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Police Practice and Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 3–17

Proactive Policing: Standing on the Shoulders of Community-Based Policing Curtis Clarke

Taylor and Francis LtdGPPR_A_157933.sgm10.1080/15614260600579508Police Practice & Research1561-4263 (print)/1477-271X (online)Original Article2006Taylor & Francis71000000March 2006Dr CurtisClarkecurtisc@athabascau.ca

This paper examines how Edmonton Police Service has built on the foundation of community-based policing and problem solving in an effort to achieve greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness. These proposed operational strategies are closely aligned with the conceptual framework of proactive policing. Here, proactive policing, in its original formulation, ‘refers to the strategic deployment of resources in order to target criminally active individuals’ (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5). The paper also examines the implications proactive policing has for police management and how Edmonton has responded to an organizational environment that requires management of demand.

Keywords: Proactive Policing; Community Policing; Crime Management; Intelligence- Led Policing

Introduction

Recently, police policymakers and strategists have begun to build on the foundation of community-based policing and problem solving in an effort to achieve greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness. These proposed operational strategies are closely aligned with the conceptual framework of proactive policing. Here, proactive policing, in its original formulation, ‘refers to the strategic deployment of resources in order to target criminally active individuals’ (Stockdale, Whitehead, & Gresham, 1999, p. 5). Interest- ingly, proactive policing has a number of implications for police management in that, it sets in place an environment that requires management of demand. These demands are succinctly stated in the following passage:

Curtis Clarke is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Criminal Justice Program at Athabasca University (Alberta, Canada). He has carried out empirical studies on the implementation of community-based policing, police organizational/managerial change, intelligence-led policing, and the shifting boundaries between private and public policing. Correspondence to: Dr Curtis Clarke, 10-26312 Twp. Rd., 514 Spruce Grove, Alberta, Canada T7Y 1C8. Email: curtisc@athabascau.ca

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Increased proactivity requires a change in management ethos, as well as placing more demands on managers. Higher levels of proactivity assume that managers are able to elicit support from all levels in the service, despite cultural resistance; to deal with a range of ethical and civil liberties issues; and, in many cases, to take greater accountability for resource deployment and outcome. (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5)

Moreover, in this changing environment and adoption of proactive strategies, police managers ‘must be prepared to stand away from traditional police philosophies and methodologies; to believe that operations can and should be driven by intelligence; to act rather than to react’ (RCMP, 2002). From an operational perspective these initia- tives require a rapid adaptation from a service model which ‘until relatively recently, still bore many of the structural characteristics of its organizational (and operational) origins in the nineteenth century’ (Savage & Charman, 1996, p. 39).

Defining Proactive Policing (Crime Management/Intelligence-Led Policing)

If there is indeed a trend toward the adoption of proactive policing the question of defi- nition becomes a critical point of clarification. As we can attest from previous paradigm shifts corresponding with community-based policing, clarity of definition is essential to successful implementation. In the context of this paper and in light of previous operational shifts in policing, the question to ask is whether or not a clear definition of proactive policing exists. Certainly, a comprehensive definition is possible based on research regarding specific actions and goals associated with existing policing initia- tives and their implementation. Evaluations undertaken by numerous policing academics and practitioners have resulted in a consensus of key elements and broad principles associated with Proactive and Intelligence-Led Policing. A synthesis of these evaluations suggests the following typology of core components:

1. A strategic future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control. 2. A focus upon the identification, analysis, and management of persisting and devel-

oping problems or risks. 3. A strategy centred on the acquisition of intelligence in order to facilitate knowl-

edge-based decision making, allowing the targeting of resources and the disruption of prolific criminals.

4. An enabling of variability and flexibility of operational initiatives. 5. A requirement for management of demand, in order to increase the resources for

proactivity, as well as, the resources made available. 6. A presupposition of a higher status afforded to the intelligence function. 7. And use of feedback to adjust, expand, abandon, and maintain initiatives (Amey,

Hale, & Uglow, 1996; Barker-McCardle, 2001; Maguire, 2001; Read & Tilley, 2000; Stockdale et al., 1999).

Simply put, in practice proactive policing means

making use of data to establish the existence and extent of a problem, to analyse its nature and source, to plan intervention measures to reduce it, and to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the selected responses. (Read & Tilley, 2000, p. 3)

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Previous evaluations of proactive policing have articulated clear criteria for success- ful implementation based upon a police service’s ability to achieve key crime manage- ment concepts (Amey et al., 1996; Read & Tilley, 2000; Stockdale et al., 1999; Tilley & Laycock, 2002). These concepts are outlined in Table 1.

