Study Two Paper

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Counterfactual Thinking and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame

Former Student

Florida International University

PSY 3215: Research Methods II

Dr. Anabelle Andon

Oct. 7, 2020

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Counterfactual Thinking and Need For Cognition: Appointing Blame

As free-willed beings, humans are often the victims of their own decisions. Imagine

accidentally running over a stray cat because you decided to look away from the road at the exact

moment the cat decided to cross the street. Following the accident, most people would be

plagued with thoughts of how alternative circumstances or decisions could have prevented such

an unfortunate situation. Every time an individual forms a ‘what if’ scenario in which he or she

mentally alters the course of events occurred, they are participating in a process that is known as

counterfactual thinking (Ruiselová, Prokopčáková, & Kresánek, 2007; Williams, Lees-Haley, &

Price 1996). This process allows individuals to consider the multiple factors at play in a situation

(i.e mutability), and to decide what specific condition was responsible for the ultimate outcome

of the event. The primary focus of our study is to analyze the extent of culpability people place

on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. That is, if it is easy to

“undue” an event that ends in a tragic outcome, will participants find an actor who fails to

engage in that easy behavior more at fault?

The development of counterfactual thoughts relies on the variability of the situation as

well as the knowledge that different actions could have resulted in alternate outcomes (Alquist,

Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015). According to Alquist et al., situations that are

believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem

unavoidable. However, ruminating on every conceivable alternative of a situation would take an

unlimited amount of time and resources. Instead of allotting so much time and energy on a

cognitive task, people tend to narrow down the different scenarios that come to mind according

to the degree of controllability of the factors involved (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). For example,

the deliberate decisions individuals make that ultimately lead to a certain outcome is considered

Commented [RW5]: This first section in the paper is essentially a revised version of Paper I (based on our feedback). You’ll see a few changes in this section compared to Paper I that are based on feedback we gave to this student on that first paper. Look at your own Paper I feedback and USE IT.

To get to the new stuff, jump down to page nine for the new lit review section for Paper III

Commented [RW4]: Again, the title is identical to the one on the title page.

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to be a controllable event, whereas uncontrollable events are unavoidable circumstances, such as

traffic jams or natural disasters (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). When mentally forming a scenario

different than the one occurred, individuals tend to change controllable rather than uncontrollable

events (2000). Therefore, events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction generally receive the

brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.

In a similar light, a study performed by McCloy and Byrne (2000), discovered that

inappropriate events are more often changed through the process of counterfactual thinking than

appropriate ones, especially when the outcome of these events was negative. Inappropriate

events include the decisions individuals make that are considered to be ‘socially wrong’, whereas

appropriate events are ‘socially acceptable’ actions. Due to these results, we can conclude that

what McCloy and Byrne consider to be “inappropriate controllable” events, will likely be

regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation.

Another contributing factor to perceived culpability is the extent of knowledge of the

actors involved in an event, as well as the intent of their actions (Gilbert, Tenney, Holland, &

Spellman, 2015). For example, in the aforementioned scenario, had the driver known that

looking away from the road would have caused her to run over the stray cat, the driver would

have been more likely to be perceived guilty, even though the actions and the outcome of the

situation remained the same. This rationalization is the product of a bottom-up method of

thinking in which individuals are able to generate more counterfactual thoughts due to the actor’s

knowledge of the outcome (Gilbert et al., 2015). As these authors have noted, the increased

development of counterfactual thoughts will in turn attribute more responsibility to the actor,

which will ultimately increase perceived blame. But this is not the full picture when it comes to

focusing on the role of counterfactual thoughts in altering participant responses.

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Although most of the general population engages in counterfactual thinking, the number

of counterfactual thoughts created varies between people. This is because the development of

numerous counterfactual thoughts is determined by the overall mutability of a situation as well as

the distinct differences between individuals (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman,

2015). For example, people who have an inclination for structuring situations in meaningful,

integrated ways, or more aptly put, have a high need for cognition, are more prone to elaborate

on presented information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, these individuals might be more

likely to participate in the generation of counterfactual thoughts than individuals who typically

avoid effortful cognitive activity, or have a low need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). Despite the

fact that several studies have researched scenario mutability and need for cognition, no prior

findings have examined the influence these two variables have on the assignment of blame. The

primary focus of our second study, therefore, is to analyze the extent of culpability people place

on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct Need for

Cognition of each subject.

