April 14, 2014, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/04/ staten_island_elected_official_9.html.
173 Ibid. 174 Ibid.
65
Figure 23. Gateway National Park Entrance175
Figure 23 depicts the four agencies involved in this intersection. Getting those
four agencies to collaborate would create a safer, cleaner neighborhood. An
accountability model would ensure all agencies are maintaining their respective property.
F. HYLAN BOULEVARD—STATEN ISLAND EXPRESSWAY DETERIORATION
Previous sample events detailed failures in communication between city agencies,
then between city and state agencies, and finally between city and federal agencies, but
all were prior to emergency events, focusing on repair and maintenance. This thesis
recommends agency collaboration overseen by the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure in
conjunction with Emergency Management (NYC EM), which is currently tasked with
only post-emergency multi-agency collaboration.
175 Adapted from “Great Kills Park, Staten Island Satellite View,” Google Maps, accessed October
11, 2016, https://www.google.com/maps/place/Great+Kills+Park/@40.5552261,- 74.1261318,228a,20y,313.34h,45t/ data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x89c24bd5dc4a0f23:0xd7a54d9d9efca532!8m2!3d40.5502073!4d- 74.1269322?hl=en.
66
The next event depicts failures in post-emergency event communication. The
NYC DOT’s inadequate repair work to the Hylan Boulevard overpass on the Staten
Island Expressway caused a second deterioration six years later, resulting in long-term
construction and traffic issues, both of which affect general and emergency
transportation. Hylan Boulevard passes over the Staten Island Expressway in two
locations—one northbound and one southbound—at the northernmost end of the Staten
Island Expressway before the Verrazano Bridge. See Figure 25. The northbound lane
services 8300 vehicles daily and the southbound, 8,800. In late April 2009, deterioration
of the roadway of the northbound lane caused baseball-sized concrete pieces to rain down
onto the Staten Island Expressway 25 feet below. The falling concrete caused closure of
the eastbound Staten Island Expressway for hours as the fire department placed
emergency netting under the overpass. The overpass itself was closed for days afterward
to repair the nine-inch hole in the roadbed with exposed rebar, as shown in Figure 24.
The cause was determined to be freezing winter weathers and use of salt to melt ice and
snow. The investigation revealed that neighborhood residents had complained about the
widening hole for weeks prior.176
176 Phil Helsel, “Falling Debris Creates Dangerous Condition on the Staten Island Expressway,”
Staten Island Advance, April 27, 2009, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/ overpass_debris_causes_danger.html.
67
Figure 24. Broken Concrete and Exposed Construction Rebar177
Photo Credit: Hilton Flores
Figure 25. View of Northbound Hylan Boulevard Overpass178
Photo Credit: Hilton Flores
177 Source: Ibid. 178 Source: Ibid.
68
On June 3, 2015, State Senator Kirsten Gillibrand cited a New York State
Department of Transportation report noting 74 percent of Staten Island’s highway bridges
are either “functionally obsolete” or “structurally deficient.”179 Eight days later, a hole
opened up in the same location that was previously addressed in 2009. The NYS DOT
immediately began a project to replace the decking of the overpass, which had been
slated for repair at an unspecified date and was estimated to cost $10 million.180 Local
elected officials were outraged over the decision that caused hours of delays of the
uninformed public, also giving emergency responders no time to prepare for traffic
control and emergency response. An agreement was reached to postpone the project for
three weeks until after July 4. On June 22, 2015, a second hole opened in a different
portion of the roadway. DOT covered the section with a steel plate in anticipation of the
upcoming full-scale construction.181
The initial deterioration was due to inadequate CI upkeep. After the discovery of
the first hole, inefficient repair methods used, and further rehabilitation did not
commence until after the second incident occurred six years later. When DOT expedited
the construction plan, information was not disseminated to local media sources, elected
officials, and community members. The disconnect between the city and state agencies,
the elected officials, and the community is addressed in this thesis.
G. MAJOR ACCIDENT ON VICTORY BOULEVARD
Our final example of poorly coordinated post-event emergency collaboration was
the lack of city agencies’ and private companies’ communication requiring street closure
for two and a half days after an early morning car accident at closed a section of a major
Staten Island thoroughfare. On September 7, 2015, at 2 a.m., a driver lost control of his
179 Vincent Barone, “Sen. Gillibrand Pushes Measure For More Bridge Funding,” Staten Island
Advance, June 3, 2015, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/ sen_gillibrand_pushes_measure.html.
180 Vincent Barone, “Hole in Hylan Boulevard Overpass Prompted Emergency Closures,” Staten Island Advance, June 11, 2015, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/ hole_in_hylan_boulevard_overpa.html.
181 Virginia N. Sherry, “New Hole Opens in Hylan Boulevard Expressway Overpass,” June 22, 2015, Staten Island Advance, http://www.silive.com/eastshore/index.ssf/2015/06/ another_hole_in_hylan_boulevar.html.
69
vehicle, striking a tree. While the driver only suffered minor injuries, the chain reaction
began with the impacted tree falling on overhead power lines, pulling them down along
with multiple utility poles supporting those wires. Figures 26 and 27 show the extent of
the damage.182
Figure 26. Victory Boulevard Accident183
Photo Credit: Anthony DePrimo
182 Paul Liotta, “Victory Boulevard Still Closed for Second Evening Commute,” Staten Island
Advance, September 8, 2016, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/09/ victory_blvd_still_closed_for.html.
183 Source: Ibid.
70
Figure 27. Victory Boulevard Accident184
Photo Credit: Anthony DePrimo
Residents complained to local media, resulting in reporters questioning agency
response. After the new poles were installed, DOT referred questions regarding re-
opening the street to the NYPD, who forwarded requests to Con Edison, the local
electricity provider. The New York City Fire Department representatives present
indicated the reason for closure was the need for Con Edison to hang new wires. The
NYC Councilwoman in that district, Deborah Rose, stated, “It’s ridiculous that Victory
Boulevard, a major thoroughfare, is closed to through traffic during weekday rush
hours, and on the first day of school.”185 Residents and elected officials were
understandably outraged regarding the lack of communication regarding re-opening
status.
184 Source: Ibid. 185 Ibid.
71
H. CONCLUSION
This chapter lists specific incidents collected from elected officials’ reports, local
media stories, and personal observation, making those local elected officials the
repository of concerns of the taxpayers, who insist on a more transparent and accountable
government. The events are organized by order of increasing necessity for
communication. The first section details street widening, water runoff, and pedestrian
safety; these incidents require communication between city agencies. The second
grouping: Superstorm Sandy buyout and Gateway National Park, required collaboration
with state and federal agencies, respectively. Finally, the Hylan Boulevard deterioration
and Victory Boulevard accident also demonstrate failure in emergency event
coordination. The NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations coordinates pre-event
collaboration and follow-up. NYC Emergency Management (NYC EM) is tasked with
collaboration of resources in a post-emergency environment. The last two incidents
reflect the need for coordination of city services in emergency incidents. A
communication model for non-emergency incidents would greatly assist in emergency
incidents as well. A dedicated Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure and a system of pre-event,
routine communication and monitoring, such as the NYPD’s CompStat model, will
ensure effective organization between agencies and that resources are spent wisely.
Chapter V details how CompStat works within the NYPD and how it could be
applied to create the NYC Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure.
72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
73
V. COMPSTAT
Chapter IV presented sample events of communication failures that resulted in
wasted tax dollars and, in some cases, limited access to roadways for emergency response
and everyday transportation. Chapter V analyzes the New York City Police Departments
CompStat model as a possible solution; CompStat significantly reduced crime in NYC
while encouraging communication-enhancing accountability and Chapter V also reviews
models similar to CompStat from other police departments and disciplines. This thesis
recommends that the mayor’s office prioritize CI by creating the NYC Mayor’s Office of
Infrastructure, and that the Office of Infrastructure implement a CompStat model to
ensure CI fixes, by building on the existing office of Operations Infrastructure theme.
Adapting the NYPD’s model of CompStat to CI improvement and protection will create a
system of communication, accountability, and interagency collaboration.
A. OVERVIEW
Performance measurement enables officials to hold organizations accountable and to introduce consequences for performance. It helps citizens and customers judge the value that government creates for them. And it provides managers with the data they need to improve performance.186
CompStat, short for comparative statistics, is a police management and
accountability tool that began in the NYPD in 1994. Police Commissioner William
Bratton spent time with the Boston Metro Police Department and the NYC Transit Police
before being appointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to head the largest police agency in
the country, at a time of uncontrolled crime and decreasing quality of life.187
At the time, New York City was ten years into the fight against the crack
epidemic and needed a system of accountability to monitor and reduce crime. During
186 David E. Osborne and Peter Plastrik, The Reinventor's Fieldbook: Tools for Transforming Your
Government (Jossey-Bass San Francisco, CA, 2000). 187 Bratton, William, and Peter Knobler. The Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the
Crime Epidemic. New York: Random House, 2009.
74
those ten years, the homicide rate for African-American males age 14–24 had doubled,
60 percent of prisoners’ cases involved drug offenses, and the fetal mortality rate in inner
cities had increased by over 20 percent.188 Quality of life, in general, was deteriorating
rapidly.
Violence typically begins as lower-level disorder and chaos. Commissioner
Bratton associated Kelling’s and Wilson’s “broken windows” theory to lower-level
quality of life crimes. “Broken windows” theorizes that, if lower-lever violations are left
alone, an increase in more serious crimes will occur.189 The name comes from the belief
that a broken window left in disrepair is a sign that property owners do not care, resulting
in more broken windows and destruction.190 Wesley Skogan, Northwestern University
policing and disorder professor, identified the cycle shown in Figure 28.
Figure 28. Spiral of Decline191
188 “Cocaine, Conspiracy Theories & the CIA in Central America,” Frontline, accessed July 31, 2016.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/cia.html. 189 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken
Windows,” Atlantic Monthly 127, no. 2 (1982). 190 Ibid. 191 Source: George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and
Reducing Crime in our Communities (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
75
This cycle demonstrates how the broken windows theory contributes to more
lawless behavior as the cycle worsens. To disrupt the pattern, the NYPD needed a system
to address the increased crime by tracing the cycle backward to citizen fear and disorder.
The CompStat model monitored the aspects of the cycle and created accountability for
those entrusted to disrupt it.
Commissioner Bratton and a team of dedicated advisors devised the CompStat
system, in order to combat crime with accountability, based on four principles:
• Accurate and timely intelligence
• Effective tactics
• Rapid deployment
• Relentless follow-up and assessment192
The principles and structure are addressed in the following section but due to the
terminology used, it is important to discuss a sample of the New York City Police
Department’s structure as it relates to CompStat.
There are currently 77 precincts in New York City divided into five geographic
boroughs and eight patrol boroughs. The police commissioner is a civilian title, appointed
by the mayor. The chief of department is the highest-ranking uniformed member of the
department. The deputy commissioner of operations is also a civilian rank who works
directly for the chief of department and is tasked with overseeing CompStat. The NYPD
is broken down into bureaus covering housing, transit, transportation, detectives, and
patrol functions. The chief of patrol commands the eight patrol boroughs, each supervised
by an assistant chief, titled borough commander. The borough commander oversees the
precincts within his or her patrol borough. In Figure 29, the author outlines a sample of
the hierarchal structure within the NYPD, depicting one patrol borough with two
precincts as an example.