While it is essential to define what is meant by Proactive or Intelligence-Led Policing it is also important to evaluate both the effectiveness and the degree to which these concepts are in fact operationalized. With this objective in mind the remainder of this paper analyses Edmonton Police Service’s (EPS’s) efforts to imple- ment a model of proactive policing. The following sections offer first a brief over- view of the socio-political drivers guiding the EPS’s operational shift toward proactive policing and secondly an examination of the current implementation process, best practices, and efforts EPS has undertaken to ensure proactive policing strategies are effective.

The Socio-political Context: Responding to an Era of Fiscal Restraint

Edmonton’s evolution toward a model of proactive policing has been driven, in part, by a decade of Provincial and Municipal fiscal restraint. The trend of fiscal conserva- tism had begun with the 1993 election of Premier Ralph Klein’s Conservative Party. Under the stewardship of the Klein government, policing, like other municipal services, was swept into the vortex of budget restraint and restructuring. The Klein revolution (a phrase frequently utilized when referring to the Klein policy platforms) would deliver two direct policy hits to municipal policing. The first came from the Ministry of Justice in its attempt to set in place its required three-year business plan. In Alberta Justice’s 1994–95 annual report Deputy Minister of Justice Neil McCrank set out 11 business functions all of which had a number of goals attached, ‘some of [which] are related to budget, while others are related to increased efficiency or improvement of service’ (Alberta Justice, Annual Report, 1994–95, p. ii). Topping the list of business functions was that of ‘reducing crime through policing and prevention programs’ and the first goal related to this function was ‘to provide high quality cost

Table 1 Crime Management Concepts.

Concept 1 Proactivity is given a higher priority over reactivity.

Concept 2 Divisional management teams direct all operational work and manage resources according to force and divisional priorities.

Concept 3 Intelligence unit is central to the working of the Division and produces targeted intelligence files and quality information to support policing functions. Intelligence is used to target criminals and to inform crime prevention activities.

Concept 4 Reactive response is decreased by use of an appropriate call dispatch distribution strategy.

Concept 5 The primary output of each team/individual initiative should be identified and made the subject of team performance indicators for both quantity and quality. This will ensure accountability, as well as create a pool of best practices.

Source: Amey et al. (1996).

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effective programs to prevent and control crime’ (ibid., p. 2). In order to achieve this goal municipal policing grants were reduced by 50% ($16 million) over the three years of the business plan (ibid.). The achievement of this restraint was well under way within the first year of the business plan and by April 1, 1994, Alberta Justice no longer awarded municipal policing grants, relinquishing this responsibility to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. It was at this point that municipal policing was to take its second hit.

Municipal Affairs’ disbursement and administration of municipal policing grants would prove problematic in that they were included in the lump sum grants allocated to the municipalities. The situation became even more precarious when the 1994–95 budget set out a $59 million cut in municipal grants. Further to this ‘the 1995/96 budget would see this grant reduced by 10 percent to $169 million and outlined plans to cut this grant in half again by 1996–97’ (Lisac, 1995, p. 196). Limited municipal grants nurtured a competitive relationship between municipal agencies and services as they vied for shrinking pieces of the budgetary pie. As with other municipalities, Edmontonians would take on increased responsibility for order maintenance as a function of the Service’s fiscal constraints and adoption of community-based policing.

One early solution to Edmonton’s increased fiscal restraint and demands for efficient service took shape in the guise of the ‘Edmonton Police Plan.’ The police plan was conceived as a guide by which Edmonton would set out clear Service goals, bound- aries of accountability, and methods of evaluation. As noted in the Police Plan’s strategic vision:

The creation of the Edmonton Police Plan is the first step in establishing a mutual and collective vision which guides the Service in the delivery of quality policing in this city for the next three years. The Edmonton Police Plan will evolve to include the principal compo- nents ordinarily associated with separate plans devoted to strategic issues, technology, communications, facilities, finances, and operations. It will not be shelf material. (Edmon- ton Police Service, 1996, p. 1)

The underlying premise of this process was the objective of implementing a decentral- ized service structure, whereby the responsibility for service could be downloaded to the Division and thus to the community.