Need for Cognition (NFC) is defined as an individual’s dispositional tendency to

participate in demanding cognitive behaviors (Curseu, 2006). People with a high-NFC tend to

enjoy engaging in cognitive endeavors and generally undergo a deep elaboration of information

(Strobel, Fleischhauer, Enge, & Strobel, 2015), while individuals with a low-NFC use cognitive

heuristics and often rely on others’ opinions (Furnham & Thorne, 2013). Petrocelli and Dowd

(2009) proposed that individuals with a high-NFC employ complex attributional systems that

allow them to think theoretically and recognize situational elements as causes of behavior. For

example, in the previously mentioned scenario, people with a high-NFC are likely to consider the

external or environmental aspects—such as distracting traffic—as blameworthy factors in the

Commented [RW6]: This is going to be the second independent variable for this student author’s study two. She previewed it in the last sentence of the paragraph above, thereby successfully weaving the two literature reviews together.

You’ll notice that she now spends a lot of time on NFC going forward and less on the concept of counterfactuals (which she detailed above). It’s a good way to write this paper, as it doesn’t get repetitive. It is also easier to write if you think about the two IVs separately (though they are related).

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unfortunate, accidental death of the stray cat. According to Curseu (2006), individuals with a

high-NFC also tend to generate more alternative solutions to problems compared to low-NFC

individuals who tend to avoid strenuous cognitive activities (Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009). Taking

these components into account, it is reasonable to expect high-NFC subjects to produce more

counterfactual thoughts than low-NFC subjects.

Considering the distinct attributes of individuals with a high and low NFC, it is highly

probable that attitudes towards judgments of blame are significantly different between the two

conditions (Sargent, 2004). According to Sargent (2004), people with high-NFC usually prefer to

tackle social problems involving crime rather than actually punishing the criminal responsible.

This might be due to the complex attributional systems used by high-NFC individuals, which

attributes behavior to “abstract, contemporary, external causes” and ultimately withdraws

responsibility from the perpetrator and places it on societal influences instead (Sargent, 2004).

Therefore, it is not surprising that Sargent found a negative correlation between high-NFC and

punitive responses to crimes, since high-NFC individuals tend to view the criminal as a victim of

circumstantial events. However, Sargent also notes that understanding the consequences of a

criminal act through exposure to particular criminal cases can cause high-NFC individuals to

think more about the consequences of a committed crime, which in turn might result in a positive

correlation between high-NFC and punitive reactions to criminal acts. Thus, whether a high-NFC

individual finds a perpetrator blameworthy or not depends on the specific details of the crime,

and the resulting consequences of the events occurred.

On a related note, an experiment conducted by Wevodau, Cramer, Clark, and Kehn

(2014) investigated the correlational interaction between NFC and perceived blame. According

to Wevodau et al. (2014), there is a substantial positive association between NFC and the

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allocation of blame. The researchers found that that highly motivated individuals who enjoy

effortful cognitive processing tend to assign more culpability than cognitively reserved

individuals (Wevodau et. al, 2014).

In pursuance of scenario changeability and NFC, study two will analyze the extent of

culpability placed on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as

the distinct need for cognition of each subject. In order to manipulate NFC in our study, we

presented participants with a set of high-NFC and low-NFC statements and asked them to agree

somewhat with each statement in reference to themselves. We then provided participants with

the same taxi scenario used in study one, though we dropped the neutral condition since it

provided results nearly identical to the unchangeable condition.

We have two main analyses in the present study, each of which examines two main

effects and one interaction for each of our main dependent variables (number of counterfactuals

and level of blame). When it comes to our first dependent variable, the number of counterfactual

statements generated in study two, we predicted a main effect for NFC such that participants

high in NFC generate more counterfactuals than those low in NFC. We did not, however, predict

a main effect of condition. Study one showed that participants generated a similar number of

counterfactuals in both the unchangeable and unchangeable conditions, and thus we do not

expect to see differences in study two. However, we did predict an interaction for number of

counterfactuals generated. That is, we expected participants high in NCF in the changeable

condition to generate the most counterfactuals since the outcome was more changeable!