192 Raymond Dussault, “Jack Maple: Betting on Intelligence,” Government Technology (1999).
76
Figure 29. NYPD Hierarchy
B. FOUR PRINCIPLES OF COMPSTAT
The four principles of CompStat depict the process of monitoring crime increase
and fostering crime decrease. The descriptions come from the first Deputy Commissioner
of Operations, Jack Maple’s, writings, and this author’s personal observations of over a
decade of CompStat experience. In Chapter VI, this thesis demonstrates the use of
CompStat and the four principles as a model of performance management for critical
infrastructure (CI) through communication and accountability.
1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence
Accurate and timely intelligence is an essential first step to the CompStat process,
which would also work well for a CI system.193 A methodology must be in place to
quickly track the criteria the director decides upon. In the case of the NYPD’s CompStat
model, the intelligence is the seven index crimes and quality-of-life violations. The focus
is the analysis of computer-driven statistical data for each crime, including where it
193 Jack Maple and Chris Mitchell, The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business (New York: Broadway Books, 2010).
77
occurred, when, the method of commission, and pedigree descriptions of the victim(s)
and the perpetrator. The FBI’s Unified Crime Reporting Data dictates the categories of
crime tracked: criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft. The first adjustment needed was the timeliness of
reporting. The FBI required the information sent yearly, but this delay prevented
immediate analysis. Commissioner Bratton and Deputy Commissioner of Operations Jack
Maple invested in the necessary technological advances to ensure intelligence gathering
and forwarding on a daily basis. The application of this principle to road and bridge
repair is the collection of data on projects initiated by all New York City agencies. Each
agency currently has computerized records, most using Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) technologies to plot incidents or projects on a map. A compatible software design
is required to allow all agencies to collate and communicate together, to avoid
overlapping initiatives.
This thesis explores creating a CompStat Unit within the newly created NYC
Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure’s Office, focusing on communication and accountability,
to monitor and improve NYC CI. That process begins with the collection of intelligence
on the current state of CI.
2. Effective Tactics
The second principle of CompStat, effective tactics, uses the previously collected
intelligence to determine what resources are needed and where, which would be an
excellent asset toward improving CI. It is the function of the department to foster, enable,
and oversee the collection of said intelligence, and, once that intelligence is amassed, the
precinct commander analyzes it to determine deployment. The phrase “put cops on the
dots” has been employed to summarize the crime-reduction strategies.194 Once
commanders locate and analyze the trouble spots, they decide what level of enforcement
is needed. That commander monitors the activity generated and the decrease in incidents
of crime. The monitoring of the process will be covered further in the follow-up section
of the CompStat process. Thinking outside of the box is encouraged of the precinct
194 Ibid.
78
commander and his/her subordinates. A lack of resources, such as personnel or
equipment, can impede progress, but a plethora of such resources is not necessarily the
answer. Intelligently analyzed deployments are the backbone of the CompStat strategy.
Before CompStat, the NYPD was a more reactive agency; responding to
complaints of crimes was part of the increase in lawlessness in the 1980s and ‘90s.
Currently, NYC agencies tasked with CI are reactive as well. This thesis recommends a
communication system to ensure proactive collaboration. The tactics employed in
CompStat include addressing emerging issues as they arise and using multi-faceted
proactive approaches to address them. The application of this principle to bridge and road
repair includes prioritization of projects and a study of materials used to ensure
effectiveness. Similar to the change in policing methods, this approach removes the
reactive function of repair and strives towards proactive monitoring and repair.
3. Rapid Deployment
The third principle of CompStat, rapid deployment, prevented incidents in the
NYPD’s model—decreasing crime. Deploying city agencies responsible for CI, correctly,
and in collaboration, will likely decrease incidents of road deterioration, traffic, and
emergencies. In policing, using the accurate intelligence and the correct enforcement-
strategies personnel can be allocated to areas of events. Rapid deployment is applicable in
the reactive necessities of policing to prevent future incidents or retaliatory action.
In the proactive aspect, rapid deployment is used to gather intelligence and
circumvent activities that may lead to criminal activity. Deployment may mean
attendance at community meetings to disseminate crime prevention materials or physical
changes, such as lighting or security facilities. The rapid deployment is an internal
strategy, also. Monitoring personnel issues, disciplinary action against officers, overtime
usage, sick time usage, and other NYPD programs creates a better-rounded agency.
In the model applicable to CI, the need is for prioritization as well as rapid
deployment. City agencies have limited resources and money. Therefore, projects and
initiatives need to be prioritized to ensure issues are tended to before they become larger
and require more money and resources.
79
4. Relentless Follow-up and Assessment
Relentless follow-up and assessment is the most important aspect of the CompStat
process or any performance-measurement related strategy; as such, it is also the most
important aspect of implementing the CompStat strategy into critical infrastructure
improvement. The follow-up phase is the recapitulation, which focuses on accountability.
As the first Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Jack Maple, stated, “Nobody ever got
in trouble because crime numbers on their watch went up…Trouble arose only if the
commanders didn’t know why the numbers were up or didn’t have a plan to address the
problems.”195 This philosophy increases the attentiveness of precinct commanders. A
quantitative analysis is the easiest way to track the outcome of CompStat, decreased
criminal activity and increased police activity; summonses and arrests. A qualitative
analysis is also useful. Did the plan work? Why or why not? What aspects of the plan will
be used in the future plan or the next plan for the next incident? Complaints from the
community can also be tracked, monitored, and followed-up on to determine success. The
citizens’ perception of order versus lawlessness is a guiding factor to the success of the
precinct or the police as a whole. In the model recommended in this thesis, the citizens’
perception of safe CI leads to reassurance in government.
These four principles, as simple as they seem, revolutionized the way police work
was conducted in New York City, followed by a majority of the country, then disciplines
outside of law enforcement, by collecting intelligence, using better tactics, deploying the
right resources to the right locations, and following up on performance. This thesis uses the
four principles to recommend a methodology for applying these principles to the subject of
critical infrastructure improvement focusing on bridge and roadway repair in New York
City.
C. MEETING
Designing a potential NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure CompStat Unit
requires understanding the meeting format and forum to incorporate and display the four
principles correctly. The CompStat meeting itself is only a small part of the CompStat
195 Ibid.
80
philosophy. CompStat is not one day or one meeting. CompStat is daily and starts the
second you leave the CompStat meeting. The meeting is the culmination of the plans you
have put in place and the accountability for their successes or failures. It is also the
podium to discuss future programs and deployments.
Weekly CompStat meetings are the means by which agency leaders can analyze and evaluate the overall trends in all key crime indicators and risk management issues. They provide the opportunity for ongoing follow-up and assessment and, just as important, serve to reaffirm responsibility and ownership of crime problems within a command’s purview as well as those that cross jurisdictional boundaries.196
The meeting, sometimes called “the show,” is the culmination of all monitoring activities
and the podium is the sounding board for the commanders to present their knowledge and
leadership, their commitment to improvement and safety.
The five geographic boroughs of New York City—Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens,
Bronx, and Staten Island—are divided into eight Patrol Boroughs by the NYPD. The
NYPD separates Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens into a North and South sections to
better manage the size, geography, and number of precincts. A precinct is a geographic
area supervised by a Commanding Officer and overseen by a Patrol Borough
Commander. Except for Staten Island, Patrol Boroughs have approximately eight to
thirteen precincts contained therein.
Weekly, a different Patrol Borough will be called to CompStat. The meeting is
always Thursday from 8 am until 11 am in Police Headquarters. On Monday, a borough
is selected based on the previous week’s crimes or major incidents and a list of cases is
sent out through the entire department. Those cases are complaints of crimes and contain
all the documentation done by the responsible investigative unit. At the meeting, the
upper echelon of the NYPD sits at the front dais, the Chief of Department, the Deputy
Commissioner of Operations and the Chiefs of all Bureaus, namely Patrol, Housing,
Transit, Detectives, Organized Crime, Community Affairs, and Training. On the arms of
the horseshoe-shaped table sit the Borough Commanders and their staff as well as the
196 Godown, “The CompStat Process,” 36–38.
81
Precinct Commanders and his/her respective staff. Members of other NYPD units that
may have a stake in the cases and precincts occupy the rest of the room. Examples of
these include Robbery Squads, Gang Division personnel, Financial Crimes, Gun
Suppression units, and my own Special Victims Division. The reason to have these sub-
units present is to address overlapping issues or perpetrators. Non-NYPD units such as
the District Attorney’s Office, Department of Parole, and Department of Probation attend
to answer any questions relating to their particular expertise.
The Chief of Department calls an average of three precincts to present at the
podium per CompStat; this system can be duplicated into CI by including the agencies
responsible for CI improvements into the meeting, but only having specific agencies
present their progress. The Precinct Commanders, their subordinates, and sub-units
provide an overview of their precincts and answer specific questions posed by the
speaker at the dais. This referenced design and format is that which the NYPD employs,
research has shown that different departments and disciplines perform their respective
stat meetings differently.
In seeking to replicate the NYPD’s CompStat model, many agencies have
accepted invitations to attend the meeting in person, demonstrating their recognition of its
success. A survey completed in 1999 “revealed that a third of the nation’s 515 largest
police departments had implemented a CompStat-like programme and 20% were
planning to do so by 2001. The same survey found that about 70% of police departments
with CompStat programmes reported attending an NYPD CompStat meeting.”197 Some
research indicates the failure of agencies to adopt a successful CompStat model is due to
reliance on the meeting without the full-time monitoring of conditions and daily follow-
up
Chapter VI discusses the development of the CompStat Unit for CI regarding the
location, division, and subdivision of various city agencies that might be involved in the
process. Figure 30 shows the physical positioning of the CompStat Dais. The Chief of
197 John A. Eterno and Eli B. Silverman, “The New York City Police Department's Compstat: Dream
or Nightmare?” International Journal of Police Science & Management 8, no. 3 (2006): 218–231.
82
Department and DCO sit at the center of the dais and share responsibilities of questioning
attendees.
Figure 30. CompStat Dais Overview198
Figures 31 and 32 depict the size of the CompStat room and the positioning of
members for maximum visibility. The Commanding Officer and precinct’s management
team present to the upper echelon from the CompStat podium.199 These figures serve as
a display of layout and, in the model recommended by this thesis, could be used as a
198 Adapted from William Bratton, “William Bratton’s Twitter Page,” Twitter. accessed November
11, 2016, https://mobile.twitter.com/CommissBratton/status/720960865911062528. 199 Adapted from “I-Team: NYPD Provides Unprecedented Look at Compstat,” NBC News, April 15,
2016, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Compstat-New-York-NYPD-Police-Tour-375761141.html.
83
guide. It is anticipated that fewer members would be present in the NYC Mayor’s Office
of Infrastructure CompStat meeting.
