Research Methods

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CONSERVATISM'S IMPACT ON JORDANIAN BANK'S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE Jarbou, Loay; Abu-Serdaneh, Jamal; Atmeh, Muhannad . The Journal of Developing Areas ; Nashville

 Vol. 52, Iss. 4,  (Fall 2018): 183-197.

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ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) The banking sector has suffered recently from a series of financial crises that have affected the worlds' financial

system's stability. It is argued that the weak financial performance of banks could be due, among other factors, to

deficiencies within corporate governance systems in banks, and the lack of conservatism (as conservatism is used

to minimize the agency problem). This paper aims to examine the effect of the corporate governance mechanism

(ownership structure, bank's characteristics) and conservatism level on the Jordanian commercial banks'

performance for the period between 2005 -2014. Four ownership structure dimensions are employed- ownership

concentration, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership. Bank characteristics are

captured by using size, age and debt-to-equity ratio. The paper used return on assets and return on equity to

assess the financial performance, and applied the accrual method and book value-to-market value method as

proxies for conservatism. The results showed a significant impact for all of the ownership structure dimensions

and bank's characteristics, on the bank's performance, except for the institutional ownership and the banks' age,

which showed no impact on performance. The explanation of this exception is that the Jordanian banking sector is

essentially built upon family business. The foreign ownership and government ownership have a positive

relationship with bank performance, as the high level of foreign ownership indicates high quality investments.

Additionally, government ownership usually imposes more controls and minimizes the agency problems. On the

other hand, the concentrated ownership and the bank's size showed a negative relationship to the banks'

performance, as concentrated investors may abuse their authority. The negative relationship to the banks' size is

due to the high cost required from these banks to control and monitor their different branches. In addition, the

results suggest a negative impact of conservatism on the bank's performance when utilizing the book value

method as the balance sheet accounts are understated, and hidden reserves are created. On the other hand, a

positive impact of conservatism on the bank's performance is detected when utilizing the accrual method. This is

because conservatism's policy will improve firm's performance by minimizing the investment in the negative net

present value projects. Thus, two different methods could have different results as every method adopts a

different perspective. FULL TEXT Headnote

ABSTRACT

The banking sector has suffered recently from a series of financial crises that have affected the worlds' financial

system's stability. It is argued that the weak financial performance of banks could be due, among other factors, to

deficiencies within corporate governance systems in banks, and the lack of conservatism (as conservatism is used

to minimize the agency problem). This paper aims to examine the effect of the corporate governance mechanism

(ownership structure, bank's characteristics) and conservatism level on the Jordanian commercial banks'

performance for the period between 2005 -2014. Four ownership structure dimensions are employed- ownership

concentration, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership. Bank characteristics are

captured by using size, age and debt-to-equity ratio. The paper used return on assets and return on equity to

assess the financial performance, and applied the accrual method and book value-to-market value method as

proxies for conservatism. The results showed a significant impact for all of the ownership structure dimensions

and bank's characteristics, on the bank's performance, except for the institutional ownership and the banks' age,

which showed no impact on performance. The explanation of this exception is that the Jordanian banking sector is

essentially built upon family business. The foreign ownership and government ownership have a positive

relationship with bank performance, as the high level of foreign ownership indicates high quality investments.

Additionally, government ownership usually imposes more controls and minimizes the agency problems. On the

other hand, the concentrated ownership and the bank's size showed a negative relationship to the banks'

performance, as concentrated investors may abuse their authority. The negative relationship to the banks' size is

due to the high cost required from these banks to control and monitor their different branches. In addition, the

results suggest a negative impact of conservatism on the bank's performance when utilizing the book value

method as the balance sheet accounts are understated, and hidden reserves are created. On the other hand, a

positive impact of conservatism on the bank's performance is detected when utilizing the accrual method. This is

because conservatism's policy will improve firm's performance by minimizing the investment in the negative net

present value projects. Thus, two different methods could have different results as every method adopts a

different perspective.

JEL Classifications: G32, G34, L25, O16 and M41

Keyword: Ownership structure, Conservatism, Bank's performance, banks' characteristics

(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)

INTRODUCTION

The series of financial crisis has exposed significant weaknesses in the worlds' financial system. It has put the

stability of the global financial system into more questions, arguing that it may damage the main capitalism rule

which states that financial markets and private financial institutions could largely be trusted to regulate

themselves (Stein 2009); thus, a new regulation is needed to regain the different stakeholders' trust.