Participants in remaining conditions (high NFC unchangeable, low NFC changeable, and low

NFC unchangeable) should generate comparable levels of counterfactuals.

Commented [RW8]: These last paragraphs cover the hypotheses. For your second study, you will also look at several analyses. Rather than a One Way ANOVA, though, you’ll do a Two Way ANOVA, or a factorial ANOVA.

A factorial ANOVA consists of main effects and interactions. There are two main effects and one interaction for EACH dependent variable. You will look at two different dependent variables

Commented [RW7]: This is a crucial part of her Paper III, as she is now focusing on how both her new study variable and the old independent variable might interact. She is merging the two literature reviews by explicitly explaining to the reader how she sees them working together to predict the outcome. I expect you to do the same.

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For our s econd dependent variable, blame, we predicted a main effect for condition such

that those in the changeable condition should find more blame than those in the unchangeable

condition. This follows from study one, where participants blamed the taxi driver more when his

cab made it safely across the bridge than when he passed safely. We also predicted a NFC main

effect for blame wherein those high in NFC would find more blame than those low in NFC. That

is, thinking deeply about the accident might elevate blameworthiness assessments compared to

thinking shallowly. More important, we predict an interaction of condition and NFC on blame

such that participants find the taxi driver more blameworthy in the high NFC and changeable

condition compared to all other conditions. Low NFC and unchangeable participants should

produce the lowest levels of blame. Commented [RW10]: This is as far as you need to go with the lit review (though make sure to look at references on the next page). In Paper IV, you’ll pick up with the methods, results, and brief discussion for study two

Commented [RW9]: Again, here is the second analysis, which also has two main effects and one interaction

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References

Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., & Stillman, T. F. (2015). The

making of might-have-beens: Effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 268-283. doi:

10.1177/0146167214563673

Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116

Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for

cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. doi:

10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13

Curseu, P. L. (2006). Need for cognition and rationality in decision-making. Studia

Psychologica, 48(2), 141-156.

Gilbert, E. A., Tenney, E. R., Holland, C. R., & Spellman, B. A. (2015). Counterfactuals,

control, and causation: Why knowledgeable people get blamed more. Personality and

Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(5), 643-658. doi: 10.1177/0146167215572137

Furnham, A., & Thorne, J. D. (2013). Need for cognition: Its dimensionality and personality and

intelligence correlates. Journal of Individual Differences, 34(4), 230-240. doi:

10.1027/1614-0001/a000119

McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable

events. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071-1078. doi: 10.3758/BF03209355

Petrocelli, J. V., & Dowd, K. (2009). Ease of counterfactual thought generation moderates the

relationship between need for cognition and punitive responses to crime. Personality and

Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(9), 1179-1192. doi: 10.1177/0146167209337164

Commented [RW11]: Once again, references start on their own page. The difference in this paper is at you will include ALL references from the WHOLE paper (from both the lit review for Study One and the lit review for Study Two.

Make sure you have a minimum of 7 references and that they match up with citations from throughout the paper. If you cite it, reference it. If it is in your reference section, make sure it is in your paper somewhere.

For more guidance on correct APA formatting, refer to the instructions for Paper I.

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Ruiselová, Z., Prokopčáková, A., & Kresánek, J. (2007). Counterfactual thinking in relation to

the personality of women--doctors and nurses. Studia Psychologica, 49(4), 333-339.

Sargent, M. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for

punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1485-

1493. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264481

Strobel, A., Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., & Strobel A. (2015). Explicit and implicit need for

cognition and bottom-up/top-down attention allocation. Journal of Research in

Personality, 55, 10-13. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.11.002

Wevodau, A. L., Cramer, R. J., Clark, John W., I.,II, & Kehn, A. (2014). The role of emotion

and cognition in juror perceptions of victim impact statements. Social Justice Research,

27(1), 45-66. doi: 10.1007/s11211-014-0203-9

Williams, C. W., Lees-Haley, P., & Price, J. R. (1996). The role of counterfactual thinking and

causal attribution in accident-related judgments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,

26(23), 2076-2099. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1996.tb01789