Figure 31. CompStat Dais200
Figure 32. CompStat Podium201
200 Adapted from NBC News, “I-Team: NYPD Provides Unprecedented Look at Compstat,” April 15, 2016, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Compstat-New-York-NYPD-Police-Tour-375761141.html.
201 Adapted from Ibid.
84
Figures 31 and 32 depict the size, structure, and set up of the NYPD’s CompStat meeting
room. The layout is similar to other agencies’ CompStat models and creates an
atmosphere necessary to the function.
D. COSTS, TECHNOLOGY, AND STAFFING
Developing the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure’s CompStat Unit would
require office space, a meeting space, computers and software, and the personnel to
effectively apply the four CompStat principles to CI. City agencies currently monitor
their respective projects but in a silo-driven system that does not allow for collaboration
with other agencies or private companies. Chapter VI addresses the design of the office
and meeting room as duplicated from the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner of Operations’
(DCO) office.
The DCO moderates CompStat, making him/her fourth in ranking structure and
equal to the Bureau Chiefs who sit at his/her side at CompStat meetings. All rank under
the Chief of Department whose purview covers the entire department. An NYPD
Inspector supervises the Office of the DCO; the Inspector’s position is essential to the
operation of the office. Precinct commanders are usually deputy inspectors or captains;
therefore, no precinct commander outranks the Inspector in the DCO’s Office
The primary function of the members of the DCO’s office is to analyze the
100,000-plus index crimes that occur in NYC yearly and prepare reports to the Chief of
Department and the DCO. These reports include investigative work, historical
breakdowns of the victim, perpetrator, and location.202 Their work also involves other
clerical and internal issues of managing the NYPD, such as complaints against officers,
sick leave, overtime, and quality of life Complaints. The yearly salary for the 40
members of the DCO’s office is approximately $4 million203—a staggering amount, yet
their job function is and will be different from the citywide model proposed. The
respective city agencies already have representatives tasked with tracking initiatives and
202 “Crime Statistics,” New York City, accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
downloads/pdf/crime_statistics/cs-en-us-city.pdf. 203 Personal communication with author.
85
projects and also support the computer terminals and databases required by this
recommendation.
This thesis recommends the creation of a NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure
with a CompStat component; to do so, the NYPDs CompStat model and those adapted by
other agencies and disciplines must be studied to design the space, format, and
methodology. Next, this thesis describes other CompStat-style performance management
models and the grouping of all models into a system of accountability.
E. OTHER USES OF COMPSTAT
This thesis recommends development of an NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure
CompStat Unit based on the NYPD’s CompStat model as described in the previous
section. This section details other applicable uses of the CompStat model by agencies in
New York City. In 1984, the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation began
the Parks Inspection Program (PIP) to monitor its performance internally. PIP started out
as a review conducted three times a year, but, in 1995, it was changed to a bi-weekly
randomly selected inspection location and a follow-up meeting to the meeting before.204
NYC Parks changed the meeting name in 1997 to ParkStat, and, in one meeting, a park
manager told the executive moderating the meeting that an issue with his park was due to
the Department of Transportation (DOT) not promptly repairing a roadway under his
control but within a park. The moderator’s follow-up question was, “How can we put
more pressure on DOT—what can be done at a higher level?”205 That moderator saw the
potential of incorporating multiple agencies into one meeting in an attempt to create
positive change.
Another adaptation of the CompStat model into other NYC agencies is
HealthStat, a program that began in New York City in 2000 to ensure all eligible New
Yorkers, especially children, are enrolled in state and federal health programs. The
program incorporated different NYC agencies: the Department of Health, the Housing
Authority, the Human Resource Administration, the Board of Education, and others
204 O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, 179–223. 205 Ibid., 199.
86
reporting to the Deputy Mayor of Health Care Access. An unlikely partner agency that
provided the most information was the Department of Corrections. Daily, thousands of
New Yorkers enter Riker’s Island Correctional Facility, both as defendants and family
members visiting incarcerated members.206 This system allowed access to those most
vulnerable to lacking health care coverage.207 Research shows that HealthStat is the only
multi-agency meeting to be held in New York City with a common goal, making it an
ideal stat to look to for creation of the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure.
Baltimore, Maryland, has succeeded with the only documented multi-agency
PerformanceStat program. Soon after the NYPD’s CompStat was introduced, the
Baltimore mayor tapped Jack Maple, the architect of the NYPD’s CompStat, to design a
citywide program for Baltimore called Citistat. In addition to crime reduction, Baltimore
also experienced decreased overtime in city agencies and cleaner public parks.208 In
documenting the results, the program has also yielded qualitative results such as
expedited movement on problems and better interagency collaboration.209
Adapting CompStat principles to other agencies or cities has proven to be
successful. ParkStat continues today, and Citistat has saved money by monitoring
different aspects of city government in one forum. HealthStat, as a temporary system,
coordinated agencies under the direction of mayor’s office. Combining interconnected
disciplines of CI into one mayor’s office can yield the same results and improvements.
F. PERFORMANCESTAT MODELS
This thesis recommends that NYC develop a CI CompStat using methodology
developed by performance management researcher Robert Behn. Behn studied various
CompStat programs from different cities and disciplines, combining them into a
performance management system called PerformanceStat.210 His research presents a
206 Ibid. 207 O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, 200–201. 208 Ibid., 207–208. 209 Ibid. 210 Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat,” 207.
87
format to be followed to ensure a successful CompStat-type meeting. The NYPD was the
first organization to establish CompStat in 1994, with many organizations and disciplines
following. All models of PerformanceStat should be studied to ensure success and avoid
failures in developing an office for CI CompStat.
A jurisdiction or agency is employing a PerformanceStat performance strategy if it holds an ongoing series of regular, frequent, periodic, integrated meetings during which the chief executive and/or the principal members of the chief executive’s leadership team plus the individual director (and the top managers) of different subunits use data to analyze the unit’s past performance, to follow up on previous decisions and commitments to improve performance, to establish its next performance objectives, and to examine the effectiveness of its overall performance strategies.211
Behn acknowledges that the most important aspects of CompStat meetings are “two key
pieces of infrastructure: (a) some technology to help collect, analyze, and display the data
and (b) a room in which to hold the periodic meetings,”212 but also addresses the
authority and full-time position of the moderator and the dedication of all attendees.
For stat (CompStat, PerformanceStat, or similar model) success, primarily, those
attending the meeting or adhering to the process must understand that the signals
communicated are coming from the highest levels of the organization or the highest
levels of city government in those stats that involve multiple agencies. “No precinct
commander doubted that Anemone and Maple had Bratton’s full backing. In Baltimore,
no department head doubted that Enright and Gallagher spoke for the mayor.”213 The
highest rank present at the CompStat meeting must communicate the same authority and
purpose as the absent higher ranks, as such, in the model recommended by this thesis, the
mayor need not regularly attend, but all attendees must know that the moderator is
speaking with his/her authority.
Secondly, Behn’s research shows that agencies with the best rates of success staff
their PerformanceStat office full-time. In the NYPD’s CompStat program, the Deputy
211 Ibid. 212 Ibid., 206, 235. 213 Ibid., 219.
88
Commissioner of Operations (DCO) is a full-time employee whose only job function is
CompStat. The NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure CompStat Unit requires a member
permanently assigned and whose hierarchical status is higher than or equal to the agency
commissioners.
A third key aspect of the Behn-related research is ensuring the stamina to keep the
program progressing even though results may not be immediate. In the agencies and
locations studied, Palmer, a doctoral candidate at UNC–Chapel Hill noted there was an
average of three years before significant progress can be noted.214 In a recent CompStat
meeting, the DCO stated that the stamina to begin and continue a CompStat program is
critical to success and the inability to continue that stamina is most often the reason for
program failure.
To maintain a successful CompStat meeting, a respectful, interactive back and
forth between the Deputy Commissioner of Operations and the subordinate member
presenting is necessary. Following this model, the moderator of the NYC Deputy Mayor
of Infrastructure CompStat Unit and the presenter must adhere to the four principles
while discussing past incidents and future deployments. Behn also states, “the meeting
can evolve into a game. The leadership plays gotcha, while the subunit participants
respond by attempting to score debating points, devoting their time to anticipating and
rebutting the gotcha questions. In the gotcha game, no one is attempting to actually
improve performance”215 Rather than acting as if CI is a game, presenters must believe
in the methodology to enable true improvements and the questioning members at the dais
must maintain professional decorum to promote true accountability.
To promote city government transparency, some researchers have studied the
ability of PerformanceStat to function open to public viewing, without limiting
conversation. In law enforcement–related PerformanceStats, some topics and initiatives
are ongoing and open investigations are a concern. Many public managers are reluctant to
engage in open conversation in public. As one manager noted, “If we are having a
214 Jonathan Palmer, “Municipal PerformanceStat: How Is Success Defined? What Factors Contribute to Success?” (Ph.D. diss., UNC-Chapel Hill, 2010).
215 Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat,” 207.
89
conversation about the police department, the police chief would be willing to admit his
department dropped the ball, but that would never happen with the press in the room.”216
Unlike law enforcement, issues presented at PerformanceStats, CompStat, or a CompStat
for CI are meant for public viewing.
Behn summarizes the creation of a PerformanceStat system as follows:
To make an intelligent use of the PerformanceStat strategy, the leaders of the adopting organization need to (a) specify the performance purpose they are trying to achieve; (b) decide what performance data they will collect and analyze; (c) build a small staff to analyze these data; (d) assemble the necessary infrastructure; (e) determine how they will conduct the meetings; (f) build the requisite operational capacity; (g) create an explicit mechanism to follow up on the problems identified, solutions proposed, and decisions made at these meetings; and (h) think through carefully how they adapt the features and principles of other versions of PerformanceStat to their own purpose and situation.217
Following the format of PerformanceStat described in this chapter, the NYC
Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure CompStat will moderate, promote communication
between agencies, and create greater improvement in CI. Chapter VI discusses the
particular structure of the office.