The corporate governance aims to monitor the manager's activities and protect the different stakeholders' interest,

and in order to organize and clarify this relation, Jensen &Meckling (1976) developed the ownership structure

theory, which became a main dimension for the corporate governance to explain the importance of different types

of investors and their impact on the firm's performance.

The importance of the ownership structure emerged from the need to separate the ownership from the control. As

a result of the transformation of the small, family, or government's firms to public shareholders companies with a

large number of shareholders. The different types of investors and especially individual investors cannot

effectively keep monitoring the management's performance due to the high control cost and to the lack of

expertise. The corporate governance principles developed in order to solve the conflict of interest of different types

of investors, and to capture the control problem through the ownership mechanism to protect the rights of the

minor shareholders, and introduce sufficient information to the institutional and foreign investors (Shleifer &Vishny

1997).

However, the weak corporate governance instructions in any market could force the investors to liquidate their

investments and exit from the market. Conversely, the investors could face the weak corporate governance

instructions by asking the companies to implement a strict policy in the revenue recognition and in transparency

issues to provide sufficient information and to minimize the information asymmetry between the shareholders. In

other words, the investors ask for a high level of conservatism as a substitute to the low level of corporate

governance (LaFond &Roychowdhury 2008).

The rest of the study is organized as follows: section 2 describes research problem and objectives, Section 3

presents literature review, section 4 study methodology, section 5 lists statistical analyses, and section 6

concludes the study.

RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES

The main problem of the study is that the relationship between the ownership structure and conservatism is still

unclear in the Jordanian banking sector. Moreover, the effect of conservatism on the relationship between the

ownership structure and the banks' performance was not examined before in Jordanian banks. In addition the

related parties (the stockholders) are not fully aware of their rights and responsibilities. Another problem that

needs to be clarified is getting different results when using different measures (i.e. using different measures to

assess the conservatism and performance). This study tries to explore these issues, and find its implications on

the performance of Jordanian banks.

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of ownership structure's dimensions, bank's characteristics, and

conservatism on the performance of Jordanian commercial banks.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Ownership Structure

The corporate governance aims to reduce the conflict of interest between the owners and the managers by

implementing internal and external mechanisms. The internal mechanisms focus on the company's ownership

structure, board of director's structure and sub committees, and separation of the chairman position and the CEO

position. On the other hand, the external mechanisms include the external policy, which regulates the banking

system (Denis &McConnell 2003). Mathiesen (2002) defined the ownership structure as the distribution of the

firm's owners regarding the voting powers, and also regarding the owner's identity .

The ownership structure is considered the main internal dimension or mechanism to measure the corporate

governance's level, as the corporate governance aims to protect the different types of stakeholders, and to

minimize the conflict of interest between the managers and the owners, which is caused by the separation

between the control and the management (the agency problem).

The Anglo-American definition of corporate governance suggests that a larger number of shareholders should

enrich the company with many different types of advisors, supervisors, and create various control roles, which will

reduce the conflict between the majority and the minority shareholders (LaPorta et al. 2000). Meanwhile, the large

number of shareholders tend to over-monitor the management's activities and curb its decision making process

(Aghion &Tirole 1997).

Conversely, Yeqin (2007) mentioned that the high ownership concentration gives more authority to major

shareholders to monitor and supervise the management's activities, and the power to ask the management to

implement significant changes, as the majority of shareholders will reject any inefficient decisions by the

management due to the congruence of interest between the two parties, but it also increases the conflict between

the majority and the minority of shareholders since the majority of shareholders could expropriate the minority's

rights and interests.

In every financial market, there are several types of investors. They can be divided into: institutions, individual

investors, foreign investors, and government or state investors. The role and effect of every type of investors

depends on the region and the adopted financial system (Yeqin 2007). The institutional investors usually own a

high capacity of controlling and supervising their investments than the individual investors. Foreign investors also

play a key role in influencing the company's activities, and a major role in the emerging economies (Gillan &Starks

2000). It is also argued that the government or state ownership sometimes have a negative role in the company.

While other shareholders aim to maximize their wealth, the government has different goals including supporting

the local economy.