The operational premise of the Police Plan corresponded to Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) concept of steering and rowing in which the executive sets the objective or goal for the organization (steering) and empowers those who are most capable of deliver- ing the service (rowing). Similarly Edmonton’s Police Plan outlined a process of service delivery that required a bottom-up process wherein frontline officers, supervi- sors, and managers synthesized service-wide plans into actions and standards. These Divisional actions and standards would be ‘negotiated with the Chief’s Committee for the purpose of planning, performance evaluation and accountability’ (Memorandum from Chief Lindsay, April 8, 1997, cited in Edmonton Police Service, 1997e). The criteria by which these would be measured were based on whether or not they supported the goals of the EPS. By way of comparison one can readily note the simi- larity between the Police Plans’ underlying managerial thrust and a key concept of

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proactive policing which states: Divisional management teams direct all operational work and manage resources according to force and divisional priorities. And yet, the Police Plan would serve only as a skeletal framework for future strategic and tactical steps in Edmonton’s effort to implement a solid proactive policing model.

Developing a Tactical Management Tool for Edmonton: Building on a Foundation of Proactive Policing

In response to an ongoing environment of increased demand and decreased resources, the EPS further sought to develop a refined model of policing; one that would build on its strengths and enable the service to identify crime patterns and thus effectively imple- ment strategies to reduce crime (Clarke, Weissling, & Montgomerie, 2002). The new model was to also facilitate a process wherein the EPS could ‘add structure and accountability to the current business practices of the service’ (Thue & Alston, 2002, p. 1). Furthermore, Edmonton’s model was to incorporate the concepts of proactive policing with the operational elements of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). In this context, ILP was to become an operational tool for tactical management. And while the development and institutionalization of a strategic model of intelligence-led policing continues to unfold, EPS has benefited from a strong foundation of both community- based policing and proactive policing. In its early stages EPS undertook an assessment of best practices and existing gaps in an effort to identify operational elements that would either support or undermine the implementation of ILP. Throughout the early stages of assessment there were numerous concerns regarding both tactical and strate- gic structures. And yet, there was a clear sense throughout the assessment process that the Service had a strong institutional understanding of community policing, as well as, operationalizing numerous concepts of proactive policing.

Perhaps one of the most difficult concepts for any police service to articulate or accurately assess is that of proactivity. This was a particular concern for EPS, particu- larly when data suggested that the EPS patrol workload status exceeded the Service objective of maintaining 10% of each shift for police officers to organize crime preven- tion initiatives (Edmonton Police Service, 1998). And yet, if we return to the definition of proactive policing we can see that a measure of proactivity is much more than merely a measure of patrol workload status. Proactivity ‘refers to the strategic deployment of resources in order to target criminally active individuals’ and community disorder (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5). Working from this definition EPS could readily locate a number of initiatives and practices that matched this concept.

The linking of strategic resource deployment and criminal activity had become common practice for some EPS Divisions prior to the shift to ILP. In fact, prior to the service-wide assessment, Divisional tactical meetings were consistent practice within three of the four Divisions (North, South, and West). While each of these Divisions has specific procedures they all have a common characteristic in that they implement a formalized process for the purposes of intelligence sharing, resource allocation, and problem solving. Both North and South Division utilize tactical meetings on a daily basis while West Division tactical meetings occur once per week. In the context of the

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North Division’s daily tactical meetings, management staff (Patrol, CIS, Traffic, Superintendent, and Divisional Intelligence Officer) formalize both daily and long- term strategies based on identified Divisional problems and broad service objectives. The tactical meeting begins with the Divisional Intelligence Officer (DIO) outlining particular hot spots and intelligence data. Guided by this information, managers artic- ulate particular strategies and coordinate resource allocation based on available manpower. The tactical objectives are placed on a white board in the ops/report room outlining the specific problems and operational directions. Overall, the tactical process is layered in a manner that facilitates both daily strategies and broad Division initiatives, but more importantly, allows management to focus resources at the imme- diate needs of the Division. It is a process that reflects a well-defined understanding of decentralized operations and autonomous tactical management.