G. CRITIQUES OF COMPSTAT MODELS
In adapting the CompStat principles to CI improvement, it is important to note
that the philosophy is not without critiques of its successes and methodology. The
preceding sections point to the successes of the program and later chapters describe how
to implement the system in the world of CI protection; however, criticisms are divided
into three categories: inflated numbers and unconstitutional practices, factors causing
lower crime rates, and the costs to the morale of the organization. As retired NYPD
captain Phil Eterno and CompStat researcher Eli Silverman wrote, “the weaknesses of
216 Palmer, “Municipal PerformanceStat.” 217 Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat,” 207.
90
CompStat are less recognised: due process considerations, community relations,
leadership issues, [and] inadequate problem solving.” 218
The questioning of commanders regarding crime increase and its relation to
activity levels by police officers is alleged to have caused commanders to demand more
activity.219 The demand was sometimes misconstrued as a “by any means necessary
approach” leading to unconstitutional stops. Others attribute CompStat demands to more
aggressive tactics, and the increase in Stop and Frisk incidents to document said stop as
proof of activity for crime conditions.220 W. K. Rashbaum wrote an article for the New
York Times in 1996 that cited, “Civilian complaints against police for allegedly illegal
searches skyrocketed by 135% in the first two years….Illegal vehicle searches
jumped…108%…[and] allegations of illegal apartment searches shot up 179%.’”221
Eterno and Silverman added, “Thus, as crime decreased, civilian complaints for abuse of
authority increased. This negative relationship is certainly glaring but only one of several
measures indicating a problem.”222
The second critique questions whether CompStat was truly the reason for the
massive crime reductions cited. Some research points to other reasons for declining crime
rates:
• Demographic change—This hypothesis states that the offenders of serious crimes aged out of the demographic that would commit such crimes.223
218 Eterno and Silverman, The New York City Police Department's Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?
218–231. 219 Oliver K. Roeder et al., “What Caused the Crime Decline?” (Research Paper, no. 15-28, Columbia
Business School, 2015), 72. 220 The Fourth Amendment requires that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been,
is being, or is about to be committed before stopping a suspect. If the police reasonably suspect the person is armed and dangerous, they may conduct a frisk, a quick pat-down of the person’s outer clothing. As per NYPD protocol, these stops would be recorded on a Department form; UF-250 Stop and Frisk Report.
221 W. Rashbaum, “Complaints Against Cops Surge 135%,” New York Daily News 22 (1996). 222 Eterno and Silverman, The New York City Police Department's Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?
218–231. 223 James Alan Fox, “Demographics and U.S. Homicide.” The Crime Drop in America (2000): 288–
317.
91
• More police—Due to economic prosperity larger cities had more money to expand police departments, some, such as New York City, supplemented by federal money.224
• Changing drug markets—Outdoor drug markets relocated to indoor locations thereby eliminating the ability to attack rival drug dealers.225 One would argue that the technological advancements of cellular phones and social media also led to greater declines.
• Increased abortion—Due to the increased rates of abortion in the early to mid-1970s, fewer children were born into at-risk homes, thus there were fewer children growing up into an at-risk household and susceptible to gang and drug activity.226
Social scientists insisting on varying reasons for crime rates decreasing diminish
the involvement of the NYPD in the process. Arrest activity increased, structured
analyzed placement of personnel occurred, and crime rates dropped. These factors do not
relate to CI or Homeland Security, but serve as reminders that contrary research always
exists.
In adapting the CompStat principles to CI and creating the NYC Deputy Mayor of
Infrastructure, an agency submitting fraudulent numbers and reports is a concern, but a
larger concern is the morale of the agency and the organizational behavior of adapting to
sweeping change. Research, interviews, and surveys all indicate that the negative
attributes of CompStat induced fear, alienation, and misdirection to precinct
commanders. Studies have shown that poor performance at a CompStat meeting or poor
indicators in CompStat categories has resulted in “punishment,” yet good performances
and indicators rarely generate a reward.227
Relating back to Behn’s PerformanceStat, he found that follow-up must be
relentless as the fourth principle states, but should not be hostile, stating “follow-up is
224 Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, “Specification problems, police levels, and crime
rates.” Criminology 34, no. 4 (1996): 609–646. 225 Steven D. Levitt, “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the
Decline and Six That Do Not.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 163–190. 226 John Donohue and Steven Levitt. The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime (Working Paper no.
8004). Quarterly Journal on Crime, 2000. 227 Ibid., 223.
92
absolutely necessary, and it ought to be persistent.”228 To document the loss of morale,
Eterno and Silverman interviewed captains who presented at CompStat and stated that
they “feared embarrassment during their presentations…high-level Executives would
berate them in public if their crime numbers were not decreasing…commanding officers
feared presenting at CompStat meetings and would do almost anything to escape the
embarrassment…fear was observed as a central aspect of CompStat in New York
City.” 229 To create improvements, implementing CompStat in CI must be professional
and not induce fear. Based on personal observations, the mood in a CompStat meeting
fluctuates based on spectators present. Holding the meeting publicly or having media
presence may force the professional demeanor to be maintained
Research done as well as personal observations indicate that the strong hierarchal
structure of the NYPD leads to the successes of CompStat. There is no doubt who is in
command of the proceeding and the department. As Eterno and Silverman detailed,
embarrassment and fear are motivators to ensure better performance on subsequent visits,
and when directed to perform tasks or report back successes and failures, there is not the
ability to say no or just fail to do so. Weisburd, a criminologist, adds, “This supervisory
system is strongly hierarchical and essentially negative, relying primarily on sanctions for
noncompliance with police rules and regulations,”230 and that CompStat is an “effort to
maintain and reinforce the ‘bureaucratic ‘or ‘paramilitary’ model of police
organization.”231 Weisburd’s work does not reflect the fact that a strong supervisory
system, such as CompStat, also increases accountability.
Overall, as the rates of crime reduction overshadow the negative aspects of
CompStat, promoting safety in CI through improved communication, collaboration, and
accountability will enable the success of the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure’s office.
228 Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat,” 206–235. 229 Eterno and Silverman, The New York City Police Department's Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?
218–231. 230 David Weisburd et al., “Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in
American Policing,” Criminology & Public Policy 2, no. 3 (2003), 421–456. 231 Ibid.
93
H. CONCLUSION
This chapter provided an overview of the origination of CompStat: its principles,
format, national models, and critiques. As observed in the research, the NYPD began the
CompStat model; research and personal observations demonstrate that the NYPD is still
at the forefront of the CompStat dynamic, adapting the design as times change. Eterno
and Silverman look to the future of CompStat and determine that “the NYPD needs to
acknowledge and learn from weaknesses in the process and begin to develop models of
policing that will take into account lessons learned.”232
Basic models of the stat process should be adhered to, but varying the structure
allows applicability to other agencies and disciplines. Eterno and Silverman close their
paper by citing the positive aspects of efficiency, command structure, expectations of
workers, and reduction of bias. Also included are the negative aspects of depriving
employees of having a decision-making voice, the concealment of mistakes, discouraging
loyalty, and alienation.233 The stat process as described earlier is a model of planning
and accountability to allocate resources efficiently. It cannot be viewed as a process to
take a poorly supervised agency or disconnected agencies and force better results.
In 1998, First Deputy Mayor Joseph Lhota stated, “It [the stat process] can be
used in any area of government. The fact that it was developed in the public safety area
does not mean that it has to stay there.”234 Following this sentiment, the creation of the
Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure with a CompStat component can have the same degree
of improvement as CompStat had in the NYPD. Chapter VI discusses the methodology of
creating the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure and designing a CompStat model within.
232 Eterno and Silverman, The New York City Police Department's Compstat, 229. 233 Ibid.,227. 234 O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, 179–223.
94
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
95
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Another definition of accountability is: the act of holding the subordinate liable for performing those activities for which he or she has been delegated the necessary authority and responsibility.
—Louis Eugene Boone, James W. Baird,
David Lee Kurtz, and Israel B. Markowitz235
Accountability and communication are two crucial aspects of the CompStat
process, both also particularly key to solve the needs surrounding NYC critical
infrastructure (NYC CI). Chapter V discussed the NYPD’s CompStat program, including
its successes and flaws. Chapter VI develops the strategy of implementing the CompStat
principles into NYC CI plans to increase accountability, communication, and prioritization.
The proposed system prioritizes cost-effective improvements and homeland security,
specifically CI, by enabling quicker emergency response and ability to evacuate if
necessary.
A. INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NYC CI
Currently, monitoring and assessing city agencies occurs in the NYC Mayor’s
Office of Operations; coordination of agencies for emergency incident response is
overseen by New York City Emergency Management (NYC EM). This thesis
recommends moving CI concerns from the Mayor’s Office of Operations into a newly
created Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure (DMI) Office and creating a CompStat Unit
within that office to collaborate with NYC EM to measure the performance of agencies
and ensure communication.
The Mayor’s Office of Operations and New York City Emergency Management
currently have overlapping responsibilities. Although both agencies oversee collaboration
in multi-agency response, as depicted in Figure 33, Emergency Management is better at
235 Boone, Louis Eugene, James W. Baird, David Lee Kurtz, and Israel B. Markowitz. Principles of
Management (New York: Random House, 1984).
96
multi-agency coordination post-event, than the Mayor’s Office of Operations has been
pre-event. This thesis recommends creation of the DMI to enable true collaboration,
communication, and accountability.
Figure 33. Overlapping Mission Statements
The current structure, as shown in Figure 33, causes duplicate work and important
issues to not be addressed in a timely manner due to communication and accountability
failures. This thesis recommends developing an accountability model to improve CI.
The structure of New York City government begins with the mayor, then the first
deputy mayor, and then additional deputy mayors who are on par with commissioners of
city agencies. Under this plan, the city would create a position of the deputy mayor of
critical infrastructure. Creating a deputy mayor of critical infrastructure is not just
creating more and bigger government. The NYC mayor has offices to combat domestic
violence, for housing and economic development, and health and human services;
therefore, if a system is failing, it needs to be brought into the forefront to be closely
97
monitored. The structure proposed follows the NYPD model where the person, or office,
directing the CompStat process has higher authority than those presenting for their
respective agency, increasing accountability.
The current NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations, headed by a director, “works to
make a government of over 40 agencies and 300,000 employees more effective, efficient,
and coordinated in carrying out its day-to-day business,”236 and also “monitors the
performance of all City agencies, holding each agency accountable for providing high
quality services and making data about the City’s performance readily available to the
public.”237 Information retrieved from their website reports increasing or decreasing
performance in numerous indicators per agency; the NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations
reports this information via the Citywide Performance Reporting (CPR) tool.238 The
CPR tool combines city agencies into eight citywide themes, including public safety,
legal affairs, education, and infrastructure. The infrastructure theme combines reports on
city agencies tasked with infrastructure but fails to define collaboration, coordination, or
accountability and also fails to encourage participation of private companies.
The Mayor’s Office of Operations website details how agency information is
collected but does not explain any collaborative efforts. The Performance Management
Team “monitors and reports on the performance of all City agencies, holding each agency
accountable for providing high quality services,” by maintaining the Citywide
Performance Reporting (CPR) tool, a searchable online database presenting key
performance measures from 44 city agencies.239 The Performance Management Team
also issues the bi-annual Mayor’s Management Report. The first report, issued early in
the fiscal year, defines the direction the city intends to go, while the second, issued after
the fiscal year ended, gives a recap of progress.
236 “Mission,” NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations, retrieved October 15, 2016, http://www1.nyc.gov/
site/operations/about/about.page. 237 Ibid. 238 “CPR: Agency Performance Reporting,” New York City Mayor’s Office, retrieved October 15,
2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/cpr/html/home/home.shtml. 239 Ibid.