Empirical studies introduced mixed results about the ownership structure's importance for companies. Morck

&Steier (2005) indicated that if the ownership structure in a company has a high level of ownership concentration,

this will have a positive effect as the small controlling shareholders spend more time and efforts to keep

monitoring and advise the managers. On the other hand, Fama &Jensen (1983) found that the managerial role for

shareholders may enhance the agency's problem by increasing the managerial opportunist for non-professional

major shareholders; the dominant party of shareholders may use their power and authority to force the company

to adopt activities for their personal interest rather than other stockholders' or other minority shareholders'

interest. Myers (1995) added that a major role for the shareholders will definitely decrease the manager's

initiatives as they feel constrained and directly exposed to shareholders' interventions.

Conservatism

Conservatism is a technique used widely to minimize or soften the agency problem. It constrains the top

management ability to increase the firm's net assets and revenues (Watts &Zuo 2011). Conservatism's definition is

derived from a classic saying "that you should anticipate no profit, and anticipate all the losses" (Bliss 1924, p 69).

Conservatism is considered a conservative response from the company's management to ambiguous and unclear

conditions. It includes strict standards to revenue recognitions rather than expenses' recognitions (Darash 2014).

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)

which organize the financial statements' preparation previously focused on introducing the current real value of

banks to the investors and other stakeholders. On the other hand, central banks -which are considered the

regulators for local banks - aim to build tough accounting systems which force them to be more conservative and

build up sufficient allowances or reserves to face recessions or bad economic conditions. Different models can be

used to measure and assess conservatism in any organization.

First: The Book value to Market value of the share: Beaver &Ryan (2005) measured the book value of the share to

its market value. This model suggests that if the ratio is less than one, which means the market is discounting the

real value of the firm, and this indicates the accepted level of conservatism, and vice versa.

Second: The Accrual Method: This model was developed by Givoly &Hayn (2000). It presents the difference

between the net income and the firm's operation cash flow. It is suggested that if the difference is negative, which

means that the firm adopt conservative policy to reduce the net income.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

Population and the Sample

The population of Jordanian commercial banks consists of 13 banks. The study considers all of them for the

period of 2005-2014.The foreign and Islamic banks are excluded because they have different structures and

operations, and different corporate governance instructions.

Study Variables and Hypotheses Theoretical Framework

This study assumes that the banks' performance depends on corporate governance mechanism (ownership

structure, bank's characteristics) and conservatism level. The corporate governance is considered an independent

variable, as it only affects and is not affected by the performance of banks. Therefore, the performance of banks

will be the dependent variable.

Using different measures for banks' performance could end up having different results. Therefore, this study uses

Return On Assets (ROA) and Return On Equity (ROE) to assess the financial performance and capture the features

of each variable and the possibility of changing the results.

Ownership Concentrations

Many empirical pieces of evidence present a significant positive relation between the ownership concentration and

the firm's performance, as this positive relation may reduce the conflict between the owners and the managers and

minimize the agency cost to monitor the management's performance (Garc'a &Sánchez 2011; Al-Amarneh 2014;

Soufeljil 2016; Yasser &Al Mamun 2016). However, other researchers found a negative relation between the two

variables as the high ownership concentration could give more control to a few investors and they may misuse it

(e. g. Boone et al. 2007; Kahiri, Karaa &Omri 2007).

Institutional Ownership

Institutions' investment is supposed to be based on high quality studies and rational decision making, as the

institutions' investors are more active in reviewing and monitoring their investments periodically. Thus, most of the

former studies found that there is a positive relation between the institutional ownership and the banks' financial

performance (e. g. Soufeljil 2016; Yasser &Al Mamun 2016). Some other researchers did not find a significant

relation between institutional ownership and performance (e.g. Craswell, Taylor &Saywell 1997; Al- Amarneh,

2014), Al-Amarneh (2014) illustrated these results based on the fact that the Jordanian banking sector is

essentially built upon family business. However, few studies showed a negative relation between institutional

ownership and the firm's performance as this relation may enhance the conflict of interest between the strategic

partners and the firm's managers (Barnhart &Rosenstein 1998).

Foreign Ownership

Foreign investors (individuals or organizations) are those who scan different markets in different countries looking

for a better investment that meet their needs and expectations. They should perform better research and have

better information than local investors. Hence, a high level of foreign investment may be considered as a positive

sign to the other investors, and according to some studies, there is a positive relationship between Foreign

Ownership and the bank's performance (Bai et al. 2004; Yasser &Al Mamun, 2016). On the other hand,

Praptiningsih (2009) found that there is a negative relationship between Foreign Ownership and the banks

performance in the Asian emerging markets. This surprising result is affected by the negative role of foreign

investors during the Asian Financial Crisis in the late1990s.