West Division approaches the process of tactical management from the understand- ing that the Division cannot be all things to all people. Priorities must be set based on resources guided by a range of information used to identify particular problems. Here, the tactical management team sets out a ‘do’ and ‘do not’ matrix to problem solving based on two-week projections of available resources. While this process does not differ dramatically from the other Divisions it does enable the management team to set objectives for problem resolution, targeting, etc. based on weekly resources. Moreover, it articulates the necessity of long-range resource allocation and deployment during a period of limited resources.

There is little doubt that increased proactivity places new demands upon the Divisional management structure. Greater proactivity requires managers to elicit the support from a range of service members, as well as, be accountable for resource deployment. Subsequently, the management focus becomes one of freeing ‘resources that were being used in a predominantly reactive and unproductive way and use them to bring proactive strategies centre stage’ (Amey et al., 1996, p. vi). This does not suggest that proactivity and reactivity are separate approaches to operational work but should be considered in terms of overlapping, interdependent methods to achieve divisional priorities. In turn, this requires an operational model that allows flexible deployment of resources, problem solving, and accountability/performance assess- ment, while enabling management teams to guide operational priorities.

An exemplar of how this might be achieved is illustrated by Downtown Division’s operational model. Downtown Division had instituted a community response model that enabled the Division to maintain the flexibility for problem solving while address- ing the need to respond to calls. The Community Response Model combines the concept of empowerment with defined functions and duties for designated officers (Response, District, Community, and Beats). Shifting to this model has also required a more equitable distribution of workload through the S/Sgt and Sgts facilitated, in part, by the following management team structure: Superintendent, Inspector, Admin S/ Sgt, S/Sgts for (beats, community stations, front desk, and CIS), and platoon Sgts.1

From a tactical/operational stance, the Division utilizes the Community Response Model in setting a clear hierarchy of ownership of calls for service. Embedded in this operational model is the requirement of problem solving and in an effort to facilitate

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this requirement the Divisional management team has formalized the use of Strategic Operational Projects (SOPs). In the fall of 2001 the SOPs became entrenched in the Divisional business due to the loss of the special project teams. With the demise of the special project teams, SOPs have become a useful tool in the development of problem- solving projects. Officers identify particular issues and put forward an SOP that outlines (using a SARA model) the issue, response, etc. Once it has been approved by the command, a team is formed and divisional resources shifted to address the SOP. The basic managerial concept behind this process is that of empowerment. If a member identifies a problem, the member will stay involved as the driver of the initia- tive or at least be a team member.

Integral to the success of this model is the Service’s commitment to the concept of ownership. Ownership is understood in the following manner:

Ownership applies to the structure of the organization. Ownership is built into all areas and levels of the organization. Ownership and empowerment has de-emphasized the chain of command and encouraged decision making at the lowest possible level. Management has given members increased latitude, autonomy and trust. (Edmonton Police Service, 1997a, p. 35)

From an operational standpoint, the implementation of ownership is the responsibility of each Division and is customized to fit the Divisional Objectives. This requires Divi- sional Superintendents to tailor the concept of ownership based on manpower, divi- sional demographics, and current problems. An example of the use of ownership can be noted in North Division’s service delivery model. The Division is divided into zones that have designated ownership/turf officers that are tasked with problem resolution in the zone. The shift structure is split into primary and secondary response teams with ownership/turf officers being within the secondary category. While they must continue to respond to high priority calls in their zones, they are released from minor call response in order to address identified problem-solving tasks. This division of labour, coupled with the reallocation of resources occurring at the daily tactical meetings creates a multi-layered approach to problem solving and proactivity.2

The premise supporting this concept is that the responsibility for providing local policing is devolved to the level of the Divisional Command. The Divisional Command must manage all resources (patrol, CIS, etc.) ‘proactively in accordance with intelligence-led objectives rather than allowing them simply to react’ (Gill, 2000, p. 82). As the above examples indicate, Edmonton’s decentralized model enables Divisions to respond to the need for proactive and reactive strategies in a manner that best suits the needs of their Divisional boundaries and resources.

And while it is important to facilitate a decentralized approach it is also necessary to ensure that the Service’s reactive response is decreased by use of an appropriate call dispatch distribution strategy. A large number of calls for service are minor and do not require the attendance of a police officer and as such should be dealt with in a more effective manner than the traditional practice of dispatching officers to all calls for service. Therefore, if a shift to proactivity is to be successful, there must be a mechanism that facilitates a freeing of resources; one that can reduce the reactive demands placed on existing resources.