98
NYC Emergency Management, headed by a commissioner, coordinates mitigation
efforts after emergency events. The agency has different sections to handle various
functions of city government and different categories of emergency. These divisions form
the structure for collaboration in pre-event planning discussed in this thesis. New York
City’s Emergency Management began as the New York office of the federal Office of
Civil Defense in 1941.240 In 1950, it became a New York City agency and has developed
under many incarnations since then, most notably as a subunit of the NYPD in 1975 and
the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) in 1996 by Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani. Under current Mayor Bill DeBlasio, NYC OEM has been renamed New York
City Emergency Management (NYC EM) as a rebranding to increase public awareness of
the organization and get the public’s assistance in coordination and preparedness.241
Similar rebranding of city agencies, like creating Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure,
could improve CI. The NYC EM mission statement explains that the agency “plans and
prepares for emergencies, educates the public about preparedness, coordinates emergency
response and recovery, and collects and disseminates emergency information.”242 The
author would be remiss in ignoring that, while the agency description and presentations
by the NYC EM commissioner and chief of staff stresses the term emergency, the type of
multi-agency communication recommended within does not currently fall under their
purview, therefore creating the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure in collaboration with
NYC EM would enhance the accountability of agencies and companies in the
infrastructure discipline.
NYC Emergency Management is divided into nine different divisions covering
post-event scenarios, each division combines interconnected agencies. This thesis focuses
on the Planning and Preparedness Division and the Transportation and Infrastructure Unit
240 “Agency History,” New York City Emergency Management, accessed September 6, 2016,
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/em/downloads/pdf/agency_history.pdf. 241 Ibid. 242 “Overview,” New York City Emergency Management, accessed September 6, 2016,
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/em/downloads/pdf/agency_history.pdf.
99
housed therein.243 The Transportation Unit “strengthens the resiliency of New York
City’s massive power, telecommunications, water, and transportation infrastructure
during disasters through response, recovery, and mitigation planning.”244 Under the plan
proposed in this thesis, when collaborating with the Deputy Mayor’s Office of
Infrastructure, the phrase “during disasters” can be removed revealing a section of the
agency concerning itself with “strengthening the resiliency of New York City’s massive
power, telecommunications, water, and transportation infrastructure through response,
recovery, and mitigation planning.”
New York City Emergency Management also developed emergency support
functions (ESF) to be commensurate with FEMA. FEMA’s ESF details different
functions, such as transportation, communications, and firefighting, describing the types
of work and responses that fall into those categories. NYC EM developed a listing of city
agencies, state agencies, and private corporations that fall under their purview, as subject
matter groups. These groups control, organize and regulate necessary functions to help
continue normal basic life in and recovery from emergency incidents. Examples of these
are the Health & Medical ESF, Public Safety ESF, Transportation ESF, and Infrastructure
ESF.
B. INCREASED COMMUNICATION FOR NYC CI
The description of NYC EM indicates the functionality of the ESF collaboration
in a post-event scenario, such as grouping together interconnected agencies in the CI
discipline. Developing a performance management operation within the NYC Deputy
Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure collaboration with NYC EM would bring together the
interests of the agencies represented in this thesis. NYC EM’s Transportation ESF covers
rail and bus transit, NYC Department of Transportation, NYS Department of
Transportation, Taxi Commission, and representatives from areas outside of New York
City. The NYC EM Infrastructure ESF covers the Department of Design and
243 “Divisions and Units,” New York City Emergency Management, accessed September 6, 2016,
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/em/about/divisions-units.page. 244 Ibid.
100
Construction, Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Parks, and similar
agencies from other jurisdictions. These ESFs open jointly or as single units as necessary
during a post-incident joint operation, and form the model for a CompStat meeting when
combined with the Mayor’s Office of Operations Infrastructure Theme in the Deputy
Mayor of Infrastructure Office (DMI).
Forming a CompStat analysis section within the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure
Office and working with NYC EM enables communication, monitoring, and
accountability. The Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure could coordinate the CompStat
processes of setting up the technology, meeting space, and scheduling. A rank structure
similar to the NYPD enables oversight, maintains accountability, and provides a
hierarchal system to ensure compliance with mayoral orders. The Deputy Mayor of
Infrastructure can examine CompStat for its strengths and weaknesses, and apply lessons
learned to strengthen and enhance disaster preparedness on an everyday level. The
hierarchy outlined in Figure 29 is essential to the CompStat meeting design. The Police
Commissioner rarely attends, and if so to announce new initiatives or hear an overview of
the presentation. CompStat is under the direction under the Chief of Department and
tasked to the Deputy Commissioner of Operations (DCO). The DCO is on the same level
of authority as the Bureau Chiefs which is important as the DCO and Bureau Chiefs are
in a physical and authoritative position to question subordinates. The Deputy Mayor of
Infrastructure would assume a position similar to the NYPD’s Chief of Department and
designate a position similar to the NYPD’s DCO in the duplicated model for CI, as
depicted in Figure 34.
101
Figure 34. Hierarchy of CompStat Model and the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure Model
This thesis recommends taking infrastructure concerns off the overburdened plate
of Mayor’s Office of Operations and create a new Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure to
collaborate with New York City’s Emergency Management. The current New York City
Commissioner of Emergency Management is Joseph Esposito, who is a former Chief of
Department for the New York City Police Department. In that assignment, he
commanded the CompStat process for 13 years (2000–2013). Commissioner Esposito’s
experience commanding CompStat and NYC EM will be immensely valuable in the
transition process. His experience in ensuring communication and accountability in the
NYPD would translate well into the new collaboration of NYC EM and the Mayor’s
Office of Infrastructure, and we would have all hands on deck to improve CI.
The goal of introducing CompStat principles to CI is to enable agencies to adapt
to the constant cycle of the CompStat principles, collecting intelligence, tactics/
deployment, and, most importantly, follow-up. The duality of the CompStat process is the
pre-planning or initiative phase and the follow-up phase. In pre-planning, commanding
officers make plans while the follow-up phase focuses on the accountability aspect of
critiquing actions and plans whether positive or negative. The culmination of the
102
CompStat process is the CompStat meeting, but both the leaders at the dais and the
presenting units engage in pre-CompStat meetings, resulting in the coordination of
efforts. For the dais, the DCOs office and the respective Bureau chiefs meet a day before
CompStat to discuss the highlighted issues for CompStat. This meeting ensures CompStat
discussion of the most relevant topics, as well as how to limit the session to an acceptable
length. The presenters, mostly precinct personnel, will meet during the week leading up
to CompStat to discuss the issues observed. On the day before CompStat, those units will
be called down to present the observations to the borough chief of the respective borough
presenting. This process applies to other units such as detective squads, robbery squads,
etc., who anticipate presenting at CompStat.
This pre-CompStat process is carried on by some successful borough chiefs or
unit commanding officers regularly with little influence of the CompStat schedule,
ensuring that communication and the principles of CompStat are adhered to daily. Under
a system of regular pre-CompStat meetings, members are kept apprised of issues and
monitor performance typically called into question at a real CompStat. Frequently, issues
discussed at pre-CompStats will not make it onto the agenda at the CompStat meeting
due to time constraints and level of importance. The pre-CompStat meeting ensures that
all issues are being looked at and under the direction of the borough commander.
This model develops a pre-meeting into each agency conducting respective mini-
CompStats. Subordinates brief agency heads on issues that may arise at CompStat and the
agency head instructs subordinates on issues observed. This system translates into mini-
CompStats off the CompStat schedule that create a system of accountability through the
year.
C. PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO NYC CI
Chapter V delineated the NYPD’s CompStat model and the four principles that
define the process; the next section explains how we can apply those to the Mayor’s
Office of Infrastructure. Adapting those four principles to the recommended Deputy
Mayor of Infrastructure provides a methodology to coordinate multi-agency cooperation
although organizational behavior will need to adjust.
103
1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence
Collection of intelligence is an agency-centric design that is already occurring but
needs to be analyzed and compared to other agencies. Accurate and timely intelligence is
a natural aspect of CompStat model for a citywide multi-agency application. In 2003,
New York City Department of Information Technology and Communications (NYC
DoITT) created the 311 quality-of-life hotline system. Customers can call to get
information or make complaints about hundreds of issues such as garbage collections,
alternate side parking, and noise. Originally intended to alleviate traffic to the 911
emergency dispatch system, 311 has become a repository for searchable requests
documented and issued a unique identifying number for follow-up. The 311 system
averages 10 million calls a year and provides services in 170 languages. Since the
creation of the 311 system, NYC DoITT has added a 311 website and apps for iOS-,
Android-, and Windows-operated cellular phones. The volume of calls and methods of
contact demonstrate the usage rate and the access that citizens have. The complaints are
collected and forwarded to respective agencies for action and replies are stored in the 311
system. The intelligence is being collected and used but not compared against
information from other agencies.
In preparation for research on this thesis, I attended meetings and seminars on
critical infrastructure by several government representatives from New York City
Council, New York State Assembly, and the Staten Island Borough President. All
presenters had no shortage of stories of governmental failure in improving infrastructure
in a prioritized manner. These officials, currently the repository of failures, can also be a
source of intelligence to the respective agencies. The incidents depicted Chapter IV all
indicate a need for oversight, communication, and accountability.
2. Effective Tactics
Effective tactics in the CI model come in the form of civilian agencies and
industry representatives to discuss new technologies and initiatives with city agencies
responsible for improvements. In the NYPD’s CompStat meetings, outside agencies are
104
invited to come and observe and participate. Also, NYPD units provide demonstrations
on new tactics and equipment.
Effective tactics tie in with rapid deployment. Rating systems are in place and
demonstrated in previous sections of this thesis. The American Society of Civil
Engineers, the NYC DOT, the Rudin Center, TRIP, Center for an Urban Future all use
the same collected rating systems to indicate which roadway or bridge needs repair first.
This information and the presence of those groups at CompStat would enforce the
prioritization.
3. Rapid Deployment
Rapid deployment coupled with effective tactics relies on taking the intelligence,
developing a plan to address it, and getting to it quickly based on priority. PlowNYC is a
website to enable citizens to track the progress of snow removal vehicles and to
determine the rating of their street in the priority removal order—primary, secondary, and
tertiary.245
The pre-event planning aspect of CompStat would enable joint rapid deployment
by agency representatives engaging in conversation about processes of their respective
organizations. Utility companies in New York City—Con Edison, National Grid, and
Verizon—have a plan in place in which they confer on upcoming projects. As a result,
the agencies can work together in one area, work more efficiently, reduce traffic
congestion, and save money. City agencies do not currently have a similar plan unless the
work comes under the Department of Design and Constriction Capital Projects.
4. Relentless Follow-up
Relentless follow-up is the tricky part. Developing a system where one person
with the authority of the mayor and can question city agencies could cause a hostile
environment. The goal is to encourage free conversation between agencies. The planning
phase of the meeting should be a moderated discussion between agencies. The follow-up
245 “PlowNYC,” New York City Department of Sanitation, accessed September 7, 2016,
http://maps.nyc.gov/snow/#.
105
and accountability phase does not have to be punitive but can be taken with the authority
of the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure. Being witness to hundreds of CompStat
presentations, I can testify to the resistance of some. Precinct commanders and borough
commanders unwilling to participate in the NYPD’s 1994 CompStat retired or adapted.
The result was and still is a massive well-documented decrease in crime. The result of
this recommendation is a vastly improved system of government-supervised
infrastructure.