Government Ownership

Many prior studies found a negative relation between the government's ownership and the bank's performance (e.

g. Zulkafli &Samad 2007; Praptiningsih 2009). Shleifer &Vishny (1997) found that governments may implement too

much control and that the government's bureaucrat procedures kill the company's flexibility and delay the decision

making process. In addition to that, Huang &Xiao (2012) and Tu, Khanh &Quyen (2014) had the same findings.

Conversely, some studies found a positive relation between the government's ownership and the firm's

performance, as the government may play a key role in monitoring and controlling the firm's management. (Jiang,

Laurenceson &Tang 2008; Xu &Wang, 1999).

Banks' Characteristics

Abor &Biekpe (2007) and Ahmed (2010) found a significant negative relation between the bank's size and its

financial performance, as the larger banks need more costly governance structures. However, little empirical

evidence showed a positive relation between the firm's size and its performance (e. g. Abdelkarim &Alawneh 2008).

Higher firms' age should lead to higher performance as the firms accumulate the experiences to effectively and

efficiently accomplish tasks and jobs. For example, Brown &Caylor (2006), which examined 1868 U.S firms'

performance and governance implementation using the firms age as a control variable, found the same results as

the older firms faced many different economic cycles and had some past experience on how to deal with it. On the

other hand, Abor &Biekpe (2007) had unexpected results as the study reached a negative relation between SMEs

firms in Ghana and the firms age. This result may be caused by special conditions in Ghanaian banks.

The Debt /Equity ratio represents the bank's capital structure or source of fund (Sayek, Lehmann &Kang 2004).

High ratios mean that the bank depends more on external resources (client deposits, loans from other institutions)

to finance its activities rather than use the internal cheaper source (capital, reserves, retained earnings). Kahiri,

Karaa &Omri (2007) mentioned to the negative impact of the debt/equity ratio to the firms performance, this result

came after an extensive study of 320 firms in US market for the period of 1994 to 2001. This result consists with

other studies (e. g. Kahiri, Karaa &Omri 2007; Ahmed, 2010)

Conservatism and Firm's Performance:

Most of the empirical studies found that implementing a high level of conservatism in the companies will lead to a

higher revenue quality. Young (2005) found that using conservatism techniques has a positive effect on financial

reporting and minimizes the agency cost. In addition. Ren (2014) examined the conservatism's effect on the

Chinese companies for the period of 2007 to 2010, and he found a strong positive impact for conservatism and the

firm's performance. However, some other researchers found that conservatism hides the fair and real value of

companies, which could mislead some of the external stockholders. Penman (2002) believed that a high level of

conservatism could generate hidden reserves, which meant a lower quality of the firm's earnings. In the same way ,

Belkaoui (1992) and Beaver &Ryan (2005) stated that because of the understatement of the balance sheet, which

is reflected to a lower book value of the share, the conservatism result is a misunderstanding of the current firm's

position and leads to inaccurate accounting decisions.

The Study Model

This study examines the effect of ownership structure dimensions on the performance of Jordanian banks, using

ownership and the banks' characteristics as the independent variable, and the banks' performance as the

dependent variable. Since financial performance is measured by two methods (ROA and ROE), and conservatism is

measured by two methods: Accrual Method (Accrual/NI) and Book Value to market value Method (BV/P), the study

applies six models as follows:

... (1)

... (2)

... (3)

... (4)

... (5)

... (6)

4.4 Hypotheses of the Study

Based on the relationship between the independent variables (ownership structure, banks' characteristics,

conservatism), and the dependent variable (banks' performance), the study formulizes the following null

hypotheses.

First main hypothesis

H01: There is no significant impact for ownership structure on bank's performance

This hypothesis will be divided into the following sub hypotheses:

H01-1: There is no significant impact for ownership concentration on bank's performance

H01-2: There is no significant impact for institutional ownership on bank's performance

H01-3: There is no significant impact for foreign ownership on bank's performance

H01-4: There is no significant impact for government ownership on bank's performance.

