PADM530Wk7&

Photo by Unknown Author Licensed under CC BY

Pictures of President Moon Jae-In of South Korea and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un of North Korea meeting and embracing on April 27, 2018 gave some people hope that the planned upcoming high-level talks between North Korea and U.S. President Trump could lead to the end of hostilities between the two countries or at least to a dramatic lessening of tensions. (CBS News, April 27, 2018) The release of three hostages from the U.S. by North Korea increased that hope. (CBS News, May 9, 2018) The meeting between Moon and Kim and the scheduled meeting between Trump and Kim are unprecedented since the Korean War ended in an Armistice in 1953. (History, 2018; Davenport, 2018) While there is reason for hope, history shows that there is also reason for caution, even if an agreement is reached.

Proceed with Caution Elizabeth Keavney, Ph.D. Professor at American Public University System Published May 15, 2018

+ Follow

The U.S. is faced with what could be an historic opportunity to reduce the threat of war with North Korea. However, success is far from certain, and the stakes are high. There are at least two ways that negotiations could fail: they could break down, resulting in no agreement, or they could produce an agreement that gives the illusion of success, but does not include adequate verification and enforcement provisions. In this context, it is instructive to review the history of negotiations and agreements between North Korea and other countries, especially with respect to the development of nuclear weapons.

From 1985 to 2008, North Korea agreed either not to pursue nuclear weapon technology, to stop developing nuclear weapon technology, or to give up the nuclear technology it had developed on at least six occasions. North Korea violated all of these agreements. Some were violated covertly, with secret nuclear programs. Others were violated openly, by insisting on conditions not included in the agreement or by refusing mandated access to inspectors. In some cases, North Korea complied with the agreements for a time, but all were eventually violated (Davenport, 2018).

In 1985, North Korea joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty required it to ratify a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within 18 months. North Korea refused, insisting on U.S. removal of nuclear weapons from South Korea as a precondition. Since the treaty did not allow North Korea to set preconditions, North Korea was in violation until it ratified such an agreement in 1992. North Korea further violated this agreement by engaging in clandestine nuclear weapon research in the early 1990s (according to U.S. intelligence and the IAEA), by refusing IAEA inspectors access to a plutonium reprocessing facility in 1994, and by removing fuel rods (which could be reprocessed into weapon-grade material) from its research reactor without IAEA monitors present in 1994. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. (Davenport, 2018)

In 1992, North Korea and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this agreement they agreed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities”. (Joint Declaration, 1992) North Korea violated this agreement by conducting clandestine nuclear development programs in the early 1990s and later, according to U.S. Intelligence. North Korea further violated this agreement by building and detonating nuclear

weapons in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017. (U.S. Delegation, 2010, Preparatory Commission, n.d.)

Also in 1992, North Korea reached a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea violated this agreement in 1993 by refusing to allow the IAEA inspectors access to two sites. The IAEA request was based on inconsistencies between North Korea’s declared plutonium and the Agency’s analysis that suggested that North Korea was violating its commitments under the NPT. (IAEA, 2017) North Korea violated this agreement again by removing spent fuel (which can be reprocessed into weapons-grade nuclear material) from a reactor without IAEA inspectors present. In 2002, North Korea further violated this agreement by cutting IAEA seals, removing surveillance equipment from its reactor, moving fuel rods in apparent preparation for restarting the reactor, and expelling IAEA inspectors from the country. (IAEA, 2017)

In 1994, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, “which called for it to freeze and then eliminate its nuclear facilities, in exchange for two light water reactors (LWR) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil” during LWR construction. (US/DPRK Agreed Framework, 1994) North Korea violated this agreement by conducting a clandestine uranium enrichment program before 2002. (IAEA, 2017)

In 2005, North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons, and to return to the NPT, the IAEA safeguards agreement and the 1992 agreement with South Korea on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a joint statement issued with the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. North Korea violated this commitment in 2006 by detonating a nuclear weapon in an underground test. (IAEA, 2017) North Korea conducted five more underground nuclear tests between 2009 and 2017. (Preparatory Commission, n.d.)

In 2007, North Korea agreed to abandon is nuclear program in exchange for 1,000,000 tons of fuel oil, removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list and the release of $25,000,000 in frozen North Korean assets. (Davenport, 2018) North Korea violated this agreement by conducting an underground nuclear test in 2009 and four more such tests in 2013, 2016 and 2017. (Preparatory Commission, n.d.)