5. Limitations
Researching the CompStat process, the state of critical infrastructure, and a
method of applying CompStat principles to CI uncovered limitations. The origination of
CompStat in 1994 was not without setbacks, retirements, and transfers. The government
is known to work in its silo-based system with little change from the previous
administration, regime, or generation. A conversion of that mindset into the NYPD’s
team mentality is necessary. Accountability and measurement are keys to successes,
recognition, and promotion of those who excel.
6. Summary
The recommendation of this thesis is to incorporate agencies and commissioners
along the ESF structure. This grouping would enable commissioners in compatible or
related fields to be grouped together for presentation at the NYC Deputy Mayor of
Infrastructure’s CompStat. The quotes in the Chapter II Section B and in Chapter V of
this thesis display that CompStat is not without its downsides. It can be aggressive,
confrontational, and sometimes demeaning, and documentation exists of attempts to
report false numbers to make the appearance of declining crime. The positive outcomes
of reduced crime and increased quality of life greatly outweigh the negative.
The CompStat process is not a panacea. It is not a magical cure-all that will transform a poorly run and inefficient organization into a model of public service excellence. Rather, it is an additional tool that can be used
106
to enhance performance by means of careful measurement and planning and effective allocation of resources.246
CompStat requires, fosters, and forces buy-in by all involved. It is a system to
build a hard-working team around a mission. Applying the CompStat principles to CI
would create similar partnership in all agencies involved in particular disciplines.
This thesis details hierarchies of authority in both the NYPD and the city of New
York. When the discussion relates to public safety, public infrastructure, and using tax
money to ensure both, the real bosses are the citizens of New York City. The ultimate
goal of this thesis is to create a fair system of accountability in which citizens can witness
the transparency and interact with the system in place. The CompStat system has
punished and rewarded members. This recommended system must gain success with
limited punishment and much public praise.
Democratic governments are also obligated to be accountable to their owners—the citizenry. Performance management principles and practices give governments the ability to provide easily understood and timely information to the public so citizens can assess the results their government is producing and fulfill their role as collective owners of their governments.247
The goal of accountability is to create a better product for consumers. In applying
accountability to CI, the citizens and taxpayers get a better transportation system, a better
use of tax money, and a safer of emergency response and evacuation system.
The NYPD did not invent the idea of accountability, but they are one of few city
agencies to implement it and receive the documented extreme results. The National
Academy of Public Administration is a non-partisan, non-profit organization to “assist
government leaders in building more effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent
246 O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, 179–223. 247 National Performance Management Advisory Commission, A Performance Management
Framework for State and Local Government: From Measurement and Reporting to Management and Improving (Chicago, IL: NPMAC, 2010).
107
organization.”248 Their 1991 report, Performance Monitoring and Reporting by Public
Organization strongly recommends agency heads:
• Monitor program quality to improve performance and credibility.
• Implement performance monitoring.
• Obtain agreement between policy making and operating levels.
• Involve citizens in setting goals and monitoring results.
• Collect data on system performance
• Report to elected officials.249
This 25-year-old report predates CompStat by three years and details principles similar to
those in CompStat, yet 25 years later that system has yet to be developed for CI.
This chapter has detailed the methodology to be used to promote CI safety via the
mayor moving this task from under the overburdened Mayor’s Office of Operations and
dedicating a new office to CI. This office, working with NYC EM, promotes
communication, collaboration, and accountability to city agencies. The CompStat Unit of
the new Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure can duplicate the advances to crime reduction
by the NYPD’s CompStat program into NYC CI. Chapter VII stresses the importance of
NYC CI for emergency response, evacuation, and routine travel.
248 “Who We Are,” National Academy of Public Administration, accessed September 7, 2016,
http://www.napawash.org/about-us/who-we-are.html. 249 “Performance Monitoring and Reporting by Public Organizations,” National Academy of Public
Administration, November 8, 1991. Washington, DC: NAPA.
108
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
109
VII. CONCLUSION
Institutions parade goals and mission statements whose benevolent generalities discreetly obscure the conflicts and contradictions of day-to- day activity.
—H. W. Love250
The federal government has critical infrastructure (CI) plans, reviews, and
critiques all done by federal agencies; the New York State system has plans, but no
reviews or critiques; and finally, the New York City system has no plans, no reviews and
only critiques by transportation think-tanks. Concrete government-run critiques of
agencies and follow up, currently nonexistent, must become the new model to ensure
accountability and communication, ensuring improved CI. As one expert has noted,
“Performance assessment and performance indicators are tools to manage with, not a
substitute for management. They aid in decision making, not take its place.”251
This thesis began by examining federal plans and directives; in continuing
research, the author learned that those do not affect local municipalities, however the lack
of plans and follow-up in those municipalities does. Documentation has shown horrifying
information on the current state of critical infrastructure and the disasters that can occur
as a result. Second, this thesis provided a thorough background of the CompStat system
and its accomplishments and flaws. Third, this thesis developed a model to incorporate
the successes of CompStat with the issues of critical infrastructure and combine them into
a NYC Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure, following the ESF model of NYC Emergency
Management, and begin a CompStat program to promote accountability through follow-
up and communication.
250 H. W. Love, “Communication, Accountability and Professional Discourse: The Interaction of
Language Values and Ethical Values,” Journal of Business Ethics 11, no. 11 (1992): 883–892. 251 Stephen P. Osborne et al., “Performance Management and Accountability in Complex Public
Programmes,” Financial Accountability & Management 11, no. 1 (1995): 19–37.
110
The topic of this thesis was developed in May 2015, while the author was stuck in
traffic on a normal day, in Staten Island, and traffic had become a sea of impassable
parking lots. The research began shortly after and continued through fall of 2016. While
researching government documents, media sources, think-tank organizations reports, and
seminars presented by the Commissioner of NYC Emergency Management and local
elected officials, the author was unable to find a NYC office dedicated solely to
infrastructure, but did find a theme within the NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations. A
“theme” does not fix roads and bridges; therefore, we need a separate office to prioritize
CI. The lack of documentation displays a need for the mayor’s office to move
infrastructure review out from the Mayor’s Office of Operations. This is not a
condemnation of that office, but a recommendation that critical infrastructure be
addressed in a more direct manner. The Mayor’s Office of Operations collects and posts
ratings of city agencies to create transparency in government, but the office is lacking in
follow-up, communication, and accountability as recommended by this thesis. Moving
the infrastructure theme into its own office reassures the public that the current
administration is taking the future of CI seriously. The programs in place can be
expanded upon to promote a brighter future for CI.
During this research, I have been called a “pissed-off constituent” and mocked
that I should just call my thesis “Why Do We Fill in Potholes Twice.” While all of that
may be true, this process has informed me of the current state of CI, the unintended future
if current systems are not improved, and how a model of accountability that changed the
course of the NYPD and crime reduction can yield similar results in CI. This research
was done and presented in a manner to establish a more accountable infrastructure
partnership. Concerns are based on the current inability to leave New York City on an
average day, thus mass evacuation would be impossible. Traffic and construction work
cause delays in emergency response to routine police, fire, medical calls, and also to
major events.
The large-scale implications and interdependencies of the critical infrastructure
system and how those relate to homeland security are important aspects to keep in mind.
The incidents discussed are from Staten Island, the smallest borough of New York City
111
with a population of approximately 400,000 people252 and third largest in terms of square
miles.253 These sample events are the same transportation-related issues that arise in all of
New York City due to being overseen by the same agencies. Furthermore, the issues
presented demonstrate processes that affect critical infrastructure and homeland security
nationwide. While the minutia deals with road repair and bridge repair, the larger scale
issue addresses emergency response to events and the concerns regarding evacuation of the
city in the event of a terror-related incident or weather disaster similar to 2012’s Hurricane
Sandy.
Staten Island, New York City, and the United States are dealing with shrinking
budgets and increasing repair and replacement costs. Contained in this thesis is
documentation from agencies citing significant defects with CI in the U.S. as well as the
associated exorbitant prices tags. Staten Island is a microcosm of NYC. The examples
cited in this thesis are small scale but indicators of a larger problem in the lack of
accountability and communication. Similar to the broken windows theory, we can fix
small problems before they become larger.
The NYPD uses the motto “do more with less” when faced with issues of
shrinking forces. The way to do more with less is to institute policies that ensure the
resources available are performing the correct tasks at the proper location. The CompStat
process has contributed to a monumental crime drop, an increase in quality of life, and
reclaiming of once war-torn neighborhoods. Executives participating in the original
CompStats either participated and increased their responsibility level or faced
replacement. CompStat achieved its mission of decreased crime and improved the quality
of life by providing increased accountability. The flaws and critiques discussed were a
small price to pay for that safety.
The recommendations in this thesis are simple. New York City government must
make agencies more interwoven in their responsibilities. The examples relate to some of
252 “Current and Projected Populations,” New York City Department of Planning, August 19, 2016,
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/nyc-population/current-future-populations.page. 253 “Borough (New York City),” Wikipedia, August 19, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Borough_(New_York_City).
112
the city agencies, therefore the systems proposed should begin with those and expand to
all disciplines. Agencies track efforts on an individual, agency-based, silo-driven system.
The proposed system for the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure and the CompStat
Unit recommended within accomplishes three missions at once: increase accountability,
improve communication, and promote inter-agency collaboration.
113
LIST OF REFERENCES
American Highway Users Alliance. “About American Highway Users Alliance.” Accessed September 5, 2016. http://www.highways.org/about/.
———. “Unclogging America’s Arteries 2015: Prescriptions for Healthier Highways.” November 23, 2015. http://www.highways.org/2015/11/unclogging-study2015/.
———. “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure, 2013.” Accessed December 28, 2015. http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/ NY_ReportCard_FullReport_9.29.15_FINAL.pdf.
———. “Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, 2009.” Accessed December 28, 2015. http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/2009/sites/default/files/ RC2009_full_report.pdf.
———. “Report Card for Los Angeles County Infrastructure, 2012.” Accessed December 28, 2015. https://247942916.onlinehome.us/pdf/2012-ASCE- Report%20Card-Revised-10-2-2012- REVISED_FINAL_FOR%20THE%20WEBSITE.pdf.
———. “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure, 2015” accessed December 28, 2015. http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/new_york/newyork/.
———. “Report Card for Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure, 2013.” Accessed December 28, 2015. http://www.pareportcard.org/.
———. “Report Card for Washington, DC’s Infrastructure, 2016.” Accessed February 15, 2016. http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ ASCE-DC-Report-Card-2016-Report.pdf.
Balsamini, Dean. “City to Destroy Safety Barriers for West Indian Day Parade Floats.” August 28, 2016. http://nypost.com/2016/08/28/city-to-destroy-safety-barriers- for-west-indian-day-parade-floats/.
Barone, Vincent. “Hole in Hylan Boulevard Overpass Prompted Emergency Closures.” Staten Island Advance, June 11, 2015. http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/ 2015/06/hole_in_hylan_boulevard_overpa.html.