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During the mid-1990s, Service-wide brainstorming resulted in the position that if EPS was to implement a more efficient service model, it would need to be responsive to community needs, increase public access, decrease the number of police responses to calls, and improve the effectiveness of overall call management. To facilitate these outcomes the EPS formulated a model consisting of four service components, each inclusive of a set of guiding principles and a strategy for implementation. These four service components were:

● Receiving: How the public accesses police service. ● Responding: How the police make themselves available and attend to public needs. ● Recording: How the police capture information. ● Resolving: How the police work to identify problems and develop solutions.

Each of these components is connected with a common objective of improved service delivery. And while there is an assumed interplay between each component, receiving is considered the stage at which service delivery is first negotiated.

The operational component of receiving necessitates effective management of calls for service. This first requires the diversion of calls to appropriate levels of service. Edmonton’s initial response was the development of a call path chart with the underlying rationale of reducing calls for service. If the number of calls could be diminished, officers would have less committed time, enabling them to execute problem-solving initiatives. While the call path chart was an important initiative, diverting calls was only part of the solution. Call management would also be achieved through the application of response criteria and effective application of the call path chart.

The synthesis of these components resulted in the Service’s development of a two- tier response strategy: primary and ownership. Primary response officers respond to all emergency and service level calls. Ownership officers respond to emergency calls, priority response calls close to their ownership turf, and all service or deferred level calls in their community. Calls not fitting these criteria are diverted to community stations or other non-emergency services (this process has been highlighted in the previous example of ownership).

While ensuring operational characteristics and processes are appropriately reengi- neered, it is also incumbent upon police managers to ensure the central function of intelligence. As Peter Gill suggests,

intelligence is intended to be used in two main ways, first, to target specific criminally active people with a view to developing the evidence necessary for a conviction and, second, to inform crime prevention strategies via the analysis of problems. (2000, p. 83)

In this context, ‘the intelligence unit is central to any proactive model … and that it is responsible not only for generating intelligence itself but also for developing strategies and tactics for other teams within the Division’ (Amey et al., 1996, p. 4). Others have suggested that the intelligence units are the linchpin in ensuring that resources are effectively allocated and that problem-solving initiatives are directed in the most efficient manner.

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Management of intelligence is central to facilitating the effective dissemination and use of the knowledge resident in different units of EPS. As a concept, intelligence management is complex and goes beyond the mere management of information. Intelligence consists of two basic components: data and information. Data are identi- fiable, objective facts about events, while knowledge is created by adding context, providing analysis, ensuring accuracy, and summarizing data into concise and under- standable forms. There is no shortage of data and information at EPS—crime statistics, response times, hot spots, crime mapping, etc. However, it is only when they are inter- preted, analysed, and used as a tool to proactively guide tactical manoeuvres leading to crime prevention and other goals of EPS, that data and information become intelli- gence. The task, then, becomes one of empowering officers at all levels of EPS to identify what data and information are most useful and effective to develop into intel- ligence. Certainly Edmonton had recognized these very issues and as the following examples suggest the Service had indeed acknowledged the proactive value of intelli- gence in its efforts to implement a model of proactive policing.

Divisional Intelligence Officers (DIOs)

Each Division has one intelligence officer (an exception to this is Downtown Division which has two). Divisional Intelligence Officers (DIOs) serve a range of functions but more importantly they peel away the various layers of information entering the Division’s intelligence hopper, such as CAD data, reports from community stations, Street Information Reports (SIRs), Central Crime Analyst reports, etc. The end result is a snapshot of Divisional trends, hot spots, and high-risk individuals from which tactical strategies can be mounted and appropriate resources allocated. The DIO plays an integral role in the daily tactical meetings, platoon/squad parades, CIS intelligence packaging, and inter-divisional intelligence sharing. An example of the latter is the numerous collaborative relations DIOs are associated with: weekly DIO conference call, monthly multi-agency property meetings, shared data with Alberta Justice (re: release dates for YOA and adult offenders), etc. At a micro level DIOs collect and correlate data as they pertain to specific SOPs, investigations, etc. Here, the DIO devel- ops an intelligence package that relates to a specific project or member request. In this function the DIO supplies a consistent layer of information and management of infor- mation related to a range of Divisional projects.