Second main hypothesis

H02: There is no significant impact for conservatism on bank's performance

STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Descriptive and Correlation Analysis

The descriptive analysis presents the results in a simple way which helps in exploring the data before testing the

hypotheses; the descriptive results for our sample are shown in Table (1). The table shows that the ownership

structure of 13 Jordanian banks has an average concentration ownership around 60%, with a wide range from

25.25% to 89.2%, which means that the Jordanian banking sector enjoys a high level of concentrated ownership.

The foreign ownership for our sample has an average of 44.98%, which means that the Jordanian banking sector

attracts a significant number of foreign investors, but the table shows a high level of standard deviation, as the

range started from only 10.4% for some banks and reached 90.1% for others, which indicates that foreign investors

are very picky, as they prefer some banks over others. For the Government ownership, the average was 2.67%,

which indicate that government ownership in the Jordanian banking system is very low, as the Jordanian

government sold most of its ownership to local and foreign investors.

The average for the institutional ownership is 39.3%. We can also notice here how the institutional investors are

carful in choosing their investments as the ratio range is only between 2% and 93%. For the bank's characteristics,

the average bank's size, which is measured by the logarithms, is 9.1. And the bank's average age is 38.5 years .The

Debt to Equity average is 6.3 times, the highest level is 12.69, and the lowest level reaches only 3.55. However, this

ratio means that the bank depends heavily on the liabilities (customers' deposits) to finance its activities. The

average accrual to the net income is minus 1.59, and the book value to price is only 0.80 - these two ratios

calculate the bank's conservatism level- and according to Givoly &Hayn (2000) and Beaver &Ryan (2005) who

stated that if the average accrual to the net income ratio is minus and /or the book value to price is less than one,

then the bank implements an accepted level of conservatism. Thus, Jordanian banks imply an accepted level of

conservatism.

For the bank's performance, the average ROA is only 1.5%. It ranges between 0.1% and 3.8%. The rOe average is

much higher than ROA to reach 11%, the highest ratio is 27.1% and the lowest is 0.7%. These results could be

explained due to the high assets of the banks as the banks depend heavily on customers' deposits compared to

equity, which results in a low ROA compared to ROE. These results may differ based on the bank's efficiency and

economic cycles. Table (2) presents Pearson correlation results. The correlation is used to explore the strength

and direction of the relationship between the study's variables before testing the hypotheses using the multiple

regressions. Moreover, the correlation was used to test the multicolleniarity between the independent variables,

one of the multiple regression assumptions.

Table (2) results show that there is no multicollinearity relationship between the independent variables, since there

is no perfect or high relation between independent variables. Also, the primary results show that there are a

significant relationship between ROA and Concentration, Age, Accrual, and BV/P. These primary results will be re-

tested by Multiple Regression Analysis in the following section.

Multiple Regression Analysis

Testing the First Hypothesis

Table (3) presents multiple regression results to test the first main and sub hypotheses. This table shows the first

two models, the first one applied the ROA performance measure and the results show that there is a positive

significant impact for foreign, and government ownership on bank's performance, while the concentration, banks

size, and debt to equity have a negative impact on the Bank's performance measured by ROA. In addition, there is

no significant impact for the institutional ownership and the bank's age on the banks' performance. The second

part of table (3) presents the results of model 2 which applied ROE performance measure. The regression results

for model 2 showed that the Institutional Ownership and the Bank's age have no significant impact on the banks

performance, and that foreign, government ownership and debt to equity have a positive significant impact on the

banks' performance, while the concentration, and banks' size have a negative impact on the banks' performance

measured by the ROE measure.

As a result, and according to table (3), and test mentioned in the first main and sub hypotheses, the study found a

negative impact for the ownership concentration, which is consistent Boone et al. (2007). According to Kahiri,

Karaa &Omri (2007), as the high level of ownership concentration could give more authority and control to a few

number of investors, which may abuse this authority for their personal purpose, thus we reject the H01-1 null

hypothesis. The regression results showed a positive significant effect of the foreign ownership on the banks

performance, as foreign investors seek to best utilize their funds in best available investments, these results in line

with Bai et al. (2004) results, thus we reject the H01-3 null hypothesis.