———. “Mayor Allocates $15 Million for Arthur Kill Road Expansion.” Staten Island Advance, May 7, 2015. http://www.silive.com/southshore/index.ssf/2015/05/ mayor_allocates_15_million_for.html.
———. “Sen. Gillibrand Pushes Measure For More Bridge Funding.” Staten Island Advance, June 3, 2015. http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/ sen_gillibrand_pushes_measure.html.
114
———. “Smoother Island Roads! City Hikes paving miles by 52%.” Staten Island Advance, June 9, 2015. http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/ staten_island_woll_see_a_89_pe.html.
Behn, Robert D. “Designing PerformanceStat: Or What Are the Key Strategic Choices That a Jurisdiction or Agency Must Make When Adapting the Compstat/Citistat Class of Performance Strategies?” Public Performance & Management Review 32, no. 2 (2008).
———. “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures.” Public Administration Review 63, no. 5 (2003).
Biography.com. “Michael Bloomberg.” July 28, 2016. http://www.biography.com/ people/michael-bloomberg-16466704.
Bloch, Matthew, Ford Fessenden, Alan McLean, Archie Tse and Derek Watkins. “Surveying the Destruction Caused by Hurricane Sandy.” New York Times. Accessed September 9, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2012/1120- sandy/survey-of-the-flooding-in-new-york-after-the-hurricane.html.
Bloomberg, Michael. A Stronger, More Resilient New York. New York: PlaNYC Program, 2013.
Boone, Louis Eugene, James W. Baird, David Lee Kurtz, and Israel B. Markowitz. Principles of Management. New York: Random House, 1984.
Bratton, William. “William Bratton’s Twitter Page.” Twitter. Accessed November 11, 2016. https://mobile.twitter.com/CommissBratton/status/720960865911062528.
Bratton, William, and Peter Knobler. The Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic. New York: Random House, 2009.
Bush, George W. “Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council.” Federal Register 66, no. 196 (October 10, 2001).
———. “Executive Order 13231: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.” Federal Register 66, no. 202 (October 18, 2001).
———. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7): Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 39, no. 51 (December 22, 2003).
———. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8). 17 December 2003.” Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. Accessed March 11, 2016. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217- 7.html.
115
Business Insider. “America’s Crumbling Infrastructure: Bridging the Gap.” June 29, 2014. Accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/americas- crumbling-infrastructure-bridging-the-gap-2014-6.
CBS News. “Falling Apart: America’s Neglected Infrastructure.” Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/falling-apart-america-neglected-infrastructure/.
Center for an Urban Future. “About Center for an Urban Future.” Accessed September 4, 2016. https://nycfuture.org/.
Clinton, William. “Executive Order 13010-Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Federal Register 61, no. 138 (1996).
Comes, Tina, and Bartel Van de Walle. “Measuring Disaster Resilience: The Impact of Hurricane Sandy on Critical Infrastructure Systems.” In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM2014), edited by Starr Roxanne Hiltz, Mark S. Pfaff, Linda Plotnick and Patrick C. Shih, 196. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2014.
Dabney, Dean. “Observations regarding Key Operational Realities in a Compstat Model of Policing.” Justice Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2010), 28.
Department of Homeland Security. “What Is Critical Infrastructure?” Accessed December 28, 2015. http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.
Department of Homeland Security—Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis. “Impact of Population Shifts on Critical Infrastructure.” July 6, 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis.
Donohue, John, and Steven Levitt. The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime. Working Paper No. 8004. Quarterly Journal on Crime, 2000.
Dussault, Raymond “Jack Maple: Betting on Intelligence.” Government Technology (1999).
Earth Justice. “Brookfield Landfill: Cleaning Up a Toxic Dump.” Accessed September 9, 2016. http://earthjustice.org/our_work/cases/2008/brookfield-landfill-cleaning-up- a-toxic-dump#.
———. “City Budgets $141 Million for Toxic Waste Cleanup at Staten Island Site.” June 18, 2009. http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2009/city-budgets-141-million- for-toxic-waste-cleanup-at-staten-island-site.
———. “Staten Islanders Sue For Toxic Waste Cleanup.” October 14, 2008. http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2008/staten-islanders-sue-for-toxic-waste- dump-cleanup.
116
Economist. “America’s Transport Infrastructure: Life in the Slow Lane.” April 28, 2011. Accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.economist.com/node/18620944.
Eterno, John A., and Eli B. Silverman. “The New York City Police Department’s Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?” International Journal of Police Science & Management 8, no. 3 (2006).
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Unified Crime Report.” Retrieved May 8, 2016. https:// www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr.
Forman, Adam. “A Call to Sustain New York’s Economic Vitality by Improving Infrastructure.” Center for an Urban Future, November 2014. https:// nycfuture.org/research/publications/a-call-to-sustain-new-yorks-economic- vitality-by-improving-infrastructure.
———. “Caution Ahead: Overdue Investments for New York’s Aging Infrastructure.” Center for an Urban Future, 2014, Forman, Adam. “Caution Ahead: Overdue Investments for New York’s Aging Infrastructure.” Center for an Urban Future (2014).
Fox, James Alan. “Demographics and U.S. homicide.” Crime Drop in America (2000).
Frontline. “Cocaine, Conspiracy Theories & the CIA in Central America.” Accessed July 31, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/cia.html.
Giles, Jamie. “Do Municipal Stat Programs Improve Services and Reallocate Resources? Evidence from LouieStat.” MPS/MPP Capstone Project, University of Kentucky, 2014. Accessed March 29, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/4.
Godown, Jeff. “The CompStat Process: Four Principles for Managing Crime Reduction.” The Police Chief 76, no. 8 (2009).
Google Maps. “Brookfield Landfill.” Accessed September 9, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/ Arthur+Kill+Rd,+Staten+Island,+NY/@40.5640205,- 74.1571289,1126m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x89c24adc72a56fb1:0xa075b2c 456c84349!8m2!3d40.5558469!4d-74.2016273?hl=en.
———. “Great Kills Park, Staten Island Satellite View.” Accessed October 11, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Great+Kills+Park/@40.5552261,- 74.1261318,228a,20y,313.34h,45t/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x89c24bd5dc4a0 f23:0xd7a54d9d9efca532!8m2!3d40.5502073!4d-74.1269322?hl=en.
Hao, S. “I-35W Bridge Collapse.” Journal of Bridge Engineering 15, no. 5 (2009), 608.
117
Helsel, Phil. “Falling Debris Creates Dangerous Condition on the Staten Island Expressway.” Staten Island Advance, April 27, 2009. http://www.silive.com/ news/index.ssf/2009/04/overpass_debris_causes_danger.html.
Hess, Daniel Baldwin, and Julie C. Gotham. “Multi-Modal Mass Evacuation in Upstate New York: A Review of Disaster Plans.” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 4, no. 3 (2007).
Horton, Jeffrey L. “Surviving an Interstate Bridge Collapse.” Public Roads 78, no. 3 (2014). https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/14novdec/05.cfm.
Kaufman, Sarah, Carson Qing, Nolan Levenson, and Melinda Hanson. “Transportation during and after Hurricane Sandy.” (2012).
Kelling, George L., and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in our Communities. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.
Kelling, George L., and William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter?: An Analysis of the Impact of New York City’s Police Reforms. New York: CCI Center for Civic Innovation at the Manhattan Institute, 2001.
Kensinger, Nathan. “Residents Retreat from Staten Island’s Hard-Hit Waterfront.” Curbed New York, October 29, 2014. http://ny.curbed.com/2014/10/29/ 10029950/residents-retreat-from-staten-islands-hard-hit-waterfront.
Kimery, Anthony L. “FEMA Outlines Decade of Progress after Hurricane Katrina, But Millions in Public Assistance Grants Misspent, IG Says,” Homeland Security Today, http://www.hstoday.us/industry-news/general/single-article/fema-outlines- decade-of-progress-after-hurricane-katrina-but-millions-in-public-assistance- grants-misspent-ig-says/43d7822af3d3a03728600ee072aa5ac9.html.
Landa, Marjorie. “Management Audit: Audit Report on the Department of Transportation’s Tracking of Pothole Repairs.” City of New York Office of the Comptroller, June 29, 2016. http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/ documents/ME15_114A.pdf.
Lemer, A. C. “Progress Toward Integrated Infrastructure-Assets-Management Systems: GIS and beyond.” In Innovations in Urban Infrastructure Seminar of the APWA International Public Works Congress. Washington, DC: American Public Works Association, 1998.
Levitt, Steven D. “Understanding Why Crime Fell In The 1990s: Four Factors That Explain The Decline And Six That Do Not.” Journal Of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004).
118
Liotta, Paul. “Victory Boulevard Still Closed for Second Evening Commute.” Staten Island Advance, September 8, 2016. http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/ 09/victory_blvd_still_closed_for.html.
Love, H. W. “Communication, Accountability and Professional Discourse: The Interaction of Language Values and Ethical Values.” Journal of Business Ethics 11, no. 11 (1992).
Maple, Jack, and Chris Mitchell. The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business. New York: Broadway Books, 2010.
Marvell, Thomas B., and Carlisle E. Moody. “Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates.” Criminology 34, no. 4 (1996).
Metzenbaum, Shelley H. “Performance Management Recommendations for the New Administration” (2009). Edward J. Collins Center for Public Management Publications. Paper 11. 4. Retrieved on November 8, 2015, from http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cpm_pubs/11.
National Academy of Public Administration. 1991. Performance Monitoring and Reporting by Public Organizations. Washington, DC: NAPA.
———. “Who We Are.” Accessed September 7, 2016. http://www.napawash.org/about- us/who-we-are.html.
National Performance Management Advisory Commission, A Performance Management Framework for State and Local Government: From Measurement and Reporting to Management and Improving, Chicago, IL: NPMAC, 2010.
NBC News. “Cuomo Announces Buyouts for Sand-Decimated Staten Island Homeowners.” November 18, 2016. http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/11/18/ gov-cuomo-announces-buyouts-for-ocean-breeze-homeowners/.
———. “I-Team: NYPD Provides Unprecedented Look at Compstat,,” April 15, 2016, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Compstat-New-York-NYPD-Police- Tour-375761141.html.
New York City Department of Planning. “Current and Projected Populations.” August 19, 2016. http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/nyc-population/current- future-populations.page.
New York City Department of Sanitation. “PlowNYC.” Accessed September 7, 2016. http://maps.nyc.gov/snow/#.
New York City Department of Transportation. “Bridges.” Accessed October 8, 2016. http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/infrastructure/bridges.shtml.
119
———. “High Pedestrian Crash Locations—2012. Accessed October 11, 2016. http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/2012-nyc-top-20-pedestrian-crash- locations.pdf.
———. “The Daily Pothole—Mill & Pave.” August 8, 2016 http://thedailypothole.tumblr.com/.
New York City Emergency Management. “Agency History.” Accessed September 6, 2016. http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/em/downloads/pdf/agency_history.pdf.
———. “Divisions and Units.” Accessed September 6, 2016. http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ em/about/divisions-units.page.
———. “Overview.” Accessed September 6, 2016. http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/em/ downloads/pdf/agency_history.pdf.