Community Program Coordinators, D Division

This position has traditionally been located in the crime prevention unit but has recently moved to the Divisions. On a day-to-day basis the Community Program Coordinator (CPCO) works with the DIOs comparing and deconstructing weekly statistics in an effort to identify trends specific to the Divisional districts. This has enabled the Division management to both direct and identify particular projects at the micro level of the district. Moreover, the CPCO is able to develop intelligence packages that support problem-solving initiatives. Under this tactical format, problems and

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resolution strategies are generated in two ways. (1) An officer will approach the CPCO and identify a problem at which point a file is opened. (2) The CPCO may note partic- ular trends from their daily analysis of statistics. At this point, the CPCO will notify the district officers of the trend/problem who will then direct the problem resolution. There is a two-month diary date that is set for each internal file at which time the officer/team should have submitted a follow-up report.

An essential concern for implementing this level of proactive policing is the flow of intelligence both in terms of internal and external inputs. The success of proactive policing is directly reliant upon pertinent and complete data (often referred to as robust data). Good data on crime and intelligence on criminals are prerequisites to effective crime control (Tilley & Laycock, 2002). This suggests the need for a service- wide tactical structure that ensures a coordinated synthesis of both operational approaches and intelligence. Unfortunately, the current tactical structure of EPS is defined by autonomous (Divisional) operational approaches loosely linked by fragmented networks of intelligence and tactical coordination, as illustrated in Figure 1. One of the challenges that currently confronts EPS is how it will address these identified gaps and fragmented networks so that the service can achieve an effective coordination of resources. Figure 1 Tactical Structure and Identifying Gaps.

Finally, if a Service is to successfully achieve proactive policing outcomes there must be a mechanism whereby the primary output of each team/individual initiative can be identified and made the subject of team performance indicators for both quantity and quality. Unfortunately, as Read and Tilley (2000) suggest, dependable outcome evalu- ations of problem-solving initiatives have been less than consistent throughout police organizations. And yet, evaluations are in fact valuable methods of encouraging a crit- ical assessment of successful, as well as, unsuccessful practices. Moreover, consistent evaluation of initiatives assists in the process of replicating best practices. Tilley and Laycock (2002, p. 18) note, ‘it is through replication that successful interventions are disseminated more widely. The payoff from hard-won evidence that a given response

Reactive

Resolution PredictingProactive

Fragmented Network

Prevention

Figure 1 Tactical Structure and Identifying Gaps.

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has been effective is its successful application elsewhere.’ While there is a sense that intelligence-led policing is solely concerned with crime-related data, it is important to note that the evaluation of project outcomes is a form of intelligence that informs future allocation of resources and operational practices. For Edmonton the importance of evaluation was recognized in its earlier shift to community-based and problem- oriented policing. As the following ‘Problem Files’ Management process suggests within EPS there is indeed an institutionalized expectation of how problem files (problem- solving initiatives) are identified, tracked, and managed.

EPS Problem Files Management

Problem Identification is determined by one of two ways

1. Information received from frontline officers. They communicate this information to the Community Programs Coordinator.

2. Through the Community Programs Coordinator/DIO’s analysis of repeat calls for service or other external sources.

Once the existence of a problem has been confirmed it is assigned to a particular member, in most cases, members who have ownership in district, community, or beat where the problem exists.

Problem Tracking

1. Once the problem has been assigned the problem is added to the Master List. 2. An electronic folder is created for the particular address and linked to the appropriate

district, community, beat. 3. A tracking sheet is created containing basic information, platoon commander,

assigned service member and a diary date for response. The diary date is forwarded to the Platoon commander as well. (It is the responsibility of the assigned member to respond back through the chain of command on or before the diary date. This does not mean that the problem must be resolved by this date but rather it is an update of what the member has accomplished to date.)

Concluded or Ongoing Files

If problems are ongoing then new diary dates are assigned and future updates required. If the problem is concluded, a Problem Solving (PS-1) form is completed by the member, the problem is removed from the master list and placed in to the completed problems folder and a hard copy of the information is printed for the District binder. It is important to note that the master list and district folders are used not only by other ownership members (Beats, Community and District) but also the Divisional Intelligence officers (DIO), the management team and others in the Service. The data in these files provide a snapshot of what is going on in the Division and what is being done about it. This information is used on a regular basis to update members of the community and Service. (EPS Memorandum, April 3, 2002)

While this analysis suggests the existence of a strong foundation for ILP there are a number of opportunities and practices the Service must evaluate as it moves forward. Edmonton must ensure that its model of ILP continues to refine the concepts of proac- tive policing. Moreover, it must ensure that intelligence supports both proactive and reactive policing activities.