Regarding the government ownership, table (3) showed a significant positive impact on the banks performance, as

the government could have a positive impact as it may play a key role in monitoring, controlling and motivating the

firm's management. Jiang, Laurenceson &Tang (2008) and Xu &Wang (1999) support this positive relation, thus we

reject the H01-4 null hypothesis. Institutional ownership in the Jordanian banks has an immaterial impact on the

bank's performance. These results are consistent with our H01-2 hypothesis, as the Institutional investors are not

playing a key role in supporting and monitoring their investments. Al-Amarneh (2014) stated that institutional

investors have a null impact on Jordanian banks due to the fact that the Jordanian banking sector is essentially

built upon family businesses. Craswell, Taylor &Saywell (1997) also has the same results, thus we accept the H01-

2 null hypothesis

Testing the Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis stipulates the relationship between conservatism and bank performance. Table (4)

presents simple regression tests for four models (3, 4, 5, and 6) since the study used two performance measures

and two conservatism measures.

The third and fifth models, which represent the impact of conservatism (Accrual/NI) on the bank's performance

using ROA and ROE showed a strong positive impact when using ROA, and a weak positive impact when using

ROE. Young (2005) mentioned that conservatism have a positive effect on financial reporting and will minimize the

agency cost. Watts &Zuo (2011) stated that the conservatism's policy will improve firm's performance by

minimizing the investment in the negative net present value projects.

The fourth and sixth models, which represent the impact of conservatism (BV/P) on the bank's performance using

ROA and ROE shows a strong negative impact and a higher R square compared to the (Accrual/NI) model. Beaver

&Ryan (2005) justified these results; as when using (BV/P) the balance sheet will be decreased by using accepted

accounting policy, which will lead to the "understatement" of the company's balance sheet and create hidden un-

used reserves. Moreover, Dalton &Dalton (2005) stated that sometimes the two conservatism methods could have

conflicting results due to special characteristics of the management or the markets. Ren (2014) explained that the

(Accrusl/NI) method used an accounting method to assess conservatism, while the (BV/P) method used market

based information to assess conservatism, and if the markets are inefficient, the (BV/P) results could be

misleading. However, using different measures to assess the conservatism's level may explain the difference in

the findings. As a result, and according to table (4), we reject the second main hypothesis.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The aims of this research are to find the impact of the ownership structure, bank characteristics, and the level of

the conservation on Jordanian bank's performance. The results showed a significant relation for all of the

ownership structure dimensions and bank's characteristics to the bank's performance (using ROA and ROE) except

the institutional ownership and the banks age, which show no impact on the performance. This finding is in

agreement with Al-Amarneh (2014) which stated that the Jordanian banking sector is essentially built upon family

business, with no significant impact of the institutional of the bank's age to its performance due to special

characteristics of our sample.

The directions of the ownership structure dimensions to the banks' performance are positive for foreign and

government ownership, as the high level of foreign ownership indicates high quality investments. On the other

hand, the concentrated ownership and the bank's size showed a negative relation to the banks' performance; as

concentrated investors may abuse their authority. Additionally, the negative relation to banks' size is due to the

high cost required from these banks to control and monitor their different branches, which is due to the task and

delegation of authority to lower managers. Results of Abor &Biekpe (2007), Kahiri, Karaa &Omri (2007), Boone et al.

(2007) and Ahmed (2010) are consistent with this research's results.

This study found that conservatism using (BV/P) has a strong negative impact on the bank's performance (ROA

and ROE), and the conservatism using the (Accrual/NI) has a strong positive impact on the bank's performance

(ROA). It also found a weak impact when using the bank's performance (ROE). These conflicting results were

explained by Dalton &Dalton (2005) as the two different methods could have different results as every method

adopts a different perspective.

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DETAILS

Subject: Book value; Revenue recognition; Investments; Economics; Banks; Economic crisis;

Studies; Commercial banks; Banking industry; Equity financing; Transition

economies; Business schools; Literature reviews; Corporate governance; Accounting

Publication title: The Journal of Developing Areas; Nashville

Volume: 52

Issue: 4

Pages: 183-197

Publication year: 2018

Publication date: Fall 2018

Publisher: Journal of Developing Areas

Place of publication: Nashville

Country of publication: United States, Nashville

Publication subject: Business And Economics--International Development And Assistance, Sociology,

Political Science

ISSN: 0022037X

Source type: Scholarly Journals

Language of publication: English

Document type: Journal Article

ProQuest document ID: 1964461673

Document URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1964461673?accountid=33337

Database copyright  2018 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Terms and Conditions Contact ProQuest

Copyright: Copyright Journal of Developing Areas Fall 2018

Last updated: 2017-11-16

Database: ABI/INFORM Collection