In 2012, North Korea agreed to suspend operations at a uranium enrichment plant and to suspend nuclear and long-range missile testing, in exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid. (Park, 2012) North Korea was accused of violating this agreement later in 2012 by launching satellites using ballistic missile technology (Davenport, 2018), and

1Like Comment Share

certainly violated it in 2013 by conducting an underground nuclear test and violated it further with three more tests in 2016 and 2017. (Preparatory Commission, n.d.)

The agreements reached in 1994, 2007 and 2012 were each after North Korea had violated earlier agreements, and each included actions by other countries that benefited North Korea. In 1994, The U.S. agreed to help North Korea construct two light water reactors (a nuclear reactor that does not use fuel that can be reprocessed into weapons-grade material) and other countries agreed to provide substantial heating oil shipments to North Korea. (US-DPRK, 1994) In 2007, the U.S. agreed to remove North Korea from its state sponsors of terrorism list, to release $25,000,000 in frozen North Korean assets, and (with other countries) to provide 1,000,000 tons of fuel oil. (Davenport, 2018) In 2012, the U.S. agreed to provide 240,000 tons of food. (Park, 2012)

Since North Korea has been granted concessions for actions it did not complete or continue, it may understandably expect any new negotiation to produce benefits in exchange for commitments it can abandon or violate. Thus, any successful negotiation must be undertaken with great care to avoid granting North Korea any significant benefit until rigorous and comprehensive inspections have verified its compliance, and any agreement should ensure that any benefits to North Korea are structured so that their revocation or termination would be harmful enough to deter North Korea from abandoning the agreement.

North Korea may be unwilling to accept such an agreement. If it is expecting to duplicate its earlier successes at cheating, and the U.S. insists on conditions that would prevent such success, the two countries may find themselves at an impasse. If so, it is important not to compromise vital conditions for the sake of having an agreement. Failure to reach an agreement would be better than reaching one that advances North Korea’s military or economic aims without improving the security of the U.S. and its allies.

 

 References

 

CBS News. (April 27, 2018). Kim Jong Un walks across border to meet South Korean president. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kim-jong-un-walks-across-

border-live-updates-today-2018-04-26/

CBS News. (May 9, 2018). 3 freed American detainees on way home from north Korea, Trump says. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-frees-us- prisoners-mike-pompeo-donald-trump-announces-today-2018-5-9/

Davenport, K. (April 2018) Chronology of U.S.-North Korean nuclear and missile diplomacy. Arms Control Association. Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron

History. (2018). 1953 Armistice ends the Korean War. Retrieved from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/armistice-ends-the-korean-war

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2017). Fact sheet on DPRK nuclear safeguards. Retrieved from https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk- nuclear-safeguards

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. (1992). Retrieved from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDecla rationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf

Park, J. (2012) U.S-North Korea agreement: a breakthrough? United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/03/us-north-korea- agreement-breakthrough

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. (n.d.). Comparison of seismic signals (to scale) of all six declared DPRK nuclear tests. Retrieved from https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2017-sept- dprk/

U.S. Delegation to the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. (2010). Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf

US-DPRK Agreed Framework / Six-Party Talks. (1994) Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptagframe.pdf

 

To view or add a comment, sign in

Insights from the community

Spacecraft

How can nuclear propulsion foster international cooperation and competition in space?

Power Engineering

More articles by this author

When Policy and Basic Economics Collide Dec 17, 2022

Paying the Bill Jun 19, 2021

No Majority in Electoral College—What Happens? Nov 20, 2020

See all

What are the most pressing challenges for nuclear power generation today?

Power Generation

How can we foster more international collaboration and innovation in nuclear fission and fusion research?

Mechanics

How can you safely incorporate nuclear energy into your designs?

Mechanical Engineering

How can nuclear power plants be made more resilient to natural disasters?

Spacecraft

How do you choose the best power source for your spacecraft mission?

Show more

Explore topics Sales

Marketing

Business Administration

HR Management

Content Management

Engineering

Soft Skills

See All

© 2024 About

Accessibility User Agreement

Privacy Policy Your California Privacy Choices

Cookie Policy Copyright Policy

Brand Policy Guest Controls

Community Guidelines Language