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Points of Concern

The model of ILP proposed by EPS certainly offers an opportunity to propel the service into a proactive stance wherein resources can be utilized in a strategic and effective manner. And yet, it is not as simple as it may appear on the surface. It does require a strategic orientation whereby activities are guided and evaluated in terms of broad service objectives. Moreover, it is a process that implies a multi-layered linkage of information, tactical initiatives, resource allocation, etc. As one can note from Figure 2, there are numerous points in which the process can break down. Figure 2 The Key Elements of the EPS Intelligence-Led Policing Model. Source: Veitch, Warden, Alston, & Thue (2004).

Therefore, the evaluation process must remain dynamic in order to address dysfunctional elements within the model. In the case of Edmonton, early analysis suggested that both tactical and strategic elements of the service required attention. For example:

Tactical:

● Develop IT capacity that will enable DIOs to quickly cross-reference divisional intel- ligence, share analysis and trends.

● Utilize Community Stations in a more effective manner (Community Station personnel should be more active in coordinating problem-solving initiatives, funnelling information from the community, serve as a clearing house of informa- tion for patrol, beat, and community officers, etc.

Figure 2 The Key Elements of the EPS Intelligence-Led Policing Model. Source: Veitch, Warden, Alston, & Thue (2004).

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● Insure that middle management play an active role in informing frontline officers about why it is important to both input and access intelligence data.

● Encourage community members to take a more active role in the dissemination of intelligence.

Strategic:

● Adopt a fully integrated business planning process for the purpose of improving: operational performance, strategic decision making, and resource allocation and accountability for the achievement of stated outcomes.

● Implement a quarterly Crime Management Conference in which Divisions share information on operational objectives, best practices, performance measurement, etc.

● Develop a process for community involvement in identifying priority areas and outcomes (Clarke et al., 2002).

Recognition of these shortcomings is only a first step. The operational and organiza- tional response to these would require both the coordination and support of internal and external stakeholders. As with the earlier examples of Community-Based Policing one of the key challenges will be to ensure there is a continued inclusion of key stake- holders. All stakeholders must understand both the concepts of proactive policing and their role in the successful implementation of proactive initiatives.

Conclusion

As this case study indicates, prior organizational practices of community-based policing have underlined current strategic and operational efforts to implement an effective model of proactive policing. More importantly, these examples suggest that community policing continues to be a central vehicle for the development of future operational and strategic policing initiatives. This is not to say that future trends will be confined by the concept of community policing but that community policing offers a foundation by which innovation can evolve. Edmonton’s operational shift to proactive policing repre- sents a logical transition from the earlier operationalization of community policing and problem-oriented policing. More succinctly, proactive policing is a maturing or refine- ment of these. Furthermore, returning to the basic definition of proactive policing, ‘making use of data to establish the existence and extent of a problem, to analyse its nature and source, to plan intervention measures to reduce it, and to monitor and eval- uate the effectiveness of the selected responses’ one can easily see how this concept parallels the central theme of problem-solving models such as SARA, CAPRA, and PARE (Read & Tilley, 2000, p. 3). Perhaps the central difference is that proactive polic- ing is a broad strategic application which guides service-wide operations.

Notes 1

[1] This management structure characterizes Divisional governance throughout the Service. 2

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[2] It should be noted that while the above examples focus on North and Downtown Divisions, there are new operational models being implemented in the remaining two divisions. As of May 1, 2002, South Division had implemented a team-policing model that would support greater sharing of resources, linkage of events, and continuity. Recently, West Division has undergone a structural reorganization implementing a change from nine squads to 12. The objective of this model is to allow greater overlap of manpower, enabling the Division to implement a priorities-based management model. Moreover, this model will support an operational shift currently focused on crime-related issues to one that is inclusive of all disorder issues.

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Alberta Justice, Annual Report 1994–1995. Alberta Justice, Annual Report 1995–1996. Alberta Justice, Annual Report 1996–1997. Alberta Justice, Annual Report 1997–1998. Amey, P., Hale, C., & Uglow, S. (1996). Development and evaluation of a crime management model

(Police Research Series Paper 18). London: Home Office. Barker-McCardle, J. (2001). An international perspective on performance measurement: Intelligence-

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