———. “Overview.” August 19, 2016. http://www1.nyc.gov/site/em/about/ overview.page.
New York City Environmental Protection. “Brookfield Landfill Remediation.” Accessed September 9, 2016. http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/dep_projects/ cp_brookfield_landfill.shtml.
New York City Mayor’s Office. “CPR: Agency Performance Reporting. Accessed October 15, 2016. http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/cpr/html/home/home.shtml.
New York City Mayor’s Office of Operations. “Mission.” Accessed October 15, 2016. http://www1.nyc.gov/site/operations/about/about.page.
New York City Office of Information Technology & Telecommunications. “NYCityMap.” Accessed November 8, 2016. http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/nycitymap/ template.jsp?z=4&p=991201,192667&c=GISBasic&f=DDC_PROJECTS.
New York City Police Department. “Compstat 2.0.” Retrieved May 7, 2016. https://Compstat.nypdonline.org/.
New York Post. “NYC Is Pothole City.” March 19, 2015. http://nypost.com/2015/03/19/ new-york-city-is-one-big-pothole/.
New York State Department of Transportation. “Highway Mileage Report 2014.” Accessed October 8, 2016. https://www.dot.ny.gov/highway-data-services.
New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services. “New York State Homeland Security Strategy 2014–2016.” Accessed September 4, 2016. http://www.dhses.ny.gov/media/documents/NYS-Homeland-Security- Strategy.pdf.
120
New York, City of. “Crime Statistics.” Accessed September 10, 2016. http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_statistics/cs-en-us-city.pdf.
———. “New York City Underground Infrastructure Working Group, Infrastructure Report.” June 2014. www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/ 2014/infrastructure_report.pdf.
———. “Protected Streets Listing.” Accessed September 9, 2016. http://www.nyc.gov/ html/dot/downloads/pdf/segallboro.pdf.
NYU Rudin Center for Transportation. “The Mobility Factbook.” Accessed September 4, 2016. http://nycmobility.org/private-car.
NYU Rudin Center for Transportation Policy & Management. “About the Rudin Center.” Accessed October 10, 2016. http://wagner.nyu.edu/rudincenter/about/.
O’Connell, Paul E. Using Performance Data for Accountability, the New York City Police Department’s Compstat Model of Police Management. Arlington, VA: Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2001.
Obama, Barack. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, Washington, DC: White House, 2013.
Oddo, James. Facebook page. Accessed September 3, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/ jamessoddo?fref=ts.
Odometer. “20 Cities with the Worst Roads.” Accessed September 29, 2016. http://www.odometer.com/lifestyle/4672/20-cities-with-the-worst-roads/#page=6.
Omer, Mayada, Ali Mostashari, and Roshanak Nilchiani. “Assessing Resilience in a Regional Road-based Transportation Network.” International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering 13, no. 4 (2013): 391.
Osborne, David E., and Peter Plastrik, The Reinventor’s Fieldbook: Tools for Transforming Your Government. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2000.
Osborne, Stephen P., Tony Bovaird, Steve Martin, Mike Tricker, and Piers Waterston. “Performance Management and Accountability in Complex Public Programmes.” Financial Accountability & Management 11, no. 1 (1995).
Palmer, Jonathan. “Municipal PerformanceStat: How is Success Defined? What Factors Contribute to Success?” Ph.D. diss., UNC-Chapel Hill, 2010.
Rafferty, John. “Superstorm Sandy.” Encyclopedia Britannica, Last updated May 31, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/event/Superstorm-Sandy.
121
Randall. Judy. “City DOT Milling, Paving Streets in Sandy Buy-out Neighborhoods.” Staten Island Advance, April 16, 2014. http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/ 2014/04/city_dot_milling_paving_street.html.
Rashbaum, W. “Complaints Against Cops Surge 135%.” New York Daily News, 22 (1996).
Riccio, Lucius. “Applying Data Science to the War on Potholes.” Columbia University Data Science Institute, March 15, 2016. http://datascience.columbia.edu/applying- data-science-war-potholes.
Rich, Kiamwa. “Staten Island Elected Officials Call on Government to Clean Up Garbage in Bay Terrace.” Staten Island Advance. April 14, 2014. http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/04/ staten_island_elected_official_9.html.
Roeder, Oliver K., Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Julia Bowling, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Inimai M. Chettiar. “What Caused the Crime Decline?” Research Paper No. 15–28. Columbia Business School Research Paper, 2015).
Rued, Emily S. “Why Are the Streets Always Under Construction?” New York Times, August 8, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/18/nyregion/new- york-101-streets-repair-and-maintenance.html?_r=3.
Santos, Joost R., Yacov Y. Haimes and Chenyang Lian. “A Framework for Linking Cybersecurity Metrics to the Modeling of Macroeconomic Interdependencies.” Risk Analysis 27, no. 5 (2007): 1283.
Schaller, Choices at a Critical Junction: New York’s Mobility and Highway Infrastructure Needs for 2005–2010. New York: NYU Wagner Rudin Center for Transportation Policy & Management, 2005.
Sharp, Tim. “Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm.” LiveScience, November 27, 2012. http://www.livescience.com/24380-hurricane-sandy-status-data.html.
Sherry, Virginia. “New Hole Opens in Hylan Boulevard Expressway Overpass.” June 22, 2015, Staten Island Advance. http://www.silive.com/eastshore/index.ssf/2015/06/ another_hole_in_hylan_boulevar.html.
Silverman, Eli B. “Mapping Change: How the New York City Police Department Reengineered itself to Drive Down Crime.” Law Enforcement News, December 15, 1996.
Smith, Rachael Holliday. “City Rips Up New Eastern Pkwy Pedestrian Islands For West Indian Day Parade.” August 30, 2016. https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/ 20160830/crown-heights/city-rips-up-new-eastern-pkwy-pedestrian-islands-for- west-indian-day-parade.
122
Stein, Mark. “Former Brookfield Landfill on Staten Island Being Transformed.” Staten Island Advance, October 27, 2012. http://www.silive.com/eastshore/index.ssf/ 2012/10/former_brookfield_landfill_on.html.
Taquechel, Eric F., and Ted G. Lewis. “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure Risk.” (2012).
TRIP. “About TRIP.” Accessed September 5, 2016. http://tripnet.org/about.php.
———. “New York’s Top Transportation Issues: Meeting the State’s Needs for Safe, Smooth, and Efficient Mobility.” Accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.tripnet.org/docs/NY_Top_Transportation_Issues_TRIP_Report_Jan_2 016.pdf.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Threats to the Electric Grid. (GAO-15-692). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-692T.
———. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on Key Factors in DHS’s Implementation of its Partnership Approach. (GAO 14–494). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014. Accessed February 5, 2016. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-494.
———. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on Key Factors in DHS’s Implementation of its Partnership Approach. (GAO 14–464). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014. http://www.gao.gov/products/ GAO-14-464T.
———. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts. (GAO 14–507). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014. http://www.gao.gov/ products/GAO-14-507.
———. Critical Infrastructure: Assessment of the Department of Homeland Security’s Report on the Results of Its Critical Infrastructure Partnership Streamlining Efforts (GAO-14-100R). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-100R.
———. Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Assessing National Capabilities. (GAO-11-260). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d11260t.pdf.
123
———. National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities. (GAO-13-637T). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-637T.
Weisburd, David, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Ann McNally, Rosann Greenspan, and James J. Willis. “Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing.” Criminology & Public Policy 2, no. 3 (2003).
White House, Homeland Security Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, Washington, DC, December 17, 2003. http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/ gc_1189788256647.shtm.
Wikipedia. “Borough (New York City).” August 19, 2016. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Borough_(New_York_City).
———. “I-35 Bridge Collapse. Accessed September 28, 2016. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Image- I35W_Collapse_-_Day_4_-_Operations_%26_Scene_%2895%29_edit.jpg/ 220px-Image-I35W_Collapse_-_Day_4_- _Operations_%26_Scene_%2895%29_edit.jpg.
Willis, James J., David Weisburd, and Stephen D. Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities. Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2003.
Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. “The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows.” Atlantic Monthly 127, no. 2 (1982).
Winston, Clifford, and Fred Mannering. “Implementing Technology to Improve Public Highway Performance: A Leapfrog Technology from the Private Sector is Going to be Necessary.” Economics of Transportation 3, no. 2 (2014), 158.
Wrobleski, Tom. “Terror and traffic: Staten Island on Edge.” Staten Island Advance, July 20, 2016. http://www.silive.com/opinion/columns/index.ssf/2015/07/ terror_and_traffic_staten_isla.html.
Zarate, Mozes. “Potholes Put a Dent in New York City Budget.” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/potholes-put-a-dent-in-new-york-city- budget-1438303741
124
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
125
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 2. Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California
© 2016 by the author(s). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the following terms: Homeland Security Affairs is an academic journal available free of charge to individuals
and institutions. Because the purpose of this publication is the widest possible dissemination of knowledge, copies of this journal and the articles contained
herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research or educational purposes free of charge and without permission. Any
commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the author(s) of the article. Homeland Security Affairs is the online journal of the
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
- NAVAL
- POSTGRADUATE
- SCHOOL
- I. INTRODUCTION
- A. RESEARCH QUESTION
- B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
- C. HYPOTHESIS
- D. RESEARCH DESIGN
- II. LITERATURE REVIEW
- A. BACKGROUND ON CI POLICY AND PROGRESS
- 1. Government Directives Regarding CI
- 2. Evaluations of Government CI Efforts
- B. COMPSTAT
- C. HOW DO WE FIX CI?
- III. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN NYS AND NYC
- A. INTRODUCTION
- B. NEW YORK STATE
- C. NEW YORK CITY
- D. CONCLUSION
- IV. SAMPLE EVENTS
- A. ARTHUR KILL ROAD WIDENING
- B. BAY TERRACE, STATEN ISLAND, WATER RUNOFF
- C. EASTERN PARKWAY
- D. SUPERSTORM SANDY BUYOUT AND REBUILDING
- E. GATEWAY NATIONAL PARK
- F. HYLAN BOULEVARD—STATEN ISLAND EXPRESSWAY DETERIORATION
- G. MAJOR ACCIDENT ON VICTORY BOULEVARD
- H. CONCLUSION
- V. COMPSTAT
- A. OVERVIEW
- B. FOUR PRINCIPLES OF COMPSTAT
- 1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence
- 2. Effective Tactics
- 3. Rapid Deployment
- 4. Relentless Follow-up and Assessment
- C. MEETING
- D. COSTS, TECHNOLOGY, AND STAFFING
- E. OTHER USES OF COMPSTAT
- F. PERFORMANCESTAT MODELS
- G. CRITIQUES OF COMPSTAT MODELS
- H. CONCLUSION
- IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- A. INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NYC CI
- B. INCREASED COMMUNICATION FOR NYC CI
- C. PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO NYC CI
- 1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence
- 2. Effective Tactics
- 3. Rapid Deployment
- 4. Relentless Follow-up
- 5. Limitations
- 6. Summary
- VII. CONCLUSION
- list of References
- initial distribution list